Viterbi Family Center
for Public Opinion
and Policy Research

20 Years of Surveying Democracy in Israel (2003–2022)

THE ISRAELI DEMOCRACY INDEX

2022

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The views expressed in this book do not necessarily reflect those of the Israel Democracy Institute.

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

In Memoriam: Prof. Asher Arian, founder of *The Israeli Democracy Index*

"If a country is already a democracy, how can it become more democratic?"

Robert A. Dahl, *On Democracy*

Asher Arian (1938–2010), one of the leading figures in political science in Israel and among the pioneers of election studies and public opinion research in the country, founded *The Israeli Democracy Index* in 2003 and served as its editor until his death. Prof. Arian spearheaded the incorporation of the Israel Institute of Applied Social Research, established by Prof. Louis Guttman, into the Israel Democracy Institute (IDI), making IDI a major player in the field of public opinion research in Israel. Today, the Viterbi Center is carrying on the work of the former Guttman Institute. Under its leadership, the *Democracy Index* continues to be published annually, along with other important public opinion research projects such as the *Conditional Partnership* series focused on Jewish-Arab relations, and Data Israel, the largest database of its kind in Israel.

In the Introduction to the first *Democracy Index*, published under the aegis of the IDI President's Conference and presented there to the President of Israel, in what has since become an annual tradition, Asher Arian described the raison d'être of the *Index* as follows:

> The *Israeli Democracy Index* project was established to evaluate the quality and functioning of Israeli democracy by collecting quantitative comparative data that are as comprehensive, precise, clear, reliable, and valid as possible. We plan to conduct periodic assessments of the state of democracy in Israel, and to present these findings annually. The Israel Democracy Institute believes that the information presented here can help promote informed, in-depth public discourse about the state of Israeli democracy, and contribute to bolstering, consolidating, and enhancing it.

With the passage of twenty years since the *Index* first appeared, we can safely state that it is fulfilling its mission. Alongside the *Elections in Israel* reports originated by Arian in 1969 (still published today, with Prof. Michal Shamir and Prof. Gideon Rahat as editors), the *Israel Democracy Index* (now led by Prof. Tamar Hermann) is the most enduring public opinion research project in Israel.

The *Democracy Index*, as conceived by Asher Arian, records the pulse of Israeli democracy. He designed it to combine Israel's standing in international indicators that assess various facets of democracy—which he termed the institutional aspect, the rights aspect, and the stability aspect—with a public opinion poll of a representative sample of the Israeli public that examines substantive perceptions of democracy, its institutions, and Israeli society. Reading the *Democracy Index* through the years, and tracking similar questions that have been posed for two decades, highlights the extent to which Arian and his co-authors documented trends in Israeli public opinion in real time regarding democratic values, political participation, and trust in institutions. It is surprising to discover, for example, that as early as 2003 Arian and his colleagues identified low levels of both social trust and solidarity within the Israeli public, in contrast with the myth of a cohesive Israeli society. Twenty years later, Prof. Tamar Hermann and her research team have encountered similar findings. Patterns of political participation have likewise hewed closely to those observed in the first *Democracy Index* reports as well as Prof. Arian's earlier studies, notwithstanding political upheaval over the years: That is to say, the Israeli public is interested in politics, and has a relatively high rate of voter turnout, but does not possess a sense of political efficacy. Similarly, his prescient observation, when the Index was first starting out, that the Israeli public has insufficiently assimilated the values of substantive democracy was, and remains, true.

Asher Arian's passion as a person and a scholar, his sensitivity and his profound grasp of the innermost workings of democracy and public opinion, are reflected in the *Israel Democracy Index* project. Despite the information revolution, emergence of social media, myriad opinion polls, and political shifts that have occurred over the twenty years since it first appeared, the *Index* continues to serve as an accurate barometer of the state of Israeli democracy, faithfully representing the gamut of opinions in Israeli society with all its diversity and divisions.

Principal Findings

Chapter 1: Changes Over Time in Political and Social Self-Definitions of Israelis

- Twenty years of *Democracy Index* surveys show that the opinions of the Israeli public are shaped in large part by several key variables: among Jews, political orientation (Right, Center, Left) and religiosity (Haredi, national religious, traditional religious, traditional non-religious, secular); and among Arabs, religion (Muslim, Christian, Druze) and voting pattern in national elections (for Zionist or [Arab] non-Zionist parties).
- A majority of the Jewish public define themselves as being on the Right (multi-year average, 49.5%). This self-definition has grown even stronger in recent years (2022, 62%). The Center has remained relatively stable over the years, with a multi-year average of 25.4%, while the Left has undergone a decline (multi-year average, 18.6%).
- According to Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics, in the twenty years of this report, there has been virtually no change in the proportion of secular Jews, who constitute the largest group in the Israeli public, though not a majority (roughly 42%). The share of traditional Jews as a whole declined slightly between the first and second decades studied (traditional non-religious, from 24.2% to 21.3%; traditional religious, from 12.7% to 12.1%). Concurrently, we recorded a slight rise in the share of national religious (from 9.3% to 10.4%) and a more substantial increase in the share of Haredim (from 7.4% to 9.2%).
- There is considerable overlap between self-defined religiosity and alignment with the major political camps of Right, Center, and Left. A majority of Haredi, national religious, and traditional Jews identify with the Right (multi-year averages of 74.5%, 82.2%, and 57.1%, respectively), while secular Jews are split almost evenly between the three camps.
- Young Jews in Israel tend to be more right-wing than the older age groups. Moreover, if we compare the first and second decades examined in this report, the share of young people who align themselves with the Right is greater today than in the past.
- Arab interviewees report voting for Zionist parties to a much smaller extent than in the past, and show a greater tendency to vote for (Arab) non-Zionist parties. At present, the share of Arab voters for non-Zionist parties greatly exceeds that of voters for Zionist parties.
- The lion's share of interviewees identify themselves with strong or quite strong groups in Israeli society (multi-year average, 62.6%), though this majority decreased in size between 2020 and 2022. Jews are more likely than Arabs to feel that they belong to these groups (multi-year averages: Jews, 66.3%; Arabs, 43.7%).
- We found an association in the Jewish public between political orientation and social location (identification with stronger or weaker groups in society). Interviewees on the Left feel a greater sense of belonging to the strong/quite strong groups than do members of the other two camps.
- Similarly, there is a connection in the Jewish sample between religiosity and social location. The national religious feel a greater sense of belonging to the strong/quite social groups than do the other religious categories.

Chapter 2: How is Israel Doing?

- Since 2019, there has been a clear and continuous decline in the share of respondents who rate Israel's situation as "very good/good," compared with an upturn in those who view it as "so-so" or "very bad/bad."
- Over the years, and more so since 2010, the Right is the most positive camp in its assessment of Israel's overall situation, and the Left, the most negative. However, over the last two surveys, apparently as a result of the formation of the Bennett-Lapid government, the picture has reversed itself, and the favorable assessment of the Left has risen sharply while that of the Right has declined greatly.
- A majority of Israelis are satisfied with their personal situation (multi-year average, 69.8%), but here too there has been a falling-off in recent years. Arab interviewees are less happy with their personal situation than are Jews, with multi-year averages of 56.0% and 72.4% respectively.
- Since 2020, the sense that the state is able to ensure the security of its citizens has plummeted (2020, 76%; 2021, 56.5%; 2022, 38%). This drop is especially striking on the Right (from 84% of Jewish respondents in 2020 to 30% in 2022). In addition, the feeling that the state is looking out for their security is noticeably lower among Arabs than among Jews (multi-year averages: 45.2% and 61.2%, respectively).
- The perceived success of the state at ensuring the welfare of its citizens has been low in and of itself over the years. It also rates lower when compared with safeguarding citizens' security (multi-year averages: welfare, 30.4%; security, 58.6%).
- In the total sample, there has been a slight increase over time in the share of those who disagree with the statement: "Citizens of Israel can always rely on the state to come to their aid in times of trouble" (2017, 53%; 2022, 57%).

- There has been a steep drop in the share of respondents who feel optimistic about Israel's future—from a majority of 76% in 2012 to roughly half (49%) in 2022. The proportion of optimists in the Jewish public is higher than that in the Arab public (multi-year averages: 67.6% versus 48.0%, respectively). National religious Jews are the most optimistic (multi-year average, 82.7%), while secular Jews are the least (60.1%).
- A majority of interviewees have expressed pride in being Israeli through the years (multi-year average, 79.8%). Jews report greater pride in their Israeliness than do Arabs (with multi-year averages of 85.9% contrasted with 46.0%, respectively). Among Jews, the Haredim are the least proud of their Israeli status, while in the Arab population, the Druze are prouder than the Christians and Muslims.
- In the total sample, there has been some decline in the sense of belonging to the state and its problems (multi-year averages: 2003–2012, 83.9%; 2013–2022, 77.2%). Jews feel more a part of the state than do Arabs (multi-year averages: 86.2% versus 48.7%, respectively). Haredim feel less connected with the state than do other Jewish groups. The Druze feel a greater sense of belonging to the state and its problems compared with the other Arab communities.
- Most of those surveyed would prefer to live in Israel even if offered citizenship of another Western country (multi-year averages: Jews, 77.2%; Arabs, 82.0%), though there has been a decline in the share of Jews who feel this way (from a multi-year average of 83.1% in 2015–2019 to 68.4% in 2021–2022). A greater proportion of national religious and Haredi respondents than of other Jewish religious groups would rather remain in Israel. The same holds true on the Right compared with the Center or Left.
- A majority of those surveyed hold that Israel is a good place to live (multi-year averages: Jews, 75.5%; Arabs, 67.3%); however, there has been a gradual but steady decline in both groups in this regard.

Chapter 3: Commitment of Israeli Public to Democratic Principles

- Since 2018, the share of respondents who agree with the statement that "Jewish citizens of Israel should have more rights than non-Jewish citizens" has climbed consistently (from 27% in 2018 to 49% in 2022). Over the years, roughly one-half of Jews on the Right have expressed agreement with this assertion, with corresponding shares of about one-quarter in the Center and only a negligible minority on the Left. The proportion of secular Jews who agree with this statement is the lowest of the religious groups, while that of Haredim is the highest.
- From a minority of 41% in 2014 who agreed with the statement that "to handle Israel's unique problems, we need a strong leader who is not swayed by the Knesset, the media, or public opinion," support for this position has grown in 2022 to a majority of 61%. Jewish respondents on the Right express greater support for a strong leader than do those in the Center or on the Left, though agreement with this view rose in all three political camps in 2022.
- A sizeable majority of Arab respondents favor having Arab parties in the government, including the appointment of Arab ministers (multi-year average, 78.8%). Among Jews overall, only a minority share this view (multi-year average, 31.7%), though a substantial majority on the Left support this position, compared with a large and growing minority in the Center, and a very small and consistent minority on the Right.
- The bulk of Jewish interviewees (multi-year average, 74.2%) believe that decisions crucial to the state on issues of peace and security should be made by a Jewish majority. This majority is more sizeable among respondents from the Right and Center than from the Left.
- We also found a majority who support requiring a Jewish majority for crucial decisions in matters of economy and society (multi-year average, 59%). Here too, the share who agree with this position is greater on the Right than in the Center or on the Left.
- In the total sample, a majority agree that the Supreme Court should have the power to overturn laws passed by the Knesset if they are found to conflict with various democratic principles. In the Left and Center camps, the share who support such powers has been steadily rising, compared with a stable minority on the Right.
- Among the total sample of respondents, a clear majority agree with the statement that "the use of violence for political ends is never justified" (multi-year average, 75.1%). This proportion has even grown over the last two surveys.
- We examined the extent to which six key democratic principles are upheld in Israel today, as seen by the public:
  - **Right to live in dignity:** Over the last decade, there has been a moderate upswing in the share who think that this right is insufficiently upheld.
  - **Minority rights:** Whereas in the current survey, a sizeable majority of Arabs indicated that minority rights in Israel are upheld too little in Israel today, only a minority of Jews share this view.
  - **Separation of powers:** Almost one-half of the total sample stated that separation of powers is inadequately maintained. We did not encounter significant differences between Jews and Arabs on this issue.
  - **Freedom of religion:** In past years, the most common response in the total sample was that freedom of religion is upheld to the appropriate degree, but in this year's survey we encountered a shift for the first time, with the most frequent answer being that it is upheld too little.
  - **Freedom of expression:** In the previous two surveys, the majority of Jewish respondents believed that this principle was upheld too much or to the right degree, while the majority of Arabs reported that it was maintained too little.
  - **Freedom of political association:** In the Jewish sample, only a small but consistent minority have stated that this principle is insufficiently upheld, whereas in the Arab sample, there has been a significant rise in the share of respondents who feel this way, reaching one-half of those surveyed in 2022.

Chapter 4: Democracy, Government, Citizens

- There has been a slow upswing in the share of respondents who agree with the statement that "the democratic system in Israel is in grave danger" (from 45% in 2017 to 59% in 2022). In the Arab public, the sense that Israeli democracy is under serious threat is much higher than that among Jews (with multi-year averages of 71.5% and 47.1%, respectively). The share of the Jewish sample who feel that Israeli democracy is in jeopardy has been highest on the Left through the years, but under the Bennett-Lapid government, this fear has diminished on the Left and intensified on the Right.
- A sizeable majority of the Jewish public hold that Israel acts democratically toward its Arab citizens, as opposed to a minority who share this view in the Arab public (multi-year averages: 70.3% and 32.7%, respectively). In this year's survey, slightly less than half of Jewish respondents on the Left feel this way, compared with a considerable majority on the Right and in the Center.
- Among both Jews and Arabs, a substantial majority agree that politicians are more concerned with their own interests than with those of the public that elected them (multi-year average: Jews, 79.3%; Arabs, 73.1%).
- A small minority of the total sample (multi-year average, 33.6%) agree with the statement that "on the whole, most Knesset members work hard and are doing a good job." Since 2018, there has even been a sharp decline in the share of those who agree, reaching 22% in 2022. The differences between Jews and Arabs on this question are negligible.
- The public's assessment of the extent of corruption among Israel's leaders has remained virtually unchanged despite recent events (including the ongoing trial of Binyamin Netanyahu on charges of bribery, fraud and breach of trust), with a multi-year average of 2.38 on a scale of 1 to 5 (where 1 = very corrupt, and 5 = not at all corrupt).
- In both populations (Jews and Arabs), only a minority indicated that they would advise a friend or family member to go into politics, though that minority is larger among Arabs than among Jews.
- Assessments of the extent to which the composition of the Knesset reflects the distribution of opinions in the general public have generally been higher over the years among Jews than among Arabs (multi-year averages: 55.5% and 46%, respectively).
- In the total sample, a majority disagree with the statement that "it makes no difference who you vote for; it doesn't change the situation" (multi-year average, 56.8%).
- The proportion of Jews who express an interest in politics is higher than that among Arabs (multi-year averages: Jews, 70.0% and Arabs, 46.2%). Indeed, among Arab respondents, there has been a continuing decline in the share who report being interested in politics (from 62% in 2011 to just 28% in 2022).
- Israeli citizens' sense of being able to influence government policy has been low over the years, with quite similar levels among Jews and Arabs (multi-year averages: 22.3% and 23.5%, respectively).
- Among Jews, a majority report that there is a party that accurately represents their views, while Arabs feel this way to a lesser extent (multi-year averages: 55.3% versus 32.8%, respectively).
- The share of Jews who think that human rights organizations cause damage to the state has been high over the years, and remains so (multi-year average, 59.1%). Among Arabs, only a minority share this view (multi-year average, 30.0%).
- The extent of agreement or disagreement with the (rather extreme) assertion that "it would be best to dismantle all the country's political institutions and start over from scratch" has been examined on two occasions. In the 2010 survey, a clear majority of the total sample (59%) expressed disagreement, while in 2022, respondents were split virtually down the middle, with 43% agreeing and 46% disagreeing.

Chapter 5: Public Trust in State Institutions

- Dividing the findings into two decades (2003–2012 and 2013–2022), we found that—with the exception of the IDF—the multi-year average level of public trust in each of the institutions was lower in the second decade than in the first.
- The **IDF** is the institution that enjoys the highest level of trust in the Jewish sample (multi-year average, 88.1%), but ranks only fifth in the Arab sample, with a much lower share (multi-year average, 33.9%). In a comparison among the Jewish religious groups, the Haredim are those who express the least trust in the IDF. The Druze report a higher degree of trust in the IDF compared with the Christians and Muslims (with multi-year averages of 65.6%, 43.0%, and 28.1%, respectively).
- The **President of Israel** is ranked second in the Jewish sample (multi-year average, 66.9%) and fourth in the Arab sample (multi-year average, 36.3%). The share of those who trust the president is lower on the Right than on the Left or in the Center, as well as lower among Haredim than in the other Jewish religious groups.
- The **Supreme Court** places third in the Jewish sample (multi-year average, 59.5%), and first in the Arab sample (multi-year average, 55.9%). In the 2022 survey, only a minority in both populations expressed trust in this institution (Jews, 41%; Arab, 40%). Among Jewish respondents, the Left places more faith in the Supreme Court than do the Center or the Right.
- The **police** are in fourth place in the Jewish sample and third place in the Arab sample (with multi-year averages of 48.0% and 37.5%, respectively). This year marked the lowest level since 2008, with just 32% of the total sample expressing trust in the police. Among Arab respondents, confidence in the police reached an all-time record low of 13% in 2022.
- The **government** comes in fifth in the Jewish sample and seventh in the Arab sample (multi-year averages: 37.5% and 27.1%, respectively). In 2022, the level of trust in the government reached a historic low (21% of the total sample).

- The **media** places sixth in the Jewish sample but second in the Arab sample (with multi-year averages of 37.3% and 40.3%, respectively). Since 2019, the total sample has registered a continuing decline in public trust in the media, culminating in an all-time low of 22% in 2022.
- The **Knesset** is in seventh place in the Jewish sample (multi-year average, 36.1%) and sixth place in the Arab sample (multi-year average, 32.3%). The 2022 survey yielded the lowest level of trust to date (total sample, 14%).
- The **political parties** are ranked eighth and lowest in both the Jewish and Arab populations (with multi-year averages of 21.2% and 24.1%, respectively). The findings in 2022 are the lowest so far (total sample, 9%).

In addition to the eight recurring institutions, we have on various occasions examined the extent of public trust in the following:

- **Municipalities/local authorities:** The level of trust in this institution has consistently been higher over the years in the Jewish sample than in the Arab sample (with multi-year averages of 58.2% and 32.7%, respectively).
- **Chief Rabbinate:** The multi-year average level of trust (among Jewish respondents, of course) stands at 35.7%. The share who express confidence in this institution is higher among Haredi and national religious respondents than in the traditional groups, and much higher when compared with secular Jews.
- **Shari'a/canonical courts:** A breakdown of the Arab sample by religion shows a downturn among Muslims, a rise among Christians, and a sharp drop between 2017 and 2021 among Druze respondents followed by stable results in the last two surveys.
- **State Attorney's Office:** The Jewish public expresses greater trust in this institution than does its Arab counterpart (with multi-year averages of 48.9% versus 36.7%, respectively). A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation and religiosity indicates that the Left places greater faith in the State Attorney's Office than do the Center or Right, and that Haredim have less confidence in it compared with the other religious groups.
- **Attorney General:** Jewish interviewees report greater trust in this institution than do Arabs (multi-year average of 44.8% and 27.4% respectively). A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation and religiosity shows that those on the Left have greater faith in the Attorney General than do those from the Center or Right, and that Haredi and national religious respondents express less trust than do the other religious groups.

Chapter 6: Israel—Jewish or Democratic?

- In the total sample, a multi-year average of 44.9% hold that the Jewish component of Israel's identity is overly dominant. A much lower share think that the democratic component is too strong (multi-year average, 21.8%), and a (steadily diminishing) minority believe that there is a good balance between the two (multi-year average, 23.7%).
- A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation indicates that a majority on the Left, roughly one-half in the Center, and a minority on the Right hold that the Jewish component is too dominant (multi-year averages: 76.5%, 51.3%, and 21.0%, respectively). A majority of Haredim think that the democratic element is overly strong, in contrast with the other religious groups.
- We asked the Jewish interviewees which component they feel should be the dominant one: the Jewish or the democratic. The most frequent response was that both should be equally strong (multi-year average, 37.3%). In second place, the most common preference was for the Jewish component to be dominant, and in third place, the democratic component (with multi-year averages of 33.0% and 28.2%, respectively).
- Which should be given priority in the event of a conflict between democratic principles and Jewish religious law? Over the years, the Jewish public has favored giving greater weight to democratic principles over a more flexible approach ("it depends on the circumstances") or upholding Jewish law (in the 2022 survey, there was a slight preference for flexibility over maintaining democratic principles). As expected, virtually all Haredi respondents, and a very small minority of secular Jews, prefer to decide in accordance with the precepts of Jewish law in the event of a conflict.
- We asked the interviewees as a whole whether Israel has become a more religious country than in the past. Slight over one-third think that this is the case (total sample, 36%). Among Jews, a majority of secular respondents hold that the country has become more religious, in contrast with the other religious groups (secular, 56.5%; traditional non-religious, 31%; traditional religious, 14%; national religious, 16%; Haredim, 13%).
- Revisiting the question of whether Israel will become a more religious country in the not-so-distant future (the next 10–15 years), we found that roughly one-half of Jewish respondents do not think that the country will become more religious, while a steady minority take the opposite view.
- We asked how worried respondents are that they will be unable to maintain their preferred lifestyle due to the growing power of certain groups in Israeli society that advocate a different way of life from theirs. The results show that the share who are very worried has risen sharply since we first posed the question (from 19% in 2017 to 28.5% in 2022).

Chapter 7: Israeli Society

- Over the years, Jewish respondents have given higher assessments of the level of solidarity in Israeli society than have Arab respondents (multi-year averages on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 = no solidarity at all and 10 = high level of solidarity: Jews, 5.0; Arabs, 4.3). Both populations have recorded a decline in these scores since 2020. In the Jewish sample, the average solidarity rating over the years is lower on the Left than in the Center or on the Right, and lower among Haredim than in the other religious groups.
- Throughout our surveys, a majority of Jews have agreed with the statement that "Israelis can always count on other Israelis to help them in times of trouble," while the share of

Arabs who expressed agreement was lower (multi-year averages: Jews, 71.0%, Arabs, 47.8%).

- Since 2012, we have examined interviewees' assessments of the greatest sources of tension in Israeli society. The following are the groups perceived as having the highest level of tension between them, in descending order:
  - **Jews and Arabs:** In most of our surveys, this source of tension headed the list in the total sample (multi-year average, 42.5%); however, between 2021 and 2022, the share who cited tensions between Jews and Arabs as the most severe soared from 46% to 61%. Arabs have tended more than Jews to rate this as the most serious point of friction (multi-year averages: 55.7% versus 40.1%, respectively), though there has also been an upsurge of Jews who take this view in the last two years. Jews who align themselves with the Right are more inclined than those from the Center or Left to rate Jews and Arabs as having the highest level of tension between them.
  - **Right and Left:** This source of tenson, which has traditionally ranked second in severity (multi-year average, 26.9%), in fact led the list from 2018 to 2020. Jews who identify with the Left see it as a more serious focal point of tension in Israeli society than do those from the Center and Right.
  - **Religious and secular:** While this places third on the list of groups with the highest level of tension between them (multi-year average, 15.4%), Haredi and secular Jews tend more than the other religious groups to cite it as the most serious source of friction in Israeli society.
  - **Rich and poor:** The multi-year average of those who cite tensions between rich and poor as the most severe is just 7.4%.
  - **Ashkenazim and Mizrahim:** Throughout our surveys, this has always been at the bottom of the list in terms of level of tension between groups (multi-year average, 2.9%).
- In both the Jewish and Arab populations, there has been a steep rise between 2018 and 2022 in the share who characterize relations between the two groups as bad or very bad (Jews, from 27% to 60%; Arabs, from 26% to 45%). But despite this, the Arab public tend to view this relationship as favorable to a greater degree than do the Jewish public (in 2022, 17% versus 4%, respectively).
- A majority of the Arab public feel that Arabs are discriminated against in Israel (multi-year average, 78.4%). Among Jews, the share who support the claim of discrimination has been much lower throughout our surveys (multi-year average, 45.9%), and in 2022 there was even a further decline, yielding the lowest percentage to date. A majority of Jews on the Left believe that Arabs are discriminated against in Israel, as opposed to the Center or Right.
- A clear majority of Arab respondents agree with the statement that "most Arab citizens of Israel want to integrate into Israeli society" (multi-year average, 76 .6%). Roughly one-half of Jews feel this way (multi-year average, 55.0%), with a steady decline since 2020.

Chapter 8: International Indicators

As in previous years, we examined Israel's scores in a series of 15 international indicators (for 2021, since the indicators are compiled for the preceding year), as well as its global ranking and its standing relative to the other OECD states.

- Israeli democracy earned its highest scores in 2021, as it has throughout the years, in the Economist Intelligence Unit's political participation indicator (2021, 100; multi-year average, 87.3) and Freedom House's political rights indicator (2021, 85; multi-year average, 89.9). At the bottom of the list this year are the freedom of the press indicator compiled by Reporters Without Borders (2021, 59.6; multi-year average, 74.8), and Transparency International's perception of corruption indicator (2021, 59; multi-year average, 61.3).
- Comparing Israel's scores for 2021 with its multi-year averages over the last two decades (2003–2020) yields a relatively balanced picture. In five indicators, Israel scored higher in 2021 than the multi-year average, and the two most substantial increases were found in political participation (with an impressive surge of 15.9%) and participatory democracy (with an upturn of 4.8%). And in six of the indicators, the scores in 2021 fell below the multi-year average—a trend that was particularly noticeable in the three indicators under the heading of Political Rights and Freedoms: Freedom of the press recorded the steepest drop (21.3%), but civil liberties and political rights also showed considerable declines of 6.0% and 5.7%, respectively. The democratic political culture indicator also showed a marked decrease (7.8%).
- In comparison with Israel's performance in the 2020 indicators, its global ranking improved in six areas (political rights, political participation, egalitarian democracy, participatory democracy, control of corruption, and equal distribution of resources); in three indicators, its position remained similar to the previous year's (voice and accountability, deliberative democracy, and functioning of government); and in six others, there was a decline (civil liberties, freedom of the press, democratic political culture, rule of law, perception of corruption, and regulatory quality).

Introduction

The home page of the Israel Democracy Institute website features the following statement: "The Institute engages in rigorous applied research aimed at laying the conceptual and practical foundations of Israeli democracy. Based on these studies, we formulate real-world recommendations for improving the functioning of government and cultivating a long-term vision of democratic culture adapted to Israeli society with its mosaic of identities." The annual ***Israeli Democracy Index*** survey is a key tool in fulfilling the national mission that IDI took upon itself with its founding. Each year, the Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research (formerly the Guttman Center) compiles and carries out a comprehensive public opinion poll whose purpose is to explore the attitudes and feelings of all segments of the Israeli public regarding the core principles of Israeli democracy; government performance; relations between different sectors and groups; the optimal balance between the Jewish and democratic components of Israeli identity; and assorted other topics at the heart of the country's political, social, and economic discourse.

Until now, each of the reports has focused on the year in which the corresponding survey was conducted, and where necessary, we also presented developments over time. The *2022 Israeli Democracy Index*—the twentieth in number, covering 2003–2022—is fundamentally different in that it focuses on a longitudinal analysis of topics that have been examined over the years, in addition to reporting this year's data. Our primary objective this year was to examine where Israeli public opinion stands today in comparison with both twenty years ago and the intervening years. In this we way, we aim to showcase long-term trends of stability as well as change; in other words, asking where we have come from, and where we find ourselves today.

This is especially important given the claims from various parts of the political spectrum that Israeli democracy is poised at the abyss—or may already be in a state of free fall. Obviously, public opinion polls cannot entirely prove or disprove such fears, but they can shed light on basic factors and tendencies; this is assuming they are conducted, as our surveys are, in a systematic manner and in accordance with the most stringent professional criteria, including full transparency regarding the questionnaires and data, and without serving any particular political agenda or body. Indeed, the annual *Democracy Index* project has succeeded over the years in carving out a place of honor for itself among broad swathes of political decision makers, academicians, foreign and domestic media, and interested members of the general public. The survey findings have always garnered a great deal of attention both immediately upon publication, when the annual report is presented to the sitting president, and over the course of the following year, in relevant contexts. There is reason to assume that this year's comparative data will attract even more interest, as they highlight how far we have come over the last two decades.

Truth be told, not all the data collected in the Index surveys are welcomed. There are individuals and institutions that prefer to "shoot the messenger" (rather than examining why the public's view of them is so uncomplimentary) or to cast aspersions on the way the data were collected. Pointing out public perceptions of unsatisfactory performance by a given system, as we have done in some of the reports, does not necessarily bring us accolades, especially since the very word "democracy" has taken on a particular political connotation in certain circles. Nevertheless, for the most part, the widespread use of the survey by professionals, academicians, journalists, and even people in positions of power within the very systems we assessed, validates our feeling that we are doing a good—if obviously not perfect—job, for nothing in this world is perfect.

The *2022 Israeli Democracy Index* is based, first and foremost, on questions that have been posed over the years, and, to a much lesser extent than in previous surveys, on "ad hoc" questions. That being said, one can learn a great deal from it about the mood of the public in Israel today. This no simple thing, given the fact that the country is currently in the throes of an ongoing political crisis caused in part by the dismal reality of profound differences between various segments of the Israeli public, not only over possible solutions but even over fundamental problems. Despite this, as shown in the following report, most of the interviewees, this year as always, still feel that Israel is a good place to live, and would choose to remain here even if offered the chance to emigrate under attractive conditions. Moreover, on a considerable number of issues—though of course not all—there are broad areas of consensus between Jews and Arabs, secular and Haredi Jews, young and old, and Right and Left. In other words, the prime minister, and the government of Israel as a whole—whatever their political camp—have a foundation on which to build.

Without specifying names and positions, we wish to thank all those who took part in preparing the report that you have before you, within and outside the Israel Democracy Institute, and who played a role in bringing it to your literal and virtual bookshelves; and in particular, the Israeli public, who have been willing to share their thoughts, preferences, and aspirations with us over the years.

We hope that you will find this report thought-provoking and relevant.

Prof. Tamar Hermann
Fall 2022

Methodology

The *2022 Israeli Democracy Index* is more comparative in nature than its predecessors, comparing and contrasting data from the 19 previous democracy surveys with those of this year's poll. For this reason, virtually all the content questions this year (60 out of 64) are recurring questions. This holds true both for chapters 1 through 7, in which we analyze the findings of surveys conducted in Israel, and for chapter 8, which presents data on Israel as collected and analyzed by international research institutes.

The two polling firms that carried out the field work for this year's survey are the C.I. Meida Shivuki marketing research group (Hebrew interviews) and Afkar Research and Knowledge (Arabic interviews). The data were collected between May 22 and June 21, 2022. Interviewers for the Arabic-language questionnaire were native speakers.

The questionnaire

The questionnaire for this year's survey, compiled by the Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research on the basis of questions posed in the past that are still pertinent today, consists of 64 content questions, some with multiple subsections. The questionnaires in Hebrew and Arabic are largely similar, though several of the questions are applicable only to Jews or to Arabs. This is noted clearly in the relevant questions in Appendices 1 and 2. In addition, 12 sociodemographic questions were posed in the Hebrew questionnaire, and 10 in the Arabic questionnaire. For all questions, the response option of "don't know" was presented to the interviewees only in the online survey and not by telephone.

The sample

The total sample for this survey consisted of 1,311 men and women aged 18 and over:

- 1,092 interviewees constituting a representative sample of Jews and others, interviewed in Hebrew[1]
- 219 interviewees constituting a representative sample of Arab citizens of Israel, interviewed in Arabic

To ensure that the Jewish and Arab samples accurately represented their proportion of the population in Israel, they were weighted by religiosity (Jews) or by religion (Arabs), and by age.

The maximum sampling error for the total sample is ±2.76% (±3.02% for the Jewish sample, and ±6.75% for the Arab sample).

The sizes of the Jewish and Arab samples in each of the *Democracy Index* surveys throughout the years are as follows:

Year	Jews	Arabs	Total
2003	1,067	141	1,208
2004	1,007	193	1,200
2005	1,003	200	1,203
2006	1,016	188	1,204
2007	1,016	187	1,203
2008	1,016	185	1,201
2009	1,242	177	1,419
2010	1,017	183	1,200
2011	1,020	180	1,200
2012	828	191	1,019
2013	854	146	1,000
2014	843	146	989
2015	854	163	1,017
2016	1,168	363	1,531
2017	864	160	1,024
2018	851	190	1,041
2019	852	166	1,018
2020	1,000	180	1,180
2021	1,004	184	1,188
2022	1,092	219	1,311
Total	**19,614**	**3,742**	**23,356**

1 The category of "others" was adopted by Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) during the 1990s to denote individuals who are not Jewish according to halakha (Jewish religious law) but are not Arab. This pertains mainly to immigrants from the former Soviet Union who were eligible to immigrate to Israel under the Law of Return despite not being considered halakhically Jewish. Like the CBS, we relate to them as part of the Jewish public.

Data collection

The data were collected primarily via the Internet in addition to phone interviews. The Arabic survey was conducted by telephone only.

	Internet (%)	Telephone (%)	Total (%)
Hebrew survey sample	88.7	11.3	100
Arabic survey sample	–	100	100
Total (full sample)	73.9	26.1	100

The survey in Hebrew was conducted largely via the Internet, supplemented by phone interviews, mainly with older and Haredi (ultra-Orthodox Jewish) respondents.

Religiosity (Jewish sample)	Internet (%)	Telephone (%)	Total (%)
Secular	92.8	7.2	100
Traditional non-religious	92.8	7.2	100
Traditional religious	90.4	9.6	100
National religious	92.8	7.2	100
Haredim	66.9	33.1	100

Age (Jewish sample)	Internet (%)	Telephone (%)	Total (%)
18–24	100	–	100
25–34	95.8	4.2	100
35–44	83.8	16.2	100
45–54	93.9	6.1	100
55–64	93.4	6.6	100
65+	75.4	24.6	100

Data analysis

We analyzed the data based on several factors: first, the variables known from previous studies (including the *Democracy Index* through the years) to have explanatory value in understanding Israeli public opinion, which are included as a rule in our analysis; for example, nationality (Jews, Arabs), religiosity (Jews),[2] political orientation (Jews),[3] and age of the interviewees. The Arab sample was also analyzed on the basis of religion and (in certain cases) voting patterns in the 2021 Knesset elections. In addition, we conducted various other analyses—in keeping with the study rationale, and on the basis of trial and error—which we present, when relevant, to describe and explain our findings.

As stated, we have not produced the same type of report as in previous years, instead focusing our analysis on identifying trends in Israeli society in the subject areas discussed over the twenty years since the inception of the *Democracy Index* in 2003 and up to and including the present report. Hence, almost all the questions that appear in this year's survey have been posed in the past, whether just a few times (such as, To what extent are the following democratic principles upheld in Israel today?) or on a yearly basis (To what extent do you trust the various state institutions?; or the question that opens every *Democracy Index* survey, How would you characterize Israel's overall situation today?).

This year, in the context of our review of the last two decades, we have also provided multi-year averages in several places, that is, averages of the findings for a given variable across all the surveys. At times, this is presented as an overall average of all the interviewees, and at times, as the average of a specific group (only Jews or only Haredim, for example).

One of the challenges we encountered when writing this report was analyzing the findings on the basis of religiosity (in the Jewish sample). In the first decade of the *Democracy Index* (2003–2011), this variable was broken down into four categories: Haredim, national religious, traditional, and secular; since 2012, however, it has comprised five categories, with traditional Jews divided into two groups: traditional religious and traditional non-religious. In analyzing the data over the years, we have found marked differences between these two groups, and it is highly important from a research standpoint to view them separately. Accordingly, in certain cases the analysis is divided into two time periods: the first decade, when we use the category of traditional, and the second decade, when we employ two categories—traditional religious and traditional non-religious.

In the Arab sample, data is sometimes presented according to religious group (Muslims, Christians, Druze). In this *Index*, when this breakdown is presented for 2022 alone, the sampling error is significantly larger than for other breakdowns.

2 The categories for this variable were: Haredim, national religious, traditional religious, traditional non-religious, and secular. The proportion of each group in the various democracy surveys is in accordance with its size in CBS data.

3 The categories for this variable were: Right, Center, and Left.

Occasionally, data are presented in appendix 2 which do not appear in the chapters themselves (in figures and tables), due to measurements taken in other contexts and not as part of the *Israeli Democracy Index* survey.

Navigating the report

To make it easier to navigate the report, two types of references have been inserted below the title of each question: The first type, alongside each question number, refers the reader to the page where that question appears in appendix 1 (which contains the questionnaire and the distribution of responses for each content question in a three-part format: total sample, Jews, Arabs). The second type appears only for recurring questions, and points to the page where that question appears in appendix 2 (a multi-year comparison of data). The references appear in the text as follows:

■ Israel's overall situation

Question 1 | Appendix 1, page 147 | Appendix 2, page 162

In addition, next to each question in appendices 1 and 2, there is a reference to the page in the text where that question is discussed.

Note: To make for easier reading, we mainly present the data in whole numbers in the text and accompanying figures, using half-percentage points in rare instances. In the appendices, however, the data are shown to a higher degree of precision—up to one decimal place. Due to this rounding (which, as stated, is used to assist the reader), there are occasionally very slight differences between the data in the main body of the report and in the appendices.

Part One

Israel in the Eyes of its Citizens

Chapter 1 / Changes Over Time in Political and Social Self-Definitions of Israelis

In this chapter, we discuss the following topics:

- Self-defined political orientation and religiosity (Jews)
- Age and self-defined political orientation (Jews)
- Voting for Zionist and Arab non-Zionist parties (Arabs)
- Sense of belonging to stronger or weaker social groups (Jews and Arabs)

As shown in the *Democracy Index* of the last few years, public opinion in Israel is largely determined by two main **subjective** (self-defined) factors: political orientation (Jews and Arabs)[4] and religiosity (Jews). This is in addition to the **objective** sociodemographic factors published periodically by Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics, such as national self-identification (Jews and Arabs/Palestinians), education, income, and so on. We will also be discussing a variable that is unique to the Israel Democracy Institute, namely, sense of belonging to stronger or weaker social groups.

As is evident below, these subjective factors virtually dictate Israelis' positions on most of the issues that we have examined through the years. In other words, if we know how interviewees define themselves according to one or more of these variables, we will be able to state with a high degree of certainty what their positions will be on almost every one of the topics that we study. This robust and consistent association indicates that, over time, **sociopolitical discourse in Israel has become less about issues and more about identity.**

Political orientation

Question 65 | Appendix 1, page 160

As shown in the figure below, the Jewish public in Israel identifies largely with the Right (multi-year average, 49.5%), and there has been a clear upswing in recent years in the share who define themselves this way. This stands in stark contrast to the Center, which has remained largely stable (multi-year average, 25.4%), and the Left, which has shrunk over the years (multi-year average, 18.6%). In fact, today the Right (at 62%) is almost twice the size of the Center (24%) and Left (11%) combined (35% together).

4 Among Jewish respondents, we have used the term "political orientation" to indicate self-identification with the Right, Center or Left; and among Arab respondents, voting for Zionist parties or one of the Arab parties.

The figure below shows the changes in the percentages of Jewish respondents who have identified with each of the political camps over the 20 years we have asked this question in the Democracy Index. The reason why Arab respondents are not included in this breakdown is that all the political parties in each of these three camps are Zionist by self-definition; we therefore consider the Arab public, which does not identify with this fundamental Jewish Israeli ethos, to constitute a separate political camp. We discuss this camp separately below.

Figure 1.1 / Political orientation (Jewish sample; %)



It should be noted that, whereas in the past it was crystal clear what Right and Left meant, since the distinction was based mainly on opinions about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, today the division between the two camps is more reminiscent of that between the Democrats and the Republicans in the United States. That is, it reflects two opposing sets of opinions, emotions, and behaviors that apply to a range of issues, from what Zionism means today, questions of religion and state, and Jewish versus universal values; to women's rights and alternative lifestyles such as LGBTQ+; to the status of Arab citizens of Israel and the preferred solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. (When it comes to the Center, the picture is much more clouded,

as on certain issues—primarily security and the economy—the Center is nearer to the Right in its views, and on others—such as religion and state—it is closer to the Left.) Thus, the key word here is identity, more than political beliefs. It should be stated that on economic issues, for example, and in several other areas, the differences between the political camps in Israel are small, as we will see below. With regard to questions such as pride in being Israeli, the desire to remain in Israel or emigrate, and the sense of belonging to the state, the differences are also minor.

Despite the above, and for lack of better terms that might be more suited to this time and place, and to enable long-term comparisons, we continue to use "Right" and "Left" rather than an alternative pairing such as liberals and conservatives, which likewise is not optimal.

Religiosity

Question 70 | Appendix 1, page 161

As shown just below, the second variable that effectively explains the issues in this report is the self-defined religiosity of the Jewish respondents. The following table shows the relative proportions of the religious subgroups in the Jewish public according to the CBS, divided into two periods:

Table 1.1 (Jewish sample; %)

Religiosity	2003–2011	2012–2020
Haredi	7.4	9.2
National religious	9.3	10.4
Traditional religious	12.7	12.1
Traditional non-religious	24.2	21.3
Secular	41.3	41.5

Data taken from the Social Survey produced by the Central Bureau of Statistics

It emerges from the above table that the share of secular Jews has remained unchanged since we began our surveys (in 2003). They constitute the largest segment of the Jewish population, but not a genuine majority. The proportion of traditional Jews (including both subgroups)[5] has experienced a decline, while there has been a minimal increase in the national religious population and a slightly more significant rise in the percentage of Haredim.

We cannot disregard the (sociologically valid) argument that none of these groups is homogeneous: among secular Jews, many define themselves as believers, and observe some religious commandments; the traditional group is divided into two subgroups; the national religious public encompasses a "national Haredi" faction; and the Haredim run the gamut from conservative to modern.[6] However, as demonstrated later in this report, there are distinct and statistically significant differences between the major categories (see the figure below on political orientation broken down by religiosity), while the differences within these groups are smaller and, frequently, not statistically significant. For this reason, we continue to use these five main categories in our multi-year analysis as well.

Perhaps the salient point for our purposes, and the best explanation for many of the phenomena to be discussed below, is the strong correspondence between religiosity and identification with a specific political camp. The figure below presents the multi-year averages for each of the political camps in each of the five categories of religiosity. In each of the groups, we see that the majority locate themselves on the Right, with the exception of secular Jews, who are spread among the various camps. This breakdown offers a solid basis for those who wish to predict Israel's political constellations in the near future; moreover, we have found that it is rare for individuals to stray far from their political origins to positions that are intrinsically different ideologically and sociologically.

Figure 1.2 / Political orientation, multi-year averages, 2003–2022 (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)



5 Since 2012, the CBS (and hence, we as well) have distinguished between traditional religious and traditional non-religious when breaking down the Jewish public by religiosity. This division is justified empirically; later in this report, it will become evident that, on many issues, the traditional religious group is closer to the national religious—and at times even the Haredim—whereas the traditional non-religious are nearer to the positions of the secular population.

6 "National Haredi" (in Hebrew, "Haredi leumi," also referred to as "Torani") is a group that is closer to the ultra-Orthodox Haredi public in terms of religious observance, but closer to the mainstream national religious public in terms of its strong commitment to Zionism and the State of Israel. Tamar Hermann et al., *The National-Religious Sector in Israel 2014*, Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute, 2014; Lee Kahaner, *Haredi Society on the Axis between Conservatism and Modernity*, Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute, 2020.

Political orientation and religiosity, by age

A recurring question in the Israeli context is whether young people in Israel are more right-wing than their elders, and whether today's young people are more firmly on the Right than in the past. Once again, we split the period studied into two sub-periods, this time in order to assess the support of the various age groups for the different political camps. The findings presented in the table below show that in both sub-periods, a higher proportion of those in the younger age groups than in the older groups identified themselves as being on the Right. Still, across all age groups, the percentage of respondents on the Right has risen over the years.

Table 1.2 (Jewish sample; %)

	Age group, by political orientation					
	Left		Center		Right	
	2003–2012	2013–2022	2003–2012	2013–2022	2003–2012	2013–2022
18–24	15.8	12.0	17.4	18.4	61.4	65.1
25–44	20.1	13.4	22.9	21.6	50.3	59.3
45–64	23.1	18.3	29.1	29.0	41.7	47.3
65 and over	21.8	23.0	29.6	32.0	36.8	38.3

An analysis of self-defined religiosity by age group shows that while the largest share of respondents in every age group are secular, the proportion of secular respondents in the younger age groups is in decline, while the proportion of Haredi and national religious respondents is on the rise.

Figure 1.3 / Political orientation, by age group (Jews; %)*



* Data taken from the CBS Social Survey

Voting for Zionist and (Arab) non-Zionist parties

Question 68 | Appendix 1, page 160

As noted above, based on numerous surveys and studies conducted by us, we have reached the conclusion that it is incorrect to analyze samples of Arab citizens of Israel using a Left-Right paradigm, which is better suited (in the Israeli context) to the Jewish public. Even if the likelihood of some type of coalition between Arab and Zionist parties was, and remains, greater in the case of the Jewish Left (though recently, it became clear that even this partial linkage is no longer valid as a result of coalition negotiations between the Arab parties and Zionist parties on the Right), the Arab parties and their electorate are not similar in character to the liberal-Zionist, mostly Jewish parties on the Left, in terms of both their voters and the makeup of their

Knesset blocs. The alternative that we decided upon was to distinguish between Arab-Israeli interviewees who voted for Zionist parties and those who voted for (Arab) non-Zionist ones.[7]

It bears recalling that self-reports of past votes are not always full or accurate, and are influenced by the prevailing mood of the public and not by the official results in various elections. As shown in the figure below, in recent years (primarily since 2013), Arab interviewees report voting for Zionist parties much less frequently than in the past, with a concomitant rise in votes for the (Arab) non-Zionist parties, as borne out by the official data. In other words, if in the early years of the *Democracy Index*, the interviewees who voted were split roughly down the middle between those who opted for Zionist parties and those who favored (Arab) non-Zionist ones, today the latter group clearly have the numerical advantage.

Figure 1.4 / Self-reported vote (Arab sample; %)



Identification with stronger or weaker social groups

Question 3 | Appendix 1, page 147 | Appendix 2, page 163

In many countries, respondents' socioeconomic status or class is considered a key variable for examining survey responses. In Israel, many studies (including *Democracy Index surveys*) have found that universal designations of class (working class, middle class, upper middle class, and the like) or of income (whether in shekels, or measured relatively as below average, average, and above average) do not work well in Israel, since, for example, the proportion who define themselves as middle class is unrealistic and not necessarily connected to their absolute or relative income.[8] Education level was also not helpful in identifying meaningful patterns since, as we explained earlier, self-defined religiosity and political orientation entirely overwhelm these factors of class. Accordingly, since 2012, we have posed the following question: "Societies throughout the world are divided into stronger and weaker groups. Which group in Israeli society do you feel you belong to?" As demonstrated later in this report, we have found that this serves as an excellent explanatory variable for our purposes that distinguishes nicely between different population groups. The response choices that we offer here are: strong group, quite strong group, quite weak group, and weak group. We have found this question to be an excellent explanatory variable for our purposes, as it systematically does a good job of differentiating between population groups.

Figure 1.5 / Societies throughout the world are divided into stronger and weaker groups. Which group in Israeli society do you feel you belong to? (total sample; %)



The figure indicates that there has been no large or consistent change in this variable: Over the years, a majority of the total sample have identified with the strong and quite strong groups (multi-year average of 62.6%), indicating social resilience and a sense of belonging (see the discussion of question 7 in chapter 2 below). Nevertheless, in 2013, 2014, 2020, and 2022 we

7 While Hadash is by definition a Jewish-Arab party, in our opinion the ratio between Jews and Arabs among its voters and Knesset representatives, as well as its agenda through the years, warrant including it with the Arab non-Zionist parties.

8 In certain cases, but not all, income did indeed serve to differentiate between different groups, but we chose not to use it "as is," because property and social status are not always a function of income per se—as claimed for example by the "Second Israel" thesis put forward in recent years by Dr. Avishay Ben Haim.

found a particularly small majority who identified with the strong or quite strong groups in society (respectively, 54.5%, 58%, 59%, and 59%).

We found a very strong association between income and identification with stronger or weaker groups. Those respondents with lower income are more likely to identify with the weaker groups (though, here too, roughly one-half associate themselves with the strong or quite strong groups); and the converse holds true with regard to average or high-income earners.

Table 1.3 (total sample, 2012–2022; %)

Multi-year averages	Social location, by income		
	Below-average income	Average income	Above-average income
Belong to stronger social groups	49	65	79.5
Belong to weaker social groups	44	28	16
Don't know	7	7	4.5
Total	100	100	100

The figure below shows the distribution of responses on this question, broken down by nationality. Among Jewish interviewees, the majority consistently report feeling that they belong to the strong or quite strong groups, with a multi-year average of 66.3%. This year, the share who see themselves in this category dropped by 10 percentage points compared with last year, but is comparable to the finding from 2020.

Among Arab respondents, the share who feel a sense of belonging to the strong or quite strong groups has always been lower than that among Jews (multi-year average, 43.7%). The Arab sample also showed a decline in 2022 relative to 2021, though to a slightly lesser degree than in the Jewish sample.

Figure 1.6 / Feel they belong to stronger groups in society (Arab and Jewish samples; %)



The obvious question is whether the Jewish or Arab populations are homogeneous in terms of their identification with stronger or weaker groups in Israeli society.

The following tables present the sense of belonging to stronger social groups in different segments of the Jewish public. Based on the data, we see that those on the Left, despite being the smallest camp in Israeli Jewish politics, feel a greater identification with the stronger groups than do the other camps (multi-year average of 73.3% as compared with 67.2% in the Center and 66.2% on the Right). Moreover, in 2022 the share of respondents on the Left who identified themselves with the stronger groups was virtually identical to the multi-year average for this camp, while in the Center and on the Right, the corresponding percentages for this year were lower than the multi-year averages. This demonstrates once again that a sense of belonging to stronger of weaker groups in society reflects not just a personal aspect but a collective-political one; thus, the Left, which returned to the government for the first time in many years, feels stronger than in the past, and the Center and Right, less so.

Table 1.4 (Jewish sample; %)

	Feel they belong to stronger social groups	
	Multi-year average	2022
Right	66.2	62
Center	67.2	62
Left	73.3	73

This finding can also be attributed to the fact that incomes on the Left are higher, on average, than in the other two camps.

Table 1.5 (Jewish sample; %)

	Feel they belong to stronger social groups					
	Below-average income		Average income		Above-average income	
	2022	Multi-year average 2012–2022	2022	Multi-year average 2012–2022	2022	Multi-year average 2012–2022
Left	22	27.2	28	20.0	39	42.1
Center	28	30.7	29	22.3	33	34.4
Right	34	39.4	24	21.3	33	29.2

We learn further from the table below that the national religious population identifies with the strong or quite strong groups in Israeli society to a greater degree than do the other religious categories (with a multi-year average of 73.2%), in contrast to the Haredim, who feel the lowest sense of belonging to the stronger groups (multi-year average, 53.2%). It should be noted that the secular respondents and both groups of traditional respondents reported a lower level of identification with the stronger groups in society this year than their multi-year average, indicating a decline (at least for the moment) in their sense of social power. Among the Haredim, the data for this year are very similar to their multi-year average, while in the national religious group there has even been a slight upturn; however, the increase still falls within the range of statistical error, such that it cannot be considered a significant finding at this stage.

Table 1.6 (Jewish sample; %)

	Feel they belong to stronger social groups	
	Multi-year average	2022
Haredim	53.2	54
National religious	73.2	75
Traditional religious	63.2	56
Traditional non-religious	65.7	60
Secular	69.4	65

We broke down the responses of the Arab sample by religion. Muslims identify to the smallest degree with the strong or quite strong groups (multi-year average, 42.1%); Christians show the greatest fluctuation, which may be caused by the relatively small size of this group in the yearly samples and not necessarily by changes in the "real world" (multi-year average, 48.9%); and Druze respondents have the highest multi-year average, of 56.8%.

As shown in the following table, this year's assessment of sense of belonging to stronger social groups corresponds closely with the respective multi-year averages of Muslim and Druze respondents. By contrast, among the Christian respondents, the corresponding percentage this year is higher than the multi-year average.

With regard to voting patterns, it seems that voters for the (Arab) non-Zionist parties feel less of a sense of belonging to the stronger groups in Israeli society than do those who reported voting for Zionist parties or not voting at all. Interestingly, the share who identify themselves with the stronger groups in 2022 is higher than the multi-year average in all three cases, perhaps due to the participation of Ra'am in the coalition.

Table 1.7 (Arab sample; %)

Sense of belonging to stronger social groups		Multi-year average	2022
Religion	Muslims	42.1	42
	Christians	48.9	60
	Druze	56.8	57
Vote for Zionist parties or Arab non-Zionist parties	Zionist parties	50.8	65
	Arab parties	38.4	43

Chapter 2 / How is Israel Doing?

In this chapter, we will be reviewing Israel's overall situation through the years, as seen by the public, with the aim of observing whether certain things have changed, and if so, how. We discuss the following topics:

- Israel's overall situation
- Respondents' personal situation
- How well does Israel ensure the security and welfare of its citizens?
- Can citizens count on the state for help?
- Optimism about Israel's future
- Pride in being Israeli
- Feeling part of the state and its problems
- Prefer to emigrate or remain in Israel?
- Is Israel a good place to live?

Israel's overall situation

Question 1| Appendix 1, page 147 | Appendix 2, page 162

Since we began our surveys in 2003, the public's view of Israel's situation has fluctuated repeatedly; but in the years since 2019—a period of political deadlock, pandemic, and economic crisis—we have witnessed a steady downward trend in the share of the total sample who hold that Israel's overall state of affairs is good or very good (by around a quarter). Nevertheless, until now, the proportion who viewed the situation favorably exceeded those who saw it as bad or very bad. Yet this year's survey saw a steep rise in the share who assess it as bad or very bad (from 26% to 37%). Thus, the share of respondents with negative perceptions now exceeds the share who see the country in a more positive light, and is on par with those who define Israel's status as so-so.

This question, which opens the democracy survey each year, functions as a type of barometer of the national mood. And in fact, as we will see below, the grim atmosphere that it reflects this year is also expressed in many other, more specific questions.

Figure 2.1 / How would you rate Israel's overall situation? (total sample; %)



As shown in the figure below—somewhat surprisingly, given the different life circumstances of Jews and Arabs in Israel—there is a longstanding pattern of similarity between the groups in their assessment of Israel's situation, though the variability is greater in the Arab sample (see, for example, the brief spikes in 2010 and 2014). The multi-year average of those who see Israel's overall situation as good or very good is 33.0% among Jews and 32.9% among Arabs, compared with a gap of nine percentage points between the two groups in the present survey, with slightly over one-quarter (27%) of Jewish respondents who view the situation positively this year, as opposed to only 18% who feel this way among Arab respondents. In the Jewish sample, this represents a relatively moderate decline from last year, when the favorable rating stood at 32.5%; while in the Arab sample, there has been a drop from 24.5% in 2021 to just 18% in 2022.

Figure 2.2 / Define Israel's overall situation as good (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



The hypothesis that we proposed in chapter 1—namely, that those who see themselves as belonging to stronger social groups feel differently on many subjects than do those who associate themselves with weaker groups—was corroborated at the outset when we cross-tabulated this year's findings on Israel's overall situation with responses to the question of self-defined social location: Of those who identified with the stronger groups in society, 34% categorized Israel's situation as good or very good, as opposed to only 13% of those who identified with the weaker groups. The differences on this question between Jews and Arabs in terms of social location were relatively minor.

How homogeneous is the **Jewish** public in its assessment of Israel's general situation? As shown in the figure below, in terms of **political orientation**, there were virtually no differences between the various camps in their perception of the country's situation up until 2009. Starting in 2010, however, after Binyamin Netanyahu became Prime Minister, a change took place, and the assessments of the different camps diverged. Over the years, the Right has been the camp with the most positive view of Israel's situation, and the Left, the most negative, as reflected in the multi-year averages of the favorable responses (Right, 39.0%; Center, 30.7%; Left, 22.6%).

The view on the **Right** of Israel's situation as good or very good reached its peak in 2018, when a majority of 71% gave the country a positive review (compared with 49% that year in the Center, and just 28% on the Left). But, with the establishment of the Bennett-Lapid government, this rating plummeted to the extent that in the 2021 democracy survey, conducted immediately after the coalition's entry into office, the share who indicated that Israel's situation was good or very good on the Right and on the Left (which, as stated, had traditionally been lower) converged, followed by a complete reversal in 2022: The share of those on the Right who expressed a positive view of Israel's situation plunged to less than one-quarter (23%), while the corresponding share on the Left was almost double (42%).

Over the years, the **Center** camp has largely fallen somewhere in between the Right and the Left. In 2021, shortly after the Bennett-Lapid government took office, the share who rated Israel's state of affairs as good or very good stood at 27%. In the present survey, this rose slightly, to 32%.

The **Left** is the camp which offered the least favorable assessments of Israel's situation until 2022, when the share who took a positive view showed a sudden upsurge; it is too soon to tell at this stage whether this shift is fleeting or permanent. The share in this camp who defined Israel's situation as good or very good reached a nadir in 2020 (its lowest since 2004), climbing gradually since then to an all-time high of 42% in the present survey, under a government with substantial representation of the Left and Center camps.

Figure 2.3 / Define Israel's overall situation as good (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



As noted in chapter 1, there is a high degree of overlap in the Jewish sample between religiosity and political orientation. As shown in the figure below, this is also reflected in the responses to the question on Israel's general situation, though the congruence is not total. The national religious group, which identifies with the Right to a very large extent, has been the most inclined to characterize the state of affairs in Israel as good or very good throughout most of the period surveyed (multi-year average, 48%); but from a peak of 88% in 2018 (the highest

in all the camps over the years), the share who feel this way has plunged this year to a low of just 37% (though this is still the highest in all the religious groups). Parallel declines can also be seen in the multi-year averages of the following groups: Haredim, 31.7%; traditional religious, 2012–2022, 46.3%; and traditional non-religious, 2012–2022, 39.6%).

The secular respondents (who, as noted, identify most strongly with the Left) offer the least favorable assessment of Israel's situation (multi-year average, 28.5%). However, since 2021, there has been a discernible rise in this rating, up to 31% this year—second only to the national religious group.

Figure 2.4 / Define Israel's overall situation as good (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)



In this year's survey, we found a sizeable difference between the sexes, but in opposing directions in the Jewish and Arab populations. In the Jewish sample, men have a more positive perspective than women on Israel's situation, while in the Arab sample the converse holds true. Accordingly, 36% of Jewish men think that Israel is in a good or very good position in general, while among women only 17% feel this way. Among Arab respondents, who, as stated, take a dimmer view of Israel's situation overall, just 15% of the men characterized Israel's condition as good or very good compared with 21% of the women.

How homogeneous is the **Arab** public on this question? The figure below shows that until 2020 there was virtually no difference between Christian and Muslim respondents in terms of their perception of how Israel is doing; however, there has been a rise since then in the share of Christians who consider the country's situation to be good or very good position, alongside a decline in the corresponding share of Muslims. At the same time, this year's survey showed a drop in both groups, reaching a low point of 14% among Muslims and 25% among Christians—an average fall of 10 percentage points from last year. The opinions of the Druze respondents differ slightly from those of the other Arab groups, and are less consistent, perhaps due to the small sample sizes and/or various events that had a distinct impact on this group. This year's findings show a higher percentage of Druze than of the other two groups who define Israel's situation as good or very good (38%).

Table 2.1 (Arab sample; %)

Religion	Define Israel's situation as good, multi-year average	Define Israel's situation as good, 2022
Muslims	32.9	14
Christians	34.4	25
Druze	42.6	38

A breakdown of the responses to this question by voting pattern (for Zionist or Arab non-Zionist parties) reveals that voters for the Zionist parties are much more apt to offer a positive assessment of Israel's condition than are voters for the non-Zionist parties (multi-year average of 51.5%, as opposed to 26.3%). Additionally, the voters for the non-Zionist parties have remained highly consistent in their perceptions over the years, while there have been pronounced fluctuations among those who voted for the Zionist parties. It should be noted that there has been a steep drop in favorable assessments among those who reported that they did not vote. Also worthy of mention is the fact that the share of voters for Zionist parties who characterized Israel's situation in positive terms in 2021 and 2022 (53.5%) exceeds the multi-year average, whereas the corresponding percentage among those who voted for (Arab) non-Zionist parties stands at 18%, below the multi-year average.

Figure 2.5 / Define Israel's overall situation as good (Arab sample, by vote for Zionist or Arab non-Zionist parties; %)



Analyzing this year's responses by age did not yield substantial differences in the Arab sample; in the Jewish sample, however, the youngest cohorts rated Israel's situation as good or very good to a much lesser extent than did their elders (also only a minority). There is reason to assume that this perception also affects the degree of willingness to emigrate, which is noticeably higher in the younger cohorts, and among Jews more than Arabs (as shown later in this chapter).

Table 2.2 (Jewish sample; %)

Age	Define Israel's situation as good, 2022
18–24	11
25–44	22
45–64	34
65+	36

Personal situation

Question 2 | Appendix 1, page 147 | Appendix 2, page 163

Alongside the question about Israel's overall situation, we also asked in several surveys about the respondents' personal situation. In all cases, the share of the total sample who answered good or very good with regard to themselves (multi-year average, 69.8%) was more than double the share who responded this way regarding the state (multi-year average, 32.9%). Moreover, the findings on a personal plane were much more stable than those at the national level.

Nonetheless, here too we encountered a decline, though smaller than that in the previous question, and in fact within the range of statistical error (from 61% in 2020 to 58% in 2022). In other words, even after the drop of the past two years, Israelis are much more satisfied with their personal situation than with the country's condition.

Figure 2.6 / Define their personal situation as good (total sample; %)



Is everyone, past and present, equally pleased with their own situation? To begin, we compared the answers of the Jewish and Arab respondents on this question. As shown in the figure below, the share of Arab interviewees who have defined their personal situation as good or very good over the years has been lower than that of the Jews, though in all our surveys—with the exception of this year's—it always constituted a majority. In 2022, the favorable rating among Arab respondents declined for the first time to a minority of those surveyed (from 54% in the previous survey, in 2020, to just 41% this year). Among Jewish interviewees, the findings have been more or less consistent; that is, they do not feel that their personal situation has worsened in recent years, while the Arabs indicate the opposite, perhaps due to the harsher economic impact of the coronavirus pandemic on this group, the deterioration in Jewish-Arab relations since the events of May 2021, and/or the hostile reactions from the Jewish Right to Ra'am's entry into the coalition (see below).

Figure 2.7 / Define their personal situation as good (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



Breaking down the Arab sample by religion over time, we did not encounter great differences in the multi-year averages; however, in this year's survey, we found major distinctions between Muslims, Christians, and Druze in their characterization of their personal situation. As shown in the table below, only a minority of Muslims (a much lower percentage than the multi-year average), roughly one-half of Christians (11 percentage points below the average), and a slightly higher-than-average proportion of Druze categorized their personal situation as good or very good. That is to say, the impact of recent events on the three Arab religious groups was not uniform, in terms of their perceptions of their personal situation.

Table 2.3 (Arab sample; %)

	Religion					
	Muslims, multi-year average	Muslims, 2022	Christians, multi-year average	Christians, 2022	Druze, multi-year average	Druze, 2022
Define their personal situation as good	54.9	38.5	59.9	49	61.9	65

We also found differences between the sexes in the responses to this question: Jewish men were more likely than Jewish women to assess their personal situation as good or very good through the years as well as in the present survey. While Arab men in 2022 tended to rate their situation more favorably than did Arab women, the multi-year average in the latter group is higher than that of the men. Moreover, there is a greater gap between men and women among Jewish respondents than among Arab ones.

Table 2.4 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

Define their personal situation as good	Jews, multi-year average	Jews, 2022	Arabs, multi-year average	Arabs, 2022
Men	74.3	65.5	54.5	43
Women	70.6	57.5	57.7	40

Breaking down the responses by social location, we found that the average ratings for this variable over the years were as follows: Of those who defined themselves as belonging to the stronger groups in Israeli society, the share who reported their personal situation as good or very good was 79.2%, while the corresponding share among those who identified with the weaker groups was only 49.8%. In other words, there is a clear association between the respondents' perception of their personal situation and their sense of belonging to stronger or weaker social groups. As shown in the following table, we found this year that among respondents identifying with the stronger groups, the proportion who categorize their own situation as good or very good is more than double the corresponding proportion among respondents who associate themselves with the weaker groups. Nonetheless, we see that in either case, the share who expressed personal satisfaction in 2022 is lower than the multi-year average (just 4.2 percentage points less for the stronger groups, but 18.8 percentage points less for the weaker groups).

Table 2.5 (total sample; %)

	Define their personal situation as good, multi-year average	Define their personalsituation as good, 2022
Identify with stronger social groups	79.2	75
Identify with weaker social groups	49.8	31

The fact that the share of Arab respondents identifying with stronger social groups who define their personal situation as good or very good (53%) is much lower than the corresponding share of Jews (78%), while there is no difference in this parameter between Jews and Arabs who associate themselves with the weaker groups, is reason to consider the complex nature of the relative positioning of each of these groups in Israeli society. It would seem that higher social standing does not compensate for being a member of the Arab minority. The similarity between the weaker groups in the Israeli public adds weight to the notion of forming a coalition of the disadvantaged; but as we will see below, it is actually these weaker groups in Jewish society who demonstrate greater hostility toward the Arab Israeli minority.

Table 2.6 (Jewish and Arab samples, 2022; %)

Define their personal situation as good or very good	Identify with stronger social groups	Identify with weaker social groups
Jews	78	31
Arabs	53	32

Analyzing the Jewish sample by political orientation shows a similar majority in all camps who have defined their personal situation as good or very good over time (with multi-year averages of 74.0% on the Right, 71.7% in the Center, and 72.0% on the Left). In 2016, we saw the beginnings of some divergence between the camps, though with no consistent trend. From 2017 until recently, the Left and Center defined their personal situation as good or very good to a slightly lesser extent than did the Right. This finding is especially interesting, since, as shown in chapter 1, those who identify with the Left or Center report, for example, having a higher income on average than do those on the Right.

As we see in the following figure, between 2018 and 2020, all three camps experienced a decline in their level of personal satisfaction, with the Center and Left clustering around the 56% mark and the Right at about two-thirds. But between 2020 and 2022, the Left and the Center parted ways: On the Left, the share who rated their situation as good or very good surged to 71%, while the Center remained at the previous level. On the Right, there was a slight dip to 62%, compared with 66.5% in 2020.

All of the above suggests that definitions of personal satisfaction may not be dependent solely on material resources.

Figure 2.8 / Define their personal situation as good (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



A breakdown of the responses on personal situation by age (2022) reveals that a majority of the Jewish sample in all age groups characterize their personal situation as good or very good, but to a lesser degree in the youngest cohort than in the older ones (18–24, 54.5%; 25–44, 63%; 45–64, 60%; 65 and over, 65%). Among Arab respondents of all ages, only a minority take a favorable view of their personal situation, and the difference between groups is not consistent.

Cross-tabulating between perceptions of the country's situation and the respondent's personal one, we found that those who report more personal satisfaction are much more likely to assess the national situation as good or very good than are those who report that their own state of affairs is so-so or bad. However, even among those who rate their situation favorably in the current survey, only a minority (38%) see the country's condition in positive terms; and of those who consider their own situation to be so-so or bad, this percentage is negligible.

Figure 2.9 / Define Israel's overall situation as good, by assessment of personal situation (total sample; %)



How well does Israel ensure the security of its citizens?

Question 40 | Appendix 1, page 155 | Appendix 2, page 185

The assessment of one's personal situation depends to a large extent on how secure citizens feel, in terms of both physical safety (addressed in this section) and social and economic welfare (addressed below). While this question has been posed only four times, all in the last three years, we see that since 2020 there has been a steep decline in the sense of security provided by the state to its citizens. In 2022, only 38% of the total sample indicated that Israel ensures the security of its citizens very much or quite a lot—a sharp drop from previous years. Lest there be any doubt about the reliability of this finding, it conforms closely with our monthly survey

results in the *Israeli Voice Index* for the same period. There too, we found declining optimism about the future of Israel's national security.[9]

Figure 2.10 / Agree that Israel ensures the security of its citizens (total sample; %)



As shown in the following figure, this downturn stems primarily from the plummeting sense of security on the Right with the formation of the Bennett-Lapid government (from 84% in 2020, under Netanyahu's government, to 30% in 2022, under Bennett-Lapid). The increased sense on the Left that the state can offer security to its citizens is not enough to offset the drop that we encountered on the Right, and to a lesser degree, in the Center. Given the fact that security is one of the most crucial issues for the Israeli public, this reflects a serious failure of governance.

Figure 2.11 / Agree that Israel ensures the security of its citizens (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



The disparities regarding the state's ability to look out for the security of its citizens also remain sizeable when analyzing on the basis of nationality. Over the years, the sense of security has clearly been weaker among Arab respondents than among Jews (multi-year averages: Jews, 61.2%; Arabs, 45.2%), including in the present survey, despite the fact that when we first posed this question in 2019, an identical majority of two-thirds of both Jewish and Arab respondents felt that the state could provide its citizens with security. It should be noted that the concept of "security" may not be the same for Jews and for Arabs: Whereas Jews tend to associate the term primarily with defense from external enemies, in light of the wave of violent crime in Arab society there is reason to assume that, for Arab interviewees, the term relates no less—and perhaps even more—to domestic security, that is, the ability of the state to protect them within their communities.

9 Israel Democracy Institute, *Israeli Voice Index*.

Figure 2.12 / Agree that Israel ensures the security of its citizens (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



A breakdown of responses in the Arab sample by religion reveals similar multi-year averages among Muslims and Christians, with less than half in both groups feeling that the state is able to ensure their security. By contrast, the multi-year average among Druze respondents shows a consistent majority who feel this way. However, this year's survey shows a decline in the sense of security in all three groups (though primarily Muslims and Christians), such that the findings for 2022 are lower in all cases than the multi-year average. Only about one-quarter of Muslims currently believe that Israel safeguards their security, compared with roughly one-third of Christians and slightly less than two-thirds of Druze.

A breakdown of the findings by voters for Zionist or (Arab) non-Zionist parties shows that a majority of the former hold that Israel protects its citizens' security, while only a small minority of the latter (less than half the share of the first group) take this view. Moreover, among those who voted for the non-Zionist parties, this year's numbers fell below the multi-year average, whereas among voters for the Zionist parties, the percentages were almost equal.

Table 2.7 (Arab sample; %)

		Agree that Israel ensures the security of its citizens, multi-year average	Agree that Israel ensures the security of its citizens, 2022
Religion	Muslims	42.5	23
	Christians	45.7	35
	Druze	68.8	65
Vote	(Arab) non-Zionist parties	42.1	27*
	Zionist parties	70	71*

* Based on reported vote in 2021 elections (in 2021 and 2022 surveys).

A breakdown of this year's responses by sex reveals that, in line with the multi-year average, Jewish men are more likely than Arab men and Jewish or Arab women to think that Israel ensures the security of its citizens. There is virtually no difference between Jewish and Arab women, in either the multi-year average or the current survey. A comparison of the multi-year averages shows that Arab women tend less than Arab men to believe that Israel keeps its citizens safe, but in this year's survey specifically, the share of women who take this view is in fact greater than that of the men.

Table 2.8 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

Agree that Israel ensures the security of its citizens	Men		Women	
	Multi-year average	2022	Multi-year average	2022
Jews	64.2	46	58.2	34
Arabs	46.4	26	44.0	31

How well does Israel ensure the welfare of its citizens?

Question 41 | Appendix 1, page 155 | Appendix 2, page 185

From the subject of security, we moved on to examine how well Israel ensures the welfare of its citizens. In all four surveys that we have conducted on this subject, the perception of the respondents in the total sample is that the state's capability in this area is low in and of itself, and even lower than its ability to safeguard their physical security. As with the latter, there was a decline this year in the feeling that the state could look out for citizens' welfare, though a more moderate one (from 33% in 2021 to 23% in 2022), perhaps as a result of what is referred to in the literature as the "floor effect," namely, the slowing or cessation of decline due to a concentration of data at or near a lower limit. Additionally, as shown in the figure, due to the

steep drop in Israel's perceived ability to protect its citizens, the sizeable gap that existed in the past between the two assessments was greatly reduced this year, despite the fact that the sense that the state could ensure their welfare also declined in comparison with last year.

Figure 2.13 / Agree that Israel ensures the security and the welfare of its citizens (total sample; %)



Interestingly enough, the perception among Arab respondents of Israel's ability to ensure its citizens' welfare (multi-year average, 46.0%) has continually exceeded that of the Jews, perhaps because their expectations from the state are lower, but there is a clear and consistent downward trend here as well. Among Jewish respondents, the findings have been relatively stable, albeit consistently reflecting a very low assessment of the state's ability to look out for the welfare of its citizens (multi-year average, 27.5%).

Figure 2.14 / Agree that Israel ensures the welfare of its citizens (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



In addition, we broke down this year's findings regarding citizens' welfare by social location. As expected, those who associate themselves with the stronger social groups believe more firmly that the state is able to ensure the well-being of its citizens than do those who identify with the weaker groups (22.5% versus 14%, respectively). A breakdown of the responses by age revealed that, though only a minority in all age groups see Israel as successful in this area, once again, the youngest cohort have a lower opinion of the state's abilities than their elders do.

Table 2.9 (total sample, 2022; %)

	Agree that Israel ensures the welfare of its citizens
18–24	18
25–44	20
45–64	28
65+	25

Cross-tabulating the responses to the two previous questions to determine if there is a correlation between them, we found that, as in past years, a majority of respondents believe that the state is **not** successful in looking out for its citizens' welfare among both those who hold that Israel does ensure the security of its citizens and those who think that it does not. However, there are differences in the size of this majority: Of those who feel that Israel protects them physically, only 54% hold that it does not safeguard their welfare, while of those who think that the state does not provide security, 89% think that it also fails to ensure their well-being.

In other words, the latter group's view is that Israel is failing to meet its citizens' needs in both respects.

Table 2.10 (total sample, 2022; %)

	Agree that Israel ensures the welfare of its citizens	Do not agree that Israel ensures the welfare of its citizens	Don't know	Total
Agree that Israel ensures the security of its citizens	45	54	1	100
Do **not** agree that Israel ensures the security of its citizens	9	89	2	100

Against the backdrop of these unflattering assessments, we presented a group of questions (all of them posed in the past) whose content is more emotionally based: Can citizens count on the state for help? Are interviewees optimistic or pessimistic about Israel's future? Are they proud to be Israeli? Do they feel a part of the state and its problems? Would they prefer to emigrate or remain in Israel? And is Israel a good place to live?

Can citizens count on the state to help them?

Question 45 | Appendix 1, page 156 | Appendix 2, page 187

Israeli citizens have high expectations—often unmet for objective and not-so-objective reasons—that the state will come to their aid when needed. We have seen this more than once in the past, for example, when we examined the level of services that the state is expected to provide to its citizens. The disappointment from these unfulfilled expectations in various areas—postal services, medicine, education, and the like—is repeatedly aired in various forums: the Knesset, the media, and personal conversations. In 2017, and again this year, we asked interviewees to indicate the extent of their agreement or disagreement with the following statement: "Citizens of Israel can always rely on the state to come to their aid in times of trouble." In both surveys, the majority did not agree that they can count on the state, and over the past five years, there has even been a rise in the share who disagree, and a decline in those who agree, with the above assertion.

Figure 2.15 / Citizens of Israel can always rely on the state to come to their aid in times of trouble (total sample; %)



Predictably enough, we found this year that, of those who identify with the stronger groups in society, the share who hold that the state will always help its citizens (44%) is noticeably higher than the corresponding share of respondents who associate themselves with the weaker social groups (33%). Nonetheless, in both cases, we are speaking of a minority who have faith in assistance from the state.

The variable of age had a clear association with the responses to this question, with young people relying less on the state to assist them than do the older age groups; in the oldest cohort, almost one-half feel that they can count on the state to always come to their aid.

Table 2.11 (total sample, 2022; %)

	18–24	25–44	45–64	65+
Agree that citizens of Israel can always count on the state to help them	29	35	44	48

Optimism about Israel's future

Question 64 | Appendix 1, page 159 | Appendix 2, page 200

As shown in the following figure, in the four previous surveys, a majority of the total sample expressed optimism regarding Israel's future (multi-year average, 64.4%), though overall we are seeing a clear downward trend. In 2022, for the first time, the share of optimists was slightly under half (49%), representing a dramatic plunge of 14 percentage points from 2021. In other

words, within one decade, there has been a decline from a solid majority who felt optimistic about the country's future to less than one-half, which jibes with the unflattering assessments (to put it mildly) of the state's performance, as discussed earlier.

Figure 2.16 / Optimistic about Israel's future (total sample; %)



Breaking down the total sample by nationality, we found that, among Jews, the share who feel optimistic about Israel's future is much higher than that among Arab respondents (multi-year averages of 67.6% and 48%, respectively). Yet, in 2022, among Jews as well, only one-half feel hopeful about the coming years, and among Arabs, just slightly over one-third.

Figure 2.17 / Optimistic about Israel's future (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



A breakdown of the Jewish sample by religiosity shows that the group that has consistently been the most optimistic about the country's future are the national religious, and the least optimistic, the secular (with multi-year averages of 82.7% and 60.1%, respectively). In 2022, the proportion of optimists in each of the groups is lower than their multi-year averages, and among the traditional non-religious and secular, does not even reach the halfway mark.

Analyzing the Jewish sample by political orientation, we find that the Left has been less optimistic over time than the Right and Center (with multi-year averages of 50.6%, 73.8% and 67.3%, respectively). And here again, the levels of optimism in 2022 are lower than the multi-year averages in all three camps, with the biggest difference on the Right, and the smallest, on the Left.

Table 2.12 (Jewish sample; %)

		Optimistic about Israel's future, multi-year average	Optimistic about Israel's future, 2022
Religiosity	Haredim	69.2	53
	National religious	82.7	73
	Traditional religious	79.9	54
	Traditional non-religious	69.5	46
	Secular	60.1	47
Political orientation	Right	73.8	54
	Center	67.3	52
	Left	50.6	46.5

Breaking down the responses in this year's survey by age, we found that younger Jews are less optimistic than their elders. In fact, the youngest cohort is the only group in which only a minority feel hopeful about Israel's future. Among Arab respondents, there is little difference between the groups, though the oldest age group (65+) is less optimistic than the others.

Table 2.13 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

	Age	Optimistic about Israel's future, 2022
Jews	18–24	42.5
	25–44	50
	45–64	51
	65+	61
Arabs	18–24	39
	25–44	36
	45–64	39
	65+	29

In this year's survey, while Jewish men are more optimistic than Jewish women about the country's future (56% versus 46.5%, respectively), there is not a great difference between the sexes in the Arab sample (38% of women compared with 35.5% of men). As expected, we also found differences between those who identified with stronger social groups (56.5%) and those who identified with weaker ones (39%).

We wished to learn whether there is a connection between perceptions of Israel's overall situation and optimism regarding the country's future. A cross-tabulation of the responses on both questions over the years yielded sizeable gaps in the level of optimism between those who felt that Israel's condition is good (the top line in the figure below), those who characterized it as so-so (the middle line), and those who saw it as bad (the bottom line, which is very low).

Figure 2.18 / Optimistic about Israel's future, by assessment of the country's situation (total sample; %)



Pride in being Israeli

Question 4 | Appendix 1, page 147 | Appendix 2, page 164

Pride in being Israeli is one of the most stable indicators we have examined over time, with a majority of respondents in the total sample consistently stating that they are proud of their Israeli identity (multi-year average, 79.8%). Despite the gloomy national mood highlighted above, we have not seen a significant drop over the years in the level of pride. In fact, there was even a slight rise this year compared with 2021 (when the level was one of the lowest), though this falls squarely within the range of statistical error, and thus should not be considered meaningful.

Figure 2.19 / Proud to be Israeli (total sample; %)



Breaking down the total sample into Jewish and Arab Israelis, we see not only vast differences over the years but divergent trends: Whereas the Jewish interviewees exhibit remarkable stability and an extremely high level of pride in their Israeliness (multi-year average, 85.9%), among Arab respondents we found steep fluctuations (for example, in the aftermath of the Second Lebanon War, and the events of May 2021), and a much lower share who expressed pride in being Israeli (multi-year average in the Arab sample, 46.0%).

In 2022, the share of Jews who are proud to be Israeli was virtually unchanged from last year (85%, compared with 84% in 2021), while among Arab respondents, there was a discernible increase (38% this year as opposed to 28% last year), though the result was still particularly low; measured in June 2021, it was apparently affected strongly by the events of the preceding month.

Figure 2.20 / Proud to be Israeli (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



Breaking down the responses by sex, we found no differences between men and women over time in the Jewish sample (multi-year averages: men, 85.8%; women, 86.1%), while among Arab respondents, the men feel a greater sense of pride in being Israeli than do the women (multi-year averages: 49.7% and 42.3%, respectively).

Analyzing this question in the Jewish sample by religiosity showed clearly that the national religious are the proudest to be Israeli (multi-year average, 93.8%), while the Haredim expressed the lowest level of pride, though still a majority (71.0%). Here too, the 2022 findings in all groups were lower than the multi-year averages.

Table 2.14 (Jewish sample; %)

	Proud to be Israeli, multi-year average	Proud to be Israeli, 2022
Haredim	71.0	62
National religious	93.8	93
Traditional*	91.9	91
Secular	83.4	84

* Until the 2013 survey, no distinction was made between traditional religious and traditional nonreligious; consequently, the multi-year averages are presented for the traditional respondents as one group.

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation shows that a majority in all three camps have expressed pride in their Israeliness through the years, but the ratings in the Right and Center have generally been relatively close (multi-year averages: 89.7% and 87.0%, respectively), while the Left has placed slightly lower for most of the years surveyed (multi-year average, 77.0%). In 2022 as well, the pattern repeated itself, with the share of respondents from the Right and Center who expressed pride in their Israeliness at a similar level, and higher than the Left (Right, 87%; Center, 88%; Left, 74.5%). Further, the 2022 results from the Right and Center are close to the multi-year averages, while on the Left this year's findings are slightly lower.

Figure 2.21 / Proud to be Israeli (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



And what about the Arab public? As we have seen in earlier questions, and in the figure below showing all three Arab religious groups through the years, here the fluctuations are pronounced, though a higher share of Druze than of Christians and Muslims express pride in being Israeli (multi-year averages: Muslims, 42.1%; Christians, 50.5%; Druze, 66.3%). The data also indicate a slight resurgence of pride among Muslim respondents in 2022 compared with 2021 (35% in 2022, as opposed to just 28% in 2021), and the same holds true for the Christians (32% in 2022, compared with 23% in 2021). As for the Druze, the impact of the Nation-State Law on their pride in being Israeli can be felt clearly in the steep drop from 70% to 33% between 2018 (when the survey was conducted before the Law was enacted) and 2021, bringing them closer to the Muslims and the Christians. This year's finding for Druze respondents climbed to a level similar to 2018 (68%), though time will tell if this was an exceptionally high, one-time finding or a return to the past.

Table 2.15 (Arab sample; %)

Religon	Proud to be Israeli, multi-year average	Proud to be Israeli, 2022
Muslims	42.1	35
Christians	50.5	32
Druze	66.3	68

Comparing the responses of Arab interviewees who voted over the years for (Arab) non-Zionist parties and those who voted for Zionist parties, we found that the share of the latter who expressed pride in being Israeli (69.1%) was almost double that of the multi-year average of the former (39.6%).

A breakdown of this year's responses by age did not yield differences between the various groups in the Jewish sample; however, among Arab interviewees, we found that the younger cohorts are much less proud of their Israeliness than are their older counterparts.

Table 2.16 (Arab sample; %)

	Proud to be Israeli, 2022
18–24	28
25–44	36.5
45–64	42
65+	51

Cross-tabulating the questions on pride in being Israeli, and Israel's overall situation, we found that the share of respondents who feel proud to be Israeli has been lower through the years among those who see Israel's situation as bad than among those who rate the country's condition as so-so, and even more so, as good.

Figure 2.22 / Proud to be Israeli, by assessment of Israel's situation (total sample; %)



Figure 2.23 / Feel part of the State of Israel and its problems (total sample; %)



* Until 2014, the interviewees were presented with the additional choice of "to some degree." For purposes of comparison, we distributed this option proportionately between the positive and negative responses.

Feeling part of the state

Question 7 | Appendix 1, page 148 | Appendix 2, page 165

Alongside the topic of pride in being Israeli, we revisited a question from many of our previous democracy surveys: "To what extent do you feel part of the State of Israel and its problems?" As shown in the figure below, here too there is a consistently high sense of belonging among respondents in the total sample (multi-year average, 81%). As with the sense of pride, the feeling of belonging registered a slight increase over last year (2021, 76%; 2022, 79%), though this too is within the range of statistical error, such that it is premature to attach any real importance to the finding at this stage.

However, dividing the years surveyed into two time frames (2003–2012 and 2013–2022) revealed some decline in the latter period in the overall sense of connectedness with the state and its problems (with multi-year averages of 83.9% and 77.2%, respectively).

For obvious reasons, as with pride in being Israeli, the sense of belonging to the country has been higher over the years among Jewish than among Arab interviewees (multi-year averages: Jews, 86.2%; Arabs, 48.7%). The gap between the two groups has been very consistent, and the distribution of responses within each group has likewise remained largely stable over the years. Nonetheless, in 2022 there was a slight increase over last year in the sense of belonging among Jewish respondents (86% compared with 82%), while in the Arab public, we found the opposite trend (from 43% to 40.5%).

Figure 2.24 / Feel part of the State of Israel and its problems (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



∗ Until 2014, the interviewees were presented with the additional choice of "to some degree." For purposes of comparison, we distributed this option proportionately between the positive and negative responses.

A breakdown of the responses in the Jewish sample by religiosity shows that Haredim feel the least connected with the state (though here too the majority expressed a sense of belonging). Moreover, this is the only religious group in which this year's findings are significantly lower than the multi-year average. The national religious respondents reported the strongest sense of connectedness with the state and its problems.

Over the years, we have not found consistent differences between the political camps; however, in 2022, there is a noticeably greater sense of belonging on the Left, presumably due to this camp being represented in the governing coalition after years of "exile" in the opposition.

A breakdown of the responses by age revealed a substantial majority in each age group who report feeling a part of the state and its problems, though the level is lower in the younger cohorts.

Table 2.17 (Jewish sample; %)

		Feel part of the state and its problems, multi-year average	Feel part of the state and its problems, 2022
Religiosity	Haredim	72.5	64
	National religious	90.5	90
	Traditional	87.8	89
	Secular	86.7	89
Political orientation	Right	86.7	86
	Center	87.5	87
	Left	87.5	92
Age	18–24	77.0	81
	25–44	83.9	81
	45–64	90.6	91
	65+	90.1	92

A breakdown by religion in the Arab sample demonstrates noticeable differences: A majority of Druze, compared with a minority of Christians and Muslims, feel a part of the state and its problems. In this year's survey, the results among Muslims were considerably lower than the multi-year average, while among Christians, the decrease was negligible, and among Druze, there was even a slight upturn.

Analyzing the responses of the Arab interviewees by vote (for Zionist or Arab non-Zionist parties), we found, as expected, that the sense of belonging of the former group is much greater than—in fact, double—that of the latter. The results for those who indicated that they did not vote are closer to those of the voters for non-Zionist parties. A breakdown by age also found that in all groups, the largest share reported feeling part of the state and its problems, though this share was smaller in the younger age groups.

Table 2.18 (Arab sample; %)

		Feel part of the state and its problems, multi-year average	Feel part of the state and its problems, 2022
Religion	Muslims	45.9	37
	Christians	47.5	45
	Druze	64.6	68
Vote	(Arab) non-Zionist parties	44	36*
	Zionist parties	65.2	69*
Age	18–24	38.8	33
	25–44	49.2	38.5
	45–64	55.1	48
	65+	55.8	44

* Based on reported vote in 2021 elections (in 2021 and 2022 surveys).

A breakdown of the 2022 results by social location shows that, in both the Jewish and Arab samples, those who identify with stronger social groups feel more connected with the state than do those who associate themselves with weaker ones. A considerable majority of Jews report a sense of belonging whether they identify with the stronger or weaker groups in Israeli society (88.5% and 82%, respectively), while among Arab respondents, we found a (sizeable) minority in both cases who feel this way (48.5% and 34.5%, respectively). Once again, we see that even Arabs who associate themselves with the stronger groups feel much less a part of the state than do Jews with a similar social identity.

We wished to know whether there is an association between sense of belonging to the state and perception of Israel's overall situation. Cross-tabulating the responses to both these questions in 2022 shows that those who feel more connected consistently take a more positive view of the country's situation than do those who feel part of the state and its problems to a lesser degree or not at all.

Figure 2.25 / Define Israel's overall situation as good, by sense of belonging to the state and its problems (total sample; %)



Prefer to emigrate or stay?

Question 63 | Appendix 1, page 159 | Appendix 2, page 199

We sought to learn whether Israelis wish to remain in Israel or emigrate. In previous years (2003–2012), the question was worded as follows: "In the long run, do you wish to remain in Israel?" The multi-year average in the Jewish sample for this period for those who want to stay in Israel is 86.8%, and in the Arab sample, 82.5%, meaning that the share of Jews who wished to remain in Israel long term was slightly greater at the time.

Figure 2.26 / Prefer to remain in Israel in the long run (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



From 2015 onward, the wording of the question was changed to: "If you could receive American citizenship, or that of another Western country, would you prefer to live there or to remain in Israel?" Here too, we found a majority of both Jews and Arabs who expressed a preference for remaining in Israel (multi-year averages: Jews, 77.2%; Arabs, 82%); however, as shown in the figure below, in this year's survey, the Arab majority who wish to remain surpasses that of the Jews.

Figure 2.27 / If you could receive American citizenship, or that of another Western country, would you prefer to live there or to remain in Israel? 2022 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



A breakdown of the Jewish sample by religiosity since 2015 shows that the national religious and Haredi respondents are the most interested in remaining in Israel. Nonetheless, the extent of this preference in 2022 is lower across all groups than the multi-year average. Breaking down the results by political orientation, we found that on the Right, the proportion who would prefer to stay in Israel exceeds the corresponding share in the Center and on the Left. Once again, the findings for 2022 are lower in all groups than the multi-year average. With regard to social location, those who associate themselves with the stronger groups in Israeli society report a greater desire to remain in Israel than do those who identify with the weaker groups.

Table 2.19 (Jewish sample; %)

		Prefer to remain in Israel, multi-year average	Prefer to remain in Israel, 2022
Religiosity	Haredim	90.9	80
	National religious	91.5	87
	Traditional religious	82.4	68
	Traditional non-religious	78.1	65
	Secular	69.0	58
Political orientation	Right	80.8	70
	Center	74.3	64
	Left	71.4	61
Social location	Identify with stronger social groups	80.8	73.5
	Identify with weaker social groups	69.4	56

Analyzing the Arab sample by religion and by vote in the 2021 election, we found a higher share of Muslim respondents than of Christians and Druze who report a desire to remain in Israel even if they would have an easy opportunity to emigrate. In this breakdown as well, the 2022 findings across all groups are lower than the multi-year average, indicating a decreasing willingness to remain in Israel. The differences between voting groups were not found to be statistically significant.

Table 2.20 (Arab sample; %)

		Prefer to remain in Israel, multi-year average	Prefer to remain in Israel, 2022
Religion	Muslims	84.2	84
	Christians	70.3	74
	Druze	77.8	72
Vote	(Arab) non-Zionist parties	81.9	80.7*
	Zionist parties	78.3	75.3*

* Based on reported vote in 2021 elections (in 2021 and 2022 surveys).

Among both Jews and Arabs, the younger age groups are more open to the possibility of emigrating. The following table shows the percentages who responded that, under the proposed conditions, they would prefer to live in a different country. A greater share of Jews, on average, expressed their willingness to engage in such a step.

Table 2.21 (Jewish and Arab samples, 2022; %)

Age	Would prefer to emigrate	
	Jews	Arabs
18–24	24	22
25–44	19	20
45–64	19	12
65+	11	6

Cross-tabulating the willingness to remain in Israel or emigrate with the level of optimism about the country's future, we found that a much greater proportion of the optimists than of the pessimists would prefer to remain in Israel. A comparison of the 2022 findings with the multi-year average shows little difference in the optimistic group, but a considerable drop below the multi-year average among the pessimists.

Table 2.22 (total sample; %)

	Prefer to remain in Israel, multi-year average	Prefer to remain in Israel, 2022
Optimistic about Israel's future	83.7	85
Pessimistic about Israel's future	59.6	54

■ Is Israel a good place to live?

Question 32 | Appendix 1, page 153 | Appendix 2, page 181

Against the backdrop of the strong (though waning) desire of the Israeli public to remain in the country, even given the attractive hypothetical conditions for moving elsewhere, we revisited the question of whether Israel is a good place to live. In the four surveys where this question was posed, a majority responded positively, though by a smaller margin among Arab respondents than among Jews (multi-year average: Jews, 75.5%; Arabs, 67.3%). This year's findings showed a decline relative to last year in the Jewish sample (from 76% in 2021 to 64%), as well as in the Arab sample (66% to 52%). Overall, the share who answered in the affirmative in 2022 was the lowest in all the surveys we have conducted to date.

Figure 2.28 / Agree that Israel is a good place to live (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



A breakdown of this year's responses shows a change from previous years: In the Jewish sample in earlier surveys, those who identified with the Right were the most inclined to agree that Israel is a good place to live (multi-year average, 80.9%), followed by the Center and the Left (with multi-year averages of 72.8% and 64.0%, respectively). This year, we found that all three camps converged around a similar level of agreement (Right, 64%; Center, 66%; Left, 65%). Compared with 2021, this represents a fairly sharp decline on the Right and in the Center, and a rise on the Left.

Figure 2.29 / Agree that Israel is a good place to live (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



An analysis of the responses to this question by age group reveals that, in both the Jewish and Arab samples, the younger age groups—which represent the greatest potential source of emigration—see Israel as a less desirable country to reside in. Indeed, this is the first time that only a minority of the youngest cohort agree that Israel is a good place to live, among both Jews and Arabs.

Table 2.23 (Jewish and Arab samples, 2022; %)

Age	Agree that Israel is a good place to live	
	Jews	Arabs
18–24	43	37
25–44	58.5	49.5
45–64	69	64
65+	80	63

Cross-tabulating the responses on whether Israel is a good place to live with the desire to remain or emigrate, we found, understandably enough, that the share who would prefer to stay among those who consider Israel an attractive option is almost double that of the respondents who feel that Israel is not a desirable place to live.

Table 2.24 (total sample; %)

	Prefer to remain in Israel, multi-year average	Prefer to remain in Israel, 2022
Agree that Israel is a good place to live	82.8	82
Do not agree that Israel is a good place to live	48.4	49

Chapter 3 / Commitment of Israeli Public to Democratic Principles

In this chapter, we discuss the following topics:

- Should Jewish citizens have greater rights?
- Do Israelis want a strong leader?
- Does Israel act democratically toward Arabs as well as Jews?
- Including Arab parties in the coalition
- Should crucial decisions on issues of security and society be made strictly by a Jewish majority?
- Should Israel's Supreme Court have the power to overturn laws?
- Is it legitimate to use violence for political ends?
- Extent to which democratic principles are upheld in Israel

In this chapter, we shine a spotlight on the ideological foundations of Israeli democracy, examining the public's level of commitment to such basic democratic values as civil equality, separation of powers, and restrictions on specific actions in pursuit of political goals.

More rights for Jewish citizens?

Question 37 | Appendix 1, page 154 | Appendix 2, page 183

On ten occasions over the years, including the present survey, we examined the degree of support in the Jewish public for granting greater rights to Jews in Israel, by virtue of its being a Jewish state. The multi-year average for endorsement of this position stands at 36.6%. While this constitutes a minority of just over one-third of those surveyed, we have seen a rise in support since 2018, with the results of the last two years surpassing the multi-year average. In this year's survey, nearly one-half of Jewish interviewees (49%) expressed support for Jews in Israel being given greater rights than non-Jews, signaling a growing detachment from the democratic principle of equal rights for all citizens.

While similarly high support was recorded in 2013, that was an outlying peak which was immediately followed by a decline. By contrast, this year's finding arrives on the back of steadily rising support for the idea that Jews should have more rights, though we cannot know at this stage whether the increases of the last few years will continue or will now tail off.

Figure 3.1 / Agree that Jewish citizens of Israel should have more rights than non-Jewish citizens (Jewish sample; %)



We found differences this year between the three political camps in the Jewish sample on the question of granting greater rights to Jewish citizens: A sizeable majority of those who identify themselves with the Right agreed with this notion (62%), compared with around one-third of respondents in the Center, and a scant minority on the Left (11%). A further difference between the camps emerges when comparing this year's assessment with the multi-year average: Whereas on the Left, the two are virtually identical, in the Center, current support for this position is eight percentage points higher than the multi-year average, and on the Right, 14 percentage points, indicating growing endorsement of this undemocratic attitude in the latter two camps.

Substantial differences were also found with respect to religiosity. In the 2022 survey, as in all previous ones, only a minority of secular respondents agreed with the proposition that Jews should have greater rights than non-Jews, while in the other groups, the percentage who expressed agreement not only constitutes a majority but also exceeds the multi-year average, with the greatest upswing found among the traditional religious and the national religious.

Differences between groups in the Jewish sample were also found when analyzing the results by age: The youngest cohort (ages 18–24) are the most prone to agree that Jewish citizens should enjoy greater rights than non-Jews (2022, 59%; multi-year average, 46.6%), with the level of support declining in inverse proportion to age, culminating with the interviewees aged 65 and over (2022, 29%; multi-year average, 30.2%). It should be noted that, as we pointed out in chapter 1, the younger age groups contain a higher proportion of respondents who identify

with one of the more religious groupings (Haredi, national religious, and traditional religious), and thus it is possible that religiosity is the variable being expressed here, more than age per se.

Table 3.1 (Jewish sample; %)

Agree that Jewish citizens should have greater rights than non-Jewish citizens		Multi-year average	2022
Political orientation	Left	12.1	11
	Center	25.6	33.5
	Right	48.4	62
Religiosity	Haredim	63.5	69
	National religious	52.7	67
	Traditional religious	48.2	67
	Traditional non-religious	38.1	52
	Secular	23.3	29.5
Age	18–24	46.6	59
	25–44	39.0	58
	45–64	33.4	45
	65+	29.2	29

■ Do Israelis want a strong leader?

Question 48 | Appendix 1, page 156 | Appendix 2, page 189

Democratic governments are based on a system of checks and balances involving various institutions and actors in the state and society. In thirteen surveys over the years, we have examined whether Israelis long for a "strong leader" who would not be constrained by the Knesset, bureaucracy, or the media. We have posed this question in two different versions: Up to and including 2010, we asked interviewees to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the statement: "A few strong leaders can be more effective than any discussions or laws," and since 2014 the question has been worded: "To handle Israel's unique problems, we need a strong leader who is not swayed by the Knesset, the media, or public opinion."

In most of the surveys, we found a high proportion of respondents who favored a strong leader, with the exception of 2014–2017, when only a minority (though a sizeable one) took this position. The multi-year average in support of this statement for the period from 2003 to 2010 (when the earlier wording was used) is 58.8%, and from 2014 to 2022 (with the present-day wording), 49.0%. At the same time, the fluctuations between surveys using the first version of the question were minor, while the second version has yielded a steady rise in support for a strong leader, from 41% in 2014 to a considerable majority of 61% in 2022.

Figure 3.2 / A few strong leaders can be more effective than any discussions or laws (2003–2010); To handle Israel's unique problems, we need a strong leader who is not swayed by the Knesset, the media, or public opinion (2014–2022) (agree; total sample; %)



A breakdown of the Jewish and Arab samples shows substantial differences between the multi-year averages for each version of the question: Whereas a majority of the Jewish respondents agreed with the earlier version of the question (multi-year average, 60.7%), less than half of the Arab interviewees (48.2%) took this view. By contrast, with the later version, we found greater support for a strong leader among Arabs than among Jews (multi-year averages, 58.6% and 47.0%, respectively). This disparity may be due to the fact that the former refers to several leaders while the latter mentions only one, which may appeal more to the Arab interviewees and less to the Jewish ones. Another explanation might be the changing circumstances over the years, which have increased Arab support for such a style of leadership. It should nonetheless be noted that in the two most recent surveys (2021 and 2022), the gap between the responses of the Jewish and Arab interviewees on this question is narrowing, with a majority in both groups favoring a strong leader.

Table 3.2 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

	Agree that "a few strong leaders can be more effective than any discussions or laws" (multi-year average, 2003–2010)	Agree that "to handle Israel's unique problems, we need a strong leader who is not swayed by the Knesset, the media, or public opinion" (multi-year average, 2014–2022)
Jews	60.7	47.0
Arabs	48.2	58.6

For the later version of the statement, analyzing the degree of support in the Jewish sample by political orientation produced two key findings: first, throughout the relevant period (2014–2022), support for a strong leader was highest on the Right and lowest on the Left, with the Center falling somewhere in the middle (multi-year averages: Right, 56.1%; Center, 39.8%; Left, 29.0%); and second, the last two years have seen a rise in support for a strong leader in all three camps, with this year showing the highest level yet and the Center crossing the halfway mark for the first time (Right, 68%; Center, 54%; Left, 38%).

Figure 3.3 / To handle Israel's unique problems, we need a strong leader who is not swayed by the Knesset, the media, or public opinion (agree; Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



Breaking down the extent of support for a strong leader in the Jewish sample by religiosity, it emerges that Haredim are the staunchest believers in the need for a strong leader to address Israel's unique problems (multi-year average, 62.3%). Among traditional religious respondents, over half (56%) agree with this statement, with the corresponding levels among traditional non-religious and national religious at 50.6% and 50.1%, respectively. In 2022, half of the secular interviewees indicated that they favor having a strong leader (compared with the multi-year average of 39%).

Table 3.3 (Jewish sample; %)

	Agree that "to handle Israel's unique problems, we need a strong leader who is not swayed by the Knesset, the media, or public opinion" (2014–2022)	
	Multi-year average	**2022**
Haredim	62.3	70.5
National religious	50.1	62
Traditional religious	56	73
Traditional non-religious	50.6	66
Secular	39	50

Including Arab parties in the coalition

Question 59 | Appendix 1, page 158 | Appendix 2, page 197

The matter of including Arab parties in the coalition has long preoccupied politicians and the public in Israel, but since the March 2021 elections, and all the more so since Ra'am joined the Bennett-Lapid government three months later, this question has become one of the central issues in Israeli politics. On fourteen occasions over the last twenty years, we have examined the degree of support in the Israeli public for bringing Arab parties into the government, including the appointment of Arab ministers.

In all our surveys, a substantial majority of the Arab public has supported including Arab parties in the government and appointing Arab ministers, compared with only a minority of the Jewish public (multi-year averages of 78.8% and 31.7%, respectively).

Against the backdrop of Ra'am's entry into the coalition in the summer of 2021, the level of support for such a step rose this year in the Arab public, with a corresponding decline among the Jewish public.

Figure 3.4 / Support bringing Arab parties into the government, including appointment of Arab ministers (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



Figure 3.5 / Support bringing Arab parties into the government, including appointment of Arab ministers (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



Breaking down the responses of the Jewish sample by political orientation revealed three key points: First, the multi-year averages show a sizeable majority on the Left who have supported including Arab parties in the government and appointing Arab ministers in all surveys to date (67.2%), as opposed to a considerable minority in the Center (38.9%) and a small minority on the Right (15.5%). Second, different trends can be discerned over the years in each of the political camps: On the Left, there has been a rise in support for such a step (multi-year average of 61.8% for 2003–2010 as compared with 81.9% for 2015–2022). The Center also recorded a significant rise, from a multi-year average of 35.6% in 2003–2010 to 47.3% in 2015–2022. By contrast, the Right's position on this question has remained virtually unchanged, with low levels of support throughout the periods surveyed (first decade, 14.4%; second decade, 14.6%). Third, a comparison between the last two surveys shows disparate trends in the different camps in the Jewish sample that can be explained by changes in the political situation, with an Arab party (Ra'am) included in the governing coalition for the first time: On the Left, we found a rise of 9 percentage points in favor of bringing Arab parties into the coalition and appointing Arab ministers, and in the Center, a slight upturn of 3 percentage points, whereas on the Right, support for such a move plummeted by roughly 50% (from 21% one year ago to 10% in the current survey).

A breakdown of responses in the Jewish sample by religiosity reveals considerable differences between the various groups: Whereas one-half of secular respondents in this year's survey indicated support for inclusion of Arab parties and ministers, in the remainder of the groups, the share in favor was minuscule (6%–15%). Looking at the multi-year averages yields a similar picture, with much greater support among secular respondents (43.9%) than among the other groups (traditional, 23.5%; national religious, 16.6%; Haredim, 11.4%).

Analyzing the Jewish public by age shows sizeable differences in the multi-year average: While a minority of respondents in the young and intermediate age groups (18–44) back the notion of including Arab parties in the government and appointing Arab ministers, over half of the oldest cohort (65 and over) are in favor. Once again, it is possible that this difference is not only due to age itself, but also to the higher proportion of religious and right-wing respondents in the younger age groups.

Table 3.4 (Jewish sample; %)

Support bringing Arab parties into the government, including appointment of Arab ministers		Multi-year average	2022
Religiosity	Haredim	11.4	6
	National religious	16.6	12
	Traditional	23.5	15
	Secular	43.9	51
Age	18–24	23.1	9
	25–44	28.2	15.5
	45–64	35.5	36
	65+	40.2	53

■ Jewish majority for decisions on peace and security?

Question 42 | Appendix 1, page 155 | Appendix 2, page 186

Should Arab citizens of Israel have a hand in deciding issues crucial to the state? This year, as in the previous survey, a solid majority (80%) of Jewish interviewees held that decisions crucial to the state on matters of peace and security should be decided by a Jewish majority. This is a slightly higher share than the multi-year average of 74.2%, with support for this notion remaining more-or-less stable over the years.

Figure 3.6 / Agree that decisions crucial to the state on issues of peace and security should be made by a Jewish majority (Jewish sample; %)



A breakdown of this year's responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation shows a majority of respondents from the Right and Center who wish to exclude Arabs from having a say on critical peace and security issues (89% and 76%, respectively)—ratings that are similar to, if slightly higher than, the multi-year averages for these groups. By contrast, on the Left, only a minority (though a sizeable one, at 46%) support decision-making by a Jewish majority on such matters, a finding below the multi-year average for this group (52.7%). Nonetheless, it should be noted that the multi-year averages in all three camps point to a majority who favor making crucial decisions strictly on the basis of a Jewish majority, that is to say, excluding Arabs from the process.

We also found disparities (though slightly smaller) when breaking down the Jewish sample by religiosity: In each of the groups, a majority favor excluding Arabs from decision-making roles in matters of peace and security. Here too, the level of support is quite constant.

Table 3.5 (Jewish sample; %)

Agree that decisions crucial to the state on issues of peace and security should be made by a Jewish majority		Multi-year average	2022
Political orientation	Left	52.7	46
	Center	73.8	76
	Right	82.7	89
Religiosity	Haredim	84.6	92
	National religious	84.5	89
	Traditional	78.7	88
	Secular	68.1	67

■ Jewish majority for decisions on economy and society?

Question 44 | Appendix 1, page 155 | Appendix 2, page 187

Alongside the Jewish public's strong support for requiring a Jewish majority when making crucial decisions on matters of peace and security, we also found a (slightly smaller) majority who hold the same view on issues of economy and society (2022, 60%; multi-year average, 59.1%).

Figure 3.7 / Agree that decisions crucial to the state on issues of economy and society should be made by a Jewish majority (Jewish sample; %)



We encountered considerable gaps between the political camps in the Jewish sample in the level of support for this position: A majority of 72% on the Right agree with the assertion that decisions crucial to the state on matters of economy and society should be made by a Jewish majority, as do one-half (51%) in the Center, and only a small minority (14%) on the Left. For respondents from the Right and Center, this year's findings are similar to the multi-year averages, whereas on the Left, the share who favor keeping Arabs out of the decision-making process on these issues falls below their multi-year average. Likewise, we found differences when breaking down the results in the Jewish public by religiosity: A substantial majority of Haredi, national religious, and traditional respondents espouse this view, as opposed to a minority (albeit sizeable) of secular survey participants.

Table 3.6 (Jewish sample; %)

Agree that decisions crucial to the state on issues of economy and society should be made by a Jewish majority		Multi-year average	2022
Political orientation	Left	27.0	14
	Center	51.4	51
	Right	73.4	72
Religiosity	Haredim	76	74
	National religious	75.1	71
	Traditional	67.5	72
	Secular	45.9	42

As in past years, we found an association between support for a Jewish majority deciding crucial issues in the context of peace and security and support for the same principle in the areas of economy and society. In this year's survey, a considerable majority of those who strongly agree that decisions crucial to the state on issues of peace and security should be made by a Jewish majority also take this view with regard to matters of economy and society (strongly agree, 60%; somewhat agree, 23.5%). A much smaller majority can also be found in the "somewhat agree" group, where 6% strongly agree and 47% somewhat agree that a Jewish majority is necessary for crucial economic and social decisions. On the other hand, of those who disagree with the need for a Jewish majority on decisions concerning peace and security, there is almost a wall-to-wall consensus (87%–96%) that there need not be a Jewish majority when deciding about economy and society. In other words, there is a strong (though not absolute) correlation between the positions of the respondents on both these issues, meaning that those who wish to exclude Arabs from decision making in one area also wish to leave them out of decisions in the other realm, and vice versa.

Figure 3.8 / Agree or disagree that decisions crucial to the state on issues of economy and society should be made by a Jewish majority (Jewish sample, by position on decision-making in matters of peace and security; %)



Should the Supreme Court be able to overturn laws?

Question 35 | Appendix 1, page 154 | Appendix 2, page 182

One of the cornerstones of democracy is the principle of separation of powers, meaning a system of checks and balances between the three branches of government: the legislative, the executive, and the judicial. On three occasions, we have asked whether the Supreme Court should have the power to overturn laws passed by the Knesset if they are found to conflict with various democratic principles. In each of these three surveys, a majority have agreed that the Supreme Court should have such authority. That is, the public views the Supreme Court as having the power to review the actions of the legislative branch, and particularly to strike down certain laws, due to its role as the protector of the constitutional principles of the State of Israel. Against the backdrop of the current extensive attacks on the powers of the Supreme Court, it would seem that, in the court of public opinion, the Supreme Court's interventions are actually welcome.

Figure 3.9 / The Supreme Court should have the power to overturn laws passed by the Knesset if they conflict with democratic principles such as freedom of expression or equality before the law (total sample; %)



A comparison of Jewish and Arab responses over the years shows that, while a growing majority of Arabs support granting the Supreme Court the power to nullify laws if it deems them to be in conflict with various democratic principles (from 61% in 2010 to 87% in 2022), in the Jewish public the assessments have remained unchanged over the last three surveys, with roughly one-half favoring this proposal each time.

Figure 3.10 / Agree that the Supreme Court should have the power to overturn laws passed by the Knesset if they conflict with democratic principles (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



A breakdown by political orientation shows that between 2010 and 2022, there has been a steady rise on the Left and in the Center in the share of respondents who favor granting the authority to the Supreme Court to annul laws passed by the Knesset if they run counter to democratic principles, while on the Right the results have remained largely stable, with a slight downturn in support for this proposition.

Figure 3.11 / Agree that the Supreme Court should have the power to overturn laws passed by the Knesset if they conflict with democratic principles (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



Is it legitimate to use violence for political ends?

Question 33 | Appendix 1, page 153 | Appendix 2, page 181

One of the hallmarks of a democracy is the tacit understanding that violence must not be employed for political ends. In eleven surveys over the years (and more regularly during the first decade of the millennium), we asked interviewees to express their agreement or disagreement with the statement: "The use of violence for political ends is never justified." The multi-year average share of respondents who agree with this assertion stands at 75.1%; however, as shown in the figure below, while a majority in all the relevant surveys do not legitimize the use of violence for political objectives, the size of this majority has varied greatly over time. Thus, one cannot make the claim that there has been consistent, across-the-board rejection of the use of violence to advance political goals, since between 2007 and 2011 less than three-quarters held that violence for political ends is always illegitimate. At the same time, there may be a glimmer of hope in the fact that the last two surveys showed a consensus of opinion against the commission of violent acts for political purposes.

Figure 3.12 / Agree that the use of violence for political ends is never justified (total sample; %)



Among Arab respondents (where the multi-year average is 63.4%), the fluctuations have been more dramatic, with even a majority at certain points indicating that the use of violence for political ends was justified in some cases. Nonetheless, in the Arab public as well, the average proportion of interviewees in the last two surveys who agree with the statement (86.5%) is significantly higher than the multi-year average, meaning that here, too, the opposition to violence for political objectives is greater than in the past.

Figure 3.13 / Agree that the use of violence for political ends is never justified (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



A breakdown of responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation shows that in all three camps over the years, a majority agree that violence should not be employed under any circumstances; however, this majority is slightly higher on the Left than in the Center or on the Right (multi-year averages of 81.5%, 78.0%, and 75.5%, respectively).

Although it is generally assumed that young people are more likely to justify the use of violence for political ends (if not to actually engage in it), an analysis of responses to this question in the Jewish and Arab samples broken down by age did not produce substantial differences. Likewise, breaking down the results by sex did not yield disparities, despite the conventional wisdom that women have a greater aversion to violence than do men.

To what extent are democratic principles upheld?

Questions 25–30 | Appendix 1, pages 152–153 | Appendix 2, pages 177–180

We examined respondents' perceptions of how well six key democratic principles are being upheld in Israel today: minority rights, the right to live in dignity, freedom of expression, separation of powers, freedom of religion, and freedom of political association.

In only one instance (the right to live in dignity) is there a majority (58%) who hold that this democratic value is insufficiently upheld in Israel today. Slightly less than half feel similarly regarding minority rights (47%), separation of powers (46%), and freedom of religion (41%). With regard to freedom of expression, opinions are split three ways, with one-third believing that it is upheld too little; one-third, the right amount; and one-third, too much. Freedom of political association is seen by 40% as being upheld to the correct extent, while around one-quarter say that it is upheld too much, and a similar share that it is not upheld enough. This principle also garnered the highest proportion of "don't know" responses.

Figure 3.14 / To what extent are the following democratic principles upheld in Israel today? (2022; total sample; %)



The right to live in dignity

As stated, the greatest proportion of interviewees hold that this democratic principle is insufficiently upheld. In four surveys over the past decade, we found a sizeable increase in the share of the Jewish public who take this view (from 45% in 2013 to 58% in 2022); in other words, over the last ten years there has been a growing sense among Jews that the right to live in dignity is being eroded. Among Arab respondents, this perception is even stronger, climbing from less than one-quarter who felt this way in 2013 to 56% today.

Figure 3.15 / To what extent is the right to live in dignity upheld? (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation finds, not surprisingly, that respondents on the Left are the most inclined to believe that the right to live in dignity is not adequately upheld (multi-year average, 68.5%). A majority in the Center, as opposed to a minority (albeit substantial) on the Right, also espouse this view (with multi-year averages of 57.9% and 45.5%, respectively). However, the gap between the camps on this issue has narrowed over time (from 22 percentage points between Left and Right in 2013 to 14 in 2022). In fact, a majority in all three camps hold that the right to live in dignity is insufficiently upheld in Israel today.

Figure 3.16 / Agree that the right to live in dignity is upheld too little (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



Among Jewish respondents, the share who feel that the right to live in dignity is upheld too little rises gradually with age. Among Arab respondents in this year's survey, we found much broader agreement with this position in the eldest group, though the differences between the various age groups over the years have not been great.

Table 3.7 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

Agree that the right to live in dignity is upheld too little		Multi-year average	2022
Jews	18–24	47.7	53
	25–44	50.7	54
	45–64	55	60
	65+	57.1	68
Arabs	18–24	39.5	64
	25–44	42.2	55
	45–64	36.2	45
	65+	41	82

Minority rights

We found a noticeable gap between Jewish and Arab respondents in their perceptions of the extent to which this democratic principle is maintained: Whereas a substantial majority of Arabs (73%) indicated that minority rights are upheld too little in Israel today, only a minority of Jews (42%) take this view. Further, in comparison with last year, the proportion of Arabs who feel this way has risen sharply (by 12 percentage points), while in the Jewish sample, the assessment is virtually unchanged.

Figure 3.17 / To what extent are minority rights upheld? (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation finds a substantial majority (77%) on the Left, and roughly one-half from the Center, who hold that minority rights are insufficiently upheld in Israel. By contrast, less than one-third on the Right agree with this position, and an even higher share (35%) believe that these rights are overly respected.

Figure 3.18 / To what extent are minority rights upheld? (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



Separation of powers

In 2021 and again this year, we examined the extent to which the principle of separation of powers is maintained in Israel, in the opinion of the interviewees. In both surveys, less than half the respondents expressed the view that it is upheld too little. We did not find significant differences between Jews and Arabs on this question.

Figure 3.19 / To what extent is the separation of powers upheld in Israel today? (total sample; %)



Breaking down the results in the Jewish sample by political orientation, we found that in both surveys, a majority on the Left and slightly less than half in the Center believe that there is inadequate separation of powers in Israel. On the Right, there was a significant difference between the two surveys, from 36% who felt this way in 2021 to 44% in 2022.

Table 3.8 (Jewish sample; %)

	Agree that separation of powers is upheld too little in Israel	
	2021	**2022**
Left	60	62
Center	47	45
Right	36	44

Freedom of religion

Between 2009 and 2019, the opinions of Israelis on this question remained largely unchanged, with the most common response that the principle of freedom of religion is upheld to the right extent. This year's survey showed a change in this trend for the first time, with the most frequent choice being "upheld too little." We will be revisiting this question in future to assess whether this represents the beginning of a trend or is merely a one-time anomaly.

Figure 3.20 / To what extent is freedom of religion upheld in Israel today? (total sample; %)



A breakdown of responses in the Jewish sample by religiosity shows, as expected, that Haredim believe more than other religious groups that freedom of religion is not upheld enough; moreover, the share of Haredi respondents who feel this way has increased over the years. A similar trend, though less pronounced, can also be discerned among the national religious (2022, 41%; multi-year average, 29.4%), traditional (2022, 31%; multi-year average, 24%), and secular (2022, 37%; multi-year average, 33%). However, it is safe to assume that there are different reasons in the Haredi and secular communities for the belief that there is too little freedom of religion in Israel.

Table 3.9 (Jewish sample; %)

	Agree that freedom of religion is upheld too little in Israel	
	Multi-year average	**2022**
Haredim	42.6	67
National religious	29.4	41
Traditional	24.0	31
Secular	33.0	37

A breakdown of the Arab sample by religion shows that whereas a majority of Christians (59%) and Muslims (53%) indicated in this year's survey that freedom of religion is insufficiently upheld in Israel, only a minority of Druze respondents (40.5%) take this view.

Freedom of expression

Freedom of expression is a bedrock of democracy, and as such, we have asked on six occasions to what extent it is upheld in Israel. Between 2009 and 2019, only a minority in both the Jewish and Arab samples stated that this principle is inadequately maintained. However, when averaging the two most recent surveys (2021 and this year), a majority of Arab interviewees expressed this opinion, as contrasted with less than one-third of Jewish interviewees. In addition, there has been a decline over the years in the share of respondents who believe that freedom of expression is upheld to the right extent in Israel.

Figure 3.21 / To what extent is freedom of expression upheld in Israel today? (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



Analyzing the Jewish sample by political orientation, we found that over the last three surveys (2019–2022), positions have shifted regarding the extent to which freedom of expression is upheld in Israel: In 2019, when a right-wing government was in power, one-half of respondents on the Left and one-third in the Center indicated that freedom of expression was not upheld enough, as opposed to less than one-half on the Right who felt similarly. In the 2021 survey, immediately after the establishment of the Bennett-Lapid government, the gaps between the camps narrowed greatly, and in 2022, the share of respondents who held that freedom of expression is upheld too little was highest on the Right, and lowest on the Left.

Figure 3.22 / Freedom of expression is upheld too little in Israel (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



Figure 3.23 / To what extent is freedom of political association upheld today in Israel? (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



Freedom of political association

Of the six democratic principles that we examined, freedom of political association was the least cited by respondents as being insufficiently maintained. Nonetheless, we did find noticeable differences in the assessments of Jews and Arabs: In the Jewish sample, only a minority indicated that this principle is upheld too little, whereas among Arabs in this year's survey, one-half felt this way, compared with slightly over one-quarter just three years ago. In other words, while concerns are not rising in the Jewish public over infringement of this freedom, there has been a significant increase in the proportion of Arabs who feel that this right is being upheld to a less than optimal degree.

A breakdown of the Jewish interviewees by political orientation (2022) reveals only minor differences between the camps. At the same time, the gaps between religious groups in the Jewish sample are more sizeable, with the share of Haredi and national religious respondents who hold that this principle is insufficiently maintained being considerably greater than the corresponding shares in the traditional and secular populations.

Table 3.10 (Jewish sample; %)

Agree that freedom of political association is upheld too little in Israel today		2022
Political orientation	Left	12
	Center	15
	Right	19
Religiosity	Haredim	34
	National religious	23
	Traditional religious	17
	Traditional non-religious	17
	Secular	12

Chapter 4 / Democracy, Government, Citizens

In this chapter, we discuss the following topics:

- Is the democratic system in Israel in grave danger?
- Does Israel act democratically toward its Arab citizens?
- How representative is the Knesset? Whose interests do Knesset members serve? And how well are they doing their job?
- Integrity/corruption of Israel's leadership
- Does it make a difference who we vote for?
- Citizens' level of interest in politics, ability to influence government policy, and membership in political parties
- Civil rights organizations and the state
- Should we dismantle everything and start over?

Is democracy in Israel in grave danger?

Question 31 | Appendix 1, page 153 | Appendix 2, page 180

Much has been said in recent years about a sense of impending political catastrophe in Israel. These fears are expressed across the political and media spectrum, though obviously they vary in nature depending on the political camp. Since 2017, we have been asking interviewees to express their opinion regarding the following statement: "The democratic system in Israel is in grave danger." As shown in the figure below, the share of respondents who hold that Israeli democracy is under serious threat is gradually rising. This year, the percentage who agreed with the above assertion was the highest since we began examining this topic, and is in fact above the trend line (meaning that the increase is greater than expected, even assuming a continued upturn).

Figure 4.1 / Agree that the democratic system in Israel is in grave danger (total sample; %)



A breakdown of the data by nationality shows that the sense that Israeli democracy is imperiled is much higher among Arabs than among Jews. As shown in the figure below, in 2019 the gap between the two groups on this question was at its narrowest, and in 2021, at its widest. But overall, there has been an upward trend in both populations between 2021 and 2022 in the proportion of respondents who see democracy in Israel as being at risk.

Figure 4.2 / Agree that the democratic system in Israel is in grave danger (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



Figure 4.3 / Agree that the democratic system in Israel is in grave danger (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



From an analysis of Jewish interviewees' responses over the years by political camp, it emerges that the Left is the camp that feels the most pronounced sense of danger regarding Israeli democracy (multi-year average, 74.2%); however, this perception has not worsened since last year's survey. On the contrary, the share in this group who indicated that democracy in Israel is in jeopardy in 2021–2022 is actually lower than in 2017–2020. Through the years, the Center has fallen somewhere between the Left and Right in its assessment of the risk to Israeli democracy (with a multi-year average of 56.1% who feel it is in grave danger), while the Right has consistently been less alarmed on this score (multi-year average, 34.3%). Nonetheless, it seems that interviewees' responses are dependent, to a large extent, on both their political orientation and the government in power, as evidenced by the fact that in the 2021 survey (immediately following the establishment of the Bennett-Lapid government), the danger to Israeli democracy as seen by Left and Center respondents showed a noticeable downturn, concurrent with a clearcut rise in this view on the Right. In the present survey, the three camps have drawn closer to one another in this regard, owing to an increase in the share who espouse this view on the Right and in the Center (although the latter camp was well represented in the government, it apparently found the situation unsatisfactory from a democratic standpoint) and the lack of change on the Left. This also marked the first survey in which a majority in all three camps expressed fear for the fate of Israeli democracy.

In keeping with our findings in chapter 2 on the high level of optimism in the national religious public regarding Israel's future (chapter 2, page 41), and the very high share in this camp who rated Israel's overall situation as good, here too this group stands out for its positive outlook, as manifest in its assessment (the lowest in all groups) of the danger to Israeli democracy: Only a minority of respondents who identified as national religious believe that democracy in Israel is imperiled, as opposed to a majority who take this view in the other religious groups.

Table 4.1 (Jewish sample; %)

Agree that Israeli democracy is in grave danger	Multi-year average	2022
Haredim	37.1	55
National religious	24.0	36
Traditional religious	40.4	60
Traditional non-religious	46.1	56
Secular	57.6	59

We cross-tabulated the responses to the present question with the desire to remain in Israel or emigrate (chapter 2, page 47) with the aim of exploring whether those who think that democracy in Israel is in grave danger would be more inclined to prefer emigration. And indeed, we found that those who feel this way are almost twice as likely to consider leaving Israel (22% as opposed to 11.5%).

Table 4.2 (2022; total sample; %)

	Would rather remain in Israel	Would rather emigrate	Don't know	Total
Agree that the democratic system in Israel is in grave danger	65	22	13	100
Do **not** agree that the democratic system in Israel is in grave danger	78	11.5	10.5	100

Is there an answer to the danger to Israeli democracy? That is to say, can a change in government improve the situation? We examined the option of a strong leader—a solution that, as shown in chapter 3, enjoys noticeable (and even growing) support. As much as such a scenario seems incomprehensible to those who think that a strong leader and democracy are incompatible, support for this option has risen more sharply among Jewish respondents who hold that democracy is in danger than among those who do not take this view (from 35% in 2017 to 65% in 2022). In the Arab population, where a majority have favored the notion of a strong leader all along, this period saw a more moderate rise among those who feel that democracy in Israel is at risk, and a decline among those who believe the opposite.

Table 4.3 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

	Agree that to handle Israel's unique problems, a strong leader is needed who is not swayed by the Knesset, the media, or public opinion			
		2017	2021	2022
Jews	Agree that democracy in Israel is in grave danger	35	55	65
	Do **not** agree that democracy in Israel is in grave danger	46	57	56
Arabs	Agree that democracy in Israel is in grave danger	60	62	67
	Do **not** agree that democracy in Israel is in grave danger	63	62	55

Is Israel a democracy for Arab citizens as well?

Question 36 | Appendix 1, page 154 | Appendix 2, page 183

One of the basic tenets of a democracy is equality among citizens. In the previous chapter, we saw that roughly one-half (49%) of the Jewish public believe that Jews should have more rights than non-Jews, which is a blatant violation of this principle. We therefore wished to see whether there is a difference between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority on the question of whether Israel acts democratically toward its Arab citizens as well as its Jewish ones.

We found a huge disparity between the perceptions of Jews and Arabs on this subject, with a sizeable majority of Jews believing that the system in Israel is democratic toward Arab citizens, as opposed to only a minority of Arabs. In fact, in two out of our three surveys, the share of Jews who take this view is more than double the corresponding share of Arabs.

Figure 4.4 / Agree that Israel acts democratically toward Arab citizens as well (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



A breakdown of responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation shows that, on the Left, just under one-half hold that Israel is democratic toward its Arab citizens, as contrasted with a substantial majority among those who identify with the Center or Right.

Table 4.4 (Jewish sample; %)

	Left	Center	Right
Agree that Israel acts democratically toward Arab citizens as well	47	69	74

Cross-tabulating this question with that of greater rights for Jews in Israel (question 37; see discussion on page 51), we found that, of those respondents in the Jewish sample who hold that Israel is democratic to its Arab citizens, the percentage who believe that Jews should enjoy greater rights is slightly greater than those who do not. By contrast, of those who think that Israel does not act democratically toward its Arab citizens, a clear majority are opposed to the notion of greater rights for Jewish citizens.

Table 4.5 (2022; Jewish sample; %)

	Think that Jewish citizens of Israel should have more rights than non-Jewish citizens	Do not think that Jewish citizens of Israel should have more rights than non-Jewish citizens	Don't know	Total
Agree that Israel acts democratically toward Arab citizens as well	52	44	4	100
Do **not** agree that Israel acts democratically toward Arab citizens as well	40	58	2	100

Do politicians look out mainly for themselves?

Question 50 | Appendix 1, page 157 | Appendix 2, page 190

In nine surveys in total, we asked interviewees to give their opinion on politicians' primary motivations. In 2009–2010, the question was worded as follows: "Politicians go into politics solely for personal gain." From 2011 onward, the question was posed as: "Politicians are more concerned with their own interests than with those of the public that elected them," as the previous version was too extreme.

In all the surveys with the second wording, a substantial majority of Jewish respondents (multi-year average, 79.3%) agreed with the statement. This view was also shared by a considerable majority of the Arab public, though slightly less than that in the Jewish sample (multi-year average, 73.1%), up until 2016, when Arab respondents "pulled ahead" of the Jews to a slight extent on the question of politicians' self-centeredness. In other words, there is a prevailing sense in the Israeli public that politicians are not fulfilling their mandate to safeguard, first and foremost, the interests of those who put them in office; instead, they are perceived as looking out primarily for themselves.

Figure 4.5 / Agree that politicians are more concerned with their own interests than with those of the public that elected them (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



A breakdown of the responses by age did not produce any clear differences in either the Arab or Jewish samples, but what stood out in particular was the huge share (91%) of Arab interviewees in the youngest cohort (18–24) who responded that politicians are concerned mainly for themselves—larger than in any other age group.

Breaking down this year's responses in the Jewish sample by religiosity yielded a substantial majority in all groups who agree with the assertion that politicians serve their own interests above all: Haredim, 83%; national religious, 79%; traditional religious, 84%; traditional non-religious, 86%; and secular, 79%.

Likewise, an analysis of the 2022 findings in the Jewish sample by political orientation did not yield any major differences, with the Left, Center, and Right agreeing with the statement to a similarly large degree (75%, 80%, and 83%, respectively). Overall, our findings through the years show a virtually wall-to-wall consensus that politicians in Israel are motivated primarily by self-interest.

Knesset members' job performance

Question 51 | Appendix 1, page 157 | Appendix 2, page 191

Another means of observing how Israelis assess the performance of their elected representatives is by examining the share of interviewees who agree with the statement: "On the whole, most Knesset members work hard and are doing a good job." In total, we have posed this question on nine occasions, with a multi-year average of 33.6% in the total sample who expressed their agreement. The differences between the multi-year averages in the Jewish and Arab samples

on this question are minuscule (33.6% and 33.8%, respectively); in both cases, only a minority agree with the above assertion, with a steep decline in the last two years in the share who take a positive view of Knesset members' performance. The findings here are largely consistent with those from the previous question, reinforcing the impression that the Israeli public is dissatisfied—to put it mildly—with the functioning of its political representatives. The impact of the ongoing political crisis of the last few years is especially striking in this case, with the share of respondents who assert that Knesset members are doing a good job plunging in 2021 and 2022 to the lowest levels to date.

Figure 4.6 / Agree that on the whole, most Knesset members work hard and are doing a good job (total sample; %)



In this year's survey, only a minority in all three political camps in the Jewish sample agree that most Knesset members are performing their jobs well; however, the share who feel this way on the Right (20%) is noticeably less than in the Center or on the Left (27% and 32%, respectively).

A breakdown of the 2022 data by vote in the 2021 Knesset elections indicates that only a minority of voters from all parties give their representatives a favorable review, with the highest rating among voters for Blue and White (35.5%) and Labor (33%), and the lowest, among New Hope and Shas voters (both 14%).

Extent of corruption at the top

Question 21 | Appendix 1, page 151 | Appendix 2, page 173

For several years now, the subject of corruption at the highest levels of government has been front and center in public discourse in Israel, as in many places around the world. On 17 occasions (in two different versions) over the years, we have examined interviewees' views on whether Israel's leadership is corrupt, and if so, to what extent.

From 2003 to 2010, the question was worded as follows: "In your opinion, to what extent is there corruption in Israel?" The response options were: to a very large extent, to quite a large extent, to a small extent, not at all. As shown in the following figure, the assessment of corruption during this period was consistently very high.

Figure 4.7 / To what extent is there corruption in Israel? (very large and quite large extent; total sample; %)



Beginning in 2014, the wording of the question was changed to: "How would you rate Israel's current leadership in terms of corruption, where 1 = very corrupt and 5 = not at all corrupt?" As shown in the table below, despite present circumstances such as the trial of a former prime minister on charges of corruption, and the heated (some might say overwrought) media coverage along the lines of "they're all corrupt," the public's perception of corruption in the country's leadership from 2014 to 2022 has remained virtually unaltered over the years, even as different leaders have come and gone. The annual mean ratings[10] hover close to the midpoint of the scale, tending slightly toward the negative, as reflected in the multi-year average (2.38). In the Jewish sample, the multi-year average is higher, and therefore slightly less negative, than in the Arab sample (2.41 versus 2.34, respectively). It should be noted that the Israeli public's current view of government corruption largely conforms with international assessments as reflected in the global rankings (see chapter 8, page 138).

10 Note that, due to the way the scale is structured (1 = very corrupt, 5 = not at all corrupt), the lower the mean rating, the greater the perceived level of corruption.

Table 4.6 (average score on scale of 1–5; total sample)

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Mean annual corruption ratings	2.55	2.37	2.32	2.41	2.48	2.24	2.29	2.42	2.38

A breakdown of responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation in the last three surveys shows a drop in the mean ratings on the Right in 2021 and 2022 as compared with 2020, indicating greater perceived corruption at the top under the Bennett-Lapid coalition. In the Center and on the Left, by contrast, the mean ratings for these years rose, meaning that respondents in both these camps held that under this government, the leadership was less corrupt than in the past.

Table 4.7 (average score on scale of 1-5; Jewish sample)

Corruption among Israel's leadership			
	2020	2021	2022
Right	2.64	2.51	2.05
Center	1.91	2.50	2.96
Left	1.66	2.30	3.34

Would you advise going into politics?

Question 57 | Appendix 1, page 158 | Appendix 2, page 196

Given the public's poor opinion of politicians, we asked: "If someone close to you (a family member or good friend) was considering going into politics, what advice would you give them?" Throughout the years surveyed, only a minority have indicated that they would recommend entering politics. Between 2008 and 2018, we discerned a rise in the share of respondents who would advise in favor of a political career, but apparently as a result of the extended political crisis of the last few years, there has been a sharp drop in this rating since 2018. In fact, this year's findings have reverted to the low levels measured in 2008.

One finding of interest is that the proportion of Arab respondents who would recommend going into politics is slightly higher than among Jews, possibly because, for Arab citizens of Israel, this represents a relatively easy path to social (and perhaps also economic) mobility, whereas for Jews, there are many other options available to them for this purpose (for example, military service). Another reason may be that Arab citizens of Israel attach greater importance to politics and politicians due to their vulnerability as a minority group.

Figure 4.8 / Would advise friends or family members to go into politics (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



A cross-tabulation of the responses here with the question of what motivates politicians found that among those who hold that politicians look out more for their own interests than for those of the voting public, a sizeable majority would not recommend going into politics, and among those who think that this is not an apt characterization of politicians, a smaller majority would advise against it. That is to say, there is a difference between the two groups, but neither would recommend pursuing a career in this field.

Table 4.8 (2022; total sample; %)

	Would advise friends or family members to go into politics	Would not advise friends or family members to go into politics	Don't know	Total
Think politicians are more concerned with their own interests than with those of the public	19	70	11	100
Do **not** think politicians are more concerned with their own interests than with those of the public	31	59.5	9.5	100

How representative is the Knesset?

Question 56 | Appendix 1, page 158 | Appendix 2, page 195

One of the arguments in favor of the existing electoral system in Israel is that it enables a large number of diverse groups to be represented. We wished to know whether, from the public's perspective, this goal of optimum representation has in fact been achieved. In ten surveys over the years, we have posed the following question: "To what extent does the present composition of the Knesset reflect the distribution of opinions in the general public?" In the Jewish sample, assessments of the representativeness of the Knesset are generally higher than in the Arab sample; however, since 2019, we have seen a parallel downturn in both populations in their perception of how well the Knesset reflects the range of public opinion, with the lowest ratings since the inception of our surveys.

Figure 4.9 / To what extent does the present composition of the Knesset reflect the distribution of opinions in the general public? (very much and quite a lot; Jewish and Arab samples; %)



In this year's survey, a breakdown of responses in the Jewish sample based on political orientation shows that one-half (51%) of respondents on the Left, 42% in the Center, and only one-third (34%) on the Right think that the Knesset offers a fair reflection of the gamut of opinions in the Israeli public. An analysis of the results based on religiosity reveals considerable differences, and in particular, a sense of dissatisfaction with their representation on the part of Haredi and national religious respondents.

Table 4.9 (2022; Jewish sample; %)

	Haredim	National religious	Traditional religious	Traditional non-religious	Secular
Agree that composition of the Knesset reflects the distribution of opinions in the general public	25.5	25	43	40	42.5

It makes no difference who you vote for

Question 49 | Appendix 1, page 156 | Appendix 2, page 190

The broad public consensus over the years that political officeholders are not fulfilling their responsibilities properly, and in the view of some, are even tainted by corruption, led us on twelve occasions to solicit the public's opinion on this statement: "It makes no difference who you vote for; it doesn't change the situation." Though the gap between the two positions on this question is not large, the findings favor those who disagree with the assertion (multi-year average, 56.8%) over those who think that "they're all the same" (multi-year average, 40.7%). Despite this, the fact that such a large segment of the Israeli public hold that that there is no real difference between the parties, as far as expectations that the situation will improve, is highly disturbing from a democratic standpoint.

Figure 4.10 / It makes no difference who you vote for; it doesn't change the situation (total sample; %)



Interest in politics

Question 46 | Appendix 1, page 156 | Appendix 2, page 188

One of the oldest, and most frequently asked, questions in our democracy surveys (posed 13 times since 2003) deals with respondents' level of interest in politics. The figure below is instructive on several points: First, in the Jewish sample, there is a consistent majority who indicate that they are interested in politics (multi-year average, 70.0%), with the corresponding share in the Arab public only about one-half and often less (multi-year average, 46.2%). Second, perhaps contrary to expectations, the fact that elections are held in a given year does not guarantee greater-than-usual interest in politics. Third, in the Arab public, there has been a continuous downward trend since 2011 in the share who report an interest in politics, dropping to an unprecedented low point this year of only about one-quarter of respondents. And finally, 2011, which was a turbulent year for Israelis in terms of civic/political engagement (with widespread social-justice and cost-of-living protests), marked the highest level of interest in politics before or since, among both Jews and Arabs.

Figure 4.11 / How interested are you in politics? (very much and quite a lot; Jewish and Arab samples; %)



How does age affect the extent of interest in politics? Breaking down the responses in both populations, we found clearly that in the Jewish population, the level of interest increases with age, while in the Arab sample, the reported interest is lower across all age groups and without a consistent trend.

Is there a difference between men and women in this area? While three-quarters of Jewish men in this year's survey expressed interest in politics, only one-half of women felt the same. We found a similar pattern, though with much lower levels of interest, in the Arab population.

A breakdown of the results in the Jewish population by political orientation reveals that a majority in all three camps report being interested in politics, with the highest percentage on the Left.

Table 4.10 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

Very and quite interested in politics			Multi-year average	2022
Age	Jews	18–24	60.3	55
		25–44	65.6	61
		45–64	74.8	63
		65+	79.0	73.5
	Arabs	18–24	39.3	26
		25–44	46.9	24
		45–64	52.0	40
		65+	45.8	12.5
Sex	Jews	Men	75.8	74.5
		Women	64.8	51
	Arabs	Men	49.2	32
		Women	42.5	23
Political orientation	Jews	Left	77.5	72
		Center	71.2	60
		Right	69.2	64

Citizens' ability to influence politics

Question 47 | Appendix 1, page 156 | Appendix 2, page 188

Among the components of a functioning democracy is the degree of government responsiveness to the people, as reflected in the sense among citizens that their opinion makes a difference and that they can influence the political system not only on election day. Over the course of 17 surveys, we have asked interviewees to what extent they and their friends are able to have an impact on government policy. The figure below presents a number of findings: First, the feeling of influence among citizens has been in the very low range, for the most part, throughout the years studied; in fact, only rarely have there been more than one-third of respondents who rated their degree of influence on the government as very much or quite a lot. Second,

the differences between Jews and Arabs on this score (with multi-year averages of 22.3% and 23.5%, respectively) are negligible, though the fluctuations in the Arab sample are steeper than among the Jews. Third, even in election years, when the feeling of influence would presumably be greater, we found no clear and consistent sense among citizens that they are able to affect government policy.[11]

Figure 4.12 / Feel that they and their friends are able to influence government policy (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



Breakdowns of this year's responses to this question by sex (Jewish and Arab populations) and by political orientation (Jewish sample) reveal a small minority of less than 20% in all categories who feel they can have an impact.

Cross-tabulating this question with the previous one, we found a majority who feel unable to influence government policy both among those who expressed an interest in politics and those who did not, though the margin is somewhat higher in the latter group than in the former (86% versus 75%, respectively).

11 Prof. Asher Arian termed this "the paradox of political participation in Israel": "Although Israelis are interested in politics, discuss it quite a bit, vote in large numbers..., they do not have much faith in their own ability to influence policy." Asher Arian, *The Choosing People: Voting Behavior in Israel* (Cleveland: Case Western Reserve University Press, 1973).

Do you favor a certain party?

Question 53 | Appendix 1, page 157 | Appendix 2, page 192

We have posed the following question a number of times (with slight variations): "Is there a political party in Israel today that accurately represents your views?" Our findings show that despite all the reservations regarding politicians and Knesset members, a majority of Jewish respondents have reported through the years that there is a party that faithfully represents their views, and that this share is consistently much higher than the corresponding percentage among Arab respondents. This would seem to contradict the assertion that the Knesset does not reflect the range of opinions in the general public; however, first, not all parties are represented in the Knesset, and second, representation by a small party in the Knesset does not ensure that voters' positions will have a significant impact on parliamentary decision-making.

Table 4.11 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

There is a party that accurately represents my views	Jews	Arabs
2003	60	47
2012	40	28
2016	53	34
2017	50	32
2019*	75	34
Multi-year averages	**56.1**	**32.8**

* The intermediate response choices for this year have been divided proportionately between the positive and negative options to enable comparison with previous years.

In this year's survey, when respondents were presented with an intermediate category ("There is a party that partly represents my views"), we found that the share in the Center camp who indicated that there is no party that accurately represents them was greater than that on the Right or Left (31%, compared with 22.5% and 13%, respectively).

Figure 4.13 / Is there a political party in Israel today that accurately represents your views? 2022 (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



Contradicting our initial assumption that older respondents would be more inclined to state that there is a political party that aptly represents their views, the gaps between age groups were found to be negligible and not consistent over time. It should be noted that in this year's survey, only among Haredim did we find a majority (52%) who reported that there is a party that accurately represents them.

Membership in a political party

Question 54 | Appendix 1, page 157

In this year's survey, a decisive majority of interviewees (81%) responded in the negative when asked whether they hold membership in a political party or have done so in the past. Only about 6% reported that they are a member of a party at present, and a further 11% that they had been a member previously. The differences between Jews and Arabs on this question were negligible, with Arab respondents even less involved in the world of party politics than Jews. The low share of interviewees who indicated that they belonged to a political party now or previously was striking, given that years ago, and even in the not-so-distant past, party membership was very common in Israel, if only because this used to be an accepted path to obtaining jobs, accessing community services, and so on. The well-known political scientist Benjamin Akzin even characterized Israel in its early years as a "party-state."[12]

12 Benjamin Akzin, "The Role of Parties in Israeli Democracy," *The Journal of Politics* 17, no. 4 (November 1955): 507–45.

Figure 4.14 / Party membership, 2022 (total sample; %)



On the Left, the share of respondents who are past or present members of political parties (24% and 7%, respectively, for a total of 31%) greatly exceeds the proportion on the Right (9% and 8%, respectively, totaling 17%), and the Center (11% and 2%, respectively, totaling 13%).

While the very low percentages of interviewees who reported belonging to political parties either now or in the past makes analysis difficult, we nonetheless wished to know whether the level of interest in politics in this group differs from that of respondents who are not past or present party members. And indeed, as shown in the table below, a very large majority of those who belong or have belonged to a political party expressed an interest in politics, compared with a significantly smaller majority among those who are not and have never been party members.

Table 4.12 (2022; total sample; %)

Party membership	Very or quite interested in politics	Not so or not at all interested in politics	Don't know	Total
Currently member of a party	85	15	0	100
Previously member of a party	76	23	1	100
Never a member of a party	53	46	1	100

In addition, we examined whether those who are past or present party members think differently from those who have not belonged to a party about whether it matters who people vote for. Here, an interesting difference emerged between those who belong to party at present (a sizeable majority of whom disagreed with the statement that it makes no difference who we vote for) and those who belonged to a party in the past, or have never been a party member (of whom a noticeably smaller majority agreed with the above assertion). In other words, those who were party members in the past (but are not now) are much more similar to those who never belonged to a party than to those who presently belong to a party, suggesting that their experience of party membership was not especially favorable.

Table 4.13 (2022; total sample; %)

	It makes no difference who you vote for			Total
	Agree	Disagree	Don't know	
Currently member of a party	18	82	0	100
Previously member of a party	42	57	1	100
Never a member of a party	41	57	2	100

In conclusion, we wished to examine whether those who are party members now, those who were in the past, and those who have never held party membership have different opinions as to whether politicians are motivated mainly by their own interests. Once again, we see a similarity between those who were party members in the past but are not today, or who have never belonged to a party, and those who belong to a party at present. In the first two groups, the vast majority believe that politicians look out mainly for themselves, while among those who are party members today, this majority is significantly lower.

Table 4.14 (2022; total sample; %)

Party membership	Politicians are more concerned with their own interests than with those of the public	Politicians are not more concerned with their own interests than with those of the public	Don't know	Total
Currently member of a party	65	33	2	100
Previously member of a party	80	19	1	100
Never a member of a party	84	14	2	100

Political participation

Question 55 | Appendix 1, page 158 | Appendix 2, pages 193–194

As discussed in the chapter comparing Israeli democracy with that of other countries (page 131), Israel places near the top of the global rankings in political participation. We asked the interviewees whether they had been involved in one or more of a list of specific activities during the previous three years (not including belonging to a party, which we explored separately above).[13] While roughly one-half of the respondents did not engage in any of the political activities listed, the remainder definitely participated in at least some, with the most common ones being efforts to change a family member's opinion on a political issue (Jews) or taking part in a demonstration (Arabs). These are very high percentages, indicating an impressive level of political engagement on the part of Israeli citizens.

Figure 4.15 / Participation in political activity, 2022 (Jewish sample and Arab sample; %)



A breakdown of responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation shows that those who align themselves with the Left report the highest levels of political participation, primarily in

13 The data presented in this section relate to each of the activities separately; however, since the interviewees were allowed to choose several activities, the sum of all the responses (including of those who indicated more than one activity) totaled 14.7%.

terms of attending demonstrations and signing petitions. The Center is generally the least engaged camp of the three in terms of political participation.

Figure 4.16 / Participation in political activity, 2022 (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



We did not find substantial differences in political participation between men and women in either the Jewish or Arab samples, though women showed a slightly greater tendency to engage in non-confrontational activities such as signing a petition.

Human rights organizations and the state

Question 34 | Appendix 1, page 153 | Appendix 2, page 182

For some time now, we have been following the fierce criticism of various civil rights organizations by the political Right and its leaders, in an effort to examine whether the Right's campaign is gaining ground or running aground in the field of public opinion. To this end, in six of our surveys since 2010 we have asked interviewees to express their agreement or disagreement with the following statement: "Human and civil rights organizations, such as the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) and B'Tselem, cause damage to the state." In the Jewish sample, the perceived harm to the state has been, and remains, high, while in the Arab public—notwithstanding fluctuations over the years—the corresponding share has been much lower (with the exception of the first assessment, in 2010), and in general, only a minority.

Figure 4.17 / Agree that human and civil rights organizations, such as the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) and B'Tselem, cause damage to the state (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



The differences between political camps in the Jewish sample on this question are perhaps the greatest in this year's survey. On the Left, a scant minority; in the Center, slightly over half; and on the Right, a substantial majority view the human rights organizations as a danger to the state.

Figure 4.18 / Agree that human and civil rights organizations, such as the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) and B'Tselem, cause damage to the state, 2022 (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



Dismantle all the country's political institutions and start over?

Question 52 | Appendix 1, page 157 | Appendix 2, page 191

To round out this discussion, we offer a slightly unconventional question that we posed only once before, in 2010. The interviewees were asked to respond to the following statement: "It would be best to dismantle all the country's political institutions and start over from scratch." In the earlier survey, the distribution of responses tended toward the negative, that is, the share who did not agree with this assertion exceeded those who did, since it was a somewhat outlandish proposition. However, to our surprise, in this year's survey, interviewees were split almost down the middle. In other words, whereas in 2010, it was obvious that the majority were not thinking in terms of "out with the old, in with the new," in 2022 the share who agree that we should leave the past behind is only slightly less than the share who disagree with this (unrealistic) proposal.

Figure 4.19 / It would be best to dismantle all the country's political institutions and start over from scratch (total sample; %)



Both in 2010 and 2022, a minority of the Jewish sample (albeit a sizeable one, at 40–41%) favored tearing down and rebuilding the political system. Among Arab respondents, however, a majority of 55% chose this option in 2022, as opposed to 25% in 2010.

A breakdown by political orientation of responses in the Jewish sample in 2010 shows a definite similarity between the three camps, as contrasted with 2022, when those who identified with the Right were twice as likely as those on the Left, and noticeably more than those in the Center, to favor such a radical step as dismantling all political institutions and making a fresh start.

Table 4.15 (Jewish sample; %)

Agree it would be best to dismantle all the country's political institutions and start over from scratch	2010	2022
Right	40	46
Center	38	37
Left	40	21

Breaking down the responses in both the Jewish and Arab samples by age, we found that in 2010 the youngest cohort was actually less in favor than the other age groups of dismantling and rebuilding the system, while in 2022 the oldest and youngest groups in the Jewish sample were more hesitant than the intermediate age groups to make such a far-reaching change, and only a minority in all age groups backed such a move. In the Arab sample, by contrast, the youngest group offered the strongest support for such a revolutionary step in 2022; moreover, a majority in all groups agreed with this proposition. Likewise, the degree of support in the Arab public in 2022 for dismantling and rebuilding Israel's political institutions is greater in all age groups than in the parallel cohorts in the Jewish sample. Given the fact that in 2010, smaller shares of Arabs than of Jews favored such a move, this year's findings may reflect a radicalization of the Arab public; alternatively, Arab respondents in 2010 may still have been fearful of openly supporting such a drastic step in a public survey.

Table 4.16 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

Agree it would be best to dismantle all the country's political institutions and start over from scratch		2010	2022
Jews	18–24	25	33
	25–44	43	47
	45–64	43	42
	65+	33	34
Arabs	18–24	39	67
	25–44	17	50
	45–64	29	53
	65+	25	56

Cross-tabulating the responses to this question with that of optimism or pessimism about Israel's future, we found that a majority of those who agreed that the system should be demolished and rebuilt took a pessimistic view of the coming years. By contrast, of those who did not support such a radical step, the majority expressed optimism about the country's future.

Table 4.17 (2022; total sample; %)

	Optimistic about Israel's future	Pessimistic about Israel's future	Don't know	Total
Agree it would be best to dismantle all the country's political institutions and start over from scratch	41	53	6	100
Do **not** agree it would be best to dismantle all the country's political institutions and start over from scratch	59	34.5	6.5	100

Chapter 5 / Public Trust in Institutions

In this chapter, we discuss the following topics:

- Public trust in state institutions: an overview through the years
- Trust in the IDF
- Trust in the police
- Trust in the President of Israel
- Trust in the Supreme Court
- Trust in the media
- Trust in the Knesset
- Trust in the government
- Trust in the political parties
- Trust in municipalities/local authorities
- Trust in the Chief Rabbinate/Shari'a court/canonical court
- Trust in the State Attorney's Office
- Trust in the Attorney General
- Is trust in state institutions on the decline?

In recent years, numerous countries around the world, including Israel, have been grappling with diminishing levels of trust in their state institutions. Israeli President Isaac Herzog made reference to this problem in his speech at the ceremonial presentation of the *2021 Israeli Democracy Index*:

> The decline in Israeli citizens' trust in state institutions is deeply troubling. There is no substitute for Israel's democracy, and there is no substitute for its state institutions, and therefore the loss of trust keeps me awake at night. No state can exist if its citizens do not have confidence in it and its institutions. Public trust is the most important asset that any state system or institution has, and the prolonged decline in public trust is a warning sign for all of us.

Based on the premise that citizens' trust in the state and its institutions is one of the cornerstones of any democracy, we examined once again in 2022 (as we have every year since the inception of the *Democracy Index* in 2003) the levels of public trust in eight institutions: the IDF, President of Israel, Supreme Court, police, government, Knesset, political parties, and media. In addition, this year we looked at several other institutions that we study less frequently: the municipalities/local authorities where the interviewees reside; the Chief Rabbinate/Shari'a courts/canonical courts; the State Attorney's Office; and the Attorney General.

In this chapter, we will be presenting the extent of public trust in all of these institutions in 2022 as well as reviewing the changes and trends in the levels of confidence in each of these individuals and bodies over the past twenty years.

Public trust: an overview through the years

Examining the ranking of public trust in the eight institutions studied regularly in our annual democracy surveys, we see that the IDF continually heads the list in the Jewish sample, while the Supreme Court takes first place in most of the surveys in the Arab sample. In both groups, the Knesset and the political parties are at, or near, the bottom of the ratings.

Table 5.1 (total sample; Jewish and Arab samples; %)

Trust quite a lot or very much, multi-year averages, 2003–2022	Total sample		Jews		Arabs	
	Institution	Multi-year average	Institution	Multi-year average	Institution	Multi-year average
1	IDF	79.7	IDF	88.1	Supreme Court	55.9
2	President of Israel	62.2	President of Israel	66.9	Media	40.3
3	Supreme Court	58.9	Supreme Court	59.5	Police	37.5
4	Police	46.4	Police	48.0	President of Israel	36.3
5	Media	37.8	Government	37.5	IDF	33.9
6	Government	36.0	Media	37.3	Knesset	32.3
7	Knesset	35.5	Knesset	36.1	Government	27.1
8	Political parties	21.6	Political parties	21.2	Political parties	24.1

The following figures present the levels of trust of Jewish and Arab respondents in each of the above institutions through the years. The figure for the Jewish sample shows that the IDF has garnered the highest level of trust year after year, with the smallest fluctuations. For all the other institutions, the ranking is less consistent, showing a waning level of trust beginning with the 2012 survey that continues to this day, though this decline is not clear-cut or linear.

In the figure representing the Arab sample, we see sharp fluctuations and noticeable shifts over time, which we will be discussing at length below. As shown, the Supreme Court earns the highest level of trust from Arab interviewees in the bulk of our surveys over the years.

A comparison of both figures confirms what we saw in the table above, namely, that the percentage of respondents in the Arab sample who express trust in all the institutions studied is lower than that in the Jewish population. Likewise, the changes here are more irregular than in the Jewish sample. Whereas among Jewish respondents, the distribution of levels of trust in the different institutions is quite broad, and follows an orderly pattern for the most part, in the Arab population the differences between institutions are much smaller but there are frequent shifts in the order of the rankings.

Figure 5.1 / Trust, 2003–2022 (Jewish sample; %)



Figure 5.2 / Trust, 2003–2022 (Arab sample; %)



When we examined which of the eight institutions studied regularly are at the "top of the standings" in each of the political camps in the Jewish sample, we found the IDF in first place in all three groups; however, the average level of trust is lower on the Left than in the Center or on the Right. On the Left, the Supreme Court earns second place in the rankings, and the President of Israel comes in third. By contrast, among Center and Right respondents, the President of Israel comes in second, with the Supreme Court in third place. Compared with the Left and Center, the average share on the Right who express faith in the Supreme Court is very low, despite ranking third in this camp.

Table 5.2 (Jewish sample; %)

Trust, multi-year averages, 2003–2022	Left	Center	Right
1	IDF (84.3)	IDF (90.4)	IDF (89.0)
2	Supreme Court (83.6)	President of Israel (73.9)	President of Israel (61.4)
3	President of Israel (76.8)	Supreme Court (70.6)	Supreme Court (47.2)

In the five subgroups under the category of religiosity in the Jewish sample, the ranking of the top institutions is similar, with the IDF and the president occupying the first two slots (albeit with much lower levels of trust among Haredim than in the other groups), but there are differences when it comes to the third place: While among Haredi and national religious Jews, the police hold this slot, among secular and traditional Jews, the Supreme Court is the third most trusted institution.

Table 5.3 (Jewish sample; %)

Trust, multi-year averages, 2003–2022	Haredim	National religious	Traditional	Secular
1	IDF (69.2)	IDF (89.4)	IDF (90.8)	IDF (89.7)
2	President of Israel (40.7)	President of Israel (60.0)	President of Israel (69.4)	President of Israel (72.8)
3	Police (35.7)	Police (51.3)	Supreme Court (60.3)	Supreme Court (71.9)

We examined whether age is associated in any way with trust in state institutions. While in all age groups in the Jewish sample, the three top-ranked institutions were the same, the proportions of younger respondents who expressed trust were lower than in the older cohorts.

Table 5.4 (Jewish sample; %)

Trust, multi-year averages, 2003–2022	18–24	25–44	45–64	65+
1	IDF (84.3)	IDF (85.3)	IDF (90.2)	IDF (92.8)
2	President of Israel (59.2)	President of Israel (62.2)	President of Israel (71.8)	President of Israel (74.6)
3	Supreme Court (54.3)	Supreme Court (55.1)	Supreme Court (64.0)	Supreme Court (64.1)

An analysis of the Arab sample by religion shows that the Supreme Court is ranked number one in all three groups, with the Muslim respondents citing the lowest level of trust. Further, whereas among Druze respondents, the IDF and President of Israel take second and third place, among Christians, those slots are filled by the media and the IDF, and among Muslims, the media and the police.

Table 5.5 (Arab sample; %)

Trust, multi-year averages, 2003–2022	Muslims	Christians	Druze
1	Supreme Court (52.4)	Supreme Court (61.2)	Supreme Court (66.7)
2	Media (37.9)	Media (45.4)	IDF (65.6)
3	Police (34.6)	IDF (43.0)	President of Israel (56.0)

In the Arab sample, an analysis of the effect of age showed the Supreme Court in first place in all age groups, with only minor differences between cohorts. In second place in the two younger age groups (18–44) are the media, and in the two older groups (45 and above), the president. The third place in both younger groups is occupied by the police, and in the two older groups, by the media and the IDF, respectively.

Table 5.6 (Arab sample; %)

Trust, multi-year averages, 2003–2022	18–24	25–44	45–64	65+
1	Supreme Court (54.0)	Supreme Court (55.7)	Supreme Court (56.6)	Supreme Court (58.6)
2	Media (40.2)	Media (40.5)	President of Israel (40.6)	President of Israel (49.3)
3	Police (40.2)	Police (37.4)	Media (40.0)	IDF (44.8)

Finally, we examined the total sample to see which institutions, of the eight studied regularly, head the standings when broken down by social location. While both groups ranked the same three institutions—the IDF, President of Israel, and Supreme Court—highest, the proportion who expressed trust was noticeably greater among those who associated themselves with stronger social groups than with weaker ones.

Table 5.7 (total sample; %)

Trust, multi-year averages, 2012–2022	Identify with stronger social groups	Identify with weaker social groups
1	IDF (85.4)	IDF (68.7)
2	President of Israel (70.8)	President of Israel (53.5)
3	Supreme Court (60.9)	Supreme Court (48.7)

We will now explore in greater depth the extent of public trust in each institution individually.

Trust in the IDF

Question 13 | Appendix 1, page 149 | Appendix 2, page 168

With regard to trust in the IDF, the gaps between Arabs and Jews are so substantial that analyzing the total sample is irrelevant here.

Among Jews, the IDF earns a very high level of trust both through the years and in 2022, though the share who expressed confidence in the army this year (85%) is lower than the multi-year average of 88.1%. The degree of trust in the army has remained relatively stable over time, with slight fluctuations, particularly following wars, military operations, and related events: for example, there was a decline in trust following the Second Lebanon War (2006), a rise in trust after Operation Cast Lead (late 2008/early 2009), and a further upswing following Operation Protective Edge (2014).

In the Arab sample, this year's survey saw a particularly low level of trust in the IDF, of just 15% (recalling the all-time low of 14% in 2009 following Operation Cast Lead)—much lower than the multi-year average of 33.9%. In fact, since 2019, there has been a continuing decline in Arab trust in the IDF, somewhat similar to the drop between 2005 and 2009. However, the levels rebounded after the previous low point, meaning that this year's downturn does not necessarily indicate a permanent loss of faith in the IDF, and the level of trust may well rise again.

Figure 5.3 / Trust the IDF (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



A majority of respondents in all three political camps in the Jewish sample have expressed their trust in the IDF over the years, though generally by a slightly smaller margin on the Left. In this year's survey, however, the share who expressed faith in the army among those who identified with the Right is actually lower than that on the Left or in the Center.

A breakdown of the findings in the Jewish sample by religiosity shows that Haredim express the lowest level of trust of all the religious groups—though still a majority—both this year and in the multi-year average.

And finally, if we analyze the findings by age, we see that, while the IDF earns a high level of trust in all age groups, it is markedly lower in the younger cohorts. The share of men and of women who have expressed trust in the army through the years is very similar.

Table 5.8 (Jewish sample; %)

Trust the IDF		Multi-year average	2022
Political orientation	Left	84.3	87
	Center	90.4	89
	Right	89.0	84
Religiosity	Haredim	69.2	64
	National religious	89.4	86
	Traditional	90.8	87
	Secular	89.7	88
Age	18–24	84.3	80
	25–44	85.3	80.5
	45–64	90.2	88
	65+	92.8	91

A breakdown of trust in the IDF in the Arab population by religion indicates that, among Druze respondents, the army earns the highest share of trust of the three groups. Analyzing the responses by age, we find that the IDF is trusted to a greater extent by the older cohorts (in particular, the 65-and-over group) than by the younger ones. Based on these two variables (religion and age), the levels of trust measured in the current survey are lower than the multi-year average.

Table 5.9 (Arab sample; %)

Trust the IDF		Multi-year average	2022
Religion	Muslims	28.1	11
	Christians	43.0	12
	Druze	65.6	46
Age	18–24	30.0	16
	25–44	32.8	13
	45–64	37.0	13
	65+	44.8	25

Looking at the total sample, those who identify with stronger social groups express greater confidence in the IDF than do those who associate themselves with weaker groups; in both cases, however, the current levels of trust are slightly lower than the multi-year average.

Table 5.10 (total sample; %)

Trust the IDF	Multi-year average	2022
Identify with stronger social groups	85.4	80
Identify with weaker social groups	68.7	60

Trust in the police

Question 10 | Appendix 1, page 149 | Appendix 2, page 166

In the total sample, the level of trust in the police in this year's survey (32%) is the lowest since 2008, and significantly lower than the multi-year average for this indicator (46.4%). The figure below shows the three periods when trust in the police hit record lows (2006–2010, 2015–2017, and 2021–2022). Support for the police peaked in 2003–2004 and 2011–2013, when the share who indicated that they had faith in the police was almost double that of today.

Figure 5.4 / Trust the police (total sample; %)



Breaking down the results by nationality, we find much smaller differences between the Jewish and Arab populations in their level of trust in the police as compared with the IDF (multi-year average: Jews, 48%; Arabs, 37.5%). Nonetheless, in both samples, there has been an erosion in the level of trust in the police in recent years, particularly in the current survey. Moreover, the share of trust on the part of Arab respondents, especially in 2021 and 2022, is not only lower than that of the Jews but also much lower than the multi-year average in the Arab sample. This is apparently due to the feeling among many Arab citizens of Israel that the police are not keeping them safe, and may in fact be over-policing them.

Figure 5.5 / Trust the police (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

A breakdown of the level of trust in the police among Jewish respondents by political orientation, both over time and in the present survey, indicates that those who align themselves with the Left have greater faith in the police than do those in the Center or on the Right.

Analyzing the Jewish sample by religiosity shows that confidence in the police among Haredim is low in and of itself, and in comparison with other groups. Furthermore, in all groups in this category, the level of trust in 2022 is lower than the multi-year average. We did not find sizeable differences in the multi-year averages when broken down by age or sex.

Table 5.11 (Jewish sample; %)

Trust the police		Multi-year average	2022
Political orientation	Left	52.9	48
	Center	49.4	40
	Right	46.4	32
Religiosity	Haredim	35.7	11
	National religious	51.3	31.5
	Traditional	49.1	39
	Secular	49.2	41

Analyzing responses in the Arab sample by religion through the years, we find that the police earn the highest level of trust from Druze interviewees (albeit less than the IDF). The degree of confidence in the police force in all three religious groups in 2022 is much lower than the multi-year averages.

Table 5.12 (Arab sample; %)

Trust the police	Multi-year average	2022
Muslims	34.6	11
Christians	39.9	8
Druze	50.6	31

In the total sample, in keeping with the pattern of trust in the IDF (though by lower margins), those respondents who identify with stronger groups in Israeli society place greater faith in the police than do those who associate themselves with weaker groups. In both cases, the levels of trust in the current survey are lower than the multi-year averages.

Table 5.13 (total sample; %)

Trust the police	Multi-year average	2022
Identify with stronger social groups	49.3	36
Identify with weaker social groups	36.4	25

Trust in the President of Israel

Question 11 | Appendix 1, page 149 | Appendix 2, page 167

Throughout our surveys, public trust in the President of Israel has been high (multi-year average, 62.2%). After reaching its lowest ebb in 2007, when faith in the presidency plummeted due to the rape and sexual harassment charges against President Moshe Katzav, the rating began to climb among both Jews and Arabs immediately upon Shimon Peres's entry into office. However, since 2019, there has been a slow but steady decline in the level of trust among Jewish respondents (multi-year average, 66.9%), even with regard to this highly respected position (2019, 71%; 2020, 63%; 2021, 60%; 2022, 58%). Among Arab respondents, the shift has been more dramatic, with 2022 yielding the lowest level of trust to date (just 17%, compared with a multi-year average of 36.3%).

Figure 5.6 / Trust the President of Israel (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



Breaking down the findings in the Jewish sample by political orientation, we found that the level of trust among those who identify with the Right is noticeably lower than among respondents from the Left or Center, and is much lower this year than the multi-year average for this camp (49% versus 61.4%, respectively). Similarly, an analysis by religiosity shows that Haredim have expressed less trust in the institution of the presidency over the years than have the other religious groups.

And finally, a breakdown of Jewish respondents by age reveals that the older cohorts feel greater trust in the President of Israel than their younger counterparts, in both the present survey and through the years. Levels of confidence in the president among young people in 2022 are lower than the multi-year averages, while in the two older age groups (45 and up), the ratings are very close to the multi-year averages.

Table 5.14 (Jewish sample; %)

Trust the President of Israel		Multi-year average	2022
Political orientation	Left	76.8	83
	Center	73.9	72
	Right	61.4	49
Religiosity	Haredim	40.7	33.5
	National religious	60.0	56
	Traditional	69.4	50.5
	Secular	72.8	71
Age	18–24	59.2	44
	25–44	62.2	44
	45–64	71.8	69
	65+	74.6	76.5

Breaking down the findings in the Arab sample by religion, we found that Druze respondents have reported greater trust over time than have Christians and Muslims. Likewise, the president has earned a higher level of confidence through the years among older respondents than among younger ones. The trust ratings in the present survey across all religions and ages in the Arab population are lower than the respective multi-year averages.

Table 5.15 (Arab sample; %)

Trust the President of Israel		Multi-year average	2022
Religion	Muslims	32.7	16
	Christians	42.4	12
	Druze	56.0	30
Age	18–24	29.9	14
	25–44	35.6	17
	45–64	40.6	22.5
	65+	49.3	12

When analyzing the responses in the total sample by social location, we see that those who identify with stronger social groups place more faith in the presidency than do those who associate themselves with weaker groups. In both cases, the levels of trust this year are lower than the multi-year averages.

Table 5.16 (total sample; %)

Trust the President of Israel	Multi-year average	2022
Identify with stronger social groups	70.8	59
Identify with weaker social groups	53.5	39

Trust in the Supreme Court

Question 9 | Appendix 1, page 148 | Appendix 2, page 166

In 2022, only a minority in both populations (Jews, 41%; Arabs, 40%) reported that they trusted the Supreme Court—a much lower share in each case than the respective multi-year averages of 59.5% and 55.9%.

As presented in the figure below, faith in the Supreme Court among Jewish respondents has gradually diminished from 2012 to the present survey, which registered the lowest level of trust to date. We observed a steep decline between 2004 and 2008 as well, but this was a briefer trend and followed by a rebound of sorts up until 2012. Among Arab interviewees, trust in the Supreme Court is prone to fluctuations, apparently in response to events specific to this population; nevertheless, this indicator has shown a downturn since 2020.

Figure 5.7 / Trust the Supreme Court (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



A breakdown of responses in the Jewish camp by political orientation over time reveals vast differences between the camps: On the Left, there is a high level of trust in the Supreme Court; on the Right, a very low level; and in the Center, somewhere in the middle, and closer to the Left at present. The share on the Right who expressed faith in the Supreme Court this year was the lowest since the inception of our surveys; at the same time, we have not seen a decline in trust on the Left in recent years, while such a pattern is apparent in the Center and on the Right.

Figure 5.8 / Trust the Supreme Court (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



An analysis of responses in the Jewish sample through the years, broken down by religiosity, points to a particularly low level of confidence in the Supreme Court on the part of the Haredi public; but among secular Jews as well, who report the highest rates of trust in this institution, there has been some decline since 2019. The steepest drop, however, has been recorded among traditional respondents (from 53% in 2020 to just 34% in 2022).

Figure 5.9 / Trust the Supreme Court (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)



Lastly, a breakdown of responses in the Jewish sample by age revealed that trust in the Supreme Court is lower in the younger age groups (18–44) than in the older cohorts, particularly the 65-and-over group. Moreover, in most of the age groups (with the exception of the oldest), the 2022 findings are lower than the multi-year averages, with the greatest disparity among the younger age groups (18–44).

Table 5.17 (Jewish sample; %)

Trust the Supreme Court	Multi-year average	2022
18–24	54.3	26.5
25–44	55.1	27
45–64	64.0	48
65+	64.1	66

Breaking down the responses in the Arab sample by religion and age, we found that trust in the Supreme Court has been lower among Muslims over the years than among Christians or Druze. Here too, the current levels for all three groups are lower than the respective multi-year averages. When analyzing the findings over the years by age, virtually no differences were found between groups.

We likewise examined the Arab samples by vote in the most recent Knesset elections (in 2021), finding that the level of trust in the Supreme Court is higher among those who voted for Zionist parties than among voters for (Arab) non-Zionist parties.

Table 5.18 (Arab sample; %)

Trust the Supreme Court		Multi-year average	2022
Religion	Muslims	52.4	39
	Christians	61.2	48
	Druze	66.7	45
Age	18–24	54.0	39
	25–44	55.7	41
	45–64	56.6	42
	65+	58.6	26
Vote	Zionist parties	69.0	70.5*
	(Arab) non-Zionist parties	51.8	42*

* Average vote in 2021 elections (based on 2021 and 2022 democracy surveys)

A breakdown of the total sample by identification with stronger or weaker social groups shows that respondents in the former category express greater trust in the Supreme Court than do those in the latter. We found further that, though this year's survey showed a relatively small gap between the two groupings, the disparity has been larger over the years.

Table 5.19 (total sample; %)

Trust the Supreme Court	Multi-year average	2022
Identify with stronger social groups	60.9	44
Identify with weaker social groups	48.7	37

And finally, we examined the share of the total sample who expressed trust in the Supreme Court, broken down by extent of agreement or disagreement with the statement: "The Supreme Court should have the power to overturn laws passed by the Knesset if they conflict with democratic principles such as freedom of expression or equality before the law" (chapter 3, page 56). We found that a majority (79%) of interviewees who disagree with the Court having such authority trust the Supreme Court not so much or not at all. By contrast, of those who agree with this principle, a majority trust it quite a lot or very much. In other words, the readiness to grant greater authority to the Supreme Court is tied to the degree of trust in that institution.

Table 5.20 (2022; total sample; %)

		Trust in Supreme Court			
		Quite a lot or very much	Not so much or not at all	Don't know	Total
The Supreme Court should have the power to overturn laws passed by the Knesset if they conflict with democratic principles such as freedom of expression or equality before the law	Strongly or somewhat agree	55	43	2	100
	Strongly or somewhat disagree	19	79	2	100

Trust in the media

Question 8 | Appendix 1, page 148 | Appendix 2, page 165

We have seen over the years, and in the present survey in particular, that a relatively low share of the total sample express trust in Israel's media (multi-year average, 37.8%), dropping continuously since 2019 to this year's all-time low of just 22%.

Figure 5.10 / Trust the media (total sample; %)



The multi-year average of Jewish interviewees who have confidence in the media is lower than that of the Arab interviewees (37.3% and 40.3%, respectively). It should be noted that media consumption in the Jewish public is dissimilar to that in the Arab public due to language differences, among other reasons; consequently, the trust or lack of trust expressed by each group relates, at least in part, to different media outlets.

Figure 5.11 / Trust the media (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



A breakdown of the responses in the Jewish sample over time by political orientation indicates that since 2015 the three camps have diverged on this issue, with a very small share on the Right expressing faith in the media as compared with the Center or Left. Given the proliferation of outlets expressing right-wing views, and the presence of obviously right-leaning journalists in the mainstream press, it is surprising that the extent of trust in the media as a whole on the Right has not experienced an upswing in recent years.

Figure 5.12 / Trust the media (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



Breaking down the responses in the Jewish sample through the years by religiosity shows that secular Jews have greater trust in the media than do the other groups in this category, in particular the Haredim.[14] The levels of trust in each of the subgroups are lower in 2022 than the multi-year averages. We found further that the oldest age group (65 and over) has greater confidence in the press than do the younger ones.

Table 5.21 (Jewish sample; %)

Trust the media		Multi-year average	2022
Religiosity	Haredim	9	4
	National religious	20.2	12
	Traditional	35.6	18
	Secular	47.9	37
Age	18–24	32.2	18
	25–44	32.7	13
	45–64	41.4	27
	65+	43.2	41

14 We did not specifically examine the level of trust of Haredim in Haredi media outlets, or of Arabs in Arab outlets, which would presumably have yielded different results.

Analyzing the Arab sample by religion points to slightly lower levels of trust among Muslims than among Christians and Druze, both over the years and in the present survey. In all three groups, the current findings are markedly lower than the multi-year averages.

Table 5.22 (Arab sample; %)

Trust the media	Multi-year average	2022
Muslims	37.9	12
Christians	45.4	17
Druze	45.7	26

In the total sample, interviewees who identify with stronger social groups express greater trust in the media than do those who associate themselves with weaker groups, but in both cases, the percentages in 2022 are lower than the multi-year averages.

Table 5.23 (total sample; %)

Trust the media	Multi-year average	2022
Identify with stronger social groups	36.8	26
Identify with weaker social groups	28.5	15

As noted earlier, in both the Jewish and Arab populations, the key political institutions of a democracy—the parliament (Knesset), government, and especially, the political parties—are at the bottom of the list in terms of trust. We will now look at each of these separately.

Trust in the Knesset

Question 12 | Appendix 1, page 149 | Appendix 2, page 167

Israel's legislature, the Knesset—like many parliaments in other countries—has not enjoyed a high degree of public trust over the years (multi-year average, 35.5%). The following figure shows two periods marked by a gradual erosion of trust: 2003–2008 and 2013–2022, with the latter registering the lowest levels thus far.

Figure 5.13 / Trust the Knesset (total sample; %)



We did not encounter significant differences when breaking down the levels of trust in the Knesset over time by nationality (total sample), political orientation (Jewish sample), or age (Jewish and Arab samples); however, differences were found through the years when analyzing the Jewish sample by religiosity, with Haredim expressing the lowest degree of trust, and the other groups clustered quite closely together.

Table 5.24 (Jewish sample; %)

Trust the media	Multi-year average	2022
Haredim	25.9	10
National religious	43.6	16.5
Traditional	38.3	14
Secular	34.4	17

A breakdown of the Arab sample by religion shows that Muslims have less confidence in the Knesset than do Christians and Druze.

Table 5.25 (Arab sample; %)

Trust the media	Multi-year average	2022
Muslims	29.5	8
Christians	38.8	20
Druze	39.2	20

We examined the association between trust in the Knesset and agreement with the statement: "On the whole, most Knesset members work hard and are doing a good job." A majority of both those who agreed and those who disagreed reported that they trusted the Knesset not so much or not at all; however, this majority was much larger among respondents who do not think that Knesset members work hard and do a good job (90% versus 65%, respectively).

Table 5.26 (2022; total sample; %)

On the whole, most Knesset members work hard and are doing a good job	Trust the Knesset			
	Quite a lot or very much	Not so much or not at all	Don't know	Total
Agree	33	65	2	100
Disagree	8	90	2	100

Trust in the government

Question 14 | Appendix 1, page 149 | Appendix 2, page 168

The present survey was conducted one year after the formation of the Bennett-Lapid government (as of this writing, it is no longer in office). As shown in the figure below, following a period of relative stability from 2016 through 2021, there was a drop in the level of trust in the government, with 2022 yielding the lowest finding to date. It is worth noting that between 2003 and 2008, a gradual erosion of public trust in the government took place, but this was followed by a steep rise from 2009 to 2012.

A breakdown by nationality reveals that more Jews than Arabs have expressed trust in the government over the years (multi-year averages, 37.5% and 27.1%, respectively). The present survey conforms with this pattern (Jews, 23%; Arabs, 10%).

Figure 5.14 / Trust the government (total sample; %)



Looking at the Jewish sample, the gap in trust in the government between political camps over time is strongly influenced by the composition of the governing coalition at the time of a given survey. Thus, during Binyamin Netanyahu's terms in office (from 2009 until June 2021), the level of trust on the Right was greater than that among the Center and Left, though subject to fluctuations over the years. The decline in confidence on the part of the Right was first observed in 2019, and worsened under the Netanyahu-Gantz government (May 2020–June 2021). With the formation of the Bennett-Lapid government (in June 2021), there was a steep drop in the level of faith in the government in the right-wing camp, coinciding with a sharp rise in trust on the Left and a more moderate upturn in the Center.

Figure 5.15 / Trust the government (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



A breakdown of the findings in the Jewish sample by religiosity over time indicates that the Haredim have consistently expressed less faith in the government when compared with the other groups. Moreover, the levels of trust among Haredi, national religious, and traditional respondents are lower in the current survey than their respective multi-year averages—a result of the composition of the governing coalition when the survey was conducted.

Analyzing the findings by age (Jewish sample), we see that in the present survey, the older groups expressed greater faith in the government than did the younger ones; once again, this is apparently because a higher proportion of the respondents in the older cohorts voted for the parties that formed the Bennett-Lapid government. The current levels of trust are lower than the multi-year averages.

Table 5.27 (Jewish sample; %)

Trust the government		Multi-year average	2022
Religiosity	Haredim	23.5	2.5
	National religious	44.2	12.5
	Traditional	41.5	15
	Secular	35.5	39
Age	18–24	37.8	9
	25–44	34.6	12
	45–64	39.5	32
	65+	40.5	42

Breaking down the findings in the Arab sample by religion and age of the interviewees, we found that Druze respondents have expressed greater trust through the years than have Christians and Muslims. In the present survey, the levels of trust in the government in all three groups are lower than the multi-year averages. Additionally, the 65-and-over age group have reported greater trust than the other cohorts, both over time and in 2022.

An analysis by vote in the March 2021 Knesset elections reveals that trust in the government among Ra'am voters is twice as great as among voters for the Joint List.

Table 5.28 (Arab sample; %)

Trust the government		Multi-year average	2022
Religion	Muslims	24.7	8
	Christians	32.1	4
	Druze	42.3	30
Age	18–24	30.4	8.5
	25–44	25.2	10
	45–64	25.5	8
	65+	36.4	19
Vote in March 2021 elections*	Joint List	–	4
	Ra'am	–	11
	Zionist parties	–	46

* Average of the 2021 and 2022 democracy surveys.

In the total sample this year, interviewees who associate themselves with Israel's stronger social groups expressed greater faith in the government than did those who identify with the weaker groups, though in both groups the levels are lower than the multi-year averages.

Table 5.29 (total sample; %)

Trust the government	Multi-year average	2022
Identify with stronger social groups	39.4	26
Identify with weaker social groups	26.9	14

When we analyzed this year's findings in the total sample by vote in the 2021 elections—broken down into voters for the Coalition parties and voters for the Opposition parties—the final picture was not surprising: the share who express trust in the government among those who voted for the Coalition parties is much higher than the corresponding share among voters for the Opposition parties (39% as opposed to 5%, respectively).

To conclude, we examined the level of trust in the government by degree of interest in politics, and found that those who expressed an interest reported greater faith in the government than those who did not.

Table 5.30 (2022; total sample; %)

	Trust the government			
	Quite a lot or very much	Not so much or not at all	Don't know	Total
Interested in politics	26	74	–	100
Not interested in politics	15	82.5	2.5	100

■ Trust in the political parties

Question 15 | Appendix 1, page 150 | Appendix 2, page 169

The political parties have consistently ranked last in terms of trust among the eight institutions that we regularly survey. As shown in the figure below, the period between 2013 and 2016 registered a steep drop in trust in the parties, after which the findings stabilized at low levels. Since the 2020 survey, there has been a further decline in trust, culminating in the lowest levels to date in 2022. We found low levels of trust in the political parties across all categories.

Figure 5.16 / Trust the political parties (total sample; %)



In addition to the eight "permanent" institutions, this year we also examined the respondents' level of trust in their municipality/local authority, the Chief Rabbinate/Shari'a court/canonical court, the State Attorney's Office, and the Attorney General.

Trust in municipality/local authority

Question 16 | Appendix 1, page 150 | Appendix 2, page 169

We have measured the share of trust in the interviewees' home municipality/local authority on five occasions thus far. As with the institutions discussed above, the level of trust found in the total sample this year was lower than in the past (multi-year average, 54.1%; 2022, 48%). The share who expressed trust in their municipality/local authority in the Jewish sample has consistently been higher than that in the Arab sample (multi-year averages: Jews, 58.2%; Arabs, 32.7%).

Table 5.31 (total sample; Jewish and Arab samples; %)

Trust own municipality/ local authority	2016	2018	2020	2021	2022
Total sample	51.5	53	61	57	48
Jews	55	60	63	62	51
Arabs	33	19.5	48	32	32

A breakdown of the responses in the Jewish sample by district of residence shows that those who live in Haifa and its outskirts, or in Tel Aviv and the Gush Dan area, express less faith in their municipality/local authority than do those who live in the other districts. A similar breakdown in the Arab sample reveals a higher level of trust among respondents who reside in the Galilee (where the bulk of the Arab population in Israel is concentrated) than among residents of the other areas. The lowest level of trust in this category was registered among Arab interviewees living in the Negev.

Table 5.32 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

Trust own municipality/local authority		2022
District of residence (Jews)	North	52.5
	Haifa and outskirts	40
	Center	55
	Tel Aviv and Gush Dan	46
	Jerusalem	52
	South	55
	Judea and Samaria	60
Area of residence (Arabs)	Galilee	37
	"Triangle"*	28
	Mixed cities	31
	Negev	19

* The "Triangle" is an area in central Israel with a largely Arab population, including the major Arab towns of Tayibe, Tira, Baqa al-Gharbiyye, and Umm el-Fahm.

In the total sample, interviewees who associate themselves with the stronger groups in Israeli society report greater trust in their municipality/local authority than do those who identify with the weaker groups.

Table 5.33 (total sample; %)

Trust own municipality/local authority	2022
Identify with stronger social groups	53
Identify with weaker social groups	40

Trust in the Chief Rabbinate/Shari'a court/canonical court

Question 17 | Appendix 1, page 150 | Appendix 2, page 170

We have examined the share of respondents in the Jewish sample who express trust in the Chief Rabbinate on ten occasions to date, in the course of which we observed two periods in which the levels of trust in this institution diminished (2003–2009, and 2013–2017), after which they rebounded. While the two most recent surveys yielded higher levels of trust than in 2017, which marked the lowest point thus far, they are nonetheless lower than the multi-year average of 35.7%.

Figure 5.17 / Trust the Chief Rabbinate (Jewish sample; %)



The variable with the greatest influence on level of trust in the Chief Rabbinate is self-defined religiosity. The share of Haredi and national religious respondents who express trust in this institution is greater than of the traditional group, and greater still when compared with the secular interviewees.

Figure 5.18 / Trust the Chief Rabbinate (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)



Respondents in the Jewish sample who align themselves politically with the Right have expressed greater trust in the Chief Rabbinate over the years than have those who identify with the Center or Left (multi-year averages: Right, 47.4%; Center, 27.7%; Left, 18.2%).

In the Arab sample, we have posed the question of trust in religious institutions three times in recent years, asking Muslim and Druze respondents about the Shari'a court, and Christians about the canonical court. In the Arab population as a whole, we found a gradual decline in the share who express confidence in these bodies. Breaking down these findings by religion reveals a drop in trust from one survey to the next among Muslims, a rise in trust among Christians, and a sharp downturn between 2017 and 2021 among Druze, followed by stable results over the last two surveys.

Table 5.34 (Arab sample; %)

Trust Shari'a and canonical courts	2017	2021	2022
Total Arab sample	59	48	39.5
Muslims (Shari'a court)	59	48	38
Christians (canonical court)	35	38.5	48
Druze (Shari'a court)	83	50	50

Trust in the State Attorney's Office

Question 18 | Appendix 1, page 150 | Appendix 2, page 170

We have measured public trust in the State Attorney's Office's on eleven occasions. The figure below indicates a diminished level of trust found in the two most recent surveys (2019, 42%; 2022, 27%) following an upsurge between 2008 and 2011. It should be noted that a gradual erosion of trust also occurred between 2004 and 2008, prior to the aforementioned increase, such that we are unable to state whether the present decline is a lasting or transient phenomenon. In the current survey, the share who expressed trust was the lowest to date (multi-year average, 47.1%; 2022, 27%).

Figure 5.19 / Trust the State Attorney's Office (total sample; %)



A breakdown of the total sample (Jews and Arabs) over time shows a strong similarity between the two groups in this parameter, though the Jewish respondents give the State Attorney's Office a slightly higher trust rating than do the Arab respondents (with the exception of 2019). However, the situation overall is not encouraging, to put it mildly: At present, this institution enjoys the trust of less than one-third of the Jewish public (multi-year average, 48.9%, 2022, 29%) and under one-fifth of the Arab public (multi-year average, 36.7%; 2022, 18%).

Figure 5.20 / Trust the State Attorney's Office (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



As with the Supreme Court, in the Jewish sample the variables of political orientation and religiosity were closely connected with trust in the State Attorney's Office. This year, a majority on the Left express faith in the latter institution, compared with a sizeable minority in the Center and a small minority on the Right, presumably due to the criminal investigations of Binyamin Netanyahu and his ongoing trial on corruption charges. Among respondents from the Center and the Right, the levels of trust in the current survey are significantly lower than the multi-year averages, but on the Left, the respective percentages are the same. A breakdown of the findings in the Jewish sample by religiosity shows that the Haredi respondents have reported the lowest level of trust over the years. Likewise, the shares who express confidence in the State Attorney's Office across all groups in this category are lower in 2022 than the respective multi-year averages.

And finally, a breakdown of the 2022 findings on the basis of age reveals that the older cohorts, in particular the 65-and-over age group, report much greater faith in the State Attorney's Office than do the younger ones (especially ages 18 to 44). In all age groups, the current survey yields much lower levels of trust than the multi-year averages.

Table 5.35 (Jewish sample; %)

Trust the State Attorney's Office		Multi-year average	2022
Political orientation	Left	70.2	70
	Center	56.5	40
	Right	39.5	18
Religiosity	Haredim	15.0	6
	National religious	39.7	13
	Traditional	49.7	22
	Secular	57.0	46
Age	18–24	42.9	18
	25–44	47.1	19
	45–64	52.6	34
	65+	51.3	46.5

An analysis of the Arab sample by religion shows that the share of Druze respondents who express trust in the State Attorney's Office has been higher over the years than that of the Christians and Muslims. Breaking down the results by age, we found that the level of trust among each of the cohorts this year was significantly lower than the multi-year averages.

Table 5.36 (Arab sample; %)

Trust the State Attorney's Office		Multi-year average	2022
Religion	Muslims	32.3	15
	Christians	44.3	37
	Druze	50.4	36
Age	18–24	33.6	23
	25–44	35.0	16
	45–64	39.2	17
	65+	48.9	19

To conclude, we found an association between levels of trust in the Supreme Court and in the State Attorney's Office: a substantial majority of those who did not express confidence in the Supreme Court feel similarly about the State Attorney's Office (88%), while a (smaller) majority of those who have faith in the former also reported trusting the latter (58%).

Table 5.37 (total sample; %)

	Trust State Attorney's Office quite a lot or very much	Trust State Attorney's Office's not so much or not at all	Don't know	Total
Trust Supreme Court quite a lot or very much	58	35	7	100
Trust Supreme Court not so much or not at all	6	88	6	100

Trust in the Attorney General

Question 19 | Appendix 1, page 150 | Appendix 2, page 171

We have measured the levels of trust in the Attorney General seven times altogether (multi-year average, 42.2%). Following a rise in the share of the total sample who expressed trust, as recorded in the 2009 and 2011 surveys, we saw a decline in 2017, after which the levels remained stable until 2020. We encountered a steep drop once again this year, with only one-quarter of the respondents reporting that they have faith in this institution—the lowest level thus far.

Figure 5.21 / Trust the Attorney General (total sample; %)



Breaking down the results by nationality, we see that here too (as with the State Attorney's Office) the Jewish public has expressed greater trust in the Attorney General through the years than has the Arab population (multi-year averages of 44.8% and 27.4%, respectively); however, the patterns are largely similar.

Figure 5.22 / Trust the Attorney General (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



A breakdown of current levels of trust in the Attorney General in the Jewish sample by political orientation shows a majority on the Left who express faith in this institution, compared with a minority (albeit sizeable) in the Center and a small minority on the Right. Analyzing the data on the basis of religiosity yields findings similar to those for the Supreme Court and the State Attorney's Office, with Haredi and national religious respondents citing less confidence in the Attorney General over the years relative to the other religious groups. The older age groups report greater trust in this office than do the younger ones. In all the above subgroups in the Jewish sample (with the exception of the Left), the levels of trust this year are lower than the multi-year averages.

Table 5.38 (Jewish sample; %)

Trust the Attorney General		Multi-year average	2022
Political orientation	Left	58.2	64.5
	Center	51.4	40.5
	Right	39.7	16
Religiosity	Haredim	19.8	4
	National religious	38.4	10
	Traditional	45.7	19
	Secular	51.2	45
Age	18–24	36.7	11
	25–44	39.5	19
	45–64	50.3	33
	65+	51.8	46

Breaking down the Arab sample by religion, we found that Druze respondents have expressed greater trust in the Attorney General through the years than have Christians and Muslims.

Table 5.39 (Arab sample; %)

Trust the State Attorney's Office	Multi-year average	2022
Muslims	25.0	14
Christians	31.0	29
Druze	44.5	42

Is trust in Israel's state institutions on the decline?

One of the key questions arising from the above analysis is whether there is truth to the claim of an overall decline in public trust in Israel's state institutions, and if so, how drastic the decline is. To answer this, we calculated three types of average trust ratings:

- Multi-year average of each institution
- Yearly average of all eight institutions as a whole (that is, the average percentage of respondents who expressed quite a lot or very much trust across all the institutions in a given year)
- Multi-year average of all the institutions as a whole for all the years surveyed

Multi-year average trust rating of each institution

The table below offers a comparative summary of the average share of respondents who expressed trust in each of the eight institutions that we regularly survey. To examine whether the level of trust has diminished, we calculated the average for each institution for the entire period since the inception of the *Democracy Index* (2003–2022) as well as by decade (2003–2012, and 2013–2022). It emerged that the IDF has garnered the highest overall multi-year average and decade averages, and the political parties, the lowest. We found further that, with the exception of the IDF, which averaged a higher level of public trust in the second decade than in the first among Jewish respondents, the converse held true for each of the institutions surveyed.

Table 5.40 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

Trust, multi-year averages	Jews				Arabs			
	2003–2022	2003–2012	2013–2022	Change between decades	2003–2022	2003–2012	2013–2022	Change between decades
IDF	88.1	87.5	88.7	▲	33.9	34.7	33.0	▼
President of Israel*	69.4	70.4	68.5	▼	36.7	39.5	34.2	▼
Supreme Court	59.5	63.9	55.1	▼	55.9	60.4	51.3	▼
Police	48.0	50.9	45.1	▼	37.5	43.4	31.6	▼
Media	37.3	42.6	31.9	▼	40.3	51.8	28.8	▼
Government	37.5	41.9	33.5	▼	27.1	30.2	24.4	▼
Knesset	36.1	40.8	31.4	▼	32.3	38.7	26.0	▼
Political parties	21.2	24.9	17.0	▼	24.1	26.0	22.0	▼

* Excluding 2007, when trust in the President of Israel reached a historic low due to charges of rape and sexual harassment against then-President Moshe Katzav.

Yearly average trust rating for all eight institutions

In 2022, the yearly average level of trust for all the institutions as a whole was the lowest to date. In the figure below, the curved line represents the yearly cross-institutional trust ratings for 2003 through 2022 (those expressing trust in these institutions), while the straight line shows the multi-year mean of these averages, which stands at 47.6% this year compared with 48.6% last year. The comparison between the two lines shows that since 2016, and especially in this year's rating, the yearly overall averages are consistently below the line for the multi-year mean of all the institutions. The disparity is particularly large this year due to a decline in trust in all the institutions across the board. Between 2007 and 2010 as well, the yearly averages were lower than the multi-year average, but this was followed by a rise in levels of trust, suggesting that the current situation is not necessarily permanent, and may yet improve in future.

Figure 5.23 / Yearly average level of trust in all the institutions as a whole, compared with overall multi-year average (total sample; %)



The following figure depicts the multi-year average level of trust of each of the institutions separately (the individual columns), compared with the multi-year average of all the institutions taken as a whole throughout the years surveyed (the straight horizontal line). As shown, the averages of the IDF, President of Israel, and Supreme Court are higher than the overall multi-year average; the average of the police is very similar; and the averages of the media and the political institutions (the government, Knesset, and political parties) all fall below the overall average.

Figure 5.24 / Multi-year average level of trust in each institution, compared with multi-year average of all the institutions as a whole (total sample; %)



Figure 5.25 / Yearly average level of trust in all the institutions as a whole (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



As shown in the figure below, in the Jewish sample the average yearly levels of trust in all the institutions as a whole experienced a steep downturn between 2004 and 2007, and again between 2013 and 2016, subsequently remaining relatively stable until this year, when we recorded another significant decline. In fact, the 2022 survey yielded the lowest cross-institutional yearly average thus far (36.3%).

In the Arab sample, the average yearly levels of trust in Israel's state institutions plummeted between 2004 and 2009, rose from 2010 to 2012, dropped sharply again between 2015 and 2018, and fell once more between 2020 and 2022. As in the Jewish sample, the 2022 survey of the Arab public yielded a historically low trust rating averaged across all the institutions (15.8%).

Multi-year average level of trust in all the institutions as a whole, Jewish respondents: 49.7%

Multi-year average level of trust in all the institutions as a whole, Arab respondents: 36.3%

As illustrated in the figure below, in six of the eight recurring institutions, the multi-year average level of trust is higher among Jewish respondents than among Arab respondents, with the greatest disparity pertaining to trust in the IDF (88.1% as opposed to just 33.9%, respectively). The average trust rating over the years is higher in the Arab than in the Jewish public in the case of only two of the institutions—the media and political parties—though the gaps here are small.

Figure 5.26 / Multi-year average level of trust in each institution (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



Figure 5.27 / Yearly average level of trust in all the institutions as a whole, by political orientation (Jewish sample; %)



Examining the overall yearly averages of all the institutions by political orientation (in the Jewish sample), we found that the average level of trust on the Right was consistently lower than in the Center and on the Left. However, the averages of the three camps diverged more noticeably in 2021 and 2022, with the yearly average on the Left rising slightly; in the Center, declining slightly; and on the Right, dropping more precipitously. In fact, the average overall level of trust among right-wing respondents this year is the lowest to date.

This pattern is also reflected in the multi-year averages of each camp, where the Left records the highest level of trust, the Center slightly lower, and the Right, the lowest:

Multi-year average level of trust in all the institutions as a whole, Left: 55.4%

Multi-year average level of trust in all the institutions as a whole, Center: 53.2%

Multi-year average level of trust in all the institutions as a whole, Right: 46.9%

Breaking down the average multi-year level of trust in each of the institutions by political camp reveals that respondents on the Right report less trust in the Supreme Court, the President of Israel, and the media than do those from the Center or Left. By contrast, the Right expresses a slightly higher level of trust than the other groups with regard to the political parties, the Knesset, and the government. The IDF earned the highest level of trust in all three camps, with the lowest rating on the Left.

Figure 5.28 / Multi-year average level of trust in each institution, by political orientation (Jewish sample; %)



Figure 5.29 / Yearly average level of trust in all the institutions as a whole, by religiosity (Jewish sample; %)



In addition, we examined the yearly averages in the Jewish sample across all institutions by religiosity. Here, it was very evident that the average yearly level of trust among Haredim has been significantly lower over the years than that of the national religious, traditional, and secular respondents. Trust ratings reached a record low in all the groups between 2007 and 2009, after which they began rising to a high point for secular, traditional, and national religious respondents in 2011 and for Haredim in 2012. This was followed by a slow but steady decline in trust among all groups. The 2022 findings are the lowest yet in the traditional, national religious, and Haredi groups, with the secular respondents returning to their 2008 level, slightly above their low point of 41.5% in 2007.

Multi-year average level of trust in all the institutions as a whole, Haredim: 30.2%

Multi-year average level of trust in all the institutions as a whole, national religious: 47.4%

Multi-year average level of trust in all the institutions as a whole, traditional: 51.2%

Multi-year average level of trust in all the institutions as a whole, secular: 53.0%

In the Jewish sample, the multi-year average levels of trust in each of the institutions, broken down by religiosity, also show a considerably lower degree of trust among Haredim across the board, in comparison with the other groups. The secular respondents stand out for their high level of trust in the Supreme Court and the media; the national religious report slightly more trust than the other groups with regard to the police, the government, the Knesset, and the political parties; and confidence in the IDF among national religious, traditional, and secular respondents is at virtually identical levels.

Figure 5.30 / Multi-year average level of trust in each institution, by religiosity (Jewish sample; %)



To conclude, we also examined the yearly averages in the Jewish sample across all the institutions by age. The average ratings of the younger groups (18–44) were consistently somewhat lower than those of the older cohorts (45 and above).

Multi-year average level of trust in all the institutions as a whole, ages 18-24: 47.4%

Multi-year average level of trust in all the institutions as a whole, ages 25-44: 46.9%

Multi-year average level of trust in all the institutions as a whole, ages 45-64: 52.0%

Multi-year average level of trust in all the institutions as a whole, ages 65+: 53.1%

In the figure below, the multi-year average trust rating in each of the age groups by institution shows clearly that the older cohorts have greater confidence than do the younger ones in four institutions: the IDF, President of Israel, Supreme Court, and the media. In the remaining institutions, the gaps between cohorts are not great, except with regard to the political parties, where the average is slightly higher among the youngest age group (18–24).

Figure 5.31 / Multi-year average level of trust in each institution, by age (Jewish sample; %)



In the Arab sample, we examined the yearly averages across all the institutions by religion. In most cases, the average ratings among Druze respondents were higher than those among Christians and Muslims.

Multi-year average level of trust in all the institutions as a whole, Muslims: 33.0%

Multi-year average level of trust in all the institutions as a whole, Christians: 41.8%

Multi-year average level of trust in all the institutions as a whole, Druze: 49.3%

Breaking down the multi-year average trust rating in each of the institutions by religion, we see that the Muslims report the lowest levels of trust. The averages of the Druze respondents are higher than those of the Christians with regard to five institutions: the IDF, Supreme Court, President of Israel, police, and government.

Figure 5.32 / Multi-year average level of trust in each institution, by religion (Arab sample; %)



In addition, we examined the yearly averages in the Arab sample across all the institutions by age, finding similar averages in all age groups. We recorded a decline in all cohorts in 2020, which has persisted through to the present survey.

Multi-year average level of trust in all the institutions as a whole, ages 18–24: 35.9%

Multi-year average level of trust in all the institutions as a whole, ages 25–44: 35.5%

Multi-year average level of trust in all the institutions as a whole, ages 45–64: 36.7%

Multi-year average level of trust in all the institutions as a whole, ages 65+: 40.9%

The multi-year average level of trust in each of the institutions, broken down by age, shows that respondents aged 65 and over place greater faith than do the other age groups in the IDF, President of Israel, Supreme Court, and government. In the remaining institutions, similar averages were found in all cohorts.

Figure 5.33 / Multi-year average level of trust in each institution, by age (Arab sample; %)



Finally, we examined the yearly averages across all institutions in the total sample by social location, finding consistently that those who associate themselves with stronger social groups average higher levels of trust than do those who identify with weaker groups. In addition, we see a gradual decline in both these categories through the years, up to and including the present survey, which produced the lowest levels of trust to date.

Multi-year average level of trust in all the institutions as a whole, respondents who identify with strong or quite strong groups: 50.7%

Multi-year average level of trust in all the institutions as a whole, respondents who identify with weak or quite weak groups: 38.5%

Figure 5.34 / Multi-year average level of trust in each institution, by social location (total sample; %)



Gradations of trust

This year, for the first time, we constructed an additional trust indicator that characterizes the interviewees by their degree of trust in the eight institutions that we examine regularly.[15] We divided the interviewees into three categories: those who expressed a low level, a moderate level, or a high level of trust. As shown in the following table, when the data are broken down by nationality, a majority of Jewish respondents are located in the moderate category, while the Arab respondents are split almost evenly between moderate and low levels of trust. We did not find substantial differences between the three political camps in the Jewish sample, nor did a breakdown by age yield significant differences; however, analysis on the basis of religiosity in the Jewish sample shows that, unlike the other groups, a majority of Haredim fall into the low-trust category.

In the Arab sample, we found that roughly one-half of Muslim respondents come under the heading of low level of trust, whereas a majority of the Christians and Druze are in the moderate group.

A breakdown of the findings in the total sample by social location shows that in the category of low level of trust, there are more interviewees who identify with weaker social groups than with stronger ones.

15 The new indicator is based on the summation of respondents' scores across all the institutions we asked about. Since, in certain years, we presented only seven institutions, the lowest possible score is 7 (for those who rated their trust as 1=not at all for all seven institutions), and the highest score is 32 (for those rated their trust as 4=very much for all eight institutions).

Table 5.41 (total sample; Jewish and Arab samples; %)

		Multi-year averages of trust in all institutions			
		Low level of trust	Moderate level of trust	High level of trust	Total
Nationality (total sample)	Jews	19	66	15	100
	Arabs	43	46	11	100
Political orientation (Jewish sample)	Left	10	73	17	100
	Center	14	69	17	100
	Right	24	63	13	100
Religiosity (Jewish sample)	Haredim	52	45	3	100
	National religious	22	65	13	100
	Traditional	17	67	16	100
	Secular	14	70	16	100
Religion (Arab sample)	Muslims	48	42.5	9.5	100
	Christians	34	53	13	100
	Druze	26	55	19	100
Social location (total sample)	Identify with stronger groups	18	65	17	100
	Identify with weaker groups	35	56	9	100

Chapter 6 / Israel—Jewish or Democratic?

In this chapter, we discuss the following topics:

- Balance between the Jewish and democratic components in Israel
- Preference for the Jewish or democratic component
- Has Israel become more religious? Will it become more religious?
- Likelihood of being able to maintain one's desired lifestyle

Jewish and democratic?

Question 22 | Appendix 1, page 151 | Appendix 2, page 175

Since Israel's founding, it has generally been assumed that it would be a Jewish and democratic state, though this was never stated explicitly in its Declaration of Independence or any other official document. Israel's formal definition as a Jewish and democratic state was stipulated clearly in writing for the first time in the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, both of which were enacted in 1992.[16] Since then, one of the key questions in Israeli public discourse has been that of the balance—or imbalance—between these two aspects. Since 2016, we have posed the following question in each of our yearly surveys: "Israel is defined as a Jewish and democratic state. Do you feel there is a good balance today between the Jewish and the democratic components?"

As shown in the figure below, the largest share of the total sample through the years has held that the Jewish component is overly dominant (multi-year average, 44.9%). There has been virtually no change in this assessment since we began our surveys, though 2022 showed a slight downturn (from 45% last year to 38% this year, that is, less than the multi-year average). Similarly, in the (much smaller) share of respondents who hold that the democratic element is too strong, there have been only minor changes over time, without a clear-cut trend (multi-year average, 21.8%). By contrast, since 2019 there has been a slow but steady decline in the proportion who believe that there is a good balance between the Jewish and democratic components in Israel (multi-year average 2016–2019, 27.2%; 2020–2022, 19%). This year, only 18% hold that such a balance exists. We are also seeing a change in the share of "don't know" responses, which has more than tripled from 6% in 2016 to 18.5% in 2022—a finding that may point to growing uncertainty on this issue.

16 The first reference to this definition appears in the Basic Law: The Knesset, 5718-1958, article 7a.

Figure 6.1 / Is there is a good balance today in Israel between the Jewish and democratic components of the state? (total sample; %)



As we learn from the multi-year averages in the table below, the greatest share of Jewish respondents (though not a majority, at slightly over one-third) hold that the Jewish component is too dominant. Among Arab respondents, by contrast, a clear majority of more than three-quarters feel this way.

Breaking down the multi-year averages (2016–2022) for the Jewish sample by political orientation, we find that the Left (which has the largest share of secular respondents) is very similar to the Arab sample on this question, with roughly three-quarters saying that the Jewish component is too dominant. The Center is split: around half believe that the Jewish component is too strong, one-quarter that there is a good balance between the two components, and a minority that the democratic component is too strong. On the Right, where the proportion of Haredi and national religious respondents is very large, the largest share hold that the Jewish component is too strong (36%), but the share of those who think that there is a good balance is almost the same (32%).

A breakdown of the Jewish respondents by religiosity shows that two-thirds of Haredim believe that the democratic element is overly dominant in Israel today. Among national religious respondents, the pattern is similar, though here the largest share (but not a majority) take this view. The traditional religious are divided on this issue, but in this group the largest share (roughly

one-third) hold that there is a good balance between the two components. The traditional non-religious, too, are split, but tend more toward the view that the Jewish component is too strong (again, about one-third), while among the secular respondents a sizeable majority answered that the Jewish component is too dominant.

Table 6.1 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

Multi-year averages, 2016–2022		There is a good balance between the Jewish and democratic components	The Jewish component is too dominant	The democratic component is too dominant	Don't know
Nationality	Jews	26.0	38.5	24.5	11.0
	Arabs	11.1	78.7	7.5	2.7
Political orientation (Jews)	Left	13.5	76.5	4.7	5.3
	Center	24.0	51.3	13.3	11.4
	Right	32.0	21.0	36.0	11.0
Religiosity (Jews)	Haredim	15.6	6.2	65.1	13.1
	National religious	35.3	8.7	44.6	11.4
	Traditional religious	33.4	21.9	32.3	12.4
	Traditional non-religious	32.3	34.2	20.8	12.7
	Secular	21.1	60.4	9.3	9.2

Cross-referencing the responses to this question with responses to the earlier question about the extent to which the principle of freedom of religion is upheld in Israel (chapter 3, page 61) reveals that half of those who think that there is a good balance between the Jewish component and the democratic component said that freedom of religion is maintained to the appropriate degree. By contrast, among those who hold that there is not a good balance, whether they believe that the Jewish component or the democratic component is too strong, the most common response is that freedom of religion in Israel is upheld too little in Israel today.

Figure 6.2 / Extent to which freedom of religion is upheld in Israel, 2022, by view on whether there is a good balance between the Jewish and democratic components (Jewish sample; %)



Preference for the democratic or Jewish component?

Question 23 | Appendix 1, page 151 | Appendix 2, pages 175–176

From an assessment of the existing situation in the previous question, we moved on to examining the public's preferences on this issue, asking the Jewish interviewees which of the two components they think should be dominant. This question has been posed nine times, in different versions. From 2010 to 2015, we asked: "Israel is defined as both a Jewish and a democratic state. Which part of this definition is more important to you personally?" In 2017–2022, the wording was changed slightly to: "Which component should be the dominant one, in your opinion?" Below, we present the distribution of preferences in the Jewish sample. As shown, it differs from perceptions of the situation in practice, as, for most of the years surveyed (with the exception of 2014, 2015, and 2022), the respondents preferred that both components be equally important. In fact, the multi-year average shows this option at the top of the list (37.3%), followed by prioritizing the Jewish component (33.0%), and lastly, the democratic component (28.2%). In other words, we are witnessing what is essentially a three-way split between those who emphasize the Jewish aspect, those who assign priority to the democratic aspect, and those who favor the two equally.

Figure 6.3 / Israel is defined as both a Jewish and a democratic state. Which part of this definition is more important to you personally? 2010–2015; Which component should be the dominant one, in your opinion? 2017–2022 (Jewish sample; %)



So as not to overburden the reader, we will confine our analysis to the three most recent surveys in which this question was posed, but the conclusions can be considered valid for the preceding years as well. First, a breakdown of responses in the Jewish sample by religiosity in the 2017, 2018, and 2022 assessments shows, as expected, that the Haredi and national religious respondents have expressed a preference over the years for the Jewish component, whereas the secular prioritize the democratic aspect. In the past, both groups of traditional Jews favored the two elements equally, though this year their preference shifted to the Jewish component. It is too soon to tell at this stage whether this represents an anomaly or a profound change. Second, this year's findings across all groups show a decline in the share of respondents who favor both components equally, with an especially noticeable drop in support for that option among the national religious (from roughly half in 2017 to just one-fifth in 2022). And third, the secular respondents are the sole group in which a consistent majority prioritizes the democratic component, which has garnered scant support from the Haredi and national religious groups over the years, and only slight, and dwindling, endorsement from both traditional groups.

Table 6.2 (Jewish sample; %)

		Prefer the Jewish component	Prefer the democratic component	Prefer both equally
Haredim	2017	79	1	18
	2018	84	2	14
	2022	85	1	13
National religious	2017	43	6	48.5
	2018	57	1	41
	2022	77	2	20
Traditional religious	2017	31	11	56
	2018	31	10	59
	2022	58.5	5	35
Traditional non-religious	2017	16	28	54
	2018	21.5	22	56
	2022	45	17	37
Secular	2017	6	54	39
	2018	6	63	30
	2022	15	51	31

Likewise, a breakdown of this question by political orientation reveals a decline this year in all three camps in the share of Jewish respondents who wish to see both components be equally dominant. On the Right, there was a sharp upturn, and in the Center, a moderate rise in support for the Jewish component, while the Left saw an increase in the longstanding majority who favor the democratic component. This analysis points to a broadening of the gap between those who pin their hopes on the Jewish element and those who lean more toward the democratic aspect, along with an apparent decline in the public's faith that such a balancing act is even viable.

Table 6.3 (Jewish sample; %)

		Prefer the Jewish component	Prefer the democratic component	Prefer both equally
Right	2017	40.5	11.5	47
	2018	41	15	43
	2022	60	11	28
Center	2017	6	46	46
	2018	11	47	41
	2022	19	46	34
Left	2017	4	64	31.5
	2018	4	70	26
	2022	3	70.5	24

Cross-tabulating the questions about the existing degree of balance, and the preference for a given component, we found that, of those who favor a stronger democratic element, a sizeable majority hold that the Jewish component is too dominant. The converse also holds true: among those who prioritize the Jewish element, the feeling is that the democratic component is too strong. Among those who prefer a balance between the two, there is a slightly greater tendency to feel that the Jewish aspect is too dominant. The share who chose the "don't know" response is also the highest in this group.

Table 6.4 (Jewish sample, 2022; %)

	Jewish component is too strong	Democratic component is too strong	There is a good balance between the two components	Don't know	Total
Democratic component should be dominant	66	3.5	17	13	100
Jewish component should be dominant	9	54	16	21	100
Both equally	25	20	28	27	100

■ What to do if there is a conflict between the two components?

Question 24 | Appendix 1, page 151 | Appendix 2, page 176

And what should be done in the event of a conflict between democratic principles and halacha (Jewish religious law)? Should priority be placed on upholding democratic values or on maintaining the precepts of Jewish law? Or should there be a flexible approach, with each situation judged separately? We have posed this question on seven occasions over the years. The multi-year average for the three options shows that, at least to date, democracy has an edge over both flexibility and ruling on the basis of halacha (priority to democratic principles in all cases, 43.4%; it depends on the circumstances, 28.9%; precepts of Jewish religious law in all cases, 25%).

Figure 6.4 / In the event of a conflict between democratic principles and halacha (Jewish religious law), should priority be given to democratic principles or to the precepts of Jewish law? (Jewish sample; %)



We have not examined this question for close to ten years, and we will need to revisit it in future to corroborate our impression from this year's assessment. The fact that the findings for 2022 are substantially different from those in past surveys may signal a major shift in Israeli society, reflecting a waning commitment to democracy. While between 2003 and 2013, an average of roughly half the interviewees (45%) indicated that in cases of conflict, actions should always be guided by democratic principles, in the present survey only one-third chose this response. By contrast, in 2003–2013 just 27.5% favored a flexible stance ("it depends on the circumstances"), whereas this year, the latter was the most frequent choice (37%). The share of respondents who prioritized the precepts of Jewish law in all cases of conflict has remained stable over the years.

Breaking down the responses to this question over the years by religiosity, we found, as expected, that in the event of conflicting values, nearly all the Haredi interviewees would wish to decide in accordance with halacha, with only a very small minority opting for flexibility (that is, deciding based on the circumstances). In the national religious group as well, a majority (though much smaller than that among the Haredim) favor deciding in keeping with religious law in all cases, while a much higher share than among the Haredim choose a flexible response. The traditional respondents tend to lean more in the direction of flexibility, whereas the secular group, again not surprisingly, show a sizeable majority who would give priority to democratic principles in the event of a conflict.

A breakdown of the results by political orientation finds a substantial majority on the Left (even greater than that among the secular respondents) who would prefer to decide according to democratic principles in cases of conflict. So too with the Center, though by a smaller majority. The Right is split more or less evenly among the three options.

Table 6.5 (Jewish sample; %)

Multi-year average		Priority to democratic principles in all cases	Depends on circum-stances	Priority to Jewish law in all cases	Don't know / there is no conflict	Total
Religiosity	Haredim	2.1	8.3	88.8	0.8	100
	National religious	8.6	31.1	56.9	3.4	100
	Traditional	30.6	42.0	24.4	3.0	100
	Secular	65.5	25.4	6.8	2.3	100
Political orientation	Left	70.1	20.5	7.6	1.8	100
	Center	53.5	30.6	13.2	2.7	100
	Right	28.0	31.4	38.2	2.4	100

Has Israel become more religious?

Question 61 | Appendix 1, page 159

This is a new question, which we posed for the first time in this year's survey. As shown in the figure below, a majority of the Israeli public (56%) does not believe that Israel has become more religious over the last 10–15 years, while roughly one-third (36%) think the opposite. The answers in and of themselves do not tell us whether the notion of the country becoming more religious is viewed as a positive or negative development by the different groups of interviewees; however, we did glean some information from the breakdown of responses below.

Figure 6.5 / In your opinion, what is Israel's situation today compared with the recent past (10–15 years ago)—has it become a more religious country? 2022 (total sample; %)



A breakdown of the responses by nationality shows that in the Jewish sample, a majority (57%) hold that Israel has not become more religious; however, in the Arab sample, the respondents are almost evenly split between those who think that the country has become more religious (41%) and those who feel that it has not (49%). It seems clear enough that the responses of the Jewish interviewees refer to whether the country has drawn closer to the Jewish religion; however, we cannot know for certain what the Arab interviewees had in mind in their responses—do they think that Israel has become more religious Jewishly, or are they relating to greater religiosity in Arab society, or to both these processes? Our hesitation as to how to interpret the responses is exacerbated by the differences we found between religious groups in the Arab sample: Christians are the most prone to think that the country has become more religious (56%), compared with one-half of Druze (50%), and only a minority, though a sizeable one, of Muslims (40%).

Breaking down the Jewish sample by religiosity, only a minority in all groups (with the exception of the secular) hold that Israel has become more religious in the period in question; in the latter case, a majority feel this way.

Figure 6.6 / Certain or think that Israel has become more religious, 2022 (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)



In terms of political orientation, the differences between the camps are very pronounced, with only a minority on the Right, roughly one half in the Center, and a solid majority on the Left holding that this is the direction the country has taken.

Table 6.6 (Jewish sample, 2022; %)

	Think that Israel has become more religious
Right	22
Center	51
Left	78

Cross-tabulating between the questions on whether the democratic or the Jewish component should be more dominant, and whether Israel has become more religious (Jewish respondents), we found that of those who emphasize the democratic element, a majority of 69% hold that Israel has become more religious, while of those who prioritize the Jewish aspect, a majority (79%) answered that it has not become more religious. Among those who prefer that both components be equally strong, the findings were closer to the latter group, though to a lesser degree; here, a majority of 57% hold that Israel has not become more religious in recent years.

Will Israel become more religious in future?

Question 62 | Appendix 1, page 159 | Appendix 2, page 198

To understand how the public sees the future, we revisited a question that we had posed once before, in 2012: "What do you think will happen in the not-so-distant future (the next 10–15 years)—will Israel become a more religious country?" It emerges that there is virtually no difference between the predictions made then and now: A majority of respondents are not of the opinion that the country is on the road to becoming more religious, though in 2022, the share who are uncertain is higher than it was a decade ago.

Table 6.7 (Jewish sample; %)

	What will happen to Israel in the near future?	
	2012	2022
Israel will become more religious	39	38
Israel will **not** become more religious	54	49
Don't know	7	13

A breakdown of responses to this question then and now on the basis of religiosity shows that, in the past, a majority of Haredim anticipated that Israel would become more religious, but today, the share who predict this is noticeably less. Among the national religious as well, close to half thought that the country would become more religious, and today they are less inclined to make such a forecast. In the traditional groups, only a minority held that Israel would become more religious, with the proportions largely unchanged over time. By contrast, among secular respondents, the share who believe Israel is set to become more religious showed a clear increase from 2012 to 2022, climbing to almost half of the group.

Figure 6.7 / Predict that the country will become more religious (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)



The responses indicate that, on the Left, the percentage who predict (or presumably, fear) that the country will become more religious is greater today than in the past. In the Center, we found a rise in the proportion who hold that the country is on such a trajectory, and there is reason to assume that, here too, there is concern over what is seen as a less-than-desirable trend. On the Right, however, there was actually a decline in the share who see this as the country's future direction (perhaps influenced by the views of the many Haredim and national religious respondents in this camp, who, as shown above, do not believe that Israel will become more religious in the not-too-distant future).

Table 6.8 (Jewish sample; %)

Certain or think that Israel will become more religious	2012	2022
Right	38	29.5
Center	32	46.5
Left	57	65

Cross-tabulating the 2022 responses on the previous two questions (whether Israel has become more religious, and whether it will become more religious in the next 10–15 years), we found that, of those who stated that it has become more religious, three-quarters hold that this process will continue, whereas, of those who think that the state has not become more religious, the same percentage hold that it will not become more religious in the next decade or so. In other words, perceptions of the past on this subject dictate predictions for the future.

Table 6.9 (Jewish sample, 2022; %)

	Israel will become more religious	Israel will not become more religious	Don't know	Total
Think or certain that Israel has become more religious	74	16	10	100
Think or certain that Israel has **not** become more religious	17	74	9	100

Likelihood of maintaining your preferred lifestyle

Question 60 | Appendix 1, page 159 | Appendix 2, page 198

In light of the assessment (primarily among secular respondents) regarding the trend toward religionization in Israel, we asked in 2017, and again this year: "How worried are you that you will be unable to maintain your preferred lifestyle because of the increasing power of certain groups in Israeli society that advocate a different way of life from yours?" Obviously, this question can be interpreted not only in the context of relations between religious and non-religious Israelis, but since it reflects the level of concern over possible future changes to the fabric of Israeli society, we included it in this chapter.

As shown in the figure below, the share of respondents who are worried that they will be unable to maintain their lifestyle because of the growing strength of other groups in Israeli society has risen sharply (by 29 percentage points) over the last five years.

Figure 6.8 / How worried are you that you will be unable to maintain your preferred lifestyle because of the increasing power of certain groups in Israeli society that advocate a different way of life from yours? (total sample; %)



Worries about a changing Israeli society are greater among Arab respondents than among Jews, though a majority in both groups expressed trepidation. In the Arab population, the assumption is that these concerns center not (only?) on religionization but (also?) on the strengthening of the Jewish component of the state, with all that this entails in terms of the standing of Arab citizens of Israel.

Table 6.10 (Jewish and Arab samples, 2022; %)

	Worried they won't be able to maintain preferred lifestyle	Not worried they won't be able to maintain preferred lifestyle
Jews	68	28
Arabs	79	20

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by religiosity shows a majority in all groups who are worried that they will not be able to maintain their desired lifestyle due to the growing influence of groups that will impose a different way of life on them. In 2017, this fear was strongest among secular respondents and those on the Left, with over half predicting such a scenario. In the other religious groups, and on the Right, only a minority felt this way, while in the Center, the share who expressed concern was slightly under the halfway mark. In 2022, however, the picture is completely different: In all groups, without exception, we found an unequivocal majority who are afraid that they will be unable to preserve their present lifestyle, though here too, this majority is the highest among secular respondents and the Left.

Table 6.11 (Jewish sample; %)

Worried they won't be able to maintain preferred lifestyle		2017	2022
Religiosity	Haredim	34	67
	National religious	22	58
	Traditional religious	18	69
	Traditional non-religious	31.5	68
	Secular	55	71
Political orientation	Right	30	67
	Center	46	67
	Left	56.5	80

Cross-tabulating the above question (concerns about the ability to maintain one's desired lifestyle in Israel) with the query on the intention to remain in Israel or emigrate, we found that among both the "worriers" and the "non-worriers," a majority wish to stay in Israel, though by a much smaller margin in the former group. In other words, not surprisingly, those who feel that their way of life is threatened are more likely to weigh the possibility of emigrating than are those who do not share this fear. In chapter chapter 2 (page 48), we noted that the proportion of respondents who would be willing to consider emigration is slightly greater among secular Jews and on the Left than among other groups. Based on the findings here, this may be attributable to a fear of being unable to preserve their way of life over time due to what they foresee as the growing influence of religion.

Table 6.12 (Jewish sample, 2022; %)

	Would rather emigrate	Would rather remain in Israel	Don't know	Total
Worried they won't be able to maintain preferred lifestyle	22	63	15	100
Not worried they won't be able to maintain preferred lifestyle	10	80	10	100

Chapter 7 / Israeli Society

In this chapter, we discuss the following topics:

- Social solidarity and mutual support in Israeli society
- Focal points of tension in Israeli society
- Relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel
- Status of Arab citizens of Israel: discrimination versus integration

Solidarity in Israel

Question 5 |Appendix 1, page 148 | Appendix 2, page 164

One of the keystones of any democratic society is the sense of solidarity among its constituent groups and individuals. As shown in the figure below, the public's assessment of Israel's social solidarity, or sense of togetherness, has remained virtually unchanged throughout our surveys, at slightly below the halfway mark of 5.5 on a scale of 1–10 (where 1 = no solidarity at all, and 10 = a high level of solidarity). Further, the assessment given by the Jewish respondents has consistently been higher than that provided by their Arab counterparts (multi-year averages of 5.0 and 4.3, respectively), with the highest disparity yet in the 2021 and 2022 surveys. Among Jewish respondents, there was a slight increase in the perceived level of solidarity in Israeli society between 2011 and 2020, followed by a noticeable decline. The Arab public experienced a falloff in solidarity ratings between 2011 and 2014, followed by a slight rise from 2014 to 2020, after which the levels dropped once again, more steeply than in the Jewish population.

Figure 7.1 / Average level of solidarity in Israeli society (Jewish and Arab samples; scale of 1–10)



Breaking down the solidarity ratings through the years by political orientation of the Jewish public, we found a lower multi-year average on the Left than in the Center or Right (where the averages were identical), and lower levels in 2022 than the multi-year average in all three camps.

Looking at the same population in terms of religiosity, we see that the multi-year average of the Haredim is much lower than that of the other groups, with the secular respondents slightly above them, such that the two groups at either end of the religious spectrum awarded the poorest solidarity ratings, while the multi-year averages of the other groups were clustered more closely together.

Table 7.1 (Jewish sample; scale of 1–10)

Average level of solidarity in Israeli society		Multi-year average	2011	2014	2015	2020	2021	2022
Political orientation	Right	5.1	4.9	4.8	5.2	5.7	5.1	4.6
	Center	5.1	4.6	5.1	5.6	5.3	5.1	4.9
	Left	4.7	4.9	4.6	4.9	4.6	4.8	4.6
Religiosity	Haredim	4.3	4.4	3.5	4.6	5.5	4.4	3.4
	National religious	5.2	5.5	4.4	5.0	6.0	5.5	4.9
	Traditional religious	5.5	--	5.4	6.0	5.9	5.3	5.0
	Traditional non-religious	5.4	--	5.5	5.7	5.7	5.1	4.9
	Secular	4.9	4.6	4.9	5.1	5.1	4.9	4.7

A breakdown of the responses from Arab interviewees by religion reveals that the multi-year average among the Druze is just above that of the Christians and Muslims, meaning that the Druze have a slightly higher assessment of the level of solidarity in Israeli society than do the other two religious groups. Here too, this year's findings are lower than the multi-year averages, pointing to a decline in the level of social solidarity in Israel as perceived by the Arab public.

Arab respondents who reported voting for the Zionist parties perceive the level of solidarity as higher than do those who voted for the (Arab) non-Zionist parties, but in both groups the 2022 ratings are lower than the respective multi-year averages.

Table 7.2 (Arab sample; scale of 1–10)

Average level of solidarity in Israeli society		Multi-year average	2011	2014	2015	2020	2021	2022
Religion	Muslims	4.2	4.4	4.0	4.4	4.8	4.0	3.6
	Christians	4.4	4.8	3.6	5.3	4.2	4.7	3.9
	Druze	4.5	4.2	4.4	4.2	5.4	4.3	4.3
Vote	Zionist parties	5.2	4.4	4.8	4.9	5.6	6.6	5.0
	(Arab) non-Zionist parties	4.1	4.3	4.2	4.3	4.5	3.9	3.6

Jewish Solidarity

Question 6 |Appendix 1, page 148 | Appendix 2, page 164

From here, we moved on to a separate examination of solidarity in Jewish Israeli society, on the assumption that the tension between Jews and Arabs skews the perceived level of solidarity within the majority group. The data below are remarkably consistent, with all of the ratings above the midpoint of the scale (5.5).

Figure 7.2 / Average level of solidarity in Jewish Israeli society (Jewish sample; scale of 1–10)



In all our surveys to date, the Jewish respondents, not surprisingly, have assessed the level of intra-Jewish solidarity as higher than that of Israeli society as a whole (as shown in the figure below).

Figure 7.3 / Average level of solidarity in Jewish Israeli society and in Israeli society as a whole (Jewish sample; scale of 1–10)



Breaking down the findings in the Jewish sample by political orientation shows that all three camps likewise rate the level of intra-Jewish solidarity as higher than that of Israeli society overall. Once again, respondents on the Right see the sense of togetherness as stronger than do the other groups, with this year's findings identical to the multi-year average for the Right, and slightly lower than the averages in the Center and on the Left.

A breakdown of the multi-year averages by religiosity shows that national religious respondents rate the level of intra-Jewish solidarity much higher than do the other groups, with the Haredim at the opposite end of the spectrum. At the same time, the perception of solidarity in Israeli Jewish society among all the groups is higher than that of solidarity in Israeli society as a whole. Interestingly enough, this year's findings in the national religious group are higher than the multi-year average, while in the other groups, the latest survey results are the same as, or lower than, the multi-year average.

Table 7.3 (Jewish sample; scale of 1–10)

Average level of solidarity in Jewish Israeli society		Multi-year average	2011	2012	2014	2018	2019	2022
Political orientation	Right	6.3	6.1	6.3	6.2	6.2	6.5	6.3
	Center	5.8	5.7	6.2	6.3	5.4	5.8	5.6
	Left	5.4	5.6	5.6	5.5	5.2	5.0	5.2
Religiosity	Haredim	5.5	5.5	5.4	5.4	5.8	5.4	5.4
	National religious	6.6	6.4	6.3	6.1	6.7	7.0	6.8
	Traditional non-religious	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.6	5.8	6.3	6.3
	Secular	5.7	5.4	6.2	6.0	5.5	5.7	5.5

■ Do Israelis look out for one another?

Question 43 | Appendix 1, page 155 | Appendix 2, page 186

One of the indicators of social solidarity is mutual support. Accordingly, we asked the interviewees if they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: "Israelis can always count on other Israelis to help them in times of trouble." As shown in the figure below, in all three surveys where this question was posed, a majority of Jews agreed that they can always rely on their fellow Israelis to lend a hand. Among Arabs, slightly over one-half agreed with this assertion in the first two surveys, but only a minority in the present one. The difference between the two populations may be substantive; but it is also possible that Arab respondents do not hear the term "Israelis" as including them. And indeed, many Arabs (not to mention Jews) often use the word "Israeli" to refer to Jewish citizens specifically, and feel that they themselves are left on the sidelines.

Figure 7.4 / Agree that Israelis can always count on other Israelis to help them in times of trouble (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



A breakdown of this year's responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation yielded a majority in all three camps who agree with the statement presented, though by a smaller margin among Left and Center respondents than among those on the Right (Left, 60%; Center, 62%; Right, 73%).

In the Arab sample, only a minority in all three religious groups agreed this year that Israelis can be counted on to come to the aid of their fellow citizens (Muslims, 39%; Christians, 36%; Druze, 46%). However, the gap between voters for Zionist and for (Arab) non-Zionist parties in the last elections (in 2021) is substantial, with the former clearly feeling a greater sense of belonging to the entity known as "Israelis."

Table 7.4 (2022; Arab sample; %)

Vote in 2021 elections	Agree that Israelis can always count on other Israelis to help in times of trouble
Voted for Zionist parties	70
Voted for (Arab) non-Zionist parties	37

As shown in the table below, when we cross-tabulated these findings with responses to the statement "Citizens of Israel can always rely on the state to come to their aid in times of trouble" (chapter 2, page 40), we found that Jewish respondents who hold that Israelis will always help out one another are split almost down the middle between those who agree that the state can be counted on to help, and the slightly greater share who disagree with this assertion (46%

versus 52%, respectively). But of those who do not think that Israelis will necessarily support one another, a sweeping majority (80%) believe that the state cannot be relied upon either.

In the Arab sample, respondents are divided between those who feel that they can count on the assistance of both the state and their fellow citizens (88%) and those who do not place their faith in the state or in other Israelis (70%).

Table 7.5 (2022; Jewish and Arab samples; %)

		Agree that Israeli citizens can always rely on the state to come to their aid in times of trouble	Do not agree that Israeli citizens can always rely on the state to come to their aid in times of trouble	Don't know	Total
Jews	Agree that Israelis can always count on other Israelis to help in times of trouble	46	52	2	100
	Do **not** agree that Israelis can always count on other Israelis to help in times of trouble	18	80	2	100
Arabs	Agree that Israelis can always count on other Israelis to help in times of trouble	88	11	1	100
	Do **not** agree that Israelis can always count on other Israelis to help in times of trouble	29	70	1	100

Tensions in Israeli society

Question 20 | Appendix 1, page 151 | Appendix 2, page 172

One of the most fascinating questions for our purposes concerns the greatest source of tension, or deepest rift, in Israeli society at a given time, as seen through the eyes of our respondents. As we learn from the figure below, there was a steep rise—both between 2020 and 2021, and 2021 and 2022—in the share of the total sample who identified the tension between Jews and Arabs as being the most serious, with a corresponding drop in the share who place tensions between Right and Left, or religious and secular Jews, at the top of the list.

Figure 7.5 / Which of the following groups have the highest level of tension between them? (total sample; %)



We will now touch on each focal point of tension, from the least severe to the most:

Ethnic tensions between Ashkenazim and Mizrahim have been seen throughout our surveys as the least acute source of friction (multi-year average, 3%). This year, the rating in this area in the total sample is even lower than the multi-year average; in other words, though it is often a topic of discussion in the media and cultural discourse, the perception in the general public is that this tension exists but is not central to an understanding of Israeli society today (or in recent years).

Breaking down the responses in the Jewish sample by ethnic origin, we found that only scant percentages of interviewees over the years have considered this to be the primary source of tension in Israel (multi-year average, 3%), with slightly higher shares among Ashkenazim than among Mizrahim.

Table 7.6 (Jewish sample; %)

	View tensions between Ashkenazim and Mizrahim as the most severe, multi-year average	View tensions between Ashkenazim and Mizrahim as the most severe, 2022
Ashkenazim	2.8	4
Mizrahim	2.8	1
Mixed/Israeli	2.3	1

Tensions between rich and poor were perceived as more serious in our earlier surveys, evidently as a result of the cost-of-living protests of 2011, but their importance has waned over time, with a lower rating in 2022 than the multi-year average of 7.5%. Breaking down the assessments of the level of tension by income level in the Jewish sample, we found this year that in all three categories, only negligible percentages pointed to this as the primary source of tension in Israel society, though the share who feel this way is higher among respondents whose income is below the national average.

Table 7.7 (Jewish sample; %)

	View tensions between rich and poor as the most severe, multi-year average	View tensions between rich and poor as the most severe, 2022
Below-average income	8.1	6
Average income	7.8	2.5
Above-average income	8.1	3

Tensions between religious and secular Jews were seen in our initial surveys as a greater cause for concern, even outstripping those between Right and Left; today, however, they are considered less important. This is not necessarily because such friction does not exist; rather, we would suggest that it is subsumed within the tensions between Right and Left—a logical assumption given the findings that we presented in chapter 1 (page 26) regarding the strong overlap between political orientation and religiosity. The multi-year average of those who indicated this as the primary source of friction in Israeli society is 15.4%, with this year's findings the lowest to date.

A breakdown of the assessments by religiosity in 2022 revealed a minority in all groups who hold that the religious-secular divide is the most severe in Israeli society today, but there are still discernible differences: The groups at either extreme—that is, Haredim and secular Jews—are more inclined than the others to single this out as the greatest source of friction (Haredim, 12%; secular, 7%).

Table 7.8 (Jewish sample; %)

	View tensions between religious and secular Jews as the most severe, multi-year average	View tensions between religious and secular Jews as the most severe, 2022
Haredim	23.7	12
National religious	9.6	2
Traditional religious	12.1	4
Traditional non-religious	11.5	4
Secular	19.3	7

In recent years, **tensions between Right and Left** have been seen as one of the major points of friction in Israeli society, and from 2018 to 2020, even topped the list, though this year's finding of 24% is lower than the multi-year average of 26.9%. The differences between the political camps in the Jewish sample are considerable (multi-year averages: Right, 27.9%; Center, 28.7%; Left, 39.9%). In all three cases, a minority this year hold that this is the primary source of tension; however, the share who take this view is much greater on the Left than on the Right, and also noticeably higher than in the Center.

Figure 7.6 / The greatest source of tension is between Right and Left (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



Tensions between Jews and Arabs are rated by the Israeli public this year as the most severe (multi-year average of 42.5%). In fact, in five of the eight surveys where this question was posed, this source of friction ranked first, climbing sharply between 2021 and 2022—the steepest increase in all the surveys and all points of tension studied.

As shown in the figure below, in the initial survey, very similar proportions in the Jewish and Arab samples held that Jewish-Arab tensions were the most acute in Israeli society, but the two populations later diverged. They have now drawn closer again, but with much higher percentages than in the past.

The share of Arabs who have seen this as the major focal point of tension in Israel over the years greatly exceeds that of Jews (with multi-year averages of 55.7% and 40.1%, respectively), though this year's survey—which yielded the highest percentage yet among Jews, though not among Arabs—registered the smallest gap between the two groups since 2012.

Figure 7.7 / The greatest source of tension is between Jews and Arabs (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



Figure 7.8 / The greatest source of tension is between Jews and Arabs (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



As shown in the following table, a sizeable majority on the Right see the tension between Jews and Arabs as the most severe in Israeli society today, compared with slightly over one-half in the Center, and a minority of around one-third on the Left. By contrast, respondents on the Left consider intra-Jewish tensions between Right and Left to be the greatest source of friction in Israel at present, and in fact, have done so since 2016.

Table 7.9 (Jewish sample; %)

	View tensions between Jews and Arabs as the most severe, multi-year average	View tensions between Jews and Arabs as the most severe, 2022
Right	47.1	69
Center	33.7	53
Left	25.7	30

As shown in the following figure, respondents on the Right have always rated the tensions between Jews and Arabs as more acute than have the Center and Left. This perception has greatly intensified on the Right and in the Center since 2020, while the Left has been less affected by current events.

A breakdown of the Jewish interviewees by age reveals that the older age groups tend less than the younger ones to see Jewish-Arab tensions as the primary source of friction in Israeli society. Nonetheless, this year's findings in each age group are higher than the multi-year averages.

Table 7.10 (Jewish sample; %)

View tensions between Jews and Arabs as the most severe	Multi-year average	2022
18–24	43.7	66
25–44	44.8	66.5
45–64	38.9	58
65+	30.2	48

An analysis of the Arab interviewees by religion shows that Muslim respondents, more than Christians or Druze, consider the tension between Jews and Arabs to be the greatest source of friction in Israeli society, in both the multi-year averages and the 2022 findings. In addition, the share who hold this view in all three religious groups this year is greater than the multi-year average.

Table 7.11 (Arab sample; %)

View tensions between Jews and Arabs as the most severe	Multi-year average	2022
Muslims	57.5	67
Christians	48.6	60
Druze	58.1	61

Jewish-Arab relations

Question 58 | Appendix 1, page 158 | Appendix 2, pages 196–197

The subject of Jewish-Arab relations has been explored in numerous *Democracy Index* surveys. Between 2003 and 2008, the question was worded as follows: "How would you characterize relations between Israeli Arabs and Jews? Very good/good/not so good/not at all good." In other words, it was possible to express a positive or negative opinion, but there was no middle option. On the whole, we found that Arab interviewees took a more favorable view of Jewish-Arab relations than did their Jewish counterparts.

Table 7.12 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

Multi-year average 2003–2008	Jews	Arabs
Jewish-Arab relations are good or very good	9.8	39.0
Jewish-Arab relations are bad or very bad	89.0	60.2
Don't know	1.2	0.8
Total	100	100

As shown in the figures below, for the most part a very small portion of the Jewish sample, and less than one-half of the Arab sample, characterized relations between Jews and Arabs as good or very good during the period in question, though in 2004 and 2005 a majority of Arabs did define the ties as positive.

Figure 7.9 / Assessment of relations between Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel, 2003–2008 (Jewish sample; %)



Figure 7.10 / Assessment of relations between Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel, 2003–2008 (Arab sample; %)



Because of changes in relations between the Jewish and Arab populations in recent years (in particular following the passage of the Nation-State Law), and the heightened debate over the civil status of Arabs in Israel, the wording of the question in 2018 and 2022 was modified by adding an intermediate position that allowed for a more nuanced response: "Do you feel that relations between Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel today are very good/good/so-so/bad/

very bad?" The figure below, showing the distribution of responses to the newer version of the question, demonstrates that, despite the addition of the middle option, there has been an unmistakable decline in the share of both Jews and Arabs who take a positive view of relations between the two groups, and a sharp increase in the share with a negative perception (particularly among the Jewish respondents). Likewise, we see that in both surveys, the Arabs showed a greater tendency than did the Jews to view the relationship as good. In 2018, the intermediate option of "so-so" was favored by a majority in the Jewish sample and a plurality in the Arab sample. But in the 2022 survey, a clear majority of Jews characterized Jewish-Arab relations as bad or very bad, despite the possibility of choosing the more neutral option. Among Arab respondents as well, the largest share (though not a majority) opted for "bad or very bad" in 2022.

Figure 7.11 / Assessment of relations between Jews and Arabs, 2018 and 2022 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



A breakdown of the 2022 findings in the Jewish sample by political orientation shows only a tiny minority in all three camps who categorize Jewish-Arab relations as good or very good. However, there are sizeable differences between groups in the share who label them as bad or very bad, ranging from a minority on the Left (albeit a considerable one) to a substantial majority on the Right, and the Center roughly in between, with about one-half offering a negative view.

Table 7.13 (2022; Jewish sample; %)

Relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel	Good/very good	So-so	Bad/very bad	Don't know
Right	3	26	69	2
Center	4.5	49	45	1.5
Left	4	58	38	0

Breaking down the responses of the Arab interviewees by vote in the 2021 elections, we found that, among those who voted for Zionist parties, the greatest share (though not all that high in and of itself) defined relations between the two populations as good or very good, and slightly less, as so-so. Among voters for the (Arab) non-Zionist parties, the largest share (almost one-half) categorized the ties as bad or very bad.

Table 7.14 (2022; Arab sample; %)

Relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel	Good/ very good	So-so	Bad/ very bad	Don't know	Total
Voted for Zionist parties	37	34	29	–	100
Voted for (Arab) non-Zionist parties	13	39	47	1	100

Thus, since the inception of our surveys—no matter how the question was worded—the responses in both groups have tended toward the negative; stated otherwise, the most common assessment, which has become even more pronounced over the last year, is that relations between Jews and Arabs are not good (though this negative perception is stronger among the Jewish respondents).

Are Arabs in Israel discriminated against?

Question 39 | Appendix 1, page 154 | Appendix 2, page 184

In chapter 4, we saw that Jews and Arabs do not see eye to eye on whether Israel is democratic toward its Arab citizens as well as its Jewish ones. A majority of the former think that it is, while the latter group takes the opposite view. In our analysis here, we take the topic one step further, asking the respondents directly whether Arabs citizens in Israel are discriminated against. The figure below, which presents the share who have agreed with the claim of discrimination over the years (the question has been posed in 13 surveys), highlights two key findings: In all our surveys, a substantial majority of Arab interviewees answered in the affirmative, indicating that, in general, they believe that Arabs are discriminated against in Israel (multi-year average

including 2014, 78.4%; multi-year average excluding 2014, 80.2%).[17] In the Jewish sample, not only is the share who agree with this assertion much lower throughout our surveys (multi-year average, 45.9%), but there was a steep decline this year, reaching the lowest level to date (though there were similar results in 2009 and 2014, meaning that this was apparently not a case of statistical error).

Figure 7.12 / Agree that Arab citizens of Israel are discriminated against compared with Jewish citizens (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



A breakdown of the 2022 findings in the Arab sample by religion did not yield differences. When analyzed by vote, a majority of Arab voters for all parties support the claim of discrimination, though by a greater margin among voters for the Joint List (Joint List, 94%; Ra'am, 80%; Zionist parties, 74%). Hence, it would be safe to state that there is virtually wall-to-wall consensus on this question in Arab Israeli society.

Breaking down the responses in the Jewish sample over time by political orientation, we found tremendous gaps between the three camps: On the Left (similar to the Arab interviewees), a consistent majority have held that Arab citizens of Israel are indeed discriminated against (multi-year average, 76.2%). Nonetheless, in this camp as well, the 2022 results are lower than in the previous survey (in 2016), though higher than the multi-year average. On the Right, only a minority through the years have supported the claim of discrimination (multi-year average, 32.3%). Here, the drop was much sharper this year, with less than half of the share from the previous survey expressing agreement—far lower than the multi-year average, which is already the lowest of the three. As is often the case, the Center falls squarely in between the Right and the Left, with a multi-year average of 54.1%, and in this camp, too, there has been a noticeable decline in the share of those who think that Arab citizens suffer discrimination relative to Jewish citizens.

Figure 7.13 / Agree that Arab citizens of Israel are discriminated against compared with Jewish citizens (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



Cross-tabulating the responses on this question with the subject of relations between Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel, we found that the greatest share of Jewish respondents offer a negative assessment of Jewish-Arab ties, whether or not they agree with the claim of discrimination; however, the percentage who feel this way is much higher among those who do not think that Arabs are treated unfairly than among those who believe that Arabs are in fact subject to prejudice (68% versus 44%, respectively). By contrast, in the Arab sample, we see a different pattern: Of those who believe that Arabs suffer from discrimination, only a small minority (10%) define them as good or very good. Among Arabs who reject the claim of discrimination, the largest share (47%) take a positive view of the relationship between Jews and Arabs.

17 Based on this question and others in the 2014 survey, it appears that the findings in the Arab sample for that year were an anomaly. For this reason, we present multi-year averages with and without 2014, with the latter naturally being higher.

Table 7.15 (2022; Jewish and Arab samples; %)

Relations between Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel		Good or very good	So-so	Bad or very bad	Don't know	Total
Jews	Agree that Arab citizens of Israel are discriminated against compared with Jewish citizens	3	52	44	1	100
	Do not agree that Arab citizens of Israel are discriminated against compared with Jewish citizens	4	28	68	0	100
Arabs	Agree that Arab citizens of Israel are discriminated against compared with Jewish citizens	10	39	49.5	1.5	100
	Do not agree that Arab citizens of Israel are discriminated against compared with Jewish citizens	47	24	20	9	100

Do Arab citizens wish to integrate into Israeli society?

Question 38 | Appendix 1, page 154 | Appendix 2, page 184

A key question for understanding the relationship between Jews and Arabs in Israel is the way that each group assesses Arab citizens' desire to be fully integrated members of Israeli society. As shown in the figure below, a clear majority of Arab respondents in all five of our surveys on this topic agree with the statement that most Arab citizens want to integrate into Israeli society and be part of it, though from 2019 onward there has been a decline in this indicator. This majority persists (with slight differences in size) across all three Arab religious groups, and among voters for both Zionist parties and (Arab) non-Zionist parties.

The picture shifts when we look at the Jewish public: Whereas in 2018, a majority of two-thirds agreed that Arab Israelis wished to integrate, from 2019 to 2021 the share stood at roughly one-half, and by 2022, it had shrunk to a minority (albeit a sizeable one). In other words, there is a fundamental difference between the Jewish and Arab readings of this issue.

Figure 7.14 / Agree that most Arab citizens of Israel want to integrate into Israeli society and be part of it (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



At the same time, the positions of the Jewish public on this question are not homogeneous, and we found vast differences between political camps: On the Left, a substantial majority hold that Arab citizens of Israel wish to integrate, and in the Center, slightly over half (still a majority), while on the Right only a minority take this view. Further, the multi-year average of respondents on the Left who believe that most Arabs would like to integrate is almost double the corresponding share on the Right.

Table 7.16 (Jewish sample; %)

	Agree that Arab citizens of Israel wish to integrate into Israeli society, multi-year average	Agree that Arab citizens of Israel wish to integrate into Israeli society, 2022
Right	44.1	29
Center	64.3	53
Left	82.4	77

Cross-tabulating these findings with the question of whether Jewish citizens of Israel should have more rights than non-Jews (chapter 3, page 51), we found that, of those who think that Arab Israelis wish to integrate, a majority (63%) hold that Jews **should not have** more rights than non-Jews. By contrast, of those who hold that Arab citizens do not want to integrate, a similar majority (61%) believe that Jews should in fact have more rights.

Table 7.17 (2022; Jewish sample; %)

	Jewish citizens of Israel should have more rights than non-Jewish citizens	Jewish citizens of Israel should not have more rights than non-Jewish citizens	Don't know	Total
Agree that most Arab citizens of Israel want to integrate into Israeli society	35	63	2	100
Do **not** agree that most Arab citizens of Israel want to integrate into Israeli society	61	36	3	100

Part Two

Israeli Democracy: An International Comparison

Chapter 8 / International Indicators

Preoccupation with the state of democracy, and with the transformations it is undergoing, is not unique to Israel. Throughout the world, quality of government is a major issue, commanding the attention of decision-makers, academia, the media, and the general public alike. Accordingly, along with the opinions of the Israeli public, we present below a set of international indicators that pertain to Israel's democratic performance, published by research institutes from around the world. These assessments, compiled on the basis of professional surveys, public opinion polls, and official statistics, enable us to examine the present state of Israeli democracy in comparison with the past, with other countries around the globe, and with fellow OECD members.

The reader should bear in mind that the international indicators published each year relate to the state of democracy in the given countries in the previous year; thus, the indicators published this year (2022) relate to the state of democracy in 2021.

As in previous years, we review 15 indicators in six areas:

1. Democratic rights and freedoms (political rights, civil liberties, freedom of the press)
2. The democratic process (voice and accountability, political participation, egalitarian democracy, participatory democracy, deliberative democracy, democratic political culture)
3. Governance (functioning of government, rule of law)
4. Corruption (control of corruption, perception of corruption)
5. Regulation (regulatory quality)
6. Economic equality (equal distribution of resources)

Throughout these categories, we offer two types of comparison: first, Israel's performance relative to other countries; and second, the quality of Israeli democracy today compared with its standing over the last two decades. For each of the 15 indicators, we present four ratings: (1) Israel's **score** this year; (2) Israel's **score** this year compared with the past and with a multi-year average; (3) Israel's **global ranking** in relation to the other countries included in the indicator; and (4) Israel's **ranking** among the 38 member states of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

A note on methodology: Each of the research institutes responsible for these indicators uses its own scale to present its scores, in some cases 0–10, in others 0–40, 0–60, 0–1, and so on. To make it easier to compare Israel's scores across the various indicators, we standardized these scores on a uniform scale from 0 to 100. The higher the score, the better the quality of democracy in a given country. The table below presents Israel's scores and its ranking in the various indicators.

The distinction between **scores** and **ranking** is important: The score is compiled for a given country in a given year, whereas the ranking relates to the country's standing relative to the other countries surveyed. This means that a country's score can remain unchanged year after year, but if other countries improve or decline in their democratic performance, then that country's ranking will change. And conversely, a score can change, but if the scores of all the other countries change in the same direction, then its ranking may remain the same. The score is presented as an absolute number between 0 and 100, whereas the ranking is given in two forms: an absolute number and a percentile.

Table 8.1 / Israel's ranking in international indicators, 2021

	Indicator	Global ranking	Percentile–all countries surveyed	OECD ranking (out of 38 countries)	Percentile–OECD countries	Standardized score (0–100)
Democratic rights and freedoms	Political rights (Freedom House)	58–64 (out of 210)	70–72	31–32	16–18	85
	Civil liberties (Freedom House)	81–84 (out of 210)	60–61	35	8	70
	Freedom of the press (Reporters Without Borders)	86 (out of 180)	52	34	11	59.6
Democratic process	Voice and accountability (World Bank)	68 (out of 208)	67	33	13	63.6
	Political participation (Economist Intelligence Unit)	1–2 (out of 167)	99–100	1–2	95–100	100
	Egalitarian democracy (V-Dem)	35 (out of 179)	80	30	21	81.8
	Participatory democracy (V-Dem)	46–47 (out of 179)	74	31	18	61.2
	Deliberative democracy (V-Dem)	66 (out of 179)	63	31	18	74.3
	Democratic political culture (Economist Intelligence Unit)	28–40 (out of 167)	76–83	21–27	29–45	69.0

	Indicator	Global ranking	Percentile–all countries surveyed	OECD ranking (out of 38 countries)	Percentile–OECD countries	Standardized score (0–100)
Governance	Functioning of government (Economist Intelligence Unit)	25–28 (out of 167)	83–85	19–21	45–50	75.0
Governance	Rule of law (World Bank)	39 (out of 209)	81	27	29	68.8
Corruption	Control of corruption (World Bank)	41 (out of 209)	80	22	42	67.2
Corruption	Perception of corruption (Transparency International)	36–38 (out of 180)	79–80	26–27	29–32	59.0
Regulation	Regulatory quality (World Bank)	32 (out of 209)	85	24	37	74.2
Economic equality	Equal distribution of resources (V-Dem)	45 (out of 179)	75	27	29	83.9

Figure 8.1 / Israel's percentile in the international indicators, 2021



As in past years, Israel's highest scores in 2021 are in the political participation indicator of the Economist Intelligence Unit (2021, 100; multi-year average, 87.3) and the political rights indicator of Freedom House (2021, 85; multi-year average, 89.9).

Israel's lowest scores this year are in the freedom of the press indicator compiled by Reporters Without Borders (2021, 59.6; multi-year average, 74.8), and the perception of corruption indicator published by Transparency International (2021, 59; multi-year average 61.3).

Figure 8.2 / Israel's scores in the international indicators, 2021



8.1 Democratic Rights and Freedoms

Freedom in the World is a report compiled annually by Freedom House based on expert assessments. It encompasses two indicators that reflect countries' performance in the areas of political rights and civil liberties.

Political rights

Institution: Freedom House

Israel's score: 85

No. of countries included in indicator: 210

Israel's ranking among all countries surveyed: 58–64 (70th–72nd percentile)

Israel's ranking among OECD members: 31–32 (16th–18th percentile)

Figure 8.3 / Distribution of standardized scores in political rights indicator, 2021



The political rights indicator examines the extent to which a given country meets the following criteria: free and fair elections; unhindered competition between political parties; actual power of elected representatives; and a strong and influential opposition. In addition, it assesses the level of corruption; the safeguarding of minority rights; whether the country is subject to military rule; and whether there is foreign intervention in its affairs.

Israel's score in the political rights indicator in 2021 rose slightly over that of the preceding two years (85 versus 82.5), but is low in comparison with the multi-year average (89.9). This year's score places Israel in the 70th–72nd percentile in the global ranking, and near the bottom of the

list among OECD states: in 31st–32nd place out of 38, which translates into the lowest quartile (16th–18th percentile), slightly above the United States and South Korea but below almost all other OECD members.

Figure 8.4 / Israel's score in political rights indicator, 2003–2021



Civil liberties

Institution: Freedom House

Israel's score: 70

No. of countries included in indicator: 210

Israel's ranking among all countries surveyed: 81–84 (60th–61st percentile)

Israel's ranking among OECD members: 35 (8th percentile)

Figure 8.5 / Distribution of standardized scores in civil liberties indicator, 2021



The **civil liberties indicator** reflects the extent to which a country upholds such democratic rights as freedom of expression, the press, movement, religion, and association, along with academic freedom and marital and family rights. Also assessed in this indicator are independence of the judicial system; personal security; equality before the law; absence of political violence; property rights; and gender equality.

Israel's score in the civil liberties indicator in 2021 is 70, marking a slight downturn from the previous year. This represents its lowest grade since 2003, and falls far below the multi-year average of 74.3. Of the countries included in this indicator, Israel ranks in the 60th–61st percentile. Its score is noticeably lower than that of the other OECD states, placing it in the 8th percentile (near the bottom of the fourth quartile), ahead of only Colombia, Mexico, and Turkey. This assessment conforms with that of the interviewees in our survey in terms of the degree to which civil rights such as freedom of expression, political association, and so on are upheld in Israel today (see chapter 3, page 59).

Figure 8.6 / Israel's score in civil liberties indicator, 2003–2021



Figure 8.7 / Distribution of standardized scores in freedom of the press indicator, 2021



Freedom of the press

Institution: Reporters Without Borders

Israel's score: 59.6

No. of countries included in indicator: 180

Israel's ranking among all countries surveyed: 86 (52nd percentile)

Israel's ranking among OECD members: 34 (11th percentile)

The ***World Press Freedom Index***, published by Reporters Without Borders, assesses reporters' freedom of activity in 180 countries around the globe. It is calculated based on an analysis of objective quantitative data—for example, the number of incidents of abuse or acts of violence against journalists over the past year—combined with the opinions of media experts in such areas as media independence, representation of different opinions, censorship, and transparency.

Israel's score for 2021 is 59.6—a significant drop from 2020 (69.1) and its lowest score since 2003. This reflects a continuous decline in freedom of the press, from 92 in 2003 to today's rating, which is much lower than the multi-year average of 74.8. In comparison with the other countries surveyed, Israel places at the bottom of the second quartile, ranking 86th out of 180. Relative to the other OECD states, its position is even lower, in the fourth quartile (11th percentile), topping only Greece, Colombia, Mexico, and Turkey.

Figure 8.8 / Israel's score in freedom of the press indicator, 2003–2021



Figure 8.9 / Distribution of standardized scores in voice and accountability indicator, 2021



8.2 Democratic Process

Voice and accountability

Institution: World Bank

Israel's score: 63.6

No. of countries included in indicator: 208

Israel's ranking among all countries surveyed: 68 (67th percentile)

Israel's ranking among OECD members: 33 (13th percentile)

The **voice and accountability indicator** of the World Bank is based on expert assessments, public opinion polls, and official statistics. It examines the extent to which citizens are able to influence the composition and policies of the government, as well as levels of freedom of expression, association, and the press.

Israel's rating in this indicator has changed little over the years, with a score of 63.6 in 2021, similar to its multi-year average of 63.5. Its grade was slightly higher in 2016, but remained virtually unchanged the following year, meaning that it has retained more or less the same slot in the global ranking, placing it in the second quartile (67th percentile). In addition, it continues to rank low compared with the other OECD states, in the fourth and lowest quartile (13th percentile), above only Poland, Hungary, Colombia, Mexico, and Turkey.

Figure 8.10 / Israel's score in voice and accountability indicator, 2003–2021



Figure 8.11 / Distribution of standardized scores in political participation indicator, 2021



Political participation

Institution: Economist Intelligence Unit

Israel's score: 100

No. of countries included in indicator: 167

Israel's ranking among all countries surveyed: 1–2 (99th–100th percentile)

Israel's ranking among OECD members: 1–2 (95th–100th percentile)

The **political participation indicator** of the Economist Intelligence Unit is based on a combination of expert assessments, public opinion polls, and official statistics that measure the following parameters: voter turnout; minorities' voting rights and right of association; the proportion of women in parliament; party membership rates; citizens' level of interest in current affairs in general and the political system in particular; political engagement; readiness to participate in legal demonstrations; and government encouragement of political participation.

In 2021, Israel received the highest score possible in political participation (100), even topping last year's grade of 94.4. This year's score surpasses the multi-year average of 87.3 in this indicator by a significant margin, reflecting an upturn in political participation from 77.8 in 2006 through the present. This positions Israel in first place in the global ranking, alongside Norway, as well as at the head of the list of OECD countries (95th–100th percentile).

Figure 8.12 / Israel's score in political participation indicator, 2006–2021



Figure 8.13 / Distribution of standardized scores in egalitarian democracy indicator, 2021



Egalitarian democracy

Institution: V-Dem Institute

Israel's score: 81.8

No. of countries included in indicator: 179

Israel's ranking among all countries surveyed: 35 (80th percentile)

Israel's ranking among OECD members: 30 (21st percentile)

The **Egalitarian Component Index**, one of several democracy indicators compiled by the V-Dem (Varieties of Democracy) Institute, is based on a worldwide survey of experts. Its underlying principle is the belief that equal distribution of resources between groups contributes to political equality, and hence to the quality of democracy in a given country. Thus, the indicator examines to what extent all groups in a given society have an equal chance to play a role in the political sphere, run for office, express their opinions, and influence decision-making.

Israel's 2021 score in this indicator is 81.8, slightly above last year's grade, and its highest in the last decade; still, it has fluctuated only slightly over the years, as shown by the fact that the multi-year average (81.0) is almost identical to the current score. While it places in the top quartile (80th percentile) globally, Israel is situated in the fourth and lowest quartile (21st percentile) among OECD states.

Figure 8.14 / Israel's score in egalitarian democracy indicator, 2003–2021



Figure 8.15 / Distribution of standardized scores in participatory democracy indicator, 2021



Participatory democracy

Institution: V-Dem Institute

Israel's score: 61.2

No. of countries included in indicator: 179

Israel's ranking among all countries surveyed: 46–47 (74th percentile)

Israel's ranking among OECD members: 31 (18th percentile)

V-Dem Institute's **Participatory Component Index** (PCI) is based on the premise that in a substantive democracy, citizens' political involvement should not be confined to voting in elections every few years but must also include active, ongoing participation in all political processes. Thus, the PCI measures citizens' participation in civil-society organizations as well as in regional and local government.

Israel's score this year is 61.2, its highest grade since 2003 (multi-year average, 58.5), which translates into a rise of 20 places in the global ranking. Despite this climb, its position remains relatively low (46–47), placing it in the second quartile (74th percentile) globally, and 31st among OECD states (after holding 36th place out of 38 in 2020).

Figure 8.16 / Israel's score in participatory democracy indicator, 2003–2021



Figure 8.17 / Distribution of standardized scores in deliberative democracy indicator, 2021



Deliberative democracy

Institution: V-Dem Institute

Israel's score: 74.3

No. of countries included in indicator: 179

Israel's ranking among all countries surveyed: 66 (63rd percentile)

Israel's ranking among OECD members: 31 (18th percentile)

The **Deliberative Component Index** (DCI) of the V-Dem Institute centers on the political decision-making process. A deliberative democracy is one in which political decisions are made in a public process focused on the common good, as opposed to being shaped by partisan or narrow political interests, or imposed from the top down. Democratic deliberation is measured by the extent to which political elites share with the public the reasoning behind their positions on key issues under discussion, acknowledge opposing views, and are open to respectful dialogue with those who disagree with them.

Israel's score this year in the DCI is 74.3, virtually identical to its grade of the last three years, and slightly lower than its multi-year average of 76.0. Israel has retained its place in the second quartile (63rd percentile) in the global ranking, but continues its poor showing among OECD states, placing in the bottom quartile (18th percentile), ahead of only countries with low democratic standing such as Colombia, Mexico, Poland, Hungary, and Turkey.

Figure 8.18 / Israel's score in deliberative democracy indicator, 2003–2021



Figure 8.19 / Distribution of standardized scores in democratic political culture indicator, 2021



Democratic political culture

Institution: Economist Intelligence Unit

Israel's score: 69.0

No. of countries included in indicator: 167

Israel's ranking among all countries surveyed: 28–40 (76th–83rd percentile)

Israel's ranking among OECD members: 21–27 (29th–45th percentile)

The **democratic political culture indicator**, compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit, is based on expert assessments and public opinion polls. It considers the following parameters: citizens' support for a democratic system, and their opposition to rule by a "strong leader," a military regime, or technocratic leadership; the perception (or lack thereof) that democracy is beneficial to public order and economic prosperity; and the separation of church and state.

Israel's score for 2021 is 69, its lowest grade on record (multi-year average, 74.6). This conforms with our finding in the first section of this report that support for a strong leader is at a historic high (see chapter 3). Israel's standing in this indicator is reflected in a drop in the global rankings from the 21st–31st slot to 28–40, as well as a decline relative to the other OECD states, from 17–24 to 21–27, where it is presently positioned alongside Austria, Costa Rica, France, Estonia, Portugal, and Belgium.

Figure 8.20 / Israel's score in democratic political culture indicator, 2006–2021



Figure 8.21 / Distribution of standardized scores in functioning of government indicator, 2021



8.3 Governance

Functioning of government

Institution: Economist Intelligence Unit

Israel's score: 75.0

No. of countries included in indicator: 167

Israel's ranking among all countries surveyed: 25–28 (83rd–85th percentile)

Israel's ranking among OECD members: 19–21 (45th–50th percentile)

The Economist Intelligence Unit's **functioning of government indicator** is based on expert assessments, public opinion polls, and official statistics that reflect the level of democratic functioning and the effectiveness of government institutions in numerous areas. These include the government's ability to set policy, free of pressure from vested interests; separation of powers, based on a system of checks and balances; parliamentary oversight of government; involvement of the military or other extrapolitical entities in politics; the degree of government transparency and accountability; the extent of government corruption; and the level of public trust in state institutions.

Israel's score in this indicator remains the same as the previous year (75), slightly above the multi-year average (74.1). This places Israel at the bottom of the highest quartile in the global rankings (in the 25–28 slot out of 167). Among OECD states, Israel is situated in the third quartile (with a ranking of 19–21), on par with the United Kingdom and France.

Figure 8.22 / Israel's score in functioning of government indicator, 2006–2021



Figure 8.23 / Distribution of standardized scores in rule of law indicator, 2021



Rule of law

Institution: World Bank

Israel's score: 68.8

No. of countries included in indicator: 209

Israel's ranking among all countries surveyed: 39 (81st percentile)

Israel's ranking among OECD members: 27 (29th percentile)

The World Bank's **rule of law indicator**, based on a combination of expert assessments, public opinion polls, and statistical data, measures the extent to which citizens and government bodies have confidence in, and abide by, the country's laws. In addition, it examines the areas of contract enforcement, property rights, functioning of the police force and the legal system, and prevention of crime and violence.

Israel's score this year was 68.8, close to the multi-year average for this indicator (69.0). Nonetheless, this represents a slight downturn from its grade of 69.4 in 2020, causing it to drop one point in the global ranking (from 37–38 last year to 39). Among OECD states, Israel slipped from 26th to 27th place out of 38, placing it in the third quartile.

Figure 8.24 / Israel's score in rule of law indicator, 2003–2021



Figure 8.25 / Distribution of standardized scores in control of corruption indicator, 2021



8.4 Corruption

Control of corruption

Institution: World Bank

Israel's score: 67.2

No. of countries included in indicator: 209

Israel's ranking among all countries surveyed: 41 (80th percentile)

Israel's ranking among OECD members: 22 (42nd percentile)

The **control of corruption indicator**, issued annually by the World Bank, reflects the public's perception of the extent to which political power is exercised for personal gain. A wide range of variables are examined, from the incidence of corruption at the local and regional level to the influence of elites and private interests on the conduct of the state and its leaders. The data, which are drawn from various sources (research institutes, NGOs, international organizations, and private companies), are combined with the opinions of experts in assorted fields and a survey of the general public. The higher the score in this indicator, the lesser the extent of corruption.

Israel's score this year is 67.2, similar to the multi-year average for this indicator (67.4). Compared with 2020, this marks a significant increase (from 61.2 to 67.2), close to its grade of 66 in 2019. As a result of this improvement, Israel climbed 21 places in the global ranking (from 62 to 41), returning to its level of past years. In the OECD ranking as well, Israel rose from the 31st slot, in 2020, to the 22nd position in 2021 (here too, reflecting a return to previous levels).

Figure 8.26 / Israel's score in control of corruption indicator, 2003–2021



Figure 8.27 / Distribution of standardized scores in perception of corruption indicator, 2021



Perception of corruption

Institution: Transparency International

Israel's score: 59

No. of countries included in indicator: 180

Israel's ranking among all countries surveyed: 36–38 (79th–80th percentile)

Israel's ranking among OECD members: 26–27 (29th–32nd percentile)

The **Corruption Perceptions Index**, produced by Transparency International, is based on an analysis of indicators published by 12 independent research institutes around the world. It presents expert assessments of the extent of corruption in the public sector, with an emphasis on abuse of power for personal gain; bribery; mechanisms to expose corruption and prosecute corruption suspects; protection of whistleblowers; and nepotism in the civil service, among other areas.

In contrast with its improved performance in the World Bank's control of corruption indicator, Israel's score in perception of corruption is 59, slightly less than the grade of 60 it received in 2020 and than its multi-year average (61.3). Its global ranking places it in the top quartile (79th–80th percentile). Among OECD states, Israel is at the bottom of the third quartile (in the 29th–32nd percentile), alongside Latvia.

Figure 8.28 / Israel's score in perception of corruption indicator, 2003–2021



Figure 8.29 / Distribution of standardized scores in regulatory quality indicator, 2021



8.5 Regulation

Regulatory quality

Institution: World Bank

Israel's score: 74.2

No. of countries included in indicator: 209

Israel's ranking among all countries surveyed: 32 (85th percentile)

Israel's ranking among OECD members: 24 (37th percentile)

The **regulatory quality indicator**, compiled by the World Bank, assesses the extent to which the government formulates regulations and implements policies that promote private-sector development. It examines various aspects of regulation, such as price controls, discriminatory taxation, efficiency of tax collection, ease of doing business, and competitiveness of the local market.

Israel's score this year in regulatory quality is 74.2, slightly above its multi-year average (73.0), but lower than its 2020 grade of 74.8. In fact, this marks its lowest score since 2014. In the global ranking, Israel dropped form 27–29 in 2020 to the 32nd slot in 2021. Among OECD states as well, it dropped from a position of 20–22 last year to 24 out of 38.

Figure 8.30 / Israel's score in regulatory quality indicator, 2003–2021



Figure 8.31 / Distribution of standardized scores in equal distribution of resources indicator, 2021



8.6 Economic Equality

Equal distribution of resources

Institution: V-Dem Institute

Israel's score: 83.9

No. of countries included in indicator: 179

Israel's ranking among all countries surveyed: 45 (75th percentile)

Israel's ranking among OECD members: 27 (29th percentile)

The **equal distribution of resources index** is an additional democracy indicator produced by the V-Dem Institute. It examines the extent to which basic resources necessary to exercise democratic rights and freedoms are made available to citizens. This indicator includes, among other factors, levels of poverty and economic disparities; equality of access to food, education, and healthcare; distribution of social/political power between different groups; and the correspondence between these power differentials and economic gaps.

Israel's score this year in the equal distribution of resources index is 83.9, an increase over the previous four years but still close to the multi-year average (83.7). Relative to the countries surveyed, Israel's ranking rose five places this year, to 45, placing it at the bottom of the highest quartile (75th percentile). Likewise, its ranking among OECD states rose slightly (from 28 to 27), putting it between Ireland and Australia.

Figure 8.32 / Israel's score in equal distribution of resources indicator, 2003–2021



8.7 Overview of International Indicators

Once again, the quality of Israeli democracy earns mixed reviews in various areas compared with the previous year. Overall, scores in six of the 15 indicators rose, six fell, and the remaining three remained stable.

Table 8.2 / Israel's global ranking in 2021 indicators compared with 2020

	Indicator	2021 standardized score	2021 ranking	2021 percentile	2020 standardized score	2020 ranking	2020 percentile	Change
Democratic rights and freedoms	Political rights (Freedom House)	85	58–64 (out of 210)	70–72	82.5	65–73	65–69	^
	Civil liberties (Freedom House)	70	81–84 (out of 210)	60–61	71.7	78–83	60–63	v
	Freedom of the press (Reporters Without Borders)	59.6	86 (out of 180)	52	69.1	86	52	v
Democratic process	Voice and accountability (World Bank)	63.6	68 (out of 208)	67	63	66	68	=
	Political participation (Economist Intelligence Unit)	100	1–2 (out of 167)	99–100	94.9	2	99	^
	Egalitarian democracy (V-Dem)	81.8	35 (out of 179)	80	80.7	37	79	^
	Participatory democracy (V-Dem)	61.2	46–47 (out of 179)	74	57.6	66	63	^
	Deliberative democracy (V-Dem)	74.3	66 (out of 179)	63	74.3	69	61	=
	Democratic political culture (Economist Intelligence Unit)	69.0	28–40 (out of 167)	76–83	75.0	21–31	81–87	v
Governance	Functioning of government (Economist Intelligence Unit)	75.0	25–28 (out of 167)	83–85	75.0	24–29	83–86	=
	Rule of law (World Bank)	68.8	39 (out of 209)	81	69.4	37–38	82	v
Corruption	Control of corruption (World Bank)	67.2	41 (out of 209)	80	61.2	62	70	^
	Perception of corruption (Transparency International)	59.0	36–38 (out of 180)	79–80	60.0	35–39	78–81	v
Regulation	Regulatory quality (World Bank)	74.2	32 (out of 209)	85	74.8	27–29	86–87	v
Economic equality	Equal distribution of resources (V-Dem)	83.9	45 (out of 179)	75	80.3	50	72	^

^ Improvement in Israel's ranking compared with 2020

= No change in Israel's ranking compared with 2020

v Decline in Israel's ranking compared with 2020

If we compare Israel's scores this year in each of the 15 indicators with the average of its scores over the last two decades (Table 8.3), the picture that emerges is quite balanced: In five indicators, Israel scored higher this year than the multi-year average, including two that improved more substantially: political participation, with an impressive surge of 15.9%, and participatory democracy, with a slight upturn of 4.8%. Six of the scores in 2021 were lower than the multi-year average. This was particularly pronounced in the three indicators under the heading of Political Rights and Freedoms, which fell well below the average of the last twenty years. Freedom of the press recorded the steepest drop (-21.3%), but civil liberties and political rights also showed noticeable declines of -6.0% and -5.7%, respectively. The democratic political culture indicator also declined considerably (-8.0%).

Table 8.3 / Israel's scores in 2021 indicators compared with average over previous two decades

	Indicator	2021 score	Average score, 2003–2020	Change (in %)
Democratic rights and freedoms	Political rights (Freedom House)	85	90.1	5.7 ⌄
	Civil liberties (Freedom House)	70	74.5	6.0 ⌄
	Freedom of the press (Reporters Without Borders)	59.6	75.7	21.3 ⌄
Democratic process	Voice and accountability (World Bank)	63.6	63.5	0.2 ⌃
	Political participation (Economist Intelligence Unit)	100	86.3	15.9 ⌃
	Egalitarian democracy (V-Dem)	81.8	80.9	1.1 ⌃
	Participatory democracy (V-Dem)	61.2	58.4	4.8 ⌃
	Deliberative democracy (V-Dem)	74.3	76.1	2.4 ⌄
	Democratic political culture (Economist Intelligence Unit)	69	75.0	8.0 ⌄
Governance	Functioning of government (Economist Intelligence Unit)	75	74.1	1.2 ⌃
	Rule of law (World Bank)	68.8	69.0	0.3 ⌄
Corruption	Control of corruption (World Bank)	67.2	67.4	0.3 ⌄
	Perception of corruption (Transparency International)	59	61.4	3.9 ⌄
Regulation	Regulatory quality (World Bank)	74.2	72.9	1.8 ⌃
Economic equality	Equal distribution of resources (V-Dem)	83.9	83.7	0.2 ⌃

⌃ Improvement in Israel's score compared with average of the previous two decades

= No change in Israel's score compared with average of the previous two decades

⌄ Decline in Israel's score compared with average of the previous two decades

Appendices

Appendix 1 / 2022 Democracy Index Survey: Distribution of Responses (total sample, Jewish sample, Arab sample; %)

1. How would you characterize Israel's overall situation today? | Discussion on p. 31

	Very good	Good	So-so	Bad	Very bad	Don't know	Total
Jews	3	24	39	19.5	14	0.5	100
Arabs	5	13	29.5	28.5	24	0	100
Total sample	3	22	37	21	16	1	100

2. And what about your personal situation? | Discussion on p. 34

	Very good	Good	So-so	Bad	Very bad	Don't know	Total
Jews	14	47	32	5	1.5	0.5	100
Arabs	10.5	31	36	13	8	1.5	100
Total sample	14	44.5	33	6	2.5	0	100

3. Societies throughout the world are divided into stronger and weaker groups. Which group in Israeli society do you feel you belong to? | Discussion on p. 28

	Strong group	Quite strong group	Quite weak group	Weak group	Don't know	Total
Jews	10	53	24	5	8	100
Arabs	7	38	43	9	3	100
Total sample	9	50	27.5	6	7.5	100

4. How proud are you to be an Israeli? | Discussion on p. 42

	Very much	Quite a lot	Not so much	Not at all	Don't know	Total
Jews	51	34.5	10	3	1.5	100
Arabs	8	30	31	25	6	100
Total sample	43	34	13.5	7	2.5	100

5. How would you rate the level of solidarity (sense of "togetherness") of Israeli society (Jews, Arabs, and all other citizens), where 1 = no solidarity at all and 10 = a high level of solidarity? | Discussion on p. 112

	1 – No solidarity/sense of togetherness at all	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 – High level of solidarity	Don't know	Total	Average
Jews	13	9	11	12	16	13	13	7	2	2	2	100	4.65
Arabs	25	10	10	15.5	22	3	7	5	0.5	1	1	100	3.75
Total sample	15	9	11	13	17	12	12	7	2	2	0	100	4.50

6. How would you rate the level of solidarity (sense of "togetherness") of Jewish society in Israel? | Discussion on p. 112

	1 – No solidarity/sense of togetherness at all	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 – High level of solidarity	Don't know	Total	Average
Jews	5	4	7	8	16	14	17	17	6	4	2	100	5.93

7. To what extent do you feel part of the State of Israel and its problems? | Discussion on p. 45

	Very much	Quite a lot	Not so much	Not at all	Don't know	Total
Jews	37	49	10	2	2	100
Arabs	10	30.5	41	17	1.5	100
Total sample	33	46	15	5	1	100

To what extent do you trust each of the following individuals or institutions?

8. The media | Discussion on p. 87

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know	Total
Jews	39	36	20	3	2	100
Arabs	43	43	11	3	0	100
Total sample	39	37	19	3	2	100

9. The Supreme Court | Discussion on p. 85

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know	Total
Jews	31.5	24	23	17.5	4	100
Arabs	25	32	25	15	3	100
Total Sample	30	25.5	23.5	17	4	100

10. The police | Discussion on p. 82

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know	Total
Jews	22	40	29	7	2	100
Arabs	49	37	10.5	2.5	1	100
Total sample	26	40	26	6	2	100

11. The President of Israel | Discussion on p. 83

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know	Total
Jews	13	21.5	31	27	7.5	100
Arabs	43	34	13	4.5	5.5	100
Total Sample	18	24	28	23	7	100

12. The Knesset | Discussion on p. 88

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know	Total
Jews	37.5	45	13	2	2.5	100
Arabs	50	37	9	2	2	100
Total sample	40	43.5	12	2	2.5	100

13. The IDF | Discussion on p. 81

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know	Total
Jews	4	10	31	54	1	100
Arabs	55	27	8	6.5	3.5	100
Total sample	12	13	27	46	2	100

14. The government | Discussion on p. 89

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know	Total
Jews	45	30	19	5	1	100
Arabs	56	34	7	3	0	100
Total sample	47	30.5	17	4	1.5	100

15. The political parties | Discussion on p. 91

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know	Total
Jews	42	45	8	1	4	100
Arabs	53	38	5	2	2	100
Total sample	44	44	8	2	2	100

16. Your municipality or local authority | Discussion on p. 92

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know	Total
Jews	14	32	38	13	3	100
Arabs	34	34	27	5	0	100
Total sample	18	32	36	11.5	2.5	100

17. (Jewish respondents) Chief Rabbinate; (Muslim and Druze respondents) Shari'a court; (Christian respondents) Canonical court / church law | Discussion on p. 93

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know	Total
Jews	34.5	29	19	11	6.5	100
Arabs	21	30	30	10	9	100

18. The State Attorney's Office | Discussion on p. 94

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know	Total
Jews	38	24	20.5	8	9.5	100
Arabs	35.5	39	13	5	7.5	100
Total sample	37.5	27	19	8	8.5	100

19. The Attorney General | Discussion on p. 95

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know	Total
Jews	37	25	19	8	11	100
Arabs	38	40	12	6	4	100
Total sample	37.5	27	18	8	9.5	100

20. In your opinion, which of the following groups have the highest level of tension between them? | Discussion on p. 115

	Mizrahim and Ashkenazim	Religious and secular Jews	Right and left	Rich and poor	Jews and Arabs	Don't know	Total
Jews	2	6	26	4	60	2	100
Arabs	3	6	15	6	65	5	100
Total sample	2	6	24	4	61	3	100

21. How would you rate Israel's current leadership in terms of corruption, where 1 = very corrupt and 5 = not at all corrupt? | Discussion on p. 68

	1 – Very corrupt	2 – Quite corrupt	3 – Moderately corrupt	4 – Not so corrupt	5 – Not at all corrupt	Don't know	Total	Average
Jews	32	22	21	15	7	3	100	2.41
Arabs	42	18	22	10	6	2	100	2.20
Total sample	34	21	21	14	7	3	100	2.38

22. Israel is defined as a Jewish and democratic state. Do you feel there is a good balance today between the Jewish and the democratic components? | Discussion on p. 104

	There is a good balance between the two components	The Jewish component is too dominant	The democratic component is too dominant	Don't know	Total
Jews	20	29	30	21	100
Arabs	7.5	86	3	3.5	100
Total sample	18	38	25	19	100

23. Which component should be the dominant one, in your opinion? | Discussion on p. 105

	Jewish	Democratic	Both equally	Don't know	Total
Jews	43	26	30	1	100
Arabs	2	78	18	2	100
Total sample	36	35	28	1	100

24. In the event of a conflict between democratic principles and halacha (Jewish religious law), should priority be given to democratic principles or to the precepts of Jewish law? | Discussion on p. 107

	Democratic principles in all instances	Depends on the circumstances	Jewish law in all instances	Don't know	Total
Jews	33	37	25	5	100

To what extent are the following democratic principles upheld in Israel today?

25. Minority rights | Discussion on p. 59

	Far too much	Slightly too much	The right amount	Slightly too little	Far too little	Don't know	Total
Jews	14	13	25	26.5	15	6.5	100
Arabs	5	5	17	30	43	0	100
Total sample	12	12	23	27	20	6	100

26. The right to live in dignity | Discussion on p. 59

	Far too much	Slightly too much	The right amount	Slightly too little	Far too little	Don't know	Total
Jews	3	6	27	34	25	5	100
Arabs	5	6	31	29	27	2	100
Total sample	4	6	27	33	25	5	100

27. Freedom of expression | Discussion on p. 59

	Far too much	Slightly too much	The right amount	Slightly too little	Far too little	Don't know	Total
Jews	15	20	32	18	11	4	100
Arabs	7	8	27.5	23	34	0.5	100
Total sample	14	18	31	19	14.5	3.5	100

28. Separation of powers | Discussion on p. 59

	Far too much	Slightly too much	The right amount	Slightly too little	Far too little	Don't know	Total
Jews	4	6	30	25	21	14	100
Arabs	6	8	36	24	24	2	100
Total sample	4	7	31	25	21	12	100

29. Freedom of religion | Discussion on p. 59

	Far too much	Slightly too much	The right amount	Slightly too little	Far too little	Don't know	Total
Jews	9	14	34	20	18	5	100
Arabs	11	11	26	19	32	1	100
Total sample	9.5	13	33	20	20.5	4	100

30. Freedom of political association | Discussion on p. 59

	Far too much	Slightly too much	The right amount	Slightly too little	Far too little	Don't know	Total
Jews	10	17	42	10	7	14	100
Arabs	6	10	31	25	24	4	100
Total sample	9	15.5	40	13	10	12.5	100

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

31. The democratic system in Israel is in grave danger. | Discussion on p. 64

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	22	33	24	15	6	100
Arabs	39	41	12	5	3	100
Total sample	25	35	22	13.5	4.5	100

32. Israel is a good place to live. | Discussion on p. 49

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	21	42.5	26	8	2.5	100
Arabs	16	36	38	9	1	100
Total sample	20	41	28	8	3	100

33. The use of violence for political ends is never justified. | Discussion on p. 58

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	72	18	5.5	3	1.5	100
Arabs	69	19	6	6	0	100
Total sample	72	18	5.5	3	1.5	100

34. Human and civil rights organizations, such as the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) and B'Tselem, cause damage to the state. | Discussion on p. 75

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	45	21	15	11	8	100
Arabs	12	21.5	43	18	5.5	100
Total sample	39	21	20	12	8	100

35. The Supreme Court should have the power to overturn laws passed by the Knesset if they conflict with democratic principles such as freedom of expression or equality before the law. | Discussion on p. 56

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	25	25.5	19	20	10.5	100
Arabs	52	35	7	4	2	100
Total Sample	30	27	17	17	9	100

36. Israel acts democratically toward Arab citizens as well. | Discussion on p. 66

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	34	36	18	7	5	100
Arabs	9	22	37	31.5	0.5	100
Total sample	29.5	33	21	11	5.5	100

37. Jewish citizens of Israel should have more rights than non-Jewish citizens. | Discussion on p. 51

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	28	20	22	24	6	100
Arabs	2	9	27	62	0	100
Total Sample	24	18.5	23	30.5	4	100

38. Most Arab citizens of Israel want to integrate into Israeli society and be part of it. | Discussion on p. 121

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	9.5	31	34	20	5.5	100
Arabs	23	51.5	18	6	1.5	100
Total sample	12	34	31	17	6	100

39. Arab citizens of Israel are discriminated against compared with Jewish citizens. | Discussion on p. 119

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	6.5	25	28	37	3.5	100
Arabs	50	34	11.5	4	0.5	100
Total sample	14	26	25	31	4	100

40. In your opinion, to what extent does the State of Israel ensure the security of its citizens? | Discussion on p. 36

	Very much	Quite a lot	Not so much	Not at all	Don't know	Total
Jews	6	34	44	14	2	100
Arabs	5	23	52	18	2	100
Total sample	6	32	45	15	2	100

41. And to what extent does it ensure the welfare of its citizens? | Discussion on p. 38

	Very much	Quite a lot	Not so much	Not at all	Don't know	Total
Jews	2	19	54	23	2	100
Arabs	6	26	48.5	17	2.5	100
Total sample	3	20	53	22	2	100

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

42. Decisions crucial to the state on issues of peace and security should be made by a Jewish majority. | Discussion on p. 55

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	53	27	11	5	4	100
Arabs	5	9.5	28.5	54	3	100
Total sample	45	24	14	13	4	100

43. Israelis can always count on other Israelis to help them in times of trouble. | Discussion on p. 114

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	24	44.5	24	5	2.5	100
Arabs	9	30	41	11.5	8.5	100
Total sample	21	42	27	6	4	100

44. Decisions crucial to the state on issues of economy and society should be made by a Jewish majority. | Discussion on p. 55

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	34	26	23	12	5	100
Arabs	5.5	8	33	51.5	2	100
Total sample	29	23	24	19	5	100

45. Citizens of Israel can always rely on the state to come to their aid in times of trouble. | Discussion on p. 40

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	11	26	35	24.5	3.5	100
Arabs	11	40.5	33	11	4.5	100
Total sample	11	28.5	35	22	3.5	100

46. How interested are you in politics? | Discussion on p. 71

	Very much	Quite a lot	Not so much	Not at all	Don't know	Total
Jews	25	38	29	7	1	100
Arabs	6	21	48	24	1	100
Total sample	22	35	32	10	1	100

47. To what extent are you and your friends able to influence government policy? | Discussion on p. 71

	Very much	Quite a lot	Not so much	Not at all	Don't know	Total
Jews	3	13	42	36	6	100
Arabs	2	12.5	40	41	4.5	100
Total sample	3	13	42	37	5	100

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

48. To handle Israel's unique problems, we need a strong leader who is not swayed by the Knesset, the media, or public opinion. | Discussion on p. 52

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	36	24	19	17	4	100
Arabs	33	31	18	15	3	100
Total sample	35	25.5	19	17	3.5	100

49. It makes no difference who you vote for; it doesn't change the situation. | Discussion on p. 70

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	12	24	32	30	2	100
Arabs	16.5	39.5	32	10	2	100
Total sample	13	27	32	26.5	1.5	100

50. Politicians are more concerned with their own interests than with those of the public that elected them. | Discussion on p. 67

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	42.5	39	13	2	3.5	100
Arabs	46	39	13	2	0	100
Total Sample	43	39	13	2	3	100

51. On the whole, most Knesset members work hard and are doing a good job. | Discussion on p. 67

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	3	20	42	31.5	3.5	100
Arabs	6	16	59	18	1	100
Total sample	3	19	45	29	4	100

52. It would be best to dismantle all the country's political institutions and start over from scratch. | Discussion on p. 76

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	21	20	24	23	12	100
Arabs	26	29	32	10	3	100
Total Sample	22	21	25	21	11	100

53. Is there a political party in Israel today that accurately represents your views? | Discussion on p. 72

	There is a party that accurately represents my views	There is a party that partly represents my views	There is no party that accurately represents my views	Don't know	Total
Jews	33	36	24	7	100
Arabs	14	32	51	3	100
Total sample	30	35	29	6	100

54. Membership in a political party: | Discussion on p. 73

	I am presently a member of a party	I am not a member of a party at present, but I was in the past	I am not and have never been a member of a party	Don't remember	Total
Jews	6	11	80	3	100
Arabs	4	8	86	2	100
Total sample	6	11	81	2	100

55. Have you done one or more of the following during the past three years?* | Discussion on p. 74

	Attended a demonstration	Participated in a parlor meeting at which a politician was present	Signed a political petition	Participated in a political discussion online	Participated in an activity of the political party that you belong to or support	Tried to persuade a family member or friend to agree with your views on a political issue	None of the above	Don't know	Total who engaged in any activity
Jews	14	6	21	14	6	40	45	3	52
Arabs	25	10	10	22	12	20	50	2	48
Total sample	16	7	19	15	7	37	46	3	51

* More than one response allowed.

56. To what extent does the present composition of the Knesset reflect the distribution of opinions in the general public? | Discussion on p. 70

	Very much	Quite a lot	Not so much	Not at all	Don't know	Total
Jews	8	30	33	17	12	100
Arabs	6	27.5	36	27	3.5	100
Total Sample	8	30	34	19	9	100

57. If someone close to you (a family member or good friend) was considering going into politics, what advice would you give them? | Discussion on p. 69

	Strongly advise in favor	Largely advise in favor	Largely advise against	Strongly advise against	Don't know	Total
Jews	5.5	13	26	42	13.5	100
Arabs	3	24	33	31	9	100
Total sample	5	15	27	40	13	100

58. Do you feel that relations between Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel today are: | Discussion on p. 118

	Very good	Good	So-so	Bad	Very bad	Don't know	Total
Jews	0	3	36	32	27	2	100
Arabs	4	13	36	35	10	2	100
Total sample	1	5	36	33	24	1	100

59. Do you support or oppose bringing Arab parties into the government, including the appointment of Arab ministers? | Discussion on p. 53

	Strongly support	Moderately support	Moderately oppose	Strongly oppose	Don't know	Total
Jews	8	20	22.5	44	5.5	100
Arabs	26	53	10	8.5	2.5	100
Total sample	11	26	20	38	5	100

60. How worried are you that you will be unable to maintain your preferred lifestyle because of the increasing power of certain groups in Israeli society that advocate a different way of life from yours? | Discussion on p. 110

	Very worried	Quite worried	Not so worried	Not at all worried	Don't know	Total
Jews	27	41	21	6.5	4.5	100
Arabs	34	45	15	5	1	100
Total sample	28.5	41	20	6	4.5	100

61. In your opinion, what is Israel's situation today compared with the recent past (10–15 years ago)—has it become a more religious country? | Discussion on p. 108

	I'm certain it has	I think it has	I think it hasn't	I'm certain it hasn't	Don't know	Total
Jews	12	24	33	24	7	100
Arabs	15	26	33	16	10	100
Total Sample	12	24	33	23	8	100

62. And what do you think will happen in the not-so-distant future (the next 10–15 years)—will Israel become a more religious country? | Discussion on p. 109

	I'm certain it will	I think it will	I think it won't	I'm certain it won't	Don't know	Total
Jews	11	26	37	12	14	100
Arabs	11	31	26	19	13	100
Total sample	11	27	35	13	14	100

63. If you could receive American citizenship, or that of another Western country, would you prefer to live there or to remain in Israel? | Discussion on p. 47

	I would prefer to live there	I would prefer to remain in Israel	Don't know	Total
Jews	18	67	15	100
Arabs	17	80	3	100
Total sample	18	69	13	100

64. In general, are you optimistic or pessimistic about Israel's future? | Discussion on p. 40

	Very optimistic	Quite optimistic	Quite pessimistic	Very pessimistic	Don't know	Total
Jews	12	39.5	32	8	8.5	100
Arabs	4	33	40	15.5	7.5	100
Total sample	10.5	38	34	9.5	8	100

65. In Israeli politics, it is common to refer to Left and Right. Where would you place yourself on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 = Left, 4 = Center, and 7 = Right? | Discussion on p. 25

	1 – Left	2	3	4 – Center	5	6	7 – Right	Don't know	Total
Jews	3	3	7	24	16	21	25	1	100

66. Sex

	Men	Women	Total
Jews	51	49	100
Arabs	50	50	100
Total sample	51	49	100

67. Age

	18–24	25–44	45–64	65+	Total
Jews	12.5	35	28.5	24	100
Arabs	20.5	48	23.5	8	100
Total sample	14	37	28	21	100

68. Vote in March 2021 elections

	Labor	Meretz	Likud	Blue and White	Yesh Atid	New Hope	Yisrael Beytenu	Shas	Yamina	Religious Zionist Party	United Torah Judaism	Joint List	Ra'am	Other party	Blank ballot	Didn't vote	Declined to respond	Total
Jews	5	3	20	10	16	3	2	4	8	6	9	0	0	0	0.5	5.5	8	100
Arabs	0.5	1.5	2	1	3	0.5	0	0	0	0	0	25	20	0	1	30	15.5	100
Total sample	4	2.5	17	9	13.5	3	2	3	6.5	5	8	4	3.5	0	0.5	10	8.5	100

69. What is your level of formal education?

	Elementary or partial high school	Full high school with matriculation certificate	Post-secondary (teacher's college, nursing school, practical engineering school)	Post-secondary yeshiva	Partial academic education (no degree)	Full academic degree, bachelor's or higher	Don't know / declined to respond	Total
Jews	9	17	16	3	8	45	2	100
Arabs	24	36	9	0	8	23	0	100
Total sample	12	20	15	2.5	8	41	1.5	100

70. Religiosity

	Haredi (ultra-Orthodox)	National religious / Haredi leumi (national ultra-Orthodox)	Traditional religious	Traditional non-religious	Secular	Total
Jews	14.5	11	10.5	22	42	100

71. Religion

	Muslim	Christian	Druze	Other	Total
Arabs	79	12	9	0	100

72. The average (median) monthly household income in Israel these days is about NIS 16,000 (gross), and in one-person households, about NIS 8,000 (gross). Is your overall household income (of all household members):

	Below average	Average	Above average	Don't know / declined to respond	Total
Jews	32	25	33	10	100
Arabs	59	23	10.5	7.5	100
Total sample	37	25	29	9	100

74. How would you define your ethnicity?

	Ashkenazi	Mizrahi	Mixed / both	FSU immigrant	Don't know / declined to respond	Ethiopian / other	Total
Jews	43	35	13.5	4	3	2	100

75. Nationality

Jews	83
Arabs	17
Total sample	100

Appendix 2 / Distribution of Democracy Index Results 2003–2022 (%)

1. How would you characterize Israel's overall situation today? | Discussion on p. 31

		2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Total sample	Good + very good*	11	13	30	22	15	28	31	40	28	38	35	44	41	37	48	53	50	37	31	25
	So-so	26	33	35	38	34	36	38	35	41	40	41	37	39	40	33	30	31	40	42	37
	Bad + very bad*	63	53	35	39	50	34	29	24	30	20	22	17	18	23	17	16	18	22	26	37
	Don't know	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Good + very good*	10	13	28	22	12	27	31	37	29	38	37	43	44	36	49	56	50	39	32	27
	So-so	27	35	37	39	35	37	42	39	43	41	43	38	38	41	33	29	33	41	45	39
	Bad + very bad*	62	52	34	39	53	36	26	23	27	19	18	17	16	22	16	14	16	19	22	34
	Don't know	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Good + very good*	16	15	36	26	28	37	35	55	22	37	27	55	29	39	42	39	48	29	24	18
	So-so	18	23	27	35	33	31	13	16	32	38	31	27	40	32	33	32	22	37	27	30
	Bad + very bad*	66	62	37	39	37	28	50	25	46	25	39	18	29	28	24	26	29	34	48	52
	Don't know	0	1	1	1	2	4	2	3	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	3	1	0	0	0
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Up until 2013, the response choices were "quite good" and "quite bad" rather than "good" and "bad."

Note: Because percentages were rounded up to the next whole number, some totals may exceed 100%.

2. And what about your personal situation? | Discussion on p. 34

		2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2020	2022
Total sample	Good + very good	66	75	75	73	80	61	58
	So-so	22	20	20	20	17	30	33
	Bad + very bad	9	5	4	5	3	8	9
	Don't know	2	1	1	1	0	0	0
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Good + very good	69	76	78	77	83	62	62
	So-so	21	18	18	18	15	31	32
	Bad + very bad	8	5	4	4	2	7	6
	Don't know	2	1	1	1	0	0	0
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Good + very good	50	65	61	56	65	54	41
	So-so	28	29	31	33	29	28	36
	Bad + very bad	20	6	8	11	6	18	22
	Don't know	2	0	1	0	0	0	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

3. Societies throughout the world are divided into stronger and weaker groups. Which group in Israeli society do you feel you belong to? | Discussion on p. 28

		2012	2013	2014	2015	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Total sample	Strong group + quite strong group	65	55	58	60	61	73	67	59	68	59
	Weak group + quite weak group	29	37	31	34	31	22	26	33	23	33
	Don't know	6	9	11	6	8	5	7	7	9	8
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Strong group + quite strong group	68	57	61	65	66	75	73	63	72	62
	Weak group + quite weak group	25	34	29	28	26	20	19	29	19	29
	Don't know	7	8	10	7	9	5	7	8	10	8
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Strong group + quite strong group	49	41	45	31	39	60	36	40	52	44
	Weak group + quite weak group	48	49	46	66	56	36	59	59	45	52
	Don't know	3	10	9	3	5	4	5	1	4	4
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

4. How proud are you to be an Israeli? | Discussion on p. 42

		2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2016	2017*	2018	2019**	2021	2022
Total sample	Very much + quite a lot	84	77	82	85	75	78	78	79	83	81	76	82	81	80	82	88	75	77
	Not at all + not so much	16	21	16	14	23	20	21	19	16	17	21	16	17	17	16	11	20	21
	Don't know	0	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	1	4	2
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Very much + quite a lot	90	82	88	90	84	85	84	85	88	89	83	85	86	86	88	92	84	85
	Not at all + not so much	10	17	11	9	15	14	15	13	11	10	15	13	14	13	11	7	14	14
	Don't know	0	1	2	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	2	2	0	1	1	1	2	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Very much + quite a lot	40	54	57	57	30	42	37	45	53	45	40	65	55	51	51	65	28	38
	Not at all + not so much	60	42	41	41	67	55	58	49	42	50	56	34	37	40	43	32	55	55
	Don't know	1	3	3	2	3	3	6	5	6	6	4	1	7	9	7	3	17	7
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Source: IDI, *Peace Index*, April 2017.

** Source: Hermann et al., *Jews and Arabs: A Conditional Partnership, Israel 2019*.

5. How would you rate the level of solidarity (sense of "togetherness") of Israeli society (Jews, Arabs, and all other citizens), where 1 = no solidarity at all and 10 = a high level of solidarity? | Discussion on p. 112

		2011	2014	2015	2020	2021	2022
Total sample	Mean rating	4.78	4.71	5.13	5.35	4.86	4.5
Jews	Mean rating	4.83	4.83	5.26	5.46	5.01	4.65
Arabs	Mean rating	4.49	3.99	4.48	4.76	4.09	3.75

6. (Jewish respondents) How would you rate the level of solidarity (sense of "togetherness") of Jewish society in Israel? | Discussion on p. 112

	2011	2012	2014	2018	2019	2022
Mean rating (1–10)	5.79	6.17	6.11	5.74	6.00	5.93

7. To what extent do you feel part of the State of Israel and its problems?* | Discussion on p. 45

		2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2019	2020	2021	2022
Total sample	Very much + quite a lot	90	88	86	87	78	76	84	83	85	83	77	75	79	77	76	79	76	79
	Not so much + not at all	10	12	9	13	20	22	16	16	15	16	20	22	19	22	23	20	22	20
	Don't know	0	1	6	0	1	1	1	1	0	2	2	3	1	1	1	1	2	2
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Very much + quite a lot	94	91	88	92	84	80	88	87	91	88	83	78	88	84	83	85	82	86
	Not so much + not at all	6	8	6	9	16	19	12	12	9	10	16	18	10	15	16	14	16	12
	Don't know	0	1	6	0	1	1	0	1	0	2	2	3	2	1	1	1	2	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Very much + quite a lot	53	66	69	51	48	50	51	53	48	45	44	59	32	39	42	43	43	41
	Not so much + not at all	46	34	29	49	49	47	46	46	51	54	51	38	67	59	58	56	53	58
	Don't know	1	1	2	0	4	3	3	1	1	1	6	3	1	2	0	1	4	2
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* In 2003–2013, five response categories were presented: to a very large extent, to a large extent, to some extent, to a small extent, and to a very small extent. For purposes of comparison, we distributed the responses of "to some extent" proportionately between those who answered "to a large extent" and those who responded "to a small extent."

To what extent do you trust each of the following individuals or institutions:

8. The media | Discussion on p. 87

		2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Total sample	Not so much + not at all	51	49	49	56	54	62	64	65	47	52	50	67	63	75	71	68	62	65	71	76
	Very much + quite a lot	49	51	50	44	44	37	34	34	52	46	47	30	36	24	28	31	36	33	27	22
	Don't know	0	0	0	0	2	1	1	1	1	2	3	4	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	2
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Not so much + not at all	52	51	53	59	57	64	64	64	49	54	51	68	66	74	69	66	62	65	68	74
	Very much + quite a lot	48	49	47	40	42	36	36	35	50	43	47	28	33	26	30	33	36	33	30	24
	Don't know	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	2	2	4	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	2
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Not so much + not at all	48	36	33	37	35	55	68	72	36	39	45	60	48	83	82	81	60	65	83	86
	Very much + quite a lot	52	63	67	63	57	43	25	25	63	60	48	37	51	15	18	18	36	35	16	14
	Don't know	0	1	1	0	8	2	7	3	1	2	7	3	1	2	0	1	4	0	1	0
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

9. The Supreme Court | Discussion on p. 85

		2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Total sample	Not so much + not at all	30	21	28	31	37	49	40	44	27	23	32	32	32	41	40	45	42	44	49	56
	Very much + quite a lot	70	76	71	67	58	47	51	52	69	73	61	61	62	56	56	52	55	54	47	41
	Don't know	0	3	1	2	5	4	8	5	5	4	7	7	6	3	3	3	3	2	4	4
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Not so much + not at all	31	21	28	32	39	47	38	39	26	24	30	31	32	41	41	42	43	46	49	56
	Very much + quite a lot	69	76	71	65	57	50	54	56	69	72	63	62	62	57	57	55	55	52	48	41
	Don't know	0	3	1	3	4	4	8	5	5	4	7	7	6	2	3	3	3	2	4	4
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Not so much + not at all	24	18	28	27	29	62	61	69	30	19	43	37	32	42	39	61	37	38	51	57
	Very much + quite a lot	76	81	73	73	64	35	29	26	69	78	50	60	63	52	54	36	56	60	44	40
	Don't know	0	1	0	0	7	3	10	5	1	3	7	3	5	6	8	4	8	2	5	3
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

10. The police | Discussion on p. 82

		2003	2004	2055	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Total sample	Not so much + not at all	34	34	44	56	57	67	58	57	42	37	38	49	54	59	58	52	55	56	61	66
	Very much + quite a lot	66	65	56	43	40	32	38	41	56	61	59	47	42	40	40	47	43	43	37	32
	Don't know	0	1	1	1	2	2	4	2	2	2	3	4	4	1	2	1	2	1	2	2
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Not so much + not at all	32	33	43	56	58	67	56	54	39	37	36	51	54	57	56	47	54	54	56	62
	Very much + quite a lot	68	66	56	42	40	31	40	45	59	61	62	45	42	42	42	52	44	44	42	36
	Don't know	0	1	1	1	1	1	4	2	2	2	2	4	4	1	2	1	2	1	2	2
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Not so much + not at all	43	38	47	51	53	63	73	73	60	36	50	41	54	72	69	80	61	66	85	86
	Very much + quite a lot	57	60	54	48	40	33	19	23	39	62	44	57	44	27	29	18	38	33	14	13
	Don't know	1	2	0	1	7	4	8	4	1	2	6	2	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

11. The President of Israel | Discussion on p. 83

		2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Total sample	Not so much + not at all	32	25	34	32	74	52	38	29	21	19	24	25	22	36	29	35	28	39	36	42
	Very much + quite a lot	67	69	64	64	20	46	58	68	78	79	73	69	70	61	65	61	66	58	56	51
	Don't know	1	6	1	4	5	2	5	3	2	2	3	7	8	3	6	4	6	3	8	7
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Not so much + not at all	28	22	31	28	76	49	33	22	15	14	19	22	16	30	24	27	23	34	32	35
	Very much + quite a lot	71	73	68	68	19	49	63	75	84	84	79	71	76	68	71	68	71	63	60	58
	Don't know	1	6	1	4	5	2	4	3	1	2	2	7	8	2	5	4	6	3	8	7
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Not so much + not at all	57	44	55	55	63	67	68	68	54	44	51	39	56	66	56	72	53	68	52	77
	Very much + quite a lot	42	51	45	43	28	29	23	27	44	52	42	56	39	26	34	26	37	29	35	17
	Don't know	1	5	1	2	9	4	9	4	2	4	7	5	5	8	10	2	10	3	13	5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

12. The Knesset | Discussion on p. 88

		2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Total sample	Not so much + not at all	48	53	60	67	65	70	61	61	47	44	45	59	61	72	72	71	68	67	68	83
	Very much + quite a lot	51	46	39	33	32	28	36	36	52	53	52	35	35	27	26	28	29	32	27	14
	Don't know	1	1	1	1	3	1	3	3	1	3	3	6	4	2	2	1	4	1	4	3
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Not so much + not at all	47	55	61	69	68	69	59	58	45	44	43	61	62	71	71	69	68	67	68	82
	Very much + quite a lot	52	43	38	31	30	30	38	39	53	53	54	35	34	28	27	30	30	32	29	15
	Don't know	1	1	1	0	1	1	2	3	1	3	2	4	4	1	2	1	2	1	4	3
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Not so much + not at all	57	40	52	57	49	77	72	74	55	46	53	52	53	77	76	83	67	67	70	87
	Very much + quite a lot	43	59	46	42	42	20	18	21	44	51	39	36	44	18	19	16	24	31	22	11
	Don't know	0	1	2	1	9	3	10	4	1	3	8	12	3	4	5	1	9	2	8	2
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

13. The IDF | Discussion on p. 81

		2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Total sample	Not so much + not at all	16	14	22	21	25	29	19	19	13	13	16	14	14	17	17	22	16	21	18	25
	Very much + quite a lot	83	85	78	78	73	70	79	79	86	85	82	82	84	82	81	78	82	75	79	73
	Don't know	0	1	0	1	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	3	2	1	2	1	2	4	3	2
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Not so much + not at all	10	7	15	14	20	21	11	10	6	5	8	10	6	9	11	10	9	14	9	14
	Very much + quite a lot	89	93	84	86	80	78	88	89	94	94	91	88	93	90	88	89	90	82	90	85
	Don't know	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	0	1	0	1	4	2	2
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Not so much + not at all	62	51	55	60	57	71	75	70	53	52	56	38	56	62	49	79	54	60	64	82
	Very much + quite a lot	37	44	46	40	35	25	14	23	42	42	35	51	37	32	41	19	41	35	24	15
	Don't know	1	5	0	0	9	3	11	7	5	6	9	11	7	6	11	2	5	5	12	4
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

14. The government | Discussion on p. 89

		2003	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Total sample	Not so much + not at all	45	57	60	67	74	66	66	48	41	42	59	61	71	70	68	67	71	66	77
	Very much + quite a lot	55	42	39	30	25	31	33	51	57	54	38	36	27	29	30	30	28	27	21
	Don't know	0	0	1	2	1	3	2	1	3	4	3	3	2	1	1	3	1	7	2
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Not so much + not at all	42	57	61	69	74	64	62	46	37	39	61	60	70	69	65	67	70	65	75
	Very much + quite a lot	58	42	38	30	26	33	37	54	60	58	37	37	29	30	34	30	29	29	23
	Don't know	0	0	2	1	1	2	1	1	3	3	2	3	1	1	1	3	1	6	2
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Not so much + not at all	70	57	57	60	74	77	84	61	57	59	49	65	75	75	84	66	75	70	90
	Very much + quite a lot	30	42	43	32	23	16	11	36	40	33	43	30	20	23	15	28	25	18	10
	Don't know	0	1	0	8	3	7	5	4	3	8	8	5	5	3	2	6	1	11	0
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

15. The political parties | Discussion on p. 91

		2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Total sample	Not so much + not at all	67	72	77	77	77	83	75	72	61	62	57	71	82	79	80	75	78	79	88
	Very much + quite a lot	32	27	21	22	21	15	20	24	36	34	38	19	14	15	16	15	19	15	9
	Don't know	0	2	1	0	3	2	5	4	3	4	5	10	5	6	4	10	2	6	3
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Not so much + not at all	67	73	78	79	78	82	76	71	60	62	59	73	81	78	79	75	81	80	87
	Very much + quite a lot	33	25	20	20	21	16	20	25	36	34	37	15	14	15	16	14	17	15	9
	Don't know	0	2	2	0	2	2	4	4	4	4	4	12	5	6	5	11	2	6	3
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Not so much + not at all	72	65	72	65	71	87	74	75	67	61	47	58	85	81	84	71	67	77	91
	Very much + quite a lot	28	34	28	35	21	11	16	19	32	36	43	40	12	16	15	20	30	15	8
	Don't know	0	2	0	0	9	2	10	6	1	3	10	2	4	3	1	10	3	9	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

16. Your municipality or local authority | Discussion on p. 92

		2016	2018	2019*	2020	2021	2022
Total sample	Not so much + not at all	47	46	42	38	40	50
	Very much + quite a lot	52	53	56	61	57	48
	Don't know	1	1	2	2	3	2
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Not so much + not at all	44	39	41	35	35	46
	Very much + quite a lot	55	60	56	63	62	51
	Don't know	1	1	3	2	3	2
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Not so much + not at all	66	79	46	52	64	68
	Very much + quite a lot	33	19	52	48	32	32
	Don't know	1	2	2	0	4	0
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Source: Hermann et al., *Jews and Arabs: A Conditional Partnership, Israel 2019*.

17. (Jewish respondents) **Chief Rabbinate** | Discussion on p. 93

		2003	2004	2005	2009	2011	2013	2014	2017	2021	2022
Jews	Not so much + not at all	52	51	59	55	49	47	58	75	64	64
	Very much + quite a lot	46	42	38	35	43	43	29	20	30	30
	Don't know	2	6	3	10	8	10	13	5	6	6
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

17. (Muslim and Druze respondents) **Shari'a court;** (Christian respondents) **Canonical court / church law** | Discussion on p. 93

		2017	2021	2022
Arabs	Not so much + not at all	27	33	51
	Very much + quite a lot	59	48	40
	Don't know	14	19	9
	Total	100	100	100

18. The State Attorney's Office | Discussion on p. 94

		2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2019*	2022
Total sample	Not so much + not at all	41	33	40	49	51	60	49	45	33	50	64
	Very much + quite a lot	57	62	58	51	41	33	40	46	61	42	27
	Don't know	1	6	2	0	8	7	12	9	6	8	9
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Not so much + not at all	40	31	39	48	50	58	45	40	31	50	62
	Very much + quite a lot	59	63	59	52	42	35	43	51	64	42	29
	Don't know	1	6	2	0	7	8	12	10	6	8	9
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Not so much + not at all	49	42	45	55	58	69	74	76	48	48	74
	Very much + quite a lot	48	55	53	45	33	25	18	19	46	43	18
	Don't know	3	3	3	0	9	5	8	5	6	9	8
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Source: IDI, *Israeli Voice Index*, November 2019.

19. The Attorney General | Discussion on p. 95

		2008	2009	2011	2017	2018	2019*	2020	2022
Total sample	Not so much + not at all	58	43	25	48	50	43	53	65
	Very much + quite a lot	34	46	64	42	42	46	42	26
	Don't know	8	12	11	10	7	12	5	9
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Not so much + not at all	56	38	22	48	45	41	52	62
	Very much + quite a lot	35	50	67	44	47	49	44	27
	Don't know	8	12	11	8	8	10	4	11
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Not so much + not at all	69	72	43	50	78	52	58	78
	Very much + quite a lot	24	15	50	31	19	28	34	18
	Don't know	6	13	7	19	3	20	8	4
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Source: Hermann et al., *Jews and Arabs: A Conditional Partnership, Israel 2019*.

20. In your opinion, which of the following groups have the highest level of tension between them? | Discussion on p. 115

		2012	2015	2016	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Total sample	Mizrahim and Ashkenazim	3	4	1	5	3	3	2	2
	Religious and secular Jews	20	10	11	25	22	17	11	6
	Right and Left	9	18	24	32	37	39	32	24
	Rich and poor	13	13	8	5	5	8	3	4
	Jews and Arabs	48	47	53	30	27	28	46	61
	Don’t know	7	8	3	2	6	4	5	3
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Mizrahim and Ashkenazim	3	4	1	3	3	4	2	2
	Religious and secular Jews	21	10	11	24	24	19	12	6
	Right and Left	9	20	27	36	40	42	36	26
	Rich and poor	14	14	8	6	4	8	3	4
	Jews and Arabs	47	44	50	28	23	25	43	60
	Don’t know	6	8	2	2	5	4	4	2
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Mizrahim and Ashkenazim	4	1	1	16	2	2	3	3
	Religious and secular Jews	16	12	10	27	13	11	10	6
	Right and Left	9	8	6	12	21	22	12	15
	Rich and poor	8	7	8	1	8	12	4	6
	Jews and Arabs	50	64	68	43	44	48	64	65
	Don’t know	12	8	8	2	12	4	7	5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

21. How would you rate Israel's current leadership in terms of corruption, where 1 = very corrupt and 5 = not at all corrupt? | Discussion on p. 68

		2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Total sample	Very corrupt + quite corrupt	43	48	55	50	47	58	58	49	55
	Moderately corrupt	31	32	31	31	32	24	24	25	21
	Not so corrupt + not at all corrupt	19	14	12	16	19	16	16	18	21
	Don't know	7	6	2	3	2	3	2	9	3
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	Mean rating (1–5)	**2.55**	**2.37**	**2.32**	**2.41**	**2.48**	**2.24**	**2.29**	**2.42**	**2.38**
Jews	Very corrupt + quite corrupt	44	45	55	49	43	59	58	47	54
	Moderately corrupt	30	34	31	32	34	24	25	25	21
	Not so corrupt + not at all corrupt	20	15	13	17	21	15	15	18	22
	Don't know	5	6	1	2	2	2	2	10	3
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	Mean rating (1–5)	**2.54**	**2.44**	**2.33**	**2.45**	**2.60**	**2.21**	**2.28**	**2.46**	**2.41**
Arabs	Very corrupt + quite corrupt	38	61	53	54	69	52	58	55	60
	Moderately corrupt	39	21	31	28	23	23	19	23	22
	Not so corrupt + not at all corrupt	16	13	9	8	6	21	21	15	17
	Don't know	8	5	6	9	2	4	2	6	2
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	Mean rating (1–5)	**2.64**	**2.03**	**2.25**	**2.21**	**1.90**	**2.36**	**2.33**	**2.21**	**2.2**

21. (previous version) **In your opinion, is there corruption in Israel?** | Discussion on p. 68

		2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Total sample	To a very large extent*	54	56	49	61	73	59	51	49
	To quite a large extent*	35	33	34	29	18	29	37	35
	To a small extent + not at all	11	10	15	9	7	10	10	15
	Don't know	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	To a very large extent*	52	56	51	67	75	62	51	53
	To quite a large extent*	37	34	34	28	17	29	38	36
	To a small extent + not at all	10	9	14	5	6	8	9	10
	Don't know	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	To a very large extent*	62	57	39	31	63	42	49	27
	To quite a large extent*	22	27	38	37	23	34	33	31
	To a small extent + not at all	16	16	23	31	11	17	14	39
	Don't know	1	1	2	1	3	8	3	3
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* In 2003–2007, the wording of the question was: "In your opinion, to what extent is there corruption in Israel?" The response choices were: to a large extent, to some extent, to a small extent, not at all.

22. Israel is defined as a Jewish and democratic state. Do you feel there is a good balance today between the Jewish and the democratic components? | Discussion on p. 104

		2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Total sample	There is a good balance between the two components	26	27	28	28	20	19	18
	The Jewish component is too dominant	45	47	45	47	47	45	38
	The democratic component is too dominant	23	20	21	18	23	22	25
	Don't know	6	7	6	7	10	14	19
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	There is a good balance between the two components	29	29	30	31	22	21	20
	The Jewish component is too dominant	39	42	39	41	42	38	29
	The democratic component is too dominant	25	23	24	20	25	24	30
	Don't know	6	7	7	8	11	17	22
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	There is a good balance between the two components	7	16	17	13	9	8	7
	The Jewish component is too dominant	80	74	77	77	76	82	86
	The democratic component is too dominant	9	6	5	8	14	7	3
	Don't know	4	4	2	2	1	3	4
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

23. (Jewish respondents) **Which component should be the dominant one, in your opinion?** | Discussion on p. 105

		2017	2018	2022
Jews	Jewish	23	26	43
	Democratic	32	35	26
	Both equally	43	38	30
	Don't know	2	1	2
	Total	100	100	100

23. (previous version) (Jewish respondents) **Israel is defined as both a Jewish and a democratic state. Which part of this definition is more important to you personally?** | Discussion on p. 105

		2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Jews	Jewish	32.4	29.5	34.3	32.3	39.7	36.6
	Democratic	17	22.9	21.8	29.2	34.7	35.3
	Both are equally important [not read]	48.1	46.1	41.9	37	24.9	26.7
	Neither is important [not read]	1.7	1	0.5	0.6	0.2	0.3
	Don't know	0.8	0.5	1.5	0.9	0.5	1.1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

24. (Jewish respondents) **In the event of a conflict between democratic principles and halacha (Jewish religious law), should priority be given to democratic principles or to the precepts of Jewish law?** | Discussion on p. 107

		2003	2004	2005	2006	2011	2013	2022
Jews	Democratic principles should be given priority in all cases	42	48	42	45	50	43	33
	It depends on the circumstances	34	24	35	25	27	21	37
	Jewish religious law should be given priority in all cases	23	27	22	29	21	28	25
	Don't know	0	1	1	1	3	8	4
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Note: NA = Not asked

To what extent are the following democratic principles upheld in Israel today:

25. Minority rights | Discussion on p. 59

		2021	2022
Total sample	Far too much + slightly too much	23	24
	The right amount	26	23
	Slightly too little + far too little	43	47
	Don't know	8	6
	Total	100	100
Jews	Far too much + slightly too much	23	27
	The right amount	29	25
	Slightly too little + far too little	40	42
	Don't know	9	7
	Total	100	100
Arabs	Far too much + slightly too much	24	10
	The right amount	12	17
	Slightly too little + far too little	61	73
	Don't know	3	0
	Total	100	100

26. The right to live in dignity | Discussion on p. 59

		2013	2019	2021	2022
Total sample	Far too much + slightly too much	16	13	12	10
	The right amount	37	35	30	27
	Slightly too little + far too little	42	49	54	58
	Don't know	5	3	5	5
	Total	100	100	100	100
Jews	Far too much + slightly too much	14	11	10	10
	The right amount	37	33	31	27
	Slightly too little + far too little	45	53	54	58
	Don't know	5	3	5	5
	Total	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Far too much + slightly too much	30	22	24	12
	The right amount	39	47	21	31
	Slightly too little + far too little	23	28	53	56
	Don't know	9	4	2	1
	Total	100	100	100	100

27. Freedom of expression | Discussion on p. 59

		2009	2010	2013	2019	2021	2022
Total sample	Far too much + slightly too much	35	38	37	29	33	32
	The right amount	46	41	40	40	33	31
	Slightly too little + far too little	17	18	18	28	32	34
	Don't know	2	3	4	3	3	3
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Far too much + slightly too much	36	36	39	30	34	35
	The right amount	47	44	41	39	34	32
	Slightly too little + far too little	16	17	17	29	28	29
	Don't know	2	3	3	3	4	4
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Far too much + slightly too much	29	51	30	26	25	15
	The right amount	43	21	37	46	25	28
	Slightly too little + far too little	24	25	24	25	49	57
	Don't know	4	3	10	2	2	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

28. Separation of powers | Discussion on p. 59

		2021	2022
Total sample	Far too much + slightly too much	13	11
	The right amount	29	31
	Slightly too little + far too little	42	46
	Don't know	16	12
	Total	100	100
Jews	Far too much + slightly too much	11	10
	The right amount	30	30
	Slightly too little + far too little	42	46
	Don't know	17	14
	Total	100	100
Arabs	Far too much + slightly too much	21	13
	The right amount	25	36
	Slightly too little + far too little	41	48
	Don't know	14	2
	Total	100	100

29. Freedom of religion | Discussion on p. 59

		2009	2010	2013	2019	2022
Total sample	Far too much + slightly too much	27	28	27	25	23
	The right amount	45	41	41	41	33
	Slightly too little + far too little	26	28	28	31	41
	Don't know	3	3	5	3	4
	Total	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Far too much + slightly too much	26	24	25	25	23
	The right amount	46	44	42	40	34
	Slightly too little + far too little	26	28	30	32	39
	Don't know	3	3	4	4	5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Far too much + slightly too much	31	50	36	28	23
	The right amount	38	22	37	44	26
	Slightly too little + far too little	25	25	18	24	51
	Don't know	6	3	9	3	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100

30. Freedom of political association | Discussion on p. 59

		2019	2022
Total sample	Far too much + slightly too much	21	25
	The right amount	52	40
	Slightly too little + far too little	19	23
	Don't know	9	12
	Total	100	100
Jews	Far too much + slightly too much	21	27
	The right amount	54	42
	Slightly too little + far too little	17	18
	Don't know	9	14
	Total	100	100
Arabs	Far too much + slightly too much	22	16
	The right amount	41	31
	Slightly too little + far too little	28	49
	Don't know	10	4
	Total	100	100

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

31. The democratic system in Israel is in grave danger. | Discussion on p. 64

		2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Total sample	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	45	46	54	53	49	59
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	51	50	44	45	48	36
	Don't know	4	4	2	2	3	5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	41	41	52	50	44	55
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	56	54	47	49	53	40
	Don't know	3	5	1	2	4	5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	65	70	66	73	75	80
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	26	29	28	25	23	18
	Don't know	9	1	6	2	2	2
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

32. Israel is a good place to live. | Discussion on p. 49

		2017	2020	2021	2022
Total sample	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	84	76	74	62
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	15	23	23	36
	Don't know	1	1	2	2
	Total	100	100	100	100
Jews	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	86	76	76	64
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	13	23	22	34
	Don't know	1	1	2	2
	Total	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	73	78	66	52
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	27	22	28	47
	Don't know	0	0	5	1
	Total	100	100	100	100

33. The use of violence for political ends is never justified. | Discussion on p. 58

		2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2019	2022
Total sample	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	82	77	81	82	71	60	71	67	68	78	90
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	18	22	18	17	25	38	26	29	30	20	9
	Don't know	1	1	1	1	3	2	3	3	1	2	2
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	80	80	83	83	75	64	73	73	73	77	90
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	19	19	16	17	23	35	25	25	26	22	8
	Don't know	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	3	1	2	2
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	94	61	71	76	51	38	54	36	44	85	88
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	6	38	28	22	39	59	28	56	55	11	11
	Don't know	0	1	2	2	10	3	18	8	1	4	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

34. Human and civil rights organizations, such as the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) and B'Tselem, cause damage to the state. | Discussion on p. 75

		2010	2013	2015	2016	2017	2022
Total sample	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	50	50	50	64	52	61
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	40	38	40	31	41	32
	Don't know	10	12	9	5	7	7
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	50	52	56	71	59	66
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	40	36	34	25	35	26
	Don't know	10	12	10	4	6	8
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	51	42	19	23	12	34
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	39	45	75	67	77	61
	Don't know	10	13	6	10	11	5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

35. The Supreme Court should have the power to overturn laws passed by the Knesset if they conflict with democratic principles such as freedom of expression or equality before the law. | Discussion on p. 56

		2010*	2021	2022
Total sample	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	53	56	57
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	40	35	34
	Don't know	8	9	9
	Total	100	100	100
Jews	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	51	53	51
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	40	40	39
	Don't know	9	8	10
	Total	100	100	100
Arabs	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	61	74	87
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	34	11	12
	Don't know	5	15	2
	Total	100	100	100

* In 2010, the wording of the question was: "The Supreme Court should have the power to overturn laws passed by the Knesset if, in the opinion of the Justices, they conflict with democratic principles."

36. Israel acts democratically toward Arab citizens as well. | Discussion on p. 66

		2018	2020	2022
Total sample	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	69	61	63
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	30	35	33
	Don't know	1	4	5
	Total	100	100	100
Jews	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	76	66	69
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	23	31	25
	Don't know	1	4	6
	Total	100	100	100
Arabs	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	33	35	31
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	67	63	69
	Don't know	1	2	1
	Total	100	100	100

37. (Jewish respondents) Jewish citizens of Israel should have more rights than non-Jewish citizens. | Discussion on p. 51

		2009	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017*	2018	2019**	2021	2022
Jews	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	36	49	35	25	29	40	27	34	42	49
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	62	47	63	71	70	56	72	61	53	46
	Don't know	2	4	2	3	1	4	1	5	5	5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Source: Hermann et al., *Jews and Arabs: A Conditional Partnership, Israel 2017*.

** Source: Hermann et al., *Jews and Arabs: A Conditional Partnership, Israel 2019*.

37. (previous version) To what extent do you support or oppose the following: Full equal rights for Jewish and Arab citizens of the state | Discussion on p. 51

		2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Jews	Oppose + strongly oppose	53	41	45	46	53	47	48	44	28
	Support + strongly support	46	57	53	54	42	50	48	52	68
	Don't know	0	2	2	0	4	2	5	4	4
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

38. Most Arab citizens of Israel want to integrate into Israeli society and be part of it. | Discussion on p. 121

		2018	2020	2022
Total sample	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	67	60	46
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	31	36	49
	Don't know	2	4	5
	Total	100	100	100
Jews	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	67	57	40
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	31	39	54
	Don't know	2	4	6
	Total	100	100	100
Arabs	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	66	81	75
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	34	18	24
	Don't know	–	1	1
	Total	100	100	100

39. Arab citizens of Israel are discriminated against compared with Jewish citizens. | Discussion on p. 119

		2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2011	2012	2014	2015	2016	2022
Total sample	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	55	63	55	53	53	50	40	50	45	40	59	58	40
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	45	35	44	46	43	47	56	47	52	56	34	40	57
	Don't know	0	3	1	1	4	3	3	3	3	4	7	1	4
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	51	58	50	48	49	47	36	45	38	36	54	53	31
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	49	39	48	50	48	50	62	52	58	60	38	46	65
	Don't know	0	3	1	1	4	3	2	3	3	4	8	1	4
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	90	89	79	81	74	66	70	76	75	57	87	91	83
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	10	10	21	19	19	30	18	21	23	39	11	9	16
	Don't know	0	1	1	0	6	3	12	3	3	4	3	1	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

40. In your opinion, to what extent does the State of Israel ensure the security of its citizens? | Discussion on p. 36

		2019	2020	2021	2022
Total sample	Very much + quite a lot	64	76	57	38
	Not so much + not at all	35	23	41	60
	Don't know	1	1	3	2
	Total	100	100	100	100
Jews	Very much + quite a lot	63	80	61	40
	Not so much + not at all	35	19	36	58
	Don't know	1	1	3	2
	Total	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Very much + quite a lot	64	56	33	28
	Not so much + not at all	35	43	65	70
	Don't know	1	2	3	2
	Total	100	100	100	100

41. And to what extent does it ensure the welfare of its citizens? | Discussion on p. 38

		2019	2020	2021	2022
Total sample	Very much + quite a lot	35	31	33	23
	Not so much + not at all	63	67	63	75
	Don't know	2	2	4	2
	Total	100	100	100	100
Jews	Very much + quite a lot	30	28	31	21
	Not so much + not at all	68	71	65	77
	Don't know	2	2	4	2
	Total	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Very much + quite a lot	61	50	41	32
	Not so much + not at all	38	49	56	65
	Don't know	1	1	3	2
	Total	100	100	100	100

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements:

42. Decisions crucial to the state on issues of peace and security should be made by a Jewish majority.* | Discussion on p. 55

		2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2013	2014	2015	2016	2018	2020	2021	2022
Jews	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	77	82	67	76	65	59	80	83	78	67	74	74	72	74	75	80	80
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	23	15	31	23	30	36	16	14	20	30	22	21	27	24	20	17	16
	Don't know	1	3	2	1	5	6	4	4	2	3	5	5	1	2	4	3	4
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	50	38	50	35	45	52	20	21	16	12	36	17	NA	NA	23	27	15
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	49	61	49	64	41	38	76	74	84	80	58	80	NA	NA	75	73	83
	Don't know	1	1	2	1	13	10	5	4	1	8	7	3	NA	NA	2	0	3
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	NA	NA	100	100	100

* In 2003–2008, the wording was "a Jewish majority on decisions crucial to the state, such as returning territory."
In 2009–2010, the wording was "a Jewish majority on decisions crucial to the state," and the response choices were: strongly support, support, oppose, strongly oppose, and don't know.
Note: NA = Not asked

43. Israelis can always count on other Israelis to help them in times of trouble. | Discussion on p. 114

		2016	2017	2022
Total sample	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	71	67	63
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	28	30	33
	Don't know	1	2	3
	Total	100	100	100
Jews	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	75	70	68
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	25	28	29
	Don't know	1	2	2
	Total	100	100	100
Arabs	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	52	52	39
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	45	44	53
	Don't know	3	4	8
	Total	100	100	100

44. Decisions crucial to the state on issues of economy and society should be made by a Jewish majority.* | Discussion on p. 55

		2011	2013	2014	2015	2016	2018	2021	2022
Jews	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	70	57	61	54	57	59	55	60
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	29	39	35	41	41	39	42	35
	Don't know	1	4	4	6	2	1	3	6
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	13	19	36	10	NA	NA	28	13
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	86	73	53	90	NA	NA	72	85
	Don't know	2	8	10	0	NA	NA	0	2
	Total	100	100	100	100	NA	NA	100	100

* In 2011–2018, the wording of the question was: "Questions crucial to the state on the system of government and the country's economic and social structure should be made by a Jewish majority."
Note: NA = Not asked

45. Citizens of Israel can always rely on the state to come to their aid in times of trouble. | Discussion on p. 40

		2017	2022
Total sample	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	46	39
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	53	57
	Don't know	1	4
	Total	100	100
Jews	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	43	37
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	56	60
	Don't know	1	3
	Total	100	100
Arabs	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	61	52
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	37	44
	Don't know	3	5
	Total	100	100

46. How interested are you in politics? | Discussion on p. 71

		2003	2004	2005	2006	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2018	2022
Total sample	Very much + quite a lot	76	67	70	72	56	66	62	77	67	66	62	64	57
	Not so much + not at all	24	33	30	26	42	33	38	23	33	33	36	36	42
	Don't know	0	0	0	2	2	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Very much + quite a lot	79	70	74	78	58	70	64	79	69	72	66	68	63
	Not so much + not at all	21	30	26	21	41	30	35	21	31	28	33	32	36
	Don't know	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Very much + quite a lot	57	52	51	40	43	40	46	62	57	35	45	43	28
	Not so much + not at all	42	48	49	51	50	57	52	37	43	59	53	56	72
	Don't know	1	1	1	9	6	3	2	1	0	5	2	1	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

47. To what extent are you and your friends able to influence government policy? | Discussion on p. 71

		2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2022
Total sample	Very much + quite a lot	20	18	31	27	23	18	16	19	28	35	35	20	19	17	19	20	16
	Not so much + not at all	80	68	68	72	74	77	82	78	71	63	61	76	78	82	78	79	79
	Don't know	0	14	1	0	3	5	2	3	1	2	4	4	3	1	3	2	5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Very much + quite a lot	21	18	29	26	21	19	16	18	29	36	35	18	20	18	21	18	16
	Not so much + not at all	79	81	70	74	76	78	83	80	70	61	61	78	78	81	76	80	79
	Don't know	0	1	1	0	2	4	1	2	1	3	3	4	3	1	3	2	5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Very much + quite a lot	12	16	42	37	31	17	20	24	22	30	32	35	19	10	8	28	14
	Not so much + not at all	87	0	56	63	64	73	73	69	77	69	60	60	78	87	88	71	82
	Don't know	1	84	2	0	5	10	7	7	1	2	7	5	3	3	4	1	4
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements:

48. To handle Israel's unique problems, we need a strong leader who is not swayed by the Knesset, the media, or public opinion. | Discussion on p. 52

		2014	2016	2017	2021	2022
Total sample	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	41	42	45	56	61
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	55	56	53	39	35
	Don't know	5	2	2	5	4
	Total	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	40	38	42	55	60
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	57	60	56	40	36
	Don't know	3	2	2	5	4
	Total	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	46	63	59	61	64
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	45	32	36	32	33
	Don't know	9	4	6	7	3
	Total	100	100	100	100	100

48. (previous version) A few strong leaders can be more effective than any discussions or laws. | Discussion on p. 52

		2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Total sample	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	56	56	57	59	66	61	60	57
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	43	41	42	39	29	33	35	39
	Don't know	1	3	2	2	5	6	5	5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	56	57	57	59	70	64	62	62
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	44	39	42	40	26	31	34	35
	Don't know	1	4	2	1	4	5	3	4
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	58	51	57	62	42	44	41	31
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	40	48	42	36	45	45	40	60
	Don't know	1	2	2	3	13	11	19	9
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

49. It makes no difference who you vote for; it doesn't change the situation.* | Discussion on p. 70

		2003	2004	2006	2009	2010	2012	2013	2014	2015	2017	2020	2022
Total sample	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	39	36	41	49	49	43	37	45	29	35	46	39
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	61	63	58	48	48	51	58	52	69	62	53	58
	Don't know	0	0	1	3	3	6	5	3	2	2	1	3
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	37	36	40	50	51	41	39	47	29	32	45	36
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	63	63	60	48	47	53	58	52	69	65	53	62
	Don't know	0	1	0	1	2	7	4	2	2	2	1	3
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	47	40	53	38	36	53	30	42	27	52	47	56
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	53	58	45	44	55	44	61	51	71	46	51	42
	Don't know		2	2	18	10	3	9	7	1	2	2	2
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* In 2003 and 2004, there were five response choices, with slightly different wording: definitely disagree, disagree, not sure, agree, definitely agree. For purposes of comparison, we distributed the "not sure" responses proportionately between those who agreed and those who disagreed with the statement.

50. Politicians are more concerned with their own interests than with those of the public that elected them.* | Discussion on p. 67

		2009*	2010*	2011**	2012	2013	2014	2016	2017	2022
Total sample	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	62	63	85	78	69	75	79	80	82
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	36	35	14	18	25	20	19	18	16
	Don't know	2	2	1	3	6	5	2	2	2
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	68	69	86	80	71	77	79	79	82
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	31	29	13	17	24	19	19	19	16
	Don't know	1	2	1	3	5	4	1	2	3
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	28	39	81	68	55	64	78	83	85
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	63	56	19	27	34	25	19	11	14
	Don't know	9	5	1	6	11	11	3	6	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* In 2009 and 2010, the wording of the question was: "Politicians go into politics solely for personal gain."

** In 2009–2011, there were five response choices: definitely disagree, disagree, not sure, agree, definitely agree. For purposes of comparison, we distributed the "not sure" responses proportionately between those who agreed and those who disagreed with the statement.

51. On the whole, most Knesset members work hard and are doing a good job. | Discussion on p. 67

		2011	2012	2013	2015	2016	2017	2018	2021	2022
Total sample	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	33	34	46	37	34	29	42	26	22
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	63	62	48	54	65	68	56	69	74
	Don't know	4	4	6	9	2	3	2	5	4
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	32	34	46	36	33	30	43	26	22
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	64	62	48	54	66	67	56	68	74
	Don't know	4	5	5	9	2	3	2	6	4
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	38	36	43	38	38	27	37	26	22
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	59	61	48	54	58	70	59	72	77
	Don't know	3	3	9	8	3	3	4	2	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

52. It would be best to dismantle all the country's political institutions and start over from scratch.* | Discussion on p. 76

		2010*	2022
Total sample	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	37	43
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	59	46
	Don't know	4	11
	Total	100	100
Jews	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	40	41
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	57	47
	Don't know	4	12
	Total	100	100
Arabs	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	25	55
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	68	42
	Don't know	8	4
	Total	100	100

* In 2010, there were five responses choices: definitely disagree, disagree, not sure, agree, definitely agree. For purposes of comparison, we distributed the "not sure" responses proportionately between those who agreed and those who disagreed with the statement.

53. Is there a political party in Israel today that accurately represents your views? | Discussion on p. 72

		2003	2012	2016	2017	2019	2022
Total sample	There is a party that accurately represents my views	58	38	51	47	55	30
	There is a party that partly represents my views	NA	NA	NA	NA	20	35
	There is no party that accurately represents my views	41	57	48	50	24	29
	Don't know	1	5	2	3	2	7
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	There is a party that accurately represents my views	60	40	53	50	59	33
	There is a party that partly represents my views	NA	NA	NA	NA	21	36
	There is no party that accurately represents my views	40	55	45	47	19	24
	Don't know	0	6	2	3	2	7
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	There is a party that accurately represents my views	47	28	34	32	30	14
	There is a party that partly represents my views	NA	NA	NA	NA	14	32
	There is no party that accurately represents my views.\	53	68	63	66	50	51
	Don't know	0	4	3	3	5	3
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

55. Have you done one or more of the following during the past three years? (Since more than one response was allowed, the total exceeds 100%) | Discussion on p. 74

Percentage of interviewees who engaged in a given activity		2022
Total sample	Attended a demonstration	16
	Participated in a parlor meeting at which a politician was present	7
	Signed a political petition	19
	Participated in a political discussion online	15
	Participated in an activity of the political party that you belong to or support	7
	Tried to persuade a family member or friend to agree with your views on a political issue	37
	None of the above	46
	Don't know	3
Jews	Attended a demonstration	14
	Participated in a parlor meeting at which a politician was present	6
	Signed a political petition	21
	Participated in a political discussion online	14
	Participated in an activity of the political party that you belong to or support	6
	Tried to persuade a family member or friend to agree with your views on a political issue	40
	None of the above	45
	Don't know	3
Arabs	Attended a demonstration	25
	Participated in a parlor meeting at which a politician was present	10
	Signed a political petition	10
	Participated in a political discussion online	22
	Participated in an activity of the political party that you belong to or support	12
	Tried to persuade a family member or friend to agree with your views on a political issue	20
	None of the above	50
	Don't know	2

55. (previous version) **Have you done one or more of the following during the past year?** (Since more than one response was allowed, the total exceeds 100%) | Discussion on p. 74

Percentage of interviewees who engaged in a given activity		2018
Total sample	Attended a demonstration	15
	Participated in a parlor meeting at which a politician was present	9
	Signed a political petition	21
	Participated in a political discussion online	15
	Participated in an activity of the political party that you belong to or support	8
	Tried to persuade a family member or friend to agree with your views on a political issue	32
	None of the above	50
	Don't know	1
Jews	Attended a demonstration	16
	Participated in a parlor meeting at which a politician was present	10
	Signed a political petition	23
	Participated in a political discussion online	16
	Participated in an activity of the political party that you belong to or support	7
	Tried to persuade a family member or friend to agree with your views on a political issue	36
	None of the above	45
	Don't know	1
Arabs	Attended a demonstration	13
	Participated in a parlor meeting at which a politician was present	6
	Signed a political petition	11
	Participated in a political discussion online	10
	Participated in an activity of the political party that you belong to or support	11
	Tried to persuade a family member or friend to agree with your views on a political issue	15
	None of the above	73
	Don't know	0

56. To what extent does the present composition of the Knesset reflect the distribution of opinions in the general public? | Discussion on p. 70

		2003	2005	2006	2007	2008	2011	2013	2022
Total sample	Very much + quite a lot	66	59	59	50	52	59	59	37
	Not so much + not at all	32	38	37	40	39	34	30	52
	Don't know	1	3	4	10	8	7	11	10
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Very much + quite a lot	69	60	59	50	53	60	63	38
	Not so much + not at all	29	37	37	41	39	31	26	50
	Don't know	2	3	4	9	8	8	11	12
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Very much + quite a lot	41	53	59	51	49	53	36	34
	Not so much + not at all	58	47	39	36	41	46	52	63
	Don't know	1	1	2	13	10	2	12	4
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

56. (previous version) **To what extent do you agree that the present composition of the Knesset is a good reflection of the range of opinions in the Israeli public?** | Discussion on p. 70

		2015*	2017	2019
Total sample	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	33	51	48
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	58	45	46
	Don't know	9	4	5
	Total	100	100	100
Jews	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	31	53	50
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	60	44	45
	Don't know	10	3	5
	Total	100	100	100
Arabs	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	46	41	43
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	51	51	52
	Don't know	2	8	6
	Total	100	100	100

* In 2015, the wording was: "The present makeup of the Knesset is an accurate reflection of the points of division and consensus within the Israeli public."

57. If someone close to you (a family member or good friend) was considering going into politics, what advice would you give them? | Discussion on p. 69

		2008	2011	2018	2022
Total sample	Strongly + largely advise in favor	24	34	41	20
	Largely + strongly advise against	67	58	52	68
	Don't know	9	8	7	12
	Total	100	100	100	100
Jews	Strongly + largely advise in favor	24	33	40	19
	Largely + strongly advise against	68	58	53	69
	Don't know	8	9	8	13
	Total	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Strongly + largely advise in favor	26	38	48	27
	Largely + strongly advise against	60	58	48	64
	Don't know	14	4	4	9
	Total	100	100	100	100

58. Do you feel that relations between Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel today are: | Discussion on p. 118

		2018	2022
Jews	Good + very good	18	4
	So-so	53	36
	Bad + very bad	27	60
	Don't know	1	1
	Total	100	100
Arabs	Good + very good	30	17
	So-so	44	36
	Bad + very bad	26	45
	Don't know	1	2
	Total	100	100

58. (previous version) **How would you characterize relations between the following groups: Israeli Arabs and Jews** | Discussion on p. 118

		2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Jews	Very good + good	8	9	11	9	9	13
	Not so good + not at all good	91	89	89	90	89	86
	Don't know	0	2	0	1	2	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Very good + good	28	50	56	37	35	28
	Not so good + not at all good	72	49	44	62	63	71
	Don't know	0	1	0	1	2	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

59. Do you support or oppose bringing Arab parties into the government, including the appointment of Arab ministers? | Discussion on p. 53

		2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2015	2016	2017*	2019**	2021***	2022
Jews	Support strongly + moderately	69	61	63	67	75	68	67	67	57	59	66	49	53	66
	Oppose strongly + moderately	31	37	36	31	21	29	28	29	35	37	30	37	35	28
	Don't know	0	2	2	1	3	3	5	4	9	4	4	15	12	6
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs****	Support strongly + moderately	9	16	17	9	22	30	23		11	19	15	15	11	18
	Oppose strongly + moderately	91	83	82	90	72	66	74		85	72	81	76	74	79
	Don't know	0	1	2	1	5	4	3		4	9	3	9	15	3
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100		100	100	100	100	100	100

* Source: Hermann et al., *Jews and Arabs: A Conditional Partnership*, 2017.

** Source: Hermann et al., *Jews and Arabs: A Conditional Partnership*, 2019.

*** Source: IDI, *Israeli Voice Index*, February 2021.

**** The wording presented to Arab respondents in 2016 and 2017 was: "Do you support or oppose Arab parties agreeing to join the government, including the appointment of Arab ministers?"

60. How worried are you that you will be unable to maintain your preferred lifestyle because of the increasing power of certain groups in Israeli society that advocate a different way of life from yours? | Discussion on p. 110

		2017*	2022
Total sample	Very worried + quite worried	41	70
	Not so worried + not at all worried	58	27
	Don't know	1	4
	Total	100	100
Jews	Very worried + quite worried	40	68
	Not so worried + not at all worried	59	28
	Don't know	1	4
	Total	100	100
Arabs	Very worried + quite worried	44	79
	Not so worried + not at all worried	53	20
	Don't know	3	1
	Total	100	100

* In 2017, the wording was: "How concerned are you that you won't be able to maintain your religious/traditional/secular lifestyle due to the strengthening of groups with a different way of life than yours?"

62. What do you think will happen in the not-so-distant future (the next 10–15 years)—will Israel become a more religious country? | Discussion on p. 109

		2012*	2022
Total sample	I'm certain it will + I think it will	41	38
	I'm certain it won't + I think it won't	52	49
	Don't know	7	13
	Total	100	100
Jews	I'm certain it will + I think it will	39	38
	I'm certain it won't + I think it won't	54	49
	Don't know	8	13
	Total	100	100
Arabs	I'm certain it will + I think it will	50	42
	I'm certain it won't + I think it won't	46	45
	Don't know	5	13
	Total	100	100

* In the 2012 *Index*, there were three response choices: I think it will, I think it won't, and don't know.

63. If you could receive American citizenship, or that of another Western country, would you prefer to live there or to remain in Israel? | Discussion on p. 47

		2015	2017	2019	2021	2022
Total sample	I would prefer to live there	12	15	13	17	18
	I would prefer to remain in Israel	84	81	84	72	69
	Don't know	4	4	3	11	13
	Total	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	I would prefer to live there	11	15	12	18	18
	I would prefer to remain in Israel	84	81	84	70	67
	Don't know	4	5	4	13	15
	Total	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	I would prefer to live there	15	18	14	15	17
	I would prefer to remain in Israel	83	81	84	81	80
	Don't know	2	1	1	4	3
	Total	100	100	100	100	100

63. (previous version) In the long run, do you wish to remain in Israel? | Discussion on p. 47

		2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Total sample	Very much + somewhat	88	86	89	89	79	82	85	86	88	90
	Not so much + very much not	12	13	10	10	20	17	15	14	11	9
	Don't know	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Very much + somewhat	88	86	89	90	79	84	84	88	89	91
	Not so much + very much not	11	13	10	9	21	15	15	12	10	8
	Don't know	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Very much + somewhat	87	86	85	82	81	73	87	75	82	87
	Not so much + very much not	13	14	14	16	17	23	12	22	16	12
	Don't know	0	0	1	2	2	4	1	3	2	2
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

64. In general, are you optimistic or pessimistic about Israel's future? | Discussion on p. 40

		2009*	2011*	2012	2014*	2016	2017	2018*	2021	2022
Total sample	Very optimistic + quite optimistic	79	58	76	73	67	68	70	63	49
	Very pessimistic + quite pessimistic	18	38	22	24	30	29	24	30	43
	Don't know	4	4	3	3	3	3	6	7	8
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Very optimistic + quite optimistic	81	63	79	73	70	71	75	67	51
	Very pessimistic + quite pessimistic	15	34	18	24	28	26	21	27	41
	Don't know	4	3	3	3	2	3	5	7	8
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Very optimistic + quite optimistic	65	36	60	72	51	50	44	42	37
	Very pessimistic + quite pessimistic	33	59	39	24	43	46	44	50	56
	Don't know	2	6	1	4	6	4	12	8	8
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Source: IDI, *Peace Index*: April 2009, January 2011, April 2014, April 2018.

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The Israel Democracy Institute (IDI) is an independent center of research and action dedicated to strengthening the foundations of Israeli democracy. IDI works to bolster the values and institutions of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. A non-partisan think-and-do tank, the Institute harnesses rigorous applied research to influence policy, legislation, and public opinion. The Institute partners with political leaders, policymakers, and representatives of civil society to improve the functioning of the government and its institutions, confront security threats while preserving civil liberties, and foster solidarity within Israeli society. The State of Israel recognized the positive impact of IDI's research and recommendations by bestowing upon the Institute its most prestigious award, the Israel Prize for Lifetime Achievement.

The Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research conducts rigorous empirical research on the attitudes of the Israeli public regarding the functioning of the country's democratic system and the commitment of Israeli society to core democratic values. Data Israel: The Louis Guttman Social Research Database, maintained by the Center, presents current and historical survey data and other materials collected since 1949 by the Center for Applied Social Research founded by Prof. Guttman, which have been donated to the Israel Democracy Institute. The Viterbi Center strives to enrich the public discourse in Israel on social and policy issues by generating, analyzing, and publicizing authoritative information, and placing it at the disposal of researchers, journalists, and interested members of the public in Israel and around the world.

The Israeli Democracy Index offers an annual assessment of the quality of Israeli democracy. Each year, an extensive survey is conducted on a representative sample of Israel's adult population. This year's report includes a summary and comparative analysis of the findings emerging from our surveys, from the inception of the Democracy Index in 2003 through 2022. The project aims to explore trends in Israeli society on fundamental questions relating to the realization of democratic goals and values, and the performance of government systems and elected officials. Analysis of the survey results is intended to enhance public debate on the status of democracy in Israel, and create a comprehensive source of relevant information.

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