

Israeli Voice Index November 2022

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Main Findings

- ❖ For the first time since mid-2019, there is greater optimism about the future of democratic rule in Israel than about the future of Israel's national security. However, in neither case are optimists in the majority.
- ❖ Optimism about the future of democratic rule in Israel is several times higher on the Right, where optimists constitute a majority, than in the Center and on the Left, where they are a small minority.
- ❖ The majority of the Israeli public (Jews and Arabs) worry that they or members of their family may be injured in a terror attack. In both groups, women are more worried than men, and the proportion of respondents who are worried is higher among the younger age groups than the older age groups.
- ❖ The share of the total sample who are satisfied with the election results is slightly smaller than the share who are dissatisfied. There is a higher level of satisfaction among Jews than among Arabs. As expected, a larger proportion of respondents on the Right are satisfied than of those in the Center and on the Left.
- ❖ A small majority of Jews reported that they are following media reporting on the discussions to form a coalition, compared with a minority of Arabs, albeit a large minority.
- ❖ We examined support for seven legislative proposals that have been put forward at various stages of the discussions to form a coalition. In the total sample, none of these proposals enjoys majority support. Among Jewish respondents, a breakdown by political orientation reveals a majority on the Right only for proposals regarding the legalization of illegal settlements in Judea and Samaria and the cancelation of the legal prohibition on separation between men and women in public areas.
- ❖ The public is divided on the question of the likelihood that the Knesset will pass legislation in the foreseeable future which will harm citizens' basic human rights. The share of those who think that there is a high likelihood of this is larger on the Left and in the Center than on the Right, and larger among Arabs than among Jews. However, we did not find a sizable difference in findings for this question between this month's survey and our survey in 2018.
- ❖ Similarly, we did not find major differences between our 2018 survey and this month's survey regarding the question of changing the composition of the Judicial Appointment Committee: The largest share of respondents are in favor increasing the number of justices on the Committee. A breakdown by political orientation shows that of those who define

themselves as on the Right, the largest share would prefer to increase the number of politicians on the Committee.


- ❖ As on previous occasions when we asked about the proposed override clause, we again found that a majority of Israelis believe that the Supreme Court should have the authority to strike down laws passed by the Knesset if they conflict with Israel's basic laws. However, the differences between various population groups are huge: For example, a large majority of secular Jews support this principle, while only a small minority of Haredi Jews concur.
- ❖ A majority of respondents are willing to attempt to reach compromise on current political issues in order to mitigate the divisions between different blocs and groups and to facilitate dialogue between them.

This month's is the first survey we have conducted since the 2022 elections. In it, we touched on several issues on the public agenda, relating both to current feelings (for example, satisfaction with the election results), and to assessments of the future (such as the likelihood of legislation being passed that will harm basic human rights).

The National Mood

This month, for the first time since we began presenting these two questions every month (in April 2019), we found greater optimism about the future of democratic rule in Israel than about the future of Israel's national security. To a certain extent, this result stems from the continuing decline in optimism about security – presumably due to the growing number of terror attacks (this decline began in August 2022, but there were also low scores in March, April, and May of this year, months which also saw a high number of attacks). However, this month's finding is to a greater extent due to the sharp rise in optimism about the future of democratic rule in Israel among those who define themselves as on the Right.


Optimistic about the future of democratic rule in Israel and about the future of national security, April 2019–November 2022 (total sample; %)



A higher percentage of Jews are optimistic about the future of democratic rule in Israel than of Arabs (48% compared with 34%, respectively). The picture is similar regarding the future of national security: 44% of Jews, compared with 29% of Arabs, are optimistic on this score. However, it is worth noting that optimists are not in the majority on either issue.


In the Jewish sample, the share of those on the Right who are optimistic about the future of democratic rule in Israel is now around two-thirds—almost five times the equivalent share on the Left and three times that in the Center, where optimists are in the minority (around one-eighth and one-quarter, respectively). Since the elections, optimism about Israeli democracy has fallen in the Center and on the Left, and risen on the Right.

Optimistic about the future of democratic rule in Israel, October 2022 and November 2022 (Jews, by political orientation; %)



Optimism is higher among the younger age groups in the Jewish sample, a finding seemingly linked to the fact that a larger share of younger Israelis than older Israelis define themselves as being on the Right. In other words, the most influential variable is political orientation rather than age per se.

Optimistic about the future of democratic rule in Israel, November 2022 (Jews, by age group; %)




A breakdown by political orientation of responses in the Jewish sample reveals larger differences between the political camps regarding the future of national security than regarding the future of democratic rule. Moreover, on national security, optimists constitute a majority of respondents on the Right (53%), but only a minority of those in the Center (35%) and a negligible proportion of those on the Left.

The Security Situation

Seemingly due to the wave of terror attacks in recent months, we found that almost two-thirds of respondents are worried that they or members of their family could be injured in such an attack, with no major difference found between Jews and Arabs on this issue (65% and 68.5%, respectively).

To what extent are you worried or not worried that you or members of your family could be injured by terrorist acts in the course of your daily lives? (total sample; %)




Women, both Jewish and Arab, are more worried than men that they or their family members could become victims of an attack, with the gap in the Jewish public reaching almost 20 percentage points (74% of women compared with 56.5% of men). Among Arabs, 75% of women and 61% of men are worried.

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals that more than two-thirds of those who define themselves as on the Right are worried about becoming victims of terror, compared with half of those on the Left, and (situated between those two camps) 61% of those in the Center. Breaking down responses by age reveals that more than three-quarters of those aged 18–24 (77%) said they are worried about being injured in a terror attack, compared with around half of those aged 65 and over.

An analysis of the Jewish sample by area of residence reveals, perhaps surprisingly, that the lowest levels of worry were reported by respondents who live in Jerusalem (54%), which has suffered a relatively large number of terror attacks recently, while the equivalent share in other areas ranged from 65% (Tel Aviv and Haifa) to 71% (southern Israel).

Are worried that they or members of their family could be injured by terrorist acts (Jews, by area of residence; %)




We found an association between the level of worry about being a victim of terror and the level of optimism about the security situation in Israel: Those who are worried about terror are also more pessimistic about the future of Israel’s security, both among Jews (56%) and Arabs (65%). That is, the fear of being injured by terror clearly influences Israelis’ broader view of their country’s national security.

After the Elections

At the recent elections, the right-wing bloc won a clear victory. We wondered how satisfied Israelis are with the election results, and found that they are divided on this issue: In the total sample, fewer respondents are satisfied (43%) than are dissatisfied (52%). Among Jews, the two groups are close to parity, while a large majority of Arabs are dissatisfied with the results.

Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the results of the recent elections? (total sample, Jews, and Arabs; %)




In the Jewish sample, both religiosity and political orientation – which are closely linked, as we have often demonstrated – are very much associated with satisfaction with the election results: Almost half of the Haredi respondents said they are satisfied, as did around two-thirds of the national religious and traditional religious respondents and around half the traditional non-religious respondents. By contrast, only a very small minority of secular interviewees are satisfied with the results.

A breakdown by political orientation reveals that around two-thirds of those on the Right are satisfied with the election results, compared with small minorities of those in the Center (17.5%) and on the Left (5.5%). Likewise, breaking down the responses by level of income shows large differences: A majority of Jews with below-average incomes are satisfied with the results, alongside around half of those with average incomes, compared with only just over one-third of those with above-average incomes.

Analyzing the Arab sample by voting pattern reveals that hardly any Arabs are satisfied with the election results: 23% of voters for Hadash-Ta'al, 16% of voters for Ra'am, and 7% of voters for Balad.


Satisfied with the results of the recent elections (Jews, by religiosity, political orientation, and income; %)



Taking an interest in the coalition negotiations: We assessed the extent to which the Israeli public are interested in the talks being held by party leaders attempting to form a coalition government. Around half of the respondents reported being interested in these talks, compared with 43% who are not interested. Interest among Jews is higher than among Arabs (57% compared with 40.5%, respectively).

In the Jewish sample, we did not find differences between political camps, religious groupings, or voters for different parties at the recent elections.

Interest in media reports about the talks between the heads of the various parties on forming a government (Jews and Arabs; %)




Various Legislative Proposals

As part of the coalitionary negotiations, several legislative proposals were raised. In this month's survey, we assessed the level of public support for each of the following proposals: allowing ministers to appoint their own ministerial legal advisors; amending the law so that separation between men and women at public events, in education, and in public services will not be considered discrimination; increasing benefit payments to *kollel* students; awarding legal status to illegal settlements in the Occupied Territories, known as "young settlements"; canceling the reform to privatize kashrut services; canceling the "grandchild clause" in the Law of Return, and placing restrictions on the eligibility of Jews and their children to immigrate to Israel; and canceling the recognition of Reform conversions for the purposes of the Law of Return.

As can be seen from the figure below, only a minority of the total sample support each of the proposals. It is also worth noting the particularly large share of "Don't know" responses for each proposal (18% on average).

Support for various legislative proposals made during the coalition negotiations (total sample; %)



However, when the responses (in the Jewish sample) are broken down by political orientation, large differences emerge between camps. Even so, only two proposals gained majority support from respondents on the Right (and only small majorities, at that): legalizing illegal settlements in the Occupied Territories, and amending the law so that separation between men and women in the public arena will not be considered discrimination.

Proposal (support; %)	Left	Center	Right
Allowing ministers to appoint their own ministerial legal advisors	25	30	47
Awarding legal status to illegal settlements in the Occupied Territories, known as “young settlements”	7	21	57
Canceling the recognition of Reform conversions for the purposes of the Law of Return	11	17	42
Canceling the “grandchild clause” in the Law of Return, and placing restrictions on the eligibility of Jews and their children to immigrate to Israel	11	19.5	37
Amending the law so that separation between men and women at public events, in education, and in public services will not be considered discrimination	7	15	52.7
Canceling the reform to privatize kashrut services	8	17	37.5
Increasing benefit payments to <i>kollel</i> students	7	12	34.5


Legal Aspects

Are the basic rights of Israel’s citizens under threat? In light of all these legislative proposals, we asked a question previously aired in 2018: “What do you think is the likelihood that in the near future, the Knesset will pass a law that will harm the basic rights of Israel’s citizens?” In the total sample, opinions are split, with 44% holding the view that there is a high or very high likelihood that the Knesset will pass such laws, and 46% that the likelihood is low or very low.

A majority of Arabs believe that there is a danger of legislation being passed that will harm basic rights (57%), compared with a minority of Jews—albeit a large minority (41%). Interestingly, despite the more heated recent public debate of this question, no significant difference was found in public opinion since the last time we asked it in 2018.


Breaking down responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals, unsurprisingly, that a large majority of those on the Left (82%) and in the Center (61%) believe that there is a high or very high likelihood that the Knesset will pass laws that will harm the basic rights of Israel’s citizens, while only a minority of those on the Right (25%) think likewise. Similarly, a breakdown by voting pattern at the recent elections finds that voters for parties set to form the coalition estimate the likelihood of such legislation to be low or very low, while a large majority of those who voted for parties that will form the opposition consider it to be high or very high. Another interesting finding was that concern on this issue among voters for Arab parties is lower than among voters for Zionist parties in the Center and on the Left.

Think there is a high or very high likelihood that in the near future, the Knesset will pass a law that will harm the basic rights of Israel's citizens (total sample, by voting pattern at the recent elections; %)




Changing the composition of the Judicial Selection Committee: Staying with legal issues, we once again asked (four years since we last did so) whether the public thinks that the current composition of the Judicial Selection Committee (four politicians, three Supreme Court justices, and two representatives of the Israel Bar Association) is appropriate or should be changed. We found that both in 2018 and today, the largest share of respondents (2018, 32%; 2022, 25%) are in favor of increasing the number of justices on the Committee. In second place in both surveys was the response that the current composition is appropriate, though there has been a decline from 25% in 2018 to 19% today. Smaller shares of respondents would prefer to increase the number of politicians, and only a small minority expressed support for increasing the number of representatives of the Israel Bar Association. A particularly high number of respondents said that they don't know.

Views on the composition of the Judicial Selection Committee, 2018 and 2022 (total sample; %)




A breakdown of Jewish respondents by political orientation finds strong similarity between the Left and the Center, with the most common response in both these camps being that the number of justices on the Committee should be increased, and the second most common that the current composition of the Committee is appropriate. On the Right, by contrast, the largest share of respondents believe that the number of politicians should be increased. The Right also has an exceedingly high share of “Don’t know” responses (34%).

Views on the composition of the Judicial Selection Committee, 2018 and 2022 (Jews, by political orientation; %)



The override clause: As in all previous surveys, we once again found that a majority of respondents (54%) believe that the Supreme Court should have the power to strike down laws passed in the Knesset which conflict with the basic laws of the State of Israel, while around one-third (35%) disagree. The opinions of the Jewish and Arab publics on this issue are similar.


Agree that the Supreme Court should have the power to strike down laws passed in the Knesset which conflict with the basic laws of the State of Israel (total sample; %)



Sizable differences were found between different religious groups: A very large majority of secular respondents, and a majority of traditional non-religious respondents, are in favor of the Supreme Court having the power to revoke laws passed by the Knesset, compared with a decreasing minority (respectively) among traditional religious, national religious, and Haredi respondents.

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals strong support on the Left (85%) and in the Center (74%) for the Supreme Court being able to strike down legislation that conflicts with basic laws, and finds that opinion on the Right is divided, with 41% in favor and 49% opposed.

Agree that the Supreme Court should have the power to strike down laws passed in the Knesset which conflict with the basic laws of the State of Israel (Jews, by religiosity; %)




Willingness to Compromise

Finally, in light of the growing political polarization of Israeli society and the fact that in the past, we have found that Israelis are unhappy with this trend, we asked: “Do you agree or disagree that in order to build bridges between the two main political camps, there should be dialogue over proposed legislation and attempts to reach compromise?” We found that there is certainly willingness to make such an effort: Around two-thirds of respondents said that there should be dialogue and attempts to compromise, compared with only one-fifth who disagreed with this notion.

A breakdown by voting pattern at the recent elections shows that apart from Shas voters, of whom only one-third agree that efforts should be made to find compromise, a majority of the voters for all other parties support this idea. Among voters for parties that will form the opposition, the share of those in favor is—hardly surprisingly—particularly large.

Agree that in order to build bridges between the two main political camps, there should be dialogue over proposed legislation and attempts to reach compromise (total sample, by voting pattern at the elections; %)



The November 2022 Israeli Voice Index was prepared by the Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute. The survey was conducted via the internet and by telephone (to include groups that are under-represented on the internet) between November 28 and December 1, 2022, with 600 men and women interviewed in Hebrew and 147 in Arabic, constituting a nationally representative sample of the adult population in Israel aged 18 and over. The maximum sampling error was $\pm 3.59\%$ at a confidence level of 95%. Fieldwork was carried out by Midgam Research and Consulting Ltd. The full data file can be found at: <https://dataisrael.idi.org.il>.