THE ISRAELI DEMOCRACY INDEX

2018

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Or Anabi / Ella Heller / Fadi Omar

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Chapter 1: International Indicators

- Israel's **scores** in the democracy indicators have once again remained largely stable this year, registering only a slight decline. Of the 13 indicators examined, five saw a drop in comparison with last year, four showed improvement, and four were unchanged. With regard to Israel's **relative ranking** as a democracy, however, the picture is somewhat brighter, with a rise in four indicators, a decline in three others, and six with no change.

- As in 2017, Israel scored highly on political participation and democratic political culture, but received a low grade in freedom of the press and protection of civil liberties.

- Comparing Israel's scores with those of all the countries surveyed, we find that it placed in the highest quartile in half the indicators (the two governance and two corruption indicators as well as political participation, political rights, and democratic political culture), and in the second quartile in six of them (egalitarian democracy, participatory democracy, deliberative democracy, voice and accountability, civil liberties, and freedom of the press).

- Israel's ranking compared with its 34 fellow OECD members is much less favorable: Only in one indicator (political participation) does Israel place above the mid-point of the scale, while in six indicators it ranks very near the bottom (civil liberties, freedom of the press, egalitarian democracy, participatory democracy, voice and accountability, and deliberative democracy).

Part II: Israeli Democracy as Viewed by Its Citizens

Chapter 2: How is Israel Doing?

■ This year's survey shows a continued upturn in the public's view of Israel's overall situation. The percentage of respondents who define the situation as "good" or "very good" this year (53% of the total sample) is the highest since the inception of the *Democracy Index* project in 2003. Among the Jewish public, a majority (55%) offer a favorable assessment. In the Arab sample, meanwhile, the most frequent response this year is "so-so" (31%), though here too there is a noticeable increase in the share who classify the country's overall situation as "good" or "very good." An even greater majority—the largest since these assessments began—define their personal situation this year as "good" or "very good" (Jewish respondents—83%; Arab respondents—64%).

■ A total of 88% of Jewish respondents, and slightly over 50% of Arab respondents, state that they are proud to be Israeli.

■ When people were asked to rate Israel's democracy, the responses were less encouraging: 41% of the Jewish public, and only 14% of the Arab public, define the state of democracy in Israel as "good" or "very good." Moreover, 41% of Jews (most of whom identify politically with the Left or Center[1]) and 70% of Arabs feel that Israeli democracy is in grave danger.

■ A majority of Jews (58%), but only 33% of Arabs, agree with the statement that the Israeli media portray the situation in the country as much worse than it really is.

Chapter 3: Jewish and/or Democratic?

■ Regarding the balance between the Jewish and democratic components in the definition of the state, 39% of Jewish respondents and 77% of Arab respondents answered that the Jewish component is too dominant. At one extreme of the Jewish sample are the secular Jews, most of whom (61%) hold that the Jewish component is too strong, while at the other are the Haredim (ultra-Orthodox), most of whom (59%) feel that the democratic component is too dominant. A majority of secular Jews would like to strengthen the democratic aspect while the bulk of the Haredi public would like to see a stronger Jewish element. The national religious camp is more or less split between those who feel that the democratic component is too dominant and those who hold that there is a good balance

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1   **Note:** Throughout the Index, reference is made to respondents from the Right, Center, and Left. This refers to how respondents defined themselves politically in terms of their viewpoints on foreign policy and security issues (as opposed to social or economic issues). In this English translation, we use the terms "political orientation" or "political camp" to denote the range of their self-definitions.

between the two aspects, but the majority (57%) wish for a stronger Jewish component. Traditional Jews tend to see the balance as correct, and most of them would like to see it maintained.

- A clear majority of Arab respondents (69%) think that Israel does not have the right to be defined as the nation-state of the Jewish people. Meanwhile, a sizeable minority of Jews (47%) hold that those who are unwilling to affirm that Israel is the nation-state of the Jewish people should lose their right to vote.

- While, as in the past, a clear majority of Jews (72%) are opposed to granting greater rights to Jews in Israel than to non-Jews, 74% feel that crucial decisions on security matters should only be made by a Jewish majority vote. Likewise, a majority—though a smaller one (59%)—hold that a Jewish majority vote is essential for decisions pertaining to economy or society. Only on the Left is this not the most widely held view regarding either type of decision. Among secular Jews, there is no such majority when it comes to decisions on economy and society, though there is one regarding decisions on security.

- A majority of Jewish and Arab respondents (53% and 70%, respectively) are opposed to the notion that in order to preserve their national identity it is better to live in separate communities. Nonetheless, this position is favored by a majority of Haredi, national religious, and traditional religious Jews as well as respondents on the Right and those who feel they belong to the weaker groups in society. Among Arabs, there is no majority in any of the subgroups who support living separately.

Chapter 4: Democracy, Government, Citizens

- A majority of the Jewish public (68%) expressed an interest in politics, as opposed to a minority of the Arab public (43%). An especially high level of interest was found among older adults, males, respondents with college degrees, and those on the Left. In the Arab sample, no significant differences were found among the subgroups.

- Despite their interest in the subject, most Jews (53%) and almost half of Arabs (48.5%) would not advise someone close to them to go into politics. Not surprisingly, the more negative their assessment of Israeli democracy, the less inclined respondents were to recommend that a friend or family member enter the field.

- A majority of respondents (80% of Jews, and 70.5% of Arabs) believe that they have little or no ability to influence government policy. This feeling is stronger among opposition voters (85%) than among those who voted for parties in the ruling coalition (74%).

- Some 56% of the total sample reject the assertion that most Knesset members work hard and are doing a good job. While this is a worrisome statistic, it should be noted that it is lower than the average in previous years (59%), meaning that slightly fewer Israelis hold a negative opinion of their elected representatives this year. Additionally, those who voted

for coalition parties are more satisfied with the performance of Knesset members than are those who voted for parties in the opposition.

■ The average level of trust in state institutions (on a scale of 1 to 4) in the Jewish sample is near the mid-point on the spectrum (2.51), similar to past years. In the Arab sample, by contrast, the average trust rating this year is 1.81—that is, below the mid-point, and below the average rating given in previous years.

■ Of the ten institutions or individuals included in the survey, five earned the trust of a majority of the Jewish public: the IDF, the President of Israel, the respondent's municipality or local authority, the Supreme Court, and the police. In the Arab public, none of the institutions are trusted by a majority, with only 36% expressing confidence in the Supreme Court (the most trusted body among Arab respondents). At the bottom of the list in both samples are Israel's political parties.

■ Despite the low level of trust in the parties, a majority (57%) would repeat their vote from the 2015 Knesset elections. The parties with the highest rate of "voter drain" are Kulanu (just 38% of its Jewish voters think or are certain they would support them again) and the Zionist Union (only 48% would vote for them the next time around).

■ A majority of the Israeli public (56%) disagree with the idea of denying the Supreme Court the authority to nullify laws passed by the Knesset; however, there has been a rise over time in the share of respondents who agree with this position, and a decline in those who hold no opinion.

Chapter 5: Corruption

■ To clarify what constitutes corruption in the eyes of the public, respondents were presented with four scenarios: elected officials accepting gifts; elected officials favoring one constituency over another; employing the services of a "fixer"; and asking a friend at a government ministry to help "speed things up." All of these were seen as corrupt by a majority of respondents, both Jews and Arabs; however, among Jews, using the services of a fixer was viewed as an act of corruption by the greatest share of respondents (84%), while among Arabs, the most widely identified act of corruption was an official benefiting a particular group at the expense of others (82%). The Haredim were found to be the least likely to perceive these actions as corrupt.

■ What is the most important quality in a political figure? Of the four traits presented—ability to get things done, keeping promises to voters, incorruptibility, and ideology—the Jewish respondents chose incorruptibility, while the Arabs prioritized being able to get things done. In the Jewish sample, respondents on the Right as well as Haredim tended less than other groups to select incorruptibility as the most important attribute in a political figure.

- A majority (56%) of the total sample reject the notion that public figures sometimes have to circumvent laws and regulations and cut corners in order to effectively advance issues of national importance. This majority rises among respondents with a higher level of education and those with a more secular religious identity.

- In assessing the extent of corruption, the most frequent response (32%) is that Israel's leadership is midway between "very corrupt" and "not at all corrupt." The share of the total sample who feel that it is corrupt (47%) far outstrips those who believe that it is not (19%), and Arab respondents view the country's leadership as much more corrupt than do Jewish respondents. A comparison with previous years shows that, despite the ongoing investigations against high-level government figures, there has not been a rise in the perceived level of corruption in the country's leadership. An interesting—though not surprising—finding is that a majority of opposition voters (66% of them) see Israel's leaders as corrupt, as opposed to 26% of those who voted for coalition parties.

- When asked to rate a list of institutions in terms of corruption, a majority of Arab respondents saw all of the bodies presented as corrupt. Among Jewish respondents, a majority felt that the government, municipalities, Chief Rabbinate, Knesset, and media are corrupt, with only a minority attaching this label to the IDF (16%), the Supreme Court (30%), and the police (42%). For respondents on the Right, the most corrupt institution today is the media; in the Center, the Chief Rabbinate; and on the Left, the government.

- Some 37% of Jews and 41% of Arabs report that they have personally encountered an instance of corruption.

- A majority of Jews (59%) view the police investigations of public figures as evidence of the strength of Israel's democracy, while a large majority of Arabs (81%) see these probes as highlighting the weakness of Israeli democracy.

- Those who voted in 2015 for parties now in the coalition (with the exception of Kulanu) are not inclined to change their vote in response to corruption inquiries against the heads of the party they voted for, while a majority of those who voted for opposition parties state that they would be less likely to vote for a list whose leaders are suspected of corruption.

- A majority (62% of Jews and 52% of Arabs) do not believe that all corruption suspects receive the same treatment from law enforcement authorities. In the Jewish public, the sense of inequality is highest on the Right and among Haredim.

- A majority (54%) of the total sample agree that Israeli democracy is harmed by the excessive influence of a small group of wealthy individuals over the government.

Chapter 6: Israeli Society

- This year's survey found a substantial decline in the level of solidarity in Israeli society as perceived by both Arabs and Jews. In the Jewish sample, national religious respondents and those on the Right attribute a higher level of solidarity to Israeli-Jewish society than do other groups.

- Of the five focal points of tension in Israeli society as presented in this year's survey, three were characterized by the total sample as displaying a high level of strain: Right and Left; Jews and Arabs; and religious and secular Jews. Tensions between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim, and between rich and poor, were classified as moderate. This year marked a turnaround in perceptions of the highest level of tension: In the Jewish sample, the level of tension between Right and Left was classed as being higher than that between Jews and Arabs, which headed the list in the past and continues to be seen as the strongest source of tension by Arab respondents.

- The majority—among both Jews (53%) and Arabs (59%)—reject the notion of paying higher taxes to help narrow Israel's socioeconomic gaps.

- In both samples, the most common assessment of the state of relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel today is "so-so." As with last year's findings, the share of Arab respondents who characterize relations as "good" or "very good" is greater than that among Jewish respondents.

- Some two-thirds of both the Jewish and Arab samples agree with the statement: "Most Arab citizens of Israel want to integrate into Israeli society and be part of it."

- A total of 58% of Jews reject the view that Arab citizens pose a threat to Israel's security. At the same time, on the Right and among Haredim, national religious, and traditional religious Jews, a majority (of varying degrees) see Arabs as a threat.

- Slightly more than half of Arabs, and half of Jews, hold that the situation of Arabs in Israel is worse than that of Jews; however, there are sizeable differences within the Jewish sample: 84% on the (Jewish) Left share this view, as opposed to 33% on the Right.

- As for the situation of Mizrahim compared with that of Ashkenazim, nearly two-thirds of the Jewish sample feel that both groups are equally well-off. At the same time, 34% of Mizrahim (as contrasted with 12.5% of Ashkenazim) describe the situation of Mizrahim as worse than that of Ashkenazim.

Chapter 7: Democracy and Culture

- Despite budgetary limitations, there is almost total consensus—among both Jews and Arabs—that the state should fund culture and the arts.

- Roughly one-half of respondents hold that if the state provides funding for culture, it should have a say in its content. In the Jewish sample, only the secular, those who identify with the Center or Left, and "heavy" consumers of culture show a majority opposed to this view.

- A plurality of both Jews (with the exception of the Left) and Arabs favor state funding of "popular culture" over that of "high-brow" activities.

- Arab respondents prefer that artists themselves determine which cultural activities should receive funding, whereas Jewish respondents feel that this should be decided by representatives of the different population groups in Israeli society.

- A majority (64%) of the total sample hold that works of art have the power to alter people's political views.

- A slim majority (51%) of the total sample agree with the statement that "state funding should be withdrawn or reduced for institutions or artists sharply critical of the state."

Chapter 8: Women in Israel

- The most frequent assessment among the total sample (41%) is that the status of women in Israel is somewhat or much worse than that of men. Only about 25% hold that women are better off than men, and some 33% believe that the situation of both sexes is similar. Among Jewish respondents, a majority of women (52%), and only a minority of men (35%), feel that women are somewhat or much worse off than men.

- Among both Jews and Arabs, the percentage who feel that the status of women is worse than that of men rises in tandem with the level of education. The 35–54 and older cohorts share this view to a greater extent than the younger respondents.

- A total of 67% of Jews and 38% of Arabs favor making state funding for parties contingent on suitable representation of women on the party's electoral slate. In the Jewish sample, women support this position more strongly than do men.

- A majority of Jewish respondents (73%) support expanding the range of roles available to women soldiers in the IDF, with slightly more women than men taking this view. Only among the Haredim and national religious is there not a majority in favor.

- A substantial majority of the Jewish public (86%–95% of women, and 77% of men), but only a minority of the Arab public (32%–37% of women, and 40.5% of men), favor passing a law requiring that men and women receive equal pay for equal work.

Introduction

Israel's 70th anniversary year was simultaneously stormy and stable. On the stormy side, we can point to the relocation of the US Embassy to Jerusalem—a move that earned President Trump the blessings and gratitude of Israel's government but also sparked strong reactions, both positive and negative, in Israel, across the region, and around the world. In addition, there are the serious continuing clashes at the Gaza-Israel border, with no end in sight; the fierce struggles within Israel over the status of the Supreme Court and the "override clause," a legislative proposal aimed at altering the balance of power between the Court and the Knesset; and, as we write these lines, the passage of the Nation-State Law, which enjoys strong support from one side of the political spectrum but arouses vigorous opposition on the other, primarily due to its omission of any reference to the principle of civil equality that was included in Israel's Declaration of Independence and is the cornerstone of Israel's definition as a democratic and Jewish state. Investigations into corruption also evoked harsh reactions this year, among them direct attacks on the Attorney-General and the Israeli Police from both sides of the political divide, as well as major demonstrations against political corruption.

On the stable side, it seems that in spite of the dramatic events near its borders, in particular in Syria, Israel's security has not been challenged at the strategic level. And on the domestic front, it looks as though the 34th government, led by Binyamin Netanyahu, will serve out its term, or come close to it, despite predictions (so far, mistaken) that it would be short-lived. The mass anti-corruption protests—in which some had placed such high hopes—never really took off, and did not end up rocking the foundations of the political system. The national economy, too, is solid and thriving, and—both surprisingly and unsurprisingly—those who are not benefiting from this prosperity have not flooded the streets demanding a bigger slice of the pie or calling for Israel's economic leaders to be held to account. In fact, as demonstrated by the 2018 survey data, which we will be exploring below, the Israeli public as a whole is quite content—or perhaps merely apathetic.

Nonetheless, a considerable number of Israelis—both Jews and non-Jews—feel, and even fear, that the ground is crumbling beneath the country's democracy. The continuing control over the West Bank; a series of controversial pieces of legislation, whose critics see in them nationalist, and even racist, elements; and the systematic efforts to weaken the bodies considered the watchdogs of democracy (among them the Supreme Court and the more critical media outlets), are causing many people to lose sleep, to the point where some are declaring that Israel can no longer be considered a democratic state in the fullest sense of the term. However—and this should not be ignored—many others, numerically even more than those who are worried about the state of democracy in Israel (as demonstrated, for example, in the forecasts for the next elections, which are also supported by the data from the present survey), feel that Israel is moving in the right (lowercase *r*) direction. Even if they are not pleased with each and every

action taken by the political leadership, in general they are satisfied with the present state of affairs and are not seeking any radical changes. If they are fearful of anything, it is going back to the past, under the thumb of what they call "the old elites," whom they see as being aided by outside elements (such as foreign governments or international organizations) and by internal forces (in particular, civil society organizations such as the New Israel Fund) to negate the stated will of the voters, who have banished them to the opposition time and again in recent years.

As shown in the numerous statistics cited and analyzed in this annual report, two principal dividing lines can be discerned in Israeli society today: one, between Jews and Arabs; and the other, between Right and Left. Although we present separate data on the basis of nationality (Jews and Arabs) for almost all the questions in the survey, this year we will be looking less at this division, for two reasons: first, we published a comprehensive report on the subject last year, and we will be doing so again next year; and second, for the first time since we began these assessments, when interviewees were asked to rate the key focal points of tension in Israeli society, the Jewish respondents downgraded the severity of Jewish-Arab tensions to second place, below that between Right and Left. The Arab interviewees, incidentally, left Jewish-Arab tensions in first place again this year.

The primary focus of this year's report will therefore be the split between the two political camps, which, for lack of a better term (still), we will continue to refer to at this point as "Right" and "Left"—though these labels are somewhat misleading.[2] To illustrate the upswing in perceived severity of tensions between the Right and the Left, let us note that in 2012 only about 9% of Jewish respondents selected it as the major source of tension in Israeli society; in 2015, that figure rose to 18%; by 2016, it had already reached 24%; and this year, it climbed to 31%.

Perhaps the most important finding in this survey (which had already come to light in earlier studies by us and by other social researchers in Israel) is thus the emergence of two blocs with inherently contradictory points of view on many and varied aspects of Israel's collective existence. We are referring to an ever-increasing confluence of opinions on matters that are not necessarily related: views on foreign policy and security; self-identification on the spectrum of religiosity (from Haredi to secular); attitudes toward the watchdogs of democracy (in particular the Supreme Court and the media); opinions on the integration of Arab citizens of Israel in public life; willingness to make state funding for artists contingent on the content of their work; and ideas about the true motivations driving the investigation of high-ranking political figures on charges of corruption. What this means is that the primary fault line in Israeli society today is no longer solely, or chiefly, differences in outlook regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (as

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2   As part of the survey, respondents were asked to classify themselves as identifying politically with the Right, Center, or Left in terms of their viewpoints on foreign policy and security issues (as opposed to social or economic issues). In this English translation, we use the terms "political orientation" or "political camp" to denote the range of these self-definitions.

was the case at the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st), nor even differences on the basis of nationality.

Thus, we are witnessing the formation of a deep schism within the Jewish majority that is liable to have an impact on Israel's shared future and national strategy for years to come. It is noteworthy that a similar split is being identified today by sociological and political researchers in the United States and other Western countries as well, with much of the discussion of this phenomenon taking place under the heading of the "crisis of liberal democracy."

The larger bloc demographically in Israel is the Right, which shares common ground with the Center mainly on matters of security. The Right's first concern is the triad of nation-Jewishness-security, and it assigns top priority to Israel's Jewishness—even if this comes at the price of its "democratic-ness." At present, the Left is the smaller bloc numerically. Those who identify with it are committed, first and foremost, to the values of liberal democracy, universal human rights and freedoms, and the principle of civil equality. In general, they do not see an inherent contradiction between these values and the Jewish-national component. As the data below will show, the Center is closer to this bloc, particularly on matters of religion-and-state and citizenship.

The Right in Israel today is represented politically by the coalition parties, which, thanks to successful strategic coordination in recent years, enjoy relatively strong support from their voters, as demonstrated by the data below. And even if these voters are not all that pleased with the goings-on in the political arena, they are happier than those who voted for the opposition parties.

The Left is represented electorally by the opposition parties, which are divided over fundamental issues (such as the Zionist character of the state, which is unacceptable to the Joint List but is a key tenet of the Zionist Union and, to a certain degree, of Meretz as well), and find it difficult at crucial junctures to overcome their differences and work together. For this reason, their performance is rated as substandard and very disappointing by many of their voters. In light of this weakness on the part of the opposition, it is possible to understand why the minorities represented by these parties feel abandoned and poorly represented by the country's lawmakers, not to mention the fact that, in the eyes of many, the political echelons are riddled with corruption. It should be noted that on numerous issues, the Jewish Left is closer to the views of the Arab public than it is to those of the Jewish Right.

This convergence of various segments of the public around shared viewpoints on a range of diverse sociopolitical issues, and the resulting division into two blocs that are distinct from one another in virtually every regard, make Israel a political society with mutually reinforcing rather than cross-cutting social cleavages, as is generally the case in stable democracies. In a society with reinforcing cleavages, the various divisions among different population groups do not cancel out, or even mitigate, one another; on the contrary, they only serve to amplify each other. Such a situation offers a poor foundation for democratic stability, and its increasing

prominence in Israel in recent years is precluding the emergence of a shared understanding of the "common good" to which everyone can aspire, regardless of differences of opinion on this or that political issue.

The situation described here should also be a source of concern to those who are in power at present yet have an eye toward the future—for in the absence of a common vision that transcends differences of opinion, Israel is liable to witness the erosion of its remarkable accomplishments in the areas it is renowned for, and more crucially, to lose its way.

Structure of the report

As in previous years, the Index is divided into two sections:

In **Part I**, **Chapter 1**, we present a selection of indicators compiled by well-known international research institutes that show Israel's ranking in comparison with other countries. The chapter contains three types of comparisons: (a) between Israel and the states included in a given international indicator; (b) between Israel and the OECD member states, based on the assumption that this is the group of countries to which Israel aspires to belong as a democracy; and (c) between Israel's ranking in the indicators in 2018 and in previous years. To make the data easier to understand, we normalized them by converting them to a uniform scale in each case, as explained for each of the indicators individually.

Part II, which deals with democracy in Israel as perceived by its citizens, consists of seven chapters, each on a different subject:

Chapter 2: How is Israel Doing? addresses the Israeli public's perception of the current situation. The main topics discussed in this chapter include: the country's overall situation, the personal situation of the interviewees, and the relationship between the two; respondents' opinions on the state of Israeli democracy; relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel; the accuracy of the media's portrayal of the situation; and pride in being Israeli.

Chapter 3: Jewish and/or Democratic? focuses on the question of whether Israel is Jewish, or democratic, or both. First and foremost, we examined the public's perception of Israel's right to be defined as the nation-state of the Jewish people, and opinions on the possibility of denying the right to vote to those who do not recognize Israel as such. We then questioned whether Jewish and non-Jewish citizens should enjoy equal rights, or Jews should be granted greater rights. In addition, we revisited the public's views on whether a Jewish majority is essential when making crucial decisions on matters of peace and security as well as on issues of society, governance, and the economy. Finally, we sought to clarify what Israeli citizens think about preserving national identity by living in separate Jewish and Arab communities.

Chapter 4: Democracy, Government, Citizens discusses Israeli citizens' level of interest in politics, their perception of their ability to influence government policy, their assessment of Knesset members' performance, and whether they would advise a family member or friend to enter politics. Additionally, we address the crucial question of the level of trust in state institutions, whether interviewees intend to vote again for the same party in the next national elections as they did in 2015, and whether the Supreme Court should be denied the authority to nullify laws passed by the Knesset.

Chapter 5: Corruption, which explores a topic of major relevance in 2018, addresses the following issues: the extent of corruption in Israeli leadership as perceived by citizens; desirable qualities in public figures (how important incorruptibility is to citizens), and the eternal dilemma of whether it is acceptable to "cut corners" in order to be more effective. We also asked whether "everyone" is in fact corrupt, and sought to clarify what constitutes corruption in the eyes of the public. Likewise, we examined whether they personally had ever experienced corruption (as defined by them).

Chapter 6: Israeli Society deals first with the public's views on the extent of solidarity in Israeli Jewish society. We then move on to a ranking of the level of tensions between various groups in Israeli society, followed by a discussion of the ongoing tensions inherent in relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel. Further, we examine Israeli Jews' assessment of the desire of Arab citizens to integrate into Israeli society, and analyze responses to the question of whether or not Arabs pose a security risk.

Chapter 7: Democracy and Culture expands on a topic never before addressed in the *Democracy Index*. In light of the fierce differences of opinion that have erupted recently over the link between state funding and the content produced by artistic and cultural institutions as well as individual artists, we decided to explore the opinions of the general public on this issue. More specifically, we looked at the necessity of state funding for culture, patterns of cultural consumption, and the link—if any—between state funding of culture and the state's influence on cultural content. We also asked which types of culture the state should fund, and who should determine the kinds of activities to be supported. Finally, we examined perceptions of the impact of works of art and culture on political views, along with the range of opinions on denying state funding to those who are sharply critical of the government.

Chapter 8: Women in Israel briefly explores the issue of women's status in Israel: the public's assessment of the status of women in Israel as compared with men; whether or not party funding should be used as a tool to encourage greater representation of women in political bodies; opinions on the policy of expanding women's roles in the IDF; and whether or not the public supports the notion of men and women receiving equal pay for equal work.

Before we turn to the text itself, we wish to clarify three points: First, most of the sociodemographic and political variables in the survey, including age, sex, political orientation,

and religiosity,[3] are based on the interviewees' self-definition. At the same time, we made a point of ensuring that the distribution of respondents in the survey corresponded as closely as possible to the distributions that appear in the data of Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS).

Second, several questions in this year's questionnaire offered an even number of response options (for example: strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree), whereas in previous years there was an odd number of choices that also included median categories ("so-so", for example). In such cases, in those tables and figures in the body of the report that show comparisons over time, we divided the median categories between agree and disagree in accordance with the overall proportion of those who agreed or disagreed in a given year.

Third, in order to make for easier reading, we present percentages in whole numbers in the text and accompanying figures. In a few cases we use half percentage points. In the appendices, however, the data are shown to a higher degree of precision—up to one decimal place. Due to this rounding, which as stated is used to help the reader, there are slight differences in some places between the data in the main body of the report and in the appendices.

It is our hope that the abundance of data presented in this report will contribute to the public discourse, which is often based not on facts or data but on gut feelings, and will help readers gain a better understanding of the range of opinions in Israeli society today on issues related, directly or indirectly, to Israel's democratic character.

Methodology

In Part I of the report, we present data from external sources in the form of scores in democracy indicators compiled by international institutes such as the World Bank, Freedom House, and the Economist Intelligence Unit. Part II is based on a public opinion survey formulated by the staff of the Israel Democracy Institute's Guttman Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research, who also analyzed the data collected in the survey.

Two polling firms carried out the field work for the survey: in Hebrew, Smith Consulting and Research, Inc. (Ramat Gan); and in Arabic, Taldor Systems (Tira). The Hebrew survey was conducted between April 8 and April 26, 2018, and the Arabic survey, between April 8 and May 2, 2018.

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3   Throughout this report, "religiosity" refers to the participants' self-declared location on a spectrum ranging from secular to Haredi (also including traditional non-religious, traditional religious, and national religious).

The questionnaire

The questionnaire for this year's Democracy Index survey was compiled during March 2018. It consists of 60 content questions, several of them with multiple subsections. A total of 33 are recurring questions from previous *Democracy Index* surveys or from the *Conditional Partnership* study.[4] In addition to the content questions, 13 socioeconomic questions were posed in the Hebrew questionnaire, and 12 in the Arabic questionnaire. For all questions, the response "don't know / refuse" was not read to the interviewees as a possible choice. Most of the questions were posed to all the interviewees, but due to the sensitivity of certain topics, some questions were presented to either the Jewish or Arab sample only. This is noted clearly in the survey questions in Appendix 2.

The questionnaire was translated beforehand into Arabic, and the interviewers who administered this version were native Arabic speakers.

The sample

In total, 1,041 respondents aged 18 and over were interviewed:

- 851 interviewees, constituting a representative sample of Jews and others[5]
- 190 interviewees, forming a representative sample of Arab citizens of Israel

It should be noted that the Arab sample taken was larger than required by the relative size of the Arab population in Israel; this was done in order to enable us to analyze this sample by subgroup. The sample was of course later weighted in keeping with the Arab public's proportion of the Israeli adult population (16.5%) in order to arrive at the data for the total sample. The maximum sampling error for a sample of this size is ±3.1% for the total sample (±3.4% for the Jewish sample, and ±7.3% for the Arab sample).

Data collection

All data were collected via telephone interviews, using both cell phones (the majority) and landlines (roughly one-third).

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4   Tamar Hermann, Chanan Cohen, Fadi Omar, Ella Heller, and Tzipy Lazar-Shoef, *Jews and Arabs: A Conditional Partnership, Israel 2017* (Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute, 2017).

5   The category of "others" was adopted by Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics during the 1990s to denote people who are not Jewish according to halakha (religious Jewish law) but are not Arab, or who are associated sociologically with the Jewish majority. This relates mainly to immigrants from the former Soviet Union who were eligible to immigrate to Israel under the Law of Return but are not considered halakhically Jewish. In the present survey, we treat them as part of the Jewish majority, and examine differences between the group of "Jews and others" and the sample of Arab Israelis.

Breakdown of interviews by telephone type (%)

Survey language	Cell Phone	Landline	Total
Hebrew	66.3	33.7	100
Arabic	61.6	38.4	100
Total (full sample)	65.4	34.6	100

How did we analyze the data?

Although the primary variables that generally shape Israeli public opinion on political and social issues are known from earlier studies carried out by the IDI and others, we select the ones that will form the basis of our analysis in a given year only after completing our data collection and testing repeatedly by trial and error. In this year's report, our focus when analyzing the responses of the Jewish sample was on self-defined religiosity[6] and political orientation[7]; on social location (the respondents' sense of social centrality or marginality);[8] and, in certain cases, on education, income, or age as well. As shown in Appendix 4, there is a high degree of overlap between some of these variables, chiefly with regard to religiosity and political orientation. But as the congruence is not total, there is an "essential justification" for examining each of these self-definitions separately. In analyzing the responses of the Arab sample, we looked at voting patterns in the previous Knesset elections in 2015 (Joint List versus other parties), in addition to such variables as religion, age, and education.

Navigating the report

To make it easier to navigate the report, two types of references have been inserted in the margins of the text. The first type, located next to every question discussed, refers the reader to the page where that question appears in Appendix 2 (which contains the questionnaire and the distribution of responses for each content question in a three-part format: total sample, Jews, Arabs). The second type of reference appears only for recurring questions, and points to the page where that question appears in Appendix 3 (a multi-year comparison of data). The references appear in the text as follows:

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6   As noted above, the categories for this variable were: Haredi, national religious, traditional religious, traditional non-religious, and secular.

7   As explained earlier, this category relates to political orientation regarding security and foreign policy issues. The categories were: Right, moderate Right, Center, moderate Left, and Left.

8   The categories for this variable were: I feel I belong to a strong group [in society]; I feel I belong to a fairly strong group; I feel I belong to a fairly weak group; I feel I belong to a weak group.

Israel's overall situation

Likewise, next to each question in Appendices 2 and 3, there is a reference to the page in the text where that question is discussed.

We are making the full survey and the raw data used in the Index available to the public for purposes of writing and research via the webpage of **Data Israel** at https://dataisrael.idi.org.il.

Part One

Israeli Democracy–An International Comparison

Written by: Or Anabi

Chapter 1 \ International Indicators

Each year, several research institutes around the world publish indicators that examine and compare the quality of democracy in various countries across a range of aspects, including democratic structure, functioning, and values. Part I of this year's Democracy Index will look at Israel from a global perspective, based on the scores assigned to it by international research bodies. These assessments are drawn from a combination of official statistics, public opinion polls, in-depth academic studies, and the opinions of professional experts.

As in previous years, we discuss 13 indicators relating to three areas: democratic rights and freedoms (political rights, civil liberties, and freedom of the press); the democratic process (voice and accountability, and political participation, culture, and debate); and governance (rule of law, and functioning of government). This year, we added a fourth area—political corruption—which we examine using two indicators: perception of corruption, and the extent of control over corruption. (Since this topic is currently a major focus of Israeli public debate, we have also given it its own chapter, Chapter 5.) The comparisons below are of two types: one, Israel's performance vis-à-vis other countries (broken down further into two groups, as explained below); and two, Israel's standing in 2018 compared with that of previous years.

For every indicator, we present three figures: (1) Israel's normalized score for this year (see the note on methodology below); (2) Israel's ranking in relation to the other countries included in the indicator; and (3) Israel's ranking relative to its fellow members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Table 1.1 below shows Israel's ranking in 2018 based on the democracy indicators compiled by various international institutes (noted in parentheses).

A note on methodology: Each of the research institutes uses its own scale to present its scores: e.g., 0–10, 0–40, 0–60, 0–1, and −2.5 to 2.5. To make it easier to compare Israel's scores in the various assessments, we normalized (or converted) all the indicators this year to a scale from 0 to 100: the higher the score, the better the democratic performance. A detailed compilation of Israel's scores, the original rankings in the indicators, and a full description of the sources can be found in Appendix 1 at the end of this report.

**Table 1.1 ** Israel's ranking in international indicators

		Global ranking	All countries (percentile)	OECD countries (percentile)
Democratic rights and freedoms	Political rights (Freedom House)	**46–54/209**	**74–78**	**20–29**
	Civil liberties (Freedom House)	**83–85/209**	**59–60**	**6**
	Freedom of the press (Reporters Without Borders)	**87/180**	**52**	**6**
Democratic process	Voice and accountability (World Bank)	**58/204**	**72**	**14**
	Political participation (Economist Intelligence Unit)	**2–4/167**	**98–99**	**89–94**
	Egalitarian democracy (V-Dem)	**52–53/178**	**70–71**	**11**
	Participatory democracy (V-Dem)	**56–59/178**	**67–69**	**11**
	Deliberative democracy (V-Dem)	**67–68/178**	**62**	**20**
	Democratic political culture (Economist Intelligence Unit)	**18–26/167**	**84–89**	**40–54**
Governance	Functioning of government (Economist Intelligence Unit)	**27–31/167**	**82–84**	**34–43**
	Rule of law (World Bank)	**40/209**	**81–82**	**26**
Corruption	Control of corruption (World Bank)	**39/209**	**81**	**37**
	Perception of corruption (Transparency International)	**32/180**	**82**	**34**

As in the past, in the first grouping—ranking relative to all countries surveyed—Israel is positioned in the upper portion of the scale in all of the international indicators. Especially noteworthy are its high rankings in those indicators dealing with political participation, political culture, governance (functioning of government, rule of law), and both indicators of corruption. At the same time, when it comes to freedom of the press, civil liberties, and most measures of democratic process (deliberative democracy, participatory democracy, egalitarian democracy, voice and accountability), Israel's global ranking in comparison with the other countries surveyed is lower, placing it in the second quartile.

The second set of comparisons, with the OECD states, is much less complimentary to Israel. In most of the indicators, with the exception of political participation, Israel earns a low ranking, and in civil liberties and freedom of the press, it is virtually in last place.

**Figure 1a ** Israel's ranking in international indicators (percentile)

Democratic Rights and Freedoms

20–29 / 74–78	Political rights (Freedom House)
6 / 59–60	Civil liberties (Freedom House)
6 / 52	Freedom of the press (Reporters Without Borders)

Democratic Process

14 / 72	Voice and accountability (World Bank)
89–94 / 98–99	Political participation (Economist Intelligence Unit)
11 / 70–71	Egalitarian democracy (V-Dem)
11 / 67–69	Participatory democracy (V-Dem)
20 / 62	Deliberative democracy (V-Dem)
40–54 / 84–89	Democratic political culture (Economist Intelligence Unit)

Governance

34–43 / 82–84	Functioning of government (Economist Intelligence Unit)
26 / 81–82	Rule of law (World Bank)

Corruption

37 / 81	Control of corruption (World Bank)
34 / 82	Perception of corruption (Transparency International)

0
Lowest ranking

100
Highest ranking

■ Percentile among all countries

■ Percentile among OECD countries

After conversion to a scale ranging from 0 to 100, as explained above, we find that Israel's scores in all the indicators are greater than 50. More specifically, Israel's highest scores this year, as in 2017, are in political rights (90) and political participation (88.9). Its lowest score is in participatory democracy, despite this year's slight rise to 59.3.

Figure 1b \ Israel's normalized score in various indicators, 2018

1.1 Democratic Rights and Freedoms

Political rights

Political Rights Indicator

Institution: Freedom House

Scale: 0–100

Israel's score: 90

No. of countries included in indicator: 209

Israel's quartile among all countries: 1

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |

Israel's quartile among OECD members: 3–4

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |

Israel's percentile

74–78

20–29

All countries | OECD countries

Freedom in the World, a report published annually by Freedom House, is based on assessments compiled by experts. It comprises two sensitive indicators that reflect changes in countries' performance with regard to political rights and civil liberties. According to this measure, Israel is considered a free country.

The political rights indicator examines whether a given country meets the following criteria: free and fair elections; open competition between political parties; actual power of elected representatives; a strong and influential opposition; a low level of corruption; and the safeguarding of minority rights in politics and government. In addition, it assesses whether the country is subject to military rule and whether there is foreign intervention in its affairs.

Israel's normalized score this year in the political rights indicator is 90, as it has been since 2009. Nonetheless, a multi-year comparison reveals that there was a slow but steady decline in this area from 2003 to 2009; at present, Israel is located in the lower portion of the top quartile (74th–78th percentile), alongside Slovakia, Italy, and Poland. But despite its high score relative to all the countries surveyed, Israel earns a low ranking compared with the OECD states (20th–29th percentile).

Figure 1.1 \ Israel's normalized score in political rights indicator, 2003–2018

Civil liberties

Civil Liberties Indicator

Institution: Freedom House

Scale: 0–100

Israel's score: 71.7

No. of countries included in indicator: 209

Israel's quartile among all countries: 2

1	**2**	3	4

Israel's quartile among OECD members: 4

1	2	3	**4**

Israel's percentile

The civil liberties indicator, one of the two components of the *Freedom in the World* report issued by Freedom House, assesses whether a country upholds freedoms of expression, the press, religion, association, and academic freedom, as well as an independent judicial system, rule of law, personal security, equality before the law, low levels of political violence, freedom of movement, property rights, gender equality, and marital and family rights.

Israel's normalized score in the civil liberties indicator is 71.7, representing a slight drop from last year's rating of 73.3. In fact, this marks the first time since 2005 that Israel has been classified as a country with only partial protection of civil liberties. According to the report's authors, this decline is the result of a series of laws that have been enacted or proposed in recent years with the aim of tightening restrictions on NGOs and denying them access to international support.

A review of the multi-year data finds that there has been little real change in Israel's score over the last 15 years. Of the countries included in this indicator, Israel is positioned in the 59th–61st percentile, that is, the second quartile. Among OECD members, Israel scores in the sixth percentile, near the bottom of the lowest quartile, and above only Turkey and Mexico.

Figure 1.2 \ Israel's normalized score in civil liberties indicator, 2003–2018

Freedom of the press

Freedom of the Press Indicator	
Institution: Reporters Without Borders	**Israel's percentile**
Scale: 0–100	
Israel's score: 69.7	
No. of countries included in indicator: 180	
Israel's quartile among all countries: 2	
1 2 3 4	
Israel's quartile among OECD members: 4	
1 2 3 4	

Israel's percentile chart:
- All countries: 52
- OECD countries: 6

The freedom of the press indicator, published by Reporters Without Borders, assesses reporters' freedom of activity in 180 countries around the globe. It is based on an analysis of quantitative data on abuses and acts of violence against journalists combined with the assessments of experts in the field with regard to such areas as media independence, pluralism, censorship, and transparency.

Israel's scores have remained virtually unchanged since 2012 (though they were higher in 2002–2011 than in subsequent years). This year's normalized score is 69.7, slightly higher than last year's 68.99. In comparison with the other countries surveyed, Israel has regained its place in the second quartile—that is, the upper half of the scale—for the first time since 2011, ranking 87th out of 180. However, relative to the OECD states, Israel is positioned extremely low, in the 6th percentile, ahead of only Turkey and Mexico.

**Figure 1.3 ** Israel's normalized score in freedom of the press indicator, 2002–2018

1.2 Democratic Process

Voice and accountability

Voice and Accountability Indicator

Institution: World Bank

Scale: 0–100

Israel's score: 65.4

No. of countries included in indicator: 204

Israel's quartile among all countries: 2

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |

Israel's quartile among OECD members: 4

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |

Israel's percentile

The voice and accountability indicator of the World Bank is based on expert assessments, public opinion surveys, and official statistics. It examines the extent to which citizens can participate in national elections, as well as freedom of expression, association, and the press, which are of course basic prerequisites for the free and fair election of a government.

Israel's normalized score this year is 65.4, slightly higher than last year's 64.8. For the fourth consecutive year, Israel has shown a slight rise in this indicator, returning this year to its peak of a decade ago. Correspondingly, it continued its moderate upswing in the global ranking this year, reaching the 72nd percentile, compared with the 71st last year and the 70th in 2016. In comparison with the OECD states, Israel remains near the bottom of the ranking, in the 14th percentile, above only Turkey, Mexico, Hungary, South Korea, and Greece.

Figure 1.4 \ Israel's normalized score in voice and accountability indicator, 2001–2018

Political participation

Political Participation Indicator

Institution: The Economist Intelligence Unit

Scale: 0–100

Israel's score: 88.9

No. of countries included in indicator: 167

Israel's quartile among all countries: 1

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |

Israel's quartile among OECD members: 1

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |

Israel's percentile

The political participation indicator of the Economist Intelligence Unit is based on a combination of public opinion polls, official statistics, and assessments by expert analysts, focused on the following parameters: voter turnout; minority voting rights and right of association; proportion of women in parliament; party membership rates; political engagement and interest in current affairs; readiness to participate in legal demonstrations; and government encouragement of political participation.

Israel continues to score extremely highly in political participation for the fourth consecutive year, with a normalized score this year of 88.9. This positions it in second place globally (98th–99th percentile), together with Iceland and New Zealand and surpassing most of the established democracies. It also ranked highly among OECD countries, placing in the 89th–94th percentile, that is, in the upper quartile.

**Figure 1.5 ** Israel's normalized score in political participation indicator, 2007–2018

Egalitarian democracy

Egalitarian Democracy Indicator

Institution: V-Dem

Scale: 0–100

Israel's score: 74.7

No. of countries included in indicator: 178

Israel's quartile among all countries: 2

| 1 | **2** | 3 | 4 |

Israel's quartile among OECD members: 4

| 1 | 2 | 3 | **4** |

Israel's percentile

70–71

11

All countries

OECD countries

The Egalitarian Component Index is one of the democracy indicators produced by the V-Dem Institute. The V-Dem (Varieties of Democracy) project, led by the University of Gothenburg in Sweden and based on assessments by teams of international experts, proposes a new approach to conceptualizing and measuring democracy as a system of government. According to this view, whenever there are material or nonmaterial inequalities between groups, the ability of citizens to exercise their formal democratic rights and freedoms is compromised. Thus, egalitarian democracy is achieved only when the rights and freedoms of individuals are protected, and material resources are distributed, in a more or less equal fashion, and when there is equal access to political power regardless of gender, socioeconomic class, or social group.

Israel's normalized score was 74.7 this year (slightly lower than last year's 76.6), continuing a moderate downward trend since 2012. This was mirrored by a small drop in the global ranking, to the 52nd–53rd percentile (and thus down to the second quartile). In comparison with the OECD states, Israel places very low on the scale, in the 11th percentile, ahead of only the United States, Chile, Mexico, and Turkey.

Figure 1.6 \ Israel's normalized score in egalitarian democracy indicator, 2000–2018

Participatory democracy

Participatory Democracy Indicator

Institution: V-Dem

Scale: 0–100

Israel's score: 59.3

No. of countries included in indicator: 178

Israel's quartile among all countries: 2

| 1 | **2** | 3 | 4 |

Israel's quartile among OECD members: 4

| 1 | 2 | 3 | **4** |

Israel's percentile

All countries: 67–69

OECD countries: 11

The Participatory Component Index (PCI) of the V-Dem Institute is based on the premise that in a substantive democracy, citizens' involvement is not confined to voting in elections every few years but must also include active, ongoing participation in various spheres of political activity. Thus, the PCI measures participation in civil society organizations as well as in regional and local government.

Israel's normalized score this year is 59.3, reflecting a gradual, though moderate, rise since 2011's rating of 57.1. Relative to the other countries surveyed, Israel rose from the 63rd–66th percentile to the 67th–69th, though it remains in the second quartile. In comparison with the OECD states, Israel ranks near the bottom, in 31st place out of 35, placing it in the 11th percentile, above only Turkey, Luxembourg, Ireland, and Mexico.

Figure 1.7 \ Israel's normalized score in participatory democracy indicator, 2000–2018

Deliberative democracy

Deliberative Democracy Indicator

Institution: V-Dem

Scale: 0–100

Israel's score: 76.2

No. of countries included in indicator: 178

Israel's quartile among all countries: 2

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |

Israel's quartile among OECD members: 4

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |

Israel's percentile

V-Dem's Deliberative Component Index (DCI) focuses on the political decision-making process. A deliberative democracy is one in which public decisions are reached through discussion and negotiation centered on the common good, as opposed to being shaped by group solidarity, narrow interests, or coercion. According to this approach, true democracy requires respectful dialogue among informed and competent participants who are willing to change their views as a result of public discourse. Democratic deliberation is measured by the extent to which political elites give public justifications for their positions on key issues under discussion, acknowledge opposing views, and respect those who disagree. This indicator also measures the breadth of consultation among political elites.

Israel's normalized score this year is 76.2—a significant drop in comparison with last year (79.1). In the global ranking for this indicator, Israel is positioned in the second quartile, with a percentile of 62. Compared with the OECD states, however, it is in the lowest quartile (20th percentile), placing 28th out of 35—far behind Norway, which tops the list with a score of 98.7.

Figure 1.8 \ Israel's normalized score in deliberative democracy indicator, 2000–2018

Democratic political culture

Democratic Political Culture Indicator

Institution: The Economist Intelligence Unit

Scale: 0–100

Israel's score: 75

No. of countries included in indicator: 167

Israel's quartile among all countries: 1

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |

Israel's quartile among OECD members: 3

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |

Israel's percentile

84–89

40–54

All countries

OECD countries

The Economist Intelligence Unit's democratic political culture indicator, based on expert assessments and public opinion polls, measures the extent to which a country's political culture can be characterized as democratic, with emphasis on the following parameters: the degree of citizens' support for a democratic system and their opposition to a "strong leader," a military regime, or technocratic leadership; the perception (or lack thereof) that democracy is beneficial to public order and economic prosperity; and a tradition of separation of church and state.

Israel's normalized score this year is 75, a grade that has remained unchanged since this indicator was first compiled in 2001. Globally, Israel is in the top quartile, placing 18th–26th out of 167, in close proximity to Hong Kong, Uruguay, and most of the OECD countries (84th–89th percentile). In the OECD ranking, Israel falls near the mid-point, on a par with Japan, Chile, South Korea, Germany, and Spain.

**Figure 1.9 ** Israel's normalized score in democratic political culture indicator, 2007–2018

1.3 Governance

Functioning of government

Functioning of Government Indicator

Institution: The Economist Intelligence Unit

Scale: 0–100

Israel's score: 75

No. of countries included in indicator: 167

Israel's quartile among all countries: 1

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |

Israel's quartile among OECD members: 3

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |

Israel's percentile

82–84

34–43

All countries

OECD countries

The Economist Intelligence Unit's functioning of government indicator is based on expert assessments, public opinion polls, and official government statistics that reflect the level of democratic functioning and the effectiveness of government institutions in numerous areas, among them: the government's ability to set policy; separation of powers among the three branches of government; parliamentary oversight of government; involvement of the military or other extra-political entities in politics; degree of government transparency and accountability; extent of corruption; and level of public trust in government institutions.

Israel's normalized score of 75 remains unchanged from last year, and marks a return to its showing of 2009–2014. It has likewise retained its ranking in the highest quartile of the countries surveyed (82nd–84th percentile). In comparison with the OECD states, Israel is situated in the third quartile (34th–43rd percentile), along with France, Portugal, and the United Kingdom.

Figure 1.10 \ Israel's normalized score in functioning of government indicator, 2007–2018

Rule of law

Rule of Law Indicator

Institution: World Bank

Scale: 0–100

Israel's score: 70.4

No. of countries included in indicator: 209

Israel's quartile among all countries: 1

1	2	3	4

Israel's quartile among OECD members: 3

1	2	3	4

Israel's percentile

All countries: 81–82

OECD countries: 26

The World Bank's rule of law indicator, which is based on expert assessments, public opinion polls, and statistical data, measures the extent to which citizens and government bodies have confidence in, and abide by, the rules of society. Among the parameters studied are contract enforcement, property rights, functioning of the police force and legal system, and likelihood of crime and violence.

After earning its highest (normalized) score since 2000 last year (73.2), Israel saw a marked decline this year, to 70.4. In the global ranking, Israel fell from the 84th to the 81st–82nd percentile, between Lithuania and Spain, but is still positioned in the top quartile. Among the OECD states, Israel dropped four slots, to 26th place, placing it at the bottom of the third quartile (26th percentile).

**Figure 1.11 ** Israel's normalized score in rule of law indicator, 2000–2018

1.4 Corruption

Control of corruption

Control of Corruption Indicator

Institution: World Bank

Scale: 0–100

Israel's score: 71.2

No. of countries included in indicator: 209

Israel's quartile among all countries: 1

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |

Israel's quartile among OECD members: 3

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |

Israel's percentile

The control of corruption indicator, issued annually by the World Bank, assesses citizens' perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, from the incidence of corruption at the local and regional level to the influence of elites and private interests on the conduct of the state and its leaders. The data, which are drawn from various sources (research institutes, NGOs, international organizations, and private companies), are based on the opinions of experts in assorted fields combined with the results from a survey of the general public. The higher the score in this indicator, the lower the extent of corruption.

Unlike the data of Transparency International (presented in the following section), which point to an upswing in corruption in Israel, the country's normalized score in the World Bank indicator rose in comparison with last year from 68.8 to 71.2, meaning that Israel is doing a better job of controlling corruption. In the ranking of countries surveyed, Israel climbed from the 79th to the 81st percentile, locating it in the top quartile along with most of the OECD states as well as Hong Kong, Singapore, and China, among others. In the OECD ranking, it is in the 22nd position, one slot higher than last year and near the mid-point of the third quartile.

Figure 1.12 \ Israel's normalized score in control of corruption indicator, 2003–2018

Perception of corruption

Perception of Corruption Indicator

Institution: Transparency International

Scale: 0–100

Israel's score: 62

No. of countries included in indicator: 180

Israel's quartile among all countries: 1

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |

Israel's quartile among OECD members: 3

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |

Israel's percentile

The Corruption Perceptions Index, produced by Transparency International, is drawn from various sources. It reflects the opinion of experts on the extent of corruption in the public sector in the countries surveyed, with an emphasis on abuse of power for personal gain.

Israel's normalized score this year was 62, a drop of two points from last year (in contrast with the improvement shown in the World Bank indicator above). In 2002 and 2003, Israel's score topped the 70 mark, but since 2005 it has ranged between 58 and 65. In the global ranking, Israel dipped from the 84th percentile last year to the 82nd percentile, trailing behind such countries as Qatar and Taiwan. Among the OECD states, Israel dropped to the 34th percentile, or third quartile, along with Latvia, Poland, Portugal, and Chile.

Overall, despite a rise in its World Bank score and a fall in its Transparency International score, Israel's relative ranking is similar in both.

Figure 1.13 \ Israel's normalized score in Corruption Perceptions Index, 2000–2018

1.5 Overview of International Indicators

An overview of the state of democracy in Israel based on the international indicators yields a complicated picture. Relative to all countries surveyed, Israel's global ranking in six of the indicators remains unchanged from last year, while it rose in four indicators and declined in three others (see Table 1.2 below). Comparing Israel's scores this year in the 13 indicators studied with the averages for the previous decade (Table 1.3), we find seven that are above the average, five that are below, and one that corresponds with the ten-year average. More precisely, in the three indicators of political rights and freedoms (civil liberties, freedom of the press, and political rights), and in two of the five indicators of democratic process (egalitarian democracy and deliberative democracy), this year's score is lower than the average for the previous ten years. In three other measures of democratic process (political participation, participatory democracy, and voice and accountability), as well as in both of the corruption indicators and both of the governance indicators, Israel saw an improvement over the ten-year average. In the indicator of democratic political culture, no change was observed in comparison with the past decade.

**Table 1.2 ** Israel's global ranking in 2018 indicators compared with 2017

	Indicator	2018 percentile	2017 percentile	Change
Democratic Rights and Freedom	Political rights (Freedom House)	74–78	73–77	⌃
	Civil liberties (Freedom House)	59–60	61–62	⌄
	Freedom of the press (Reporters Without Borders)	52	49	⌃
Democratic Process	Voice and accountability (World Bank)	72	72	=
	Political participation (Economist Intelligence Unit)	98–99	98–99	=
	Egalitarian democracy (V-Dem)	70–71	71	=
	Participatory democracy (V-Dem)	67–69	62–66	⌃
	Deliberative democracy (V-Dem)	62	62–63	=
	Democratic political culture (Economist Intelligence Unit)	84–89	85–89	=
Governance	Functioning of government (Economist Intelligence Unit)	82–84	83–84	=
	Rule of law (World Bank)	81–82	84	⌄
Corruption	Control of corruption (World Bank)	81	79	⌃
	Perception of corruption (Transparency International)	82	84	⌄

⌃ improvement in Israel's ranking compared with 2017

= no change in Israel's ranking compared with 2017

⌄ decline in Israel's ranking compared with 2017

Table 1.3 \ Israel's scores in 2018 indicators compared with previous decade

	Indicator	2018 normalized score	Average normalized score, 2008–2017	Change
Democratic Rights and Freedom	Political rights (Freedom House)	90.0	90.5	⌄
	Civil liberties (Freedom House)	71.7	75.7	⌄
	Freedom of the press (Reporters Without Borders)	69.7	72.6*	⌄
Democratic Process	Voice and accountability (World Bank)	65.4	63.6	⌃
	Political participation (Economist Intelligence Unit)	88.9	85.4**	⌃
	Egalitarian democracy (V-Dem)	74.7	76.2	⌄
	Participatory democracy (V-Dem)	59.3	57.8	⌃
	Deliberative democracy (V-Dem)	76.2	79.3	⌄
	Democratic political culture (Economist Intelligence Unit)	75	75**	=
Governance	Functioning of government (Economist Intelligence Unit)	75	74.1**	⌃
	Rule of law (World Bank)	70.4	69	⌃

	Indicator	2018 normalized score	Average normalized score, 2008–2017	Change
Corruption	Control of corruption (World Bank)	**71.2**	**67.5**	⌃
	Perception of corruption (Transparency International)	**62**	**60.7**	⌃

*   For the Reporters Without Borders freedom of the press indicator, the average shown is for a period of nine years, as no score was published in 2010.

**   For the Economist Intelligence Unit indicators, the average shown is for a period of eight years, since scores were not published in 2008 and 2010.

⌃   improvement in Israel's score compared with average over previous decade

＝   no change in Israel's score compared with average over previous decade

⌄   decline in Israel's score compared with average over previous decade

Conclusion

The global comparative indicators reviewed here show that, while there is room for improvement in several of the parameters examined, Israel is a stable democracy in most respects. This is especially evident if we look at the comparative indicators over time, as we encounter slight fluctuations in either direction but no significant decline. Nonetheless, in comparison with its fellow OECD members, Israel generally ranks near the bottom of the scale. If it wishes to be part of this democratic club, it will have to strive to better its performance in the various measures.

In general, the comparisons show that, while Israel still meets the basic criteria of a democracy, it continues to grapple with several key problems: In the three indicators relating to democratic rights and freedoms, it registered a decline relative to the previous decade. Its low standing in this category is particularly striking when compared with the OECD states: In two indicators, Israel places in the 6th percentile (33rd place out of 35 countries), and in the political rights indicator it is ranked in the 20th–29th percentile relative to other OECD countries, that is, in the 25th–28th slot out of 35.

We would also point out that in the civil liberties indicator, Israel is in its lowest position since this index was introduced in 2003. Moreover, for the first time since 2005, Israel is designated as a country that safeguards civil liberties only in part. This demotion, according to the authors of the report, is the result of laws that have been enacted or proposed with the aim of tightening restrictions on NGOs and denying them international support.

What is more, V-Dem's annual report downgraded Israel in its overall global ranking from the status of a "liberal democracy" (one that upholds democratic values, in particular individual freedoms) to that of an "electoral democracy" (in which the electoral process is democratic, but there is a less-than-full commitment to the fundamental principles of a liberal democracy, such as individual rights).[1]

One area where Israel enjoys quite a favorable assessment is democratic process, earning very high scores for four consecutive years in the participatory democracy indicator. Its citizens also show a strong ideological commitment to the democratic system (as reflected in Israel's democratic political culture). Nonetheless, its high marks for political participation stand in stark contrast to its relatively low score in participatory democracy (including membership in civil society organizations), where Israel is positioned in the middle of the second quartile in the global ranking (67–69th percentile), and at the bottom of the list of OECD countries (11th percentile).

In the area of governance (specifically, functioning of government and rule of law), Israel has retained a comparatively high slot in the global ranking, within the first quartile. It earns a reasonable grade in government functioning, in such areas as policy-setting and policy implementation, separation of powers, and public trust in government institutions.

As for corruption, in contrast with the oft-expressed feeling in parts of the public that severe corruption is rampant in the Israeli government, it emerges from both of the corruption indicators presented here that—even if things are not perfect and there is still work to be done—the situation is satisfactory, as evidenced by the fact that we are in the 81st–82nd percentile in the world in this category, and the 34–37th percentile on the list of OECD nations.

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1   *Democracy for All: V-Dem Annual Democracy Report 2018*, May 28, 2018. https://www.v-dem.net/en/news/democracy-all-v-dem-annual-democracy-report-2018/

Part Two

Israel in the Eyes of its Citizen

Chapter 2 \ How is Israel Doing?

In this chapter, we discuss the following topics:

- Israel's overall situation
- The personal situation of the interviewees
- The state of democracy in Israel
- Relations between Jews and Arabs
- Media accuracy
- Pride in being Israeli

As we saw in Chapter 1, in most of the international indicators we surveyed, Israeli democracy remained much the same as last year, though in certain areas it declined slightly. This leads us to the question (which we will attempt to answer in this section of the report) of to what extent Israel's citizens agree with these external assessments, or take issue with them. As we will spell out below, on the whole, the responses to questions about the state of affairs in Israel in the *2018 Democracy Index* survey indicate that the public's mood is good—a recurring finding over the years. This consistency supports the survey results (even if there are those who feel that these are overly "optimistic," or that surveys are not a suitable means of assessment), and weakens the argument that public opinion is constantly shifting whichever way the wind blows, and should therefore not be taken seriously.

As we do each year, we revisited the question: "How would you characterize Israel's overall situation today?" Given the negative public discourse, particularly in the media, it is surprising that the upswing in this area (which we noted last year and the year before that) has continued. Moreover, whereas in the past, the most frequent assessment of Israel's overall situation was "so-so," the most common response this year among Jewish interviewees was that the situation in general is "good"; and if we factor in those who characterized it as "very good," there is a clear majority of Jewish respondents who view Israel's situation as favorable.

Among Arab interviewees, the most common response this year, as in the past, was "so-so," but here too there was a noticeable increase in the proportion who assessed the overall situation as "good" or "very good." What's more, if we combine the categories of "good" and "very good," here as well they surpass the share of those who answered "so-so" (39.5% versus 31%). Nonetheless, it should be noted that the percentage of Arab respondents who defined the situation as "bad" or "very bad" is over one-quarter, and double that of the Jews (27% as opposed to 14%).

**Figure 2.1 ** Israel's overall situation today (Jewish and Arab respondents; %)

Jews

Arabs

| Very good | Good | So-so | Bad | Very bad | Don't know |

What is the trend over time? The figure below illustrates the breakdown of responses to this question in the total sample through the years. It can be seen clearly that from the inception of the *Index* in 2003 up until 2009, the respondents who characterized Israel's situation as bad exceeded those who defined it as good. But since 2009—and more consistently, since 2012—the share who view the situation as good has risen steadily and each year outstrips the percentage who define it as bad. The proportion who assess Israel's overall situation as "so-so" has remained relatively stable (between 30% and 40%). In fact, the share who view the situation as "good" or "very good" this year is the highest since the *Democracy Index* project began in 2003.

**Figure 2.2 ** Israel's overall situation, 2003–2018 (total sample; %)

Good and very good   So-so   Bad and very bad

Does everyone, then, take a favorable view of Israel's situation? As shown in the following table, the breakdown of responses from Jewish interviewees by political orientation, religiosity, and social location yields sizeable differences between certain subgroups. On the Right, a majority of respondents view Israel's situation as "good" or "very good." Among those who locate themselves at the Center of the political spectrum, these are likewise the most frequent responses, though not by a majority (the positive assessments, however, far outstrip the negative ones). On the Left, by contrast, the most frequent response is "so-so," with the remainder more or less equally divided between those who characterize the situation as "good" or "very good" and those who define it as "bad" or "very bad."

Breaking down the responses by religiosity reveals that in all the subgroups, with the exception of the secular, the majority describe Israel's overall situation as "good" or "very good." The national religious show the highest proportion of positive assessments (88%), while this was also the most frequent choice among the secular respondents, though not by a majority.

When it comes to feelings of marginality/centrality in society, among those who associate themselves with the stronger groups, a majority describe Israel's overall situation as "good" or "very good"; among those who identify with the weaker groups, however, favorable responses were the most common, though they did not constitute a majority.

Table 2.1 (Jewish respondents; %)

	Israel's overall situation today:	Good and very good	So-so	Bad and very bad	Don't know \\ refuse	Total
Political orientation	Right	71	22	7	–	100
	Center	49	34	14	3	100
	Left	27	42	28	3	100
Religiosity	Haredim	62.5	26	10	1.5	100
	National religious	88	10	2	–	100
	Traditional religious	61	30	9	–	100
	Traditional non-religious	56	26	17.5	0.5	100
	Secular	44	36	18	2	100

Israel's overall situation today:		Good and very good	So-so	Bad and very bad	Don't know \ refuse	Total
Social location	Feel they belong to stronger groups	60	27	13	-	100
	Feel they belong to weaker groups	44	37	17	2	100

We analyzed the assessments of Israel's situation by voting patterns in the most recent Knesset elections (2015). As shown in the table below, the lowest proportion (in fact only a small minority) of those who took a favorable view of Israel's situation was found among voters for Meretz. In the next highest position were Arab voters for the Joint List, and Jewish voters for the Zionist Union. Among those who voted for the remaining parties, there were majorities of various sizes, topped by Jews who voted for the Jewish Home and Arabs who voted for parties other than the Joint List. Jews who voted for the Likud were in third place.

Table 2.2 (Jewish and Arab respondents; %)

Jews		Feel that Israel's situation is "good" or "very good"
Vote in 2015 Knesset elections	Likud	**75.5**
	Zionist Union	**35**
	Yesh Atid	**50**
	Jewish Home	**88**
	Kulanu	**67**
	Yisrael Beytenu	**70**
	Meretz	**17**
	United Torah Judaism	**58**
	Shas	**68**

Arabs		Feel that Israel's situation is "good" or "very good"
Vote in 2015 Knesset elections	Joint List	**34**
	Other parties	**76.5**
Religion	Muslim	**39**
	Christian	**41**
	Druze	**52**

With regard to the personal situation of the respondents, we revisited the question posed in previous years. Once again, we found the assessments were not only very positive but were more favorable than the description of the country's overall situation, which, as stated, was itself optimistic. On the personal level, a clear majority of both Jewish and Arab interviewees defined their individual situation as "good" or "very good."

**Figure 2.3 ** Define their personal situation as "good" or "very good" (Jewish and Arab respondents; %)

As shown in the table below, in all of the variables that we examined, a solid majority (two-thirds and above) characterized their personal situation as "good" or "very good." In light of claims that the younger generation perceives its situation as unfavorable, we also looked at the variable of age here. It turns out that for Jews and Arabs alike, age is not a meaningful factor in how they assess their personal situation (nor that of the country), with a majority of all age groups characterizing their personal situation as "good" or "very good." Another recurring finding of note is that the Haredi respondents—despite the fact that their financial situation, on average, is weaker than that of many other groups in Israel—were the most likely of all to report that their personal situation was "good" or "very good."

Table 2.3 (Jewish and Arab respondents; %)

Jews		Define their personal situation as "good" or "very good"
Political orientation	Right	86
	Center	78
	Left	82
Religiosity	Haredi	93
	National religious	88
	Traditional religious	82
	Traditional non-religious	81
	Secular	81
Social location	Feel they belong to stronger groups	88
	Feel they belong to weaker groups	66
Arabs		
Vote in 2015 Knesset elections	Joint List	64
	Other parties	88

➤

Arabs	Define their personal situation as "good" or "very good"
Religion Muslim	64
Christian	77
Druze	65

As with the country's overall situation, there was also a rise this year in the share of those who assessed their personal situation favorably, as shown in the following figure. This majority has been growing in recent years. In fact, the findings for 2018 are the highest in all the assessments to date.

**Figure 2.4 ** Define their personal situation as "good" or "very good," 2014–2018 (total sample; %)

We wished to find out if there is a connection between respondents' assessments of the country's overall situation and their view of their own personal situation. Cross-tabulating the responses to both questions, we found a high level of congruence between them: A majority of those who define their personal situation favorably also offer a similar assessment of the country's condition; those who view their personal situation as "so-so" are most prone to characterize the country's situation in this way; and a majority of those who view their personal state unfavorably also hold that the country is doing badly.

Table 2.4 (total sample; %)

	Country's situation is "good" or "very good"	Country's situation is "so-so"	Country's situation is "bad" or "very bad"	Don't know	Total
Personal situation is "good" or "very good"	59.5	26	13	1.5	100
Personal situation is "so-so"	29	46	22	3	100
Personal situation is "bad" or "very bad"	10	21	69	–	100

From here, we moved on to examining how our respondents view the state of democracy in Israel, asking: "How would you rate Israel's democracy in the state's 70th anniversary year (where 1 = very bad and 5 = very good)?" While the assessment among the Jewish sample of democracy is less favorable than their assessment of the overall state of the country, the responses still tend toward the positive: A plurality, though not a majority, characterize the state of democracy in Israel as "good" or "very good" (grades 4 and 5). By contrast, the Arab sample is more inclined toward the negative end of the scale, with the majority rating the state of democracy as "bad" or "very bad" (grades 1 and 2). In other words, it would appear that the public is able to distinguish between the country's overall situation and the state of its democracy, with the former being perceived much more favorably in general than the latter.

**Figure 2.5 ** State of democracy in Israel (Jewish and Arab respondents; %)

We examined whether there is any relation between the two assessments—the country's situation and the state of its democracy. As shown in the table below, a very high proportion of those who think that the state of democracy in Israel is good also hold that the country's situation is good, but this link is not as clear in other categories. Thus, of those who hold that the state of Israel's democracy is "so-so," the greatest share define the country's situation as "good" or "very good," while among those who assess the state of democracy as "bad" or "very bad," no correspondence was found: The highest percentages (though not a majority) characterize the country's situation as "so-so," or "bad"/"very bad," but only a slightly smaller proportion define the country's situation as "good" or "very good."

Table 2.5 (total sample; %)

	Country's situation is "good" or "very good"	Country's situation is "so-so"	Country's situation is "bad" or "very bad"	Don't know	Total
State of democracy is "good" or "very good"	81	15	4	–	100
State of democracy is "so-so"	46	41	11	2	100
State of democracy is "bad" or "very bad"	28	35	35	2	100

Breaking down the assessments of the Jewish respondents regarding the state of democracy in Israel by political orientation and voting patterns in the 2015 Knesset elections, we found very large differences between the political camps: While among those who identify with the Right, the majority hold that Israeli democracy is doing well, the Center is divided more or less into three equal parts: good, so-so, and bad. On the Left, meanwhile, a small minority consider the state of democracy to be good, and the remainder are split down the middle between so-so and bad.

Table 2.6 (Jewish respondents; %)

State of democracy:		Good and very good	So-so	Bad and very bad	Don't know	Total
Political orientation	Right	56	26	17	1	100
	Center	30	38	32	–	100
	Left	15	42	43	–	100

We also analyzed the assessments of the Jewish respondents regarding the state of Israel's democracy by voting patterns in the 2015 Knesset elections. The breakdown of responses in this case turned out to be fundamentally different from that of assessments of the country's overall situation. Among Jewish voters, for all parties, the share who hold a favorable opinion of Israel's democracy is markedly lower than the corresponding finding for the country's situation. In fact, of those who voted for Jewish Home, Yisrael Beytenu, the Likud, and Kulanu, a majority hold that the state of democracy in Israel is "good" or "very good," while among voters for other parties, only a minority feel similarly. Among Arab respondents, a plurality of voters for the Joint List hold that the state of democracy in Israel is bad or very bad, while among Arabs who voted for other parties, the majority feel that it is "good" or "very good."

Table 2.7 (Jewish and Arab respondents; %)

Vote in 2015 Knesset election		State of democracy in Israel is "good" or "very good"
Jews	Likud	65
	Zionist Union	20
	Yesh Atid	26
	Jewish Home	78
	Kulanu	54
	Yisrael Beytenu	60
	Meretz	10
	United Torah Judaism	33
	Shas	32
Arabs	Joint List	8.5
	Other parties	53

A breakdown of Arab responses to this question by religion yielded the finding that among Muslims, a majority (56.5%) describe the state of Israeli democracy as "bad" or "very bad," while among Christians and Druze, only a minority define it this way (36% and 30%, respectively).

In this context, we wished to know if interviewees agreed or disagreed with the statement that the regime in Israel is also democratic toward Arab citizens. As shown in the figure below, a sizeable majority of Jews feel that this is indeed the case. By contrast, among Arab respondents, some two-thirds disagree with this assessment. Comparing the findings with last year's data, we find that, among Jewish interviewees, there has been a rise in the proportion who hold that is Israel is democratic toward Arabs, while among Arabs, the share who feel this way has declined.[7]

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7   Tamar Hermann, Chanan Cohen, Fadi Omar, Ella Heller, and Tzipy Lazar-Shoef, *Jews and Arabs: A Conditional Partnership, Israel 2017* (Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute, 2017).

**Figure 2.6 ** Israel is also democratic for Arab citizens (agree; Jewish and Arab respondents; %)

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation shows that on the Right and in the Center, a substantial majority hold that Israel treats its Arab citizens democratically (87% and 73.5%, respectively); on the Left, however, only about one-half (55%) take a similar view. An analysis of the Arab sample by voting patterns in the 2015 Knesset elections shows that only about one-third of voters for the Joint List characterize Israel as democratic toward its Arab citizens, as opposed to 60% of Arab voters for other parties. Of particular interest is the breakdown of Arab responses by religion: In all the religious subgroups, we find a majority with a negative view on this question: 68% of the Muslim and Christian respondents feel that Israel is not democratic toward its Arab citizens, as do 64% of the Druze.

In certain political circles and media outlets, it has been said in recent years that Israeli democracy is in real danger. Is this also the perception of the general public in Israel?[8] A majority of Jewish respondents do not agree with the statement that democracy in Israel is in grave danger (54%, similar to last year's findings). By contrast, among Arab respondents there was a slight increase (from 65% in 2017 to 70% this year) in the share who expressed agreement with the statement.

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8   An error was found regarding this question in our survey. For this reason, the data cited here are taken from the *Peace Index* survey of May 2018, where the same question was posed using identical wording.

**Figure 2.7 ** "The democratic system in Israel is in grave danger" (total sample; %)

Nevertheless, as expected, there are profound differences of opinion on this question, based on political orientation. As indicated in the following table, in the Jewish sample, the Left shows the greatest tendency to view Israeli democracy as being in grave danger, followed by the Center (in both camps, this is the majority position), and lastly, the Right, where only a minority perceive a danger to democracy in Israel. A comparison with last year reveals that in all three camps, the sense that Israeli democracy is under threat has intensified; however, it can be assumed that the various camps each hold different factors responsible.

Table 2.8 (agree; Jewish respondents; %)

Democracy in Israel is in grave danger	2017	2018
Right	23	28
Center	48	55
Left	72	75

No less fascinating is an analysis of the Jewish interviewees by religiosity: among secular respondents, a majority (57%) hold that Israeli democracy is in danger, while in all the other

groups, only a minority take this view: traditional non-religious, 35%; traditional religious, 32%; Haredim, 25.5%; and national religious, only 13%. Among Arab respondents, as stated, a sizeable majority believe that democracy in Israel is in danger; hence, a breakdown by subgroups was unnecessary for our purposes.

The claim is often made these days by the country's leadership and the general public that the media in Israel, for various reasons, do not portray things as they really are but instead paint a bleaker picture. We asked the interviewees this year, as in 2017, whether they agree or disagree with the statement: "Israeli media portray the situation here as much worse than it really is." Among Jewish respondents, we found an (identical) majority both years who agreed with this claim, whereas among Arab respondents, only a minority agreed with it this year, as opposed to a majority who felt this way last year. Further assessments are necessary to determine whether there has truly been a reversal in Arab public opinion on this question, or whether this is a one-time statistical anomaly.

Figure 2.8 \ "The media portray the situation as worse than it really is," 2017 and 2018 (agree; Jewish and Arab respondents; %)

We also broke down the responses of the Jewish interviewees by political orientation. As shown in the following table, on the Right a clear majority hold that the media indeed portray the situation with a negative slant—a view shared by roughly one-half of respondents from the Center and only a minority on the Left. Interestingly enough, level of education—a variable that we had expected to affect perceptions of the media and their reliability—was found to have no impact whatsoever.

Table 2.9 (Jewish respondents; %)

Agree that media portray the situation as worse than it really is	
Right	**75**
Center	**47**
Left	**28**

A breakdown of Arab interviewees' responses by voting patterns in the 2015 Knesset elections reveals that, of those who voted for the Joint List, a majority disagree with the above statement and only a third agree with it, while the corresponding finding among voters for the other parties is almost double. In other words, Arabs who voted for the other parties feel, for the most part (like the majority in the Jewish sample) that the media present Israel's situation in an excessively negative manner.

The final topic to be discussed in this chapter is pride in being Israeli.

Numerous studies have already shown that Israeli society is strongly patriotic. And in fact, one of the most dependable findings in the *Democracy Index* is the high proportion of respondents who are proud to be Israeli. As illustrated by the following figure, the share of Jewish respondents who express pride in their "Israeliness" is consistently high—a finding that is not self-evident, given the deep political differences within the Jewish majority in Israel. Not surprisingly, the percentage of Jews who feel proud of being Israeli is much higher than that of Arab respondents, at times double and even more. But among Arab interviewees as well, a considerable share show pride in being Israeli—this year, roughly one-half of the respondents. Some would say that this is a greater proportion than expected under the present circumstances. In addition, while the share of Jewish respondents who are proud to be Israeli has remained more or less stable, among Arab respondents it fluctuates greatly. It is also important to note that in the last three assessments, there has been a noticeable widening of the gap between the Jewish and Arab expressions of pride, with the former on the upswing and the latter experiencing a downward trend.

Pride in being Israeli

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**Figure 2.9 ** Pride in being Israeli, 2003–2018 (proud; Jewish and Arab respondents; %)

Breaking down the responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation, religiosity, and social location, we found a substantial majority in all groups who are proud to be Israeli, with the largest majority among the national religious, traditional, and the Right, and the lowest, among Haredim and the Left. An analysis of the question among Arab respondents by religion and by voting patterns in the most recent Knesset elections (2015) found slightly less than half of voters for the Joint List who are proud to be Israeli, as opposed to a very sizeable majority among voters for the other parties. Breaking down the findings by religion revealed only a minority of Muslims who express pride in being Israeli, while a large majority of Christians and Druze feel this way.

Table 2.10 (Jewish and Arab respondents; %)

Jews		Proud to be Israeli
Political orientation	Right	**94**
	Center	**91**
	Left	**72**

Jews		Proud to be Israeli
Religiosity	Haredim	**75**
	National religious	**97**
	Traditional religious	**93**
	Traditional non-religious	**95**
	Secular	**84**
Social location	Feel they belong to stronger groups	**89**
	Feel they belong to weaker groups	**84**

Arabs		Proud to be Israeli
Vote in 2015 Knesset elections	Joint List	**49**
	Other parties	**86**
Religion	Muslim	**41**
	Christian	**91**
	Druze	**69.5**

An analysis of the Jewish sample by perceptions of the state of Israeli democracy yielded the finding that a majority in all groups are proud to be Israeli; however, the majority is smaller among those who rated Israeli democracy as "bad" or "very bad" (70%), and much larger among those who held that the state of democracy in Israel is "so-so" (92%) or "good"/"very good" (97%).

Chapter 3 \ Jewish and/or Democratic?

In this chapter, we discuss the following topics:

- Israel—Jewish and/or democratic?
- Israel's right to be the nation-state of the Jewish people
- Link between the right to vote and recognizing Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people
- Equal rights for Jewish and non-Jewish citizens
- Need for a Jewish majority when making crucial decisions
- Preserving national identity by having Jews and Arabs live separately

Among the most controversial issues in Israel in recent years between Jews and Arabs, and between secular Jews and national religious/Haredi Jews, is that of the balance—or lack thereof—between the Jewish and democratic components of public life, given the complex definition of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state.

To begin with, we examined which of the two elements—Jewish or democratic—is the dominant one in Israel today.

We posed the question: "Israel is defined as a Jewish and democratic state. Do you feel there is a good balance today between the Jewish and the democratic components?" As we found last year, once again the greatest share of Jewish respondents, and a large majority of Arab respondents, answered that the Jewish component is too dominant.

**Figure 3.1 ** Balance between Jewish and democratic components in Israel (Jewish and Arab respondents; %)

A comparison between the responses to this question in 2018 and those in 2016 and 2017 reveals a high level of consistency, especially in light of the fact that this issue has been hotly debated in recent years. In all three surveys, a plurality of Jewish respondents held that the Jewish component is too strong, while among Arab interviewees, an actual majority felt this way. Some would suggest that the responses from the Jewish sample relate to the religious-Jewish, rather than the national-Jewish, aspect of the state, and that the respondents' opposition is not to the Jewish component as a whole but to what is perceived as the increasing "religionization" of Israeli society. At the same time, it is impossible to ignore the link between religion and nationhood in Judaism, or the sense among the Jewish public that there is not a good balance between the Jewish and democratic components in Israel today.

Table 3.1 (Jewish and Arab respondents; %)

Jews	There is a good balance between the two components	The Jewish component is too dominant	The democratic component is too dominant	Don't know	Total
2016	29	39	25	7	100
2017	29	42	23	6	100
2018	30	39	24	7	100

Arabs	There is a good balance between the two components	The Jewish component is too dominant	The democratic component is too dominant	Don't know	Total
2016	7	80	9	4	100
2017	16	74	6	4	100
2018	17	77	5	1	100

When we broke down the responses of the Jewish sample by religiosity, the results were not surprising: A majority of Haredim feel that the democratic component is too strong at present, whereas the lion's share of secular Jews hold that the Jewish aspect is too dominant. While a plurality (though not a majority) of national religious respondents feel that the democratic element is too dominant, only a slightly smaller proportion hold that the balance is in fact good. Among traditional Jews of both types, we found a similar spread among the different options, with the most frequent response that the right balance exists.

Table 3.2 (Jewish respondents; %)

	There is a good balance between the two components	The Jewish component is too dominant	The democratic component is too dominant	Don't know	Total
Haredim	22	7	59	12	100
National religious	42	8	46	4	100
Traditional religious	34	32	27	7	100
Traditional non-religious	37	28	26	9	100
Secular	26	61	9	4	100

We also analyzed the responses of the Jewish interviewees by voting patterns in the 2015 Knesset elections. Only those who voted for the Jewish Home party showed a majority who hold that the Jewish and democratic components are well balanced; among Likud voters, the largest share (though not a majority) take this view. A majority of voters for the Haredi parties feel that the balance is slanted too strongly in favor of democracy, whereas a majority of Zionist Union, Yesh Atid, Kulanu, and of course, Meretz voters, as well as most Arab respondents (regardless of which party they voted for), hold that the Jewish component is overly dominant.

Table 3.3 (Jewish and Arab respondents; %)

	Vote in 2015 Knesset elections	There is a good balance between the two components	The Jewish component is too dominant	The democratic component is too dominant	Don't know	Total
Jews	Likud	42	27	29	2	100
	Zionist Union	20	68	11	1	100
	Yesh Atid	31	53	10	6	100
	Jewish Home	51.5	1.5	40	7	100
	Kulanu	36	41	18	5	100
	Yisrael Beytenu	30	30	40	–	100
	Meretz	15	85	–	–	100
	United Torah Judaism	12	2	77	9	100
	Shas	24	20	52	4	100
Arabs	Joint List	16	79	4	1	100
	Other parties	41	53	6	–	100

Breaking down the responses of the Arab respondents by religion, here too we found a consensus among the three groups: 79% of Muslims, 64% of Christians, and 77% of Druze feel that the Jewish component is too dominant in Israel today.

In the previous question, we examined perceptions of the existing state of affairs; however, we also wished to know what the public would consider desirable. We therefore asked again this year: "Which component should be the dominant one, in your opinion?" This question was posed solely to the Jewish sample, as the preferences of the Arab sample are self-evident. The breakdown of responses was as follows: The greatest share preferred a balance between the two components, followed by those who wished to see the democratic aspect predominate, and lastly, those who favored the Jewish component.

**Figure 3.2 ** Which component should be dominant? (Jewish respondents; %)

The battles that took place this year over the Jewish-democratic balance apparently had some impact, since we found a decline from last year in the proportion who responded "both equally" to the question of which component should be dominant, and a rise in the share who favored either the democratic or the Jewish component, suggesting a deepening of the rift within the Jewish public on this issue.

Table 3.4 (Jewish respondents; %)

Prefer:	Both equally	Jewish component	Democratic component	Don't know	Total
2017	43	23	32	2	100
2018	38	26	35	1	100

We broke down the responses to this question by religiosity. As shown in the following table, only in the traditional group is there a majority who would like to see the Jewish and democratic components carry equal weight. The Haredim, by a large majority, are interested in bolstering the Jewish aspect, and the secular respondents, the democratic one. A majority of the national religious wish to see the Jewish component strengthened, though a sizeable minority of this group would prefer to strike a balance between the two aspects of Israel's definition.

Table 3.5 (Jewish respondents; %)

	Prefer:	Both equally	Jewish component	Democratic component	Don't know	Total
Religiosity	Haredim	14	84	2	–	100
	National religious	41	57	1	1	100
	Traditional religious	59	31	10	–	100
	Traditional non-religious	56	21.5	22	0.5	100
	Secular	30	6	63	1	100

Analyzing the responses by voting patterns in the 2015 Knesset elections, we found that a majority of voters for the Jewish Home party (of whom a sizeable proportion believe that the existing balance is good) would like to strengthen the Jewish component—a feeling shared by voters for United Torah Judaism and Shas. Among Likud as well as Kulanu voters, a majority wish to see both elements be equally strong. By contrast, voters for the Zionist Union, Yesh Atid, and Meretz parties favor strengthening the democratic component. Voters for Yisrael Beytenu are split evenly between a preference for a stronger democratic component and equal weight between the two.

Table 3.6 (Jewish respondents; %)

Vote in 2015 Knesset election	Both equally	Jewish component	Democratic component	Don't know	Total
Likud	52	32	16	–	100
Zionist Union	31	5	63	1	100
Yesh Atid	40	5	55	–	100
Jewish Home	37	56	6	1	100
Kulanu	59	10	31	–	100
Yisrael Beytenu	40	20	40	–	100
Meretz	19	0	81	–	100
United Torah Judaism	12	88	–	–	100
Shas	16	84	–	–	100

From here, we moved on to Israel's right to be defined as the nation-state of the Jewish people.

Since there is a virtual consensus among the Jewish public on this question, we presented it in this year's survey solely to the Arab respondents. As in previous years, we found a majority of over two-thirds in this group (in 2016, it reached more than three-quarters) who disagree with the statement that Israel has the right to be defined as the nation-state of the Jewish people.

Figure 3.3 \ "Israel has the right to be defined as the nation-state of the Jewish people," 2016–2018 (disagree; Arab respondents; %)

In the Jewish sample, by contrast, we wished to know whether respondents thought there should be consequences for those who are unwilling to affirm that Israel is the nation-state of the Jewish people.

As in 2017, a high proportion of Jewish respondents this year (though not a majority, as we found in 2016) hold that those who are unwilling to affirm that Israel is the nation-state of the Jewish people should be denied the right to vote. Once again, it seems the fact that the right to vote in Knesset elections is not dependent on one's personal opinions has yet to be absorbed by many members of the Jewish public.

Right to vote tied to recognition of Israel as nation-state of the Jewish people

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**Figure 3.4 ** "People who are unwilling to affirm that Israel is the nation-state of the Jewish people should lose their right to vote," 2016–2018 (agree; Jewish respondents; %)

We examined the breakdown of responses in the Jewish sample based on religiosity. Out of all the subgroups, only among the secular respondents is there not a majority who would deny the right to vote to those unwilling to assert that Israel is the nation-state of the Jewish people. Of particular interest is the sizeable majority in favor among Haredim, virtually all of whom define themselves as at least non-Zionist, if not anti-Zionist, and in principle do not attach great importance to the nation-state of Israel.

Table 3.7 (Jewish respondents; %)

People who are unwilling to affirm that Israel is the nation-state of the Jewish people should lose their right to vote	Agree
Haredim	61
National religious	69.5
Traditional religious	57
Traditional non-religious	58
Secular	31.5

Israel's status as the nation-state of the Jewish people raises the question of the rights of its non-Jewish citizens. This year as well, we asked (only) the Jewish interviewees to express their agreement or disagreement with the statement: "Jewish citizens of Israel should have greater rights than non-Jewish citizens." Here too (and to a greater extent than in most of the previous surveys), we found a majority of respondents who did **not** agree with this statement. In fact, looking back, there has been a steady rise since 2013 in the share who reject the notion as a whole that Jews in Israel should enjoy greater rights.

Figure 3.5 \ Greater rights for Jewish citizens, 2013–2018 (disagree; Jewish respondents; %)

Among Haredim there is less than a majority. In an analysis by religiosity, it emerged that only Haredim support granting greater rights to Jewish citizens. In all the other subgroups, a majority disagree with this notion, which suggests that the argument often made that the entire Israeli public is racist and undemocratic is incorrect. However, it is clear that the higher the level of religiosity, the greater the share who agree with the notion of granting greater rights to Jews.

Table 3.8 (Jewish respondents; %)

Jewish citizens should have greater rights		Disagree
Political orientation	Right	61
	Center	81
	Left	92
Religiosity	Haredim	44
	National religious	56
	Traditional religious	66
	Traditional non-religious	72
	Secular	84

Despite these encouraging findings, we cannot be complacent when it comes to fostering democratic values such as equality, since it may well be that had we used the word "Arabs" in the question rather than "non-Jews," the findings would have been different. This assessment is supported, inter alia, by the breakdown of responses to the following two questions.

In all our surveys, past and present, we have found a majority of Jewish respondents (the only ones presented with this question) who feel that decisions crucial to the state on issues of peace and security should be made by a Jewish majority. In other words, in the eyes of the Jewish interviewees, Arab citizens of Israel are not part of the relevant majority in this regard—which detracts somewhat from the supposed "democratic-ness" of the public as suggested by the distribution of responses to the previous question. The figure below illustrates the share of respondents who have supported the need for a Jewish majority in crucial decisions relating to security matters over the years. This year's finding of 74% who agree with this notion is similar to the multi-year average (73.8%).

**Figure 3.6 ** Crucial decisions on peace and security—only by a Jewish majority, 2003–2018 (agree; Jewish respondents; %)

Since some would say that this is not a case of excluding Arab citizens of Israel as a group from crucial decisions in general but rather concern on the part of the Jewish majority with regard to security matters—an area in which Arab citizens are liable to find themselves in a conflict of interest—we examined the same question in the context of Israel's system of government, and the structure of its economy and society.

We asked the (Jewish) interviewees to express their agreement or disagreement with the statement: "Decisions crucial to the state regarding governance, economy, or society should be made by a Jewish majority." Here too, as in the past, we found a majority—albeit a smaller one than in the previous question—who favor dependence on a Jewish majority. Stated otherwise, the unwillingness to rely on the Arab public when making crucial decisions also comes into play on matters unrelated to security (the multi-year average here is 61.5%).

**Figure 3.7 ** Crucial decisions on governance, economy, and society—
only by a Jewish majority, 2011–2018 (agree; Jewish respondents; %)

We broke down the responses to both these questions based on the same variables that have
proven themselves influential in this context: political orientation and religiosity.

Table 3.9 (Jewish respondents; %)

Crucial decisions should be made only by a Jewish majority		Agree—on matters of peace and security	Agree—on matters of governance, economy, and society
Political orientation	Right	88	77
	Center	71	51
	Left	44	24.5
Religiosity	Haredim	83	78
	National religious	90.5	72
	Traditional religious	82.5	74
	Traditional non-religious	89	72.5
	Secular	60	43

As shown in the preceding table, when it comes to vital decisions on peace and security, in all subgroups excluding the Left there is a majority—of varying sizes—who feel that a Jewish majority is required. On matters of governance, economy, and society, a majority (in all cases, smaller than that for peace and security) in all subgroups agree with this position, this time with the exception of the secular as well as the Left.

Does the position on crucial decisions also "spill over" into opinions on living together? We asked the interviewees in the Jewish sample to express their attitude toward the statement: "To preserve **Jewish** identity, it is better for Jews and Arabs in Israel to live separately." With Arab interviewees, we posed the question: "To preserve **Arab** identity, it is better for Jews and Arabs in Israel to live separately." As shown in the following figure, a majority in both samples are against such a separation, with greater opposition among Arab respondents than among Jews. However, while there was an increase this year in the proportion of Jewish respondents opposed to separation (from 45% to 53%), among Arab respondents, there was a decline (from 77% to 70%). This may be the result of different research contexts: unlike the 2018 findings, which are drawn from the *Democracy Index* survey, the 2017 data are from a survey devoted entirely to Jewish-Arab relations. Nonetheless, it is possible that we are seeing a shift. We will be able to offer a more definitive answer only after additional assessments.

Figure 3.8 \ "To preserve Jewish/Arab identity, it is better for Jews and Arabs in Israel to live separately," 2017 and 2018 (disagree; Jewish and Arab respondents; %)

We broke down the opinions of the Jewish sample by political orientation, religiosity, and social location. The table below presents the share who **support** living separately in each of the subgroups. As shown, in the case of religiosity, there is a clear division between the Haredim, national religious, and traditional religious, on the one hand, most of whom favor separation in order to preserve identity, and the traditional non-religious and secular respondents, on the other, of whom only a minority support Jews and Arabs living separately. Analysis by political orientation yields a distinction between the Right, where a majority support separation, and the Center and Left, where a majority are opposed to it. Analyzing by social location, we find that, of those who feel they belong to the stronger groups in society, a majority are opposed to separation, while among those who associate themselves with the weaker groups, the majority favor living apart. In all subgroups that we examined in the Arab sample, only a minority support such a separation.

Table 3.10 (Jewish and Arab respondents; %)

Jews		Support living separately to preserve Jewish/Arab identity
Political orientation	Right	55
	Center	36
	Left	21
Religiosity	Haredim	76
	National religious	55
	Traditional religious	53.5
	Traditional non-religious	43
	Secular	30.5
Social location	Feel they belong to stronger groups	40
	Feel they belong to weaker groups	53

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Arabs		Support living separately to preserve Jewish/Arab identity
Religion	Muslim	**29**
	Christian	**36**
	Druze	**27**
Vote in 2015 Knesset elections	Joint List	**32.5**
	Other parties	**43**

Chapter 4 \ Democracy, Government, Citizens

In this chapter, we discuss the following topics:

- Israeli citizens' interest in politics
- Perceived ability to influence government policy
- Performance of Knesset members
- Going into politics?
- Trust in institutions
- Intention to vote again for the same party
- Revoking the Supreme Court's authority to nullify laws passed by the Knesset

As reflected in the international indicators presented in chapter 1, the Israeli public is noteworthy for its high levels of political awareness and participation. We therefore revisited the question this year: "How interested are you in politics?" We found a high level of interest among the Jewish respondents, and a lower one in the Arab sample.

Figure 4.1 \ Interested in politics (Jewish and Arab respondents; %)

The claim is frequently made that young people are less interested than older adults in politics. To examine this assertion, we broke down the responses to this question by age. Among Jewish respondents, we found a majority who are interested in politics at all age levels; however, the majority is smaller among young people than in the older age groups: 61% express an interest in the 18–34 age group, 66% between the ages of 35 and 54, and 76% among those aged 55 and above. Among Arab interviewees, we did not find any systematic association between age and level of interest in politics.

Does level of education affect the degree of interest in politics in Israel? Among Jews, we found a slightly higher level of interest in politics among respondents with an academic education (full or partial) than in other subgroups, while among Arabs, again, no consistent association was found.

On the other hand, sex was found to be an influential variable to some extent: In the Jewish sample, 75% of the men showed a strong interest in politics, as opposed to 61% of the women. Among Arab respondents (where, as shown, less than a majority expressed an interest), we did not find any real difference between men and women in this regard.

Is there a relationship between political orientation and interest in politics? The answer is yes. Among Jewish respondents, we found greater interest in politics on the Left (86%) than on the Right or in the Center (64% for both). Among Arab interviewees, meanwhile, there was a difference based on voting patterns: Of those who voted for the Joint List in the 2015 Knesset elections, 54% reported being interested in politics "very much" or "quite a lot," as contrasted with 40% among those who voted for other parties.

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by voting patterns in the 2015 Knesset elections reveals that the reported level of interest in politics is highest among voters for Meretz (92%) and the Zionist Union (84%), and lowest among voters for Shas (42%) and Yisrael Beytenu (30%).

We also compared the level of interest in politics among Jews and Arabs over the years:

**Figure 4.2 ** Interested in politics, 2003–2018 (very much or quite interested; Jewish and Arab respondents; %)

As shown in the preceding figure, in all the years surveyed, the share of Jewish respondents who expressed an interest in politics (multi-year average: 71.5%) was greater than the corresponding share of Arab respondents (multi-year average: 50.8%), with the exception of 2008, when the percentage of Arab respondents reporting an interest exceeded that of Jewish respondents. It should be noted (as shown in surveys at the time) that 2008 was remarkable for the anger expressed by Jewish citizens toward the government, along with a pronounced sense of alienation—most likely the result of the Second Lebanon War (2006). These feelings were seemingly reflected in the low proportion of Jews who reported taking an interest in politics that year. Be that as it may, in both populations the annual average shows a majority interested in politics—a sign of a healthy democracy.

Cross-tabulating the responses from the Jewish sample on the state of democracy in Israel with the level of interest in politics, we did not find a consistent association between the two. In other words, interest in politics does not determine one's view of the state of democracy in Israel, and vice versa.

Ability to influence government policy?

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The news here is old, and not good: The majority of respondents, both Jews and Arabs, feel that they have little to no influence over government policy. As shown in the figure below, throughout the years surveyed, a majority of the total sample (ranging from 63% to 82%, with an average of 75.2%) have felt able to influence government policy "not so much" or "not at all"—a very worrisome finding for Israeli democracy.

**Figure 4.3 ** Feel that they have little to no influence over government policy (total sample; %)

Among the Jewish respondents, the differences between age groups are slight and not statistically significant. The youngest cohort of Arabs feel that their influence is limited, but to a lesser degree than do the older age groups. This finding may support the thesis of "the proud [younger] generation" versus "the cowed [older] generation," with the share of those in the Arab sample who feel that they have little to no influence standing at 61% among those aged 18–34, 74% in the 35–54 age group, and 81% among those aged 55 and over.

Level of education did not have a systematic effect on perceptions of influence among Jews or Arabs, nor did we find differences between the groups on the basis of sex: A sizeable majority of men and women alike, in both populations, feel that they have little to no influence on government policy.

When we examined whether those who voted for the parties that are now in the coalition believe that they have greater influence than voters for the parties sitting in the opposition, we found that a majority of voters for all the parties feel ineffectual; nonetheless, there are differences between those who voted for coalition parties (76.6% of whom, on average, feel unable to influence policy) and those who chose opposition parties (where 85% feel this way).[9]

Table 4.1 (Jewish and Arab respondents; %)

Jews		Feel they have little to no influence on government policy
Voted for coalition parties in 2015 elections	Likud	**71.5**
	Jewish Home	**73.5**
	Kulanu	**72**
	Yisrael Beytenu	**90**
	United Torah Judaism	**81**
	Shas	**72**

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9   The averages are not weighted in accordance with the size of the parties.

Jews		Feel they have little to no influence on government policy
Voted for opposition parties in 2015 elections	Zionist Union	83
	Yesh Atid	86
	Meretz	85
Arabs		
Vote in 2015 elections[10]	Joint List	62
	Other parties	53
Religion	Muslim	72
	Christian	77
	Druze	52

We asked the interviewees to express their opinion regarding the following statement: "On the whole, most Knesset members work hard and are doing a good job." Once again this year, a majority of both Jewish and Arab respondents (56% and 60%, respectively) disagreed with the assertion; however, this marks a drop in comparison with recent years (56% of the total sample this year, as opposed to the multi-year average of 59%).

Table 4.2 (total sample; %)

	2011	2012	2013	2015	2016	2017	2018
Disagree that most Knesset members work hard and are doing a good job	**63**	**62**	**48**	**54**	**64**	**68**	**56**

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10   Of the Arab interviewees who reported that they did not vote in the 2015 elections, more than 82% stated that they do not have any influence over government policy.

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Breaking down this year's results by voting patterns in the 2015 Knesset elections, we found that the average percentage of coalition voters who disagreed with the statement (47.5%) was lower than that of opposition voters (60.5%), meaning that those who voted for coalition parties are more satisfied on the whole with the performance of Knesset members.

Table 4.3 (Jewish and Arab respondents; %)

	Vote in 2015 Knesset elections	Disagree that most Knesset members work hard and are doing a good job
Jews	Likud	49
	Zionist Union	64
	Yesh Atid	64
	Jewish Home	38
	Kulanu	54
	Yisrael Beytenu	50
	Meretz	60.5
	United Torah Judaism	42
	Shas	64
Arabs	Joint List	55.5
	Other parties	35

We wished to know if there is a difference in the assessment of Knesset members' performance between those who are satisfied and those who are dissatisfied with the state of democracy in Israel. Our findings show that, of those respondents who rate Israel's democracy as "bad" or "very bad," 75% disagree with the statement that most Knesset members work hard and are doing a good job. Among those who consider it "so-so," there is still a majority—albeit a smaller one—who disagree (59%). But among respondents who assign high marks to Israeli democracy, only a minority (41%) disagree that Knesset members are doing a good job. In the Arab sample,

69% of those who see Israeli democracy as "bad" or "very bad" disagree with the statement, as do 53% of those who rate it "so-so" (still a majority, as in the Jewish sample), and only 38% of those who rate it "good" or "very good." In other words, the way that respondents view Israeli democracy is related to their assessment of Knesset members' performance.

Given the public's poor estimation of Knesset members' performance, we posed the question: "If someone close to you (a family member or close friend) was considering going into politics, what would you advise them to do?" As shown in the figure below, the tendency among Jews is to advise against such a move, while among Arabs, opinions are divided.

Figure 4.4 \\ What would you advise a family member or friend about going into politics? (Jewish and Arab respondents; %)

Breaking down the responses of the Jewish interviewees by their assessment of Israel's democracy, we found that among those who see it as "bad/very bad" or "so-so," the majority would advise those close to them not to enter politics. However, with respondents who consider the state of Israeli democracy to be "good/very good," opinions are split down the middle as to whether they would advise for or against—that is, those who hold a more positive view of the system have fewer reservations about the world of politics. Among Arab respondents, of those who see the state of democracy as "bad" or "very bad," slightly more than a third would recommend getting into politics, if asked; but of those who characterize Israel's democracy as "so-so" or "good/very good," the majority would recommend it.

Trust in Institutions

One of the cornerstones of democratic regimes is citizens' trust in their leaders and in government institutions. Trust is the basis for the mandate granted to elected representatives to make decisions that affect the fate of the people, who are sovereign. However, despite the fact that a majority of interviewees view the country's situation as favorable, not only do Israeli citizens express less than complete trust in their leadership, but in recent decades the level of confidence has been on the decline. A similar state of affairs exists in many other democratic countries as well. In this section, we will analyze the (mis)trust of Israelis in their government institutions.

This year, we examined the level of trust in ten officials and institutions, eight of which we look at on an annual basis (the IDF, President of Israel, Supreme Court, police, media, government, Knesset, and political parties). As we do each year, to these eight we added two institutions that we do not assess regularly; this year, these were the Attorney-General, who was at the center of a bitter controversy surrounding investigations of the prime minister; and the respondent's municipality/local authority, in the run-up to Israel's local elections in October 2018.

As shown in the figure below, this year, as in the past, there is a very sizeable difference between Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel in their level of trust in the various institutions. For all the officials and institutions that we cited, the extent of trust among Jewish respondents far outstrips that of the Arab respondents; however, the gap this year exceeds anything we have encountered to date. Moreover, of the ten institutions and officials assessed, in the Jewish sample, five received a vote of confidence from the majority of interviewees, whereas in the Arab sample, there was not a majority who expressed trust in any of the institutions. Indeed, all ten received expressions of trust from only a small minority of Arab interviewees, which was in all cases no higher than 36% (earned by the Supreme Court). Since this year's findings in the Arab sample deviate from those of previous surveys, we believe that additional assessments should be conducted to verify the conclusion suggested by this year's data, namely, that there has been a sharp decline in the Arab public's level of trust in Israel's institutions and officials.

**Figure 4.5 ** Trust in state institutions and officials (very much or quite a lot; Jewish and Arab respondents; %)

Institution	Arabs	Jews
IDF	20	89
President of Israel	26	68
Your municipality/local authority	20	60
Supreme Court	36	55
Police	18	52
Attorney General	19	47
Government	15	34
Media	18.5	33
Knesset	16	30
Political parties	15	16

■ Jews   ■ Arabs

As shown in the above figure, the percentages of the Jewish public who expressed trust this year in the institutions surveyed were as follows (in descending order):

1.   The IDF, 89%

2.   The President of Israel, 68%

3.   The respondent's municipality/local authority, 60%

4.   The Supreme Court, 55%

5.   The police, 52%

6.   The Attorney-General, 47%

7.   The government, 34%

8.   The media, 33%

9.   The Knesset, 30%

10.   The political parties, 16%

The corresponding findings in the Arab public were as follows (in descending order):

1.   The Supreme Court, 36%

2.   The President of Israel, 26%

3-4.   The IDF, 20%
       The respondent's municipality/local authority, 20%

5.   The Attorney-General, 19%

6.   The media, 18.5%

7.   The police, 18%

8.   The Knesset, 16%

9-10. The government, 15%
       The political parties, 15%

We calculated the average level of trust this year in the eight major institutions, in both the Jewish and Arab samples, on a scale of 1–4 where 1 = not at all and 4 = very much, so that the mid-point of the scale is 2.5. The average score this year in the Jewish sample was 2.51, marking a slight increase over 2017, and in the Arab sample, 1.81—a sharp decline since last year. Thus, this year's average score in the Jewish sample is just above the mid-point, on the side of greater trust, whereas the score in the Arab sample is far below it.

Table 4.4 (Jewish and Arab respondents; %)

Trust in institutions and officials	Average score 2017	Average score 2018
Jews	2.46	2.51
Arabs	2.08	1.81

In the table below, we present the levels of trust this year as compared with last year in each of the eight recurring institutions, along with the multi-year average for each. The comparison reveals that in the Jewish sample, the level of trust this year in the IDF, the President of Israel, and the police is above the multi-year average, whereas in the other institutions, it is below. Among the Arab respondents, all of this year's scores for trust are below the multi-year averages, meaning that further assessment is necessary to make certain that this is not an anomaly due to current circumstances or to this year's sample.

Table 4.5 (Jewish and Arab respondents; %)

The Institution	Expressed trust 2018 (Jews)	Expressed trust 2017 (Jews)	Change from 2017 (Jews)	Multi-year average (Jews)	Expressed trust 2018 (Arabs)	Expressed trust 2017 (Arabs)	Change from 2017 (Arabs)	Multi-year average (Arabs)
IDF	89	88	+	88.4	20	41	−	30.6
President of Israel	68	71	−	67.8	26	34	−	38.6
Supreme Court	55	57	−	62.6	36	54	−	58.7
Police	52	42	+	49.5	18	29	−	42.3
Government	34	30	+	40.5	15	22.5	−	30.6
Media	33	30	+	39.3	18.5	18		45.8
Knesset	30	29	+	39	16	19	−	36.2
Political parties	16	15	+	24	15	16	−	25.9

With regard to the Attorney-General (a position whose full scope is known to only small sections of the public, but whose profile has become much higher of late due to police investigations of the Prime Minister), we found consistency in the share who express their trust in him compared with last year, with a score of 42% of the total sample for both 2017 and 2018.

As for the municipalities/local authorities, despite all the faultfinding and the investigations against municipal heads over the years, we found a small majority this year (as in the previous survey on this topic) who expressed trust: 51.5% in 2016, and 53% in 2018.

As shown in the following table, this year we found again that, in the Jewish sample, each of the three political camps has its own "team" of trusted institutions. As in the past, the level of trust on the Right is lower than that among Left and Center respondents.

Table 4.6 (Jewish respondents; %)

Expressed trust	First place	Second place	Third place
Right	**IDF** (89%)	**President** (53%)	**Government** (50%)
Center	**IDF** (93%)	**President** (83%)	**Supreme Court** (76%)
Left	**President** (94%)	**IDF** (88%) **Supreme Court** (88%)	

The figures below illustrate the fluctuations in the level of trust among Jews and Arabs over the years. Among Jewish respondents, the IDF, the President of Israel (with the exception of a low point during the investigation of former President Moshe Katzav), and the Supreme Court have always been at the top of the list, with the political parties consistently at the bottom. Trust in the police is one of the measures most prone to shifts; the increase this year can likely be attributed to the police's conduct in the investigations of the prime minister. Three institutions—the government, the media, and the Knesset—experienced a slight upswing in public confidence this year, though they still enjoy the trust of only a minority of Jewish respondents.

In the Arab sample, the institution that always garners the highest level of trust is the Supreme Court, but confidence in this body, as in all the others, saw a drastic drop this year (based on our findings, which should be validated by further assessments). In any event, the levels of trust among Arab respondents have been less stable over the years than the corresponding indicators in the Jewish public. This may well be due to the much more tenuous sense of belonging to Israel's state institutions among Arabs, causing them to be more strongly influenced by specific events.

Figure 4.6 \ Trust in institutions, 2008–2018 (Jewish respondents; %)

Legend: IDF, President of Israel, Supreme Court, Police, Government, Media, Knesset, Political parties

Values at 2018: 89, 68, 55, 52, 34, 33, 30, 16

Figure 4.7 \ Trust in institutions, 2008–2018 (Arab respondents; %)

Legend:
- IDF
- President of Israel
- Supreme Court
- Police
- Government
- Media
- Knesset
- Political parties

Y-axis: 0, 20, 40, 60, 80, 100

X-axis: 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018

End values: 36, 21, 20, 18.5, 18, 15, 15, 16

In light of the low level of trust that we found in the political parties, and the relatively high degree of confidence in the Supreme Court, we posed the following two questions to clarify the meaning of our findings.

We asked: "If elections were held in the near future, would you vote again for the same party as in the last elections (in 2015), or would you vote for a different party?" It turns out that a majority think, or are certain, that they would vote for the same party. On this point, there was no real change from last year (57% this year as opposed to 54% in 2017). In other words, the events of the past year have had little to no effect on party loyalties.

**Figure 4.8 ** Voting again for the same party (total sample; %)

- Certain I would
- Think I would
- Think I would not
- Certain I would not
- Other / don't know

We analyzed the responses to this question based on the party that the interviewees voted for in the last elections (2015). As the table indicates, among Arab interviewees, the majority of voters for all the parties think or are certain that they would vote again for the same party if elections were to take place in the near future. By contrast, among the Jewish respondents, it is entirely unclear if certain parties would be chosen by the same voters this time around; this is true in particular of the Zionist Union and Kulanu, where less than half their voters from 2015 think or are certain that they would vote for them again in the next elections.

Table 4.7 (Jewish and Arab respondents; %)

	Vote in 2015 elections	Think or are certain they would vote again for same party
Jews	Likud	73
	Zionist Union	48
	Yesh Atid	54
	Jewish Home	73.5
	Kulanu	38
	Yisrael Beytenu	60
	Meretz	81
	United Torah Judaism	91
	Shas	56
Arabs	Joint List	70
	Other parties	65

The final question to be discussed in this chapter deals with a subject that has made headlines this year, popularly known as "the override clause."

We revisited the question asked in previous years about the proposal to deny the Supreme Court the authority to nullify laws passed in the Knesset by the elected representatives of the citizenry. As shown in the figure below, this year (as in the past), a majority of the Israeli public remains opposed to removing this power from the Supreme Court. However, apparently as a result of the considerable public attention paid to this issue recently, and the uncompromising stand taken on it at the highest levels of government, we are witnessing a gradual rise in the share of those who agree with such a move, coupled with a slight decline in the share who disagree. There has also been a noticeable drop in the proportion of respondents who are unsure of their opinion on this question.

Table 4.8 (total sample; %)

	2015	2017	2018
Agree	32	36	40.5
Disagree	56	58	56
Don't know	12	6	3.5
Total	100	100	100

Breaking down the responses to this question by voting patterns in the most recent Knesset elections (in 2015), we found vast differences between voters for the various parties: The strongest support for denying this authority to the Supreme Court is found among those who voted for United Torah Judaism, and the weakest, among voters for Meretz.

Figure 4.9 \ Supreme Court should be denied the authority to nullify laws passed by the Knesset, by vote in 2015 Knesset elections (agree; total sample; %)

A breakdown of the Arab sample by voting patterns in the last elections (2015) shows that, among voters for the Joint List as well as the other parties, the tendency is to oppose removing this authority from the Supreme Court.

In addition, we analyzed the responses of the Jewish sample by religiosity and political orientation. A majority of Haredi, national religious, and traditional religious interviewees (81%, 71%, and 52%, respectively) favor denying the Supreme Court the authority to override laws enacted by the Knesset. By contrast, among traditional non-religious and secular respondents, the majority are opposed to such a step (59% and 76%, respectively). On the Right, a majority (58%) support taking away this power from the Supreme Court, while in the Center and on the Left the majority are opposed to doing so (by 72.5% and 87%, respectively).

Breaking down the responses based on assessments of the state of democracy in Israel, we found that, of those who characterize it as "so-so" or "bad/very bad," a majority are opposed to removing this authority from the Supreme Court (65% and 64.5%, respectively); however, of those who hold that Israel's democracy is doing well, a majority of 52% favor such a move.

Chapter 5 \ Corruption

In this chapter, we discuss the following topics:

- What is corruption?
- Desirable qualities in political figures
- Extent of corruption in Israeli leadership
- Is everyone corrupt?
- Corruption in institutions
- Personal exposure to corruption
- Ways to fight corruption
- Business-government ties
- Corruption investigations

Corruption, and the fight against it, took center stage in Israeli public discourse this year. While we have already looked at the public's views on the subject in past *Democracy Index* surveys, this year we made it one of our main points of discussion, adding many questions that addressed it in one way or another. We will open the chapter with a group of questions intended to clarify which actions are perceived by the public as corrupt, and which are not.

What is corruption?

Questions 42–45

Appendix 2
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We presented the interviewees with behaviors and actions that are common in Israel, and asked if they considered them to be indicators of corruption. The figure below shows the share of respondents who see each of these actions as reflecting corruption.

**Figure 5.1 ** Is it corruption? (yes; Jewish and Arab respondents; %)

As shown in the figure, all four of the behaviors or actions presented were seen by a majority of interviewees, both Jews and Arabs, as examples of corruption. Among Jews, the greatest share of respondents saw the (apparently common) use of the services of a "fixer" as an act of corruption, while among Arabs, benefiting a certain constituency at the expense of others was at the top of their list. Nonetheless, there is no ignoring the fact that a minority (of varying sizes ranging from roughly 33% to 10%, depending on the activity in question and the percentage of "don't knows") did not view these behaviors as acts of corruption.

When we examined what might affect citizens' perception of a given action as corrupt, the findings were not insignificant. For example, breaking down the results by political orientation—a variable that helped us throughout the survey to explain differences between certain preferences—did not yield substantial distinctions here: In all three camps, a similar majority held that all of the actions described reflect corruption. We also broke down the responses in the Jewish sample by religiosity. In this case, more salient differences emerged: The Haredi subgroup were consistently less likely than the other subgroups to consider these behaviors as acts of corruption. Moreover, with regard to asking a friend to grease the wheels at a government ministry, or an elected official accepting a small gift, only a small minority of Haredi interviewees (as opposed to a majority in all other subgroups) felt that these would be examples of corruption.

Examining further whether there are differences (in the total sample) between those who feel that they belong to the stronger or the weaker groups in Israeli society, we found that the primary distinction concerns accepting a modest gift: In this instance, some 68.5% of those who identify with the stronger groups see this as corruption, versus roughly 60% of those who associate themselves with the weaker groups.

We calculated the share of interviewees who define all four of the actions presented as acts of corruption among voters for the various parties in the 2015 Knesset elections:

1.   Yesh Atid, 55%

2.   Zionist Union, 54%

3.   Meretz, 52%

4.   Kulanu, 45%

5.   Likud, 31%

6.   Shas, 24%

7.   Jewish Home, 22%

8.   Yisrael Beytenu, 20%

9.   United Torah Judaism, 7%

In other words, those who voted for the opposition parties are more likely to define a given action or behavior as corrupt than are voters for the coalition parties.

Incorruptibility and corruption are two concepts that are closely intertwined. For this reason, we wished to examine to what extent incorruptibility is an important quality in the eyes of the public in comparison with other traits. We asked the interviewees what is most important to them in a political figure: ability to get things done; keeping promises to voters; incorruptibility; or ideology. As the figure below illustrates, there is a sizeable difference in priorities between the Jewish and the Arab interviewees. Among Jews, incorruptibility is in first place, with ability to get things done trailing far behind, whereas among Arabs, being a "doer" is at the top of the list, followed quite closely by keeping promises to voters.

**Figure 5.2 ** Most important quality in a political figure (Jewish and Arab respondents; %)

Jews

21.5   5   16

17

40.5

Arabs

39   2 2   24

33

- Able to get things done
- Keeps promises to voters
- Incorruptible
- Ideology
- Other / don't know

We then broke down the responses of the Jewish sample by religiosity and political orientation, as well as by voting patterns in the most recent Knesset elections (2015). Although incorruptibility is ranked in first place among all the subgroups, it seems that the Center and Left attach greater importance to this quality than do those on the Right, as shown in the table below. A similar pattern is evident on the religious spectrum, with Haredi respondents placing less importance on the integrity of political figures than do all other religious subgroups. In the breakdown by vote in the 2015 elections, incorruptibility heads the list by the greatest margin among voters for the Zionist Union, and by the smallest, among voters for Yisrael Beytenu.

Table 5.1 (Jewish respondents; %)

		Hold that incorruptibility is the most important quality in a political figure
Political orientation	Right	33
	Center	50
	Left	49

		Hold that incorruptibility is the most important quality in a political figure
Religiosity	Haredim	32
	National religious	39
	Traditional religious	44
	Traditional non-religious	38
	Secular	44
Vote in 2015 Knesset elections	Likud	30
	Zionist Union	60
	Yesh Atid	46
	Jewish Home	38
	Kulanu	34
	Yisrael Beytenu	20
	Meretz	46
	United Torah Judaism	33
	Shas	36

As we saw above in the Jewish sample, incorruptibility and the ability to get things done occupy the two top slots in the scale of desirable qualities in a political figure. We attempted to further explore the implications of these very different qualities.

We asked the interviewees if they feel that, in certain cases, public figures must sidestep laws and regulations and "cut corners" to effectively advance issues of national importance. A majority of the public rejected the argument that at times such actions are unavoidable, though a substantial minority did agree that there is sometimes no choice but to cut corners. Among Arab respondents, the share who disagreed with the statement was much greater than that among Jewish interviewees (65% as opposed to 54.5%).

Figure 5.3 \ "Public figures sometimes have to circumvent laws and regulations and cut corners in order to effectively advance issues of national importance" (total sample; %)

At least in theory, then, the public recognizes the importance of the rule of law and of maintaining order, though this recognition is not equal across all subgroups in Israeli society. Thus, an analysis of the responses of both the Jewish and Arab samples showed that a higher level of education correlates with a greater sense of disagreement with the statement. In other words, those who are less educated are more willing to accept cutting corners as a means to an end than are those who are better educated. When we examine the responses of the Jewish sample by religiosity, we see that the lower the level of religious observance, the higher the tendency to disagree with the statement. In fact, as shown in the following table, the share of those who disagree is almost three times as high among secular respondents than among Haredim.

Table 5.2 (Jewish and Arab respondents; %)

Disagree that public figures must sometimes cut corners		Jews	Arabs
Religiosity	Haredim	23	
	National religious	43	
	Traditional religious	46	
	Traditional non-religious	54	
	Secular	67	
Education	Elementary or partial high school	41	59
	Full high school or other secondary education	47	62
	Higher education (partial or complete)	61	79

We also asked the interviewees to express their opinion regarding the following (slightly different) statement: "Better a leader who sometimes sidesteps laws and regulations and cuts corners, but succeeds in advancing important national matters, than a leader who's straight as an arrow and breaks no laws or regulations but is unable to advance such matters effectively." Here, we found a substantial difference between the Jewish and Arab respondents. Among the Jews, a majority agreed with this assertion, whereas among the Arabs interviewees, only a minority (albeit a sizeable one) supported it. The responses to both these questions suggest that, at least in theory, Jews are more tolerant of "corner-cutting" than are Arabs.

Figure 5.4 \ "Better a leader who sometimes sidesteps laws and regulations and cuts corners but succeeds in advancing important national matters than a leader who's straight as an arrow and breaks no laws or regulations but is unable to advance such matters effectively" (agree; Jewish and Arab respondents; %)

We examined the distribution of responses of the Jewish interviewees by political orientation. Of those who identify with the Right, a majority (55.5%) prefer a leader who sometimes sidesteps laws and regulations but who moves things forward versus only a minority of Center and Left respondents who agree with this position (36.5% and 23%, respectively). Breaking down the responses by religiosity, it emerges that a decisive majority of Haredi, national religious, and traditional respondents agree with the statement, as opposed to a majority of secular respondents who disagree with it.

What, then, is the general thinking in Israel regarding the extent of corruption at present? In the eyes of its citizens, is the country's leadership corrupt?

The interviewees were asked to rate Israel's leadership on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 = very corrupt and 5 = not at all corrupt. As shown in the following figure, the proportion who hold that the leadership is not so, or not at all, corrupt (19%) lags far behind those who feel that it is quite or very corrupt (47%). The remainder (32%) believe that it is somewhere in between.

Figure 5.5 \ How corrupt is Israel's leadership, where 1 = very corrupt and 5 = not at all corrupt (total sample; %)

- **1 A great deal of corruption**
- **2**
- **3**
- **4**
- **5 No corruption**
- **Don't know**

To facilitate comparisons over time—that is, to understand whether Israelis have changed their minds in either direction regarding the extent of corruption in their country's leadership—we calculated an average score for each year that the question was posed. As shown in the table below, the average rating in past years tends toward the more corrupt end of the scale (with all scores below the mid-point of 3). This year's score is very close to those of previous years, though we cannot ignore the fact that it is one of the two most positive scores received in the previous five surveys (along with 2014's). In other words, all of the suspected cases of corruption currently under investigation by the police have not fundamentally changed the public's assessment of the integrity (or lack thereof) of the country's leadership, perhaps because the fight being waged against corruption by the authorities is seen by many as politically motivated.

Table 5.3 (yearly average; total sample)

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Corruption in Israel's leadership: average yearly score	2.5	2.4	2.3	2.4	2.5

Comparing the scores assigned by the Jewish and the Arab interviewees, we found that this year (as in 2017) the Arabs tend to see the country's leadership as much more corrupt than do the Jews (average score in 2018: Arabs, 1.9; Jews, 2.6).

Is there a difference in the perception of corruption between voters for the parties presently in the coalition and those who voted for the parties now in the opposition? From the table below, we can see that among voters for the coalition parties, only a minority (of varying sizes) characterize Israel's leadership as corrupt, as opposed to a majority (also of varying sizes)

of opposition voters who share this view. Stated otherwise, whether the parties they voted for in the last Knesset elections (2015) are sitting inside or outside the government strongly influences the feelings of interviewees regarding the extent of corruption at the highest levels, substantiating the presence of the political motives that we referred to earlier. Interestingly enough, voters for the Jewish Home party attributed the least amount of corruption to the country's leadership—precisely the opposite of voters for Meretz, who were the most likely to ascribe a high level of corruption to Israel's leaders.

Table 5.4 (total sample; %)

		Feel that Israel's leadership is corrupt
Voted for coalition parties	Jewish Home	**15**
	Yisrael Beytenu	**20**
	Likud	**23.5**
	United Torah Judaism	**37**
	Kulanu	**38**
	Shas	**40**
Voted for opposition parties	Yesh Atid	**58**
	Zionist Union	**67**
	Joint List	**67**
	Meretz	**78**

We also attempted to see if there is a correlation between interviewees' assessments of Israel's current situation and their view of the extent of corruption at the top, and in fact found a very strong association. Thus, of those who defined the country's situation as "bad" or "very bad," a resounding majority (83%) viewed the leadership as corrupt; of those who characterized the state of the nation as "so-so," 59% shared this view; and of those who categorized it as "good" or "very good," only 29% saw the leadership as corrupt.

Again this year, we asked the public if they think that high-ranking politicians are corrupt.

Perhaps due to the fierce, politically divided debate this year surrounding the topic of corruption, and perhaps for other reasons, the bulk of interviewees in 2018, unlike in past years, disagreed with the statement: "To get to the top in Israeli politics, you have to be corrupt." In fact, this is the first year that we found a majority of the total sample who disagreed.[11]

Figure 5.6 \ "To get to the top in Israeli politics, you have to be corrupt," 2003–2018 (disagree; total sample; %)

The rise in the proportion who disagree with the statement may be due to Netanyahu's supporters' "reading into" the question this time an indirect accusation of sorts against him. Indeed, a breakdown of the results by political orientation reveals that on the Right, two-thirds disagree with the assertion that people have to be corrupt to succeed in Israeli politics, while in the Center and on the Left, roughly 55% agree with it. A breakdown of the findings by voting patterns in the 2015 Knesset elections further corroborates this hypothesis: Among voters for the Likud and Jewish Home, some three-quarters are opposed to this statement; for the Haredi parties, about two-thirds; and for the remaining parties, slightly more than half. In other words, the responses to this question were, to a large extent, politically based.

Opinions on this question were also found to be related to assessments of the state of democracy in Israel today. Accordingly, of those who characterized Israeli democracy as "bad"

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11 To allow for comparison between different years, for years when the rating scale ran from 1 to 5 instead of the current 1 to 4, we divided the data for the middle category 3 between categories 2 and 3 in the current version of the question. For this reason, there is an apparent difference between the data in the figure here and the data on this question in Appendix 3.

or "very bad," 48% responded that to reach the top politically, it is necessary to be corrupt; and of those who defined it as "so-so," 40% felt this way. But of those who viewed the state of democracy in Israel as "good" or "very good," only 26% felt that reaching the highest levels inevitably entailed corrupt behavior.

From here, we moved on to asking the interviewees if they view various bodies as corrupt.

As in the question of trust discussed in the previous chapter, here too we presented the interviewees with a list of institutions, asking in each case whether they considered them to be corrupt. As shown in the figure below, the extent of corruption that the respondents attributed to the various institutions is not at all low (raising the question of how it is possible that so few of them have personally encountered instances of corruption, as they reported in the next question).

On this subject, certain differences came to light between the Jewish and Arab respondents. In the eyes of a majority of Jewish interviewees, three of the bodies that we presented are not corrupt: the IDF, Supreme Court, and, to a lesser extent, the police. From the perspective of most of the Arab respondents, by contrast, all of the bodies presented are tainted by corruption. In particular, the gap between them and the Jewish interviewees stands out with regard to the police and the Supreme Court. In three cases, only a minority of Jews gave the body in question poor marks (scores 3 and 4), signifying a high level of corruption—these were the IDF (16%), the Supreme Court (30%), and the police (42%). Among Arab respondents, however, a majority awarded poor scores to two of the three institutions: the Supreme Court (56%) and the police (68%). That is to say, in contrast with the Jewish public, a majority of the Arab public view the Supreme Court—and even more so, the police—as corrupt institutions.

Figure 5.7 \ Consider the institution very corrupt (scores 3 and 4)
(Jewish and Arab respondents; %)

Within the Jewish sample, we found very sizeable differences in the breakdown by political
orientation. At number one on the corruption charts among respondents on the Right are the
media; in the Center, the Chief Rabbinate; and on the Left, the government. Broken down by
religiosity, we find that the institutions rated as most corrupt are the media (among Haredim and
the national religious); the government (both traditional subgroups); and the Chief Rabbinate
(secular respondents).

Table 5.5 (Jewish respondents; %)

Feel that these institutions are highly corrupt (scores 3 and 4)		IDF	Supreme Court	Government	Knesset	Media	Municipalities	Chief Rabbinate	Police
Political orientation	Right	17	44	62	61	71.5	67	53.5	46
	Center	15	18.5	80	67	43	71	82	38
	Left	9	6	89	72	29	74	85	33
Religiosity	Haredim	28	67	52	55	86	52	16	51
	National religious	15	53	50.5	51	74	57	39	48
	Traditional religious	15	32	71	68	60	71	58	38
	Traditional non-religious	15	26	77	73	62	73	70	42
	Secular	13	17	81	68	41	73	87	39

We examined the relation between the degree of trust in a given institution and the perception of it as corrupt, and found, as expected, a strong association between the two: The more corrupt an institution is considered, the lower the level of confidence in it. For example, of those who express trust in the IDF, 79% hold that it is not at all corrupt, while among those who do not have faith in the army, only 2% see no corruption there. And conversely, of those who do not trust the IDF, 51% feel that it is highly corrupt, as opposed to only 2% who take this view among respondents who do have confidence in the army.

For obvious reasons, it is not possible to ask the interviewees if they themselves have acted corruptly and hope to receive an honest answer, but we can and did ask them if they have personally encountered instances of corruption.

As illustrated in the following figure, a majority of both Jews and Arabs reported that they themselves have never encountered corruption—a surprising response in light of the above, though perhaps understandable.

**Figure 5.8 ** Personal encounter with corruption (Jewish and Arab respondents; %)

A breakdown by such variables as income, political orientation, assessment of democracy in Israel, and social location did not yield any real differences: In all of the groups, a clear majority responded that they had never personally experienced corruption.

What do the public consider to be the most effective ways to fight corruption? By a large margin, imposing stiffer penalties tops the list of other methods we presented (encouraging the public to report instances of corruption by offering suitable protection for informants; making clear what is and is not permissible for people in public office; and media exposure of irregularities in public bodies).

Figure 5.9 \ The most effective way of fighting government corruption (total sample; %)

Interestingly, the share who opted for clarifying the rules as the most effective method of battling corruption was much higher among voters for the Haredi parties (United Torah Judaism, 37%; Shas, 28%) than it was among voters for the established "secular" parties (Yesh Atid, 8%; Zionist Union, 4.5%; and Meretz, 4%).

In the previous question, one of the tools that we presented for fighting corruption was reporting by members of the public. As we know, over the past year several figures close to the prime minister have agreed to become state witnesses against him, and the head of the Likud faction in the Knesset, MK David Amsalem, has condemned this, calling those who assist the police in their investigations "informers." We wondered if the public shares this view. Accordingly, we asked the interviewees if they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: "Someone who testifies about corruption among those around him, and assists a police investigation, is an 'informer.'" The figure below shows that a sizeable majority do not feel this way.

Figure 5.10 \ "People who testify about corruption and assist the police are 'informers'" (total sample; %)

Are those who testify to the police about corruption informers?

Question 40

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This was true for both the Arab and the Jewish samples, but among Arab respondents, the minority who did agree with this characterization was higher than that among the Jews (23% as opposed to 16%).

A very interesting finding relates to the link between respondents' religiosity and their views on those who assist the police in corruption investigations. It seems that the proportion who hold that cooperating in an investigation constitutes "informing" drops sharply in tandem with the level of religiosity. Thus, among Haredim, 44% agree with the statement that those who cooperate with the police are informers, with this figure tailing off for national religious (25%), traditional religious (16%), traditional non-religious (11%), and secular respondents (only 9%).

The parties whose supporters in the 2015 Knesset elections are particularly likely to agree with Amsalem's comment are Shas (52%) and United Torah Judaism (49%). By contrast, in the Likud, Amsalem's party, only 29% agree with his position. In the other parties, support for this view is much lower.

Among the characteristics of corrupt regimes are ties between decision makers and special interest groups, and decision making that serves these groups but harms the rest of the public. We wished to know if this is in fact the situation in Israel.

Do a few wealthy individuals influence the government?

Question 12

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This year as well, we asked the interviewees to express agreement or disagreement with the statement: "Israel is not a true democracy because a few wealthy individuals influence the government to make decisions that benefit them and harm the average citizen." Among Jews and Arabs alike, we found a majority who agree with this perception.

**Figure 5.11 ** "In Israel, a few wealthy individuals influence the government" (total sample; %)

Is there a difference on this question between the haves and the have-nots, and between those who feel that they belong to the stronger groups in Israel society and those who associate themselves with the weaker groups? We broke down the responses of the Jewish sample based on two variables: income and social location. Of those with low or average incomes, a majority agreed with the statement that wealthy Israelis exert influence on the government,

thereby harming the country's democracy; but among those whose income is above average, only a minority agreed with this description. When we broke down the responses by perceived centrality or marginality within society (social location), we found a majority in both categories who agree that the wealthy have a disproportionate influence over the conduct of the government in Israel; however, the majority is much larger among those who report a sense of belonging to the weaker groups in society.

Interestingly, the pattern among Arab respondents is just the opposite: Specifically among those whose income is above average, we found greater agreement with the claim that the rich influence the government for their own benefit. The same applies with regard to social location: While most respondents in both categories (stronger and weaker social groups) agree with the statement, the majority is in fact larger among those who associate themselves with the stronger elements of society. Perhaps those Arabs who feel that they belong to the stronger groups are more sensitive to institutional oppression in Israel precisely because they possess financial and human capital, based on which they would expect to be treated better by the government and not marginalized by the wealthy elites.

Table 5.6 (Jewish and Arab respondents; %)

Jews		Agree that in Israel a few wealthy individuals influence government
Income	Below average	61
	Average	55.5
	Above average	47
Social location	Feel they belong to weaker groups	69
	Feel they belong to stronger groups	51
Arabs		
Income	Below average	55
	Average	52
	Above average	82
Social location	Feel they belong to weaker groups	58
	Feel they belong to stronger groups	51.5

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation shows a majority on the Left (65%) and in the Center (60%) who agree with the statement about the influence of the wealthy few on Israel's government today, and its negative impact on democracy. Among those who place themselves on the Right, there is no such majority, with 45% expressing agreement.

We also examined if there is a correlation between agreement with the statement and respondents' assessment of the state of democracy in Israel. And indeed, we found that, of those who see the state of democracy in Israel as "bad" or "very bad," over 66% agree with the above assertion, and of those who define it as "so-so," some 60% express agreement; but of those who characterize Israeli democracy as "good" or "very good," only about 40% hold that democracy in Israel is flawed due to the influence of wealthy individuals on government decision making.

To conclude our examination of corruption, we presented four questions concerning the police investigations that have captured a great deal of political, media, and public attention over the past year. The first question dealt with the investigations as indicators of the quality of Israeli democracy; the second, the treatment of individuals under investigation for corruption; the third, the effect of the investigations on how respondents intend to vote in future; and the fourth, the claim that current efforts to uncover corruption are excessive, and damaging to the state.

Corruption investigations: Do they indicate strength or weakness of Israeli democracy?

Question 46

We asked the interviewees: "Which of these statements do you agree with more strongly: 'The many recent corruption investigations and indictments indicate the weakness of Israeli democracy,' or 'The many recent corruption investigations and indictments in fact indicate the strength of Israeli democracy'?" On this question, we found a very sizeable difference between Jewish and Arab respondents: A majority of the Jewish interviewees saw the investigations as testifying to the strength of Israeli democracy, while an even greater majority of the Arab interviewees viewed them as a sign of weakness.

Figure 5.12 \ Corruption investigations and indictments: a sign of strength or weakness of Israeli democracy? (Jewish and Arab respondents; %)

A breakdown by religiosity saw the Haredi subgroup (where some two-thirds viewed the investigations as indicating weakness) on one side of the scale, and all the other subgroups on the other, with a majority in each considering the investigations a sign of strength (national religious, 54%; traditional religious and traditional non-religious, 61%; and secular, 68%).

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation shows a majority in all groups who hold that the investigations and indictments are proof of the strength of Israeli democracy; but whereas on the Right about half feel this way, among Center and Left respondents we found a clear majority who share this view (69% and 75%, respectively).

Over and above the question of who is investigated, it has also been asked in the media and in public discourse whether all those suspected of corruption are treated equally, or whether some are more equal than others. A worrisome finding from a democratic point of view is that most of the public feel that law enforcement authorities do not treat all corruption suspects the same way.

Equal treatment for all corruption suspects?

Question 50

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Figure 5.13 \ "All corruption suspects receive the same treatment from law enforcement authorities" (total sample; %)

- I'm certain they do
- I think they do
- I think they don't
- I'm certain they don't
- Don't know

A breakdown of opinions in the Jewish public by political orientation reveals that lack of faith in the fairness of the legal authorities is strongest on the Right, where 69% feel that corruption suspects are not treated equally. Among respondents who identify with the Center, 57% share this view, while the Left is split more or less down the middle, leaning slightly toward lack of trust in the fairness of the legal process. We found even larger gaps when analyzing by religiosity.

Table 5.7 (Jewish respondents; %)

Religiosity	Think or are certain that corruption suspects don't receive equal treatment
Haredim	82
National religious	70.5
Traditional religious	66
Traditional non-religious	66
Secular	53

The third question regarding corruption investigations dealt with their impact on voter preferences.

We asked: "Will the investigations taking place now decrease, increase, or not affect the likelihood that you will vote again for a given party, even if its leaders are suspected of corruption?" Among the general public, the lion's share stated that the investigations would lessen the chances they would vote for a party whose leaders were under investigation. In the Jewish sample, only about 10% stated that if the leaders of a given party were being investigated for corruption, they would be more likely to vote for that party. By contrast, among Arab respondents, 49.5% reported that such investigations would increase the likelihood that they would vote for a party whose leaders were under suspicion.

Figure 5.14 \ Likelihood of voting again for a party whose leaders are under investigation for corruption (total sample; %)

Breaking down the responses of the Jewish sample by voting in the 2015 Knesset elections for parties presently in the coalition or the opposition, we found that—apart from voters for Kulanu—most of those who supported coalition parties would not change their vote if the leaders of the party they had voted for previously were under investigation; at the same time, a majority of voters for opposition parties stated that this would reduce the chances they would vote for the same party.

Table 5.8 (Jewish respondents; %)

	Voted for:	Investigation of party leaders would not change their previous vote	Investigation of party leaders would reduce the chances they would vote for the same party
Coalition parties	United Torah Judaism	**70.5**	
	Likud	**55**	
	Shas	**56**	
	Jewish Home	**51**	
	Yisrael Beytenu	**30**	**30**
	Kulanu		**51**
Opposition parties	Yesh Atid		**60**
	Zionist Union		**62.5**
	Meretz		**54**

A breakdown by religiosity found that in the Haredi, national religious, and traditional religious subgroups, the majority report that investigations against leaders of a given party would not affect their vote for that party in the future (72%, 55%, and 50%, respectively); however, in the traditional non-religious and secular subgroups, the majority stated that such a situation would reduce the chances that they would vote for it again (52% and 50%, respectively).

Among Arab respondents, a majority said that they would not alter their vote if the leaders of the party they had voted for were under investigation, apparently because they see such probes as harassment of their representatives by the authorities.

The final question in this chapter addresses the claim that "we're suffering from over-investigation."

The argument has been made recently that Israel is in the throes of an "investigative frenzy" that is hampering the running of the country. We therefore asked respondents whether the current efforts to uncover corruption in the state are excessive and harmful. Interestingly enough, we found that a considerable portion of the public consider this is an apt description of the situation.

Figure 5.15 \ Are corruption investigations excessive and damaging? (total sample; %)

- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree
- Don't know

An analysis of the responses in the Jewish sample by religiosity showed that among Haredim and the national religious, the majority feel that the investigations are excessive and damaging to the state (74% and 61%, respectively). By contrast, among traditional religious, traditional non-religious, and secular respondents, only a minority feel this way (44%, 46%, and 26.5%, respectively).

A breakdown of the responses by voting patterns in the 2015 Knesset elections reveals that a majority of voters for the coalition parties, with the exception of Kulanu, hold that the investigations go too far and are detrimental. Voters for the opposition parties—apart from the Joint List, whose leaders are frequently called in for investigations, and whose voters were the exception in the previous question as well—feel that they are not excessive or harmful.

Table 5.9 (%)

Vote in 2015 Knesset elections	Feel that investigations are excessive and damaging
Likud	61.5
Zionist Union	17
Yesh Atid	23

Vote in 2015 Knesset elections	Feel that investigations are excessive and damaging
Jewish Home	62
Kulanu	28
Yisrael Beytenu	50
Meretz	2
United Torah Judaism	79
Shas	80
Joint List	54

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation shows that on the Right, the majority (55.5%) hold that the investigations are disproportionate and damaging to the state, as opposed to 25% in the Center and 18% on the Left who share this view.

Chapter 6 \ Israeli Society

The topics discussed in this chapter are:

- Solidarity in Israeli-Jewish society
- Primary points of tension in Israeli society
- Paying higher taxes to reduce socioeconomic inequality
- Relations between Jews and Arabs
- Relations between Arab citizens of Israel and Israeli society

In any country, there is a strong connection between its chosen system of government and the character of its society. Accordingly, democratic societies function differently from non-democratic ones, and the relationship between government and citizens is not the same under each of these models. In chapter 4, we discussed Israeli citizens' perceptions of their government. We will now move on to examining their views on some of the key relationships in Israeli society today.

There is a widespread assumption that democratic societies are more cohesive than non-democratic ones. The first question that we will examine, then, is the public's perception of the level of solidarity in Israeli-Jewish society today. We will of course also be discussing Jewish-Arab relations later in this chapter.

Both Jewish and Arab respondents were asked to rate the level of solidarity (or feeling of "togetherness") in Israeli-Jewish society on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 = no solidarity at all and 10 = a high level of solidarity. As shown in the figure below, the Arab respondents see Jewish society as less cohesive than do the Jewish interviewees; in other words, Arab respondents tended to choose lower solidarity ratings, resulting in an average score of 4.5, compared with 5.7 in the Jewish sample.

Solidarity in Israeli-Jewish society

Question 19

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**Figure 6.1 ** Level of solidarity of Israeli-Jewish society (Jewish and Arab respondents; %)

This question has been asked three times in past surveys. The following table, which presents the average score in each of these assessments for the total sample and for the Jewish and Arab samples separately, shows a marked decline this year in the perceived level of solidarity in Israeli-Jewish society. The 2018 score is even lower than that in 2011, when the survey was conducted before the social protests erupted but when there were already rumblings of discontent beneath the surface.

Table 6.1 (average score; total sample, Jewish, and Arab respondents)

Solidarity of Israeli-Jewish society	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
2011	5.8	5.8	6.1
2012	6.0	6.2	5.4
2014	6.0	6.1	5.7
2018	5.6	5.7	4.5

Do different groups within the Jewish public differ in their assessments of the level of solidarity in Israeli-Jewish society? Calculating the average scores for each of the various subgroups based on religiosity, political orientation, and social location, we found that, for the most part, these

are clustered around the midpoint of the scale and not at either extreme. On the religious spectrum, the national religious respondents see Israeli-Jewish society as displaying greater solidarity than do the other subgroups, followed (in descending order) by the Haredim, traditional religious, traditional non-religious, and secular. Breaking down the responses by political orientation yielded a sizeable difference between the Right, with the highest average score, and the Center and Left, where the average score is noticeably lower. Stated otherwise, those on the Right see Israeli-Jewish society as more cohesive than do respondents from the Center and Left. As for social location, those who feel they belong to the stronger social groups attribute a slightly higher level of solidarity to Israeli-Jewish society.

Table 6.2 (average score; Jewish respondents)

		2018
Religiosity	Haredim	5.8
	National religious	6.7
	Traditional religious	5.8
	Traditional non-religious	5.8
	Secular	5.5
Political orientation	Right	6.2
	Center	5.4
	Left	5.2
Social location	Feel they belong to stronger groups	5.8
	Feel they belong to weaker groups	5.6

Are there differences between subgroups in the Arab public in their assessment of social solidarity in Israel? We did not find major differences between Muslims, Christians, and Druze in their perception of the level of solidarity in Israeli-Jewish society, despite the fact that the Druze are in closer contact with Jewish society than are members of the other subgroups. By contrast, we found considerable differences between voters for the Joint List, who tended to

rate the level of solidarity as lower, and voters for other parties, who were more likely to see Israeli-Jewish society as cohesive.

From here, we moved on to discussing the various focal points of tension in Israeli society as a whole.

We presented five points of friction in Israeli society, and asked the interviewees to label the level of tension in each case as high, moderate, or low. Here too, there were noticeable differences between the assessments of the Jewish and the Arab respondents.

Table 6.3 (total sample, Jewish, and Arab respondents; %)

Tension between:		High	Moderate	Low/None at all	Other	Total
Ashkenazim and Mizrahim	Total sample	22	44	33	1	100
	Jews	21	43.5	35	0.5	100
	Arabs	24	46.5	21	8.5	100
Religious and secular Jews	Total sample	54	34	11	1	100
	Jews	57.5	33	9	0.5	100
	Arabs	38	38	20	4	100
Right and Left	Total sample	65	25	9	1	100
	Jews	71.5	22	6	0.5	100
	Arabs	33	39.5	23	4.5	100
Rich and poor	Total sample	39	40.5	18	2.5	100
	Jews	41	39	17	3	100
	Arabs	27	46.5	23	3.5	100

Tension between:		High	Moderate	Low/None at all	Other	Total
Arabs and Jews	Total sample	52.5	39	8	0.5	100
	Jews	56	38	5	1	100
	Arabs	35	44	20	1	100

In the total sample, there were only two cases where the greatest share of respondents characterized the level of tension as moderate: that between rich and poor, and between Ashkenazim and Mizrahim. Tensions between the remaining groups were labeled as high by a plurality of those surveyed. In other words, Israel is perceived by its citizens as a seriously divided society.

A comparison over time (see Appendix 3) shows that the tension between rich and poor, which was rated as high by the total sample in all the previous assessments, dropped this year to a moderate rating, while the tension between Ashkenazim and Mizrahim has been labeled as moderate in all the surveys including this year's. Tensions between all the other groups are still seen as high, as in previous years.

Which groups are considered to have the highest level of tension between them this year? Among Jewish respondents, there has been a turnaround in the responses to this question: The tension between Right and Left has climbed to the top of the rankings, while friction between Jews and Arabs, which headed the list in all the previous surveys, has dropped to second place. Among Arab respondents, Jewish-Arab tensions are still ranked the highest among the options presented.

Figure 6.2 \ Which groups have the highest level of tension between them? (Jewish and Arab respondents; %)

We examined the various subgroups directly affected by each of these points of tension to see if their assessments would be similar or different. As stated, the Arab respondents rate Jewish-Arab tension as being the most severe, while the Jewish interviewees position it in second place. A breakdown of the Jewish sample by religiosity shows that the Haredim place Jewish-Arab tensions at the top of the list, unlike the other subgroups in this category, who rate the tension between Right and Left as the strongest; that is to say, none of the groups along the religious spectrum rank the level of tension between religious and secular Jews as the most severe.

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation yielded a finding of particular interest: The proportion of respondents on the Right who rank the tension between Jews and Arabs as the highest is only one percentage point greater than the share who selected the tension between Right and Left (36% and 35%, respectively), while in the Center, the tension between religious and secular Jews heads the list, and on the Left, the tension between Right and Left. Only 15% of respondents on the Left see Jews and Arabs as having the highest level of tension between them.

With respect to the tension between rich and poor, a breakdown of the Jewish sample by income level shows that in all the subgroups (below-average, average, and above-average income), the tension between Right and Left is rated the strongest, while that between rich and poor is in second-to-last place, ahead of only the tension between Ashkenazim and Mizrahim. Examining the attitudes of Ashkenazim and Mizrahim regarding the tension between them (which this year, as in past surveys, was rated the least severe of all), we found that both groups ranked this point of friction in last place.

A breakdown of the responses of Arab interviewees by religion produced intriguing results: Among Muslims, the level of tension between Jews and Arabs was seen as the highest by a clear margin, with tensions between religious and secular Jews lagging far behind in second place. Among Christian Arabs as well, Jewish-Arab tensions were seen as the most severe, but to a lesser degree than among Muslim respondents, and followed almost immediately by tensions between religious and secular Jews. Surprisingly, Jewish-Arab tensions even topped the list among the Druze, the "brothers in arms" of Jewish Israelis, garnering a slightly greater share than among Christians; close behind was the tension between religious and secular Jews.

A breakdown by voting patterns in the 2015 Knesset elections found that among voters for the Joint List there was a much larger spread between the different points of tension: the greatest share of respondents (32%) characterized the tension between religious and secular Jews as the strongest, while the remaining responses were distributed among the other options. Among voters for the other parties, the majority (57%) clustered around Jewish-Arab tensions.

We revisited the question of whether respondents would be willing to pay higher taxes if the monies would be used to narrow Israel's socioeconomic gaps. Among both Jewish and Arab interviewees, a (small) majority of 53% and 58%, respectively, rejected this notion. The proportions who responded this way in 2018 are very similar to those in 2014.

Are there some groups who are more willing than others to pay higher taxes in order to help narrow the gaps? Analyzing the results by income level, we found that a majority in all income groups are unwilling to increase their tax burden; however, those with above-average incomes are more willing to do so than are those with average or below-average incomes (above average, 47% are willing; average, 40%; below average, 40%). A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation revealed much greater differences. On the Left, the majority are willing to pay higher taxes, as opposed to a minority from the Center and Right, which is an apt reflection of the divergent worldviews of the different camps on social and economic issues, and suggests a correspondence between respondents' opinions in the political-security and the socioeconomic spheres.

**Figure 6.3 ** Willingness to pay higher taxes to narrow socioeconomic gaps, by political orientation (willing; Jewish respondents, %)

Despite the fact that, among Jewish interviewees, the tension between Jews and Arabs "lost" its first-place ranking this year in favor of Right-Left tensions (as stated, Arab interviewees still consider Jewish-Arab tension to be the most severe), there is no question that it remains a highly influential factor in Israeli society and politics. For this reason, we will be devoting special attention to relations between Jews and Arabs for the remainder of this chapter.

What is the current state of Jewish-Arab relations in Israel? The data from this year's survey show a very similar distribution of responses in the Jewish and Arab samples, with "so-so" being the prevailing assessment in both. Nonetheless, and not for the first time, the share of Arab respondents who describe relations as "good" or "very good" is greater than the corresponding proportion among Jewish respondents.

**Figure 6.4 ** Relations between Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel
(Jewish and Arab respondents; %)

A comparison with the 2017 findings shows consistency on this question among both Jews and
Arabs, with Jewish respondents offering a slightly more favorable assessment this year.

Table 6.4 (Jewish and Arab respondents; %)

Jewish-Arab relations in Israel today		Good or very good	So-so	Bad or very bad	Don't know	Total
Jews	2017	16	51	31	2	100
	2018	19	53	27	1	100
Arabs	2017	30	42	27	1	100
	2018	30	44	26	0	100

Breaking down the responses of the Jewish sample by political orientation—the variable most
relevant to this question—we found almost complete consensus among the three political
camps: In all cases, the majority hold that relations between the two populations are "so-so,"
with only a minority characterizing them as "good" or "very good." Once again, on the Right
specifically, the minority who take a favorable view of the state of relations is greater than the
corresponding share among Center and Left respondents.

Table 6.5 (Jewish respondents; %)

Jewish-Arab relations in Israel today	Good or very good	So-so	Bad or very bad	Don't know	Total
Right	21	51	27	1	100
Center	18	55	26	1	100
Left	13	56	31	–	100

Among the more striking conclusions in the report that we published last year, *A Conditional Partnership: Jews and Arabs, Israel 2017*, was that the Arab public is very interested in integrating into Israeli society, despite its strong reservations concerning the attitude of the Israeli government toward it and the ability of Arab citizens of Israel to express their Palestinian national identity. In the same survey, many Jewish interviewees offered differing opinions on this question, casting doubt, for example, on the possibility of being loyal simultaneously to both Israel and the Palestinian nation. In the present survey, we asked the interviewees if they agree or disagree with the statement that most Arab citizens of Israel wish to integrate into Israeli society and be part of it. The findings indicate that an almost identical majority of Jewish and Arab interviewees (roughly two-thirds) agree with this assertion.

Figure 6.5 \ "Most Arab citizens of Israel want to integrate into Israeli society and be part of it" (agree; Jewish and Arab respondents; %)

We attempted to examine which subgroups in the Jewish public contained particularly large shares of respondents who do **not** believe that Arab citizens wish to integrate into Israeli society. In fact, a breakdown by political orientation found that this is a minority view in all three camps, though sizeable differences emerged in the size of this minority (Right, 42%; Center, 22%; Left, 11%). In a breakdown by religiosity, the group with the largest minority who do not believe that Arab Israelis wish to integrate are the Haredim (45.5%), and the group with the smallest such minority are the secular respondents (22%). The remainder fall somewhere in between.

Are there differences between subgroups in the Arab public? A breakdown by religion shows most of the respondents agreeing that Arabs wish to integrate; however, this majority is largest among Christian respondents (77%), compared with 68% among Druze and 63% among Muslims. Breaking down the results by voting patterns in the 2015 Knesset elections once again yielded a majority who agree in both groups, though this majority was much smaller among voters for the Joint List (61%) than voters for other parties (82%). A breakdown by level of education showed a majority of high school graduates and those with full or partial academic degrees agree that there is a desire among Arabs to integrate (76% and 69%, respectively), as opposed to a minority among those with elementary or partial high school education (47%). A breakdown by age showed a majority in all three cohorts, but of different sizes: the youngest age group was the least inclined to agree with the assertion, perhaps because of less contact with the Jewish public (due to their age): in the 18–34 age group, 59% agree that Arabs wish to integrate; in the 35–54 cohort, 73%; and among those aged 55 and over, 64%.

While a majority of the Jewish sample hold that Arab citizens of Israel wish to integrate into Israeli society, as shown above, we nevertheless wished to know if Arabs are seen by the Jewish interviewees as a security threat. We found a majority (58%) of Jewish respondents who disagree with the view that Arab citizens pose a threat to Israel's security—virtually the same proportion as in previous surveys (55% in 2015, and 57% in 2016).

Which are the subgroups in the Jewish public who are the most inclined to see Arab citizens of Israel as a security threat? As shown in the figure below, breaking down the results by political orientation shows a clear majority on the Right who hold this view, while a breakdown by religiosity reveals that a majority (of different sizes) among the Haredi, national religious, and traditional religious respondents share this opinion.

Figure 6.6 \ "Israel's Arab citizens pose a threat to the country's security" (agree; Jewish respondents; by political orientation and religiosity; %)

A breakdown of responses in the Jewish sample by age indicates that the share who agree with the statement that Arabs pose a security threat declines in inverse proportion to age. In other words, the youngest cohort shows a greater tendency to view Arab citizens of Israel as a security risk (51%) than does the oldest one (32%), with the intermediate age group falling somewhere in the middle.

To conclude this chapter, we present a pair of identical questions on the relative status of two subgroups discussed above: Mizrahi Jewish citizens and Arab citizens. We asked: "Is the situation of Mizrahim in Israel today better than, worse than, or similar to that of Ashkenazim?" and: "Is the situation of Arab citizens in Israel today better than, worse than, or similar to that of Jewish citizens of Israel?" (A similar question was also posted on the relative status of women and men, to be discussed in Chapter 8.)

Our findings were quite surprising. With regard to the status of Ashkenazim and Mizrahim in Israel today, we found a sizeable majority of the Jewish sample (64%) who feel that the situation of the two groups is similar. Among Arab respondents, a plurality (though not a majority, at 38%) share this assessment. A breakdown of the responses in the Jewish sample by ethnic affiliation shows that, among those who define themselves as Mizrahi, 34% feel that the situation of Mizrahim in Israel is worse than that of Ashkenazim; by contrast, of those who define themselves as Ashkenazim, only 12.5% share this perspective.

When comparing the status of Jews and Arabs, we found an almost identical majority among both Arab and Jewish interviewees who hold that the situation of Arab citizens of Israel is worse than that of Jewish citizens (51% and 50.5%, respectively). Which members of the Jewish public disagreed with the assertion that the situation of Arabs in Israel is worse than that of Jews? A breakdown by religiosity shows that only among secular Jews is there a substantial majority (65%) who feel that the situation of Arabs in Israel today is somewhat or much worse than that of Jews. In all the other subgroups, we found a minority of varying proportions who take this view: Haredim, 34%; national religious, 32%; traditional religious, 36%; and traditional non-religious, 48%. Breaking down the results by political orientation yielded even greater differences: On the Right, only 33% feel that the situation of Arab citizens of Israel today is worse than that of Jewish citizens; in the Center, 63%; and on the Left, 84%.

Chapter 7 \ Democracy and Culture

The topics discussed in this chapter are:

- State funding of culture, and the state's right to influence cultural content
- Types of culture that should be funded by the state, and who should decide
- Impact of works of art and culture on political views
- Denial of state funding of culture for those sharply critical of the government

In recent years, the role of culture and the arts in the democratic sphere, and the appropriate degree of government involvement in this area, have captured headlines in Israel and around the world. In Israel, the Minister of Culture and Sports (and her supporters) and large segments of the artistic community have taken up opposing positions on this issue. For the most part, opinions on this subject in Israel break along Left-Right lines, despite the fact that there is not necessarily an intrinsic connection between the two. In any event, we decided to include several questions in this year's survey that address the link between culture and the arts, on the one hand, and the state and the democratic system, on the other.

We began by asking about patterns of cultural consumption in Israel.

Cultural consumption

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We asked: "Have you attended an exhibition \ museum \ concert \ play \ film during the last year?" As shown in the figure below, consumption of the forms of culture listed in the question is very common among Jews, with only a minority reporting that they had not attended any such events during the past year. By contrast, among the Arab public, the level of consumption of these types of culture is low; in fact, roughly one-half of the Arab interviewees had not availed themselves of such cultural events at all during the last year.

**Figure 7.1 ** Cultural consumption during the past year (Jewish and Arab respondents; %)

Cultural consumption is obviously shaped by a range of factors, including the type of cultural fare being offered, income, education, and community attitudes, and this is corroborated by our data. A breakdown by income shows that in the Jewish sample, 27% of those with below-average incomes stated that they had not consumed any of these forms of culture during the last year, compared with 14% of those with average incomes, and only 9% of those with above-average earnings. Examining the responses by level of education in the same sample, we found that 45.5% of those with elementary or partial high school education had not consumed culture of this type, as contrasted with 23% of those with a full high school or other secondary education, and 8.5% of those with full or partial higher education.

A breakdown of the findings based on religiosity shows that, among Haredim, 58% had not consumed culture of the types listed in the past year, as compared with 22% of the national religious, 16% of the traditional religious, 10% of the traditional non-religious, and 9% of the secular respondents. Breaking down the data by political orientation, we found that 22% of those who placed themselves on the Right stated that they had not consumed any of the types of culture enumerated in the question over the past year, versus 13% in the Center and only 6% on the Left.

In the Arab sample, we found sizeable differences in the breakdown by religion: A majority of Muslims (51%) reported that they had not consumed culture of this type during the last year, as opposed to 41% of Christians and 38% of Druze. A breakdown by level of education showed a majority among those with elementary (51%) or high school (53%) education who had not

consumed these forms of culture in the last year, compared with a minority (37%) of those with full or partial higher education.

The second question in this context addressed the necessity of state funding of culture, both for artists and for cultural products.

We asked: "Since the state budget is limited, do you feel that the government should or should not fund/subsidize cultural activities?" It seems that Jewish and Arab interviewees alike favor state funding for culture and the arts virtually across the board.

**Figure 7.2 ** Should the state fund culture and the arts? (total sample; %)

Legend:
- Certain it should
- Think it should
- Think it should not
- Certain it should not
- Don't know

Values shown: 8, 6, 1, 31, 54

Who thinks that the state should not fund or subsidize culture and the arts? Apart from the Haredi respondents, one-third of whom are opposed to such funding, we did not find a substantial minority among any group in the Jewish or Arab samples who do not support state funding of culture and the arts.

Another question that has arisen as part of the public debate on this issue is whether providing funding grants the state the right to interfere in artistic and cultural content. Our respondents were divided on this, with a slight preference for the view that financing does not buy the right to intervene.

**Figure 7.3 ** Should state funding of culture and the arts grant it the right to influence artistic content? (total sample; %)

Who, then, does believe that government funding should grant the state the right to influence cultural content? A breakdown by religiosity shows that only the secular respondents are largely opposed (72%) to allowing the state such influence in exchange for funding. In all the other subgroups, the majority support such intervention on the part of the state (Haredim, 56%; national religious, 79%; traditional religious, 58%; traditional non-religious, 50%). Breaking down the findings by political orientation shows a majority of two-thirds on the Right in favor of making funding contingent on the ability to influence content. Among respondents from the Center and Left, the majority take the opposite view (69% and 88%, respectively).

We broke down the responses of the Jewish sample by cultural consumption as well, based on the parameter of the earlier question—that is, the number of times the respondents had attended a play, exhibition, concert, or film in the previous year. Among those who had not attended any cultural events, those who had attended on one or two occasions, and those who had attended 3–5 times in the past year, a majority felt that if the state provides funding, then it has the right to get involved in content. By contrast, among those who had attended cultural events of the type above 6 or more times in the previous year, less than one-third shared this view.

Among Arab interviewees, a majority held that if the state pays, it has the right to influence content. However, before we draw any far-reaching conclusions from these findings, the issue should be reexamined, since a bitter struggle took place only recently between certain entities in Arab society and the Ministry of Culture and Sports over this very question, with the former arguing that such a linkage is patently undemocratic.

As part of the public debate over state funding of culture, the question has also arisen of which types of culture and art the state should finance. We asked: "The budget for culture and the arts is also limited. In your opinion, how should it be allocated? Who should receive more?" The two main response options were: "Give more to types of art and culture that are considered 'highbrow,' even though only a small number of people are interested in them"; and "Give more to types of art and culture that are considered 'popular,' which many people are interested in." In both the Jewish and Arab samples, the greatest share supported allocating more to popular culture.

Figure 7.4 \\ Which types of culture and art should the state fund? (total sample; %)

- High culture
- Popular culture
- Both equally
- Neither of them
- Don't know

We broke down the preferences of the Jewish interviewees by a number of sociodemographic and political variables. As shown below, only among respondents on the Left is there a preference for funding more "highbrow" forms of culture. In all the remaining subgroups, the clear preference is for supporting popular culture.

Table 7.1 (Jewish respondents; %)

		"Highbrow" culture	Popular culture	Both equally
Education	Elementary or partial high school	30	50	12
	Full high school or other secondary education	21	55	16
	Higher education	31	37.5	23

		"Highbrow" culture	Popular culture	Both equally
Income	Below average	27	49	17
	Average	27	43	21
	Above average	28	42	22.5
Age	18–34	26	52	16.5
	35–54	26	43	22
	55+	30	39	22
Political orientation	Right	25	53	14
	Center	28	39	23
	Left	33	29	32
Religiosity	Haredim	29.5	51	8
	National religious	29	49	14
	Traditional religious	21	52	19
	Traditional non-religious	26	50	18
	Secular	28	38	25

A breakdown of the responses in the Arab sample by level of education shows that, among those with elementary or high school education, a small majority express a preference for popular culture, while among those with higher education, this preference is held by a plurality, though not a majority.

We also broke down the responses to this question by cultural consumption, again based on the parameter of the earlier question, that is, the number of times the respondents had attended an exhibition, play, concert, or film in the previous year. We found that in all groups in the total sample—those who had not attended at all, and those who had attended 1–2, 3–5, or 6 or more times in the past year—the preference was for funding popular culture, though among those who had attended cultural events 6 or more times, a considerable minority were nonetheless in favor of having most state funding go to "highbrow" culture.

Since, as stated, the majority of respondents agree that the state should finance cultural and artistic activities, and since there is not a consensus as to which activities it should support, we wished to know who should determine which activities and institutions are given state funding. As shown in the figure below, among Jews the greatest proportion favors decision-making by representatives of various groups within Israeli society, whereas among Arabs, the preference is for the artists themselves to decide. Nearly one-half of the Arab respondents expressed no opinion on this subject.

**Figure 7.5 ** Who should determine which cultural and artistic activities receive support from the state? (Jewish and Arab respondents; %)*

Legend:
- Artists or relevant experts
- Representatives of various population groups
- Minister of Culture
- Ministry of Finance officials
- Don't know/Other

*   Since more than one option could be chosen, the total exceeds 100%.

We examined the responses to this question by political orientation as well. On the Right, the greatest share (41%) hold that the recipients of funding should be determined by the Minister of Culture. The Center is split (40% and 40%) between those who feel that the decision should be made by representatives of different groups and those who believe it should rest with the artists themselves or their representatives. On the Left, a plurality (48%) hold that the artists or their representatives should be the ones to decide how to allocate cultural funding.

What effect do cultural activities and works of art have on people's opinions? It appears that a majority of respondents in our survey believe that art and culture can in fact alter political views.

**Figure 7.6 ** Effect of cultural activities and works of art on people's political opinions (total sample; %)

We did not find any real differences between subgroups on this question.

The question of whether it is appropriate to "penalize" artists or cultural institutions that harshly criticize the state has recently been the subject of impassioned debate in Israel. Our survey findings indicate that public opinion on this issue is divided, with a slight inclination in favor of such a move (51% versus 46%).

Which groups in fact agree with the notion of reducing state funding for artists or institutions that are strongly critical of the state?

**Figure 7.7 ** Reduction in funding for artists or institutions sharply critical of the state (support; Jewish respondents, by political orientation; %)

Cutting funding to institutions or artists sharply critical of the state

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A breakdown of the responses in the Jewish sample by religiosity shows that the secular respondents are the only group where there is not a majority who feel that it is justified to reduce state support in such cases (the greatest proportion of supporters for such a cut is found among the national religious, at 77%). Breaking down the results by political orientation yields a majority in favor of such reductions among those who locate themselves on the Right (69%, as opposed to 35% in the Center and only 10% on the Left). And what of the voters for the various parties? As shown in the table below, among those who voted for the coalition parties, a majority favor such "penalization," whereas among those who voted for the opposition parties, only a minority support it.

Table 7.2 (agree; Jewish respondents; %)

Vote in 2015 Knesset elections		Agree that funding should be cut for artists or institutions sharply critical of the state
Coalition parties	Yisrael Beytenu	**90**
	United Torah Judaism	**84**
	Shas	**80**
	Jewish Home	**76.5**
	Likud	**64**
	Kulanu	**59**
	Yesh Atid	**34**
Opposition parties	Zionist Union	**20**
	Meretz	**2**

Chapter 8 \ Women in Israel

The topics discussed in this chapter are:

- The status of women in Israel as compared with that of men
- Greater representation of women in political bodies
- Expansion of the roles available to women in the IDF
- Equal pay for women and men

The #MeToo movement propelled the issue of relations between the sexes[12] and gender power relations into the spotlight this year, in Israel and elsewhere. Accordingly, we decided to include in our survey several questions on the subject of women and their status in Israeli democracy. As in the past, we found almost no real differences this year between the views of men and women on political and social issues in general; however, on this topic specifically, there were noticeable differences based on sex, though in most of the questions below (apart from the first), the distribution of responses showed similar patterns, and differed only in degree.

The first question that we posed related to the extent of equality between men and women in Israel, as perceived by the respondents.

The prevailing opinion in the Israeli public today is that the status of women in Israel is somewhat or much worse than that of men. Only about one-quarter of the respondents hold that women enjoy better standing than men, and roughly one-third believe that the two groups hold similar status.

Status of women in Israel compared with that of men

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12 To forestall any reservations about the use of the term "sex" rather than "gender" (which is commonly used today, often incorrectly), let us note that the word "sex" relates to the biological distinction between men and women, whereas the word "gender" relates to differences in social functioning on the basis of this biological distinction.

**Figure 8.1 ** Status of women in Israel compared with that of men
(total sample; %)

On the whole, the responses point to greater awareness in the Jewish than in the Arab public of women's lesser status compared with that of men. An analysis of the responses in the Jewish sample based on sex yielded a substantial difference: Only a minority of men view the status of women in Israel today as worse than that of men, whereas a majority of women take this view. Breaking down the results by religiosity, we found that only among the secular respondents is there a majority who feel that women's standing is lower than that of men. What is more, the higher the level of religious observance, the smaller the proportion who hold that the status of women is worse than that of men. The variable of age did not affect the responses to this question. By contrast, education was found to have an influence, with a clear distinction between those with a low level of education (only a small share of whom feel that women have lesser standing in Israel today than men) and those with intermediate or higher education (for whom this is the most frequent response, though not by a majority).

In the Arab sample, we did not find a systematic pattern in most of the variables, although women, to a slightly greater extent than men, hold that the status of women in Israeli society is worse. When the results are broken down by religion, the Druze emerge as the most likely to feel this way. We found further that the older groups show a greater tendency than the youngest cohort to view the standing of women as lower than that of men. Education was not proven to exert a consistent influence in this area.

Table 8.1 (Jewish and Arab respondents; %)

Status of women in Israel today is somewhat or much worse than that of men			Agree
Jews	Sex	Women	52
		Men	35
	Religiosity	Haredim	15
		National religious	32
		Traditional religious	37
		Traditional non-religious	46
		Secular	54
	Age	18–34	40.5
		35–54	45
		55+	45
	Education	Elementary or partial high school	20
		Full high school or secondary school	41
		Higher education	49
Arabs	Sex	Women	23
		Men	25.5
	Religion	Muslim	24.5
		Christian	14
		Druze	32

➤

Status of women in Israel today is somewhat or much worse than that of men			Agree
Arabs	**Education**	Elementary or partial high school	**22.5**
		Full high school or secondary school	**17**
		Higher education	**34**
	Age	18–34	**18**
		35–54	**28**
		55+	**28**

The second question on this topic dealt with encouraging greater representation of women in political bodies.

We asked the interviewees to indicate whether they agree or disagree with the following statement: "The state should encourage greater representation of women in political bodies; for example, by making party funding contingent on suitable representation of women on the party's electoral slate." Among Jewish respondents, a majority agreed with this assertion, while among Arab interviewees, a majority disagreed with it.

Making party funding contingent on suitable representation of women on the party's slate

**Figure 8.2 ** Linking party funding with suitable representation of women on electoral slates (agree; Jewish and Arab respondents; %)

A breakdown of the responses in the Jewish sample reveals that a majority of both men and women support making party funding dependent on suitable representation of women; however, the majority among female interviewees clearly outstrips that among the men. Analyzing by religiosity, we found the Haredi respondents to be the only subgroup with a majority opposed to linking party funding with representation of women (as we know, there has never been a woman candidate on any of the Haredi party slates for the Knesset). At the same time, the fact that roughly one-fifth of Haredi respondents did agree with the statement cannot be ignored.

As for the effect of age, a rise in age was found to be coupled with a higher proportion in favor of making funding contingent on appropriate representation. This finding does not necessarily indicate the emergence of a more conservative outlook among younger respondents in general, as it may stem from the greater proportion of secular Jews in the older age groups in Israel, or conversely, the higher share of Haredim and national religious in the youngest cohort. With regard to education, the differences between the various subgroups, all of which favored linking party funding with equal representation, were negligible.

In the Arab sample, we did not find a difference between men and women on this question. Breaking down the responses by religion revealed that, among Christians and Druze, a majority support making party funding dependent on ensuring suitable representation while among Muslims, only a minority agree with this stance. Surprisingly, both of the younger age groups were less in favor than the oldest cohort when it came to encouraging women's representation. Here too, the variable of education was not consistently influential.

Table 8.2 (agree; Jewish and Arab respondents; %)

Party funding should be linked to suitable representation of women on electoral slates			Agree
Jews	**Sex**	Women	**73**
		Men	**60**
	Religiosity	Haredim	**22**
		National religious	**52**
		Traditional religious	**77**
		Traditional non-religious	**80**
		Secular	**74**
	Age	18–34	**62**
		35–54	**67**
		55+	**72.5**
	Education	Elementary or partial high school	**64**
		Full high school or secondary school	**69**
		Higher education	**67**
Arabs	**Sex**	Women	**38**
		Men	**37**
	Religion	Muslim	**30**
		Christian	**64**
		Druze	**50**

Party funding should be linked to suitable representation of women on electoral slates		Agree
Arabs	**Education**	Elementary or partial high school	**33**
		Full high school or secondary school	**43**
		Higher education	**36**
	Age	18–34	**32**
		35–54	**35**
		55+	**47**
	Vote in 2015 Knesset election	Joint List	**33**
		Other parties	**59**

The debate over mixed-sex units in the IDF, which reached new heights this year, also encompassed the issue of making more military roles open to women. We asked the interviewees if they agree or disagree with the statement: "The IDF's current policy of expanding the range of roles available to women soldiers is correct." A substantial majority of Jewish respondents, and roughly one-half of Arab interviewees (for whom the subject holds little relevance), agreed with the policy of expanding roles for women.

Expanding the range of roles for women in the IDF

Question 10

**Figure 8.3 ** Expanding the range of roles for women in the IDF (agree; Jewish respondents, by religiosity; %)

Breaking down the responses of the Jewish sample by sex, we found that a majority of men and women alike favor a policy of greater roles for women, though the majority among women respondents is slightly higher. We analyzed the findings further, on the basis of religiosity: As shown in the preceding figure, both Haredi and national religious interviewees are opposed to expanding women's roles in the IDF, while both of the traditional groups as well as the secular respondents support such a move by a clear majority. Analyzing the results by age yields a majority in all three cohorts, a finding that rises with age. A breakdown of the findings by education—a variable known to have a marked impact on attitudes toward the status of women in society—was also found to be influential in this case, though not to a large extent: In all three subgroups, a majority approved of the expansion policy, with respondents with a higher level of education expressing slightly greater support.

Table 8.3 (agree; Jewish respondents; %)

Policy of expanding women's roles in the IDF is correct		Agree
Sex	Women	76
	Men	71
Religiosity	Haredim	11
	National religious	38
	Traditional religious	78
	Traditional non-religious	87
	Secular	91
Age	18–34	64
	35–54	74
	55+	82.5
Education	Elementary or partial high school	67
	Full high school or secondary school	72
	Higher education	76

The final question to be addressed here relates to the issue of equal pay.

We wished to know whether the Israeli public favors enacting a law requiring equal pay for men and women who do the same work. Among Jewish interviewees, we found a large majority who favor equal pay, but among Arab respondents, only a minority would make it obligatory.

Law mandating equal pay for men and women?

Question 39

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**Figure 8.4 ** Law mandating equal pay for men and women? (support; Jewish and Arab respondents; %)

Since an unequivocal majority of the Jewish public favor equal pay, there is no need to analyze these findings by subgroup; however, it should be noted that while 77% of male respondents would back such a law, among women the support is almost unanimous, at 95%. In the Arab sample, we found a sizeable difference on the basis of religion: Some 33% of Muslims and 39% of Druze support a law mandating equal pay, whereas among Christians, a majority of 55% are in favor. Once again, education was not found to have a consistent impact. Paradoxically, Arab women are less inclined than Arab men to support a law dictating equal pay for equal work (32% and 40.5%, respectively).

Appendix 1
Israeli Democracy: An International Comparison

This year's international comparison, based on 13 indicators published by six research institutes around the world, is divided into four sections: democratic rights and freedoms, democratic process, governance, and corruption. The indicators were examined from three perspectives: Israel's ranking relative to all other countries; Israel's ranking relative to other OECD states; and Israel's (normalized) scores for 2018 compared with those in previous years.

Table A-1.1 \ International Indicators

	Indicator	Institution and Publication
Democratic rights and freedoms	Political rights	Freedom House Freedom in the World
	Civil liberties	Freedom House Freedom in the World
	Freedom of the press	Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index
Democratic process	Voice and accountability	World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators
	Political participation	Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index
	Egalitarian democracy	V-Dem Institute Varieties of Democracy
	Participatory democracy	V-Dem Institute Varieties of Democracy
	Deliberative democracy	V-Dem Institute Varieties of Democracy
	Democratic political culture	Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index

	Indicator	Institution and Publication
Governance	Functioning of government	Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index
	Rule of law	World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators
Corruption	Control of corruption	World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators
	Perception of corruption	Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index

Countries studied, and method of comparison

Each institution compiled its own list of countries for assessment, with the number of countries ranging from 167 to 209. To create a common frame of reference, Israel's comparative ranking in each of the indicators is presented in percentile form. A high percentile indicates a good ranking in terms of quality of democracy, and a low percentile, a poor one.

We wish to note the following points: First, a change in a particular country's ranking in a given year does not necessarily correspond with a change in that country's score. Thus, a country can receive the same score for two or more consecutive years but can rise or fall in its position relative to other countries. In other words, if the scores of other countries improve, a given country can drop in its comparative ranking even if its score remains unchanged. And conversely, if many other countries experience a decline in their scores, a country can rise in the rankings even if its democratic performance has not improved.

And second, when we note the indicators for a certain year, we are referring to the year in which they were published, though in most cases these are based on data from the previous year. This being the case, the 2018 indicators generally reflect performance in 2017.

Israel's comparative ranking in 2018

In comparison with last year, Israel's ranking improved in four indicators, dropped in four others, and remained the same in five indicators.

Table A-1.2 \ Israel's ranking in the 2018 indicators compared with other countries

Indicator	2018 ranking	2018 percentile	2017 ranking	2017 percentile	Change
Political rights	**46–54** (out of 209)	**74–78**	**49–57** (out of 209)	**73–77**	⌃
Civil liberties	**83–85** (out of 209)	**59–60**	**79–82** (out of 209)	**61–62**	⌄
Freedom of the press	**87** (out of 180)	**52**	**91** (out of 180)	**49**	⌃
Voice and accountability	**58** (out of 204)	**72**	**58** (out of 204)	**72**	=
Political participation	**2–4** (out of 167)	**98–99**	**2–4** (out of 167)	**98–99**	=
Egalitarian democracy	**52–53** (out of 178)	**70–71**	**51–52** (out of 178)	**71**	=
Participatory democracy	**56–59** (out of 178)	**67–69**	**60–67** (out of 178)	**62–66**	⌃
Deliberative democracy	**67–68** (out of 178)	**62**	**65–67** (out of 178)	**62–63**	=
Democratic political culture	**18–26** (out of 167)	**84–89**	**19–22** (out of 167)	**85–89**	=
Functioning of government	**27–31** (out of 167)	**82–84**	**27–29** (out of 167)	**83–84**	=
Rule of law	**40** (out of 209)	**81**	**33** (out of 209)	**84**	⌄
Control of corruption	**39** (out of 209)	**81**	**44** (out of 209)	**79**	⌃
Perception of corruption	**32** (out of 180)	**82**	**28** (out of 180)	**84**	⌄

⌃   Improvement in Israel's ranking compared with 2017

=   No change in Israel's ranking compared with 2017

⌄   Decline in Israel's ranking compared with 2017

International indicators: Description and sources

Freedom House

The Freedom House research institute has been publishing its annual *Freedom in the World* report since 1972. The report presents scores on a variety of political rights and civil liberties in 209 countries around the globe. The data for our comparative chapter were drawn from *Freedom in the World 2018: Democracy in Crisis*.

The political rights indicator is divided into three principal components: functioning of government, electoral process, and political pluralism and participation. The scores in this indicator range from 0 (absence of political rights) to 40 (full political rights). Israel's score in this indicator remains unchanged from last year, at 36.

The civil liberties indicator, which incorporates 15 criteria, is based on a scale of 0 to 60. The indicator is divided into 7 groupings, ranging from 1 (representing the greatest degree of freedom) to 7 (the smallest degree of freedom). Israel's score this year dipped from 44 to 43—dropping it from the second to the third group—though it is still classified as a free country.

Economist Intelligence Unit

Each year, the Economist Intelligence Unit (a division of the *Economist* weekly) publishes a global *Democracy Index*, assessing the level of democracy in 167 countries around the world. The *Index* consists of five categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; functioning of government; political participation; and democratic political culture. In the comparative chapter, we note Israel's scores in three of the five areas: political participation, democratic political culture, and functioning of government.

The political participation indicator is based on a scale of 0 to 10 (with 0 representing a low rate of political participation, and 10, a high rate). Israel's score this year, as in the 2017 *Index*, was very high, at 8.89.

The democratic political culture indicator uses scores ranging from 0 to 10 (where 0 symbolizes an undemocratic political culture, and 10, a democratic one). Israel's score this year, as in all the assessments since 2007, was 7.5.

The functioning of government indicator is similarly based on a scale of 0 to 10 (with 0 representing poor functioning, and 10, high functioning of government). Israel's score this year, as last year, was 7.5.

World Bank

The World Bank publishes annual comparative data on 178 countries. Its *Worldwide Governance Indicators* examine six aspects of governance: voice and accountability, political stability and lack of violence/terrorism, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. This year, we present data in three of these parameters: voice and accountability,

rule of law, and control of corruption. The most recent figures were published on the World Bank site in September 2017.

The scores for voice and accountability range from −2.5 to 2.5, with a higher score indicating a greater degree of representation. Israel's score rose slightly over last year in this category, from 0.74 to 0.77.

Likewise, the rule of law indicator is presented on a scale of −2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to greater confidence in the rule of law. Israel was rated at 1.02 this year, a decline from last year's score of 1.16.

Control of corruption is also measured on a scale of −2.5 to 2.5, with the higher score denoting a greater incidence of corruption, and a lower score, the opposite. Israel's score this year rose from 0.94 to 1.06.

V-Dem Institute

The *Annual Democracy Report* of the V-Dem (Varieties of Democracy) Institute focuses on five key principles of democracy in 178 countries: respect for liberal values; electoral representation; equality; participation; and deliberation. In our report, we cite figures on the egalitarian, participatory, and deliberative aspects of democracy.

In the Egalitarian Component Index, the scores range from 0 (no equality at all) to 1 (full democratic egalitarianism). Israel's rating was 0.747 this year, a slight drop from last year's score of 0.766.

The Participatory Component Index is similarly based on a scale of 0 to 1, with a higher score indicating a stronger participatory democracy and vice versa. Israel's score this year is 0.593, showing a slight increase over last year's score of 0.582.

The Deliberative Component Index also ranges from 0 (low extent of deliberative democracy) to 1 (high extent). Israel's score dropped this year from 0.791 to 0.762.

Transparency International

The acknowledged leader in the world's fight against corruption in all forms is Transparency International. The organization's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) is a composite assessment drawing on 13 international surveys from a variety of independent institutions specializing in governance and business-climate analysis. The CPI compares the extent of corruption in 180 countries worldwide using a scale of 0 to 100. The higher the score, the lower the perceived incidence of corruption. Israel's score this year of 62 represents a slight drop from last year's rating of 64.

Reporters Without Borders

Reporters Without Borders is an international NGO established in 1985 to defend global freedom of information and freedom of the press, in part through continuous monitoring of attacks on these freedoms around the world. Each year, the organization publishes the *World Press Freedom Index*, offering data on freedom of the press in 180 countries. Country scores are made up of two components: quantitative data on abuses and acts of violence against journalists during the past year, and qualitative data based on the responses of experts to a questionnaire on a range of subjects such as media independence, relevant legislation, and the existing infrastructure for journalistic work.

The scores range from 0 (full freedom of the press) to 100 (complete lack of press freedom). Israel's score this year was 30.26, marking a slight improvement over 2017 (31.01).

Appendix 2

Questionnaire and Distribution of Responses
(Total Sample, Jews and Arabs; %)

1. How would you characterize Israel's overall situation today?

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
Very good	17.1	18.2	11.6
Good	35.8	37.4	27.7
So-so	29.6	29.3	31.2
Bad	8.4	7.3	13.9
Very bad	7.7	6.7	12.7
Don't know / refuse	1.4	1.1	2.9
Total	100	100	100

■ Throughout the survey, this response was recorded if the respondent replied "I don't know," or was unwilling to select one of the options offered.

■ In certain cases, this value was rounded up by 0.1% in order to bring the total to 100%.

2. And what about your personal situation?

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
Very good	33.6	33.7	33.1
Good	46.3	49.3	31.4
So-so	17.1	14.7	29.1
Bad	1.2	0.8	3.5
Very bad	1.4	1.2	2.9
Don't know / refuse	0.4	0.3	—
Total	100	100	100

3. How proud are you to be an Israeli?

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
Very much	55.5	63.8	13.4
Quite a lot	26.1	23.8	37.2
Not so much	9.6	8.6	14.5
Not at all	6.7	2.5	27.9
Don't know / refuse	2.1	1.3	7.0
Total	100	100	100

4. How would you rate Israel's democracy in the state's 70th anniversary year (where 1 = very bad and 5 = very good)**?**

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
1 – Very bad	17.7	14.2	35.7
2	12.9	12.3	15.8
3	32.7	32.5	33.9
4	23.3	26.7	5.8
5 – Very good	13.0	13.8	8.8
Don't know / refuse	0.4	0.5	—
Total	100	100	100
Mean rating (1–5)	**3.0**	**3.1**	**2.4**

5. Do you feel that relations between Israel's Jewish and Arab citizens today are:

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
Very good	3.4	2.9	5.8
Good	17.0	15.7	23.7
So-so	51.7	53.3	43.9
Bad	18.7	18.8	18.5
Very bad	8.2	8.3	7.5
Don't know / refuse	1.0	1.0	0.6
Total	100	100	100

6. To what extent do you trust each of the following individuals or institutions?

Total Sample

		Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know / refuse	Total
6.1	The media	28.5	39.9	24.8	6.0	0.8	100
6.2	The Supreme Court	19.5	25.6	26.3	25.4	3.2	100
6.3	The police	18.0	34.1	34.4	12.2	1.3	100
6.4	The President of Israel	15.6	19.1	24.0	37.3	4.0	100
6.5	The Knesset	24.3	46.8	22.5	5.0	1.4	100
6.6	The IDF	10.5	11.1	25.6	52.2	0.6	100
6.7	The government	29.4	39.1	21.8	8.7	1.0	100
6.8	The political parties	30.7	48.8	13.7	2.2	4.6	100
6.9	The Attorney General	20.5	29.6	30.5	11.8	7.6	100
6.10	Your municipality or local authority	18.1	27.6	35.5	17.6	1.2	100

Jews

		Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know / refuse	Total
6.1	The media	26.2	39.8	27.5	5.6	0.9	100
6.2	The Supreme Court	18.0	24.1	27.6	27.3	3.0	100
6.3	The police	12.3	34.2	39.2	13.1	1.2	100
6.4	The President of Israel	10.2	17.2	25.7	42.5	4.4	100
6.5	The Knesset	19.5	49.3	24.8	5.1	1.3	100
6.6	The IDF	2.5	7.7	28.2	61.2	0.4	100
6.7	The government	24.9	40.6	24.3	9.3	0.9	100
6.8	The political parties	26.6	52.0	14.3	2.0	5.1	100
6.9	The Attorney General	14.8	29.7	33.8	13.1	8.6	100
6.10	Your municipality or local authority	12.0	27.0	39.8	19.9	1.3	100

Arabs

		Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know / refuse	Total
6.1	The media	40.0	40.5	11.1	7.4	1.0	100
6.2	The Supreme Court	27.5	33.3	19.9	15.8	3.5	100
6.3	The police	46.2	33.5	10.4	7.5	2.4	100
6.4	The President of Israel	43.0	28.5	15.1	11.0	2.4	100
6.5	The Knesset	48.8	34.3	11.0	4.7	1.2	100
6.6	The IDF	50.3	28.3	12.7	6.9	1.8	100
6.7	The government	52.0	31.6	9.4	5.3	1.7	100
6.8	The political parties	51.6	32.6	11.1	3.7	1.0	100
6.9	The Attorney General	48.8	29.1	14.0	5.2	2.9	100
6.10	Your municipality or local authority	48.8	30.2	14.0	5.8	1.2	100

7. Israel is defined as a Jewish and democratic state. Do you feel there is a good balance today between the Jewish and the democratic components?

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
There is a good balance between the two components	27.8	30.0	16.9
The Jewish component is too dominant	45.5	39.3	76.7
The democratic component is too dominant	20.9	24.1	4.7
Don't know / refuse	5.8	6.6	1.7
Total	100	100	100

8. (Jewish respondents) Which component should be the dominant one, in your opinion?

	Jews
Jewish	26.4
Democratic	34.6
Both equally	38.3
Don't know / refuse	0.7
Total	100

9. If elections were held in the near future, would you vote again for the same party as in the last elections (in 2015), or would you vote for a different party?

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
I'm certain I'd vote for the same party	40.3	42.5	28.9
I think I'd vote for the same party	17.0	14.4	30.1
I think I'd vote for a different party	11.3	11.5	10.4
I'm certain I'd vote for a different party	15.7	17.2	8.1
I didn't vote in the last elections (in 2015)	6.6	4.7	16.2
Don't know / haven't decided who I would vote for / refuse	9.1	9.7	6.3
Total	100	100	100

10–16: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

10. The IDF's current policy of expanding the range of roles available to women soldiers is correct.

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
Strongly agree	46.6	52.7	15.7
Somewhat agree	22.3	20.7	30.2
Somewhat disagree	13.7	10.2	31.4
Strongly disagree	13.7	14.2	11.6
Don't know / refuse	3.7	2.2	11.1
Total	100	100	100

11. Current efforts to uncover corruption in Israel are excessive, and are damaging the country.

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
Strongly agree	22.3	24.6	10.5
Somewhat agree	20.0	16.9	35.7
Somewhat disagree	18.4	14.8	36.3
Strongly disagree	38.5	42.7	17.0
Don't know / refuse	0.8	1.0	0.5
Total	100	100	100

12. Israel is not a true democracy because a few wealthy individuals influence the government to make decisions that benefit them and harm the average citizen.

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
Strongly agree	25.5	26.5	20.3
Somewhat agree	28.8	27.5	35.5
Somewhat disagree	27.1	25.8	33.7
Strongly disagree	17.5	19.1	9.3
Don't know / refuse	1.1	1.1	1.2
Total	100	100	100

13. On the whole, most Knesset members work hard and are doing a good job.

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
Strongly agree	9.6	9.4	10.5
Somewhat agree	32.2	33.4	26.3
Somewhat disagree	34.0	32.0	44.4
Strongly disagree	22.3	23.7	15.2
Don't know / refuse	1.9	1.5	3.6
Total	100	100	100

14. Israeli media portray the situation here as much worse than it really is.

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
Strongly agree	28.1	31.2	12.8
Somewhat agree	25.5	26.6	19.8
Somewhat disagree	25.4	21.3	45.9
Strongly disagree	18.7	18.6	19.2
Don't know/ refuse	2.3	2.3	2.3
Total	100	100	100

15. (Jewish respondents) **People who are unwilling to affirm that Israel is the nation-state of the Jewish people should lose their right to vote.**

	Jews
Strongly agree	35.3
Somewhat agree	12.0
Somewhat disagree	15.3
Strongly disagree	35.4
Don't know / refuse	2.0
Total	100

16. (Jewish respondents) **Jewish citizens of Israel should have greater rights than non-Jewish citizens.**

	Jews
Strongly agree	16.1
Somewhat agree	10.6
Somewhat disagree	18.3
Strongly disagree	53.6
Don't know/ refuse	1.4
Total	100

17. How would you rate Israel's leadership in terms of corruption
(where 1 = very corrupt and 5 = not at all corrupt)**?**

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
1 – Very corrupt	28.1	24.4	46.5
2	18.8	18.1	22.7
3	32.3	34.2	22.7
4	12.6	14.5	2.9
5 – Not at all corrupt	6.0	6.6	2.9
Don't know / refuse	2.2	2.2	2.3
Total	100	100	100
Mean rating (1–5)	2.5	2.6	1.9

18. Is the situation of Arab citizens in Israel today better than, worse than, or similar to that of Jewish citizens of Israel?

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
Much better than that of Jewish citizens	10.0	10.5	7.5
Somewhat better than that of Jewish citizens	11.3	8.2	27.2
Similar to that of Jewish citizens	26.2	28.7	13.9
Somewhat worse than that of Jewish citizens	32.4	32.5	31.8
Much worse than that of Jewish citizens	18.2	18.0	19.1
Don't know / refuse	1.9	2.1	0.5
Total	100	100	100

19. How would you rate the level of solidarity (sense of "togetherness") **of Jewish society in Israel** (where 1 = no solidarity at all and 10 = high level of solidarity)**?**

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
1 – No solidarity at all	7.3	5.4	16.8
2	5.5	4.9	8.1
3	10.1	9.1	15.0
4	7.4	6.1	13.9
5	18.7	19.8	13.3
6	10.9	11.4	8.1
7	16.9	18.7	7.5
8	13.8	15.6	4.6
9	3.5	3.6	3.5
10 – High level of solidarity	5.5	4.9	8.1
Don't know / refuse	0.4	0.5	1.1
Total	100	100	100
Mean rating (1–10)	5.6	5.7	4.5

20–24: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

20. Most Arab citizens of Israel want to integrate into Israeli society and be part of it.

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
Strongly agree	23.9	24.2	22.7
Somewhat agree	43.2	43.2	43.6
Somewhat disagree	20.9	19.8	26.7
Strongly disagree	10.4	11.0	7.0
Don't know / refuse	1.6	1.8	—
Total	100	100	100

21. The Supreme Court should be denied the authority to nullify laws passed by Knesset members, who were elected by the country's citizens.

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
Strongly agree	22.2	25.1	7.6
Somewhat agree	18.3	14.6	37.2
Somewhat disagree	20.1	16.3	39.0
Strongly disagree	35.7	40.2	13.4
Don't know / refuse	3.7	3.8	2.8
Total	100	100	100

22. The state should encourage greater representation of women in political bodies; for example, by making party funding contingent on suitable representation of women on the party's electoral slate.

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
Strongly agree	37.6	41.7	16.9
Somewhat agree	24.6	25.3	20.9
Somewhat disagree	20.0	14.3	48.8
Strongly disagree	16.4	17.1	12.8
Don't know / refuse	1.4	1.6	0.6
Total	100	100	100

23. (Jewish respondents) Decisions crucial to the state on issues of peace and security should be made by a Jewish majority.

	Jews
Strongly agree	52.3
Somewhat agree	21.9
Somewhat disagree	10.9
Strongly disagree	12.7
Don't know / refuse	2.2
Total	100

24. (Jewish respondents) Decisions crucial to the state regarding governance, economy, or society should be made by a Jewish majority.

	Jews
Strongly agree	35.5
Somewhat agree	23.8
Somewhat disagree	18.1
Strongly disagree	21.2
Don't know / refuse	1.4
Total	100

25. For many years, the following were considered to be the major focal points of tension in Israeli society. How would you characterize the level of tension between these groups today?

25.1 Mizrahim and Ashkenazim

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
High	21.6	21.1	24.4
Moderate	44.0	43.5	46.5
Low	31.3	33.7	19.2
No tension at all*	1.5	1.5	1.7
Don't know / refuse	1.6	0.2	8.2
Total	100	100	100

*   This option was not read out to interviewees, but was recorded when given in response to the question.

25.2 Religious and secular Jews

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
High	54.4	57.5	38.4
Moderate	33.6	32.8	37.8
Low	10.9	9.2	19.2
No tension at all*	0.5	0.3	1.2
Don't know / refuse	0.6	0.2	3.4
Total	100	100	100

25.3 Right and Left (on foreign policy and national security issues)

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
High	65.0	71.5	32.6
Moderate	25.2	22.3	39.5
Low	8.2	5.6	20.9
No tension at all*	0.4	0.1	1.7
Don't know / refuse	1.2	0.5	5.3
Total	100	100	100

25.4 Rich and poor

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
High	39.0	41.4	27.3
Moderate	40.5	39.3	46.5
Low	15.7	14.7	20.3
No tension at all*	2.5	2.4	2.9
Don't know / refuse	2.3	2.2	3.0
Total	100	100	100

25.5 Jews and Arabs

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
High	52.5	55.9	35.3
Moderate	39.2	38.2	43.9
Low	7.1	4.8	18.5
No tension at all*	0.5	0.2	1.7
Don't know / refuse	0.7	0.9	0.6
Total	100	100	100

26. In your opinion, which groups have the highest level of tension between them?*

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
Mizrahim and Ashkenazim	5.5	3.5	15.7
Religious and secular Jews	24.8	24.4	26.7
Right and Left (on foreign policy and national security issues)	31.9	35.8	12.2
Rich and poor	5.3	6.1	1.2
Jews and Arabs	30.3	27.9	42.4
Don't know / refuse	2.2	2.3	1.8
Total	100	100	100

*   For this question, the response pairs were presented to the interviewees in random order so as to avoid creating a bias toward a specific option.

27. How interested are you in politics?

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
Very much	23.5	24.7	17.4
Quite a lot	40.2	43.0	25.6
Not so much	26.2	25.4	30.2
Not at all	9.9	6.8	25.6
Don't know / refuse	0.2	0.1	1.2
Total	100	100	100

28. To what extent are you and your friends able to influence government policy?

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
Very much	4.7	5.1	2.9
Quite a lot	15.1	13.0	25.4
Not so much	43.5	47.4	24.3
Not at all	35.1	32.8	46.2
Don't know / refuse	1.6	1.7	1.2
Total	100	100	100

29. Is the situation of Mizrahim in Israel today better than, worse than, or similar to that of Ashkenazim?

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
Much better than that of Ashkenazim	6.4	6.1	8.1
Somewhat better than that of Ashkenazim	7.9	5.4	20.3
Similar to that of Ashkenazim	59.8	64.1	37.8
Somewhat worse than that of Ashkenazim	18.3	17.1	24.4
Much worse than that of Ashkenazim	4.1	4.0	4.7
Don't know / refuse	3.5	3.2	4.7
Total	100	100	100

30. Would you agree or disagree to pay higher taxes if the revenues would be used to narrow Israel's socioeconomic gaps?

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
Yes, I would agree	42.6	43.3	39.0
No, I would not agree	53.8	52.7	59.3
Depends on extent of increase*	1.1	1.2	0.6
Don't know / refuse	2.5	2.8	1.1
Total	100	100	100

* This option was not read out to interviewees, but was recorded when given in response to the question.

31. If someone close to you (a family member or close friend) was considering going into politics, what would you advise them to do?

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
Strongly advise in favor	14.0	15.0	8.8
Advise in favor	27.1	24.8	39.2
Advise against	17.4	18.0	14.6
Strongly advise against	34.6	34.7	33.9
Don't know / refuse	6.9	7.5	3.5
Total	100	100	100

32. Is the status of women in Israel today better than, worse than, or similar to that of men?

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
Much better than that of men	9.2	8.5	12.6
Somewhat better than that of men	15.2	12.4	29.3
Similar to that of men	32.9	33.5	29.9
Somewhat worse than that of men	29.7	32.1	17.8
Much worse than that of men	10.8	11.5	7.5
Don't know / refuse	2.2	2.0	2.9
Total	100	100	100

33. Have you done one or more of the following during the past year?*

	Percentage who engaged in each activity		
	Total Sample	**Jews**	**Arabs**
Tried to persuade a family member or friend to agree with your views on a political issue	**32.1**	**35.5**	**15.3**
Signed a political petition	**21.0**	**23.0**	**10.5**
Attended a demonstration	**15.2**	**15.7**	**12.6**
Participated in a political discussion online, or wrote a letter to the editor on a political topic	**14.7**	**15.7**	**9.5**
Participated in a parlor meeting at which a politician was present	**9.0**	**9.5**	**6.3**
Participated in an activity of the political party that you belong to or support	**7.5**	**6.8**	**11.1**
None of the above	**49.6**	**44.9**	**73.2**
Don't know / refuse	**0.5**	**0.6**	–
Total who engaged in any activity	**49.9**	**54.5**	**26.8**

*   Since more than one choice can be noted, the total may be greater than 100%.

34–39: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

34. The regime in Israel is also democratic for Arab citizens.

	Total Sample	**Jews**	**Arabs**
Strongly agree	**34.7**	**40.3**	**6.4**
Somewhat agree	**34.1**	**35.7**	**26.2**
Somewhat disagree	**19.2**	**15.1**	**40.1**
Strongly disagree	**10.8**	**7.6**	**26.7**
Don't know / refuse	**1.2**	**1.3**	**0.6**
Total	**100**	**100**	**100**

35.1 (Jewish respondents) **In order to preserve Jewish identity, it is better for Jews and Arabs in Israel to live separately.**

	Jews
Strongly agree	**24.4**
Somewhat agree	**18.8**
Somewhat disagree	**24.4**
Strongly disagree	**28.7**
Don't know / refuse	**3.7**
Total	**100**

35.2 (Arab respondents) **In order to preserve Arab identity, it is better for Jews and Arabs in Israel to live separately.**

	Arabs
Strongly agree	**3.0**
Somewhat agree	**26.6**
Somewhat disagree	**45.6**
Strongly disagree	**24.9**
Don't know / refuse	**–**
Total	**100**

36. (Jewish respondents) **Israel's Arab citizens pose a threat to the country's security.**

	Jews
Strongly agree	**18.9**
Somewhat agree	**21.7**
Somewhat disagree	**33.8**
Strongly disagree	**23.8**
Don't know / refuse	**1.8**
Total	**100**

37. (Arab respondents) Israel has the right to be defined as the nation-state of the Jewish people.

	Arabs
Strongly agree	3.6
Somewhat agree	26.0
Somewhat disagree	42.0
Strongly disagree	27.2
Don't know / refuse	1.2
Total	100

38. Public figures sometimes have to circumvent laws and regulations and "cut corners" in order to effectively advance issues of national importance.

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
Strongly agree	15.2	17.4	4.1
Somewhat agree	26.4	25.9	29.1
Somewhat disagree	23.9	20.0	43.6
Strongly disagree	32.4	34.5	21.5
Don't know / refuse	2.1	2.2	1.7
Total	100	100	100

39. A law should be passed requiring that men and women receive equal pay for equal work.

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
Strongly agree	66.8	76.5	17.5
Somewhat agree	11.4	9.8	19.9
Somewhat disagree	12.5	5.5	48.0
Strongly disagree	8.8	7.6	14.6
Don't know / refuse	0.5	0.6	–
Total	100	100	100

40. Someone who testifies about corruption among those around him, and assists a police investigation, is an "informer."

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
Strongly agree	7.9	8.5	4.6
Somewhat agree	9.7	7.9	18.5
Somewhat disagree	19.1	13.7	46.2
Strongly disagree	61.2	67.4	30.1
Don't know / refuse	2.1	2.5	0.6
Total	100	100	100

41. What do you consider most important in a political figure?

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
Ability to get things done	24.4	21.5	38.7
Keeping promises to voters	19.3	16.6	32.9
Incorruptibility	37.8	40.5	24.3
Ideology	13.6	16.0	1.7
Other / more than one	3.3	3.7	1.2
Don't know / refuse	1.6	1.7	1.2
Total	100	100	100

42–45: To what extent do you see the following actions as corrupt (where 1 = not at all corrupt and 4 = very corrupt)?

42. Paying a "fixer" to cut through red tape at a government ministry

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
Not at all corrupt	4.0	4.3	2.9
Not so corrupt	13.7	10.5	30.2
Quite corrupt	23.5	23.6	23.3
Very corrupt	57.8	60.6	43.6
Don't know / refuse	1.0	1.0	–
Total	100	100	100

43. Asking a friend for a favor to speed things up at a government ministry

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
Not at all corrupt	10.6	12.2	2.3
Not so corrupt	26.5	25.5	31.4
Quite corrupt	31.1	31.2	30.8
Very corrupt	31.0	30.1	35.5
Don't know / refuse	0.8	1.0	–
Total	100	100	100

44. An elected official accepting a modest gift as a token of gratitude for helping advance a matter that's under his jurisdiction

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
Not at all corrupt	12.8	14.2	5.8
Not so corrupt	19.5	18.2	26.3
Quite corrupt	27.6	26.0	35.7
Very corrupt	38.4	39.8	31.0
Don't know / refuse	1.7	1.8	1.2
Total	100	100	100

45. Actions by an elected official aimed at benefiting his constituents, even at the expense of the greater public good

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
Not at all corrupt	8.7	9.7	4.1
Not so corrupt	13.4	13.5	13.4
Quite corrupt	28.7	25.5	44.8
Very corrupt	47.9	50.1	37.2
Don't know / refuse	1.3	1.2	0.5
Total	100	100	100

46. Which of these statements do you agree with more strongly?

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
The many recent investigations and indictments involving corruption indicate the weakness of Israeli democracy	40.5	32.6	80.8
The many recent investigations and indictments involving corruption in fact indicate the strength of Israeli democracy	52.3	59.4	16.3
Don't know / refuse	7.2	8.0	2.9
Total	100	100	100

47–49: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

47. Better a leader who sometimes sidesteps laws and regulations and "cuts corners" but succeeds in advancing important national matters than a leader who's straight as an arrow and breaks no laws or regulations but is unable to advance such matters effectively.

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
Strongly agree	26.1	29.0	11.0
Somewhat agree	25.8	25.0	29.7
Somewhat disagree	22.1	18.1	42.4
Strongly disagree	21.0	22.4	14.0
Don't know / refuse	5.0	5.5	2.9
Total	100	100	100

48. To get to the top in Israeli politics, you have to be corrupt.

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
Strongly agree	16.3	18.5	4.7
Somewhat agree	20.9	19.9	25.7
Somewhat disagree	26.1	20.6	53.8
Strongly disagree	35.1	39.2	14.0
Don't know / refuse	1.6	1.8	1.8
Total	100	100	100

49. The democratic system in Israel is in grave danger.*

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
Strongly agree	22.5	17.0	50.0
Somewhat agree	23.3	24.0	20.0
Somewhat disagree	25.2	28.8	7.0
Strongly disagree	24.5	25.0	22.0
Don't know / refuse	4.5	5.2	1.0
Total	100	100	100

*   The responses shown here are from an identical question that was asked in the May 2018 Peace Index survey.

50. In investigations of suspected corruption in Israel, do you feel that all suspects receive the same treatment from law enforcement authorities?

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
I'm certain everyone receives the same treatment	9.9	9.9	9.9
I think everyone receives the same treatment	23.3	20.7	36.3
I think everyone does not receive the same treatment	30.1	32.8	16.4
I'm certain everyone does not receive the same treatment	30.0	28.9	35.7
Don't know / refuse	6.7	7.7	1.7
Total	100	100	100

51. Have you personally ever encountered an instance of corruption?

	Total Sample	**Jews**	**Arabs**
Never	**61.2**	**61.7**	**58.5**
Rarely	**25.8**	**24.9**	**30.4**
Quite often	**8.6**	**8.6**	**8.2**
Very often	**3.1**	**3.2**	**2.3**
Don't know / refuse	**1.3**	**1.6**	**0.6**
Total	**100**	**100**	**100**

52. How would you rate each of the following institutions in terms of corruption (where 1 = no corruption and 4 = a great deal of corruption)?

52.1 The IDF

	Total Sample	**Jews**	**Arabs**
No corruption	**30.4**	**34.5**	**9.4**
Little corruption	**43.0**	**46.5**	**25.3**
Quite a lot of corruption	**14.7**	**11.5**	**31.2**
A great deal of corruption	**7.9**	**4.4**	**25.9**
Don't know / refuse	**4.0**	**3.1**	**8.2**
Total	**100**	**100**	**100**

52.2 The Supreme Court

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
No corruption	33.8	37.5	15.1
Little corruption	27.4	28.2	23.8
Quite a lot of corruption	18.1	14.1	38.4
A great deal of corruption	16.5	16.2	18.0
Don't know / refuse	4.1	4.0	4.7
Total	100	100	100

52.3 The government

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
No corruption	5.3	4.9	7.0
Little corruption	20.7	20.5	21.5
Quite a lot of corruption	35.5	34.5	40.7
A great deal of corruption	36.1	37.7	27.9
Don't know / refuse	2.4	2.4	2.9
Total	100	100	100

52.4 The Knesset

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
No corruption	5.7	5.3	7.6
Little corruption	26.3	27.4	20.9
Quite a lot of corruption	37.7	37.4	39.0
A great deal of corruption	28.0	27.8	29.1
Don't know / refuse	2.3	2.1	3.4
Total	100	100	100

52.5 The media

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
No corruption	8.3	8.7	5.8
Little corruption	30.8	32.3	23.3
Quite a lot of corruption	28.6	26.1	41.3
A great deal of corruption	29.7	30.3	26.7
Don't know / refuse	2.6	2.6	2.9
Total	100	100	100

52.6 Municipalities

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
No corruption	4.8	4.8	4.7
Little corruption	23.4	23.6	22.1
Quite a lot of corruption	36.5	35.8	40.1
A great deal of corruption	32.7	33.2	30.2
Don't know / refuse	2.6	2.6	2.9
Total	100	100	100

52.7 (Jewish respondents) Chief Rabbinate; (Muslim and Druze respondents) Shari'a court; (Christian respondents) canonical court / church law

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
No corruption	10.3	10.2	10.5
Little corruption	18.2	17.4	22.1
Quite a lot of corruption	24.7	21.7	39.5
A great deal of corruption	40.9	44.5	22.7
Don't know / refuse	5.9	6.2	5.2
Total	100	100	100

52.8 The police

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
No corruption	11.4	12.1	8.1
Little corruption	39.3	42.9	20.9
Quite a lot of corruption	29.3	27.6	37.8
A great deal of corruption	16.8	14.1	30.2
Don't know / refuse	3.2	3.3	3.0
Total	100	100	100

53. Will the investigations taking place now decrease, increase, or not affect the likelihood that you will vote for a given party even if its leaders are suspected of corruption?

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
Will not affect	37.6	43.0	10.0
Will decrease	42.1	43.0	37.4
Will increase	16.2	9.6	49.5
Don't know / refuse	4.1	4.4	3.1
Total	100	100	100

54. In your opinion, what is the most effective way to fight government corruption?

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
Increasing the penalties for people tried and found guilty of corruption	50.6	49.9	54.1
Encouraging the public to report acts of corruption by protecting informants properly	18.4	15.3	34.3
Making clear what is and is not permissible for people in public office	14.7	15.7	9.9
Exposing irregularities in public institutions via the media	11.0	12.8	1.7
Don't know / refuse	5.3	6.3	–
Total	100	100	100

55. Since the state budget is limited, do you feel that the government should or should not fund/subsidize cultural activities?

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
I'm certain it should	53.9	53.7	54.7
I think it should	30.9	31.3	29.1
I think it should not	7.8	7.0	11.6
I'm certain it should not	6.2	6.9	2.9
Don't know / refuse	1.2	1.0	1.7
Total	100	100	100

56. If the state provides funding for artistic and cultural activities and institutions, should it also have a say in their artistic content?

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
I'm certain it should	25.9	24.1	35.5
I think it should	22.2	20.0	33.1
I think it should not	18.9	19.9	14.0
I'm certain it should not	31.3	34.3	16.3
Don't know / refuse	1.7	1.7	1.1
Total	100	100	100

57. If it is decided that the state will participate in funding cultural activities and institutions, who should determine which ones it should support?*

	Percentage who noted each entity		
	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
Artists, or experts in the relevant field	30.4	29.5	34.2
Representatives of various population groups	37.5	39.5	28.4
Minister of Culture	26.3	27.5	21.1
Ministry of Finance officials	4.3	2.5	12.6
Other(s)	3.0	3.6	–
Don't know / refuse	11.0	2.9	46.8
Total	112.4	105.5	143.2

*   Since more than one choice can be noted, the total may be greater than 100%.

58. The budget for culture and the arts is also limited. In your opinion, how should it be allocated? Who should receive more?

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
Give more to types of art and culture that are considered "highbrow," even though only a small number of people are interested in them	28.1	27.3	32.4
Give more to types of art and culture that are considered "popular," which many people are interested in	45.5	44.4	50.9
Give both equal funding*	19.1	20.3	13.3
Don't fund either of them*	1.6	1.7	1.2
Don't know / refuse	5.7	6.3	2.2
Total	100	100	100

*   This option was not read out to interviewees, but was recorded when given in response to the question.

59. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: State funding should be withdrawn or reduced for institutions or artists sharply critical of the state.

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
Strongly agree	32.3	31.5	36.6
Somewhat agree	18.3	16.3	28.5
Somewhat disagree	13.5	14.7	7.6
Strongly disagree	32.1	33.8	23.3
Don't know / refuse	3.8	3.7	4.0
Total	100	100	100

60. In your opinion, can a work of art alter people's political views?

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
I'm certain it can	29.1	26.2	43.6
I think it can	35.1	33.8	41.3
I don't think it can	19.6	22.1	7.0
I'm certain it can't	14.1	15.5	7.0
Don't know / refuse	2.1	2.4	1.1
Total	100	100	100

61. Have you attended an exhibition / a museum / a concert / a play / an Israeli film during the last year? If so, roughly how many times?

	Total Sample	Jews	Arabs
Not at all	22.3	17.3	47.7
1–2 times	18.7	15.4	34.9
3–5 times	27.0	30.1	11.6
6 or more times	30.3	35.4	4.7
Yes, but I don't know how many times*	1.1	1.3	—
Don't know / refuse	0.7	0.6	1.2
Total	100	100	100

*   This option was not read out to interviewees, but was recorded when given in response to the question.

Appendix 3

Distribution of 2018 Survey Results Compared with Previous Years (%)[1]

1. How would you characterize Israel's overall situation today?

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Very good	2.5	2.3	2.8	3.1	3.2	5.3	4.3	5.8	6.4	9.5	9.5	10.7	7.3	7.6	15.1	17.1
Good*	8.6	11.1	16.5	19.4	11.4	23.1	26.9	33.9	21.4	28.6	25.7	33.6	33.9	28.9	32.7	35.8
So-so	26.1	32.9	37.5	38.2	34.3	35.7	38.4	35.2	41.0	40.5	41.1	36.6	38.7	39.9	32.9	29.6
Bad*	24.3	22.7	16.8	18.4	25.0	16.1	17.1	13.8	16.0	11.4	9.8	8.8	9.3	12.2	9.5	8.4
Very bad	38.5	30.6	25.8	20.4	25.2	18.2	12.2	9.8	13.7	8.6	11.8	8.2	8.7	10.7	7.9	7.7
Don't know / refuse	–	0.4	0.6	0.5	0.9	1.6	1.1	1.5	1.5	1.4	2.1	2.1	2.0	0.7	1.8	1.4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Until 2013, the wording was "quite good" and "quite bad."

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1 General notes:
- This comparative analysis presents the distribution of responses from the total sample (with the exception of questions that were presented only to Jews or only to Arabs, and of several questions in which only the responses of Jews are presented), including the category "Don't know / refuse."
- The wording of the questions and the response categories are presented as they appear in the 2018 Democracy Index survey. Where differences exist in wording and in categories between this year's index and previous indexes, or where there are categories that didn't appear in a particular year, this is explained in notes provided below the table.
- In all questions, the category "Don't know / refuse" was not presented as an option to the interviewee but was recorded when the respondent declined to select one of the options presented.
- The acronym "NA" is used to mark a category that was not presented to the respondents that year.

2. And what about your personal situation?

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Very good	19.5	22.6	26.0	31.2	33.6
Good	46.4	52.1	49.4	42.3	46.3
So-so	22.3	19.8	19.8	20.2	17.1
Bad	6.4	3.3	2.5	2.6	1.2
Very bad	3.1	1.5	1.7	2.6	1.4
Don't know / refuse	2.3	0.7	0.6	1.1	0.4
Total	100	100	100	100	100

3. How proud are you to be an Israeli?

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2016	2018
Very much	57.6	48.8	52.1	55.6	46.6	53.0	50.4	56.2	58.1	57.6	56.5	59.8	54.1	55.5
Quite a lot	26.1	28.4	26.7	29.7	28.7	25.1	27.3	23.1	24.6	23.8	20.0	22.0	27.1	26.1
Not so much	9.2	13.7	12.8	8.5	13.9	13.2	12.7	12.7	8.8	9.8	10.5	10.3	11.4	9.6
Not at all	6.9	7.5	7.3	5.6	9.3	6.9	8.0	5.9	7.2	6.8	10.7	5.9	6.1	6.7
Don't know / refuse	0.2	1.6	1.1	0.6	1.5	1.8	1.6	2.1	1.3	2.0	2.3	2.0	1.3	2.1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

5. Do you feel that relations between Israel's Jewish and Arab citizens today are:

	Jews		Arabs	
	2017*	2018	2017*	2018
Very good	2.0	2.9	7.4	5.8
Good	13.7	15.7	22.8	23.7
So-so	50.7	53.3	42.2	43.9
Bad	20.8	18.8	19.4	18.5
Very bad	10.5	8.3	7.8	7.5
Don't know / refuse	2.3	1.0	0.4	0.6
Total	100	100	100	100

* Source: Tamar Herman et al., *Jews and Arabs: A Conditional Partnership, Israel 2017*, Israel Democracy Institute 2017

6. To what extent do you trust each of the following individuals or institutions?

6.1 The media

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Not at all	28.1	23.8	24.3	28.9	26.5	30.4	30.3	34.5	24.4	25.7	25.9	22.4	21.0	29.0	24.7	28.5
Not so much	23.3	24.8	25.2	27.0	27.3	31.9	34.1	30.3	22.8	26.1	24.2	44.4	41.9	46.0	45.9	39.9
Quite a lot	36.8	36.3	35.0	32.6	31.9	28.7	26.7	24.1	37.4	32.3	32.5	23.8	30.2	20.8	23.4	24.8
Very much	11.8	14.7	15.1	11.4	12.5	8.3	7.8	9.7	14.4	14.0	14.8	5.9	5.5	3.3	4.5	6.0
Don't know / refuse	0.1	0.4	0.4	0.1	1.8	0.7	1.1	1.4	1.0	1.9	2.6	3.6	1.4	0.9	1.5	0.8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

6.2 The Supreme Court

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Not at all	16.0	11.4	22.3	15.5	18.4	25.2	23.2	21.6	13.6	10.7	17.7	10.3	12.1	16.1	15.6	19.5
Not so much	13.8	9.1	16.3	15.6	19.1	23.7	17.3	22.0	13.0	12.3	14.4	21.4	19.9	25.1	24.6	25.6
Quite a lot	30.4	27.4	28.6	29.0	28.7	29.1	28.1	27.9	27.3	30.5	28.1	33.5	37.0	33.3	33.0	26.3
Very much	39.4	49.0	31.4	37.5	29.2	18.3	23.1	23.8	41.4	42.9	32.7	27.4	25.4	22.5	23.4	25.4
Don't know / refuse	0.4	3.1	1.4	2.4	4.6	3.7	8.3	4.7	4.7	3.6	7.1	7.4	5.7	3.0	3.4	3.2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

6.3 The police

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Not at all	14.9	15.5	19.1	28.7	30.3	35.6	30.3	23.2	20.5	15.8	18.3	16.8	19.1	16.5	17.0	18.0
Not so much	18.6	18.3	24.6	26.8	27.1	31.1	27.7	33.5	21.8	21.3	19.8	32.4	34.7	42.5	41.0	34.1
Quite a lot	41.6	41.8	36.2	30.7	28.3	23.1	27.2	29.8	38.2	40.0	38.4	35.0	34.2	31.8	32.2	34.4
Very much	24.8	23.6	19.5	12.5	11.9	8.4	10.4	11.5	17.9	20.9	20.6	11.5	8.2	7.9	7.8	12.2
Don't know / refuse	0.1	0.8	0.6	1.3	2.4	1.8	4.4	2.0	1.6	2.0	2.9	4.3	3.8	1.3	2.0	1.3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

6.4 The President of Israel

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Not at all	16.1	12.3	17.6	15.3	54.2	29.6	21.8	14.6	10.8	9.3	13.6	11.8	10.3	15.4	13.1	15.6
Not so much	15.6	12.9	16.9	16.9	20.0	22.4	15.9	14.3	9.8	9.6	10.2	12.8	12.0	20.1	15.6	19.1
Quite a lot	36.1	33.7	29.4	30.3	14.9	24.1	27.4	25.7	21.8	22.5	22.4	30.0	37.3	35.0	34.2	24.0
Very much	31.4	35.5	34.7	33.5	5.6	21.6	30.2	42.3	56.0	56.1	50.6	38.6	32.8	26.4	31.1	37.3
Don't know / refuse	0.8	5.6	1.4	4.0	5.3	2.3	4.7	3.1	1.6	2.5	3.2	6.8	7.5	3.1	6.0	4.0
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

6.5 The Knesset

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Not at all	19.5	24.4	42.2	33.0	32.0	36.2	29.5	25.8	19.7	18.2	20.0	21.5	21.5	24.0	21.3	24.3
Not so much	28.6	28.6	33.5	33.7	33.2	33.9	31.4	34.8	27.3	26.1	24.7	37.9	39.4	47.7	50.6	46.8
Quite a lot	38.2	37.3	20.0	25.3	26.0	22.9	27.1	27.6	43.3	38.4	37.1	27.7	29.3	22.6	22.1	22.5
Very much	13.1	8.5	4.0	7.4	6.2	5.5	8.6	8.8	8.3	14.3	14.8	7.3	6.1	4.0	3.7	5.0
Don't know / refuse	0.6	1.2	0.3	0.6	2.6	1.5	3.4	3.0	1.4	3.0	3.4	5.6	3.6	1.7	2.3	1.4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	

6.6 The IDF

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Not at all	8.8	6.8	8.9	11.2	10.6	13.9	11.3	10.7	7.2	7.1	8.8	5.3	7.7	7.1	6.1	10.5
Not so much	7.6	7.1	7.6	9.6	14.8	15.2	7.5	8.1	5.8	5.8	6.7	9.0	6.0	10.0	10.6	11.1
Quite a lot	23.4	25.1	27.2	24.9	28.8	26.2	22.8	18.7	17.0	20.0	16.6	27.9	27.0	33.9	32.5	25.6
Very much	59.8	59.8	55.7	53.5	43.7	43.9	56.4	60.3	68.8	65.0	65.5	54.5	57.5	47.8	48.4	52.5
Don't know / refuse	0.4	1.2	0.6	0.8	2.1	0.8	1.9	2.2	1.2	1.9	2.4	3.3	1.8	1.2	2.4	0.6
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

6.7 The government

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Not at all	19.9	27.7	26.6	31.2	37.2	41.4	30.7	30.5	22.3	18.0	20.8	20.0	23.8	28.6	28.5	29.4
Not so much	25.4	30.8	30.5	28.8	30.2	32.2	35.4	35.1	25.6	22.5	21.6	39.4	37.0	42.6	41.6	39.1
Quite a lot	40.8	35.3	30.3	29.6	23.6	20.1	24.9	26.4	41.1	41.3	36.5	28.6	28.1	21.2	22.7	21.8
Very much	13.8	4.4	12.1	9.1	6.6	5.0	6.1	6.3	9.9	15.5	17.5	9.1	8.1	6.0	6.2	8.7
Don't know / refuse	0.1	1.8	0.5	1.3	2.4	1.3	2.9	1.7	1.1	2.7	3.6	2.9	3.0	1.6	1.0	1.0
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

6.8 The political parties

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Not at all	34.0	37.8	50.3	41.3	44.1	46.9	35.4	32.6	28.3	31.5	26.2	NA	28.3	30.5	29.7	30.7
Not so much	33.4	34.0	31.6	35.9	32.5	36.1	39.9	39.3	32.7	30.5	30.9	NA	42.3	51.1	49.0	48.8
Quite a lot	28.0	22.8	15.5	19.2	17.5	13.5	16.9	19.8	31.9	28.7	28.6	NA	16.2	12.6	12.9	13.7
Very much	4.3	3.8	2.1	3.2	3.1	1.8	2.7	4.0	3.7	5.4	9.1	NA	2.9	1.3	2.4	2.2
Don't know / refuse	0.3	1.6	0.5	0.4	2.8	1.7	5.1	4.3	3.4	3.9	5.2	NA	10.4	4.5	6.0	4.6
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

6.9 The Attorney General

	2011	2017	2018
Not at all	11.3	17.0	20.5
Not so much	14.1	31.2	29.6
Quite a lot	34.6	32.4	30.5
Very much	29.5	9.6	11.8
Don't know / refuse	10.5	9.8	7.6
Total	100	100	100

6.10 Your municipality or local authority

	2016	2018
Not at all	16.0	18.1
Not so much	31.3	27.6
Quite a lot	38.2	35.5
Very much	13.3	17.6
Don't know / refuse	1.2	1.2
Total	100	100

7. Israel is defined as a Jewish and democratic state. Do you feel there is a good balance today between the Jewish and the democratic components?

	2016	2017	2018
There is a good balance between the two components	26.1	26.7	27.8
The Jewish component is too dominant	45.1	46.6	45.5
The democratic component is too dominant	22.9	20.1	20.9
Don't know / refuse	5.9	6.6	5.8
Total	100	100	100

8. (Jewish respondents) Which component should be the dominant one, in your opinion?

	2017	2018
Jewish	22.7	26.4
Democratic	32.4	34.6
Both equally	43.2	38.3
Don't know / refuse	1.7	0.7
Total	100	100

9. If elections were held in the near future, would you vote again for the same party as in the last elections (in 2015), or would you vote for a different party?

	2017	2018
I'm certain I'd vote for the same party	40.2	40.3
I think I'd vote for the same party	14.0	17.0
I think I'd vote for a different party	11.9	11.3
I'm certain I'd vote for a different party	16.4	15.7
I didn't vote in the last elections (in 2015)	7.1	6.6
Don't know / haven't decided who I would vote for / refuse	10.4	9.1
Total	100	100

12–16: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

12. Israel is not a true democracy because a few wealthy individuals influence the government to make decisions that benefit them and harm the average citizen.

	2014	2017	2018
Strongly agree	32.0	28.7	25.5
Somewhat agree	23.3	28.9	28.8
Somewhat disagree	24.9	21.8	27.1
Strongly disagree	14.5	18.1	17.5
Don't know / refuse	5.3	1.8	1.1
Total	100	100	100

13. On the whole, most Knesset members work hard and are doing a good job.

	2011	2012	2013	2015	2016	2017	2018
Strongly agree	4.4	7.6	19.1	9.6	3.9	4.9	9.6
Somewhat agree	28.7	26.3	26.7	27.1	29.6	24.5	32.2
Somewhat disagree	35.3	30.2	22.7	26.5	35.5	40.8	34.0
Strongly disagree	27.8	31.6	25.4	27.9	28.8	26.9	22.3
Don't know / refuse	3.8	4.3	6.1	8.9	2.0	3.9	1.9
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

14. Israeli media portray the situation here as much worse than it really is.

	2017	2018
Strongly agree	29.5	28.1
Somewhat agree	26.6	25.5
Somewhat disagree	22.1	25.4
Strongly disagree	18.1	18.7
Don't know / refuse	3.7	2.3
Total	100	100

15. (Jewish respondents) **People who are unwilling to affirm that Israel is the nation-state of the Jewish people should lose their right to vote.**

	2016	2017	2018
Strongly agree	31.9	30.0	35.3
Somewhat agree	20.6	14.0	12.0
Somewhat disagree	16.8	16.1	15.3
Strongly disagree	28.6	36.9	35.4
Don't know / refuse	2.1	3.0	2.0
Total	100	100	100

16. (Jewish respondents) **Jewish citizens of Israel should have greater rights than non-Jewish citizens.**

	2009	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Strongly agree	20.6	32.9	19.8	12.6	16.4	26.6	16.1
Somewhat agree	15.3	16.0	15.2	12.8	12.5	13.6	10.6
Somewhat disagree	19.4	14.8	20.9	22.5	21.5	23.2	18.3
Strongly disagree	42.6	32.5	42.0	48.8	48.7	32.7	53.6
Don't know / refuse	2.1	3.8	2.1	3.3	0.9	3.9	1.4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

*   Source: Tamar Herman et al., *Jews and Arabs: A Conditional Partnership, Israel 2017*, Israel Democracy Institute 2017

17. How would you rate Israel's leadership in terms of corruption
(where 1 = very corrupt and 5 = not at all corrupt)**?**

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
1 – Very corrupt	22.8	28.7	27.0	27.1	28.1
2	19.8	19.1	27.9	22.7	18.8
3	31.4	31.8	30.9	31.2	32.3
4	15.2	11.1	10.0	11.1	12.6
5 – Not at all corrupt	3.2	3.2	2.4	4.5	6.0
Don't know / refuse	6.6	6.1	1.8	3.4	2.2
Total	100	100	100	100	100
Mean rating (1–5)	2.5	2.4	2.3	2.4	2.5

19. How would you rate the level of solidarity (sense of "togetherness") **of Jewish society in Israel** (where 1 = no solidarity at all and 10 = high level of solidarity)**?**

	2011	2012	2014	2018
Mean rating (1–10)	5.8	6.0	6.0	5.6

21–24: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

21. The Supreme Court should be denied the authority to nullify laws passed by Knesset members, who were elected by the country's citizens.

	2004*	**2015****	**2017**	**2018**
Strongly agree	11.4	16.8	21.8	22.2
Somewhat agree	14.7	15.2	14.0	18.3
Neither agree nor disagree	13.7	NA	NA	NA
Somewhat disagree	28.1	15.6	13.8	20.1
Strongly disagree	28.3	40.0	43.9	35.7
Don't know / refuse	3.8	11.9	6.5	3.7
Total	100	100	100	100

*   In 2004, the wording was : "We need to revoke the Supreme Court's authority to rescind laws passed by the Knesset" (five response options).

** In 2015, the wording was: "The Supreme Court's authority to rescind laws passed in the Knesset by the elected representatives of the people should be revoked."

23. (Jewish respondents) Decisions crucial to the state on issues of peace and security should be made by a Jewish majority.

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017*	2018
Strongly agree	38.0	53.6	32.9	41.8	29.1	27.7	45.4	53.6	52.6	47.0	49.8	51.2	45.9	65.8	52.3
Somewhat agree	38.6	28.2	34.3	34.2	36.2	30.9	33.8	29.3	25.2	19.7	24.0	22.4	26.1	15.2	21.9
Somewhat disagree	14.5	9.7	17.8	12.7	17.4	19.5	10.6	9.0	10.8	9.9	10.5	9.7	14.9	7.6	10.9
Strongly disagree	8.2	5.5	13.2	10.0	12.4	16.3	5.8	4.6	9.5	20.0	11.0	11.3	11.7	8.0	12.7
Don't know / refuse	0.7	3.0	1.8	1.3	4.9	5.6	4.4	3.5	1.9	3.4	4.7	5.4	1.4	3.4	2.2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Source 2017: Tamar Herman et al., *Jews and Arabs: A Conditional Partnership, Israel 2017*, Israel Democracy Institute 2017

24. (Jewish respondents) Decisions crucial to the state regarding governance, economy, or society should be made by a Jewish majority.

	2011	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017*	2018
Strongly agree	42.3	37.4	35.3	31.3	32.7	55.2	35.5
Somewhat agree	27.2	19.5	25.8	22.3	24.5	17.4	23.8
Somewhat disagree	16.1	15.7	18.6	22.2	20.9	13.9	18.1
Strongly disagree	13.1	23.4	16.1	18.3	20.1	9.9	21.2
Don't know / refuse	1.3	4.0	4.2	5.9	1.8	3.6	1.4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

*   Source 2017: Tamar Herman et al., *Jews and Arabs: A Conditional Partnership, Israel 2017*, Israel Democracy Institute 2017

25. For many years, the following were considered to be the major focal points of tension in Israeli society. How would you characterize the level of tension between these groups today?

25.1 Mizrahim and Ashkenazim

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2018
High	23.3	29.0	24.5	24.0	24.7	21.6
Moderate*	42.6	38.5	36.1	41.9	42.3	44.0
Low	30.3	23.8	28.6	25.2	27.8	31.3
No tension at all**	NA	2.9	2.7	3.0	1.3	1.5
Don't know / refuse	3.8	5.8	8.1	5.9	3.9	1.6
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

*   In 2012: So-so
**   This option was not read out to interviewees, but was recorded when given in response to the question.

25.2 Religious and secular Jews

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2018
High	59.7	55.7	52.2	47.5	50.4	54.5
Moderate*	28.9	30.6	30.4	37.4	34.6	33.6
Low	9.5	7.9	8.9	11.3	12.2	10.9
No tension at all**	NA	1.9	1.9	0.7	0.7	0.5
Don't know / refuse	1.9	3.9	6.6	3.2	2.1	0.6
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

*   In 2012: So-so
**   This option was not read out to interviewees, but was recorded when given in response to the question.

25.3 Right and Left (on foreign policy and national security issues)

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2018
High	51.8	50.5	45.3	59.7	66.8	65.0
Moderate*	33.3	32.4	32.8	27.7	21.6	25.2
Low	10.5	9.8	12.5	7.1	7.9	8.2
No tension at all**	NA	1.8	1.7	1.1	1.0	0.4
Don't know / refuse	4.4	5.5	7.7	4.4	2.7	1.2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

*   In 2012: So-so
**   This option was not read out to interviewees, but was recorded when given in response to the question.

25.4 Rich and poor

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2018
High	55.7	57.9	54.5	50.6	55.7	39.0
Moderate*	29.4	26.6	25.8	31.6	29.4	40.5
Low	11.9	8.1	11.6	11.8	11.3	15.7
No tension at all**	NA	3.0	2.3	2.4	2.0	2.5
Don't know / refuse	3.0	4.4	5.8	3.7	1.6	2.3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

*   In 2012: So-so
**   This option was not read out to interviewees, but was recorded when given in response to the question.

25.5 Jews and Arabs

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2018
High	70.6	68.0	58.0	67.1	78.4	52.5
Moderate*	21.8	23.8	29.7	25.6	17.4	39.2
Low	5.5	3.2	5.5	3.9	2.6	7.1
No tension at all**	NA	1.3	1.7	0.5	0.8	0.5
Don't know / refuse	2.1	3.7	5.1	2.9	0.8	0.7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

* In 2012: So-so
** This option was not read out to interviewees, but was recorded when given in response to the question.

26. In your opinion, which groups have the highest level of tension between them?

	2012	2015	2016	2018
Mizrahim and Ashkenazim	3.0	3.9	1.4	5.5
Religious and secular Jews	20.3	10.3	10.5	24.8
Right and Left (on foreign policy and national security issues)	8.7	18.4	24.0	31.9
Rich and poor	13.2	12.8	8.0	5.3
Jews and Arabs	47.9	47.0	53.0	30.3
Don't know / no difference between them*	6.9	7.6	3.1	2.2
Total	100	100	100	100

* This option was not read out to interviewees, but was recorded when given in response to the question.

27. How interested are you in politics?

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2018
Very much	36.3	28.6	28.9	35.7	22.6	28.9	23.3	37.7	28.4	31.0	21.6	23.5
Quite a lot	39.8	38.5	41.5	36.5	33.4	37.2	38.3	39.1	38.3	35.1	40.9	40.2
Not so much	17.5	23.3	18.1	18.2	25.6	22.0	24.9	16.0	21.1	20.9	25.1	26.2
Not at all	6.0	9.4	11.4	7.8	16.6	11.3	12.9	7.1	12.0	12.0	11.0	9.9
Don't know / refuse	0.4	0.2	0.1	1.8	1.8	0.6	0.6	0.1	0.2	1.0	1.4	0.2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

*   Until 2013 the categories were: To a large extent, to a certain extent, to a small extent, not at all.

28. To what extent are you and your friends able to influence government policy?

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Very much	4.6	3.8	7.4	6.1	5.7	3.1	3.9	2.9	7.3	9.5	11.3	6.6	4.9	4.1	4.8	4.7
Quite a lot	15.2	13.8	23.4	21.3	17.1	15.4	12.4	16.1	21.1	25.4	23.7	13.5	14.6	12.6	14.5	15.1
Not so much	40.1	32.4	32.3	36.5	30.6	31.2	31.6	31.5	35.3	34.9	28.0	42.2	45.3	45.3	43.1	43.5
Not at all	39.7	35.6	35.6	35.8	43.9	45.6	50.0	46.5	35.3	27.8	33.2	33.5	32.4	36.5	34.7	35.1
Don't know / refuse	0.4	14.4	1.3	0.3	2.7	4.7	2.1	3.0	1.0	2.4	3.8	4.2	2.8	1.5	2.9	1.6
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

*   Until 2013 the categories were: To a large extent, to a certain extent, to a small extent, not at all.

30. Would you agree or disagree to pay higher taxes if the revenues would be used to narrow Israel's socioeconomic gaps?

	2014	2018
Yes, I would agree	35.2	42.6
No, I would not agree	54.8	53.8
Depends on extent of increase*	4.7	1.1
Don't know / refuse	5.3	2.5
Total	100	100

*   This option was not read out to interviewees, but was recorded when given in response to the question.

31. If someone close to you (a family member or close friend) **was considering going into politics, what would you advise them to do?**

	2008	2011	2018
Strongly advise in favor	5.9	8.6	14.0
Advise in favor	18.3	25.3	27.1
Advise against	19.4	25.3	17.4
Strongly advise against	47.5	32.5	34.6
Don't know / refuse	8.9	8.3	6.9
Total	100	100	100

34–37: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

34. The regime in Israel is also democratic for Arab citizens.

	Jews		Arabs	
	2017*	**2018**	**2017***	**2018**
Strongly agree	39.8	40.3	17.0	6.4
Somewhat agree	27.5	35.7	28.0	26.2
Somewhat disagree	19.3	15.1	21.6	40.1
Strongly disagree	9.9	7.6	32.4	26.7
Don't know / refuse	3.5	1.3	1.0	0.6
Total	100	100	100	100

*   Source 2017: Tamar Herman et al., *Jews and Arabs: A Conditional Partnership, Israel 2017*, Israel Democracy Institute 2017

35.1 (Jewish respondents) In order to preserve Jewish identity, it is better for Jews and Arabs in Israel to live separately.

	Jews	
	2017*	**2018**
Strongly agree	35.7	24.4
Somewhat agree	16.6	18.8
Somewhat disagree	20.0	24.4
Strongly disagree	25.0	28.7
Don't know / refuse	2.7	3.7
Total	100	100

*   Source 2017: Tamar Herman et al., *Jews and Arabs: A Conditional Partnership, Israel 2017*, Israel Democracy Institute 2017

35.2 (Arab respondents) **In order to preserve Arab identity, it is better for Jews and Arabs in Israel to live separately.**

	Arabs	
	2017*	**2018**
Strongly agree	12.4	3.0
Somewhat agree	9.6	26.6
Somewhat disagree	12.0	45.6
Strongly disagree	64.6	24.9
Don't know / refuse	1.4	–
Total	100	100

*   Source 2017: Tamar Herman et al., *Jews and Arabs: A Conditional Partnership, Israel 2017*, Israel Democracy Institute 2017

36. (Jewish respondents) **Israel's Arab citizens pose a threat to the country's security.**

	Jews		
	2015	**2016**	**2018**
Strongly agree	18.1	22.2	18.9
Somewhat agree	20.9	21.3	21.7
Somewhat disagree	37.5	35.3	33.8
Strongly disagree	17.1	20.3	23.8
Don't know / refuse	6.4	0.9	1.8
Total	100	100	100

37. (Arab respondents) **Israel has the right to be defined as the nation-state of the Jewish people.**

	Arabs		
	2016	**2017***	**2018**
Strongly agree	3.5	13.8	3.6
Somewhat agree	13.9	12.6	26.0
Somewhat disagree	19.1	8.4	42.0
Strongly disagree	57.4	59.0	27.2
Don't know / refuse	6.1	6.2	1.2
Total	100	100	100

*   Source 2017: Tamar Herman et al., *Jews and Arabs: A Conditional Partnership, Israel 2017*, Israel Democracy Institute 2017

48–49: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

48. To get to the top in Israeli politics, you have to be corrupt.

	2003	**2004**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2018**
Strongly agree	14.5	19.3	21.1	20.5	21.1	15.2	18.3	20.2	16.3
Somewhat agree	24.9	22.9	26.5	22.5	28.1	22.1	24.6	22.9	20.9
Not sure	24.4	16.3	22.5	16.9	17.2	19.1	21.3	16.6	NA
Somewhat disagree	26.6	24.8	16.0	20.0	18.1	19.9	22.4	24.3	26.1
Strongly disagree	8.9	14.9	11.9	17.5	12.2	18.9	10.8	13.6	35.1
Don't know / refuse	0.7	1.8	2.0	2.6	3.3	4.8	2.6	2.4	1.6
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

49. The democratic system in Israel is in grave danger.*

	2017	2018*
Strongly agree	22.9	22.5
Somewhat agree	21.9	23.3
Somewhat disagree	23.3	25.2
Strongly disagree	27.9	24.5
Don't know / refuse	4.0	4.5
Total	100	100

*   The responses shown here are from an identical question that was asked in the May 2018 Peace Index survey.

52. How would you rate each of the following institutions in terms of corruption? (where 1 = no corruption and 4 = a great deal of corruption)

52.1 The IDF

	2005**	2006***	2018
No corruption	33.9	15.6	30.4
Little corruption	28.8	45.9	43.0
Quite a lot of corruption	17.3	14.8	14.7
A great deal of corruption	11.7	10.7	7.9
Don't know / refuse	8.3	13.0	4.0
Total	100	100	100

**   Source: June 2005 Peace Index. Question wording: To what extent do you think each of the following organizations follows the rules of proper administration, meaning it is free from corruption? Answers: To a very large extent it is free from corruption, to a large extent, to a small extent, not at all.

***   Source: August 2006 Peace Index. Question wording: Do you think that there is, or is not, corruption in each of the following institutions? Answers: No corruption, some corruption, a lot of corruption, a great deal of corruption.

52.2 The Supreme Court

	2005**	2006***	2018
No corruption	30.3	21.6	33.8
Little corruption	28.9	30.3	27.4
Quite a lot of corruption	14.9	14.0	18.1
A great deal of corruption	14.4	13.3	16.5
Don't know / refuse	11.5	20.8	4.1
Total	100	100	100

52.3 The government

	2005**	2006***	2018
No corruption	5.3	2.2	5.3
Little corruption	9.9	16.7	20.7
Quite a lot of corruption	29.9	29.4	35.5
A great deal of corruption	46.5	44.2	36.1
Don't know / refuse	8.4	7.5	2.4
Total	100	100	100

52.4 The Knesset

	2005**	2006***	2018
No corruption	4.6	2.2	5.7
Little corruption	10.8	18.1	26.3
Quite a lot of corruption	29.2	29.1	37.7
A great deal of corruption	45.9	41.3	28.0
Don't know / refuse	9.5	8.8	2.3
Total	100	100	100

52.5 The media

	2005**	2006***	2018
No corruption	10.8	17.7	8.3
Little corruption	21.4	30.7	30.8
Quite a lot of corruption	30.7	17.7	28.6
A great deal of corruption	28.5	18.6	29.7
Don't know / refuse	8.6	15.4	2.6
Total	100	100	100

52.6 Municipalities

	2006	2018
No corruption	4.8	4.8
Little corruption	20.3	23.4
Quite a lot of corruption	27.4	36.5
A great deal of corruption	35.4	32.7
Don't know / refuse	12.1	2.6
Total	100	100

52.8 The police

	2005	2018
No corruption	11.5	11.4
Little corruption	25.1	39.3
Quite a lot of corruption	34.5	29.3
A great deal of corruption	21.6	16.8
Don't know / refuse	7.3	3.2
Total	100	100

#. Societies throughout the world are divided into stronger and weaker groups. Which group in Israeli society do you feel you belong to?

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2017	2018
Strong group	21.1	20.2	16.9	21.7	21.4	21.7
Quite strong group	43.8	34.5	41.0	38.0	39.9	51.0
Quite weak group	11.7	21.4	18.5	16.6	18.0	15.8
Weak group	11.7	15.2	12.9	17.7	12.6	6.6
Don't know / refuse	6.1	8.7	10.7	6.0	8.1	4.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Appendix 4

Sociodemographic Breakdown and Self-Definitions

Total Sample (%)

Nationality	Total sample
Jews and others	81.7
Arabs	18.3
Total	100

Social location ("I feel I belong to a weak/strong group in society"), by nationality	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Strong group	21.7	21.2	24.2
Quite strong group	51.0	54.0	35.8
Quite weak group	15.8	13.9	25.3
Weak group	6.6	5.8	11.1
Don't know / refuse to answer	4.9	5.2	3.6
Total	100	100	100

Sex	Total sample
Men	50.0
Women	50.0
Total	100.0

Social location, by sex	Men	Women
Stronger group	74.5	70.8
Weaker group	21.1	23.8
Don't know / refuse to answer	4.4	5.4
Total	100	100

Age	Total sample
18–34	33.1
35–54	34.6
55+	32.2
No response	0.1
Total	100

Social location, by age	18–34	35–54	55+
Stronger group	70.9	75.3	71.0
Weaker group	25.6	19.4	23.0
Don't know / refuse to answer	3.5	5.3	6.0
Total	100	100	100

Education	Total sample
Elementary or partial high school	10.8
Full high school with matriculation certificate, or other secondary education	35.5
Full academic degree or partial higher education (without degree)	52.7
Don't know / refuse to answer	1.0
Total	100

Monthly household income	Total sample
Below average	34.8
Average	25.9
Above average	33.2
Don't know / refuse to answer	6.1
Total	100

Social location, by income	Below average	Average	Above average
Stronger group	60.9	72.9	85.5
Weaker group	34.3	22.7	10.1
Don't know / refuse to answer	4.8	4.4	4.4
Total	100	100	100

Religion	Arabs
Muslim	73.2
Christian	11.6
Druze	12.1
Circassian	0.5
Other / refuse to answer	2.6
Total	100

Religiosity	Jews
Haredi (ultra-Orthodox)	10.3
National religious / Haredi leumi (national ultra-Orthodox)	12.3
Traditional religious	13.4
Traditional non-religious	17.5
Secular	43.9
Other / refuse to answer	2.6
Total	100

Social location, by religiosity (Jews)	Haredi	National religious / Haredi leumi	Traditional religious	Traditional non-religious	Secular
Stronger group	60.3	80.0	72.0	72.5	79.4
Weaker group	33.0	17.2	19.3	21.5	16.9
Don't know / refuse to answer	6.7	2.8	8.7	6.0	3.7
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Religiosity	Arabs
Very religious	7.4
Religious	31.6
Traditional	48.9
Not at all religious	10.0
No response	2.1
Total	100

Ethnic affiliation (self-defined)	Jews
Ashkenazi	36.8
Mizrahi	29.0
Mixed	14.7
Russian / from other FSU state	3.1
Israeli / Jewish / opposed to ethnic classification*	14.3
Other (e.g., Ethiopian, Yemenite, Argentinian)	1.1
Don't know / refuse to answer	1.0
Total	100

*   This option was not read out to interviewees, but was recorded when given in response to the question.

Social location, by ethnic affiliation (Jews)	Ashkenazi	Mizrahi	Russian	Mixed	Israeli/Jewish/ opposed to ethnic classification
Stronger group	77.4	73.8	65.4	72.7	76.9
Weaker group	17.2	22.6	34.6	21.9	16.5
Don't know / refuse to answer	5.4	3.6	—	5.4	6.6
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Political orientation	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Right	24.3	28.4	3.2
Moderate Right	21.2	23.9	7.9
Center	27.0	22.1	52.1
Moderate Left	11.4	12.3	6.8
Left	9.7	8.1	17.9
Don't know / refuse to answer	6.4	5.2	12.1
Total	100	100	100

Social location, by political orientation (Jews)	Right	Center	Left
Stronger group	73.9	78.8	77.6
Weaker group	20.7	17.5	17.8
Don't know / refuse to answer	5.4	3.7	4.6
Total	100	100	100

Voting patterns in 2015 Knesset elections	Jews	Arabs
Likud	21.0	4.7
Zionist Union	12.7	1.1
Yesh Atid	11.2	1.1
Jewish Home	8.0	–
Meretz	5.6	1.1
United Torah Judaism	5.1	–
Kulanu	4.5	0.5
Shas	2.9	–
Other party	1.9	0.5
Yachad	1.6	–
Yisrael Beytenu	1.2	–
Joint (Arab) List	0.1	61.6
Refuse to answer / blank ballot	17.9	11
Didn't vote	6.3	18.4
Total	100	100

Social location, by vote in 2015 Knesset election (total sample)	Stronger group	Weaker group	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Likud	74.3	21.0	4.7	100
Zionist Union	75.7	19.8	4.5	100
Yesh Atid	88.9	7.1	4.0	100
Jewish Home	87.0	11.6	1.4	100
Kulanu	70.0	25.0	5.0	100
Yisrael Beytenu	80.0	20.0	–	100
Meretz	94.1	5.9	–	100
United Torah Judaism	58.1	34.9	7.0	100
Shas	48.0	44.0	8.0	100
Joint (Arab) List	63.6	36.4	–	100

Political orientation of voters in 2015 Knesset elections (Jews)	Right	Moderate Right	Center	Moderate Left	Left	Don't know	Total
Likud	54.8	34.6	7.8	1.1	1.1	0.6	100
Zionist Union	0.9	7.4	38.0	38.0	13.9	1.8	100
Yesh Atid	6.3	26.3	49.5	11.6	2.1	4.2	100
Jewish Home	70.6	25.0	2.9	0.0	0.0	1.5	100
Kulanu	10.5	47.4	31.6	7.9	0.0	2.6	100
Yisrael Beytenu	50.0	30.0	0.0	10.0	0.0	10.0	100
Meretz	2.1	0.0	0.0	37.5	60.4	–	100
United Torah Judaism	37.2	46.5	7.0	2.3	0.0	7.0	100
Shas	60.0	20.0	8.0	4.0	0.0	8.0	100

The Research Team

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The Israel Democracy Institute (IDI) is an independent center of research and action dedicated to strengthening the foundations of Israeli democracy. IDI works to bolster the values and institutions of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. A non-partisan think-and-do tank, the Institute harnesses rigorous applied research to influence policy, legislation and public opinion. The institute partners with political leaders, policymakers, and representatives of civil society to improve the functioning of the government and its institutions, confront security threats while preserving civil liberties, and foster solidarity within Israeli society. The State of Israel recognized the positive impact of IDI's research and recommendations by bestowing upon the Institute its most prestigious award, the Israel Prize for Lifetime Achievement.

The Guttman Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research was established in its current configuration in 1998, when it became a part of IDI. The Guttman Institute was founded in 1949 by Professor Eliyahu (Louis) Guttman and has since enriched the public discourse on thousands of issues by way of rigorous applied and pioneering research methods, enhanced by the unique "continuing survey" that has documented the attitudes of the Israeli public in all aspects of life in over 1,200 studies.

The Israeli Democracy Index is a public opinion poll project conducted by the Guttman Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research. Since 2003, an extensive survey has been conducted annually on a representative sample of Israel's adult population. Each survey presents an estimate of the quality of Israeli democracy for that year.

The project aims to assessing trends in Israeli public opinion regarding realization of democratic values and the performance of government systems and elected officials. Analysis of its results may contribute to a public discussion of the status of democracy in Israel and create a cumulative empirical database to intensify the discourse concerning such issues.