

**THE ISRAELI  
DEMOCRACY INDEX**

**2019**

**Tamar Hermann**

Or Anabi / William Cubbison / Ella Heller



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# Principal Findings

## Chapter 1 \ How Is Israel Doing?

- In 2019, half of the Jews surveyed, as well as half of the Arabs, characterized Israel's overall situation as good or very good, in keeping with the favorable assessments of recent years. At the same time, the share of Arab respondents who see the situation as not good (29%) is higher than that of the Jews (16%).
- Opinions on Israel's overall situation among Jewish respondents revealed sizeable differences between the various political camps. On the Right, 68% hold that the situation is good or very good—a much more positive assessment than that of the Left or Center, where the corresponding figures are 42% and 24%, respectively. The majority of Haredi, national religious, and traditional religious Jews see the country's situation in a positive light, while less than half the traditional non-religious and secular respondents share this view. In the Arab sample, Muslim respondents rate the country's overall situation as favorable, though to a slightly lesser degree than the Druze and Christians.
- A sizeable, and identical, majority of both Jews and Arabs (84%) would choose to remain in Israel even if offered citizenship in the United States or another Western country. This majority has held more or less steady over the years. An interesting—though not surprising—finding is that the younger the respondent, the more receptive they are in principle to the notion of emigrating from Israel.
- The most common explanation offered by Jews for the readiness of some Israelis to emigrate from Israel is the economic situation (39%), with this reason cited most often by respondents from the Right (47%) and Center (33.5%). Among those on the Left, the primary reason given is the rise in anti-democratic tendencies in Israel (34.5%). Arab respondents attributed the desire to leave to the security situation (30%) or the state of the economy (29%).
- The share of Jews who feel part of the state and its problems is double that of the Arab respondents (83% versus 42%). Among the Jews, national religious respondents showed the strongest sense of belonging to the state (at 89%), while Haredim displayed the lowest (69%), with traditional and secular Jews falling in between the two. No differences were found between the various political camps in this regard. In the Arab public, the sense of belonging to the state was weakest among Muslims (39.5%), compared with Druze (47%) and Christians (53%).

- Assessments of the state of democracy in Israel were noticeably more pessimistic than were those concerning the country's overall situation. The Israeli public is divided almost equally among those who view Israeli democracy as good, poor, or somewhere in the middle. Only around one-quarter of Arab respondents take a positive view of the state of Israeli democracy, as contrasted with approximately one-third of Jews; nearly 40% of the Arabs surveyed offered a negative characterization of Israeli democracy, compared with some 33% of the Jews.
- Dividing the Israeli Jewish public by political orientation, we find that the share who rate the state of democracy in Israel favorably in the Center and Left camps (13% and 27%, respectively) is much lower than the corresponding proportion on the Right (50%). A total of 56% of those on the Left, 41% in the Center, and only 20% on the Right consider the state of Israeli democracy to be poor.
- This year saw a rise in the share of respondents who believe that democracy in Israel is in grave danger (Arabs, 66%; Jews, 52%). In the Jewish sample, the increase was primarily among respondents from the Center (68%) and Left (84%); but on the Right as well, more than a quarter of those surveyed (29%) believe that Israeli democracy is at risk.
- Roughly two-thirds of the Israeli public—Jews and Arabs alike—hold that the country is successful at safeguarding the security of its citizens; however, almost the same proportion express **the opposite view** when it comes to ensuring the welfare of Israeli citizens.
- The most frequent response among Jews with respect to the balance between the Jewish and democratic components of the state is that the Jewish aspect is too dominant (41%). Three-quarters of Arab respondents share this view. Dissatisfaction in this area is especially noticeable at either end of the religious spectrum: 64% of secular Jews hold that the Jewish component is too strong, while an identical percentage of Haredim hold that the democratic component is overly dominant.

## Chapter 2 \ Democracy, Government, Citizens

- Of the various democratic principles that we examined, freedom of political association is the sole one that is considered by a majority of those polled (52%) to be adequately upheld in Israel. Only a minority have a similar view regarding the three other principles studied: freedom of religion (41%), freedom of expression (40%), and the right to live in dignity (35%).
- With respect to freedom of religion, a majority of both Haredi and secular Jews hold that it is not upheld to a sufficient degree (the secular respondents presumably due to concerns of “religionization,” and the Haredim apparently due to a fear of secularization).

- Among Jewish respondents, opinions on how well the right to live in dignity is maintained in Israel were found to be strongly correlated with political orientation. A majority of respondents from the Left and Center (71% and 58%, respectively), as opposed to a (sizeable) minority of 44% on the Right, hold that it is not upheld enough.
- As for freedom of expression, a slim majority on the Left (51%) think that it is insufficiently upheld. In the Center, the most frequent response is that it is maintained to a suitable degree (44%), while respondents on the Right believe that there is excessive freedom of expression in Israel (41%).
- This year, as in previous years, the IDF (90%), the President of Israel (71%), and the Supreme Court (55%) are the most trusted institutions among Jewish respondents. In all three political camps (among Jews), the IDF ranks the highest in terms of trust, with the President of Israel taking second place (Left, 89%; Center, 84%; and Right, 57.5%, respectively). Differences can be found between camps with regard to the third-place rankings: On the Right, this spot is held by the government (48%), whereas among Left and Center respondents it is the Supreme Court (at 88% and 72%, respectively).
- Arab participants in the survey displayed a lower degree of trust than did Jews. Only the Supreme Court enjoys the trust of a majority of Arab respondents (56%).
- A majority of the public (58%) hold that the country's leadership is corrupt. Since we began examining this topic in 2014, there has been a consistent rise in the percentage of Israelis who feel this way. We found a strong link between perceptions of corruption in Israel's leadership and assessments of the state of democracy in the country: A greater proportion of those who think that the leadership is corrupt also believe that the quality of Israel's democracy is poor (46.5%); by contrast, of those who take a more positive view of the ethical conduct of Israel's leaders, only 18% think that the state of Israeli democracy is poor.
- A majority of Jews surveyed (59%), though only a minority of Arabs (30%), believe that there is a party that truly represents their views.
- A total of 49.5% of Jews and 43% of Arabs hold that the party composition of the Knesset is an accurate reflection of Israeli public opinion, representing a drop from previous years. In the Jewish sample, the lowest percentage who share this view can be found in the Center (38%), and the highest, on the Right (61%).
- Roughly half of the Arabs surveyed, and a majority of the Jews (60%), think that the Arab members of Knesset do not adequately represent the range of opinions in the Arab public. This is the second survey conducted by us this year which has found a (small) majority of Arabs who are dissatisfied with their Knesset representatives, in contrast with previous years. This is a significant shift, as only a minority of the Arab public responded this way in the past.

- Some 32% of the total sample hold that the level of government involvement in the economy is too low, 30% that it is about right, and 27% that it is too high.
- Half of the total sample prefer a broader range of free services from the state even at the price of higher taxes, while 39% prefer only basic services but lower taxes. Among Jews, those on the Left (73%), traditional and secular respondents (57%), and those with average to high incomes (54%) favor the first option. Respondents on the Right (where 44% prefer higher taxes, and 45%, lower ones) as well as those with low incomes (43% of whom support higher taxes, and 43%, lower ones) are split more or less down the middle, while Haredim prefer the second option (60%).

## Chapter 3 \ Public Services

- Some 45% of the total sample hold that the tenure model in civil service impairs performance, as opposed to 39% who believe the opposite. In the 2016 survey, the opinions were reversed, with 45% believing that the tenure model improves performance, and 40% that it impairs it.
- Overall, the public's opinion of public services in Israel is not positive. Only with regard to environmental protection and the legal system did roughly half the public express satisfaction, while in the other areas surveyed, favorable reviews were harder to come by, with 44% saying they were satisfied with education, 43% with transportation and with healthcare, and just 18% (the lowest rating) with residential planning. Among Jewish respondents, those on the Right offered the most positive assessment of most of the public services we asked about, while those on the Left were the most negative. The only exception to this was the court system, where the findings were reversed: A majority from the Left and Center voiced satisfaction with the courts (66% and 56%, respectively), contrasted with only 33% on the Right.
- A majority of the public (68%) think that Israel's children do not enjoy equal opportunity in the country's education system. The health system (46%) and the courts (44%) earn higher marks with respect to equality.
- Roughly two-thirds (68%) of the general public hold that the professional decisions of senior Finance Ministry officials are influenced by their political views to a moderate or large extent, with 59% expressing similar concerns regarding the rulings of Israel's Supreme Court justices, and 45.5%, the professional decisions of high-ranking IDF officers. In the latter case, we found a sizeable difference between Jewish and Arab respondents, with 42% of Jews identifying political bias in IDF decision-making, as opposed to 65% of Arabs.

- Among the Jewish public, the view that Supreme Court rulings are affected by the political views of the justices is most prominent on the Right (78%, versus 36.5% on the Left) and among Haredim (85%, as opposed to 45% among secular Jews). Respondents on the Right also show a greater tendency to attribute political bias to high-ranking IDF officers than do those from the Center or Left (53%, as contrasted with 33% and 30%, respectively). Differences between the political camps were also found regarding the question of political influences on decisions made by senior Finance Ministry officials.
- Reminding the respondents that the state budget is finite—and hence, adding to one item means taking away from another—did not prevent most of them from opting to increase allocations in almost all the areas surveyed (in descending order): health (85% in favor of increasing allocations), education (77%), social services (76%), housing (68%), and transportation (67%). A total of 45.5% also stated that the budget for the police should be increased, though only 31% recommended upping the budget of the IDF; here, the most common response (41.5%) was to leave it at current levels.

## Chapter 4 \ Israeli Society

- Jewish respondents rated the level of solidarity of Jewish society in Israel at 6 (fair) on a scale of 1 to 10 (where 1 = no solidarity and 10 = a high level of solidarity), a finding similar to previous years. On the same scale, Arab interviewees gave a lower assessment of the solidarity in their society, with a grade of 4.25.
- Among Jewish respondents, those on the Left gave a less positive rating of social solidarity (5.03) than those from the Center (5.76) and Right (6.55).
- Solidarity in Arab society in Israel is rated higher by Muslims (4.52) than by Christians (3.29) and Druze (3.36).
- A total of 76% of Jews and 85% of Arabs agree that the use of violence for political ends is never justified. A breakdown of these findings by political orientation shows that the share of Jewish respondents who justify the use of violence for political goals is small in all camps, but larger on the Right (25%) and in the Center (23%), and smallest on the Left (11.5%). In the public as a whole, our findings show that the younger the respondent, the more likely they are to agree with the use of violence to achieve political ends.
- In keeping with the findings of previous surveys, a majority of this year's respondents (52% of Jews and 65% of Arabs) agree with the statement that young people today are less willing to contribute to the state than they were in the past. Breaking down the Jewish sample by religiosity, we find that the national religious are the sole group who disagree with this assertion (only 40% of them believe that today's youth are less willing to contribute). Surprisingly, the younger Jewish respondents agree with the statement more strongly than do the older cohorts (56% versus 45%, respectively).

- Of the five areas of tension in Israeli society that we surveyed, 40.5% of Jewish respondents cited the friction between Right and Left as the most severe; among Arab interviewees, however, the most serious source of tension identified was that between Jews and Arabs. Among Jewish respondents, a majority or plurality in all political camps believe that tensions between Israel's Right and Left are the strongest (Left—52%; Center—40%; Right—38%). But while respondents from the Left and Center consider the second-highest level of tension to be that between religious and secular Jews, for those on the Right, Jewish-Arab tensions take second place. Druze interviewees see Jewish-Arab tensions as the strongest source of friction to a greater extent (59%) than do Muslims (43%) or Christians (36%).
- A majority of Jews (55%) hold that Jewish society in Israel has become more religious in recent years. The perception of growing religiosity is strongest on the Left and in the Center (80% and 65%, respectively), as opposed to only 38% on the Right. Some 68% of secular and 56% of traditional non-religious Jews are of the opinion that Israeli society is undergoing a process of “religionization,” in contrast with 31% of Haredi, 36% of national religious, and 41% of traditional religious respondents.
- A total of 69% of Jews state that they do not feel like a minority in Israeli society, compared with 53% of Arabs who do feel this way. The Jewish groups with the strongest sense of minority status are the Haredim (46%) and the Left (54%). Among Arab respondents, the Druze have the highest proportion who feel like a minority in Israeli society (71%), followed by Christians (64%) and Muslims (47%). Only 8% of those who feel they are a minority classify the state of Israeli democracy as very good, compared with 45.6% of those who do not identify as part of a minority.
- In keeping with the previous finding, a majority of Jews (73%) and a minority of Arabs (36%) feel that they belong to a strong or quite strong group in Israeli society. Men of all nationalities were more likely to express a sense of belonging to a stronger group than were women of the same national identity.
- In terms of the different ethnic groups in the Jewish population, we found that a majority of Jews (57%) are of the opinion that Mizrahim and Ashkenazim enjoy similar status in Israel today. Many Arab interviewees were unsure of how to respond to this question (29%), but the most frequent response among those who did answer was that the situation of Mizrahim is worse than that of Ashkenazim (37%).
- Some 51% of Jewish respondents hold that the errors made in integrating Jewish immigrants from Arab countries were the result of condescension by the Ashkenazi leadership, while 36% believe that the mistakes were made in good faith. Mizrahim and respondents on the Right were more inclined than other groups to point to condescension on the part of Ashkenazi leaders as the reason for past failures (66% and 61%, respectively).

- A majority of Jews (63%) disagree with the statement that the Ashkenazi elite rules the country (as contrasted with only 22% of Arabs). Agreement with this statement is strongest among voters for the Shas party (59%), Haredim (49.5%), and young people in the 18–24 age group (40%).
- A majority of Jewish respondents (61%) hold politicians to blame for perpetuating the tensions between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim.
- A sizeable majority of Jews (85%), along with most Arabs (59%), do not believe that the Israeli-Arab conflict would have been resolved by now if the leaders of the country were Mizrahim.
- This year's findings show a rise in opposition among Jews to the idea that the government should encourage Arabs to emigrate from Israel (60%, as opposed to 41% in 2009, 44% in 2010, and 50% in 2013). This disapproval is strongest on the Left (91%) and in the Center (74%), and weakest on the Right (39%).
- A majority of Jews (71%) and of Arabs (76.5%) agree that the perspectives of both Jews and Arabs on the history of the conflict between them should be taught in all schools in Israel. Among Jewish respondents, the Haredim are the only group with a minority (38%) who favor such a policy.
- A majority of Jewish respondents (58%) are opposed to cutting back on civics and democracy studies in schools in order to devote more time to Jewish history and love of the land. Opposition to such a move is strongest among those on the Left (87%) and in the Center (70%). By contrast, a majority on the Right support it, while only a minority (39.5%) are opposed. The more religious the respondent, the lesser the objections to this policy: Among Haredi, national religious, and traditional religious respondents, only a minority are against reducing democracy studies, while in the traditional non-religious and secular camps, a large majority are opposed.

## Chapter 5 \ The IDF and Its Public Standing

- Approximately three-quarters of Jewish respondents agree with the description of the IDF as “the people’s army.” This opinion is shared by all political camps, but is stronger on the Right and in the Center (82% and 76%, respectively) than on the Left (61%).
- Slightly over half (54.5%) of Jewish respondents are opposed to abolishing mandatory enlistment and turning the IDF into a professional army. This level of opposition has remained consistent over the years.
- In each of six areas surveyed, Jewish respondents gave the IDF higher grades than did Arab respondents. The greatest disparity was in assessing the military’s moral conduct during

combat—the area that received the highest rating from Jewish interviewees (82.5%) and the lowest from Arab respondents (17%). A majority of Jews assigned high marks to the IDF for combat readiness (77%) and subordination to the elected political leadership (67.5%); but with regard to equality between the sexes, treatment of soldiers, and budgetary management, the percentages who gave the IDF high scores for its performance were much lower (46%, 43.5%, and 32%, respectively). Of the Jewish groups surveyed, the Haredim gave the lowest performance ratings to the IDF.

- Those who oppose doing away with mandatory service gave more favorable assessments of IDF performance than did those who support abolishing it.
- A majority of Jewish respondents (71%) hold that the value system of the IDF's senior command is consistent with that of the Israeli Jewish public—a sizeable increase over those who felt this way in 2016 (49%), not long after the Elor Azaria affair. In comparison with other groups, Haredi interviewees (47%), as well as the youngest age groups, see less similarity between the value systems of the public and of the IDF's top commanders. No statistically significant differences were found between political camps on this point.
- Roughly one-third of Jews (32%) and a majority of Arabs (58%) agree with the statement that the IDF top brass and the defense establishment deliberately overstate the security threats facing Israel in order to secure greater defense spending. Nearly two-thirds of Jewish respondents from the Right and Center reject this assertion, while the Left is split on this issue. Among Muslim Arabs, 61% agree with the claim that the threats are overstated, as opposed to 50% of Christians and 44% of Druze.
- Those who argue that the threats are overstated are more strongly in favor of reducing the defense budget (37%) than are those who reject this claim. But of the latter group, 15% still support reducing the defense budget.
- Among Jewish respondents, the preferred form of army service for men is as a combat soldier (34%). In second place is the option of letting the army decide on a suitable role (28%). With regard to female Jewish enlistees, a majority would leave the assignment of roles to the army, and next in order of preference is a combat role. The preference for combat roles is stronger among fathers, with mothers favoring a non-combat role. Haredim favor avoiding enlistment or performing national/civilian service, while the national religious prefer combat roles (for males) and national service (for females).
- A majority of both Jewish and Druze respondents (54%) think that the placement system for IDF recruits is fair—a view shared by only a minority of young people in the 18–34 age group (43%) and of those who identify themselves with the weaker groups in society (47%).

## Chapter 6 \ Israel and Diaspora Jewry

- A total of 40% of Jewish respondents agree with the statement that “the Jewish people is the chosen people, and therefore superior to other nations.” The share who agree rises in tandem with the degree of religiosity; thus, only 16% of secular Jewish respondents support this assertion, rising to 32% of traditional non-religious respondents, 69% of traditional religious respondents, 71% of national religious respondents, and 89% of Haredim.
- Half the Jewish respondents surveyed believe that Jews in Israel and Jews in the Diaspora share a common fate. Here too, a clear majority of Haredim, national religious, and traditional religious Jews, along with those on the Right, hold that Israeli and Diaspora Jews have a common destiny. By contrast, less than half of secular and traditional non-religious Jews, and of the Left and Center, take a similar stance.
- Some 60% of Jewish respondents think that when making important decisions, the government of Israel should not take the opinions of Diaspora Jewry into account—a steep increase from 2014, when the finding was 46.5%.

## Chapter 7 \ International Indicators

- This year, we examined Israel’s current ranking in 15 international indicators. In comparison with 2018, its standing declined in eight indicators, remained the same in six others, and improved slightly in one indicator.
- Looking at Israel’s average global ranking over the past decade, the picture has been more mixed: In eight of the indicators, there was a decline; in six, an improvement; and in one, its standing remained unchanged.
- In all of the indicators cited, Israel is ranked in the upper half of the countries surveyed, and in seven of the indicators, it is in fact in the top quartile. When compared with the OECD states, however, the picture is less favorable: In 14 of the 15 indicators, Israel is situated in the lower half, and in seven of these, in the bottom quartile.
- The sole indicator in which Israel places near the top of the list—both globally and among OECD members—is that of political participation.
- This year, we added two indicators to the international comparison: regulatory quality, and equal distribution of resources. In the regulatory indicator, Israel’s position is good, and has even shown improvement over the past decade, whereas in the distribution of resources, its ranking—both globally and relative to OECD states—is much lower.



## Introduction

Israel experienced a politically tumultuous year in 2019: In addition to the fallout from the Nation-State Law (passed in mid-2018), which continues to affect relations between Israel's Jewish and Arab citizens, national elections were moved up from the fall of 2019 to the spring. In theory, this decision resulted from the failure to bridge the gap between the Haredi parties' recalcitrance and the determination (or obstinance) of Avigdor Liberman, Yisrael Beytenu party leader, in seeking to push through changes to the Conscription Law; but in practice, it was due to Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's rather obvious interest in receiving a renewed mandate from the public as quickly as possible, with details of the corruption investigations against him constantly dominating the headlines and deepening the divide between large swathes of the Israeli public. These probes continued to shape the national agenda to a large extent, sparking anticipation (or fear, as the case may be) that an indictment against the prime minister would be handed down in the near future, thus affecting his public standing and his ability to attend to affairs of state.

Early elections took place as planned in April 2019; but the hopes of many that, when the dust settled, the country would resume its normal routine were unrealized. Not long before the spring elections, a joint centrist list (Blue and White) was established in a move unprecedented in its scope and speed. Against all odds, Blue and White managed not only to avoid collapsing under the weight of its four-way leadership, but actually to win the same number of seats as the Likud party headed by the prime minister. The task of forming a governing coalition was handed once again to Netanyahu, but the neck-and-neck results of the two major parties, and the refusal of Yisrael Beytenu's leader Avigdor Liberman to compromise with the Haredim, made it difficult to form a new government. Netanyahu was forced—or opted—to have the Knesset dissolve itself and declare new elections. No less surprising in this entire chain of events was the cooperation of the Arab parties, which, given their disappointing performance in the elections, were happy with the unexpected opportunity to reunite under the Joint List banner. As of November 2019, it would appear that the second round of elections, held in September, also failed to achieve a clear-cut result between the two political blocs of right-wing and Haredi parties on the one side, and centrist and left-wing parties on the other.

The data from the *2019 Democracy Index* survey, collected immediately following the April elections, show that these dramatic political developments—which seemed likely to shake the country's foundations—exerted only a marginal influence on Israeli public opinion regarding the political system and democracy in general. Thus, the share of respondents who offered a positive assessment of Israel's overall situation declined only slightly, and we saw merely a small rise in the percentage who felt that Israeli democracy is in dire straits. Long-term trends, such as diminished faith in politicians' commitment to the public good, and the belief that the Jewish component of Israel's "Jewish and democratic" equation is overly dominant, were once again evident in this year's assessment.

As in the past, responses to the survey questions were clearly linked to interviewees' national identity as either Jews or Arabs (with particularly differences noticeable in the case of Druze respondents, apparently as a result of the Nation-State Law); to Jewish respondents' religious identity (secular, traditional, national religious, or Haredi); and to Jewish respondents' self-declared political orientation (Right, Center, or Left). The gaps between subgroups of the Israeli public may have widened this year, but the overall figures did not rise or fall sharply. It may well be that the public, weary of all the turmoil, has developed a form of imperviousness—some might say indifference—to the goings-on in the political system, especially since its faith in politics and politicians remains quite low. But this is not to say that Israelis are blind to reality. For example, a majority of those surveyed are satisfied with the country's success in safeguarding the security of its citizens, despite the repeated incidents on the Gaza border and the potentially escalating tensions in the North, even as they take a dim view of the state's performance in ensuring their overall welfare.

Another finding of interest is that, in the international comparisons cited later in this report, Israel's position remains unchanged—for better and for worse. In certain indicators that assess the status of Israeli democracy, there has been a slight decline. Overall, however, Israel's standing is middling-to-high in comparison with the countries surveyed, though in most cases it ranks rather low among OECD states, except with regard to civic engagement, where it earns high marks in all areas.

As in previous surveys, we placed special emphasis on certain topics, spotlighting three areas this year: Israel's public services; the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and its public standing; and relations between Israel and Diaspora Jewry.

With respect to public services, of the six areas we examined, housing planning was ranked lowest by the public in terms of government performance. Five other fields (education, health, transportation, the judiciary, and the environment) scored in the mid-range, with none of them receiving outstanding grades. A troubling finding in this context is the widespread opinion that the systems in question do not offer equal treatment to those in need of their services; in other words, Israel's public services are seen as favoring certain citizens and discriminating against others. Here too, there are of course distinctions based on various factors (national or ethnic origin, income, and political orientation, to name a few), but the situation as a whole is in need of improvement. Another worrisome finding, also related to the public's confidence in assorted institutions, is the prevalence of the view that decisions made by senior Finance Ministry officials and by Supreme Court justices are influenced by their political beliefs. A smaller share of the interviewees felt the same way with respect to high-ranking IDF officers.

As for the IDF, we found that a majority of those surveyed wish to maintain its status as "the people's army" and to refrain from transforming it into a professional army. Another interesting finding is the rise (compared with three years ago, in the wake of the Elor Azaria affair) in the share of respondents who believe that the value system at the highest levels of

the IDF corresponds with that of the general public. We found further that the high degree of confidence in the army is largely based on its operational abilities; however, with respect to its administrative functioning—including the treatment of soldiers, equality between men and women, and budgetary management—the share of citizens who offer a positive assessment is much lower.

Concerning Diaspora Jewry, we found that only about half of those surveyed hold that Jews in Israel and the Diaspora share a common destiny. It is possible that this indicates a parallel process taking place here in Israel that mirrors Diaspora Jewry's distancing of itself from Israel, a phenomenon that has been much discussed by American experts and others. This may explain why a majority of the Israeli public currently think that the opinions of Diaspora Jewry should not be taken into account when policy decisions are made in Israel.

A final point in closing: In recent years, it has become popular to disparage the use of surveys as a reliable tool for identifying and analyzing social and political phenomena. This argument stems from election polls, which do err from time to time in their predictions, for reasons that are beyond the scope of this report. But in the case of systematic, repeated, multi-question surveys, such as this *Democracy Index*, public opinion polls are still considered by the world at large to be one of the most dependable and useful instruments available. True, such surveys may not reach different groups of interviewees to the same degree, and there are some whose voices are silenced or excluded; moreover, land lines, and even cell phones, are losing ground to the Internet as the most efficient tool for carrying out surveys. But at present—if we do not cultivate unrealistic expectations of accuracy from pollsters who are, after all, only human—surveys are still the primary tool for understanding which way the winds of society are blowing. And they are immeasurably better for this task than constructing armchair theories based on reading editorials, browsing social media, or chatting with random taxi drivers.

The *Democracy Index* Research Team  
August 2019

## Methodology

Part I of the report is based on a public opinion survey formulated by the staff of the Israel Democracy Institute's Guttman Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research, who also analyzed the data collected.

Two polling firms carried out the field work for the survey: in Hebrew, Shiluv I<sup>2</sup>R (Ramat Gan); and in Arabic, Statnet Research Institute (Daliyat al-Karmel). The Hebrew survey was conducted between April 30 and May 30, 2019, and the Arabic survey, between May 2 and May 19, 2019.

In Part II of the report, we present data from external sources in the form of Israel's scores and rankings in various indicators compiled by international institutes.

### The questionnaire

The questionnaire for this year's Democracy Index survey consists of 53 content questions, several of them with multiple subsections. The Arabic version contains only 46 content questions, since some of the topics examined this year were not presented to Arab respondents, either due to the sensitivity of the subject matter or the fact that they were not applicable to this group (for example, the question about reducing civic studies in schools and increasing the study of Jewish history). This is clearly noted in the relevant survey questions in Appendices 1 and 2. For the Jewish public, there were 37 recurring questions from previous *Democracy Index* surveys or from the *Conditional Partnership* study,<sup>1</sup> and for the Arab public, 30 recurring questions. In addition to the content questions, 14 sociodemographic questions were posed in the Hebrew questionnaire, and 11 in the Arabic one. For all questions, the response "don't know / refuse to answer" was not read to the interviewees as a possible choice, but was recorded as such when interviewees responded in this manner.

The questionnaire was translated beforehand into Arabic, and the interviewers who administered this version were native Arabic speakers.

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1 Tamar Hermann, Chanan Cohen, Fadi Omar, Ella Heller, and Tzipy Lazar-Shoef, *Jews and Arabs: A Conditional Partnership, Israel 2017* (Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute, 2017).

## The sample

In total, 1,014 respondents aged 18 and over were interviewed, comprising:

- 852 interviewees constituting a representative sample of Jews and others<sup>2</sup>
- 162 interviewees forming a representative sample of Arab citizens of Israel

The Arab sample was weighted by religion, age, and sex to ensure that it is as representative as possible.

The maximum sampling error for a sample of this size is  $\pm 3.1\%$  for the total sample ( $\pm 3.4\%$  for the Jewish sample, and  $\pm 7.9\%$  for the Arab sample).

## Data collection

All data were collected via telephone interviews, using both cell phones (in the majority of cases) and landlines.

### Breakdown of interviews by telephone type (%)

Survey language	Cell Phone	Landline	Total
Hebrew	88.5	11.5	100
Arabic	74.1	25.9	100
Total (full sample)	86.2	13.8	100

## How did we analyze the data?

Along with the variables known from previous studies to shape Israeli public opinion on political and social issues of the type that we examine in the *Israeli Democracy Index*, which are included as a rule in our research (religiosity, nationality, etc.), we determine the additional factors that form the basis of our analysis in a given year only after completing our data collection and testing repeatedly by trial and error. In this year's report, we further analyzed the responses

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2 The category of "others" was adopted by Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics during the 1990s to denote people who are not Jewish according to halakha (religious Jewish law) but are not Arab, or who are associated sociologically with the Jewish majority. This relates mainly to immigrants from the former Soviet Union who were eligible to immigrate to Israel under the Law of Return but are not considered halakhically Jewish. In the present survey, we treat them as part of the Jewish majority, and examine differences between the group of "Jews and others" and the sample of Arab Israelis.

## Introduction

of the Jewish sample based on self-defined religiosity<sup>3</sup> and political orientation;<sup>4</sup> and those of the Arab sample, based on religion, and in certain cases, voting patterns in the 2015 Knesset elections as well. For specific topics in both samples, we also examined how the findings correlated with respondents' social location (their sense of social centrality or marginality),<sup>5</sup> education, sex, income, or age. As shown in Appendix 3, there is a high degree of overlap between some of these variables in the Jewish sample, chiefly with regard to religiosity and political orientation; but as the congruence is not total, there is justification for examining each of these self-definitions separately.

## Navigating the report

To make it easier to navigate the report, two types of references have been inserted in the margins of the text. The first type, located next to every question discussed, refers the reader to the page where that question appears in Appendix 1 (which contains the questionnaire and the distribution of responses for each content question in a three-part format: total sample, Jews, Arabs). The second type of reference appears only for recurring questions, and points to the page where that question appears in Appendix 2 (a multi-year comparison of data). The references appear in the text as follows:

### Israel's overall situation

Question 1

Appendix 1

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Appendix 2

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Likewise, next to each question in Appendices 1 and 2, there is a reference to the page in the text where that question is discussed.

In order to make for easier reading, we present the data in whole numbers in the text and accompanying figures. In a few cases, we use half percentage points. In the appendices, however, the data are shown to a higher degree of precision—up to one decimal place. Due to this rounding (which, as stated, is used to assist the reader), there may be very slight differences between the data in the main body of the report and in the appendices.

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3 The categories for this variable were: Haredi, national religious, traditional religious, traditional non-religious, and secular.

4 The categories for this variable were: Right, Center, and Left.

5 The categories for this variable were: I feel I belong to a strong group [in society]; I feel I belong to a fairly strong group; I feel I belong to a fairly weak group; I feel I belong to a weak group.

## **Part One**

Israel in the Eyes  
of its Citizens



## Chapter 1 \ How is Israel Doing?


In this chapter, we discuss the following topics:

- Israel's overall situation
- The state of democracy in Israel
- Israel's success in ensuring the security and welfare of its citizens
- Democratic and Jewish? The balance between the two components
- Desire to remain in Israel or to emigrate
- Sense of belonging to the state and its problems

In recent years, public discourse in Israel has tended to portray the country in a gloomy light. Yet time after time, when we examine this point empirically, it emerges that—much like beauty—perceptions of Israel's condition lie in the eyes of the beholder. That is, it all depends on whom you ask. As in past years, we revisited the question: “How would you characterize Israel's overall situation today?” In the total sample, we found that half the respondents surveyed (50%) classify the country's status in general as “good” or “very good.” The share who define it as “so-so” presently stands at one-third, with less than one-fifth categorizing it as “bad” or “very bad.”

There is a similar distribution of responses in the Jewish and Arab populations for the “good” and “very good” categories (Jews, 50%; Arabs, 48%), though the share who define the situation as “bad” or “very bad” is much higher among Arabs than among Jews (29% versus 16%, respectively).

**Figure 1.1** \ Israel's overall situation today (Jewish and Arab respondents; %)



### Israel's overall situation


#### Question 1

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As shown in the figure below, the favorable opinion of Israel's situation in recent years is still the predominant view, though there has been a slight drop relative to last year in the share of respondents who take this view. Only future assessments will enable us to determine whether we are witnessing the start of a downward trend or whether the results of the present survey are merely a blip.

**Figure 1.2 \ Israel's overall situation, 2003–2019 (total sample; %)**



Who characterizes Israel's general situation more favorably, and who less so? As shown in the following table, among Jews who locate themselves on the Right, a sizeable majority define Israel's situation as good or very good. Of those in the Center, a plurality take this view, while on the Left only a minority see Israel's overall situation as good or very good. An interesting finding in this context is that there was a slight decline this year across all political camps in the share of Jewish respondents who characterize the situation as good or very good. This was most noticeable in the Center (with a drop of 7%, compared with 3% on both the Right and Left).

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by self-defined religiosity reveals that the highest level of satisfaction with Israel's overall condition is in the national religious camp, though here too there has been a decline, from 88% last year to 78% in the present survey. In the three groups considered the most religious (Haredim, national religious, and traditional religious), a majority characterize the situation as good or very good, while among traditional non-religious and secular interviewees, though this is the most frequent response, it is not a majority opinion.

In the Arab sample, a majority of Druze see Israel's overall situation as good or very good, as do around one-half of Christians. Among Muslims as well, a plurality, though not a majority, share this view.

Another noteworthy finding is the difference between the sexes: The share of Jewish men who consider the situation to be good or very good greatly outstrips that of Jewish women by a wide margin (59% versus 42%). We found a similar pattern in the Arab public, but with a smaller disparity (51% versus 45%).

**Table 1.1** (Jewish and Arab respondents; %)

Israel's overall situation today		Good or very good	So-so	Bad or very bad	Don't know	Total
Jews	<b>Political orientation</b>					
	Right	68	25	6	1	100
	Center	42	39	18	1	100
	Left	24	39	37	–	100
	<b>Religiosity</b>					
	Haredim	61	31.5	4.5	3	100
	National religious	78	14	7	1	100
	Traditional religious	63	29	8	–	100
	Traditional non-religious	46	32	20	2	100
	Secular	40	39	21	–	100
	<b>Sex</b>					
	Men	59	27	12.5	1.5	100
	Women	42	38	19	1	100

Israel's overall situation today		Good or very good	So-so	Bad or very bad	Don't know	Total
Arabs	<b>Religion</b>					
	Muslim	46	21	32	1	100
	Christian	50	29	21	–	100
	Druze	53	35	12	–	100
	<b>Sex</b>					
	Men	51	20.5	26	2.5	100
	Women	45	24	31	–	100

Among Jews and Arabs alike, we found that the older age groups (65 and over) see Israel's situation as good or very good to a lesser extent than do the younger cohorts, and show a greater tendency to label it as bad or very bad. Nonetheless, even in the oldest age group, the proportion who take a positive view exceeds that of the naysayers.

We now have a relatively clear picture of how the country's overall situation is perceived. But what does the public have to say about the state of democracy in Israel?


Public opinion on the state of democracy in Israel is less favorable than it is on the question of the country's overall situation. The respondents are divided more or less evenly into three groups, with roughly one-third assessing Israeli democracy as bad or very bad (35%; scores 1–2); approximately one-third, as good or very good (34%; scores 4–5); and about one-third, as so-so (31%; score 3).

## State of democracy in Israel

### Question 4

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**Figure 1.3** \ State of democracy in Israel today (total sample; %)


Not surprisingly, the proportion of Arab respondents who rate the state of democracy in Israel as bad or very bad is higher than that of the Jews, and the share who give it a good or very good grade is noticeably lower.

**Table 1.2** (Jewish and Arab respondents; %)

State of democracy in Israel	Good or very good (scores 4–5)	So-so (score 3)	Bad or very bad (scores 1–2)
Jews	35	30	34
Arabs	26	36	38

Breaking down the responses to this question by political orientation (among Jewish respondents) shows—again, as expected—that “politics is everything”: On the Right, one-half (the largest share) hold that the state of democracy in Israel is very good, whereas on the Left a majority take the opposite view.

**Figure 1.4** \ State of democracy in Israel today, by political orientation (Jewish respondents; %)



Our analysis revealed a connection between perceptions of the country's overall situation and opinions on the state of its democracy. For example, of those who see the state of democracy in Israel as bad or very bad, only 6% characterize the country's situation as good or very good, as opposed to 47% among those who consider the state of democracy in Israel to be good or very good.

To corroborate our findings, we added a further question (as in past surveys) concerning the state of democracy in Israel.

A majority of the Israeli public believe that the democratic system in Israel is in grave danger—a slight increase over previous years.

Some 52% of Jews and 66% of Arabs hold that democracy in Israel is in grave danger, marking a rise in both groups compared with past years, primarily in the “strongly agree” category.


### Is the democratic system in Israel in grave danger?

Question 30

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**Figure 1.5** \ “The democratic system in Israel is in grave danger,”  
2017–2019 (agree; total sample; %)



Breaking down the Jewish respondents by political orientation, we find—as in past years—sizeable differences as well as various emerging trends. On the Right, a slowly increasing minority believe that democracy in Israel is in great danger (rising 6 percentage points since 2017). Among Center and Left respondents, the majority who share this view has grown steadily over the years, and then leapt this year by 13 and 9 percentage points, respectively, relative to 2018.

**Table 1.3** (Jewish respondents; %)

Believe that democracy in Israel is in grave danger	2017	2018	2019
Right	23	28	29
Center	48	55	68
Left	72	75	84

### State's success in safeguarding its citizens' security


#### Question 9

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Given the widespread assertion that security is a key issue in Israeli society, we decided to examine public opinion on the state's success in maintaining the security of its citizens. A majority of almost two-thirds (63%) hold that the state is succeeding "quite a lot," or even "very much," in this area. The difference on this point between Jewish and Arab respondents is negligible (Jews, 63%; Arabs, 64%).

**Figure 1.6** \ To what extent does Israel safeguard the security of its citizens? (total sample; %)




Despite the fact that a majority in all three political camps believe that the state is succeeding quite or very well at safeguarding the security of its citizens, this majority is much larger on the Right (71%) than in the Center (58%) or Left (55%).

Examining whether there is any association between perceptions of the country's overall situation and assessments of its performance in maintaining the safety of its citizens, we did find a connection to some extent. For example, of those who believe that the state safeguards its citizens very well, 33% hold that Israel's overall situation is very good. By contrast, of those who hold that it is not doing a good job at all on this score, only 5% characterize the country's situation as very good.

A similar, but slightly stronger, connection was found between assessments of the state's success in ensuring the welfare of its citizens and of the country's overall situation. For instance, of those who believe that Israel is very successful at ensuring the welfare of its citizens, 46% define the country's overall situation as very good, as opposed to only 8% among those who think that the state fails to look out for the welfare of its citizens.

We also decided to examine the public's opinion of how well the state cares for the welfare of its citizens, and in this case the results were discouraging: In contrast with the previous question, here the majority (roughly two-thirds) are dissatisfied with the state's performance.

**Figure 1.7 \** To what extent does Israel ensure the welfare of its citizens? (total sample; %)



Breaking down the responses to this question by political orientation (Jewish respondents), we found a majority in each of the camps who think that the state is not successful at ensuring the welfare of its citizens. The same holds true across all income levels.

We also looked for a connection between respondents' assessments of the state's performance in ensuring the welfare of its citizens and of the country's overall situation, and found that 72% of those who believe that the state is succeeding "very much" or "quite a lot" in this regard also consider the country's overall situation to be good or very good; by contrast, among those who see the state as unsuccessful in this area, the share who rate the country's condition as good or very good is only 38%.

This year, we revisited the question: "Israel is defined as a Jewish and democratic state. Do you think there is a good balance today between the Jewish and the democratic components?" In the total sample this year, we found once again that the greatest proportion—with very little change—believe that the Jewish component is too dominant. At the same time, there has been a slight decline over the years in the share who think that the democratic element is too strong.

### State's success in ensuring its citizens' welfare

Question 10

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
### Jewish and/or democratic?

Question 17

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**Figure 1.8** \ Do you think there is a good balance today between the Jewish and the democratic components in Israel? 2016–2019 (total sample; %)




A comparison between the Jewish and the Arab respondents on this question yields noticeable differences: The share of Jews who consider the balance satisfactory far outstrips the corresponding figure among Arabs; the proportion of Arabs who hold that the Jewish component is too strong is almost double that of the Jews; and the percentage of Jews who believe that the democratic element is overly dominant is twice that of the Arabs.

**Table 1.4** (Jewish and Arab respondents; %)

	Jews	Arabs
There is a good balance between the Jewish and democratic components	31	13
The Jewish component is too dominant	41	76
The democratic component is too dominant	20	9

A breakdown of responses to this question in the Jewish sample by religiosity shows that dissatisfaction with the present situation is especially pronounced at either end of the religious spectrum, that is, among both Haredi and secular respondents. A majority of Haredim think that the democratic component is overly strong, whereas a majority of secular Jews—in fact, the same proportion—hold that the Jewish element is too dominant. The national religious are the only group in which a majority believe that the present balance is a good one.


**Figure 1.9** \ Do you think there is a good balance today between the Jewish and the democratic components in Israel? (by religiosity; Jewish respondents; %)



On this question, a breakdown of the results by ethnicity (Jewish respondents) yielded one notable finding: Mizrahim, more than the other ethnic groups surveyed (Ashkenazim; the former Soviet Union (FSU) immigrant community; and mixed), feel that the current balance is acceptable (37%, as opposed to 29%, 30%, and 29%, respectively). The deciding factor here may not be their Mizrahi status as such but the fact that Mizrahim in Israel tend, for the most part, to be more traditional or religious than other groups, and, as we saw earlier, a higher level of religiosity often goes hand in hand with a more positive view of the existing situation (though not in the case of Haredim).

The figure below summarizes the proportions of respondents who take a favorable view of the country's situation on the whole and from various perspectives. A majority of the public hold that the state does a satisfactory job of looking out for the security of its citizens, while roughly half believe that Israel's overall situation is good or very good. On the other hand, only about one-third feel this way with respect to the state of democracy in Israel and the country's ability to ensure the welfare of its citizens. The share of respondents who are satisfied with the present balance between the Jewish and democratic aspects of the state is even smaller. The difference between these last three categories is that, with regard to the state of Israeli democracy and the balance between the Jewish and democratic aspects, there is considerable variation between the political camps and between levels of religiosity, whereas in terms of the state's ability to ensure the welfare of its citizens, there is a virtual consensus across all camps and ethnic groups that it is failing.

**Figure 1.10** \ Israel's situation: Various aspects (total sample; %)



### Living abroad or staying in Israel?


#### Question 7

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Since the public appears to be dissatisfied in several major areas that lie within the state's responsibility, we reexamined the degree of readiness to leave Israel and move to a different country. We asked: "If you could receive American citizenship, or that of another Western country, would you prefer to live there or to remain in Israel?" The vast majority of the general public expressed their desire to remain in Israel despite the tempting offer that we presented. As shown in the following figure, similar proportions of Jewish and Arab respondents shared this view.

**Figure 1.11 \ Living abroad or staying in Israel? (Jewish and Arab respondents; %)**



A comparison between responses to this question in 2015, 2017, and 2019 shows that the share who prefer to stay in Israel has remained virtually unchanged (2015, 84%; 2017, 81%; 2019, 84%).

Among Jewish respondents in all political camps, we found a substantial majority who wish to continue living in Israel; however, the proportion is higher on the Right (88%) than in the Center (81%) or the Left (78%). A breakdown of the results in the Jewish sample by religiosity shows that, here too, a majority in all groups are interested in staying, but the share who feel this way is lower among secular Jews (Haredim, 94%; national religious, 93%; traditional religious, 91%; traditional non-religious, 89%; secular, 75%).

An interesting finding, which merits further study, is that in the Arab sample, it is the Muslims more than the other religious groups who express a desire to remain in Israel (87%, versus 73% of Christians and 64% of Druze). We also found that younger respondents are more open than their elders to the possibility of emigrating to another country.

**Table 1.5** (total sample; %)

Age	Willing to move to the US or other Western country that will grant them citizenship
18–24	<b>23.5</b>
25–34	<b>19</b>
35–44	<b>14</b>
45–54	<b>10.5</b>
55–64	<b>6</b>
65+	<b>3</b>

We wondered what might cause Israelis to question whether they should stay in Israel or move to another country. It emerges clearly from the responses that, among Jews, the economic situation is the primary factor behind such doubts, whereas among Arabs, it is the security situation. Given the prominence of the subject of violence in Arab social discourse, there is reason to assume that the Arab interviewees were thinking more of security in their communities—the danger of being injured in a violent crime, for example—than of national security.


**What causes people to question staying in Israel?**

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
**Figure 1.12** \ What causes people to question staying in Israel? (total sample; Jewish and Arab respondents; %)



A breakdown by political orientation (Jewish respondents) shows that respondents from the Left see the rise in antidemocratic tendencies as the primary factor raising doubts about remaining in Israel (34.5%), whereas for those from the Right and Center, the most commonly cited reason is the economic situation (47% and 33.5%, respectively).

Breaking down the responses by age group, we find that, in all cohorts, the economic situation is the primary motivator for considering emigration; however, the higher the age group, the lesser the tendency to cite this reason; in other words, the economic situation weighs more heavily on the three youngest age groups.

**Figure 1.13** \ Economic situation as primary factor in questioning whether to stay in Israel, by age group (total sample; %)



The final topic that we will address in this chapter is the sense of belonging to the state.

### Do you feel part of the state and its problems?

#### Question 2


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While the majority of respondents reported that they wish to remain in Israel, do they actually feel that they belong here? Once again this year, we revisited the question: “To what extent do you feel part of the State of Israel and its problems?” There was a huge disparity between Jews and Arabs in the responses to this question: Among Jews, a very sizeable majority feel that they are part of the state and its problems, whereas among Arabs, the majority feel this way “not so much” or “not at all.”

A breakdown of the Arab sample by religion shows that among Muslims, 39.5% feel a part of the state and its problems, compared with 47% of Druze and 53% of Christians. The fact that a high proportion of the Arab public has not felt a sense of belonging to the state over time should be cause for concern and an impetus for soul-searching by the Jewish majority and the country’s leaders, since those who do not feel part of the state and its problems will likely be passive, or even hostile, citizens. Yet, interestingly enough, the data support the thesis that the passage of the Nation-State Law in July 2018 did not deal a fatal blow to the Arab public’s sense of belonging, notwithstanding its relatively low level prior to the law being passed. It is also noteworthy that, despite the rather high proportion of Arabs who do not feel part of the state and its difficulties, a substantial majority still wish to remain in Israel—perhaps because they feel a sense of connection to the land but not the state.

**Figure 1.14** \ Do you feel part of the state and its problems?  
(Jewish and Arab respondents; %)



A breakdown of the Jewish sample by religiosity reveals that the national religious respondents feel part of the state to the greatest extent (89%), and the Haredim, the least (68.5%), while the other groups fall somewhere in between (traditional religious, 83%; traditional non-religious, 87.5%; and secular, 82%). Breaking down the responses by political camp shows only minor differences, with 82.5% of the Left, 82% of the Center, and 85% of the Right reporting a sense of belonging to the state.

We found a considerable difference in the feeling of connection with the state between those who identify themselves with the stronger groups in Israeli society and those who associate themselves with the weaker ones.<sup>6</sup> In the total sample, 84.5% of the “strong group” stated that they feel part of the state, as compared with only 55% of the “weak group.”

<sup>6</sup> The subject of belonging to stronger or weaker groups is discussed in Chapter 4, pp. 91.

## Chapter 2 \ Democracy, Government, Citizens

In this chapter, we discuss the following topics:

- Upholding of democratic principles
- Trust in institutions
- Integrity/corruption of Israel's leaders
- Representativeness of the parties, the Knesset, and members of Knesset
- Government involvement in the economy
- Taxes and services

In the previous chapter, we saw that many of those surveyed feel that the state of democracy in Israel is not very promising. To explore the reasons for this, we will start by examining how the public views the extent to which four basic democratic principles are upheld: freedom of religion, the right to live in dignity, freedom of expression, and freedom of political association.

### Upholding democratic principles


Questions 27.1–27.4

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The first democratic principle that we studied is **freedom of religion**. According to our findings, a plurality of respondents, though not a majority, believe that this principle is upheld in Israel to an appropriate degree. More respondents feel that it is upheld too little than feel that it is upheld too much.

The proportion of respondents who believe that freedom of religion is adequately maintained is greater among Arabs than among Jews (44% versus 40%, respectively). Additionally, the share of Arab respondents who feel that this principle is upheld to too great a degree (28%) is slightly higher than that of the Jewish respondents (25%). Correspondingly, a greater proportion of Jews than of Arabs hold that freedom of religion is insufficiently upheld in Israel (32% as opposed to 24%, respectively).

**Figure 2.1** \ Extent to which freedom of religion is upheld in Israel (total sample; %)



Breaking down the responses of the Jewish sample by (self-defined) religiosity, we found that among national religious and traditional religious respondents, the majority believe that freedom of religion is sufficiently maintained in Israel. Among the traditional non-religious group as well, this is the most frequent response, though not by a majority. However, the same does not hold true for Haredi and secular Jews: In both these groups, a plurality hold that freedom of religion is upheld too little—the Haredim, in terms of secularization, and the secular, in the sense of religionization.

**Table 2.1** (Jewish respondents; %)

Believe that freedom of religion is upheld:	Haredim	National religious	Traditional religious	Traditional non-religious	Secular
Too much	28	10	20	27	28
To an appropriate degree	29	64	55	42	32
Too little	38	25	23	30	35
Don't know	5	1	2	1	5
Total	100	100	100	100	100


A breakdown of responses in the Arab sample by religion shows that only among Muslims is the most frequent response “to an appropriate degree.” Among Christians and Druze, the most common opinion is that freedom of religion is upheld too much, presumably since both these groups are minorities in Arab society whereas the existing situation favors the Muslim majority.

**Table 2.2** (Arab respondents; %)

Believe that freedom of religion is upheld:	Muslims	Christians	Druze
Too much	22	47	44.5
To an appropriate degree	46	33	33
Too little	24	20	17
Don't know	8	–	5.5
Total	100	100	100

From here, we moved on to **the right to live in dignity**. In contrast to the previous question, here the most frequent response (at 49%) was that this principle is upheld too little in Israel. In fact, only 13% feel that it is maintained too much.

**Figure 2.2** \ Extent to which the right to live in dignity is upheld in Israel (total sample; %)




The impact of interviewees' political views on their responses to this question was very pronounced. Thus, among Jews who placed themselves on the Left of the political spectrum, 71% said they believe that the right to live in dignity is maintained in Israel to a less than

adequate degree, while the corresponding figure for the Center was 58%, and for the Right, only 44%.

A breakdown of the total sample by income shows that the share who hold that the right to live in dignity is upheld too little actually rises with income: Among respondents whose income is below average, 46% feel this way; at average income level, 50%; and above average, 51%. Testing on the basis of social location (sense of belonging to stronger or weaker groups in society) yielded only minor differences, largely in keeping with expectations: Of those who associated themselves with the stronger groups, 48.5% stated that the right to live in dignity is upheld too little in Israel, while 54% of those who identified with the weaker groups felt this way. A total of 53% of Jews and 29% of Arabs also held that the right to live in dignity is insufficiently maintained.

The next democratic principle that we examined was **freedom of expression**. As with freedom of religion, here too the most frequent response in the total sample was that this principle is upheld to an appropriate degree.

**Figure 2.3** \ Extent to which freedom of expression is upheld in Israel (total sample; %)




The pattern of responses among Jews and Arabs is similar overall, with certain differences: The share of Jewish respondents who believe that freedom of expression is upheld too much is greater than that of Arab respondents (30% compared with 26%, respectively), while the proportion of Arabs who hold that this principle is adequately maintained outstrips that of Jews (46% as opposed to 39%, respectively).

Here too, a breakdown of Jewish respondents by political orientation yields sizeable differences: The most frequent response on the Right is that freedom of expression in Israel is excessive; on the Left, that it is upheld too little; and in the Center, that it is maintained to an appropriate degree.

**Table 2.3** (Jewish respondents; %)

Believe that freedom of expression is upheld:	Too much	To an appropriate degree	Too little	Don't know	Total
Left	12	33	51	4	100
Center	22	44	32	2	100
Right	41	38	18.5	2.5	100

The fourth and final democratic principle that we examined this year was **freedom of political association**. A majority of the total sample feel that it is upheld to a suitable degree, meaning that the congruence between democratic theory and practice in this area is considered the strongest among the four principles that we surveyed.


**Figure 2.4** \ Extent to which freedom of political association is upheld in Israel (total sample; %)

A breakdown of Jewish respondents by political orientation shows that in all three camps, with negligible differences, the majority feel that freedom of political association is maintained in Israel to an appropriate degree (Left, 57%; Center, 55%; Right, 54%). Nonetheless, on the Right, the proportion who believe that it is upheld to too great an extent far outstrips that among respondents from the Center or Left (Right, 24.5%; Center, 19%; Left, 13%).

On this subject, we found a substantial difference between Jews and Arabs: Among Jewish respondents, 17% believe that freedom of association is insufficiently implemented, as opposed to 28% of Arabs who feel this way. A majority of Jews (54%) hold that it is maintained to a suitable degree, while only a minority of Arabs (though not a small one, at 41%) share this view.

To summarize, of the four democratic principles surveyed, only with regard to freedom of political association does a majority of the public (52%) feel that it is appropriately maintained. As for the right to live in dignity, only about one-third (35%) believe that it is being upheld to a suitable degree.

**Figure 2.5** \ “Democratic principles are upheld to an appropriate degree” (agree; total sample; %)



Based on the premise that citizens’ trust in their leaders and institutions is a central pillar of any democratic regime, we examined (as we do every year) the levels of public trust in key institutions: the media, the Supreme Court, the police, the President of Israel, the Knesset, the IDF, the government, and the political parties.

Last year’s survey showed plummeting levels of public trust in all of the above institutions among the Arab population. Back then, we raised a red flag over these findings, but with the caveat that this might be an exceptional point in time or an atypical survey. Likewise, we refrained from drawing far-reaching conclusions on the basis of this one study. Our caution has proven itself, as the current levels of trust among the Arab public have rebounded to those of previous years, though they are still quite low in absolute terms, and certainly lower (for the most part) than those of the Jewish public (with the exception of trust in the Supreme Court and the media, in which Arabs and Jews express similar levels of confidence, and the political parties, in which the Arabs place slightly more faith than do the Jews).<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup> A possible explanation is that in 2018 the data were collected by a different research institute than this year and the preceding years. While the sampling was carried out properly and in keeping with the same principles, the possible use of different work methods by last year’s institute may have yielded these atypical results.


### Trust in institutions

Questions 8.1–8.8

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**Figure 2.6** \ Trust in state institutions and officials (very much or quite a lot; Jewish and Arab respondents; %)



Three of the institutions (the IDF, President of Israel, and Supreme Court) gained the trust of more than half of the Jewish respondents, while the remainder fell below this mark. In last place, once again, are the political parties. Thus, the rankings in the Jewish public this year are (in descending order):

1. The IDF (90%)
2. The President of Israel (71%)
3. The Supreme Court (55%)
4. The police (44%)
5. The media (36%)
- 6-7. The government and the Knesset (30% each)
8. The political parties (14%)

Despite the fact that the government, the Knesset, and the political parties are in the three lowest slots in both the Arab and the Jewish samples, there are marked differences between the two groups in the ranking of trusted institutions again this year. In fact, apart from the

Supreme Court, the level of trust from the Arab public does not even reach the halfway mark for any of the institutions surveyed. Moreover, the scores here are more “concentrated,” that is, the gaps between them are smaller than those in the Jewish public:

1. The Supreme Court (56%)
2. The IDF (41%)
3. The police (38%)
4. The President of Israel (37%)
5. The media (36%)
6. The government (28%)
7. The Knesset (24%)
8. The political parties (20%)

The following table presents the level of trust among Jews in each of the institutions surveyed for both this year and 2018; the average trust rating since we began our surveys in 2003; and the level of this year’s ratings relative to the multi-year average (higher +, or lower –).

**Table 2.4** (Jewish respondents; %)

Expressed trust in:	2018	2019	Multi-year average	2019 ratings relative to multi-year average
IDF	89	90	88.6	+
President of Israel	68	71	68.5	+
Supreme Court	55	55	62.5	–
Police	52	44	49.7	–
Media	33	36	39.2	–
Government	34	30	40.2	–
Knesset	30	30	38.5	–
Political parties	16	14	23.2	–

As shown in the above table, only in the case of the IDF and the President of Israel does the proportion who expressed trust this year exceed the multi-year average. All the remaining ratings were lower than this average.

The table below presents the same data for the Arab sample; however, due to the anomalies in last year's survey, as cited earlier, we have also included the data for 2017, which overall are much closer to those from 2019.

**Table 2.5** (Arab respondents; %)

Expressed trust in:	2017	2018	2019	Multi-year average	2019 ratings relative to multi-year average
Supreme Court	54	36	56	57	–
IDF	41	20	41	35.1	+
Police	29	18	38	40.9	–
President of Israel	34	26	37	37.7	=
Media	18	18.5	36	44.4	–
Government	22.5	15	28	29.1	–
Knesset	19	16	24	35.2	–
Political parties	16	15	20	25.6	–

According to this table, among Arab respondents as well, the bulk of the institutions surveyed fared more poorly in terms of public trust this year than in the multi-year average, with the exception of the IDF—whose rating this year is higher than this average—and the President of Israel, whose score is virtually the same as the average.

To clarify the overall differences between the years and between the two population groups, we calculated the average level of trust this year in each of the eight institutions separately for both the Jewish and Arab samples, on a scale of 1–4, where 1 = not at all and 4 = very much (such that the midpoint of the scale is 2.5). In other words, any score below the midpoint falls on the side of lack of trust, and any score above it tends toward greater trust. In the table below, we can see that the average score among Jewish respondents for all of the institutions surveyed in 2019 declined somewhat, whereas the average score in the Arab sample rose—not only in comparison with 2018, in which the survey was apparently atypically low, but also when compared with 2017, whose results are similar to previous years and to the present survey.

**Table 2.6** \ Yearly average level of trust in all institutions and officials surveyed (Jewish and Arab respondents; from 1 = not at all to 4 = very much)

	2017	2018	2019
Jews	2.46	2.51	2.49
Arabs	2.08	1.81	2.16

However, neither the Jewish nor the Arab sample is internally consistent on the question of trust in institutions and individuals, as shown in the following examples of intragroup differences in the Jewish public, broken down by political orientation: On the Left, the proportion who express confidence in the government is roughly one-fifth that on the Right; the share of respondents from the Right who have faith in the political parties is double that of the Left; and the percentage who place their trust in the President of Israel on the Right is approximately one-third lower than the corresponding figures for the Left and Center.

**Table 2.7** (Jewish respondents; %)

Expressed trust in:	Left	Center	Right
Supreme Court	88	72	30
Knesset	23	23	38
Government	9.5	15	48
Political parties	9	10	19.5
President of Israel	89	84	57


Additional examples of intragroup differences, this time in the Arab public, are presented in the table below. Here, we see that Muslim respondents' trust in the Supreme Court is considerably lower than that of Christians and Druze. We can see further that the level of trust in the police and the IDF among the Druze greatly surpasses that of the Muslims and Christians, and that the Christians place more faith in the political parties than do the Druze and Muslims. It should be noted that there has been a steep drop in the share of Druze respondents who express confidence in the government (21% this year, as opposed to 39% in 2017), presumably owing to the passage of the Nation-State Law.

**Table 2.8** (Arab respondents; %)


Expressed trust in:	Muslims	Christians	Druze
Supreme Court	<b>52</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>71</b>
Police	<b>35</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>71</b>
IDF	<b>33</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>87.5</b>
Political parties	<b>18</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>26.5</b>

The figure below presents the various institutions and the percentages of respondents who expressed trust in them over the past decade. As shown, the rankings have remained largely stable over the years, with the public's faith in the key democratic institutions (the Knesset, the government, and especially, the political parties) consistently lower than in the other bodies and individuals. Further, it is clear that the IDF, the Supreme Court, and the President of Israel enjoy the highest degree of trust—not just this year but over time.

**Figure 2.7** \ Trust in institutions, 2008–2019 (Jewish respondents; %)



**Figure 2.8** \ Trust in institutions, 2008–2019 (Arab respondents; %)




As shown in the above figure, among the Arab public the long-term levels of trust in institutions and individuals are much more prone to fluctuation. Here, the Supreme Court is the institution that has earned the highest degree of trust over the years. The differences between the other institutions in this regard are relatively small; as a result, the lines are bunched together and often cross one another. An interesting, though perhaps transitory, finding is the greater level of trust in the political parties among Arabs than among Jews.

Perceptions of integrity—or alternatively, corruption—are tied to people’s faith in their leadership, and likewise affect opinions about the quality of the political framework that governs their lives. We examined how the Israeli public views the integrity of its leaders, and the relationship between their outlook in this area and their assessment of the country’s overall situation and of the state of democracy in Israel.

We presented the interviewees with a 5-point scale, where 1 = very corrupt and 5 = not at all corrupt. As shown in the following figure, a majority (58%) believe that Israel’s leadership is quite or very corrupt; roughly a quarter (24%) see the extent of corruption as moderate; and only a minority (16%) consider the leadership to be relatively or entirely uncorrupt.

**Figure 2.9 \ Is Israel’s leadership corrupt? (total sample; %)**



We broke down the Jewish responses to this question by political orientation. In all three camps, a plurality hold that the country’s leadership is corrupt, but the differences between them are sizeable, and expected: On the Left, 82% characterize the present leadership of the country as corrupt (scores 1 and 2); in the Center, 72%; and on the Right, 41%.

When the responses from the Jewish sample are analyzed by religiosity, the differences between the various groups are also substantial, and are presumably related, at least in part, to their political orientation (in that a relatively large share of secular respondents identify with the Center and Left, and of the national religious and Haredim, with the Right, as shown in Appendix 3).

### Is Israel’s leadership corrupt?

#### Question 52

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**Table 2.9** (Jewish respondents; %)

	Haredim	National religious	Traditional religious	Traditional non-religious	Secular
Define Israel's leadership as very or quite corrupt (scores 1 and 2)	36	34	45	65	71.5

A longitudinal comparison of the average scores in past *Democracy Index* surveys shows that this year's is the lowest average since we began posing this question in 2014—meaning that more Israelis now hold that their leadership is corrupt (note that on our scale, a low score indicates greater corruption, and a high score, greater integrity).

**Table 2.10** \ Yearly average corruption score (total sample)


2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
2.6	2.4	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.2

We found a clear link between responses on the subject of corruption and those on the country's situation and the state of democracy in Israel: Of those who feel that the country's leadership is corrupt, only 36% consider Israel's situation to be good or very good, as opposed to 66% among respondents who think that the leadership is not corrupt. The converse also holds true: Among those who characterize Israel's situation as bad, 84% hold that the leadership is corrupt, and only 6% that it is not corrupt. As shown in the following table, this is also the case with regard to perceptions of corruption and of the state of democracy in Israel: The lower the extent of corruption in Israel's leadership in the eyes of the interviewees, the more favorable their assessment of the quality of Israeli democracy.

**Table 2.11** (total sample; %)

	Israel's leadership is corrupt	Israel's leadership is moderately corrupt	Israel's leadership is not corrupt
State of democracy is good	21.5	47	55.5
State of democracy is so-so	30	37	26
State of democracy is bad	46.5	15	18
Don't know	2	1	0.5
Total	100	100	100

The disheartening statistics on the low level of trust in Israel's political parties led us to ask: "Is there a political party in Israel today that truly represents your views?" Slightly more than half of the total sample offered a positive response. Nonetheless, roughly a quarter of those surveyed answered that there is no party that adequately represents them, a somewhat troubling response given that the survey took place immediately following the April 2019 elections, when we would have assumed that citizens had already found a party to their liking.

**Figure 2.10** \ Is there a party that truly represents you? (total sample; %)

**Is there a party that truly represents your views?**

Question 16

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
The differences between Jews and Arabs here are considerable: A majority of Jewish respondents (59%) answered that there is a party that represents them to a large or quite a large extent, as opposed to just 30% of Arab respondents, perhaps due to the breakup of the Joint List. Moreover, among Jewish respondents, only 18.5% reported that there is no party that truly represents their views, as contrasted with 50% of Arab respondents.

We did not find substantial differences between the various political camps among Jewish respondents. In all of them, a majority indicated that there are parties that represent their viewpoint to a large or quite a large extent: Left, 67%; Center, 54%; Right, 61%.

Breaking down the Jewish responses further by religiosity, we found a majority in all groups who feel that they “have a party,” but the percentages are significantly higher among Haredi and national religious Jews than among the traditional and secular groups: Haredim, 74%; national religious, 66%; traditional religious, 55%; traditional non-religious, 59%; secular, 58%.

We wished to know if the parties that make up the Knesset are seen as faithfully representing the diversity of views held by the Israeli public. Thus, we asked the interviewees to respond to the following statement: “The party composition of the current Knesset is a good reflection of the diverse range of opinions in the Israeli public.” We found that the public is split on this question, with roughly half agreeing and half disagreeing.

**Figure 2.11 \ “The party composition of the current Knesset is a good reflection of public opinion” (total sample; %)**



The share of Jewish respondents who feel that the composition of the Knesset accurately reflects the range of opinions of the general public slightly exceeds the corresponding share among Arab interviewees (49.5% versus 43%, respectively). A breakdown of the Jewish responses by political orientation shows, not surprisingly, that a majority on the Right are satisfied with the representativeness of the Knesset, while in the Center and Left only a minority feel this way: Right, 61%; Center, 38%; Left, 43%.

**Is the party composition of the Knesset a good reflection of public opinion?**

Question 23

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A comparison over time shows a continuing drop in the proportion of respondents who feel that the Knesset adequately reflects the range of public opinion—from nearly 60% four years ago to less than 50% today.

**Table 2.12** (total sample; %)

The Knesset is a good reflection of the range of opinions in the public	2015	2017	2019
Agree	58	51	48.5
Disagree	33	45	46

Over the years, the Arab and Jewish populations have not seen eye to eye on the question of whether the Arab Knesset members are faithful representatives of Arab public opinion in Israel. In most surveys, Arab interviewees claimed that they are well represented, while Jewish interviewees were the ones who argued (and perhaps preferred to believe) that this was not the case and that the Arab MKs present more radical positions than those of the broader Arab public. For example, in the 2017 study *Jews and Arabs: A Conditional Partnership*,<sup>8</sup> we found that 58% of Arab interviewees held that the Arab MKs in fact do a good job of representing their constituents, as opposed to only 39% of Jews who shared this view. This year, we studied this subject not once but twice, and found that the distribution of opinions among Jews remained unchanged. A majority of the Jews surveyed (59.5%) believe that the Arab MKs do not satisfactorily represent the range of opinions of the public that elected them; predictably enough, the share of “don’t know” responses is also higher among the Jewish respondents. In the Arab public, however, there has been a complete reversal: In the present survey, as well as in the study *Jews and Arabs: A Conditional Partnership 2019*,<sup>9</sup> we found a small majority who think that the representation they receive from the Arab MKs is not satisfactory (present survey, 50.5%; *Conditional Partnership 2019* survey, 58%).

8 Tamar Hermann, Chanan Cohen, Fadi Omar, Ella Heller, and Tzipy Lazar-Shoef, *Jews and Arabs: A Conditional Partnership, Israel 2017* (Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute, 2017).

9 Tamar Hermann, Or Anabi, William Cubbison, Ella Heller, and Fadi Omar, *Jews and Arabs: A Conditional Partnership, Israel 2019* (Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute, 2019).


### Do the Arab Knesset members represent the views of the Arab public?

Question 24

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
**Figure 2.12** \ “Arab Knesset members represent the Arab sector very well in terms of the points of agreement and disagreement within the Arab population in Israel” (Jewish and Arab respondents; %)



From here, we moved on to examine topics related to economic policy.

We asked the interviewees if they felt that the present level of government involvement in the economy is about right, too high, or too low. Based on our findings, the public is divided on this issue into three groups of roughly equal size: those who feel that the state’s involvement is excessive (27%); those who feel that it is at the right level (30%); and those who feel that it is insufficient (32%).

**Figure 2.13** \ Level of government involvement in the economy (total sample; %)



**Government involvement in the economy**

Question 28

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A comparison between the opinions of the Arab and Jewish respondents shows that the most common response among the Arabs is that the government is too involved in Israel's economy, and among the Jews, that it is not involved enough.


**Table 2.13** (Jewish and Arab respondents; %)

Government involvement in the economy:	Too high	Right level	Too low	Don't know	Total
Jews	26	30	33	11	100
Arabs	32	28	26.5	13.5	100

Breaking down the responses by political orientation, we found that the most frequent response among interviewees from the Left and Center was that the level of government involvement in the economy is too low (45% and 37%, respectively). On the Right, by contrast, a plurality feel that the current level of involvement is correct (37%).

The respondents in our survey were not all that eager to pay higher taxes so as to cover the cost of greater government involvement and state services. We posed the question: "Do you prefer to live in a country where taxes are higher but citizens receive many free services from the state, or a country where taxes are lower but citizens receive only a few basic services from the state?" Only one-half of the total sample expressed a preference for comprehensive services and higher taxes, while a minority preferred basic public services and lower taxes.

**Figure 2.14** \ Higher taxes and comprehensive services, or the opposite? (total sample; %)



**High taxes and comprehensive services, or the opposite?**

Question 5

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The gaps between political camps (among Jewish respondents) on this question are sizeable: On the Left, as expected, the vast majority are in favor of higher taxes and broader services, while the Right is split on this point. A breakdown of the total sample by income shows that those with below-average incomes are divided on this question, while those with average or above-average incomes in fact tend to be more in favor of higher taxes and comprehensive services, perhaps because they are able to pay those higher taxes, or because they are closer in their views to the Left or Center.

Breaking down the Jewish sample by religiosity yielded a particularly interesting result: In contrast with the other groups in this category, where a majority favor higher taxes and broader services, only a minority of Haredi and national religious respondents prefer this option, while the majority favor lower taxes and basic state services. The reason for this difference may be that the Haredim and national religious have community support systems that, in certain respects, render the state services superfluous. Another possible explanation is that the state provides them with budgets and services in any case, due to their strong political bargaining power, meaning that they have no interest in paying higher taxes for what they are already receiving anyway.

**Table 2.14** (Jewish respondents; %)

		Prefer higher taxes and comprehensive services	Prefer lower taxes and basic services
<b>Political orientation</b>	Left	<b>73</b>	<b>17</b>
	Center	<b>51</b>	<b>36</b>
	Right	<b>44</b>	<b>45</b>
<b>Income</b>	Below average	<b>42</b>	<b>43</b>
	Average	<b>57</b>	<b>34</b>
	Above average	<b>54</b>	<b>35</b>
<b>Religiosity</b>	Haredim	<b>27</b>	<b>60</b>
	National religious	<b>38</b>	<b>45</b>
	Traditional religious	<b>59</b>	<b>32</b>
	Traditional non-religious	<b>54</b>	<b>34</b>
	Secular	<b>55</b>	<b>33</b>

## Chapter 3 \ Public Services


In this chapter, we discuss the following topics:

- Suitability of civil service model
- State of public services
- Equality in public services
- Nonpartisan decision-making in the Supreme Court, the Finance Ministry, and the IDF
- Allocations for public services

This is the first time that we are addressing the subject of Israel's civil service in the *Democracy Index*. To begin, we sought to examine whether, in the eyes of the Israeli public, the present model of tenure for civil service employees has a positive or negative effect.

We asked: "Does the currently accepted model of tenured employees in the civil service improve or impair its performance?" The public, it emerges, tends toward the view that this model is harmful to Israel's civil service (45% are of this opinion, versus 39% who are not). When this question was posed in 2016, the results were the reverse: The greatest share of respondents (45%) thought that the tenure model improves performance, while 41% held the opposite. Thus, it seems that the oft-repeated claim by Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and his allies that the civil service is "the fat man" riding on the back of the thin man (i.e., the public) is in fact seeping into the collective consciousness.

**Figure 3.1 \** The tenure model: Does it improve or impair civil service performance? (total sample; %)



The difference between Jewish and Arab respondents on this question is considerable: Among Jews, the greatest share of those surveyed feel that tenure harms the quality of the civil service, whereas among Arabs, the majority take the opposite view.

**Does tenure help or harm the civil service?**

Question 44

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**Table 3.1** (Jewish and Arab respondents; %)

	Jews	Arabs
Tenure model improves civil service performance	35	59
Tenure model impairs civil service performance	48	27
Don't know	17	14
Total	100	100

The second topic that we will address here relates to perceptions of the current state of several public services.

The six areas that we focused on in this study are: education, healthcare, transportation, the legal system, environmental protection, and residential planning. The assessments range from “very good” to “not at all good.” The figure below presents the public’s views in each of these spheres.


As shown in the figure, planning for the housing market earns the lowest ranking of the areas surveyed, while the legal system and the agencies charged with handling environmental protection are at the top end of the scale; however, even these last two are rated very good or quite good by only about half of the interviewees, with 40% characterizing them as not so good or not at all good, and only a small minority labeling them very good (legal system, 12%; environmental protection, 10%). The assessments of the education, healthcare, and transportation systems are very similar: 43% to 45% of the total sample rate their functioning as very good or quite good. In other words, the state of the different public services that we examined is considered, on average, to be fair or worse, with an especially low grade for residential planning.

### Public services in Israel

Questions 15.1–15.6


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**Figure 3.2 \** The state of public services (total sample; %)



We did not discover systematic differences between the perceptions of the Jewish and Arab samples. By contrast, a breakdown of Jewish responses by political orientation yields an interesting picture: All three camps assign the lowest rating in the area of residential planning. The Left gives the lowest grades across the board, with the exception of the legal system, where they offer a very positive assessment. The views of the Center camp consistently fall in between those of the Right and Left; however, they are slightly closer to the latter. In the Center as well, the legal system earns the highest rating. As for the Right, all of the areas studied enjoy more favorable assessments than in the other groups, apart from the legal system, which ranks much lower by comparison. Except for residential planning, the legal system receives the lowest grades on the Right. Stated otherwise, the courts are prized by the Center camp—and even more so, the Left—but not by the Right. In addition, the Right is more satisfied than the Left and Center with the state of the other public services, though here too, its approval level is not sky-high.

**Figure 3.3** \ Perception of public services, by political orientation (very good or quite good; Jewish respondents; %)



In the Jewish sample, a breakdown of responses to this question by religiosity shows that secular Jews give the lowest grades in all six areas surveyed, with the exception of the legal system. Additionally, we found certain associations that may stem from admiration for individual ministers who were serving at the time and were responsible for particular service areas. For example, 64% of national religious respondents expressed the opinion that the education system was functioning well, as opposed to just 31% of secular interviewees (under the last government, the education minister was Naftali Bennett, leader of the national religious Jewish Home party).

We wished to know the public's thoughts on whether various services are offered equally to citizens from different groups.

Accordingly, we asked: "In your opinion, does Israel's education system truly offer equal opportunity for children from all backgrounds and sectors?" A substantial majority of the general public (68%) think or are certain that it does not. The figure below indicates a strong similarity on this point between the views of the Jewish and Arab interviewees.


## Equality in education

### Question 34

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**Figure 3.4** \ “The education system truly offers equal opportunity for children from all backgrounds and sectors” (Jewish and Arab respondents; %)




A breakdown of Jewish respondents by political orientation shows that in all three camps, a majority think or are certain that the education system does not provide equal opportunity for all students, though this majority is especially high on the Left—a finding that corresponds with this group’s low assessment of the state of the education system, as presented above.

**Table 3.2** (Jewish respondents; %)

	Left	Center	Right
Think or are certain that the education system does not offer equal opportunity to all students	85	69	63

We asked: “In your opinion, does the public healthcare system in Israel provide equal treatment to patients from all backgrounds and sectors?” A majority of Arab respondents, but a minority of Jews, feel that the treatment is in fact equal.

**Figure 3.5** \ “Israel’s public healthcare system provides equal treatment to patients from all backgrounds and sectors” (Jewish and Arab respondents; %)



A breakdown of the Jewish responses by political orientation yields a result very similar to that of the previous question: The Left and Center are the most critical of the degree of equality in the public healthcare system, while on the Right, only a minority see a problem. Across all three camps, a greater share of respondents are satisfied with the degree of equality in the healthcare system than with the degree of equality in education.

**Table 3.3** (Jewish respondents; %)

	Left	Center	Right
Think or are certain that the healthcare system does not provide equal treatment for all	73	67	46


Lastly, we asked: “In your opinion, do the courts in Israel give equal treatment to everyone who appears before them, regardless of their background or sector?” Opinions on this point are split almost evenly, with a slight tendency toward the negative: 44% responded that the courts do provide equal treatment, and 49%, that they do not. The differences between the Jewish and Arab interviewees were not great, though the Arabs are slightly more favorable in their opinion of the legal system, and the share who answered “don’t know” is double that among the Jewish respondents.

## Equality before the courts

### Question 36

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**Figure 3.6** \ “The courts in Israel give equal treatment to everyone who appears before them, regardless of their background or sector” (Jewish and Arab respondents; %)



A breakdown of the Jewish responses by political orientation raises a fascinating finding that substantiates our earlier conclusion that the courts are the “darling” of the Left, and a “red flag” to the Right. In contrast to the two previous public service systems—education and healthcare, regarding which the Left were the most critical of all the camps—when it comes to the courts, this group is actually the least disapproving; that is, a smaller share on the Left hold that the legal system is unequal (33%). In this case, the Right are the most critical, with a majority believing that the courts do not offer equal treatment to all.

**Table 3.4** (Jewish respondents; %)

	Left	Center	Right
Think or are certain that the courts do not give equal treatment to all who come before them, regardless of background or sector	33	39	65

Civil servants are supposed to be politically neutral in their work; however, the data we have gathered in the past lead us to believe that at least some segments of the Israeli public feel that this is not the case. Accordingly, we revisited this question in the present survey.

## Are rulings of the Supreme Court justices politically biased?

Question 41


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### Chapter 3 \ Public Services

We asked: “In your opinion, to what extent are the legal rulings of the Supreme Court justices influenced by their political views?” According to our findings, a majority hold that the rulings are affected by the judges’ political opinions to a large or moderate extent, and only a minority identify such an influence to a small extent or not at all.

**Figure 3.7** \ To what extent, if at all, are legal rulings of Supreme Court justices influenced by their political views? (total sample; %)



The distribution of opinions on this subject among Jews and Arabs is similar: 60% of Jews and 54% of Arabs feel that the rulings are influenced to a large or moderate extent, while the share of those who answered to a small extent or not at all stands at 32.5% and 29% among Jews and Arabs, respectively.

A breakdown of Jewish respondents -by political orientation shows—once again—the degree to which the Left backs the Supreme Court and the Right questions it. Nonetheless, even on the Left, over one-third believe that the rulings of the Supreme Court justices are affected by their political views.

**Table 3.5** (Jewish respondents; %)

Rulings of Supreme Court justices are influenced by their political views:	Left	Center	Right
To a large or moderate extent	36.5	48	78
To a small extent or not at all	57	43	17


Breaking down the results from Jewish respondents by religiosity also produces an interesting picture: In reality, only the secular respondents are divided on this question, while in all the other groups, a majority hold that the rulings of Israel’s Supreme Court justices are influenced by their political opinions to a large or moderate extent.

**Table 3.6** (Jewish respondents; %)

Rulings of Supreme Court justices are influenced by their political views:	Haredim	National religious	Traditional religious	Traditional non-religious	Secular
To a large or moderate extent	85	81	68	60	45
To a small extent or not at all	7	14	24	32	46

The perception of political bias is even more pronounced in the case of senior Finance Ministry officials. We posed the question: “In your opinion, to what extent are the professional decisions of senior Finance Ministry officials influenced by their political views?” The response choices were the same as for the preceding question. We found that over two-thirds are of the opinion that the decisions of senior Finance Ministry officials are influenced to a large or moderate extent by their political views.

**Figure 3.8** \ To what extent, if at all, are professional decisions of senior Finance Ministry officials influenced by their political views? (total sample; %)



As shown in the above figure, in both the Jewish and the Arab samples, over two-thirds believe that the decisions of senior Finance Ministry officials are affected to a large or a moderate degree by their political stance. Among Jews, the gaps between the various political camps on this question are negligible and not systematic.

### Are decisions of senior Finance Ministry officials politically biased?

#### Question 42

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**Table 3.7** (Jewish respondents; %)

Professional decisions of senior Finance Ministry officials are influenced by their political views:	Left	Center	Right
To a large or moderate extent	67.5	62	71
To a small extent or not at all	21	28	21

Breaking down the Jewish respondents by religiosity, we find that a majority in all groups hold that the decisions of senior Finance Ministry officials are affected to a large or moderate extent by their political opinions, but the Haredim are the most critical here as well.

**Table 3.8** (Jewish respondents; %)

Rulings of senior Finance Ministry officials are influenced by their political views:	Haredim	National religious	Traditional religious	Traditional non-religious	Secular
To a large or moderate extent	77.5	67	62	69	65
To a small extent or not at all	10	21	23	25	26


The final question on this topic relates to the impact of the political views of high-ranking IDF officers on their professional decisions. As shown in the figure below, the general public is evenly divided on this point.

**Are decisions of high-ranking IDF officers politically biased?**

Question 43

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**Figure 3.9** \ To what extent, if at all, are professional decisions of high-ranking IDF officers influenced by their political views? (total sample; %)



The difference between Jews and Arabs on this issue is considerable: Among Arabs, a large majority (65%) feel that the professional decisions of high-ranking IDF officers are affected by their political opinions, whereas among Jews, only a minority (though a sizeable one) share this view (42%).

A breakdown of Jewish respondents by political orientation shows that the Right is the sole camp in which a small majority hold that these decisions are affected to a large or moderate degree. In the other two camps, only about one-third feel this way.

**Table 3.9** (Jewish respondents; %)

Professional decisions of high-ranking IDF officers are influenced by their political views:	Left	Center	Right
To a large or moderate extent	30	33	53
To a small extent or not at all	59.5	60	42


Breaking down the responses of the Jewish sample by religiosity shows that it is primarily the Haredim who believe that high-ranking IDF officers’ decision-making is affected by their political views. This opinion is also shared by a very small majority of the national religious respondents. The traditional religious are split on this question, while a majority of the traditional non-religious—and even more so, the secular—largely “absolve” the senior command of claims of political bias.

**Table 3.10** (Jewish respondents; %)

Professional decisions of high-ranking IDF officers are influenced by their political views:	Haredim	National religious	Traditional religious	Traditional non-religious	Secular
To a large or moderate extent	<b>72</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>33</b>
To a small extent or not at all	<b>10</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>59</b>

The figure below offers a comparative summary of public opinion regarding the degree of politicization in the upper ranks of the three bodies discussed here: the Supreme Court, the Finance Ministry, and the IDF. As can be seen, senior Finance Ministry officials head the list in terms of perceived political bias, followed by Supreme Court justices, and lastly, IDF commanders. Combining the high and moderate levels of political influence in our survey increases the gaps between these bodies: Over two-thirds of respondents hold that decisions made by top Finance Ministry officials are politically biased, whereas roughly 60% feel this way with regard to Supreme Court justices, and less than half concerning IDF commanders. In other words, the IDF is seen as the least politically tainted of the three. Moreover, as shown above, there is a greater consensus among the various political camps regarding political influence on decision-making in the case of the IDF than that of the Supreme Court or the Finance Ministry.

**Figure 3.10** \ Decisions of Supreme Court justices, senior Finance Ministry officials, and high-ranking IDF officers are politically biased (to a large or moderate extent; total sample; %)



From here, we moved on to the issue of the state budget, asking about allocations for various public services: Should they be increased, reduced, or left as they are?


We wished to know the public's views on how allocations should be handled in each of the following areas: the IDF, the police, healthcare, education, transportation, social welfare, and housing—on the assumption that the size of the state budget is fixed, and that increasing one item necessitates taking away from another. As shown in the figure below, our note of caution about budgetary constraints fell on deaf ears: With the exception of the IDF's budget, the respondents opted to raise allocations in every area, first and foremost the healthcare system. As for the army's budget, opinions favored leaving it as is. Over one-third felt this way concerning the police budget as well. With regard to all the other services, the clear preference was to boost their allocations.

### Allocations for public services

Questions 11.1–11.7

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**Figure 3.11** \ Allocations for public services (total sample; %)

In all cases, the share of Arab respondents who preferred to increase the budget exceeded that of the Jews, perhaps because the services that Arab citizens receive are inferior to those provided to Jewish citizens, and they hope that upping the budgetary allocations will be to their benefit.

As for the IDF—the only body whose budget the general public wished to leave untouched—we found interesting differences in the Jewish sample when breaking down the results by political orientation: On the Left, the greatest share of respondents prefer to reduce the budget, while those from the Right and Center wish to leave it as it stands. Of the three camps, the Right showed the largest plurality in favor of raising the IDF’s budget.

**Table 3.11** (Jewish respondents; %)

	Left	Center	Right
IDF budget should be reduced	41	23	13
IDF budget should be left as is	39	48	44
IDF budget should be increased	18	27	38

## Chapter 4 \ Israeli Society

In this chapter, we discuss the following topics:

- Level of solidarity within Jewish and Arab society
- Civic behavior: Legitimacy (or otherwise) of using political violence; young people's contributions to society
- Tensions in Israeli society
- Which groups feel like a minority?
- Are some more equal than others? Mizrahim and Ashkenazim
- Are some more equal than others? Jews and Arabs

Since there is so much talk in various forums about social breakdown and deepening rifts in Israel, we asked our Jewish respondents again this year to rate the level of solidarity in Jewish Israeli society, and our Arab respondents, the level of solidarity in Arab Israeli society. The scale used was: 1–2 = very low; 3–4 = quite low; 5–6 = moderate; 7–8 = quite high; and 9–10 = very high. The midpoint is thus 5.5, meaning that—to varying degrees—anything below this is low and anything above it is high.

As shown in the following figure, Jews tend to see Jewish Israeli society as having greater solidarity than do Arabs with respect to Arab Israeli society (with averages of 6.0 versus 4.25, respectively). The breadth of distribution of opinions (as expressed in the statistical measure of standard deviation), is also lower in the Jewish public (2.278) than in the Arab public (2.767)—that is, there is a greater level of agreement among the former.


### Social solidarity

#### Question 12

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**Figure 4.1** \ Level of solidarity in Jewish and Arab society (Jewish and Arab respondents; %)



This is the first time that we examined how Arabs assess the degree of solidarity in their society; thus we cannot compare our findings here with any previous data. A comparison of the average assessments of Jews regarding the extent of solidarity in Jewish Israeli society over the years shows that the level is seen as slightly higher this year than last, with a return to the levels of 2012 and 2014.

**Table 4.1** (Jewish respondents)

2011	2012	2014	2018	2019
5.8	6.0	6.0	5.6	6.0


A comparison of the average solidarity rating in Jewish society by political orientation shows that, on average, respondents on the Left see the level of social solidarity as somewhat lower than do those in the Center, and a great deal lower than those on the Right (Left, 5.03; Center, 5.76; Right, 6.55). In other words, there is a stronger sense on the Left that Israeli society is divided, in comparison with the Center or Right.

A comparison of the average levels of solidarity in Arab society, broken down by religion, reveals that Muslims perceive it as being higher (4.52) than do Druze (3.36) and Christians (3.29).

One of the factors undermining social solidarity is the use of violence for political ends—whether by individuals or groups—since in a democracy, such goals are supposed to be achieved or advanced solely through non-violent means. We therefore asked what the attitude of the Israeli public is to the use of force for political purposes.

We asked the interviewees to express their agreement or disagreement with the following statement: “The use of violence for political ends is never justified.” A substantial majority of Jewish interviewees, and an even greater majority of Arab respondents, agreed with this assertion, meaning that they rejected the use of political violence under any and all circumstances. It should be noted that, since Arabs in Israel are automatically suspected in cases of political violence, the Arab interviewees may have felt this was a “trick question,” which might explain why the proportion who legitimized the use of violence was so low. Of course, this may also have been a sincere response.

**Figure 4.2** \ “The use of violence for political ends is never justified”  
(Jewish and Arab respondents; %)



Looking more closely, we sought to know which subgroups nonetheless consider it legitimate, under certain circumstances, to utilize violence for political ends. Among Jewish respondents, one-quarter (25%) of Haredim somewhat or strongly disagree with the statement that violence must never be engaged in for political ends; that is, they see circumstances in which violence

### Use of political violence

#### Question 32

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is justified. This view is shared by 24% of traditional religious respondents, along with 21% of the traditional non-religious and secular, and 20% of the national religious. A breakdown of Jewish respondents by political orientation shows that only 11.5% on the Left can envision circumstances in which it would be legitimate to use violence to achieve political goals, as opposed to 23% in the Center and 25.5% on the Right.

Age apparently plays a role in this question, since the share of young Jewish people who disagree with the statement that violence for political ends is never justified is double that among the oldest age group.


**Table 4.2** (Jewish respondents; by age; %)

Age	18–24	25–34	35–44	45–54	55–64	65+
Agree that the use of violence for political ends is justified under certain circumstances	28	28	25	19	18	14

One of the ways in which social solidarity is expressed is in the desire to take part in national life. We examined perceptions of this willingness with regard to young Israelis.

As shown in the figure below, a majority of respondents agree that young people today are less interested in contributing to the state than in previous years.

**Figure 4.3** \ “Young people are less willing to contribute to the state today than in the past” (total sample; %)



**Are today's young people less willing to contribute to the state?**

Question 40

Appendix 1

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A majority of Jews and Arabs alike agree that young people today are less willing to contribute, with 52% of Jews and 65% of Arabs sharing this view. A breakdown of the Jewish respondents by political camp shows that, on the Left, a majority (54%) disagree with this assertion; by contrast, in the Center and on the Right, the majority agree with it (58% and 52%, respectively). Breaking down the same sample by religiosity, we find that a majority of national religious respondents disagree with the statement (only 40% agree), whereas the share who agree with it in all the other religious groups is 50% and above. Remarkably, the Haredi interviewees showed the highest degree of agreement, with 65% (!).

An interesting and unexpected finding is that the average proportion in the three oldest age groups who agree that today's youth are less willing to contribute is lower than that in the three youngest cohorts (49% versus 55%, respectively). In other words, a greater share of younger respondents than of older ones are in agreement with this statement. At first glance, this seems paradoxical; but it may simply reflect a different way of thinking, namely, that young people do not see contributing to the state as a value, perhaps due to their criticism of the way the country is being run, or dissatisfaction with their chances of creating a good life for themselves in Israel. An additional possibility is that the older interviewees know that things were not all that rosy in the past, while the young people are fed on myths of a glorious tradition of sacrifice and giving.

It should be noted that we posed a similar, though not identical, question on two occasions in the past: "There are differences of opinion as to whether young people today are willing to do what it takes to ensure the security of the state. In your opinion, are today's young people less willing, more willing, or as willing as in the past?" In both cases, the most frequent response was that today's young people are indeed less willing than in the past to do what is needed to keep the country safe (2004, 60%; 2007, 49%).

Each year, we examine the level of tension between various groups in Israeli society as perceived by the public. In the present survey, the tensions between Right and Left emerged as the most severe in the eyes of the Jewish respondents. By contrast, the Arab interviewees see the highest level of tension in Israel today as that between Jews and Arabs. Class tensions between rich and poor, which were at the core of the 2011 social protests, are declining in their perceived prominence, while friction between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim remains at the bottom of the list. On this last point, it is worth noting that FSU immigrants were the most inclined of all the ethnic groups surveyed to rank the tensions between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim as the most severe (6% felt this way, compared with 3% of Ashkenazim and Jews of mixed ethnicity, and just 2% of Mizrahim).

A breakdown of the Arab sample by religion yields another interesting finding: While plurality in each of the religious groups point to the tension between Jews and Arabs as being the most pronounced, the percentages are very different: The Druze are the most prone to believe that

## Tensions in Israeli society


### Question 13

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tensions run highest between Jews and Arabs (59%), compared with 43% of Muslims and 36% of Christians. Last year, only 35% of Druze respondents classified Jewish-Arab tensions as the most severe. The change this year can perhaps be attributed to the fact that the Druze community was gravely offended by the passage of the Nation-State Law in 2018.

**Figure 4.4 \** Which groups have the highest level of tension between them? (Jewish and Arab respondents; %)




It is noteworthy that in each of the political camps in the Jewish public, the tension between Right and Left is considered the strongest; yet a much greater share of the Left than of the Right perceive it as such. Similarly, whereas religious-secular tensions are ranked second highest by respondents from the Center and Left (by a larger proportion of the former than the latter), among those on the Right the friction between Jews and Arabs is seen as the second most severe.

**Table 4.3** (Jewish respondents; %)

	Groups with highest level of tension between them	Groups with second-highest level of tension between them
Left	<b>Right and Left (52%)</b>	<b>Religious and secular (25%)</b>
Center	<b>Right and Left (40%)</b>	<b>Religious and secular (29%)</b>
Right	<b>Right and Left (38%)</b>	<b>Jews and Arabs (32%)</b>

As shown in the figure below, the share of the total sample who feel that Left-Right tensions are the strongest point of friction in Israeli society has been on the rise since 2012, and since 2018 has replaced Jewish-Arab tensions in first place.

**Figure 4.5** \ Groups with the highest level of tension between them, 2012–2019 (total sample; %)



While religious-secular tensions fall somewhere in the middle—between the highest and lowest levels of tension—the subject of “religionization” has frequently been at the heart of public discourse this year. Accordingly, we sought to examine whether the public believes that the trend in Israel is toward greater religiosity or greater secularism.

### “Religionization”?

#### Question 26

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We posed the question: “Do you feel that Jewish society in Israel in recent years has become more secular, more religious, or remained unchanged?” A majority of respondents hold that it has become more religious, with only a small minority feeling that it is becoming more secular. However, it should be recalled that, in the eyes of the more religious groups, Israeli society’s becoming more religious is considered a welcome development, whereas from the perspective of the more secular groups, this change is seen in a negative light. Consequently, even if religious and secular interviewees select the same answer, its meaning is often the opposite.

The highest proportion of interviewees who see Israeli-Jewish society as becoming more secular can be found among Haredi and right-wing Jews as well as Arab respondents.

**Table 4.4** (Jewish and Arab respondents; %)

		Israeli society is becoming more secular	Israeli society is unchanged	Israeli society is becoming more religious
Arabs		22	36	36
Jews (overall)		14	27	55
Political orientation	Left	5.5	9	80
	Center	9	24	65
	Right	21.5	36	38
Religiosity	Haredim	36	27	31
	National religious	18	37	36
	Traditional religious	18	39	41
	Traditional non-religious	12	31	56
	Secular	9	19.5	68

We cross-tabulated the interviewees' responses on the balance between the Jewish and democratic components in Israel (discussed earlier) with the question of whether the country is undergoing a process of secularization or religionization. The connection between the two is unmistakable: Of those who think that Israeli society is becoming more religious, 73% also hold that the Jewish component is too strong in the current equation of a Jewish-and-democratic state, as opposed to 39% who feel this way among respondents who think that the country is becoming more secular, and 32% among those who hold that it has remained unchanged.


The impression from public discourse in Israel today is that numerous individuals and various groups feel as though they are a minority in Israeli society. When we asked the interviewees if they share this feeling, we found that most of the Jewish public do not feel very much or at all like a minority, while most of the Arab public feel this way very much or quite a lot.

### Feel like a minority?

#### Question 3

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**Figure 4.6 \ Do you feel like a minority in Israeli society?**  
(Jewish and Arab respondents; %)



Within each group as well, there are differences in the interviewees' feelings on this point. Thus, in the Jewish public, a breakdown by religiosity reveals that the Haredim feel the most like a minority, followed closely by the secular respondents. Breaking down the answers of the Jewish interviewees by political orientation shows that over half of those on the Left feel like a minority, whereas less than one-third of respondents in the Center and only one-fifth on the Right feel this way.

**Table 4.5** (Jewish respondents; %)

Feel very much or quite a lot like a minority		
<b>Religiosity</b>	Haredim	<b>46</b>
	National religious	<b>16</b>
	Traditional religious	<b>16</b>
	Traditional non-religious	<b>26</b>
	Secular	<b>35</b>
<b>Political orientation</b>	Left	<b>54</b>
	Center	<b>30</b>
	Right	<b>20</b>

Breaking down the responses of the Arab interviewees by religion, we find very sizeable differences on this question: While only 47% of Muslim respondents report feeling like a minority in Israeli society, 64% of Christians and 71% of Druze share this view.


One finding that may cause more than a few raised eyebrows is that the proportion of Ashkenazi Jews who feel like they are a minority (37%) is much greater than the corresponding share in all the other ethnic groups surveyed (mixed ethnicity, 25%; Mizrahi, 23%; FSU immigrant, 21%). A possible explanation is that the ethnic variable here is overlapping with that of political orientation, which we discussed earlier (given that 25% of Ashkenazim identify with the Left, as opposed to only 10% of Mizrahim and 4% of FSU immigrants). In other words, since there are more Ashkenazim on the Left, they feel like a minority not necessarily because of their ethnicity but because of their political orientation—with the opposite holding true for Mizrahim and immigrants from the FSU.

This raises the question of whether those who feel like a minority offer a different assessment of the state of democracy in Israel from those who do not feel this way. And the answer is yes: Of those respondents who feel that they belong to a minority, only 8% hold that the state of Israeli democracy is very good, as contrasted with 45.6% who share this view among those who do not feel like a minority.

Is there a connection between feeling like a minority and identifying with stronger or weaker groups in society?

This year as well, we revisited the question: “Societies throughout the world are divided into stronger and weaker groups. Which group in Israeli society do you feel you belong to?” Obviously, the share of Jewish respondents who feel that they belong to the stronger groups greatly exceeds that of the Arab respondents, and conversely, the proportion of Arabs who feel that they belong to the weaker groups in Israeli society easily surpasses the corresponding share among Jews.

**Figure 4.7 \** Which group in Israeli society do you feel you belong to—the strong or the weak? (Jewish and Arab respondents; %)



A breakdown of the responses by sex yields an interesting, though unsurprising, result: In both the Jewish and Arab samples, women feel that they belong to the weaker groups to a greater extent than do men from the same community, although, as stated, the Jewish respondents (men and women alike) are much more likely to feel that they belong to the stronger groups than are their Arab counterparts. Further, it should be noted that the gap between men and women in the Jewish public is much smaller than that in the Arab public, since Arab women are doubly marginalized, both as Arabs and as women.

**Belonging to stronger or weaker groups**

Question 29

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
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**Table 4.6** (Jewish and Arab respondents; %)

	Feel they belong to a strong or quite strong group	Feel they belong to a weak or quite weak group
Jewish men	<b>75</b>	<b>17</b>
Jewish women	<b>71.5</b>	<b>22</b>
Arab men	<b>42</b>	<b>49</b>
Arab women	<b>30</b>	<b>49</b>

Mizrahim are perceived in Israel as one of the more prominent minorities. The discourse on this subject has even become politicized over the years, as evidenced by the founding of ethnically based political parties and the growing media preoccupation with the topic. Hence, we wished to know whether the public considers the situation of Mizrahim today to be better than, worse than, or similar to that of Ashkenazim. As shown in the figure below, the Arab public sees Mizrahi Jews as worse off than the Jewish public does, though it should be noted that a large proportion of the Arab interviewees chose the response “don’t know.” Among Jewish respondents, the majority feel that there is no difference today between the situation of Mizrahim and that of Ashkenazim. We found no difference in the distribution of responses to this question between 2018 and the present survey, meaning that there is not a sense of a growing disparity between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim.

**Figure 4.8** \ Situation of Mizrahim compared with that of Ashkenazim (Jewish and Arab respondents; %)



A breakdown of the responses to this question by ethnic origin (Jewish sample) shows that, among Ashkenazim and FSU immigrants, only 13% feel that the situation of Mizrahim today is worse than that of Ashkenazim, compared with 25% of those with mixed ethnicity and 32% of those who define themselves as Mizrahim.

Breaking down the Jewish responses by political orientation, we find that in all three camps the prevailing opinion is that the situation of Mizrahim today is similar to that of Ashkenazim. Nonetheless, the Left are the most prone to characterize the situation of Mizrahim as worse than that of Ashkenazim, despite the fact that most of those who identify themselves as being on the Left are Ashkenazim.

### Situation of Mizrahim compared with that of Ashkenazim

Question 18


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**Table 4.7** (Jewish respondents; %)

	Situation of Mizrahim is better than that of Ashkenazim	Situation of Mizrahim is similar to that of Ashkenazim	Situation of Mizrahim is worse than that of Ashkenazim
Ashkenazim	11	67	13.5
Mizrahim	19	44	32
Mixed Ashkenazi and Mizrahi	10	57	25
FSU immigrant	9	68	13

Given the heated debate in Israel in recent months sparked by films and television series on the subject, we wished to know whether the public feels that mistakes were made in integrating Jewish immigrants from Arab countries in the early years of the state, but that these were made in good faith without bad intentions, or whether the prevailing opinion today is that these were not mistakes, and instead the Ashkenazi leadership of the state looked down on Jewish immigrants from Arab countries and their culture. It emerges that more interviewees (in fact the majority) believe that the failings stemmed from condescension on the part of the ruling Ashkenazi elite than from innocent mistakes.

**Figure 4.9** \ Mistakes in integrating Jewish immigrants from Arab countries: Made in good faith or caused by condescension? (Jewish respondents; %)

**Mistakes in integrating immigrants from Arab lands: Good faith or condescension?**

Question 53

Appendix 1  
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Not surprisingly, there is a substantial difference on this point between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim: A majority of Mizrahim believe that these were not mistakes made in good faith but were the result of condescension by the Ashkenazi leadership at the time. The Ashkenazi respondents, by contrast, are split on this question. A breakdown by political camp shows that respondents from the Center and Left are divided in their opinions, while those on the Right cast the blame for past failings on the condescension of the Ashkenazi leaders in the country's early years.


As expected, there is at least a partial congruence here between ethnic origin and political orientation, as more Ashkenazim define themselves as belonging to the Left or Center, and more Mizrahim, to the Right. In other words, it is difficult to know whether the responses to this question are the result of ethnicity and nothing else, or of the political camp with which the interviewees associate themselves.

**Table 4.8** (Jewish respondents; %)

		Mistakes in integrating immigrants from Arab lands were made in good faith	These were not mistakes but the result of condescension by Ashkenazi leaders
<b>Ethnic origin</b>	Mizrahim	<b>26</b>	<b>66</b>
	Ashkenazim	<b>43</b>	<b>44.5</b>
	Mixed Ashkenazi and Mizrahi	<b>34</b>	<b>46</b>
<b>Political orientation</b>	Left	<b>40.5</b>	<b>42</b>
	Center	<b>46</b>	<b>44</b>
	Right	<b>28</b>	<b>61</b>

An interesting finding relates to the effect of age on perceptions of the past: Among the younger respondents, the proportion who believe that mistakes in the integration process were committed in good faith is much smaller than the corresponding share in the older age groups. Stated otherwise, higher percentages of young people believe that this was a case of Ashkenazi condescension. At the same time, it should be recalled that more young people also identify with the Right, that is, an interaction exists between age and political stance.

**Figure 4.10** \ Agree that mistakes in integrating immigrants from Arab countries in Israel's early years were unintentional, by age (Jewish respondents; %)



If we put the past aside and focus on the present, the picture is rosier, corresponding more closely with the depiction of tensions in Israeli society as discussed above.

**Is it easier today  
for Ashkenazim to  
succeed than it is  
for Mizrahim?**


Question 37

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A majority of the Jewish public (65%) disagree with the statement: "In Israel today, it's easier for Ashkenazim to succeed and get ahead at work than it is for Mizrahim." Among Arab respondents, the proportions are reversed: Only a small minority of 19% disagree with the statement, meaning that a majority of the Arabs surveyed agree that Mizrahi Jews have it harder than Ashkenazim, perhaps because they see a reflection of their own situation as Arabs in Israeli society (although, it should be noted, roughly one-quarter of the Arab interviewees did not answer this question).

And yet, despite the majority in the Jewish public, there are certain differences between the various groups: Among Mizrahi respondents, roughly one-half (51%) disagree with the statement, as opposed to a substantial majority of FSU immigrants (79%), to cite one example. In other words, while a (slim) majority of Mizrahim do not feel that ethnicity plays a major role in getting hired today, this percentage is much smaller than the majority who reject the statement in the other ethnic groups; that is, a sizeable minority of Mizrahim (45.5%) indeed feel that Ashkenazim have an easier time finding work today, as contrasted with small minorities in the other groups who share this view.

**Figure 4.11** \ “In Israel today, it’s easier for Ashkenazim to succeed and get ahead at work than it is for Mizrahim” (disagree, Jewish respondents; %)



We saw earlier that the level of tension between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim is seen as moderate in comparison with other points of friction in Israeli society. Nevertheless, we wished to know the current source of this tension.

In the total sample, a majority (57%) disagree with the statement that “the Ashkenazi elite rules the country,” and the same holds true for the Jewish respondents (where 63% do not agree). However, here too, the perception among Arab respondents is the opposite: Only 22% disagree with the statement, that is, a majority of Arabs in fact agree that the Ashkenazi elite dominates the country. It is possible that the term “Ashkenazim” is identified by Arabs with Jews in general, but it may also be that they see the ethnic gap as wider than it is perceived by Jews.

Which group in the Jewish sample agrees with the statement to a greater extent than the others in the same category? As shown in the table below, voters for the Shas political party agree the most strongly with the claim that the Ashkenazi elite is dominant, followed by the Haredi respondents (some of whom are also Shas voters). Ranking third in support for the statement are the less well educated (here too, there is some overlap with the two previous groups), and fourth, the youngest age group.

### Does the Ashkenazi elite rule the country?

#### Question 39

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**Table 4.9 \ Agree that the Ashkenazi elite rules the country**  
(Jewish respondents; %)

Shas voters in April 2019 elections	<b>59</b>
Haredim	<b>49.5</b>
Respondents with a full or partial high school education	<b>44</b>
Ages 18–24	<b>40</b>

**Tensions between  
Mizrahim and  
Ashkenazim—are  
politicians to  
blame?**


Question 38

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The interviewees were asked to express their agreement or disagreement with the statement: “The tension between Ashkenazim and Mizrahim is perpetuated only because politicians exploit it for their own purposes.” The majority—in both the Jewish (61%) and Arab (54%) samples—agree with this assertion, meaning that they place the blame on politicians for keeping tensions alive between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim (again, with a very high proportion of 28% of the Arab sample falling under the “don’t know” category). Nonetheless, it should be borne in mind that one-third of the public are opposed to the statement, that is, they feel that this tension still exists, but not as a result of political manipulation from on high.

A breakdown of the responses by ethnic origin shows that Ashkenazim, more than any other group, tend to place the blame for the perpetuation of Mizrahi-Ashkenazi tensions squarely on the shoulders of the politicians, while less than half of Mizrahim see the latter as the source of the problem.

**Figure 4.12** \ “The tension between Ashkenazim and Mizrahim is perpetuated only because politicians exploit it for their own purposes,” by ethnicity (agree; Jewish respondents; %)



Breaking down the responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation, we find an interesting difference between the three camps: Respondents from the Left (72%) and Center (74%) tend to place the responsibility for Mizrahi-Ashkenazi tension on the politicians, who seemingly exploit it for their own purposes; meanwhile, on the Right, only about one-half (51%) of respondents see politicians as the source of the problem. Again, as we noted earlier, this may be explained at least in part by the difference in the ethnic makeup of the various camps, with the Left and Center comprising more Ashkenazim, and the Right, more Mizrahim.

And still on the subject of Mizrahim, we sought to examine whether the public viewed being Mizrahi as a resource that could benefit Israel’s integration in the Middle East.

The interviewees were asked to express their opinion of the following statement: “If Israel’s leaders were Mizrahim, the Israeli-Arab conflict would have already been resolved, since they are familiar with Middle Eastern culture.” True, a majority of both Jews and Arabs disagree with this assertion; but the distribution of responses indicates that among Arabs—more than Jews—there are some who still pin their hopes for peace on Mizrahi leaders.

**Would Mizrahi leaders already have resolved the Israeli-Arab conflict?**

Question 31

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**Table 4.10** “If Israel’s leaders were Mizrahim, the Israeli-Arab conflict would have already been resolved” (Jewish and Arab respondents; %)

	Agree	Disagree	Don’t know	Total
Jews	10	85	5	100
Arabs	25	59	16	100

A breakdown of the responses in the Jewish sample by ethnicity reveals that while only a minority in all groups think that Mizrahi leaders would have succeeded in bringing peace, the share of respondents who support this view among Mizrahim (19%) far outstrips that among Ashkenazim (6%), those of mixed ethnicity (7%), and FSU immigrants (4%).

Since we produced a special report this year devoted to Jewish-Arab relations in Israel,<sup>10</sup> we limited our discussion of this key issue in the current *Democracy Index*. Nonetheless, we did touch on it briefly, as shown here.

We asked the Jewish interviewees to express their agreement or disagreement with the statement: “The government should encourage Arabs to emigrate from Israel,” and were pleasantly surprised to find a substantial increase over previous surveys in the share of respondents who disagreed with this statement. In other words, there are now more Jews who do not wish to see the government encourage Arab citizens to emigrate from Israel.

**Should the government encourage Arabs to emigrate?**


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<sup>10</sup> Tamar Hermann, Or Anabi, William Cubbison, Ella Heller, and Fadi Omar, *Jews and Arabs: A Conditional Partnership, Israel 2019* (Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute, 2019).

**Figure 4.13** \ “The government should encourage Arabs to emigrate from Israel,” 2009–2019 (disagree; Jewish respondents; %)



However, a breakdown of the responses by political orientation points to vast differences between the three camps: While on the Left and in the Center, a sizeable majority disagree that Arab emigration from Israel should be encouraged by the government “from the top down,” on the Right only a minority reject such a notion.

**Table 4.11** (Jewish respondents; %)

	Left	Center	Right
Disagree that government should encourage Arabs to emigrate from Israel	91	74	39

We returned this year to a question that we posed in 2017: In the opinion of the interviewees, should the perspectives of both Jews and Arabs on the history of the conflict between them be taught in all schools in Israel? We found that a majority of Jews—and an even greater share of Arabs—answered in the affirmative.


**Teaching the perspectives of “the other” in the Arab-Israeli conflict**

Question 21

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**Figure 4.14** \ “The perspectives of both Jews and Arabs on the history of the conflict between them should be taught in all schools in Israel,” 2017 and 2019 (agree; Jewish and Arab respondents; %)



A breakdown of the responses in the Jewish sample by religiosity shows that only among Haredim does a minority (38%) agree with this assertion. In all the other groups, we found—as we did two years ago—a very sizeable majority who support the teaching of the conflict from both perspectives. Breaking down the Jewish responses by political orientation reveals a majority in all three camps who favor this approach, albeit to differing degrees (Right, 60%; Center, 77%; Left, 91%).


Staying on the subject of school curricula, we also examined the degree of support among Jewish respondents for the statement: “It is better to cut back on civics and democracy studies, and devote more hours to Jewish history and love of the land.” A majority of interviewees (58%) are opposed to such a move. Here too, as shown in the figure below, there is a substantial gap between the various political camps: Respondents from the Left and Center are overwhelmingly opposed to reducing civics and democracy studies, while the Right favor such a step by a sizeable majority.

**Cut back on civics,  
and devote more  
hours to love of  
the land?**

Question 50

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**Figure 4.15** \ “It is better to cut back on civics and democracy studies, and devote more hours to Jewish history and love of the land” (disagree; Jewish respondents; %)



Analyzing the responses by religiosity also yielded considerable differences: In the three religious groups (Haredim, national religious, and traditional religious), a minority are opposed to such a reduction, while in the other two groups in this category (traditional non-religious and secular), a majority are against it.

**Table 4.12** (Jewish respondents; %)

	Haredim	National religious	Traditional religious	Traditional non-religious	Secular
Oppose reducing civics and democracy studies	10	31	34	62	81

Interestingly, the share of national religious respondents who are opposed to cutting back on civics and democracy, and increasing the study of Jewish history and love of the land, has risen since the last time we studied this question (in 2013), when 26% were opposed.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Tamar Hermann, Gilad Be'ery, Ella Heller, Chanan Cohen, Yuval Lebel, Hanan Mozes, and Kalman Neuman, *The National-Religious Sector in Israel 2014* (Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute, 2014).

## Chapter 5 \ The IDF and Its Public Standing

In this chapter, we discuss the following topics:

- The IDF as “the people’s army”
- Abolishing mandatory enlistment, and turning the IDF into a professional army
- Rating the IDF’s performance
- Value system of the IDF’s senior command compared with that of the general public
- Parents’ advice to their sons and daughters prior to enlistment
- Fairness of assignment process for new recruits

When the IDF was established in 1949, it was decided that it would be a “people’s army” (in the words of then-Prime Minister David Ben Gurion: “a people is defended by a people’s army”). It was also determined that all eighteen-year-olds would be required to enlist, with certain exemptions based on criteria set by law (relating to sex, religious observance, and nationality). The question of whether or not to maintain the “people’s army” model is the subject of ongoing public discussion; likewise, there is a lively debate as to whether this is still an accurate description of the IDF today. We will be addressing these questions and others in this chapter.<sup>12</sup>

The survey findings show that an overwhelming majority of the Jewish public still consider the IDF to be the people’s army. Only a small minority hold that this is not an accurate description.


### Is the IDF “the people’s army”?

Question 47

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
**Figure 5.1 \ The IDF is “the people’s army” (Jewish respondents; %)**



<sup>12</sup> Several of the questions in this chapter were presented to the Jewish sample alone, since past experience has shown us that Arab interviewees do not welcome being asked about the issues these questions address.

The perception by the Israeli Jewish public of the IDF as the people’s army has not been consistent in recent years, apparently due to the impact of specific events. Thus, in the assessments we conducted in the first half of the decade (2013 and 2015), a sizeable majority responded that the definition of the IDF as the people’s army was quite or very accurate. By contrast (as shown in the figure below), in 2017–2018 there was a sharp drop in public acceptance of this description, perhaps in light of the Elor Azaria affair.<sup>13</sup> The past year has seen a significant rise in the share of respondents who agree with this depiction of the IDF, returning to the levels in the earlier part of the decade.

**Figure 5.2** \ Believe that the definition of the IDF as “the people’s army” is accurate, 2013–2019 (Jewish respondents; %)



Which group in the Jewish public is the most likely to view the IDF as the people’s army, and which is the least inclined to do so? Slightly less than half of those who identify politically with the Right answered that the description of the IDF as the people’s army is very accurate, with 38% in the Center and 22% on the Left sharing this view; however, when the responses “very accurate” and “quite accurate” are combined, the gaps become narrower (Right, 82%; Center, 76%; Left, 61%). In other words, a majority in all political camps hold that the IDF is indeed the people’s army.

<sup>13</sup> The reference is to an incident that took place in March 2016 in which an IDF soldier named Elor Azaria fatally shot a Palestinian as the latter lay seriously wounded on the ground after carrying out a terrorist attack.

A breakdown of the responses by religiosity shows that less than half the Haredi respondents (49%) consider the definition of the IDF as the people's army to be quite or very accurate, compared with an overwhelming majority in the other groups (national religious, 87%; traditional religious, 92%; traditional non-religious, 79%; secular, 73%).

Analyzing the results by ethnic origin shows that in all the ethnic groups surveyed, the majority think that referring to the IDF as the people's army is an accurate description, with the highest proportion found among FSU immigrants. The differences between men and women on this issue, and most of the others in this chapter, are negligible.


**Table 5.1** (Jewish respondents; %)

		"The people's army" is an accurate description of the IDF	"The people's army" is not an accurate description of the IDF	Don't know	Total
<b>Political orientation</b>	Right	82	16	2	100
	Center	76	21	3	100
	Left	61	34	5	100
<b>Religiosity</b>	Haredim	49	41	10	100
	National religious	87	11	2	100
	Traditional religious	92	5	3	100
	Traditional non-religious	79	19	2	100
	Secular	73	24	3	100
<b>Ethnicity</b>	Ashkenazim	72	24	4	100
	Mizrahim	78	19	3	100
	Mixed	77	19	4	100
	FSU immigrants	93	6	1	100

A connection was also found between perceptions of the IDF as the people's army and assessments of the state of democracy in Israel. A total of 83% of respondents who rated Israeli democracy as good or very good, and 79% of those who gave it a grade of fair, believed that the term "the people's army" is an apt description of the IDF. In comparison, just 65% of those who assigned a score of poor or very poor to Israeli democracy agreed that the description of the IDF as the people's army is an accurate one.

The next question we explored was whether the Jewish public is opposed to abolishing conscription, or supports such a step and in fact wants the IDF to become a professional army. We found that the share of respondents who oppose the shift to a professional army (54%) exceeds the share who support it (39.5%). Based on surveys we conducted in recent years, the percentage who favor abolishing mandatory enlistment in the IDF and changing over to a professional army has remained steady for the most part, meaning that the bulk of the Jewish public in Israel has supported maintaining the status quo in this area over time.

**Figure 5.3** \ "What is your opinion of the proposal (raised repeatedly in recent years) to abolish mandatory enlistment and turn the IDF into a professional army?" (Jewish respondents; %)



A breakdown of the responses by religiosity shows that a decisive majority of Haredi respondents are in favor of the shift to a professional army (82% strongly or somewhat support such a move), while a majority in the other groups prefer to maintain mandatory enlistment. The Haredi exception is understandable since, if conscription were abolished and the IDF became a professional army, this would remove a huge bone of contention between the Haredi community and most of the other groups in Israeli Jewish society.

## Mandatory enlistment?

### Question 51


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
**Figure 5.4** \ “What is your opinion of the proposal (raised repeatedly in recent years) to abolish mandatory enlistment and turn the IDF into a professional army?” by religiosity (Jewish respondents; %)



A breakdown by income reveals that whereas less than one-third of respondents with incomes above the Israeli average support the abolition of mandatory enlistment and the shift to a professional army, a majority (52%) of those with below-average incomes favor this step—perhaps because if their sons and daughters did not have to enlist, this would free them to increase the family income, or because it is difficult for low-income families to bear the financial burden of supporting soldiers during their compulsory service, and if their sons and daughters were to enlist in the IDF as a professional army, they would be better compensated.


The degree of support for abolishing conscription and shifting to a professional army model is strongest on the Right (at 44%), and weakest in the Center. Support on the Right is still the highest even if we subtract the Haredim, who (as noted above) back the elimination of mandatory enlistment virtually across the board. There is reason to assume that this position stems from the high incidence of lower income earners on the Right, who, as we saw earlier, are more strongly in favor of changing the military service model.

**Figure 5.5** \ “What is your opinion of the proposal (raised repeatedly in recent years) to abolish mandatory enlistment and turn the IDF into a professional army?” by political orientation (somewhat or strongly support; Jewish respondents; %)



We found further that the older the respondents, the less their support for changing over to a professional army. This may be due to generational differences regarding the necessity of military service as a civic act, or regarding the IDF's standing in Israeli society and the importance of military service as a part of life in Israel.

**Figure 5.6** \ Support abolishing mandatory enlistment and turning the IDF into a professional army, by age (Jewish respondents; %)



All the survey participants were asked what grade they would assign to the IDF in six areas, on a scale from 1 (unsatisfactory) to 5 (excellent). As expected, the grades given by the Arab interviewees in all areas were significantly lower than those given by the Jews.

The area in which the IDF earned the highest score from the Jewish respondents, and the lowest from the Arab interviewees, was moral conduct in combat. The vast majority of the Jewish interviewees rate the IDF's performance in this area as good or excellent, as contrasted with less than one-fifth of the Arab interviewees.

The area that reached second place in the rankings among Jews, and first place among Arabs, was combat readiness. Over three-quarters of the Jewish respondents, and slightly less than half of the Arab respondents, gave the IDF a grade of good or excellent in this area. In other words, while the Arab public feels that the IDF's moral conduct in battle is flawed, it largely recognizes the army's high level of combat readiness.

A relatively high score was given by both the Jewish and Arab samples for subordination to the elected political leadership. In the other areas that we examined—equality between men and women, treatment of soldiers and handling of their problems, and financial/budgetary management—much lower percentages of both Jewish and Arab respondents rated the IDF's performance as good or excellent. This finding jibes with the desire of most of the public to refrain from increasing the army's budget.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>14</sup> For a discussion of the IDF budget, see Chapter 3, pp. 79-80.


### Grading IDF performance in various areas

Questions 48.1–48.6

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**Figure 5.7 \** Good or excellent IDF performance in various areas (Jewish and Arab respondents; %)




In several of the areas studied, we found noticeable differences in comparison with the 2017 survey. Two years ago, roughly one-third of the interviewees categorized the treatment of soldiers and the handling of their problems as good or excellent, whereas in the present survey over 40% felt this way. An increase (of 3.5 percent) was also found this year over 2017 in rating the moral conduct of the IDF in combat. On the other hand, there was a decline of 4 percentage points in the IDF's performance score for equality between men and women.

From a breakdown of the Jewish sample by religiosity, it emerges that in all six areas studied, the Haredi respondents assigned the lowest grades of all the groups. In an analysis by sex, we did not find differences between men and women in the scores they awarded in the various areas, with the exception of equality between men and women: 53% of the men surveyed stated that there is equality between the sexes in the IDF, as opposed to only 39% of the women; that is, a majority of men hold that the IDF's performance in this area is acceptable, whereas a majority of women feel the opposite way.

We found further that in all six areas studied, those (Jewish) interviewees who supported eliminating a conscript army and replacing it with a professional fighting force assigned lower grades for IDF performance than did the interviewees who were opposed to abolishing mandatory enlistment and turning the IDF into a professional army.


**Figure 5.8** \ Good or excellent IDF performance in various areas, by position on mandatory enlistment (Jewish respondents; %)



In contrast with the respondents' demographic characteristics (apart from nationality)—which have only a weak association with their assessments of IDF performance—we found that opinions of the army's functioning are closely connected with the degree of trust in this institution. As presented in Chapter 2, a majority of the Jewish interviewees once again expressed great faith in the IDF in this year's survey. Thus, while roughly two-thirds of the respondents who view the IDF's performance in the areas studied as good or excellent also expressed a high level of trust in the IDF, of those who graded the army's performance as poor or unsatisfactory, less than one-half rated their level of trust in the army as high.

For each of the survey participants, we calculated the overall average for IDF performance in the six areas studied. As shown in the following figure, the greater the degree of trust in the army, the higher the average performance score assigned by the interviewees in all the areas combined. Of course, the opposite can also hold true: the more positive the assessment of performance, the higher the level of trust in the IDF.

**Figure 5.9** \ Average score for IDF performance in various areas, by degree of trust in the IDF (Jewish respondents)



In 2016, the Elor Azaria affair unfolded (as explained above), igniting a heated debate as to whether Azaria acted in accordance with IDF values. The immediate condemnation of his actions by the highest levels of the IDF revealed seeming disparities between the values of the IDF senior command and broad segments of the Israeli public. **In a survey conducted not long after the episode took place**, we examined whether the value system of the IDF's high command was seen as similar or dissimilar to that of the general public in Israel. At that time, roughly half (49%) of respondents stated that the value system of the IDF senior officers was close to that of the general public. Revisiting this question in the present survey, we found that three years later, opinions among most of the Jewish public have noticeably shifted: Today, a majority (71%) hold that the values of the IDF and of the public are in sync. There was therefore no basis for the fears raised in 2016 of an irreparable rift between the public and the highest levels of the IDF.


**Do the public and the IDF senior command share the same values?**

Question 25

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
**Figure 5.10** \ How similar are the value systems of the IDF senior command and of the Israeli public, 2016 and 2019 (Jewish respondents; %)



A breakdown of the Jewish sample by religiosity shows that the Haredim are the only group in which less than half (47%) of the interviewees state that the values of the IDF top brass are quite similar or very similar to those of the general public in Israel. In the other groups in this category, a majority of between 69% (national religious respondents) and 82% (traditional non-religious) hold that the values of the IDF senior officers and of the Israeli public are compatible.

Breaking down the results by age, we found that in all the age groups, the majority see a congruence between the values of the high command and those of the public; but while only a small majority of the younger respondents (up to age 34) believe that the value systems are similar, in the oldest cohort (aged 65 and over), the vast majority share this view.

**Figure 5.11** \ The value system of the IDF's senior command is similar to that of the Israeli public, by age (Jewish respondents; %)



Somewhat surprisingly, we did not find substantial differences between camps when breaking down Jewish responses by political orientation.

Defense spending is the largest item in Israel's national budget. Nonetheless, year after year, we witness appeals from the defense establishment for increased funding, the reasoning being that growing external threats necessitate larger allocations. As we saw in the chapter on public services, the Israeli public is not eager to accede to this repeated request, and in fact would prefer to leave the defense budget at its current level. We therefore asked whether it is possible that the IDF top brass and the defense establishment are deliberately overstating the threats facing Israel in order to secure greater defense spending. As shown in the figure below, a majority of the Jewish public reject this assertion, while a majority of the Arab public agree with it.

As stated, the share of Jews who see the IDF as the people's army, as well as those who maintain that the values of the army's senior command are close to those of the general public, has recently been on the upswing. Likewise, the IDF's improved public image is reflected this year in a drop in those who agree with the statement that the IDF's top brass and the defense establishment intentionally inflate the threats facing Israel in order to secure additional defense funding. In 2015, 39% of the Jewish public agreed with this assertion, while this time only 32% take this view. In the Arab public, we see the opposite trend, with 41% claiming in 2015 that the IDF senior staff and the defense establishment deliberately exaggerate their depiction of the threats, as opposed to 58% who take this view in the present survey.


### Overstating threats to get more defense spending?

#### Question 33

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**Figure 5.12** \ “The IDF top brass and the defense establishment deliberately overstate the threats facing Israel in order to secure greater defense spending,” 2015 and 2019 (Jewish and Arab respondents; %)



A breakdown of the Jewish responses by political camp shows that on the Right and in the Center, nearly two-thirds reject the claim that the IDF heads and the defense establishment intentionally overstate security threats in order to increase the defense budget. By contrast, respondents on the Left are divided on this question, with the share of those who agree with this assertion being identical to the share who disagree with it. Analyzing the results in the Jewish sample by religiosity reveals that the lowest extent of agreement can be found among the national religious and the Haredim, and the highest, among the secular and traditional non-religious. In all groups in this category, the majority reject the above claim.


Among Arab interviewees, a majority (61%) of Muslims agree that the IDF top brass and the defense establishment deliberately overstate the threats facing Israel in order to secure greater defense funding, compared with 50% of Christians and 44% of Druze who feel this way.

**Table 5.2** \ The IDF top brass and the defense establishment deliberately overstate the threats facing Israel in order to secure greater defense spending (Jewish and Arab respondents; %)

			Somewhat or strongly agree	Somewhat or strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	Political orientation	Right	29	63	8	100
		Center	29.5	64	6.5	100
		Left	47	45	8	100
	Religiosity	Haredim	25	63	12	100
		National religious	21	71	8	100
		Traditional religious	30	57	13	100
		Traditional non-religious	34	60	6	100
		Secular	36	57	7	100
	Arabs	Religion	Muslims	61	19	20
Christians			50	21	29	100
Druze			44	31	25	100

Of the interviewees who agree that security threats are exaggerated to obtain higher defense funding, over one-third argue that the defense budget should be reduced, and less than one-quarter hold that it should be increased. By contrast, of those who do not feel that the threats are being overstated, just 15% state that the defense budget should be reduced, and over one-third, that it should be increased.

**Figure 5.13** \ “The IDF top brass and the defense establishment deliberately overstate the threats facing Israel in order to secure greater defense spending,” by position on increasing or reducing the defense budget (total sample; %)



**Parents' preferences for their children's military service**

Questions 45, 46

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We asked the Jewish and the Druze interviewees what they would advise their son to do if he were about to enlist in the IDF. The Jewish interviewees were also asked how they would counsel their daughter in this case.


Among the Jewish interviewees, the preferred option for boys was for them to serve in a combat unit, and for girls, to enlist and let the army decide on the type of role. For the Druze interviewees, the option they favored for their sons was to volunteer for national or civilian service (31%), followed by to try to get out of serving (24%). It should be noted that the Druze sample is too small to be able to draw far-ranging conclusions regarding attitudes toward military service.

In second place for parents of Jewish young men is enlisting and letting the army decide what tasks they should perform; and for parents of young women, requesting to serve in a combat unit. For Druze respondents, the second most popular option among parents is to enlist in the

army and try to serve in a non-combat role. In third place for parents of young Jewish men and women is the latter option, of enlisting and attempting to serve in a non-combat role.

The greatest disparities among Jewish interviewees were with regard to recommending that their children volunteer for national or civilian service: This is the preferred option for 15% of parents of young women, but only 5% of parents of young men. So too with respect to trying to get out of military service: 9% of parents would advise this course of action for their daughter who was about to enlist, and just 5% for their son in the same circumstances.

**Figure 5.14** \ If your son or daughter was about to enlist in the army, what would you advise him/ her to do? (Jewish and Druze respondents; %)



The responses of the interviewees concerning their advice to a son or daughter on the verge of enlisting were found to be related to their demographic characteristics. A breakdown by sex shows that women, more than men, prefer that their children enlist in a non-combat role, and that men prefer that their sons or daughters serve in a combat role or special combat unit more than do women.

Breaking down the results by religiosity, we found that the Haredi interviewees would prefer, first and foremost, that their sons try to avoid army service, or that they volunteer for national or civilian service. A majority of national religious respondents would rather have their sons serve as combat soldiers or in a special combat unit, and their daughters volunteer for national or civilian service. Among secular interviewees, the two preferred options for both sons and daughters are to enlist and let the army decide on the assignment, or to serve as a combat soldier or in a special combat unit.

A breakdown by age reveals that the youngest age group (18–24) is the most strongly in favor of their (future) offspring trying to avoid army service, for both sons and daughters. Likewise, we found that the younger respondents are the least inclined to support their sons' or daughters' serving in a combat unit, if and when they enlist.

We found further that Jewish interviewees who identify themselves as belonging to weaker groups in Israeli society are less likely to encourage their children (both sons and daughters) not to enlist in the army at all (meaning to totally avoid military service), compared with those who associate themselves with the stronger groups. Moreover, the "stronger" interviewees are less willing than the "weaker" ones to encourage their sons to serve in combat unit.

Thus, the findings indicate that the IDF is (still) perceived by the Israeli public as a path to social mobility, that is, an institution that makes it possible for individuals from weaker groups to move upward in Israeli society. This explains the greater motivation in these groups to not only refrain from getting out of serving but even—and especially—to sign up for combat duty.

**Table 5.4** (Jewish respondents; %)

			Try to	Enlist, but	Enlist,	Enlist, and	Enlist and	Volunteer	Don't	Total
			get	try to serve	and let	request	volunteer	for national	know	
			out of	in non-	army	to serve	for special	or civilian		
			serving	combat	decide	as combat	combat	service		
			role	role	on role	soldier	unit			
Sex	Male recruit	Men	5	8	26	18	27	4	12	100
		Women	5	23	30	11	13	5	13	100
	Female recruit	Men	10	11	30	9	14	14	12	100
		Women	9	21	28	8	7	15	12	100


		Try to get out of serving	Enlist, but try to serve in non-combat role	Enlist, and let army decide on role	Enlist, and request to serve as combat soldier	Enlist and volunteer for special combat unit	Volunteer for national or civilian service	Don't know	Total	
Religiosity	Male recruit	Haredim	20	6	11	7	1	18	37	100
		National religious	6	7	24	24	28	4	7	100
		Traditional religious	4	18	33	16	16	2	11	100
		Traditional non-religious	2	17	33	18	23	1	6	100
		Secular	3	19	30	12	21	4	11	100
	Female recruit	National religious	8	11	13	7	4	50	7	100
		Traditional religious	8	10	28	9	6	25	14	100
		Traditional non-religious	3	20	37	11	16	6	7	100
		Secular	3	20	35	10	14	6	12	100

		Try to get out of serving	Enlist, but try to serve in non-combat role	Enlist, and let army decide on role	Enlist, and request to serve as combat soldier	Enlist and volunteer for special combat unit	Volunteer for national or civilian service	Don't know	Total	
Age	Male recruit	18–24	16	18	24	10	13	10	9	100
		25–34	5	19	21	10	23	7	15	100
		35–44	5	21	24	14	17	4	15	100
		45–54	4	16	29	16	12	8	15	100
		55–64	1	13	30	18	27	3	8	100
		65+	3	7	39	18	22	—	11	100
	Female recruit	18–24	22	18	15	5	4	27	9	100
		25–34	13	20	23	5	7	20	12	100
		35–44	10	21	28	7	9	16	9	100
		45–54	10	12	30	10	10	13	15	100
		55–64	3	14	31	11	20	11	10	100
		65+	4	10	42	13	13	7	11	100
Identification with stronger or weaker group	Male recruit	Stronger group	9	13	26	9	17	8	18	100
		Weaker group	3	17	29	16	21	3	11	100
	Female recruit	Stronger group	15	14	24	9	11	12	15	100
		Weaker group	7	17	32	9	10	16	9	100

On the whole, then, the majority of Jewish respondents would like their sons and daughters to serve in the military—as combat soldiers or in non-combat roles—and a sizeable proportion support letting the IDF decide where to assign new recruits, both male and female.

We wished to know how fair and egalitarian the system for assigning new IDF recruits to a given role is considered by our respondents. This question was posed to Jewish and Druze interviewees (the two groups for whom the issue of enlistment in the IDF is applicable). The opinions of both populations were very similar: The majority stated that the placement process is quite fair or very fair, with a larger plurality choosing the former.

**Figure 5.15** \ In your opinion, how egalitarian and fair is the assignment of new IDF recruits to various roles? (Jewish and Druze respondents; %)



Breaking down the responses by age, we found that the share in the youngest cohort who feel that the system for assigning new recruits is egalitarian and fair is noticeably smaller than that in the older age groups; in other words, the former are more critical of the army.


### Fairness in assigning new recruits

Question 49

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**Figure 5.16** \ In your opinion, how egalitarian and fair is the assignment of new IDF recruits to various roles? by age (Jewish and Druze respondents; %)



Analyzing the responses of the Jewish interviewees by religiosity shows that over one-third of Haredim declined to answer the question. Those who did respond were divided in their opinions between those who think the assignment process is egalitarian and fair (35%) and those who do not see it as such (28%). In the other groups in this category, the majority stated that the IDF's placement system is egalitarian and fair. We found that there is virtually no difference between the various groups in the size of this majority (between 55% and 57% in all of them).

A breakdown by social location (sense of belonging to stronger or weaker groups in society) found that the majority (57%) of those who associate themselves with the stronger groups think that the placement system for new recruits is fair and even-handed, compared with 47% who feel this way among those who identify with the weaker groups. Analyses based on political orientation and ethnic origin did not reveal substantial differences between subgroups in the Jewish sample.

## Chapter 6 \ Israel and Diaspora Jewry

In this chapter, we discuss the following topics:

- Are Jews the chosen people?
- Do Jews in Israel and the Diaspora share a common fate?
- How much weight should the opinions of Diaspora Jewry carry in Israeli decision-making?

As our starting point, we examined the extent to which Jewish interviewees agreed with the following statement: “The Jewish people is the chosen people, and therefore superior to other nations.” While a majority of the Jewish public as a whole disagree with this assertion, the data point to deep differences of opinion on this question: A majority of Haredi, national religious, and traditional religious respondents agree with this divisive statement, which draws a distinction between Jews and other nations, while most traditional non-religious and secular interviewees disagree with it, in similar proportions.


### Are Jews the chosen people?

Question 19

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**Figure 6.1 \ “Jews are the chosen people,” by religiosity (Jewish respondents; %)**




### A common fate for Jews in Israel and the Diaspora?

#### Question 22

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From here, we moved on to questioning the extent of agreement with the statement that “Jews in Israel and Jews in the Diaspora share a common fate.” The distribution of responses indicates that over one-half of the Jewish interviewees agree with this assertion; however, there is only a slight gap between those who agree and those who disagree.

**Figure 6.2** \ “Jews in Israel and the Diaspora share a common fate” (Jewish respondents; %)



An analysis of the responses by religiosity shows that in the three more-religious groups (Haredim, national religious, and traditional religious), the majority hold that Jews in Israel and in the Diaspora share a common destiny. By contrast, among traditional non-religious and secular respondents, the majority do not feel this way. A breakdown of the responses by political camp reveals that only on the Right is there a majority—and not a large one—who believe that the fate of Jews in Israel and Jews in the Diaspora is intertwined.


**Table 6.1** (Jewish respondents; %)

Agree that Jews in Israel and the Diaspora share a common fate		
<b>Religiosity</b>	Haredim	<b>68.5</b>
	National religious	<b>72</b>
	Traditional religious	<b>63</b>
	Traditional non-religious	<b>44.5</b>
	Secular	<b>42</b>

Agree that Jews in Israel and the Diaspora share a common fate		
Political orientation	Left	44
	Center	47
	Right	57

Recently, the question of whether the government of Israel should take the opinions of Diaspora Jewry into account when making important decisions has come up repeatedly in various contexts. A majority of the Jews surveyed answered this question in the negative, that is, they believe that the government should not consider the opinions of Diaspora Jewry when making important decisions. We found a sharp increase in the proportion who share this view—from 46.5% in 2014 to 60% this year, which may indicate that not only does Diaspora Jewry seem to be distancing itself from Israel but the Jewish public in Israel is apparently also pulling away from Jews in the Diaspora.

**Figure 6.3** \ When making important decisions, should the government of Israel take the opinions of Diaspora Jewry into account? (Jewish respondents; %)



A breakdown of the responses by religiosity did not produce substantial differences between the groups: In all cases, the majority are against taking the opinions of Diaspora Jewry into account, though opposition is strongest on this point among national religious respondents. Analyzing the responses by political orientation yielded similar results, with relatively small differences between camps. Here, the strongest opposition was found among those who identify themselves with the Right.

### Importance of Diaspora Jewry's opinions for Israeli decision-making

#### Question 14

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**Table 6.2** (Jewish respondents; %)

		<b>Believe the Israeli government should not take into account the opinions of Diaspora Jewry when making important decisions</b>
<b>Religiosity</b>	Haredim	<b>53</b>
	National religious	<b>64</b>
	Traditional religious	<b>52</b>
	Traditional non-religious	<b>61</b>
	Secular	<b>61</b>
<b>Political orientation</b>	Left	<b>54</b>
	Center	<b>58</b>
	Right	<b>64</b>

## Part Two

# Israeli Democracy— An International Comparison



## Chapter 7 \ International Indicators

Each year, research institutes around the world publish a number of comparative indicators that examine the quality of democracy in various countries across a range of aspects, including democratic structure, functioning, and values. In this chapter, we will be looking at Israeli democracy from a global perspective, based on the scores assigned to it by different research organizations. These assessments are drawn from a combination of official statistics from the different countries, public opinion polls, in-depth academic studies, and the opinions of professional experts. This year, we review 15 indicators in six areas:

- (a) democratic rights and freedoms (political rights, civil liberties, and freedom of the press)
- (b) the democratic process (political participation, political culture and debate, and voice and accountability)
- (c) governance (rule of law, and functioning of government)
- (d) political corruption (perception of corruption, and the extent of control over corruption)
- (e) regulatory quality
- (f) equal distribution of resources

In reviewing these indicators, we apply two types of comparison: first, Israel's performance vis-à-vis other countries; and second, Israel's standing in 2019 compared with that of previous years. For each indicator, we will present three ratings: (1) Israel's score for this year; (2) Israel's ranking in relation to all the other countries included in the indicator; and (3) Israel's ranking relative to its fellow members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

**A note on methodology:** Each of the research institutes uses its own scale to present its scores, e.g., 0–10, 0–40, 0–60, 0–1, and –2.5 to 2.5. To make it easier to compare Israel's scores in the various indicators, we converted the original scores to percentiles, ranking them on a scale from 0 to 100. The higher the percentile, the better the democratic performance, and vice versa.

The table below presents Israel's scores for 2019 and its ranking in the various indicators.<sup>15</sup> In the first set of comparisons—ranking relative to all countries surveyed—Israel is positioned, as in past years, in the upper two quartiles of the scale in all the international indicators. Especially

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<sup>15</sup> A detailed compilation of Israel's scores this year and the method used to determine them, as well as a full description of the sources, can be found in Appendix 4.

noteworthy, this year as well, are its high rankings in those indicators dealing with political participation, democratic political culture, governance (functioning of government, rule of law), and regulatory quality. By contrast, when it comes to freedom of the press, civil liberties, most measures of democratic process (deliberative democracy, participatory democracy, egalitarian democracy, voice and accountability), and equal distribution of resources, Israel's global ranking is lower, placing it in the second quartile.

**Table 7.1 \ Israel's ranking in international indicators**

		Global ranking	All countries surveyed (percentile)	OECD ranking (out of 36 countries)	OECD countries (percentile)	Israel's normalized score (0–100)
Democratic rights and freedoms	Political rights (Freedom House)	54-59/212	72-75	29-31	14-19	87.5
	Civil liberties (Freedom House)	80-84/212	60-62	33-34	5-8	71.7
	Freedom of the press (Reporters Without Borders)	88/180	51	34	5	69.2
Democratic process	Voice and accountability (World Bank)	61/204	70	33	8	63.9
	Political participation (Economist Intelligence Unit)	2-4/167	98-99	2-4	89-94	88.9
	Egalitarian democracy (V-Dem)	53/179	70	31	14	74.7
	Participatory democracy (V-Dem)	78-81/179	55-56	33	8	55.6
	Deliberative democracy (V-Dem)	76-77/179	57	32	11	73.8
	Democratic political culture (Economist Intelligence Unit)	18-26/167	84-89	15-20	44-58	75.0

		Global ranking	All countries surveyed (percentile)	OECD ranking (out of 36 countries)	OECD countries (percentile)	Israel's normalized score (0–100)
Governance	Functioning of government (Economist Intelligence Unit)	27-32/167	81-84	20-23	36-44	75.0
	Rule of law (World Bank)	38/209	82	25	31	70.4
Corruption	Control of corruption (World Bank)	43/209	79	23	36	66.5
	Perception of corruption (Transparency International)	34-35/180	81	23	36	61.0
Regulation	Regulatory quality (World Bank)	28/209	87	20	44	75.4
Economic equality	Equal distribution of resources (V-Dem Institute)	60/179	66	31	14	78.4


The following figure presents Israel's ranking relative to all countries surveyed in this report as well as to the OECD member states.

Figure 7a \ Israel's ranking in international indicators (percentile)

### Democratic rights and freedoms



### Democratic process



### Governance



### Corruption



### Regulation




### Economic equality



■ Percentile among all countries surveyed  
 ■ Percentile among OECD countries


As stated above in the note on methodology, we standardized the various scores on a uniform scale of 0 to 100. Israel's score in all the indicators was greater than 50. Its highest scores this year, as in previous years, are in political participation (88.9) and political rights (87.5), which changed places in the top slots this year. Its lowest score, once again this year, was in participatory democracy (55.6)—even showing a slight decline from 2018.

**Figure 7b** \ Israel's score in various indicators, 2019



## 7.1 Democratic Rights and Freedoms


### Political rights




*Freedom in the World*, a report published annually by Freedom House, is based on assessments compiled by experts. It focuses on two indicators that reflect changes in countries' performance in the areas of political rights and civil liberties. The political rights indicator examines whether a given country meets the following criteria: free and fair elections; open competition among political parties; actual power of elected representatives; a strong and influential opposition; a low level of corruption; and the safeguarding of minority rights. In addition, it assesses whether the country is subject to military rule and whether there is foreign intervention in its affairs.

Israel's score this year in the political rights indicator is 87.5, representing its first downturn following ten consecutive years with a score of 90. In fact, Israel's score this year is the lowest since *Freedom in the World* began these assessments in 2003. For the first time, this year's score dropped Israel to the second quartile among all countries surveyed, in the 72nd–75th percentile, alongside India, Latvia, Malta, Poland, and Jamaica. Despite its relatively high score in the global list of countries, Israel earns a low ranking compared with the OECD states (14th–19th percentile).

**Figure 7.1** \ Israel's score in political rights indicator, 2003–2019




**Civil liberties**




As stated, the civil liberties indicator is the second component of the *Freedom in the World* report. This indicator assesses to what extent a country upholds freedoms of expression, the press, religion, association, and academic freedom, along with an independent judicial system, rule of law, personal security, equality before the law, low levels of political violence, freedom of movement, property rights, gender equality, and marital and family rights.

Israel's score in the civil liberties indicator remains similar to that of previous years, at 71.7. This places Israel in the category of countries with only "partial protection of civil liberties." Of the countries included in this indicator, Israel ranks in the 60th–62nd percentile, that is, the second quartile. Among OECD members, Israel places in the 5th–8th percentile, near the bottom of the lowest quartile, together with Hungary, and ahead of only Turkey and Mexico.

**Figure 7.2 \** Israel's score in civil liberties indicator, 2003–2019




## Freedom of the press



The *World Press Freedom Index*, published by Reporters Without Borders, assesses reporters' freedom of activity in 180 countries around the globe. It is calculated based on an analysis of quantitative data—for example, the number of incidents of abuse or acts of violence against journalists—combined with the opinions of media experts on such areas as media independence, pluralism, censorship, and transparency.


Israel's scores in this indicator have not changed significantly since 2012. Its score this year was 69.2, slightly lower than last year's grade of 69.7. In comparison with all other countries surveyed, Israel places near the bottom of the second quartile, ranking 88th out of 180. However, relative to the OECD states, it is positioned extremely low, in the 5th percentile, leading only Turkey and Mexico. This low score, according to Reporters Without Borders, is due to military censorship in certain cases; hostility to journalists from members of government; difficulties of foreign journalists in renewing their permits to cover Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip; and IDF infringement on the rights of Palestinian journalists. This year's score was also influenced by the deaths of two Palestinian reporters from IDF fire during 2018.

**Figure 7.3** \ Israel's score in freedom of the press indicator, 2003–2019



## 7.2 Democratic Process


### Voice and accountability




The voice and accountability indicator of the World Bank is based on expert assessments, public opinion polls, and official statistics. It examines the extent to which citizens can participate in determining the composition of the government, as well as levels of freedom of expression, association, and the press, which are obviously basic prerequisites for free elections.

Israel's score this year in voice and accountability is 63.9, a decline of 1.5 points from last year (65.4), following four years of a slight upward trend. Its global ranking dropped correspondingly, to the 70th percentile (compared with 72nd last year). In comparison with the OECD states, Israel places near the bottom of the ranking, in the 8th percentile, above only Mexico and Hungary.

**Figure 7.4** \ Israel's score in voice and accountability indicator, 2003–2019




## Political participation




The political participation indicator of the Economist Intelligence Unit is based on a combination of expert assessments, public opinion polls, and official statistics that consider the following parameters: voter turnout; minority voting rights and right of association; proportion of women in parliament; party membership rates; citizens' political engagement and level of interest in current affairs; readiness to participate in legal demonstrations; and government encouragement of political participation.

Israel continues to score extremely highly in political participation for the fifth consecutive year, at 88.9. This positions it in second place globally (98th–99th percentile), together with Iceland and New Zealand and surpassing most of the established democracies. Israel also ranks highly among OECD countries, placing in the upper quartile (89th–94th percentile).

**Figure 7.5** \ Israel's score in political participation indicator, 2007–2019


## Egalitarian democracy




The Egalitarian Component Index, one of several democracy indicators compiled by the V-Dem (Varieties of Democracy) Institute, is based on a worldwide survey of experts. It examines to what extent all groups in a given society are able to play a role in the political sphere, run for office, express their opinions, and influence decision-making.

Israel's 2019 score in this index is 74.7, slightly lower than last year's. Israel's global ranking also dipped, to the 70th percentile. Relative to the OECD states, Israel places near the bottom (in the 14th percentile), ahead of the United States, Hungary, Chile, Mexico, and Turkey.

**Figure 7.6 \** Israel's score in egalitarian democracy indicator, 2003–2019




## Participatory democracy




The Participatory Component Index (PCI) produced by the V-Dem Institute is based on the premise that in a substantive democracy, citizens' political involvement is not confined to voting in elections every few years but must also include active, ongoing participation in various spheres of political activity. Thus, the PCI measures citizens' participation in civil society organizations as well as in regional and local government.

Israel's score this year is 55.6, reflecting a significant drop of two points from last year (57.6), and its lowest score in this indicator since 1994. Relative to the other countries surveyed, Israel fell to the 55th–56th percentile, sharing this slot with El Salvador, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Malaysia. Moreover, of all the V-Dem indices, Israel's placement in this one is the lowest. In comparison with the OECD states, Israel ranks near the bottom, in 33rd place out of 36, positioning it in the 8th percentile, above only Turkey, Luxembourg, and the Czech Republic.

**Figure 7.7** \ Israel's score in participatory democracy indicator, 2003–2019




## Deliberative democracy




The V-Dem Institute's Deliberative Component Index focuses on the political decision-making process. A deliberative democracy is one in which public decisions are centered on the common good, as opposed to being shaped by group solidarity, narrow interests, or coercion. In keeping with this approach, a substantive democracy requires respectful dialogue among informed and aware participants who are willing to change their views as a result of free public discourse. Democratic deliberation is measured by the extent to which political elites share the reasoning for their positions on key issues under discussion, acknowledge opposing views, and respect those who disagree with them.

Israel's score this year in the DCI is 73.8, continuing a noticeable downturn for the second year in a row (following a score of 80.4 in 2017). This marks its lowest score in this indicator in 30 years. In the global ranking, Israel places in the second quartile (57th percentile). Compared with the OECD states, however, it is in the lowest quartile, ranking 32nd out of 36—below Lithuania and Mexico, and above Turkey, Hungary, Poland, and the United States.

**Figure 7.8** \ Israel's score in deliberative democracy indicator, 2003–2019



## Democratic political culture




The Economist Intelligence Unit's democratic political culture indicator, based on expert assessments and public opinion polls, measures the extent to which a country's political culture can be characterized as democratic, with emphasis on the following parameters: the degree of

citizens' support for a democratic system, and their opposition to a "strong leader," a military regime, or technocratic leadership; the perception (or lack thereof) that democracy is beneficial to public order and economic prosperity; and a tradition of separation of church and state.


Once again this year, Israel's score is 75, a grade that has remained unchanged since this indicator was first compiled in 2001. Globally, Israel ranks in the top quartile, in the 18–26 slot out of 167 countries (84th–89th percentile). In the OECD ranking, Israel falls near the mid-point, on a par with Germany, Japan, Chile, South Korea, and the United States.

**Figure 7.9** \ Israel's score in democratic political culture indicator, 2007–2019



## 7.3 Governance


### Functioning of government




The Economist Intelligence Unit's functioning of government indicator is based on expert assessments, public opinion polls, and official government statistics that reflect the level of democratic functioning and the effectiveness of government institutions in numerous areas, among them: the government's ability to set policy; separation of powers among the three branches of government; parliamentary oversight of government; involvement of the military or other extra-political entities in politics; degree of government transparency and accountability; extent of corruption; and level of public trust in government institutions.

Israel's score of 75 has remained unchanged over the last two years, positioning it in the highest quartile (27th–32nd place out of 167 in the global rankings). Among the 36 OECD member states, Israel is situated in the third quartile (36th–44th percentile), along with France, Portugal, and the United Kingdom.

**Figure 7.10** \ Israel's score in functioning of government indicator, 2007–2019




## Rule of law



The World Bank's rule of law indicator, based on expert assessments, public opinion polls, and statistical data, measures the extent to which citizens and government bodies have confidence in, and abide by, the country's laws and social norms. It also examines the areas of contract enforcement, property rights, functioning of the police force and legal system, and prevention of crime and violence.


Though Israel's 2017 score in the rule of law indicator (73.2) was the highest since 2000, the past two years have seen a decline, to 70.4 in the current rating. This places Israel in the 82nd percentile globally, and in the 31st percentile (25th place) among OECD states.

**Figure 7.11** \ Israel's score in rule of law indicator, 2004–2019



## 7.4 Corruption


### Control of corruption




The control of corruption indicator, issued annually by the World Bank, assesses citizens' perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain. A wide range of variables are examined, from the incidence of corruption at the local and regional level to the influence of elites and private interests on the conduct of the state and its leaders. The data, which are drawn from various sources (research institutes, NGOs, international organizations, and private companies), are combined with the opinions of experts in the relevant fields and a survey of the general public. The higher the score in this indicator, the lesser the extent of corruption.

Israel's score this year in the control of corruption indicator is 66.5, a significant drop from last year (71.2), and its lowest rating since 2013. This leads us to conclude that corruption in Israel is on the rise. In keeping with the decline in its score, Israel also fell in the global ranking, from the 81st to the 79th percentile. In the OECD ranking, it remains in the 36th percentile, below Chile and Portugal, and above Slovenia and Poland.

**Figure 7.12** \ Israel's score in control of corruption indicator, 2003–2019




## Perception of corruption



The Corruption Perceptions Index, produced by Transparency International, is drawn from various sources. It reflects the opinion of experts on the extent of corruption in the public sector in the countries surveyed, with an emphasis on abuse of power for personal gain.


Israel's score this year was 61, representing a continuing downward trend for the second year running. In the global ranking as well, Israel dipped from the 84th percentile in 2017 to the 81st this year. Among the OECD states, Israel remained in 23rd place this year, positioning it in the 36th percentile, above Portugal and below Slovenia.

**Figure 7.13** \ Israel's score in perception of corruption indicator, 2003–2019



## 7.5 Regulation


### Regulatory quality



One of six indicators produced by the World Bank, the regulatory quality indicator assesses the government's ability to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. It does so by examining price controls, discriminatory taxation, efficiency of tax collection, ease of doing business, and competitiveness of the local market, among other factors.


Israel's score in regulatory quality is 75.4, placing it 28th in the global ranking (in the highest quartile, 87th percentile). Israel's international position rose steeply between 2006 (49th in the world) and 2010 (28th place), since which time it has, for the most part, remained steady. In the list of 36 OECD member states, Israel is ranked 20th (in the third quartile), between Chile and Belgium.

**Figure 7.14** \ Israel's score in regulatory quality indicator, 2003–2019



## 7.6 Economic Equality


### Equal distribution of resources



The equal distribution of resources index is a democracy indicator of the V-Dem Institute. It examines levels of poverty and economic disparity; access to food, education, and healthcare services among various groups; and the distribution of social power between populations from different socioeconomic classes, religions, and so on.

Israel's score this year in the equal distribution of resources index is 78.4, its lowest rating since 2000. It earned its highest score in 2011 (89.2), placing it in the 43rd slot in the global ranking that year, as opposed to 66th place today. Among the OECD states, Israel is situated in the lowest quartile (14th percentile).

**Figure 7.15** \ Israel's score in equal distribution of resources indicator, 2000–2019



## 7.7 Overview of International Indicators

On the whole, Israel has lost some ground over the past year in terms of its democratic markers. In 8 out of 15 indicators, it ranks lower than in 2018; in six others, its standing remains unchanged; and in only one measure has it shown a slight improvement (even in this case, Israel's relative global ranking rose, but its score remained the same as last year's).

**Table 7.2 / Israel's global ranking in 2019 indicators compared with 2018**

	Indicator	2019 normalized score	2019 ranking	2019 percentile	2018 ranking	2018 percentile	Change
Democratic rights and freedoms	Political rights (Freedom House)	87.5	54–59 (out of 212)	72–75	46–54 (out of 209)	74–78	▼
	Civil liberties (Freedom House)	71.7	80–84 (out of 212)	60–62	83–85 (out of 209)	59–60	▲
	Freedom of the press (Reporters Without Borders)	69.7	88 (out of 180)	51	87 (out of 180)	52	▼
Democratic process	Voice and accountability (World Bank)	65.4	61 (out of 204)	70	58 (out of 204)	72	▼
	Political participation (Economist Intelligence Unit)	88.9	2–4 (out of 167)	98–99	2–4 (out of 167)	98–99	=
	Egalitarian democracy (V-Dem)	74.7	53 (out of 179)	70	52–53 (out of 178)	70–71	=
	Participatory democracy (V-Dem)	55.6	78–81 (out of 179)	55–56	56–59 (out of 178)	67–69	▼
	Deliberative democracy (V-Dem)	76.2	76–77 (out of 179)	57	67–68 (out of 178)	62	▼
	Democratic political culture (Economist Intelligence Unit)	75	18–26 (out of 167)	84–89	16–26 (out of 167)	84–89	=
Governance	Functioning of government (Economist Intelligence Unit)	75	27–32 (out of 167)	81–84	27–31 (out of 167)	82–84	=
	Rule of law (World Bank)	70.4	38 (out of 209)	82	37 (out of 209)	82	=
Corruption	Perception of corruption (Transparency International)	61	34–35 (out of 180)	81	32 (out of 180)	82	▼
	Control of corruption (World Bank)	66.5	43 (out of 209)	79	39 (out of 209)	81	▼
Regulation	Regulatory quality (World Bank)	75.4	28 (out of 209)	87	27 (out of 209)	87	=
Economic equality	Equal distribution of resources (V-Dem Institute)	78.4	60 (out of 179)	66	57 (out of 178)	68	▼

▲ improvement in Israel's ranking compared with 2018

= no change in Israel's ranking compared with 2018

▼ decline in Israel's ranking compared with 2018

If we compare Israel's scores this year with the average of its scores over the past decade in each of the 15 indicators (Table 7.3), we find that in eight cases, its score this year is lower than the average for the previous decade; in six, its score is higher than the average; and in one, its score this year is the same as the ten-year average.

More specifically:

- In the three indicators of democratic rights and freedoms (civil liberties, political rights, and freedom of the press), Israel's score this year is lower than its average over the previous decade.
- In three out of the six indicators of democratic process, a similar picture emerges, with a decline this year from the ten-year average for egalitarian democracy, participatory democracy, and deliberative democracy.
- In two other indicators in the category of democratic process (political participation, and voice and accountability), Israel showed an improvement.
- In the two indicators of governance (functioning of government, and rule of law), the score for this year rose in comparison with the previous decade.
- In one of the corruption indicators (that of Transparency International), there was a slight improvement relative to the previous decade, while in the other (of the World Bank), there was a decline.
- In the regulatory quality indicator, Israel's score rose above the ten-year average, while in the equal distribution of resources indicator, Israel registered a steep drop compared with the previous decade.
- Israel's score this year for democratic political culture is the same as its average for the past decade.

**Table 7.3** / Israel's scores in 2019 indicators compared with average of previous decade

	Indicator	2019 score	Average score, 2009–2018	Change
Democratic rights and freedoms	Political rights (Freedom House)	87.5	90.3	▼
	Civil liberties (Freedom House)	71.7	75	▼
	Freedom of the press (Reporters Without Borders)	69.2	70.2*	▼

	Indicator	2019 score	Average score, 2009–2018	Change
Democratic process	Voice and accountability (World Bank)	63.9	63.6	⬆️
	Political participation (Economist Intelligence Unit)	88.9	85.4**	⬆️
	Egalitarian democracy (V-Dem)	74.7	76.3	⬇️
	Participatory democracy (V-Dem)	55.6	56.6	⬇️
	Deliberative democracy (V-Dem)	73.8	79.6	⬇️
	Democratic political culture (Economist Intelligence Unit)	75	75**	=
Governance	Functioning of government (Economist Intelligence Unit)	75	74.2**	⬆️
	Rule of law (World Bank)	70.4	69.4	⬆️
Corruption	Control of corruption (World Bank)	66.5	67.7	⬇️
	Perception of corruption (Transparency International)	61	60.8	⬆️
Regulation	Regulatory quality (World Bank)	75.4	74.1	⬆️
Economic equality	Equal distribution of resources (V-Dem Institute)	78.4	86.4	⬇️

\* For the Reporters Without Borders freedom of the press indicator, the average shown is for a period of nine years, as no score was published in 2010.

\*\* For the Economist Intelligence Unit indicators, the average shown is for a period of eight years, since scores were not published in 2008 and 2010.

⬆️ improvement in Israel's score compared with average of previous decade

= no change in Israel's score compared with average of previous decade

⬇️ decline in Israel's score compared with average of previous decade

## Summary

A review of the international indicators over time shows that in the last year, Israeli democracy has held steady in several areas, taken a step backward in others, and not improved in any respect. But a broader overview of the past decade reveals relatively moderate fluctuations in Israel's scores and its global ranking, reflecting a generally stable trend in its democratic profile. In all the indicators studied, Israel is located in the upper half of the scale in the global rankings, and in seven measures, it is even in the highest quartile. Nonetheless, a comparison of Israel's democratic standing with that of the other 35 OECD members shows that it is generally at the bottom of the list. Only in one indicator, that of political participation, is Israel in the upper half of the scale of OECD countries; by contrast, in eight other indicators, it is situated at the very bottom, in the lowest quartile.

Thus, although Israel meets the basic prerequisites of a democratic state with respect to the international indicators, it continues to grapple with major problems: In the three indicators of democratic rights and freedoms, its score this year is lower than the average for the previous decade, with the largest gap registered in the area of civil liberties. The low rating in this category of indicators stands out in particular if we compare Israel with its fellow members of the OECD. Moreover, this year (as in 2018), Israel is classified by Freedom House as a country with only "partial protection of civil liberties," and not full protection, as in the past. Israel is defined by this organization as strictly an electoral democracy, meaning a country with a democratic electoral process but lacking a full commitment to the basic values of a liberal democracy.

The areas where Israel earns the highest global ranking are citizens' political participation (voter turnout, membership in political parties, civil/political engagement, and so on) and democratic political culture (level of support for the democratic system). On the other hand, in two other indicators that also fall under the heading of democratic process—participatory democracy and deliberative democracy—Israel's scores are much lower, placing it near the mid-point of all the countries surveyed, and near the bottom of the list of OECD countries. In both these areas, we see a decline over the past decade in Israel's scores as well as its comparative ranking. With regard to governance (functioning of government and rule of law), Israel retains its relatively high global ranking this year, placing in the upper quartile.

And finally, this year we examined two indicators that have not appeared in our earlier democracy surveys: regulatory quality and equal distribution of resources. In the former, Israel's position is very good, relatively speaking, and we can even point to a slight upswing in its ranking over the past decade. By contrast, the distribution of resources indicator yields a much less positive picture: Israel ranks relatively low among all countries surveyed, and very low among the OECD states. Furthermore, a comparison with the previous decade shows a definite decline in Israel's standing in this area.



# Appendices



## Appendix 1

### Questionnaire and Distribution of Responses (Total Sample, Jews, Arabs; %)

#### 1. How would you characterize Israel's overall situation today?

	Very good	Good	So-so	Bad	Very bad	Don't know\ refuse	Total
Jews	16.1	34.4	32.6	8.7	7.0	1.2	100
Arabs	16.1	31.7	22.4	10.6	18.0	1.2	100
Total Sample	16.1	34.0	31.0	9.0	8.7	1.2	100

Discussion  
on p. 29

#### 2. To what extent do you feel part of the State of Israel and its problems?

	Very much	Quite a lot	Not so much	Not at all	Don't know\ refuse	Total
Jews	43.9	38.7	12.4	3.5	1.4	100
Arabs	12.3	29.6	38.9	19.1	0.0	100
Total Sample	38.9	37.3	16.7	6.0	1.2	100

Discussion  
on p. 44

- 
- Throughout the survey, this response was recorded if the respondent replied "I don't know," or was unwilling to select one of the options offered.
  - In certain cases, the "don't know/refuse" value was rounded up by 0.1% in order to bring the total to 100%.

Discussion  
on p. 89

### 3. Many Israelis from various groups feel like they are a minority in Israeli society. Do you also feel this way?

	Very much	Quite a lot	Not so much	Not at all	Don't know\ refuse	Total
Jews	11.2	18.7	17.6	51.0	1.5	100
Arabs	29.0	24.1	24.7	21.6	0.6	100
Total Sample	14.0	19.5	18.7	46.4	1.4	100

Discussion  
on p. 32

### 4. On a scale of 1 to 5 (where one = very bad and 5 = very good), how would you rate the state of democracy in Israel today?

	1 – Very bad	2	3	4	5 – Very good	Don't know\ refuse	Total
Jews	14.8	18.8	30.4	22.9	12.4	0.7	100
Arabs	27.0	11.0	35.6	11.7	14.1	0.6	100
Total Sample	16.7	17.5	31.2	21.1	12.8	0.7	100

Discussion  
on p. 65

### 5. Do you prefer to live in a country where taxes are higher but citizens receive many free services from the state, or a country where taxes are lower but citizens receive only a few basic services from the state?

	I prefer to pay higher taxes and receive many services from the state	I prefer to pay lower taxes and receive only basic services from the state	Don't know\ refuse	Total
Jews	50.6	37.4	12.0	100
Arabs	48.1	48.1	3.8	100
Total Sample	50.2	39.2	10.6	100

**6. Of the following, which do you see as the primary factor causing people to question if they wish to remain in Israel (for those who feel uncertain)?**

Discussion on p. 42

	Security situation	Economic situation	State of society	Rise of antidemocratic tendencies	Status of religion in Israel	All of the above	Don't know\ refuse	Other (specify)	Total
Jews	13.4	38.6	10.6	12.9	10.7	5.3	5.2	3.3	100
Arabs	30.2	29.0	7.4	14.8	8.6	4.9	3.1	2.0	100
Total Sample	16.1	37.1	10.1	13.2	10.4	5.2	4.8	3.1	100

**7. If you could receive American citizenship, or that of another Western country, would you prefer to live there or to remain in Israel?**

Discussion on p. 40

	I would prefer to live there	I would prefer to remain in Israel	Don't know\ refuse	Total
Jews	12.2	84.2	3.6	100
Arabs	14.2	84.6	1.2	100
Total Sample	12.5	84.2	3.3	100

**8. To what extent do you trust each of the following individuals or institutions?**

Discussion on p. 51

**8.1 The media**

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know\ refuse	Total
Jews	27.5	34.9	27.9	7.7	2.0	100
Arabs	34.0	25.9	26.5	9.9	3.7	100
Total Sample	28.5	33.4	27.7	8.1	2.3	100

### 8.2 The Supreme Court

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know \ refuse	Total
Jews	19.4	23.4	28.4	26.2	2.6	100
Arabs	19.9	16.7	28.0	28.0	7.4	100
Total Sample	19.4	22.3	28.3	26.5	3.5	100

### 8.3 The police

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know \ refuse	Total
Jews	13.8	40.0	33.0	11.4	1.8	100
Arabs	35.8	24.7	14.8	23.5	1.2	100
Total Sample	17.4	37.6	30.1	13.3	1.6	100

### 8.4 The President of Israel

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know \ refuse	Total
Jews	8.3	14.7	28.9	42.5	5.6	100
Arabs	37.4	15.3	14.7	22.7	9.9	100
Total Sample	13.0	14.8	26.6	39.3	6.3	100

### 8.5 The Knesset

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know \ refuse	Total
Jews	19.6	48.2	23.5	6.2	2.5	100
Arabs	40.4	26.8	14.6	9.1	9.1	100
Total Sample	22.9	44.8	22.0	6.7	3.6	100

**8.6 The IDF**

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know \ refuse	Total
Jews	2.8	6.2	33.1	56.9	1.0	100
Arabs	34.0	19.8	11.7	29.0	5.5	100
Total Sample	7.8	8.4	29.7	52.5	1.6	100

**8.7 The government**

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know \ refuse	Total
Jews	27.7	39.8	23.4	6.6	2.5	100
Arabs	44.6	21.4	15.9	11.7	6.4	100
Total Sample	30.4	36.9	22.2	7.4	3.1	100

**8.8 The political parties**

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know \ refuse	Total
Jews	23.4	52.1	11.9	2.1	10.5	100
Arabs	46.9	23.5	15.4	4.3	9.9	100
Total Sample	27.1	47.5	12.4	2.5	10.5	100

Discussion  
on p. 36

### 9. In your opinion, to what extent does the State of Israel safeguard the security of its citizens?

	Very much	Quite a lot	Not so much	Not at all	Don't know \ refuse	Total
Jews	16.5	46.8	29.7	5.6	1.4	100
Arabs	27.0	37.4	26.4	8.6	0.6	100
Total Sample	18.2	45.3	29.2	6.1	1.2	100

Discussion  
on p. 37

### 10. And to what extent does it ensure the welfare of its citizens?

	Very much	Quite a lot	Not so much	Not at all	Don't know \ refuse	Total
Jews	3.6	26.4	55.3	12.8	1.9	100
Arabs	18.5	42.6	32.1	6.2	0.6	100
Total Sample	6.0	29.0	51.6	11.7	1.7	100

Discussion  
on p. 79

### 11. Assuming that the state budget remains at a fixed amount (such that adding to one item means taking away from another), how should allocations be handled for:

#### 11.1 Defense (army)

	Reduce greatly	Reduce somewhat	Leave as is	Increase somewhat	Increase greatly	Don't know \ refuse	Total
Jews	4.9	16.4	44.1	13.4	17.1	4.1	100
Arabs	16.7	12.3	27.8	9.3	24.1	9.8	100
Total Sample	6.8	15.8	41.5	12.7	18.2	5.0	100

**11.2 Domestic security (police)**

	Reduce greatly	Reduce somewhat	Leave as is	Increase somewhat	Increase greatly	Don't know \ refuse	Total
Jews	2.9	6.6	39.3	24.8	19.7	6.7	100
Arabs	9.8	4.3	31.3	12.9	37.4	4.3	100
Total Sample	4.0	6.2	38.0	22.9	22.6	6.3	100

**11.3 Health**

	Reduce greatly	Reduce somewhat	Leave as is	Increase somewhat	Increase greatly	Don't know \ refuse	Total
Jews	0.4	0.8	10.9	23.4	62.7	1.8	100
Arabs	0.0	1.8	14.7	4.9	76.7	1.9	100
Total Sample	0.3	1.0	11.5	20.4	64.9	1.9	100

**11.4 Education**

	Reduce greatly	Reduce somewhat	Leave as is	Increase somewhat	Increase greatly	Don't know \ refuse	Total
Jews	0.8	2.2	18.2	23.6	52.7	2.5	100
Arabs	1.2	2.5	11.7	14.8	66.0	3.8	100
Total Sample	0.9	2.3	17.2	22.2	54.8	2.6	100

**11.5 Transportation infrastructure**

	Reduce greatly	Reduce somewhat	Leave as is	Increase somewhat	Increase greatly	Don't know \ refuse	Total
Jews	0.8	4.0	24.9	27.6	39.3	3.4	100
Arabs	1.9	6.2	20.4	13.6	54.3	3.6	100
Total Sample	1.0	4.3	24.2	25.3	41.7	3.5	100

**11.6 Social services**

	Reduce greatly	Reduce somewhat	Leave as is	Increase somewhat	Increase greatly	Don't know \ refuse	Total
Jews	1.4	3.1	17.1	30.2	45.4	2.8	100
Arabs	0.6	4.3	16.0	9.9	67.3	1.9	100
Total Sample	1.3	3.3	17.0	26.9	48.9	2.6	100

**11.7 Housing**

	Reduce greatly	Reduce somewhat	Leave as is	Increase somewhat	Increase greatly	Don't know \ refuse	Total
Jews	3.6	6.2	20.4	25.8	39.9	4.1	100
Arabs	2.5	4.3	11.7	9.3	69.8	2.4	100
Total Sample	3.5	5.9	19.0	23.2	44.7	3.7	100

**12A. (Jewish respondents) How would you rate the level of solidarity (sense of “togetherness”) of Jewish society in Israel (where 1 = no solidarity at all and 10 = high level of solidarity)?**

Discussion on p. 81

	1 – No solidarity at all	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 – High level of solidarity	Don’t know / refuse	Total	average
Jews	5.5	3.1	7.0	5.9	17.0	13.0	18.4	18.9	3.6	5.8	1.8	100	6.0

**12B. (Arab respondents) How would you rate the level of solidarity (sense of “togetherness”) of Arab society in Israel (where 1 = no solidarity at all and 10 = high level of solidarity)?**

Discussion on p. 81

	1 – No solidarity at all	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 – High level of solidarity	Don’t know / refuse	Total	average
Arabs	25.6	8.6	9.7	6.1	22.4	5.6	5.6	9.3	1.3	6.1	0.3	100	4.3

**13. In your opinion, which of the following groups have the highest level of tension between them?**

Discussion on p. 85

	Mizrahim and Ashkenazim	Religious and secular Jews	Right and Left (on foreign policy and national security issues)	Rich and poor	Jews and Arabs	Don’t know \ refuse	Total
Jews	2.9	24.2	40.5	4.1	23.5	4.8	100
Arabs	1.8	13.5	21.5	8.0	43.6	11.6	100
Total Sample	2.8	22.5	37.4	4.7	26.7	5.9	100

Discussion  
on p. 127

**14. (Jewish respondents) When making important decisions, should the government of Israel take the opinions of Diaspora Jewry into account?**

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know \ refuse	Total
Jews	30.8	28.9	25.4	13.0	1.9	100

Discussion  
on p. 68

**15. How would you rate each of the following areas of state functioning in Israel today?**

**15.1 Education**

	Very good	Quite Good	Not so good	Not at all Good	Don't know \ refuse	Total
Jews	3.8	36.3	39.1	19.2	1.6	100
Arabs	21.6	45.7	19.8	11.1	1.8	100
Total Sample	6.6	37.8	36.0	17.9	1.7	100

**15.2 Healthcare**

	Very good	Quite Good	Not so good	Not at all Good	Don't know \ refuse	Total
Jews	4.9	32.0	36.3	26.1	0.7	100
Arabs	30.2	44.4	15.4	8.0	2.0	100
Total Sample	9.0	34.0	32.9	23.2	0.9	100

**15.3 Transportation**

	Very good	Quite Good	Not so good	Not at all Good	Don't know \ refuse	Total
Jews	5.4	32.3	35.4	25.1	1.8	100
Arabs	34.4	38.7	16.6	8.0	2.3	100
Total Sample	10.0	33.3	32.4	22.4	1.9	100

**15.4 The courts**

	Very good	Quite Good	Not so good	Not at all Good	Don't know\ refuse	Total
Jews	8.9	37.7	26.4	18.7	8.3	100
Arabs	27.6	42.3	10.4	8.6	11.1	100
Total Sample	11.9	38.4	23.8	17.0	8.9	100

**15.5 Environmental protection**

	Very good	Quite Good	Not so good	Not at all Good	Don't know\ refuse	Total
Jews	7.9	41.8	25.0	14.3	11.0	100
Arabs	21.0	35.8	17.9	17.3	8.0	100
Total Sample	10.0	40.8	23.9	14.8	10.5	100

**15.6 Housing market (planning)**

	Very good	Quite Good	Not so good	Not at all Good	Don't know\ refuse	Total
Jews	1.1	13.8	41.9	38.3	4.9	100
Arabs	5.6	28.4	21.6	38.3	6.1	100
Total Sample	1.8	16.2	38.7	38.3	5.0	100

Discussion  
on p. 61

### 16. Is there a political party in Israel today that truly represents your views?

	Yes, to a large extent	Yes, to quite a large extent	Yes, to quite a small extent	There is no party that truly represents my views	Don't know \ refuse	Total
Jews	17.3	42.1	20.5	18.5	1.6	100
Arabs	10.5	19.8	14.2	50.0	5.5	100
Total Sample	16.2	38.6	19.5	23.6	2.1	100

Discussion  
on p. 37

### 17. Israel is defined as a Jewish and democratic state. Do you think there is a good balance today between the Jewish and the democratic components?

	There is a good balance between the two components	The Jewish component is too dominant	The democratic component is too dominant	Don't know \ refuse	Total
Jews	31.0	41.3	20.2	7.5	100
Arabs	13.5	76.1	8.6	1.8	100
Total Sample	28.2	46.9	18.3	6.6	100

Discussion  
on p. 93

### 18. Is the situation of Mizrahim in Israel today better than, worse than, or similar to that of Ashkenazim?

	Much better than that of Ashkenazim	Somewhat better than that of Ashkenazim	Similar to that of Ashkenazim	Somewhat worse than that of Ashkenazim	Much worse than that of Ashkenazim	Don't know \ refuse	Total
Jews	6.6	7.4	56.8	17.4	4.1	7.7	100
Arabs	4.9	4.3	24.7	20.4	16.7	29.0	100
Total Sample	6.3	6.9	51.7	17.9	6.1	11.1	100

19–24: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

**19. (Jewish respondents) The Jewish people is the chosen people, and therefore superior to other nations**

Discussion on p. 125

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know \ refuse	Total
Jews	23.7	16.2	17.6	39.2	3.3	100

**20. (Jewish respondents) The government should encourage Arabs to emigrate from Israel**

Discussion on p. 100

	Strongly agree	Soemwhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't konw \ refuse	Total
Jews	21.1	14.7	23.2	36.5	4.5	100

**21. The perspectives of both Jews and Arabs on the history of the conflict between them should be taught in all schools in Israel**

Discussion on p. 101

	Strongly agree	Soemwhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't konw \ refuse	Total
Jews	38.0	32.9	11.6	15.0	2.5	100
Arabs	54.3	22.2	4.9	16.0	2.6	100
Total Sample	40.5	31.2	10.6	15.2	2.5	100

**22. Jews in Israel and Jews in the Diaspora share a common fate**

Discussion on p. 126

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know \ refuse	Total
Jews	23.0	28.2	26.4	19.2	3.2	100
Arabs	30.9	15.4	12.3	22.2	19.2	100
Total Sample	24.3	26.1	24.2	19.7	5.7	100

Discussion  
on p. 62

### 23. The party composition of the current Knesset is a good reflection of the diverse range of opinions in the Israeli public

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know\ refuse	Total
Jews	16.4	33.1	23.2	21.8	5.5	100
Arabs	19.3	23.6	22.4	29.2	5.5	100
Total Sample	16.9	31.5	23.1	23.0	5.5	100

Discussion  
on p. 63

### 24. Arab Knesset members represent the Arab sector very well in terms of the points of agreement and disagreement within the Arab population in Israel

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know\ refuse	Total
Jews	8.9	13.3	21.2	38.5	18.1	100
Arabs	23.0	23.0	15.5	35.4	3.1	100
Total Sample	11.2	14.8	20.3	38.0	15.7	100

Discussion  
on p. 113

### 25. (Jewish respondents) At present, is the value system of the IDF's senior command similar or dissimilar to that of the general Israeli public?

	Very similar	Quite similar	Quite dissimilar	Very dissimilar	Don't know\ refuse	Total
Jews	21.6	49.2	13.5	4.3	11.4	100

Discussion on p. 88

**26. Do you think that Jewish society in Israel in recent years has become more secular, become more religious, or remained unchanged?**

	Much more secular	Slightly more secular	No change	Slightly more religious	Much more religious	Don't know \ refuse	Total
Jews	5.5	8.9	27.1	34.0	20.7	3.8	100
Arabs	14.2	8.0	35.8	8.6	27.8	5.6	100
Total Sample	6.9	8.8	28.5	30.0	21.8	4.0	100

**27. To what extent are the following principles upheld in Israel today?**

Discussion on p. 46

**27.1 Freedom of religion**

	Far too much	A bit too much	To the appropriate degree	A bit too little	Far too little	Don't know \ refuse	Total
Jews	14.8	9.9	40.1	18.8	12.9	3.5	100
Arabs	14.8	13.6	44.4	11.1	13.0	3.1	100
Total Sample	14.8	10.5	40.8	17.6	12.9	3.4	100

**27.2 The right to live in dignity**

	Far too much	A bit too much	To the appropriate degree	A bit too little	Far too little	Don't know \ refuse	Total
Jews	3.3	8.0	32.6	34.7	18.4	3.0	100
Arabs	9.2	12.3	46.6	12.3	16.0	3.6	100
Total Sample	4.2	8.7	34.9	31.1	18.0	3.1	100

**27.3 Freedom of expression**

	Far too much	A bit too much	To the appropriate degree	A bit too little	Far too little	Don't know \ refuse	Total
Jews	19.0	10.6	39.0	19.7	9.0	2.7	100
Arabs	17.2	9.2	46.0	12.9	12.3	2.4	100
Total Sample	18.7	10.3	40.1	18.6	9.6	2.7	100

**27.4 Freedom of political association**

	Far too much	A bit too much	To the appropriate degree	A bit too little	Far too little	Don't know \ refuse	Total
Jews	12.2	8.3	54.1	11.6	5.2	8.6	100
Arabs	14.8	6.8	40.7	8.6	19.1	10.0	100
Total Sample	12.6	8.1	52.0	11.1	7.4	8.8	100

Discussion  
on p. 64

**28. In your opinion, is the level of government involvement in the economy in Israel today:**

	Far too high	A bit too high	About right	A bit too low	Much too low	Don't know \ refuse	Total
Jews	11.4	14.4	29.9	23.2	10.2	10.9	100
Arabs	21.6	10.5	28.4	9.9	16.0	13.6	100
Total Sample	13.0	13.8	29.7	21.1	11.1	11.3	100

**29. Societies throughout the world are divided into stronger and weaker groups. Which group in Israeli society do you feel you belong to?**

Discussion  
on p. 91

	Strong group	Quite strong group	Quite weak group	Weak group	Don't know \ refuse	Total
Jews	24.3	49.1	13.8	5.5	7.3	100
Arabs	12.3	23.5	22.8	36.4	5.0	100
Total Sample	22.4	45.0	15.3	10.5	6.8	100

30–33: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

**30. The democratic system in Israel is in grave danger**

Discussion  
on p. 34

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know \ refuse	Total
Jews	29.9	21.9	17.4	29.9	0.9	100
Arabs	45.4	20.2	9.8	18.4	6.2	100
Total Sample	32.4	21.7	16.2	28.1	1.6	100

**31. If Israel's leaders were Mizrahim, the Israeli-Arab conflict would have already been resolved, since they are familiar with Middle Eastern culture**

Discussion  
on p. 99

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know \ refuse	Total
Jews	4.3	6.0	18.1	66.7	4.9	100
Arabs	11.1	14.2	13.0	45.7	16.0	100
Total Sample	5.4	7.3	17.3	63.3	6.7	100

Discussion  
on p. 83

### 32. The use of violence for political ends is never justified

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know \ refuse	Total
Jews	68.2	8.3	7.6	14.0	1.9	100
Arabs	77.0	8.1	1.9	9.3	3.7	100
Total Sample	69.6	8.3	6.7	13.2	2.2	100

Discussion  
on p. 115

### 33. The IDF top brass and the defense establishment deliberately overstate the security threats facing Israel in order to secure greater defense spending

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know \ refuse	Total
Jews	10.7	21.2	21.2	38.6	8.3	100
Arabs	40.7	17.3	6.8	13.6	21.6	100
Total Sample	15.5	20.6	18.9	34.6	10.4	100

Discussion  
on p. 70

### 34. In your opinion, does Israel's education system truly offer equal opportunity for children from all backgrounds and sectors?

	I'm certain it does	I think it does	I think it does not	I'm certain it does not	Don't know \ refuse	Total
Jews	8.9	21.1	28.9	39.7	1.4	100
Arabs	19.8	14.2	19.1	44.4	2.5	100
Total Sample	10.7	20.0	27.3	40.4	1.6	100

**35. In your opinion, does the public healthcare system in Israel provide equal treatment to patients from all backgrounds and sectors?**

Discussion  
on p. 71

	I'm certain it does	I think it does	I think it does not	I'm certain it does not	Don't know\ refuse	Total
Jews	16.3	25.0	22.7	34.3	1.7	100
Arabs	43.8	24.1	11.7	18.5	1.9	100
Total Sample	20.7	24.9	20.9	31.7	1.8	100

**36. In your opinion, do the courts in Israel give equal treatment to everyone who appears before them, regardless of their background or sector?**

Discussion  
on p. 72

	I'm certain it does	I think it does	I think it does not	I'm certain it does not	Don't know\ refuse	Total
Jews	15.8	28.4	22.5	27.3	6.0	100
Arabs	24.7	20.4	14.8	27.2	12.9	100
Total Sample	17.3	27.1	21.3	27.3	7.0	100

37–40: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

**37. In Israel today, it's easier for Ashkenazim to succeed and get ahead at work than it is for Mizrahim**

Discussion  
on p. 96

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know\ refuse	Total
Jews	12.3	19.4	25.2	39.7	3.4	100
Arabs	33.5	19.9	9.3	9.9	27.4	100
Total Sample	15.7	19.4	22.7	34.9	7.3	100

Discussion  
on p. 98

### 38. The tension between Ashkenazim and Mizrahim is perpetuated only because politicians exploit it for their own purposes

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know\refuse	Total
Jews	33.6	27.3	17.8	16.3	5.0	100
Arabs	30.7	23.3	11.0	6.7	28.3	100
Total Sample	33.1	26.7	16.7	14.8	8.7	100

Discussion  
on p. 97

### 39. The Ashkenazi elite rules the country

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know\refuse	Total
Jews	13.8	18.7	29.6	33.6	4.3	100
Arabs	36.8	20.9	11.7	9.8	20.8	100
Total Sample	17.5	19.0	26.7	29.8	7.0	100

Discussion  
on p. 84

### 40. Young people are less willing to contribute to the state today than in the past

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know\refuse	Total
Jews	24.3	27.5	22.8	20.4	5.0	100
Arabs	34.6	30.2	9.9	11.7	13.6	100
Total Sample	25.9	27.9	20.7	19.0	6.5	100

#### 41. In your opinion, to what extent are the legal rulings of the Supreme Court justices influenced by their political views?

Discussion  
on p. 74

	To a large extent	To a moderate extent	To a small extent	Not at all	Don't know\ refuse	Total
Jews	35.3	24.4	20.9	11.6	7.8	100
Arabs	24.7	29.0	13.0	16.0	17.3	100
Total Sample	33.6	25.1	19.6	12.3	9.4	100

#### 42. In your opinion, to what extent are the professional decisions of senior Finance Ministry officials influenced by their political views?

Discussion  
on p. 75

	To a large extent	To a moderate extent	To a small extent	Not at all	Don't know\ refuse	Total
Jews	39.8	27.3	15.4	7.9	9.6	100
Arabs	32.7	36.4	5.6	9.3	16.0	100
Total Sample	38.7	28.8	13.8	8.1	10.6	100

#### 43. In your opinion, to what extent are the professional decisions of high-ranking IDF officers influenced by their political views?

Discussion  
on p. 76

	To a large extent	To a moderate extent	To a small extent	Not at all	Don't know\ refuse	Total
Jews	18.8	23.1	22.2	28.6	7.3	100
Arabs	38.9	25.9	7.4	9.9	17.9	100
Total Sample	22.0	23.6	19.8	25.6	9.0	100

Discussion  
on p. 67

#### 44. Does the currently accepted model of tenured employees in the civil service improve or impair its performance?

	Greatly improves	Somewhat improves	Somewhat impairs	Greatly impairs	Don't know\ refuse	Total
Jews	8.8	25.8	29.9	18.4	17.1	100
Arabs	21.6	37.7	16.7	10.5	13.5	100
Total Sample	10.8	27.7	27.8	17.2	16.5	100

Discussion  
on p. 118

#### 45. (Jewish and Druze respondents) If your son were about to enlist in the army, what would you advise him to do?

	To try to get out of serving	To enlist, but try to serve in a non-combat role	To enlist, and let the army decide on the type of role	To enlist, and request to serve as a combat soldier	To enlist, and volunteer for a special combat unit	To volunteer for national or civilian service	Don't know\ refuse	Total
Jews	4.8	15.6	28.1	14.4	19.6	4.1	12.8	100
Druze	23.8	23.8	9.5	0.0	0.0	38.1	4.8	100
Total Sample	5.3	15.8	27.6	14.1	19.1	5.5	12.6	100

Discussion  
on p. 118

#### 46. (Jewish respondents) If your daughter were about to enlist in the army, what would you advise her to do?

	To try to get out of serving	To enlist, but try to serve in a non-combat role	To enlist, and let the army decide on the type of role	To enlist, and request to serve as a combat soldier	To enlist, and volunteer for a special combat unit	To volunteer for national or civilian service	Don't know\ refuse	Total
Jews	9.2	16.0	28.9	8.7	10.6	14.8	12.0	100

**47. (Jewish respondents) In your opinion, does the definition of the IDF as “the people’s army” accurately describe the army today?**

Discussion on p. 104

	Very accurate	Quite accurate	Not so accurate	Not at all accurate	Don't know\ refuse	Total
Jews	37.0	38.6	13.7	7.3	3.4	100

**48. What grade would you give the IDF in each of the following areas (where 1 = unsatisfactory and 5 = excellent)?**

Discussion on p. 110

**48.1 Combat readiness**

	1 – Unsatisfactory	2	3	4	5 – excellent	Don't know\ refuse	Total
Jews	0.6	2.0	12.4	40.4	37.0	7.6	100
Arabs	9.9	2.5	12.3	13.0	31.5	30.8	100
Total Sample	2.1	2.1	12.4	36.0	36.1	11.3	100

**48.2 Financial/budgetary management**

	1 – Unsatisfactory	2	3	4	5 – excellent	Don't know\ refuse	Total
Jews	10.1	12.2	30.8	22.3	9.3	15.3	100
Arabs	16.0	4.9	13.6	13.0	19.8	32.7	100
Total Sample	11.0	11.0	28.0	20.8	10.9	18.3	100

**48.3 Treatment of soldiers, and handling of their problems**

	<b>1 – Unsatisfactory</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5 – excellent</b>	<b>Don't know\ refuse</b>	<b>Total</b>
Jews	<b>6.9</b>	<b>10.4</b>	<b>30.8</b>	<b>31.5</b>	<b>12.0</b>	<b>8.4</b>	<b>100</b>
Arabs	<b>12.3</b>	<b>7.4</b>	<b>9.2</b>	<b>9.8</b>	<b>23.9</b>	<b>37.4</b>	<b>100</b>
Total Sample	<b>7.8</b>	<b>10.0</b>	<b>27.3</b>	<b>28.0</b>	<b>13.9</b>	<b>13.0</b>	<b>100</b>

**48.4 Equality between men and women**

	<b>1 – Unsatisfactory</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5 – excellent</b>	<b>Don't know\ refuse</b>	<b>Total</b>
Jews	<b>7.5</b>	<b>10.9</b>	<b>27.8</b>	<b>24.9</b>	<b>21.0</b>	<b>7.9</b>	<b>100</b>
Druze	<b>9.9</b>	<b>11.1</b>	<b>17.9</b>	<b>11.1</b>	<b>19.8</b>	<b>30.2</b>	<b>100</b>
Total Sample	<b>7.9</b>	<b>10.9</b>	<b>26.2</b>	<b>22.7</b>	<b>20.8</b>	<b>11.5</b>	<b>100</b>

**48.5 Subordination to the elected political leadership of the country**

	<b>1 – Unsatisfactory</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5 – excellent</b>	<b>Don't know\ refuse</b>	<b>Total</b>
Jews	<b>2.1</b>	<b>4.3</b>	<b>16.7</b>	<b>29.9</b>	<b>37.6</b>	<b>9.4</b>	<b>100</b>
Arabs	<b>8.0</b>	<b>4.3</b>	<b>11.7</b>	<b>14.7</b>	<b>29.4</b>	<b>31.9</b>	<b>100</b>
Total Sample	<b>3.1</b>	<b>4.3</b>	<b>15.9</b>	<b>27.5</b>	<b>36.3</b>	<b>12.9</b>	<b>100</b>

**48.6 Moral conduct in combat**

	1 – Unsatisfactory	2	3	4	5 – excellent	Don't know \ refuse	Total
Jews	1.8	2.1	8.7	26.6	55.9	4.9	100
Arabs	34.2	6.2	9.3	6.8	10.6	32.9	100
Total Sample	6.9	2.8	8.8	23.5	48.7	9.3	100

**49. (Jewish and Druze respondents) In your opinion, how egalitarian and fair is the assignment of new IDF recruits to various roles?**

Discussion on p. 123

	Very egalitarian and fair	Quite egalitarian and fair	Not so egalitarian and fair	Not at all egalitarian and fair	Don't know \ refuse	Total
Jews	12.8	41.1	23.7	7.3	15.1	100
Arabs	10.0	40.0	20.0	5.0	25.0	100
Total Sample	12.7	41.1	23.6	7.2	15.4	100

**50. (Jewish respondents) Do you support or oppose the following statement? “It is better to cut back on civics and democracy studies, and devote more hours to Jewish history and love of the land.”**

Discussion on p. 102

	Strongly support	Somewhat support	Somewhat oppose	Strongly oppose	Don't know \ refuse	Total
Jews	16.5	21.0	24.3	33.6	4.6	100

**51. (Jewish respondents) What is your opinion of the proposal (raised repeatedly in recent years) to abolish mandatory enlistment and turn the IDF into a professional army, with service regarded as a lifelong career choice and compensated accordingly?**

Discussion on p. 107

	Strongly support	Somewhat support	Somewhat oppose	Strongly oppose	Don't know \ refuse	Total
Jews	21.1	18.4	20.3	34.2	6.0	100

Discussion  
on p. 59

**52. How would you rate Israel's leadership in terms of corruption (where 1 = very corrupt, and 5 = not at all corrupt)?**

	1 – Very corrupt	2	3	4	5 – Not at all corrupt	Don't know \ refuse	Total
Jews	38.3	20.5	23.8	10.0	5.2	2.2	100
Arabs	40.7	11.1	22.8	11.7	9.9	3.8	100
Total Sample	38.7	19.0	23.7	10.3	5.9	2.4	100

Discussion  
on p. 94

**53. (Jewish respondents) Which of these opinions do you agree with more strongly?**

	Mistakes were certainly made in integrating Jewish immigrants from Arab countries in the early years of the state, but they were made in good faith, without bad intentions	These were not just mistakes; the Ashkenazi leadership of the state looked down on Jewish immigrants from Arab countries and their cultur	Don't know \ refuse	Other (specify)	Total
Jews	35.9	50.6	10.0	3.5	100

## Appendix 2

### Distribution of 2019 Survey Results Compared with Previous Years (%)

Discussion  
on p. 29

#### 1. How would you characterize Israel's overall situation today?

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Very good	2.5	2.3	2.8	3.1	3.2	5.3	4.3	5.8	6.4	9.5	9.5	10.7	7.3	7.6	15.1	17.1	16.1
Good*	8.6	11.1	16.5	19.4	11.4	23.1	26.9	33.9	21.4	28.6	25.7	33.6	33.9	28.9	32.7	35.8	33.9
So-so	26.1	32.9	37.5	38.2	34.3	35.7	38.4	35.2	41.0	40.5	41.1	36.6	38.7	39.9	32.9	29.6	31.0
Bad*	24.3	22.7	16.8	18.4	25.0	16.1	17.1	13.8	16.0	11.4	9.8	8.8	9.3	12.2	9.5	8.4	9.0
Very bad	38.5	30.6	25.8	20.4	25.2	18.2	12.2	9.8	13.7	8.6	11.8	8.2	8.7	10.7	7.9	7.7	8.8
Don't know/ refuse	–	0.4	0.6	0.5	0.9	1.6	1.1	1.5	1.5	1.4	2.1	2.1	2.0	0.7	1.8	1.4	1.2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

\* Up until 2013 the answers were “quite good” and “quite bad”.

#### General notes:

- This comparative analysis presents the distribution of responses from the total sample (with the exception of questions that were presented only to Jews or only to Arabs, and of several questions in which only the responses of Jews or of Arabs are presented), including the category “Don't know / refuse.”
- The wording of the questions and the response categories is presented as it appears in the Democracy Index 2019 survey. Where differences exist in wording or categories between this year's index and those of previous years, or where there are categories that did not appear in a given year, this is explained in notes provided below the relevant table.
- In all questions, the category “Don't know / refuse” was not read out to interviewees.
- The acronym “NA” is used to mark a question or category that was not presented to the respondents in a given year; for instance, in cases where four response choices were offered in certain years, and five in others.

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## 2. To what extent do you feel part of the State of Israel and its problems?

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2019
Very much	52	45.3	43.6	35.3	28.0	28.1	32.3	33.5	39.6	35.5	33.2	38.8	41.8	39.8	38.9
Quite a lot	26.2	27.4	29.0	33.6	30.3	27.0	31.4	30.8	29.9	29.6	27.5	36.3	37.4	37.4	37.2
To some extent	12.7	16.8	14.4	20.5	25.3	27.6	23.6	22.0	18.2	20.8	21.1	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Not so much	5.3	6.1	4.4	7.3	9.5	9.8	7.3	7.8	5.5	7.9	9.4	13.4	14.2	15.4	16.7
Not at all	3.5	3.6	3.0	3.1	5.7	6.2	4.7	4.8	6.7	4.7	6.6	8.1	5.2	6.3	6.0
Don't know/ refuse	0.3	0.8	5.6	0.2	1.2	1.3	0.7	1.1	0.1	1.5	2.2	3.4	1.4	1.1	1.2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

\* In 2003–2013, 5 response categories were presented: “to a very large extent,” “to a large extent,” “to some extent,” “to a small extent,” and “to a very small extent.” From 2014 onward, the intermediate category of “to some extent” was eliminated.

**4. On a scale of 1 to 5 (where one = very bad and 5 = very good), how would you rate the state of democracy in Israel today?**

	2010*	2018	2019
1 – Very bad	11.1	17.7	16.7
2	13.1	12.9	17.6
3	32.1	32.6	31.3
4	36.0	23.2	21.1
5 – Very good	6.4	13.1	12.7
Don't know/refuse	1.3	0.5	0.6
Total	100	100	100
Mean rating (1-5)	2.8	3.0	3.0

\* In 2010: "What grade would you give Israeli democracy today?"

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on p. 65

### 5. Do you prefer to live in a country where taxes are higher but citizens receive many free services from the state, or a country where taxes are lower but citizens receive only a few basic services from the state?

	2016*	2019
I prefer to pay higher taxes and receive many free services from the state	54.3	50.2
I prefer to pay lower taxes and receive only basic services from the state	31.2	39.1
I have no preference between the two	9.1	N/A
Don't know/refuse	5.4	10.7
Total	100	100

\* In the survey for the Eli Hurvitz Conference on Economy and Society 2016, the question was worded as follows: "Do you prefer to live in a country where taxes are higher but citizens receive many free, high-quality services from the state (the Scandinavian model), or do you prefer a country where taxes are relatively low but citizens receive only a few basic services from the state (the American model)?" The response choices were: I prefer the Scandinavian model; I prefer the American model.

Discussion  
on p. 42

**6. Of the following, which do you see as the primary factor causing people to question if they wish to remain in Israel (for those who feel uncertain)?**

	2003	2019
Security situation	30.9	16.0
Economic situation	46.4	37.2
State of society	8.5	10.0
Rise of antidemocratic tendencies	1.5	13.2
Status of religion in Israel	2.1	10.4
Other (specify)	3.1	3.0
All of the above	5.1	5.3
Don't know/refuse	2.4	4.9
Total	100	100

**7. If you could receive American citizenship, or that of another Western country, would you prefer to live there or to remain in Israel?**

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	2015	2017	2019
I would prefer to live there	11.7	15.2	12.6
I would prefer to remain in Israel	84.3	80.7	84.2
Don't know/refuse	4.0	4.1	3.2
Total	100	100	100









Discussion  
on p. 36

## 9. In your opinion, to what extent does the State of Israel safeguard the security of its citizens?

	2009*	2019
Very much	13.4	18.2
Quite a lot	24.9	45.3
Moderately	35.4	N/A
Not so much	10.8	29.1
Not at all	9.6	6.1
Don't know/refuse	5.9	1.3
Total	100	100

\* *Peace Index*, December 2009: "On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 = very bad and 5 = very good, how would you rate the present government's handling of security matters?"

Discussion  
on p. 37

## 10. And to what extent does it ensure the welfare of its citizens?

	2009*	2019
Very much	1.5	6.0
Quite a lot	4.9	29.0
Moderately	25.5	N/A
Not so much	25.0	51.6
Not at all	35.5	11.7
Don't know/refuse	7.6	1.7
Total	100	100

\* Source: *Peace Index*, December 2009.

## 11. Assuming that the state budget remains at a fixed amount (such that adding to one item means taking away from another), how should allocations be handled for:

### 11.1. Defense (army)

	2016*	2019
Reduce greatly	11.7	6.8
Reduce somewhat	20.5	15.8
Leave as is	28.7	41.5
Increase somewhat	15.9	12.8
Increase greatly	16.6	18.2
Don't know/refuse	6.6	4.9
Total	100	100

\* Source: Survey for Eli Hurvitz Conference on Economy and Society 2016.

### 11.2. Domestic security (police)

	2016*	2019
Reduce greatly	2.7	4.0
Reduce somewhat	8.0	6.2
Leave as is	25.1	38.1
Increase somewhat	31.4	22.9
Increase greatly	26.7	22.6
Don't know/refuse	6.1	6.2
Total	100	100

\* Source: Survey for Eli Hurvitz Conference on Economy and Society 2016.

**11.3. Health**

	2016*	2019
Reduce greatly	0.5	0.3
Reduce somewhat	1.6	1.0
Leave as is	9.3	11.5
Increase somewhat	28.1	20.4
Increase greatly	56.3	64.9
Don't know/refuse	4.2	1.9
Total	100	100

\* Source: Survey for Eli Hurvitz Conference on Economy and Society 2016.

**11.4. Education**

	2016*	2019
Reduce greatly	1.3	0.9
Reduce somewhat	1.0	2.3
Leave as is	10.8	17.1
Increase somewhat	22.5	22.2
Increase greatly	60.6	54.9
Don't know/refuse	3.8	2.6
Total	100	100

\* Source: Survey for Eli Hurvitz Conference on Economy and Society 2016.

### 11.5. Transportation infrastructure

	2016*	2019
Reduce greatly	0.8	0.9
Reduce somewhat	3.8	4.3
Leave as is	22.8	24.2
Increase somewhat	35.1	25.4
Increase greatly	32.9	41.8
Don't know/refuse	4.6	3.4
Total	100	100

\* Source: Survey for Eli Hurvitz Conference on Economy and Society 2016.

### 11.6. Social services

	2016*	2019
Reduce greatly	0.9	1.3
Reduce somewhat	4.1	3.2
Leave as is	16.7	16.9
Increase somewhat	27.9	26.9
Increase greatly	45.3	48.9
Don't know/refuse	5.1	2.8
Total	100	100

\* Source: Survey for Eli Hurvitz Conference on Economy and Society 2016.

**11.7. Housing**

	2016*	2019
Reduce greatly	1.9	3.5
Reduce somewhat	1.2	5.9
Leave as is	14.0	19.0
Increase somewhat	27.1	23.2
Increase greatly	50.5	44.7
Don't know/refuse	5.3	3.7
Total	100	100

\* Source: Survey for Eli Hurvitz Conference on Economy and Society 2016.

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on p. 81

**12a. (Jewish respondents) How would you rate the level of solidarity (sense of “togetherness”) of Jewish society in Israel (where 1 = no solidarity at all and 10 = high level of solidarity)?**

	2011	2012	2014	2018	2019
Mean rating (1-10)	5.8	6.2	6.1	5.7	6.0

### 13. In your opinion, which of the following groups have the highest level of tension between them?

Discussion  
on p. 85

	2012	2015	2016	2018	2019
Mizrahim and Ashkenazim	3.0	3.9	1.4	5.5	2.7
Religious and secular Jews	20.3	10.3	10.5	24.8	22.5
Right and Left (on foreign policy and national security issues)	8.7	18.4	24.0	31.9	37.5
Rich and poor	13.2	12.8	8.0	5.3	4.7
Jews and Arabs	47.9	47.0	53.0	30.3	26.7
Don't know/refuse	6.9	7.6	3.1	2.2	5.9
Total	100	100	100	100	100

### 14. (Jewish respondents) When making important decisions, should the government of Israel take the opinions of Diaspora Jewry into account?

Discussion  
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	2014*	2019
Not at all	19.7	30.8
Not so much	26.8	28.9
Quite a lot	34.4	25.4
Very much	16.4	13.0
Don't know/refuse	2.7	1.9
Total	100	100

\* Source: *Israeli Views of Diaspora Jewry 2014—A Study for the Jewish Media Summit*.

Discussion  
on p. 61

## 16. Is there a political party in Israel today that truly represents your views?

	2003*	2012*	2016	2017	2019
Yes	58.1	37.6	50.6	46.9	N/A
Yes, to a large extent	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	16.2
Yes, to quite a large extent	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	38.5
Yes, to quite a small extent	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	19.5
There is no party that truly represents my views	41.5	57.0	47.5	50.3	23.6
Don't know/refuse	0.4	5.4	1.9	2.8	2.2
Total	100	100	100	100	100

\* In 2003 and 2012: "Is there a party in Israel today that accurately reflects your views?"

Discussion  
on p. 37

## 17. Israel is defined as a Jewish and democratic state. Do you think there is a good balance today between the Jewish and the democratic components?

	2016	2017	2018	2019
There is a good balance between the two components	26.1	26.7	27.8	28.2
The Jewish component is too dominant	45.1	46.6	45.5	46.9
The democratic component is too dominant	22.9	20.1	20.9	18.3
Don't know/refuse	5.9	6.6	5.8	6.6
Total	100	100	100	100

Discussion  
on p. 93**18. Is the situation of Mizrahim in Israel today better than, worse than, or similar to that of Ashkenazim?**

	2018	2019
Much better than that of Ashkenazim	6.4	6.3
Somewhat better than that of Ashkenazim	7.9	6.9
Similar to that of Ashkenazim	59.8	51.7
Somewhat worse than that of Ashkenazim	18.3	17.9
Much worse than that of Ashkenazim	4.1	6.1
Don't know/refuse	3.5	11.1
Total	100	100

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

**19. (Jewish respondents) The Jewish people is the chosen people, and therefore superior to other nations.**Discussion  
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	2016*	2019
Strongly agree	25.4	23.7
Somewhat agree	15.4	16.2
Somewhat disagree	23.7	17.6
Strongly disagree	31.4	39.2
Don't know/refuse	4.1	3.3
Total	100	100

\* Source: *Peace Index*, November 2016.

Discussion  
on p. 100

## 20. (Jewish respondents) The government should encourage Arabs to emigrate from Israel

	2005*	2006*	2007*	2008*	2009*	2010*	2013	2019
Strongly agree	23.6	41.8	33.7	35.8	30.7	31.4	27.5	21.1
Somewhat agree	25.7	18.3	18.8	18.7	18.8	19.1	16.2	14.7
Somewhat disagree	19.6	12.2	15.8	15.6	16.3	19.0	15.8	23.2
Strongly disagree	29.0	25.8	27.2	26.9	24.4	25.2	34.1	36.5
Don't know/refuse	2.1	1.9	4.5	3.0	9.8	5.3	6.4	4.5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

\* In 2005–2010, the response categories were: strongly opposed; somewhat opposed; somewhat agree; definitely agree.

Discussion  
on p. 101

## 21. The perspectives of both Jews and Arabs on the history of the conflict between them should be taught in all schools in Israel

	2017*	2017**	2019
Strongly agree	49.3	28.3	40.6
Somewhat agree	21.0	37.3	31.2
Somewhat disagree	6.8	15.2	10.6
Strongly disagree	17.5	13.9	15.2
Don't know/refuse	5.4	5.3	2.4
Total	100	100	100

\* Source: Tamar Hermann, Chanan Cohen, Fadi Omar, Ella Heller and Tzipy Lazar-Shoef, *Jews and Arabs: A Conditional Partnership, Israel 2017* (Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute, 2017).

\*\* Source: *Peace Index*, March 2017.

### 23. The party composition of the current Knesset is a good reflection of the diverse range of opinions in the Israeli public

Discussion  
on p. 62

	2015	2017	2019
Strongly agree	27.2	20.5	16.9
Somewhat agree	31.0	30.4	31.5
Somewhat disagree	18.9	23.6	23.1
Strongly disagree	14.3	21.3	23.0
Don't know/refuse	8.6	4.2	5.5
Total	100	100	100

### 24. Arab Knesset members represent the Arab sector very well in terms of the points of agreement and disagreement within the Arab population in Israel.

Discussion  
on p. 63

	2017*	2019
Strongly agree	21.0	11.2
Somewhat agree	17.6	14.8
Somewhat disagree	23.1	20.3
Strongly disagree	30.2	38.0
Don't know/refuse	8.1	15.7
Total	100	100

\* Source: Hermann et al., *Jews and Arabs: A Conditional Partnership*, 2017.

Discussion  
on p. 113

**25. (Jewish respondents) At present, is the value system of the IDF's senior command similar or dissimilar to that of the general Israeli public?**

	2016*	2019
Very similar	7.2	21.6
Quite similar	41.7	49.2
Quite dissimilar	28.7	13.5
Very dissimilar	8.0	4.3
Don't know/refuse	14.4	11.4
Total	100	100

\* Source: *Peace Index*, July 2016.

Discussion  
on p. 64

**28. In your opinion, is the level of government involvement in the economy in Israel today:**

	2016*	2019
Far too high	17.2	13.1
A bit too high	N/A	13.8
The right level	29.9	29.6
A bit too low	N/A	21.1
Far too low	42.3	11.2
Don't know/refuse	10.6	11.2
Total	100	100

\* Source: Survey for Eli Hurvitz Conference on Economy and Society 2016.

Discussion  
on p. 91

## 29. Societies throughout the world are divided into stronger and weaker groups. Which group in Israeli society do you feel you belong to?

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2017	2018	2019
Strong group	21.1	20.2	16.9	21.7	21.4	21.7	22.4
Quite strong group	43.8	34.5	41.0	38.0	39.9	51.0	45.0
Quite weak group	17.3	21.4	18.5	16.6	18.0	15.8	15.3
Weak group	11.7	15.2	12.9	17.7	12.6	6.6	10.4
Don't know/refuse	6.1	8.7	10.7	6.0	8.1	4.9	6.9
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

## 30. The democratic system in Israel is in grave danger

Discussion  
on p. 34

	2017	2018*	2019
Strongly agree	22.9	22.5	32.4
Somewhat agree	21.9	23.3	21.7
Somewhat disagree	23.3	25.2	16.2
Strongly disagree	27.9	24.5	28.1
Don't know/refuse	4.0	4.5	1.6
Total	100	100	100

\* Source: *Peace Index*, May 2018.

Discussion  
on p. 83

### 32. The use of violence for political ends is never justified

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2019
Strongly agree	56.7	65.6	63.3	67.5	49.4	40.5	56.8	51.8	53.6	69.6
Somewhat agree	25.1	11.1	17.5	14.1	22.0	19.4	14.2	15.3	14.8	8.3
Somewhat disagree	10.3	8.4	8.5	9.3	13.0	11.2	12.5	12.9	12.3	6.7
Strongly disagree	7.3	13.6	9.6	8.1	12.5	27.1	13.2	16.5	18.1	13.2
Don't know/refuse	0.6	1.3	1.1	1.0	3.1	1.8	3.3	3.5	1.2	2.2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Discussion  
on p. 115

### 33. The IDF top brass and the defense establishment deliberately overstate the security threats facing Israel in order to secure greater defense spending

	2015*	2019
Strongly agree	15.3	15.5
Somewhat agree	23.9	20.6
Somewhat disagree	25.0	18.9
Strongly disagree	21.2	34.6
Don't know/refuse	14.6	10.4
Total	100	100

\* Source: *Peace Index*, July 2015.

### 34. In your opinion, does Israel's education system truly offer equal opportunity for children from all backgrounds and sectors?

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on p. 70

	2016*	2019
I'm certain it does	9.3	10.6
I think it does	30.4	20.1
I think it does not	28.1	27.4
I'm certain it does not	26.4	40.4
Don't know/refuse	5.8	1.5
Total	100	100

\* In *Peace Index*, August 2016, the response categories were: It definitely does; it does to some degree; it does not to some degree; it definitely does not.

### 41. In your opinion, to what extent are the legal rulings of the Supreme Court justices influenced by their political views?

Discussion  
on p. 74

	2018*	2019
To a large extent	29.7	33.7
To a moderate extent	29.1	25.2
To a small extent	15.1	19.7
Not at all	11.6	12.3
Don't know/refuse	14.5	9.1
Total	100	100

\* In *Peace Index*, April 2018: "To what extent, if at all, are the professional decisions of the Supreme Court justices influenced by their political views?"

Discussion  
on p. 75

#### 42. In your opinion, to what extent are the professional decisions of senior Finance Ministry officials influenced by their political views?

	2018*	2019
To a large extent	27.7	38.6
To a moderate extent	40.0	28.8
To a small extent	12.2	13.8
Not at all	5.2	8.1
Don't know/refuse	14.9	10.7
Total	100	100

\* In *Peace Index*, April 2018: "To what extent, if at all, are the professional decisions of senior Finance Ministry officials influenced by their political views?"

Discussion  
on p. 67

#### 44. Does the currently accepted model of tenured employees in the civil service improve or impair its performance?

	2016*	2019
Greatly improves	11.6	10.9
Somewhat improves	33.1	27.7
Somewhat impairs	26.5	27.8
Greatly impairs	14.8	17.1
Don't know/refuse	14.0	16.5
Total	100	100

\* Source: Survey for Eli Hurvitz Conference on Economy and Society 2016.

#### 45. (Jewish and Druze respondents) **If your son were about to enlist in the army, what would you advise him to do?**

Discussion  
on p. 118

	2007*	2019
To try to get out of serving	15.9	5.2
To enlist, but try to serve in a non-combat role	20.0	15.8
To enlist, and let the army decide on the type of role	25.3	27.6
To enlist, and request to serve as a combat soldier	21.4	14.1
To enlist, and volunteer for a special combat unit	10.7	19.1
To volunteer for national or civilian service	-	5.5
Don't know/refuse	6.7	12.7
Total	100	100

\* In the 2007 *Democracy Index* survey, this question was presented to Jewish respondents only.

#### 47. (Jewish respondents) **In your opinion, does the definition of the IDF as “the people’s army” accurately describe the army today?**

Discussion  
on p. 104

	2013*	2015**	2017***	2018****	2019
Very accurate	33.5	36.2	23.8	28.6	37.0
Quite accurate	36.3	44.0	37.6	30.2	38.6
Not so accurate	16.0	14.7	20.5	20.1	13.7
Not at all accurate	9.4	3.3	13.6	12.6	7.3
Don't know/refuse	4.8	1.8	4.5	8.5	3.4
Total	100	100	100	100	100

\* In *Peace Index*, October 2013: “For many years, the IDF was commonly referred to as ‘the people’s army.’ In your opinion, is this an accurate description of the army today?” The response categories were: I am certain it is; I think it is; I think it is not; I am certain it is not.

\*\* Source: *Peace Index*, July 2015.

\*\*\* Source: *Peace Index*, October 2017.

\*\*\*\* Source: *Peace Index*, June 2018.

Discussion  
on p. 110

## 48. What grade would you give the IDF in each of the following areas (where 1 = unsatisfactory and 5 = excellent)?

### 48.1. Combat readiness

	2017*	2019
1 – Unsatisfactory	2.6	2.1
2	3.7	2.1
3	9.6	12.4
4	34.5	36.0
5 – Excellent	39.9	36.1
Don't know/refuse	9.7	11.3
Total	100	100

\* Source: *Peace Index*, October 2017.

### 48.2 Financial/budgetary management

	2017*	2019
1 – Unsatisfactory	12.1	11.0
2	13.1	11.1
3	29.9	28.0
4	20.2	20.8
5 – Excellent	9.1	11.0
Don't know/refuse	15.6	18.1
Total	100	100

\* Source: *Peace Index*, October 2017.

**48.3. Treatment of soldiers, and handling of their problems**

	2017*	2019
1 – Unsatisfactory	9.2	7.8
2	11.5	9.9
3	33.9	27.3
4	21.8	28.0
5 – Excellent	10.5	13.9
Don't know/refuse	13.1	13.1
Total	100	100

\* Source: *Peace Index*, October 2017.

**48.4. Equality between men and women**

	2017*	2019
1 – Unsatisfactory	5.7	7.9
2	12.7	11.0
3	24.7	26.2
4	28.1	22.7
5 – Excellent	19.8	20.8
Don't know/refuse	9.0	11.4
Total	100	100

\* Source: *Peace Index*, October 2017.

**48.5. Subordination to the elected political leadership of the country**

	2017*	2019
1 – Unsatisfactory	5.9	3.0
2	5.7	4.3
3	17.1	15.9
4	27.9	27.5
5 – Excellent	31.5	36.3
Don't know/refuse	11.9	13.0
Total	100	100

\* Source: *Peace Index*, October 2017.

**48.6. Moral conduct in combat**

	2017*	2019
1 – Unsatisfactory	7.0	6.9
2	4.8	2.8
3	11.6	8.8
4	25.1	23.5
5 – Excellent	43.5	48.6
Don't know/refuse	8.0	9.4
Total	100	100

\* Source: *Peace Index*, October 2017.

#### 49. (Jewish and Druze respondents) In your opinion, how egalitarian and fair is the assignment of new IDF recruits to various roles?

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on p. 123

	2013*	2019
Very egalitarian and fair	14.0	12.7
Quite egalitarian and fair	38.3	41.0
Not so egalitarian and fair	25.5	23.6
Not at all egalitarian and fair	8.4	7.2
Don't know/refuse	13.8	15.5
Total	100	100

\* In the *Peace Index*, October 2013 survey, this question was presented to Jewish respondents only.

#### 51. (Jewish respondents) What is your opinion of the proposal (raised repeatedly in recent years) to abolish mandatory enlistment and turn the IDF into a professional army, with service regarded as a lifelong career choice and compensated accordingly?

Discussion  
on p. 107

	2017*	2018**	2019
Strongly support	23.0	19.2	21.1
Somewhat support	20.3	20.2	18.4
Somewhat oppose	24.8	21.6	20.3
Strongly oppose	27.5	27.5	34.2
Don't know/refuse	4.4	11.5	6.0
Total	100	100	100

\* Source: *Peace Index*, October 2017.

\*\* Source: *Peace Index*, June 2018.

Discussion  
on p. 59

### 52. How would you rate Israel's leadership in terms of corruption (where 1 = very corrupt, and 5 = not at all corrupt)?

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2019
1 – Very corrupt	22.8	28.7	27.0	27.1	38.6
2	19.8	19.1	27.9	22.7	19.1
3	31.4	31.8	30.9	31.2	23.6
4	15.2	11.1	10.0	11.1	10.2
5 – Not at all corrupt	4.2	3.2	2.4	4.5	5.9
Don't know/refuse	6.6	6.1	1.8	3.4	2.6
Total	100	100	100	100	100
Mean (1-5)	2.5	2.4	2.3	2.4	2.2

## Appendix 3

### Sociodemographic Breakdown and Self-Definitions

Nationality	Total sample
Jews and others	83.7
Arabs	16.3
Total	100

Sex	Jews	Arabs	Total sample
Men	48.1	53.0	48.9
Women	51.9	47.0	51.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Age	Jews	Arabs	Total sample
18-24	9.7	16.3	10.8
25-34	20.7	18.1	20.2
35-44	19.6	17.5	19.3
45-54	15.7	28.9	17.9
55-64	14.8	11.4	14.2
65+	19.5	7.8	17.6
Total	100	100	100

Education	Jews	Arabs	Total sample
Elementary or partial high school	5.6	33.8	10.3
Full high school with matriculation, or other secondary education	30.6	41.5	32.3
Full academic degree or partial higher education (without degree)	61.5	24.7	55.5
Don't know/refuse to answer	2.3	-	1.9
Total	100	100	100

Monthly household income	Jews	Arabs	Total sample
Bellow average	28.3	63.9	34.1
Average	16.8	14.5	16.4
Above average	43.9	16.8	39.5
Don't know/refuse	11.0	4.8	10.0
Total	100	100	100

Religion	Arabs
Muslim	68.7
Christian	8.4
Druze	17.5
Bedouin	1.2
Other/refuse	4.2
Total	100

Religiosity	Jews
Haredi (ultra-orthodox)	10.4
National religious/Haredi leumi (national ultra-orthodox)	11.7
Traditional religious	11.7
Traditional non-religious	21.4
Secular	44.5
Other/refuse	0.3
Total	100.0

Religiosity	Arabs
Very religious	3.6
Religious	30.7
Traditional	44.6
Not at all religious	20.5
No response	0.6
Total	100

<b>Immigrated to Israel from FSU, 1989 onward</b>	<b>Jews</b>
Yes	<b>10.3</b>
No	<b>87.7</b>
No response	<b>2.0</b>
Total	<b>100</b>

<b>Ethnic affiliation (self-defined)</b>	<b>Jews</b>
Ashkenazi	<b>42.5</b>
Mizrahi	<b>31.5</b>
Mixed—Ashkenazi and Mizrahi	<b>12.2</b>
FSU immigrant	<b>5.5</b>
Ethiopian	<b>0.5</b>
Israeli/Jewish/opposed to ethnic classification (not read)/other/don't know	<b>8.8</b>
Total	<b>100</b>

Political orientation	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Right	30.1	35.3	2.4
Moderate right	9.6	11.0	1.8
Center	33.0	32.6	33.1
Moderate left	6.3	6.7	6.0
Left	13.6	10.7	31.3
No response	7.4	3.7	25.4
Total	100	100	100

Political orientation (Jews)	Haredi	National religious / Haredi leumi	Traditional religious	Traditional non-religious	Secular
Right	68.5	74.0	59.0	27.5	14.8
Moderate right	9.0	13.0	13.0	12.1	10.0
Center	12.4	4.0	21.0	42.9	43.0
Moderate left	1.1	1.0	-	6.0	11.6
Left	1.1	4.0	3.0	8.8	17.7
No response	7.9	4.0	4.0	2.7	2.9
Total	100	100	100	100	100

<b>Vote in April 2019 elections</b>	<b>Jews</b>	<b>Arabs</b>
Likud	<b>16.0</b>	<b>2.4</b>
Labor	<b>6.0</b>	<b>1.8</b>
Blue and White	<b>28.5</b>	<b>7.9</b>
Yisrael Beytenu	<b>1.1</b>	<b>0.6</b>
Meretz	<b>3.9</b>	<b>6.1</b>
United Torah Judaism	<b>5.6</b>	<b>0.6</b>
Kulanu	<b>2.5</b>	<b>1.2</b>
Shas	<b>4.5</b>	<b>0.6</b>
Union of the Right-Wing Parties	<b>3.2</b>	-
Zehut	<b>2.2</b>	-
Gesher	<b>2.0</b>	<b>0.6</b>
The New Right	<b>4.0</b>	-
Hadash-Ta'al	<b>0.2</b>	<b>25.6</b>
Balad-Ra'am	-	<b>13.4</b>
Other party	<b>1.8</b>	<b>1.8</b>
Refused to say if voted or for which party / blank ballot	<b>13.5</b>	<b>10.0</b>
Didn't vote	<b>5.0</b>	<b>27.4</b>
Total	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>



## Appendix 4

### Israeli Democracy - An International Comparison

#### International Indicators and Their Sources

	Indicator	Institution and Publication
Democratic rights and freedoms	Political rights	Freedom House <i>Freedom in the World</i>
	Civil liberties	Freedom House <i>Freedom in the World</i>
	Freedom of the press	Reporters without Borders <i>World Press Freedom Index</i>
Democratic process	Voice and accountability	World Bank <i>Worldwide Governance Indicators</i>
	Political participation	Economist Intelligence Unit <i>Democracy Index</i>
	Egalitarian democracy	V-Dem Institute <i>Varieties of Democracy</i>
	Participatory democracy	V-Dem Institute <i>Varieties of Democracy</i>
	Deliberative democracy	V-Dem Institute <i>Varieties of Democracy</i>
	Democratic political culture	Economist Intelligence Unit <i>Democracy Index</i>
Governance	Functioning of government	Economist Intelligence Unit <i>Democracy Index</i>
	Rule of law	World Bank <i>Worldwide Governance Indicators</i>
Corruption	Perception of corruption	Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index
	Control of corruption	World Bank <i>Worldwide Governance Indicators</i>



	Indicator	Institution and Publication
Regulation	Regulatory quality	World Bank <i>Worldwide Governance Indicators</i>
Economic equality	Equal distribution of resources	V-Dem Institute <i>Varieties of Democracy</i>

### Countries studied, and method of comparison

Each institution compiled its own list of countries for assessment, with the number ranging from 167 to 212. To create a common frame of reference, Israel's comparative ranking in each of the indicators is presented in percentile form. A high percentile indicates a favorable ranking in terms of democratic performance, and a low percentile, a negative one.

We wish to note the following points: First, a change in a particular country's ranking in a given year does not necessarily correspond with a change in that country's score. Thus, a country can receive the same score for two or more consecutive years but can rise or fall in its position relative to other countries. In other words, if the scores of other countries improve, a given country can drop in its comparative ranking even if its score remains unchanged. And conversely, if many other countries experience a decline in their scores, a country can rise in the rankings even if its democratic performance has not improved.

And second, when we note the indicators for a certain year, we are referring to the year in which they were published, though in most cases these are based on data from the previous year. This being the case, what we cite as the 2019 indicators generally reflect a country's performance in 2018.

### International indicators: Description and sources

#### **Freedom House**

The Freedom House research institute has been publishing its annual *Freedom in the World* report since 1972. The report presents scores on a variety of political rights and civil liberties in 212 countries around the world. The data for our comparative chapter are drawn from *Freedom in the World 2019: Democracy in Retreat*.

The political rights indicator is divided into three principal components: functioning of government, electoral process, and political pluralism and participation. The scores in this

indicator range from 0 (absence of political rights) to 40 (full political rights). Israel's score in this indicator for 2019 stands at 35, representing a drop of one point in comparison with 2018. The reason for this, as stated in the report, is the Nation-State Law enacted by Israel last year: "The score declined ... because the parliament adopted a law with constitutional status that explicitly discriminates against the non-Jewish citizen population."

The civil liberties indicator, which incorporates 15 criteria, is scored from 0 to 60. Israel's score this year remains unchanged at 43, maintaining its designation as "partly free" in the area of civil liberties.

### ***Economist Intelligence Unit***

Each year, the Economist Intelligence Unit (a division of *The Economist* weekly) publishes a global *Democracy Index* that assesses the level of democracy in 167 countries around the world. The data presented below were drawn from this year's report entitled *Democracy Index 2018: Me Too? Political Participation, Protest and Democracy* (published in 2019). The *Index* consists of five independent categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; functioning of government; political participation; and political culture. In the comparative chapter, we note Israel's scores in three of the five areas: political participation, political culture, and functioning of government.

The political participation indicator is based on a scale of 0 to 10 (with 0 representing a low rate of political participation, and 10, a high rate). Israel's score this year, as in the past four years, is very high, at 8.89.

The political culture indicator uses scores ranging from 0 to 10 (where 0 symbolizes an undemocratic political culture, and 10, a democratic one). Israel's score this year, as in all the assessments since 2007, is 7.5.

The functioning of government indicator is similarly based on a scale of 0 to 10 (with 0 representing poor functioning, and 10, high functioning of government). Israel's score this year, as in the previous two years, is 7.5.

### ***World Bank***

The World Bank publishes annual comparative data on 209 countries. Its report, entitled *Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)*, examines six aspects of governance: voice and accountability, political stability and lack of violence/terrorism, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. This year, we present data in four of these parameters: voice and accountability, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption.

The scores for voice and accountability range from –2.5 to 2.5, with a higher score indicating a greater degree of representation. Israel's score this year is 0.696, marking a decline over last year's grade of 0.77.

Likewise, the rule of law indicator is presented on a scale of –2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better governance. Israel was rated at 1.02 this year, a decline from last year's score of 1.07.

Control of corruption is also measured on a scale of –2.5 to 2.5, with a higher score denoting a greater incidence of corruption, and a lower score, the opposite. Israel's score dropped significantly this year, from 1.06 to 0.83.

Regulatory quality, like the other World Bank indicators, ranges from –2.5 (sound policies and regulations) to 2.5 (poor ones). Israel's current score in this indicator is slightly lower than last year's, dipping from 1.31 to 1.27, though it is nonetheless the country's highest grade in the World Bank categories.

### **V-Dem Institute**

The V-Dem (Varieties of Democracy) Institute offers a new approach to conceptualizing and measuring democracy as a system of government. In its view, material and non-material inequalities between population groups inhibit the ability of citizens to exercise their democratic rights and freedoms. V-Dem's *Annual Democracy Report 2019* focuses on five key principles of democracy in 179 countries: respect for liberal values; electoral representation; equality; participation; and deliberation. In our report, we cite figures on the egalitarian, participatory, and deliberative aspects of democracy.

In the egalitarian democracy indicator, the scores range from 0 (no equality) to 1 (full equality). Israel's rating was 0.747 this year, marking a decline from last year's score of 0.786.

The participatory democracy indicator is similarly based on a scale of 0 to 1, with a higher score indicating a stronger participatory democracy and vice versa. Israel's score this year is 0.556, dropping from last year's score of 0.576.

The deliberative democracy indicator also ranges from 0 (low extent of deliberative democracy) to 1 (high extent). Here too, Israel's score dipped this year from 0.754 to 0.738.

In the equal distribution of resources indicator, the scores range from 0 (inequitable distribution of state resources) to 1 (equal distribution). Israel earned a grade of 0.784 this year, dropping from 0.807 last year.

***Transparency International***

Transparency International is considered the world leader in gauging perceived levels of corruption in all its forms. The organization's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) is a composite assessment drawing on 13 international surveys from a variety of independent institutions specializing in governance and business-climate analysis. The CPI compares the perception of corruption in 180 countries worldwide using a scale of 1 to 100. The higher the score, the less corrupt the country is seen to be. Israel's score this year of 61 represents a slight dip from last year's rating of 62.

***Reporters Without Borders***

Reporters Without Borders is an international NGO established in 1985 to defend global freedom of information and freedom of the press, in part through ongoing monitoring of attacks on these freedoms around the world. Each year, the organization publishes the *World Press Freedom Index*, offering data on freedom of the press in 180 countries. Country scores are made up of two components: quantitative data on abuses and acts of violence against journalists during the past year; and qualitative data based on the responses of experts to a questionnaire on a range of subjects such as media independence, relevant legislation, and journalistic infrastructure.

The scores range from 0 (full freedom of the press) to 100 (lack of freedom). Israel's score this year was 30.8, a slightly poorer showing than last year's 30.26.

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**The Israel Democracy Institute (IDI)** is an independent center of research and action dedicated to strengthening the foundations of Israeli democracy. IDI works to bolster the values and institutions of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. A non-partisan think-and-do tank, the Institute harnesses rigorous applied research to influence policy, legislation and public opinion. The institute partners with political leaders, policymakers, and representatives of civil society to improve the functioning of the government and its institutions, confront security threats while preserving civil liberties, and foster solidarity within Israeli society. The State of Israel recognized the positive impact of IDI's research and recommendations by bestowing upon the Institute its most prestigious award, the Israel Prize for Lifetime Achievement.

**The Guttman Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research** was established in its current configuration in 1998, when it became a part of IDI. The Guttman Institute was founded in 1949 by Professor Eliyahu (Louis) Guttman and has since enriched the public discourse on thousands of issues by way of rigorous applied and pioneering research methods, enhanced by the unique "continuing survey" that has documented the attitudes of the Israeli public in all aspects of life in over 1,200 studies.

**The Israeli Democracy Index** is a public opinion poll project conducted by the Guttman Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research. Since 2003, an extensive survey has been conducted annually on a representative sample of Israel's adult population. Each survey presents an estimate of the quality of Israeli democracy for that year.

The project aims to assessing trends in Israeli public opinion regarding realization of democratic values and the performance of government systems and elected officials. Analysis of its results may contribute to a public discussion of the status of democracy in Israel and create a cumulative empirical database to intensify the discourse concerning such issues.

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