STATISTICAL REPORT ON ULTRA-ORTHODOX (HAREDI) SOCIETY IN ISRAEL 2017
The ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) community in Israel has chosen to erect "walls of sanctity" to separate itself from mainstream Israeli society. This segregation by choice extends far beyond the beliefs and opinions unique to this community, and encompasses almost every sphere of life. Segregation is expressed in residential patterns (living in separate neighborhoods), in education (separate educational streams), symbolically, (distinct dress and customs), in cultural life (literature and media unique to the ultra-Orthodox community), in a separate organizational structure, and in the area of political leadership.

For many years, Israeli society’s response to the Haredi desire for separation was indifference and alienation, with only rare peeks beyond the "walls". The Haredi community was in effect absolved of the responsibilities and obligations shared by other Israeli citizens, this in turn- reinforcing its isolation.

The 2016 Statistical Report was a major breakthrough in the study of the community, inasmuch as this was the first time that a wealth of comprehensive data on diverse aspects of the ultra-Orthodox community became available.

We are happy to present the 2017 Statistical Report on Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) Society in Israel which both updates the 2016 report and brings to light many significant changes and trends among the ultra-Orthodox community, including with regard to its participation in academic studies and information on employment conditions.

The 2017 report presents updated data on important areas, for example---voting patterns in Knesset elections; the ultra-Orthodox educational system; employment trends; the
prevalence of poverty, and the community's standard of living and lifestyles. The report presents up to date information side by side with data from the past, to enable the reader not only to learn about the current situation in these areas, but also be able to compare it with the past and gain insight on trends towards change over time.

The report continues to be a primary source of information for policy makers, researchers, and the media, and no less so—for members of the ultra-Orthodox community itself. Information on the methodology, definitions of terminology, and the complete data set which served as the basis for the report appear on the websites of the Israel Democracy Institute and the Jerusalem Institute for Policy Research.

We wish to express our sincere gratitude to the Russel Berrie Foundation and to the UJA Federation of New York for their generosity and partnership. Dr. Lee Cahaner, Dr. Gilad Malach, Dr. Maya Choshen
The rate of demographic growth among the ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) population - approximately 4% a year - is the most rapid among all populations in developed countries, including in Israel. This unique pace of growth can be attributed to high fertility rates along with modern medical and living conditions, the young age at marriage in Haredi society and the large number of children per family. One consequence of these patterns is the very young age of the ultra-Orthodox population in Israel - half its members are below the age of sixteen.
Marriage Rates

- **82%** among the ultra-Orthodox population
- **63%** among other Jews

The ultra-Orthodox numbered **1,033,000** at end of 2017

1/2 the ultra-Orthodox population is under the age of 16.
This rapid demographic growth has far-reaching implications for the economic, social, and political status of the ultra-Orthodox community, and attracts public, media, and political attention. For the first time the ultra-Orthodox population in Israel surpasses one million, numbering approximately 1,033,000 members as of the end of 2017 (as compared with approximately 750,000 in 2009).

According to Central Bureau of Statistics population projections, Israel's ultra-Orthodox population, which currently comprises 12% of the total population, is expected to reach 16% of the total population by 2030, and to number 2,000,000 in 2033. Patterns of behavior within the Haredi nuclear family over the past decade show a slight decline in the fertility rate, from 7.5 between 2003 and 2005, to 6.9 between 2012 and 2014. These rates are still very high as compared with those in developed countries (less than two children per woman). The fertility rate for other Jewish women in Israel is 4.2 children among national-religious women; 3.0 children among traditional-religious women; 2.6 children among traditional-secular women; and 2.1 children among secular women.

Marriage rates among men and women ages 20 and over in the ultra-Orthodox population (82%) are much higher than among the rest of the Jewish population (63%). This difference can be attributed to the young age at marriage among the ultra-Orthodox, despite the substantial rise in age in recent years. The rate of marriage between ages 20 and 24, which stood at 61% between 2003 and 2004, fell to 56% between 2010 and 2011 and to 44% between 2015 and 2016.
The ultra-Orthodox educational stream makes up a substantial segment of the Israeli educational system as a whole. The number of ultra-Orthodox students has increased rapidly over the years, alongside the introduction of systemic and structural changes, such as the establishment of the Division for ultra-Orthodox education in the Ministry of Education and the establishment of ultra-Orthodox State and semi-private schools.
In the 2015-2016 school year, approximately 300,000 pupils – comprising 24% of pupils in the Jewish school system and 18% of the pupils in the system as a whole — attended schools in the ultra-Orthodox educational stream.

However, in recent years, the pace of growth in ultra-Orthodox education has slowed to 3 % per year, as compared with a 2-% increase in the growth rate of state- -religious education. Underlying this trend are factors such as the decline in the birth rate among the ultra-Orthodox, and the decline in the attractiveness of ultra-Orthodox schools among groups who while are part of the community, are somewhat less stringent in their observance.

Thirty-three percent of twelfth-grade pupils in ultra-Orthodox schools took the matriculation examinations in the 2014–2015 academic year — a rate much lower than that of pupils in state and state-religious schools (94 %). In recent years, the matriculation examinations have made their way into the Bais Yaakov network of Haredi girls' schools, with half of ultra-Orthodox girls taking at least some of the exams. Thirty-one percent of ultra-Orthodox girls took the matriculation examinations in the 2008–2009 academic year; this rate rose steeply to 51 % within six years (in the 2014–2015 academic year). By contrast, the percentage of boys who took the examinations in those years remained stable and even declined slightly, from 16% to 13 %. In total, only 11 % of ultra-Orthodox pupils are awarded matriculations certificates as compared with 76 % of pupils in the state and state-religious school systems.
The post-secondary educational system for ultra-Orthodox men includes studies in yeshiva (institutions for full-time advanced Torah and Talmud study) as well as vocational training and academic studies. For ultra-Orthodox women, options for post-secondary education include studies in vocational training seminaries and studies in frameworks granting academic degrees.
In 2016, 117,165 ultra-Orthodox men studied in yeshivas, 64% of whom were married. Seventy percent of the latter are exempt from army service by virtue of their marital status, so that for them --continued kollel study is not necessarily a way to avoid military service but rather stems from a combination of religious, cultural, and social factors.

The pace of growth in the number of yeshiva students declined to 2.5 % per year between 2012 and 2016, and the growth in the number of kollel students declined even further, to 1.3 % per year. The statistics showing this slowdown parallel those showing the increase in the percentage of ultra-Orthodox men joining the workforce and those enlisting in the army or volunteering for Civilian National Service.

The number of ultra-Orthodox men and women studying for an academic degree increased by 150% between 2010 and 2016. During the 2015–2016 academic year, approximately 10,000
ultra-Orthodox students — 4% of the total number of students in Israel — attended academic institutions (not including the Open University or programs leading to a diploma rather than to an academic degree). Sixty-nine percent of them were women, as compared with 59 % among the overall student population.

Ultra-Orthodox students tend to study subjects which will make it possible for them to work within the ultra-Orthodox community (education, teaching, and paraprofessional professions) and those — such as law and business administration-- which open the door to employment in “practical” professions.
The prevalence of poverty and its impact on the ultra-Orthodox population’s standard of living is far greater than among the general population. Although poverty in the ultra-Orthodox community has decreased substantially since 2008, this decline has been slow, and the rate remains very high.

The percentage of Haredim below the poverty line (54%) is much higher than in the general population (22%), with almost half (49%) of ultra-Orthodox families and almost two thirds (62%) of ultra-Orthodox children living in poverty. However, it should be noted that after a decade in which the percentage of ultra-Orthodox families living below the poverty line ranged between 50% and 58 %, the poverty rate is declining.

Standard of living is closely linked to households' levels of income and expenditure. The gross monthly income of an ultra-Orthodox family averaged NIS 12,616 in 2015 — far lower than that among other Jewish households (NIS 20,807). This low income level can be attributed to the fact that the ultra-Orthodox nuclear family often depends upon a single breadwinner who is likely to spend fewer hours on the job in a lower-paid occupation.

A look at monthly expenditures shows that in 2015, on the average, ultra-Orthodox households spent NIS 13,676 per month — 15% less than other Jewish households, even though on the average --Haredi households are larger. The gap can be attributed to ultra-Orthodox culture, whose very essence emphasizes modesty and thrift, as well as to the existence of community-based commercial centers targeted towards this population, where products can be acquired cheaply and sometimes even at no cost.
Among ultra-Orthodox households, mandatory expenditures such as income tax, National Insurance payments, and health insurance are, on average, only one-third of those among other Jewish households (1,261 NIS as compared with 3,583 NIS).

07 Poverty Rate, 2015

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<td>Children</td>
<td>62</td>
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Car ownership: ages 20+ 2003-2016

- Ultra-Orthodox Jews
- Other Jews


Ultra-Orthodox Jews: 31 41 54 68 79
Other Jews: 79 77 74 71 68 66 65 64 63 63 63 63 63
Household expenditures on mandatory payments

₪1,261 Ultra-Orthodox households
₪3,853 Other Jewish households

Use public transportation to travel to work

25 % Ultra-Orthodox
14 % Other Jews

An analysis of behavior patterns related to standard of living indicates that gaps in standard of living between the ultra-Orthodox and the general Jewish population remain wide; for example, gaps in car ownership (41% among Haredim as compared with 79% of the rest of the Jewish population) and in the use of public transportation for travel to work (25% as compared with 14%). The only area in which we found full parity between the two populations was in homeownership (75 % for both).

The Issue: A major focus of public debate on the place of the ultra-Orthodox in Israeli society and a significant source of estrangement from this community, centers on the issue of employment. The gap in employment rates between the ultra-Orthodox and the rest of Israel’s Jewish population reached its peak in 2003, at which time only about one-third of ultra-Orthodox men and only slightly more than half of ultra-Orthodox women were employed.

Trends in employment rates: Between 2003 and 2016, employment rates increased among men and women alike, due to growing needs in the community and to a public policy facilitating their entrance into the workforce. As a result of this change, more than half of ultra-Orthodox men (52 %) and almost three-fourths of women (73 %) were employed in 2016.
However, the impressive increase in employment rates over the last few years appears to have come to a halt. This standstill may be the result of the current government’s coalition agreements (since the 2015 elections and up to this writing), and the rejoining of the ultra-Orthodox parties to the coalition. As part of these agreements, incentives for entering the workforce were reduced, and stipends for yeshiva and kollel students were increased.

**Income from work:** The integration of the ultra-Orthodox community into the workforce is reflected not only in rates of employment, but also in income levels. The average income level of ultra-Orthodox workers is 62% that of other workers. This gap can be attributed to the fact that a large percentage of Haredim work fewer hours and in lower-paying economic branches. Thus for example, 28% of ultra-Orthodox men are working in the field of education as compared with only 5% among other Jewish men. By contrast, the percentage employed in hi-tech (3%) is
much lower than among other Jewish men (13 %). The situation is fairly similar among ultra-Orthodox women; 42% vs. 28% and 4% vs. 7 % respectively.

However, we can discern change in these patterns. The data indicate a decline in the percentage of the ultra-Orthodox employed in education and a rise in the percentage working in industry. If this trend continues, over the long term we can expect to see an increase in per-capita income and, as a result, in the standard of living of ultra-Orthodox households.

**Income**

[Graph showing income distribution]

**Ultra-Orthodox perspectives on employment:** Analysis of the data from the Central Bureau of Statistics Social Survey for 2016 reveals that the perspective of ultra-Orthodox workers on their employment is more as a source of income than as a career. This approach may lie at the basis of the relatively few among the ultra-Orthodox working in management positions (6 % as compared with 15 % among the general Jewish population) , which in turn implies that most ultra-Orthodox employees do not share in decision-making on their jobs, nor do they attend
in-service training courses provided by their workplaces. This is also the case with regard to the use of technology. Only a small percentage (23%) among the ultra-Orthodox use computers and the Internet on a regular basis on their jobs, and only 38% have been exposed to technological innovations that have changed their work environment.

The orientation to work primarily as a way to earn a living rather than in terms of a career also affects prospects for advancement in the workforce. Among ultra-Orthodox workers, the percentage reporting having opportunities to advance on their jobs (41%) is lower than among the general Jewish population (51%). Their motivation for changing jobs is greater, and is mostly based on a desire for higher income rather than on a desire for self-fulfillment or for maximizing their potential.

However, there are signs of change: among younger members of the ultra-Orthodox community (ages 20-34), the perception of work as a career rather than just as a source of income is more prevalent. This age group cited aspects of employment such as self-fulfillment and utilizing one's abilities to the fullest as factors motivating them to change jobs, and a lower percentage among them cited financial considerations as a motivation for such a change (48% vs. 77% among older groups).

**Work Conditions:** Assessing the working conditions of ultra-Orthodox employees is complex, and is linked to their perception of work in their lives. That is, as a result of the relatively insignificant place that work occupies in their lives, most are pleased with the balance they have struck between work, family, and leisure, and report—for example—never having had to work from home during their free time.
But at the same time, ultra-Orthodox workers report working conditions which are more pressured than those reported by their non-ultra-Orthodox peers. For example, they report that they cannot go out for breaks whenever they wish, or run errands in the middle of the workday (45 % as compared with 29 % among other Jewish employees). Their awareness of unions as a means for improving their working conditions or the desire for such improvement via unions is fairly weak, and the vast majority do not belong to a union (17 % as compared with 33 % of other Jewish employees) nor are they interested in joining.

Satisfaction on the job among ultra-Orthodox workers is high; in most cases it is equivalent to that of the general population and sometimes is even higher. This level of satisfaction is evidenced mainly with regard to a sense of value of their work (92 % of ultra-Orthodox employees feel that their work is valuable, as compared with 87 % of other Jewish employees), the sense that they are using their abilities to the fullest, and their report of good interpersonal relations in the workplace.

One surprising and important finding relates to discrimination. The vast majority of ultra-Orthodox employees report never having experienced discrimination on the job related to their way of life (97 % as compared with 98 % of other Jewish employees) or their gender, and never being asked to carry out a task that conflicted with their values (83 % as compared with
11 Employed in management positions

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12 Use advanced technology on the job

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Have prospects for advancement on the job

- Ultra-Orthodox households: 42%
- Other Jewish households: 49%

Never experienced discrimination in the workplace

- Ultra-Orthodox households: 83%
- Other Jewish households: 70%
77% of other Jewish employees). This finding is particularly encouraging in light of the growing numbers of ultra-Orthodox workers who in recent years, are more and more entering workplaces in environments that are not necessarily ultra-Orthodox.

The lifestyle of the ultra-Orthodox community is in constant flux and serves as a good indicator of its integration within the broader Israeli society. Wide gaps exist between the ultra-Orthodox and the rest of the Jewish population in rates of army enlistment and in volunteering for the Civilian National Service; in the percentage of Internet users; vacation goers, and the numbers possessing a driver's license. Yet in light of the rising rates of ultra-Orthodox participation in each of these areas of life, it is clear that the trend toward its integration into the broader society is gaining strength.

One factor accelerating this trend is the growing number of the ultra-Orthodox — men and women alike — attending institutions of higher education and working in higher level jobs. Such jobs provide them with disposable income, a growing awareness of consumer culture, and create more and more of a "modern" discourse among a growing middle class. Approximately 3,500 ultra-Orthodox men, comprising about 34% of male graduates of the ultra-Orthodox education system, enlisted in the army or joined the Civilian National Service —
an increase of 5% as compared with 2015. Among those who chose to serve, 81% enlisted in the army in 2016, and 19% joined the Civilian National Service, with the latter citing that such service makes a more meaningful contribution to society, and that it is more likely to provide them with vocational training for the job market.

Ultra-Orthodox enlisting in the IDF or serving in National Service

Forty-three percent of the ultra-Orthodox—a rate half of the rate among other Jews (86%)—used the Internet in 2015–2016, as compared with 28% in 2008–2009. A breakdown by gender indicates differences in Internet use between ultra-Orthodox men and women (men — 39%; women — 47%).
In 2015-2016, 49% of the ultra-Orthodox population vacationed in Israel, as compared with 61% of the rest of the Jewish population. Only 16% traveled abroad for vacations — much less than the percentage among the general Jewish population (47%). Nevertheless, it should be noted that over the past several years, there has been a marked increase in this percentage — from 12% in 2013–2014 to 16% in 2015–2016.