**Press Release**

**March 2024 Israeli Voice Index  
War in Gaza Survey 14**

**Across the Political Spectrum, Only a Minority of Israelis Think the Government will Survive to the End of its Term**

*Among both Jewish and Arab Israelis, just over one-third think it is likely for the government to complete its term in office as determined by law (four years, to 2026).*

The Israel Democracy Institute’s March 2024 Israeli Voice Index—conducted by IDI’s Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research—found that only a minority of Jewish Israelis across the Left (19%), Center (24%), and Right (44%) believe that the government will complete its allotted term.

When broken down by vote in the last election, Shas voters have the highest (71%) faith in government's ability to survive to the end of its term, followed by a small majority of Likud voters (51%), versus Meretz voters, who have the lowest level of faith in this regard (7%).

**Additional Findings:**

**Most Jewish Israelis think society will bear the burden of continued armed** **conflict for as long as it takes**

We asked: “In your estimation, for how much longer will Israeli society be able to bear the burden of continued fighting in Gaza and the confrontation in the north?” Overall, the highest share of Jewish Israelis (39.5%) think society can bear continued fighting for as long as it takes, compared to only 7% of Arab Israelis. An additional 9% of Jewish Israelis think that their society can bear the burden of continued fighting for a year or more, and 22% for an additional six months to a year. Among Jewish Israelis, those on the Right have a noticeably higher estimation of Israel's capacity in this regard than do those in the Center and on the Left.

**For how much longer will Israeli society be able to bear the burden of continued fighting in Gaza and the confrontation in the north? (%)**

**National Mood Approaching Lows Not Seen Since Judicial Overhaul Protests**

This month’s survey found a decline in the level of optimism about the future of democratic rule in Israel relative to previous months (from 41% in January to 35% today), and a continuation of the downward trend in optimism about the future of Israel’s security (from 39% in January to 34% today). In fact, following a spike in optimism in the early months of the war, both of these are now approaching the low points last seen in the summer of 2023, the height of the protests against the judicial reforms.

**Israelis divided on whether the government is doing its utmost to secure the release of hostages**

Against the backdrop of more vocal protests for the release of hostages, we asked: “Given the current circumstances, is Israel’s leadership is doing its utmost to secure the release of the hostages?” We found that 52% of Jewish Israelis think or are certain that the leadership is doing all it can to bring the hostages home, compared to only 30% of Arab Israelis. In addition, we found substantial differences by gender, with 59% of Jewish men saying Israel's leadership is doing its utmost to release the hostages, compared to 44% of Jewish women.

**Majority of Jewish Israelis against implementation by Israel of its part of UN Security Council Resolution**

We asked: “The UN Security Council recently adopted a resolution that included a demand for an immediate humanitarian ceasefire during Ramadan and the immediate and unconditional release of the Israeli hostages. In your opinion, should Israel implement its part of this resolution?” A very large majority of Arab respondents (78%) think that Israel should indeed implement its part of the resolution. By contrast, only around one-third of Jewish respondents hold the same view.

**About half of Jewish Israelis: the US's decision not to veto UN resolution indicates a retreat from unreserved support of Israel**

We asked: “To what extent does the fact that the United States did not veto the UN Security Council resolution indicate a retreat from its unreserved support of Israel until now?” Around half the Jewish respondents think that this fact does indeed indicate such a retreat to a fairly large or very large extent, while 37% take the opposite view. The Arab sample is divided on this issue: 41% see this as a departure by the United States from its unreserved support of Israel, while 42% do not.

**Israelis across the political spectrum: policy of Israeli governments made Oct. 7 attack easier for Hamas**

We found that a very large majority of the total sample agrees that the policies of Israeli governments made the attack on October 7 easier for Hamas. A much larger share of Jewish respondents than of Arab respondents think that governments policy contributed to Hamas’s success on October 7. In fact, among Jewish Israelis, there is general consensus on this matter across all three political camps.

**Agree that the policy of Israeli governments toward Hamas in recent years made it easier for Hamas to carry out the October 7 attack (%)**

**Israelis: Jewish and Arab Israelis split on whether the establishment of a Palestinian state would cease Hamas’ struggle against Israel; Majorities of Jews and Arabs agree that Hamas at fault for Gazan Palestinian suffering**

Only a tiny proportion of Jewish respondents (5%) think that Hamas **will cease** its struggle if a Palestinian state is established, compared with slightly more than half of Arab respondents. Across the Jewish Left (84%), Center (89%) and Right (95%), an overwhelming majority of respondents in think that Hamas **will not cease** its aggression against Israel if a Palestinian state is created. In terms of the suffering of Palestinians, a majority of both Jewish (94.5%) and Arab (61.5%) Israelis agree that Hamas bears a great deal of responsibility.

**Most Israelis think Hamas succeeded in refocusing international attention on Palestinian struggle**

We wanted to know whether Israelis think that Hamas, with the October 7 attack, succeeded in refocusing international attention on the Palestinian problem, after years in which it was relegated to the margins. We found that among both Jewish (58.5%) and Arab (56%) Israelis, a majority thinks they were, indeed, successful in doing so.

**About half of Israelis: Hamas should be recognized as representative organization for large segments of the Palestinian people**

We asked whether, despite its actions, Hamas should be recognized as a representative organization for large segments of the Palestinian people. We found that almost half of all our respondents think that Hamas’s representativeness in this regard should be recognized. The share of those in agreement was almost identical among both Jewish (46%) and Arab (46.5%) respondents. For some respondents, agreeing that Hamas represents large sections of the Palestinian public may reflect recognition of Hamas and willingness to conduct negotiations with it, while for others, agreement may reflect the perception that Hamas’s (illegitimate) views and actions reflect those of large sections of the Palestinian people.

*The March 2024 Israeli Voice Index was prepared by the Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute. The survey was conducted via the internet and by telephone (to include groups that are under-represented on the internet) between March 31 and April 3, 2024, with 606 men and women interviewed in Hebrew and 149 in Arabic, constituting a nationally representative sample of the adult population in Israel aged 18 and over. The maximum sampling error was ±3.64% at a confidence level of 95%. Field work was carried out by the Dialogue Research and Polling Institute. The full data file can be found at: https://dataisrael.idi.org.il.*