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Principal Findings

Chapter 1: How is Israel Doing?

- At the time our survey was conducted, in June 2023, only about one-fifth of the total sample of interviewees offered a positive assessment of Israel’s situation. This finding continues a downward trend dating from 2019, when half of those surveyed characterized the situation as good or very good. Conversely, there has been a rise in the share who characterize Israel’s situation as bad or very bad, to nearly one-half of the total sample (45%)—the highest level since 2007. The proportion who believe that the state of affairs in Israel is so-so has largely held steady since last year, at slightly over one-third.
- A higher share of Arabs than of Jews take a negative view of Israel’s situation, with growing pessimism in both sectors compared with last year (from 52.5% to 59% among Arabs; and from 33.5% to 42% among Jews). Breaking down the data by political orientation (Jewish sample), we find that a majority of those on the Left (73%) and roughly one-half of those in the Center (54%) consider Israel’s situation to be bad or very bad, as opposed to around one-third of respondents on the Right.
- At the same time, a significant majority of Jews report feeling part of the state and its problems, as contrasted with less than half the Arabs surveyed (85% versus 48%, respectively).
- The share of respondents who agree with the statement that “democratic rule in Israel is in grave danger” has not changed significantly since last year’s survey (Jews, 55% in both 2022 and 2023; Arabs, 80% in 2022 and 75% in 2023); however, a breakdown of the findings in the Jewish sample by political orientation points to changes within each of the camps. On the Left, the share who express agreement has climbed sharply since last year (from 64% to 92%), with a similar pattern in the Center (60% to 73%); by contrast, on the Right, the proportion who take this view dropped from 52% to 40%.
- In the eyes of the Jewish interviewees, the greatest existential threat facing Israel from within is “differences of opinion regarding the suitable balance between Israel as a Jewish state and a democratic state” (27%), followed closely by Jewish-Arab tensions within Israel (24.5%). In the opinion of the Arab interviewees, however, the most serious internal threat is tensions between Jews and Arabs (33.5%) and, in second place, Israel’s control of the West Bank (Judea and Samaria; 25%).
- A majority of both Jewish and Arab interviewees expressed a preference for remaining in Israel as opposed to emigrating. This year, in a break from the past, we found a greater share of Jews than of Arabs who wish to stay in Israel (Jews, 67% in 2022 and 70% in 2023; Arabs, 80% in 2022 and 62% in 2023). The rise in the proportion of Arab interviewees who would prefer to emigrate (from 17% to 38%) may be a result of the increase in violent crime in Arab society. Among Jews, the share who would prefer to remain in Israel is highest on the Right and lowest on the Left (Right, 80%; Center, 61%; Left, 54%).
- A higher percentage of Jews than of Arabs are optimistic about Israel’s future (52% versus 40%, respectively). A breakdown of the findings among Jewish respondents by political orientation reveals large differences (Right, 65%; Center, 42%; Left, 21%).

- A majority of Jews and Arabs alike agree that Israel is a good place to live (67% and 65%, respectively). Among Arab respondents, we found an increase from last year in the share who agreed with this statement (from 52% to 65%), while among Jews, the percentage remained unchanged. Additionally, a higher proportion of national religious and Haredi interviewees (91.5% and 90%, respectively) expressed agreement than did traditional and secular Jews (traditional religious, 74%; traditional non-religious, 66%; secular, 51%).
- As in previous years, we examined Israel's scores in a series of 15 international indicators (based on events in 2022, since the indicators are always compiled for the preceding year), as well as its global ranking and its standing relative to the other OECD states. In 2022, the highest scores earned by Israeli democracy were in the Economist Intelligence Unit's political participation indicator (94.4), V-Dem's deliberative democracy indicator (85.2), and Freedom House's political rights indicator (85), while its lowest score came in the freedom of the press indicator compiled by Reporters Without Borders (57.6).

Chapter 2: Democracy, Government, Citizens

- Of the six components of democracy presented to the interviewees, the most essential, in their view, is "free and fair elections by secret ballot, as prescribed by law" (83%), followed (in descending order) by "freedom of expression for all opinions" (74%), "equality before the law for all, without regard to religion, race, ethnic origin, or sex" (69%), "checks and balances between all three branches of government (legislative, executive, and judicial)" (65%), "separation of religion and state" (54%), and "absence of large income disparities between groups" (49%).
- Only one of these six (free and fair elections by secret ballot) was considered by a majority of interviewees (75%) to be upheld in practice in Israel. Roughly one-half (49%) feel similarly about freedom of expression for all opinions, while only a minority think that the other hallmarks of a democratic system are adequately maintained in Israel.
- One-half (50%) of the total sample agree with the statement that "decisions that are opposed to fundamental democratic values such as minority rights and freedom of expression are not democratic, even if they are passed by the government or a Knesset majority," whereas slightly over one-third (35%) of respondents side with the argument that "decisions made by a government that has a majority in the Knesset are inherently democratic."
- A considerable majority of the interviewees are worried that "democratic rule in Israel is going to be harmed, and Israel will become a failed state" (total sample, 64%; Jews, 61%; Arabs, 81%). In the Jewish sample, when broken down by political orientation, very large majorities on the Left (93%) and in the Center (81%), as opposed to a sizeable minority on the Right (46%), share this concern.
- With regard to the balance between the Jewish and democratic components of the State of Israel, the share of Jews who hold that the Jewish component is too dominant rose this year to 40.5%, from 29% in 2022, whereas a much lower proportion feel that the democratic element is too strong (30% in 2022, compared with 24% in 2023). Only about one-fifth hold that there is a good balance between the two components.

Principal Findings

- We found further that the share of Jewish respondents who agree with the statement that “legislation and legal interpretation in Israel should be based primarily on Jewish religious law” has dropped from 50% in 2013 to 38.5% this year. A majority of Haredi, national religious, and traditional religious interviewees take this view (81%, 70%, and 62%, respectively), as opposed to a minority of traditional non-religious and secular Jews (35% and 12%, respectively).
- This year saw some decline in the proportion of Jews who think that Jewish citizens of Israel should have more rights than non-Jewish citizens (from 49% last year to 43% now). Nonetheless, a majority on the Right support this notion (58%), as contrasted with a minority in the Center and on the Left (25% and 13%, respectively).
- Roughly one-half (52%) of the total sample agree with the statement that the Supreme Court intervenes too much in decisions made by the government. Among Jewish respondents, this opinion is most prevalent on the Right (68%), and much less common in the Center and on the Left (at 29% and 11%, respectively).
- Nearly two-thirds (64%) of all respondents surveyed say that Israeli courts do not accord equal treatment to defendants from all backgrounds and sectors.
- A majority of Jewish respondents (60%) believe that human rights organizations such as B’Tselem and the Association for Civil Rights in Israel cause damage to the state, while a similar majority of Arabs (61%) disagree. Breaking down the results in the Jewish sample by political orientation, we found very large differences between the camps in the proportions who expressed agreement with this statement (Right, 75%; Center, 50.5%; Left, 15%).
- There is disagreement regarding the performance of the Opposition, with 48.5% agreeing that “the Opposition in Israel is weak, and is not doing its job,” while 43% disagreed with this statement.

Chapter 3: Public Trust in State Institutions

- Of the institutions regularly examined in the survey, once again this year the IDF enjoys the highest level of trust among Jews (at 85.5%), followed by the President of Israel (54%), the Supreme Court (42%), the police (35%), the government (28%), the media (25%), the Knesset (24%), and the political parties (13%).
- A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation shows that, on the Left, trust in most of the state institutions has declined in comparison with 2022, with the exception of the Supreme Court, where the level has remained relatively steady. By contrast, on the Right, trust in state institutions has either grown or remained largely stable over the last year. In the Center, apart from a decline in trust in the government, faith in the various state institutions has remained virtually unchanged.
- In the Arab sample, none of the state institutions that we regularly examine gained a trust rating higher than 30%. At the top of the ranking among Arab interviewees is the Supreme Court (26%), followed by the IDF (21%), President of Israel, government, and Knesset (each at 18%), media (17.5%), police (17%), and political parties (15%).
- In addition to the eight institutions regularly surveyed, this year we examined the level of trust in these institutions as well:

- the local authority/municipality where the interviewee resides, with a 55% trust rating in the Jewish sample and 27.5% in the Arab sample, largely on par in both cases with the findings in 2022; and
- the Attorney General, with Jews expressing much greater faith than Arabs in this office (34% versus 16%, respectively). In the Jewish sample, trust in the Attorney General is much higher on the Left and in the Center (65% and 54%, respectively) than on the Right (19%).

Chapter 4: Israeli Society

- Average solidarity ratings in Israeli society as a whole (where 1 = no solidarity at all, and 10 = a very high level of solidarity) continued their downward trend in both sectors (Jews: 5.5 in 2020, 5.0 in 2021, 4.7 in 2022, and 4.4 in 2023; Arabs: 4.8 in 2020, 4.1 in 2021, 3.8 in 2022, and 3.6 in 2023). Jewish interviewees were also asked to assess the level of solidarity within Jewish society, and here as well, we recorded a decline in comparison with last year (from 5.9 to 5.2).
- Most Arabs, as compared with a (sizeable) plurality of Jews, feel that they belong to a minority group in Israeli society. In both samples, there was an increase in this measure relative to last year (Jews, from 30% to 38.5%; Arabs, from 53% to 65%). Breaking down the findings among Jewish respondents by political orientation, we found that the sense of being a minority was more characteristic of the Left than of the Center or Right (63% versus 38% and 32.5%, respectively).
- Relations between Right and Left topped the list of social tensions in Israel, representing a steep rise from last year (from 24% to 39%). In second place were tensions between Jews and Arabs, which declined by half (from 61% last year to 31% this year), and in third place, tensions between religious and secular Jews, which also registered a sharp increase (from 6% to 18%). Jews rated the tension between Right and Left as the most acute while Arabs cited tension between Jews and Arabs.
- A majority of respondents are worried that they may be unable to maintain their desired lifestyle because of the increasing power of certain groups in Israeli society, with Arabs being more concerned than Jews (total sample, 68%; Jews, 66%; Arabs, 80%). Among Jewish respondents, the level of concern is higher among those who align themselves with the Left or Center (89% and 80%, respectively) than it is among those on the Right (56%), while 84% of secular Jews express worry, compared with roughly one-half in the other religious groups (Haredim, 55%; national religious, 51%; traditional religious, 52%; traditional non-religious, 55%).

Chapter 5: Education and Culture

- Slightly over one-half of both Jews and Arabs think that Israel's state education system does not offer equal opportunity to children from all backgrounds and sectors (Jews, 54%; Arabs, 53%).
- A majority of respondents believe that teachers in junior high and high schools should discuss burning political issues with their students (Jews, 64%; Arabs, 75%).

Principal Findings

- The bulk of the Jewish respondents (62%) disagree with the notion that civics and democracy studies should be cut back, with more hours devoted to Jewish history and love of the Land of Israel. Opposition was strongest among secular (84%) and traditional non-religious Jews (61%), compared with a substantial majority of Haredim (76%) who expressed their agreement.
- A sweeping majority of the total sample (81%) hold that the state should fund cultural and artistic institutions and activities.
- A sizeable minority of the total sample (42%) think that the funding of culture and art by the state gives it the right to be involved in determining the content produced by the institutions and activities funded. Greater support for linking funding with involvement in content was found among those on the Right (53%) than among those from the Center and Left (25% and 14%, respectively).

Chapter 6: Heading Toward a New Social-Political Contract?

- A majority of Jews (59%) and roughly one-half of Arabs (48%) think that there is no common set of values and understandings that is shared by a majority of Israelis today (in other words, a national consensus).
- Slightly over one-half of the total sample (54.5%) say that there was a national consensus in Israel in the past.
- Over two-thirds of Jews (69%), as contrasted with a minority of Arabs (41%), hold that the Israeli public's interest in politics has grown in the wake of the protests against the proposed judicial reforms.
- The prevailing opinion (42%) in the total sample is that politicians' attentiveness to the demands of the public has remained unchanged since the start of the protests, while about one-third (34%) hold that it has decreased, and slightly less than one-fifth (17%) think that it has increased.
- A majority of those surveyed believe that it is important that Israel have a constitution (Jews, 72%; Arabs, 78%), something it currently lacks; however, only one-fifth of the total sample (22%) predict that this will happen within the next ten years.
- The bulk of those interviewed (65% of the total sample) consider it unlikely that a new social-political "contract" will emerge between citizens and the government, with only one-quarter (25%) holding that the chances of this occurring are high. As to whether a new contract is likely to evolve between different groups in Israeli society, most of the respondents (66% of the total sample) feel that the likelihood of such an outcome is not great.

Introduction

Israel is “a country that never sleeps.” As a result, virtually every *Democracy Index* published to date has made reference to one or more major internal or external events: turbulent election campaigns, military operations of varying scales, medical or social/economic crises, and the like. The *Israeli Democracy Index 2022* offered an overview of twenty years of surveys (2003–2022), aimed at identifying and analyzing trends in Israeli political opinion going beyond the events of a given year. Taken as a whole, it demonstrated clearly that the national consensus is shrinking, though Right and Left, Haredim and secular, Jews and Arabs, and others still cluster together in some ways on what is left of the common ground, based on certain points of agreement. For example, the majority in all groups would rather remain in Israel than emigrate, and think that Israel is a good place to live.

By contrast, the present *Index* was compiled at the height of an internal crisis unprecedented in Israeli history, on two levels: first, the relationship between the public and the elected political leadership, with many feeling that this leadership does not represent them in any way or look out for their interests and those of the state as a democracy, while others hold that it does indeed represent them and is safeguarding Israel’s vital national interests—for example, by protecting its status as a Jewish state in the face of those who wish instead to bolster its democratic (rather than Jewish) character. On the second level, many came to the painful realization this year that Israeli Jewish society encompasses various groups with worldviews that are difficult—if not impossible—to reconcile, and that these camps have less in common than ever before. We are not speaking here of fresh ruptures, or new groups that emerged out of nowhere, but (as shown in the data below) a deepening of the rifts on fundamental issues that already existed (though perhaps with less intensity); and a heightening of the fear, primarily among secular Jews and those from the political Center and Left, that Israeli democracy is teetering on the edge of an abyss and that their basic civil rights and way of life are at risk. The Right, national religious, and Haredim are likewise dissatisfied, but on the whole, their assessment in these and other areas is more positive, presumably since the government is more right-wing, religious, and Haredi than in the past.

The 2023 protests, which we have examined in a series of surveys since their onset in January of this year (among them, the monthly *Israeli Voice Index* from January through September 2023), showed that fears of the erosion of Israel’s democratic character infused the political Center and Left with an energy and fighting spirit not seen in years, owing to repeated election losses and to ideological splits within these camps. Concurrently, harsh feelings arose on the Right and among the various Jewish religious groups over the motivations of the protesters, interpreted not as purely political differences of opinion but as an attempt by the elites and privileged groups to use the material and other resources at their disposal to regain the power they had lost, and even to overturn the results of the 2022 elections, which showed a clear majority for the right-wing camp. Against this backdrop, class-based conflicts of interest and clashing ethnic identities that had long been suppressed or confined to the fringes, rose to the surface, with both camps feeling that they share no sense of common identity with the other.

This is not the place to discuss at length the reasons for the internal crisis that erupted, the course it took, and its expected ramifications. But what we will attempt to do in the *Israeli Democracy Index 2023*, unlike in

previous reports to some extent, is to explore the persistent fault lines between the rival camps in Israeli society in various areas. At the same time, we will seek out areas of agreement, however narrow, to carve out space for a new national consensus, or, at the very least, a basis for agreement on ground rules that will prevent Israeli society from descending into unending battles. Likewise, we will try to determine whether there is a desire to formulate a new social contract, and if such a step is seen as possible at the present time.

Methodology

As in previous years, 2023's *Democracy Index* examines Israeli political opinion on major social and political issues that lay at the heart of Israeli discourse and actions this year. In terms of methodology, the report rests on three main lines of inquiry: first, questions posed in the past, which enable us to identify long-term trends; second, new questions centered on social and political issues that were part of the public agenda this past year; and third, data collected by international research institutes, presented on a more reduced scale this year,¹ which offer a sense of the state of Israeli democracy today in comparison with other democracies and with its own past performance in an international context.

The two polling firms that carried out the field work for this year's survey were Shiluv I²R (Hebrew interviews) and Afkar Research and Knowledge (Arabic interviews). The data were collected between June 20 and June 28, 2023. Interviewers for the Arabic-language questionnaire were native Arabic speakers.

The questionnaire

The questionnaire for this year's survey consisted of 64 content questions, some with multiple subsections. The questionnaires in Hebrew and Arabic are largely similar, though several of the questions are applicable only to Jews or to Arabs. This is noted clearly in the relevant questions in appendices 1 and 2. In addition, 10 sociodemographic questions were posed to the interviewees. For all content questions, the response option of "don't know" was presented to the interviewees only in the online survey and not by telephone.

The sample

The total sample for this survey consisted of 1,204 men and women aged 18 and over:

- 1,003 interviewees constituting a representative sample of Jews and others, interviewed in Hebrew.²
- 201 interviewees constituting a representative sample of Arab citizens of Israel, interviewed in Arabic.

1 This aspect of the report is greatly reduced this year, since the data published annually by the institutes always refer to the preceding year, meaning that the 2023 data reflect the situation in 2022. Since Israeli democracy experienced profound upheaval in 2023, the international comparison may be misleading and confusing to readers of this year's report. For this reason, we decided to devote less space than usual to this topic. The ramifications of 2023 will be reflected in the international comparison appearing in 2024's *Index*.

2 The category of "others" was adopted by Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) during the 1990s to denote individuals who are not Jewish according to halakha (Jewish religious law) but are not Arab. This pertains mainly to immigrants from the former Soviet Union who were eligible to immigrate to Israel under the Law of Return despite not being considered halakhically Jewish. Like the CBS, we relate to them as part of the Jewish public.

To ensure that the Jewish and Arab samples accurately represented their proportion of the population in Israel, they were weighted by religion, age, sex, and vote in the 2022 Knesset elections. The maximum sampling error for the total sample is $\pm 2.88\%$ ($\pm 3.16\%$ for the Jewish sample, and $\pm 7.05\%$ for the Arab sample).

Data collection

The survey in Hebrew was conducted largely online, supplemented by phone interviews, mainly with older and Haredi (ultra-Orthodox Jewish) respondents who do not have Internet access. The Arabic survey was conducted by telephone only. The interview method is broken down as follows:

	Internet (%)	Telephone (%)	Total (%)
Hebrew survey	82.7	17.3	100
Arabic survey	–	100	100
Total (full sample)	68.9	31.1	100

Data analysis

We analyzed the data using several variables known from previous studies to have strong explanatory value in the Israeli context—for example, interviewees' nationality (Jewish or Arab), religiosity (in the Jewish sample),³ political orientation (in the Jewish sample),⁴ age, and level of education. The Arab sample was analyzed on the basis of voting patterns in the 2022 Knesset elections and area of residence, and (in some cases) religion as well; however, we limited the use of the latter variable due to the low share of Christians and Druze in the Arab sample (reflecting their low share in the actual population). In several places in the report, we also briefly presented more advanced statistical analyses, such as scales of measurement and factor analysis, to suggest correlations that are not apparent from a simpler analysis.

Navigating the report

To make it easier to navigate the report, two types of references have been inserted in the margins: The first, alongside each question number, refers the reader to the page where that question appears in appendix 1 (which contains the questionnaire and the distribution of responses for each content question in a three-part format: total sample, Jews, Arabs). The second is used only for recurring questions, and points to the page where that question appears in appendix 2 (a multi-year comparison of data). The references are shown in the text as follows:

³ The categories for this variable were: Haredi, national religious, traditional religious, traditional non-religious, and secular. The proportion of each group in the various democracy surveys is in accordance with its share in the Israeli CBS data.

⁴ The categories for this variable were: Left, Center, Right.

Israel's overall situation[Question 1](#)[Appendix 1, page 179](#)[Appendix 2, page 196](#)

Similarly, next to each question in appendices 1 and 2, there is a reference to the page in the text where that question is discussed.

To make for easier reading, we present the data in whole numbers in the text and accompanying figures, using half-percentage points in rare instances. In the appendices, however, the data are shown to a higher degree of precision—up to one decimal place. Due to this rounding (which, as stated, is intended to assist the reader), there are occasionally very slight differences between the data in the main body of the report and in the appendices.

Chapter 1 / How is Israel Doing?

In this chapter, we discuss the following topics:

- Israel's overall situation
- Feeling part of the state and its problems
- Is democratic rule in Israel in danger?
- Israel's greatest existential threat from within
- Prefer to remain in Israel or emigrate?
- Optimism/pessimism about Israel's future
- Is Israel a good place to live?
- International indicators

Israel's overall situation

Question 1


Appendix 1, p. 179

Appendix 2, p. 196

In every *Democracy Index* since 2003, the first survey question has always addressed Israel's overall situation, and can be seen as a barometer of the national mood. Against the backdrop of events in the first half of 2023, and the extreme discourse that accompanied them, many Israelis were pushed into ideological and practical corners that, under other circumstances, might not be their natural place. Others found themselves in a state of confusion, with difficulty deciding their position on the issues at hand, which largely boiled down to: What is or isn't the best path to follow? And who is right?


Our findings indicate that the share of respondents who feel that Israel's overall situation is bad has risen over the last several years. Nearly half our interviewees chose this response in 2023, representing a clear increase of 8 percentage points compared with last year's survey. In fact, this is the highest reading we have measured on this question since 2007, when we attributed our findings to the impact of the Second Lebanon War on morale, among other areas. Although there has been a steady decline since 2019 in the share of respondents who take a positive view of Israel's situation, we see this trend as being reinforced by the internal struggles we have witnessed since the most recent elections, and with greater intensity, since the government's announcement of its judicial reform program and the outbreak of the civil protests opposing it.

Figure 1.1 / Israel’s overall situation (total sample; %)



A comparison of the distribution of responses to this question among Jewish and Arab interviewees shows that, as in 2022, the Arab assessment is more negative than the Jewish one and has even worsened since last year.⁵ A similar trend is evident among Jewish respondents as well, that is, an increase in the share of those who characterize Israel’s situation as bad; however, in contrast with the Arab sample, they do not constitute a majority. Concurrently, there was a decrease in the proportion of respondents who categorized Israel’s condition as good/very good or so-so.

Figure 1.2 / Israel’s overall situation, 2022 and 2023 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



⁵ The 2022 survey was conducted during the Bennett-Lapid government, that is, prior to the elections in which the right-wing bloc won a majority.

A breakdown of the responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals a sharp drop from last year in the proportion of those on the Left who view Israel's situation as good, and an even steeper rise (more than fourfold) in the share who perceive it as bad. There has also been a decline in the proportion who view the situation as so-so. Likewise, a lesser share of respondents from the Center define Israel's situation as good or so-so this year. The percentage who offer a negative assessment has more than doubled itself, though the shift here is less pronounced than on the Left. On the Right, respondents were split about evenly this year between those who characterized Israel's situation as good, so-so, or bad (with a slight preference for the middle option). Only in this camp was there a decline relative to last year in the share who see the country's condition as bad.

Table 1.1 / Israel's overall situation, 2022 and 2023 (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)

	2022			2023		
	Good	So-so	Bad	Good	So-so	Bad
Left	42	41	17	4	23	73
Center	32	44	24	10	36	54
Right	23	36	40.5	30	38	31

We also found substantial gaps between religious groups in the Jewish sample, with national religious respondents once again being the most likely to define Israel's situation in positive terms (an increase of 12 percentage points from last year), and secular respondents, the least likely (a drop of 23 points). Conversely, the lowest share of negative assessments was found among the national religious, and the highest among the secular.

Table 1.2 / Israel's overall situation, 2022 and 2023 (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)

	2022			2023		
	Good	So-so	Bad	Good	So-so	Bad
Haredim	19	32	49	34	34	30
National religious	37	37	24	49	32	19
Traditional religious	17	42	40	30	42	26
Traditional non-religious	22.5	39	38.5	17	41	42
Secular	31	40	28	8	32	59

Public discourse in Israel in the first half of 2023 focused frequently on the (ostensible or actual) lessening of the sense of belonging to the state among wide swathes of the population. Our survey findings, however, do not bear this out, with virtually no change from last year's data; in fact, the share of the total sample who attested that they feel "very much" a part of the state has even increased since 2022. Only one-fifth of respondents reported that they do not feel part of the state and its problems, on par with last year.


Feeling part of the state

Question 2

Appendix 1, p. 179

Appendix 2, p. 197

Figure 1.3 / To what extent do you feel part of the State of Israel and its problems? 2022 and 2023 (total sample; %)



At the same time, the gap between Jewish and Arab respondents on this question is very noticeable, as in past years. Among Jews, a very large majority feel part of the state and its problems, while slightly less than half of Arabs take this view, albeit a greater share than last year. This finding calls for additional testing to clarify if it is an accurate reflection of the situation or an anomalous result.

Table 1.3 / Feel part of the state and its problems, 2022 and 2023 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

	2022	2023
Jews	86	85
Arabs	40.5	48

We did not find statistically significant differences when breaking down the responses in the Jewish sample by age or political orientation. Analysis on the basis of religiosity yielded a majority who feel part of the state and its problems in all religious groups; however, this majority is markedly smaller among Haredi respondents (Haredim, 74%; national religious, 93%; traditional religious, 80%; traditional non-religious, 89%; secular, 86%).

Is democratic rule in Israel in danger?


Question 23

Appendix 1, p. 184

Appendix 2, p. 211

Since 2017, we have asked on several occasions to what extent respondents agree or disagree that the democratic system in Israel is in grave danger. Somewhat surprisingly, given the turmoil in Israel since the 2022 elections and up to and including the present survey, the findings indicate that there have not been major changes in the share who believe that such a threat exists. Here too, the data have remained stable in the Jewish sample in comparison with last year, and we even found a slight dip in the proportion of Arabs who fear for Israeli democracy. Again, repeat measurements will be needed to corroborate this result. In addition, as in the past, the share who hold that democracy in Israel is in grave danger is significantly higher among Arabs than among Jews.


Figure 1.4 / Agree that democratic rule in Israel is in grave danger, 2017–2023 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation points to a sharp rise from last year in the share of respondents on the Left who believe that democracy in Israel is under serious threat (the greatest proportion ever measured in our survey), and an increase among those who identify with the Center (here too, the highest percentage recorded for this camp), as contrasted with a noticeable decline on the Right. The findings suggest that the perception of danger in the various camps is related to the timing of the survey; in other words, whether a given camp was part of the Coalition or the Opposition at that point. In the two previous surveys (2021 and 2022), when left-wing parties were part of the Coalition, we saw a decline in the share of respondents from this camp who felt that Israeli democracy was in grave danger. This time, when these parties were in the Opposition,

virtually all the interviewees in this camp expressed the belief that democracy in Israel was at serious risk. A significant increase over last year's survey was also registered among respondents from the Center. By contrast, on the Right, this year's survey showed a considerable decline in the share of respondents who hold that Israeli democracy is in jeopardy, compared with last year, when most of the right-wing parties were in the Opposition.

Figure 1.5 / Agree that democratic rule in Israel is in grave danger, 2017–2023
(Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



An examination of the differences between religious groups in the Jewish sample points to only a minority of Haredi and national religious respondents, and close to one-half of both traditional groups, who perceive democratic rule in Israel as being in serious danger, as contrasted with a large majority of secular Jews. The most striking finding is the steep decline since last year in the share of Haredi interviewees who feel that Israeli democracy is in danger. Also of interest is a breakdown of the secular respondents by political orientation: While 98% of the Left, and 84% of the Center, consider the democratic system in Israel to be under serious threat, only 58% on the Right share this view.

Table 1.4 / Agree that the democratic system in Israel is in grave danger, 2022 and 2023
(Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)

	2022	2023
Haredim	55	30
National religious	36	26
Traditional religious	60	42
Traditional non-religious	56	50
Secular	59	78

Cross-tabulating between this question and assessments of Israel's overall situation, we found that a substantial majority of those who consider it to be good also think that Israeli democracy is not at risk. Of those who view the country's condition as so-so, about one-half perceive such a danger, while a considerable majority of those who feel that Israel is in a bad way feel that its democratic system is in serious danger. It would therefore seem that there is a strong correlation between these two parameters.

Table 1.5 / Agree or disagree that Israeli democracy is in grave danger (total sample, by assessment of Israel's overall situation; %)

	Israeli democracy is in grave danger			Total	
	Agree	Disagree	Don't know		
Israel's overall situation today is:	Good	27	71	2	100
	So-so	51	46	3	100
	Bad	80	18	2	100


We wished to learn what, in the interviewees' opinion, constitutes the greatest existential threat facing Israel from within. Among Jewish respondents, we found that differences of opinion regarding the appropriate balance between Israel as a Jewish and a democratic state was considered the number one threat, followed by Jewish-Arab tensions within Israel. Among Arab respondents, by contrast, this flashpoint topped the list (by a higher share than the parallel ranking among Jews: 33.5% versus 27%), while Israeli control of the West Bank/Judea and Samaria ranked in second place—a threat that Jewish respondents perceived to be the least serious.

Israel's greatest internal threat

Question 17

Appendix 1, p. 183

Figure 1.6 / The greatest existential threat facing Israel from within (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



A breakdown of responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation offers an interesting picture: In first place among respondents from the Left and Center are differences of opinion regarding an appropriate balance between the Jewish and democratic components of Israel's identity, whereas on the Right—as echoed by the Arab interviewees—Jewish-Arab tensions were rated the most serious domestic threat. Coming second among those on the Left are socioeconomic gaps; in the Center, low public trust in state institutions and socioeconomic gaps in Israeli society; and on the Right, the balance between Israel as a Jewish and a democratic state. In third place on the Left, we found Israeli control of the West Bank/Judea and Samaria (16%); however, in the Center and on the Right, this was at the bottom of the scale (with 4.5% and 3%, respectively).

Table 1.6 / The greatest existential threat facing Israel from within (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)

	Left	Center	Right
First place	Differences of opinion on the appropriate balance between Israel as a Jewish and a democratic state (36%)	Differences of opinion on the appropriate balance between Israel as a Jewish and a democratic state (38%)	Jewish-Arab tensions within Israel (32%)
Second place	Socioeconomic gaps in Israeli society (17%)	Low public trust in state institutions, and socioeconomic gaps in Israeli society (both 17%)	Differences of opinion on the appropriate balance between Israel as a Jewish and a democratic state (21%)

Analyzing the responses in the Jewish sample by religiosity, we found that secular Jews were the only group who feel that differences of opinion over the appropriate balance between Israel as a Jewish and a democratic state are the most serious threat facing Israel internally (35%). A total of 30% of Haredi, 25% of national religious, and 41% of traditional religious respondents see the greatest threat as being tensions between Jews and Arabs, with the traditional non-religious group being split evenly between Jewish-Arab tensions and differences regarding the Jewish and democratic components of Israel's identity (24%, in both cases).

In an effort to know whether Israelis are interested in remaining in Israel or emigrating, we posed the following question once again this year: "If you could receive American citizenship, or that of another Western country, would you prefer to live there or to remain in Israel?" A majority of the total sample (69%) answered that they would wish to stay, with roughly one-fifth (21%) responding that, in this hypothetical situation, they would prefer to leave. In contrast with last year, when a greater share of Arabs than of Jews indicated that they would wish to remain in Israel, the percentage of Jews this year who stated that they would like to stay exceeded that of the Arab respondents, as well as of the Jews in the 2022 survey. Additional polls will of course be needed to determine whether the jump in the proportion of Arabs who would be interested in emigrating is an anomalous result or an actual trend.


**Preference
for staying or
emigrating**

Question 6

Appendix 1, p. 180

Appendix 2, p. 199

Figure 1.7 / If you could receive American citizenship, or that of another Western country, would you prefer to live there or to remain in Israel? (Jewish and Arab samples; %)




It is a truism that young people are always more willing to emigrate than older adults, and in the Arab sample, this association clearly held true this year; yet, among Jews, there were no consistent differences between age groups. However, the youngest secular respondents did show a relatively strong interest in emigrating, with 40% preferring to leave (alongside 40% wishing to stay, and 20% who responded “don’t know”).

Table 1.7 / If you could receive American citizenship, or that of another Western country, would you prefer to live there or to remain in Israel? (Jewish and Arab samples, by age; %)

		Stay	Emigrate	Don't know	Total
Jews	18–34	70	20	10	100
	35–54	58	25	17	100
	55+	83	8	9	100
Arabs	18–34	52	48	0	100
	35–54	65	35	0	100
	55+	80	20	0	100

Breaking down the desire to remain in Israel or emigrate by political orientation (in the Jewish sample), we found, as in the past, that the share who would prefer to stay is highest on the Right (where we also recorded a sizeable increase from 2022, when it stood at 70%), and lowest on the Left, which registered a decline (from 61% in 2022).

Figure 1.8 / Prefer to remain in Israel (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



A comparison of the findings in the Jewish sample by religiosity shows the national religious respondents to be the most decisive about remaining in Israel, and the secular, the least. In the latter group, the share who opted for the response of “don’t know” was especially high.

Table 1.8 / If you could receive American citizenship, or that of another Western country, would you prefer to live there or to remain in Israel? (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)

	Stay	Emigrate	Don't know	Total
Haredim	89.5	9	1.5	100
National religious	95	3	2	100
Traditional religious	74	16	10	100
Traditional non-religious	72	17	11	100
Secular	55	26	19	100


Cross-tabulating the responses on remaining or emigrating with those on whether Israeli democracy is in danger, we found that the desire to stay or leave is largely unaffected by the perception of Israeli democracy as being at risk or not, in the sense that a majority of both groups wish to continue living in Israel; however, this majority is more pronounced among those who do not foresee a danger to Israeli democracy.

Table 1.9 / If you could receive American citizenship, or that of another Western country, would you prefer to live there or to remain in Israel? (total sample, by agreement/disagreement that democratic rule in Israel is in grave danger; %)

	Prefer to stay or emigrate				
	Stay	Emigrate	Don't know	Total	
Democratic rule in Israel is in grave danger	Agree	62	26	12	100
	Disagree	80	14	6	100

In the total sample, the share of respondents who feel optimistic about Israel's future is similar to the proportion who feel pessimistic (50% and 45%, respectively). Interestingly, only a small minority of both the optimists and the pessimists opted for the "stronger" response choice ("very" rather than "quite").

Figure 1.9 / Are you optimistic or pessimistic about Israel's future? (total sample; %)



So who falls in which group? Among Jewish respondents, the share of optimists (52%) exceeds that of the pessimists (43%), while among Arab respondents, the opposite picture emerges, with the pessimists eclipsing the optimists (at 58% versus 40%, respectively). A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation yields a sizeable majority on the Left and a small plurality in the Center who feel pessimistic, as contrasted with a considerable majority of optimists on the Right. Moreover, we found a sharp decline from last year in the share of optimists on the Left (from 46.5% to 21%), with a parallel increase on the Right (from 53.5% in 2022 to 65% this year).


Optimism/ pessimism about Israel's future

Question 64

Appendix 1, p. 195

Appendix 1, p. 225

Figure 1.10 / Are you optimistic or pessimistic about Israel's future? (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



Analyzing the Jewish respondents by religiosity reveals a majority of optimists in the Haredi, national religious, and traditional religious groups; an almost even split between the two options among the traditional non-religious, with the optimists coming out slightly ahead; and a small minority of optimists among the secular respondents. Compared with last year, we saw a rise in the share of optimists in all religious groups with the exception of the secular, where there was a considerable decline. Here too, we found substantial differences between secular respondents who identified with the Left (just 21% of whom expressed optimism about Israel's future) and those who align themselves with the Center (36%). By contrast, nearly one-half (48%) of secular interviewees on the Right take a positive view of the country's future.

Table 1.10 / Optimistic about Israel's future, 2022 and 2023 (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)

	Haredim	National religious	Traditional religious	Traditional non-religious	Secular
2022	53	73	54	46	47
2023	70	78	70	48.5	36

Cross-tabulating the responses on this question with the potential threat to Israeli democracy, we see that, of those who hold that the democratic system in Israel is in grave danger, a majority are pessimistic about the country's future, whereas among those who do not see a risk, an even larger majority are optimistic about Israel's prospects.

Table 1.11 / Optimistic/pessimistic about Israel's future (total sample, by agreement or disagreement that democratic rule in Israel is in grave danger; %)

	Optimistic/pessimistic about Israel's future				
	Optimistic	Pessimistic	Don't know	Total	
Democratic rule in Israel is in grave danger	Agree	36	61	3	100
	Disagree	73	23	4	100

A cross-tabulation with responses on the question of staying in Israel versus emigrating shows, not surprisingly, that a very large majority of those who are optimistic about Israel's future, as opposed to slightly over one-half of the pessimists, would prefer to remain in the country.

Table 1.12 / Preference for staying in Israel or emigrating (total sample, by optimism or pessimism about Israel's future; %)

	Preference for staying or emigrating				
	Stay	Emigrate	Don't know	Total	
Optimistic/pessimistic about Israel's future	Optimistic	82	12.5	5.5	100
	Pessimistic	56	31	13	100

As shown in the figure below, this year some two-thirds of both Jewish and Arab respondents agreed with the statement that Israel is a good place to live. The similarity between these two groups is noteworthy, given the considerable differences in their circumstances. In the Arab sample, there was even an upswing from last year in the proportion who expressed agreement. To assert that that this represents a trend in the position of the Arab public on this subject would require further surveys, in addition to which this increase does not correlate with other findings in the present report and various recent studies.⁶


Is Israel a good place to live?

Question 20

Appendix 1, p. 184

Appendix 2, p. 210

⁶ For example: Tamar Hermann, Or Anabi, Yaron Kaplan, Inna Orly Sapozhnikova, and Doron Broitman, *A Conditional Partnership: Jews and Arabs, Israel 2023* (Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute, 2023).

Figure 1.11 / Agree that Israel is a good place to live (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

At the same time, unlike 2022, when roughly two-thirds in all three Jewish political camps agreed that Israel is a good place to live, this year there were substantial differences between them on this question. On the Left, a minority; in the Center, a slight majority; and on the Right, a substantial majority agreed with the above statement. Moreover, the Left registered a large **decline**, and the Center, a slight **drop**, in the share who expressed agreement (22 and 8 percentage points, respectively), as contrasted with a **rise** of 13 points on the Right.

For this question as well, a breakdown of the findings in the Jewish sample by religiosity indicates an extremely steep rise over last year in positive responses among Haredi and national religious respondents, alongside more moderate increases in both traditional groups. By contrast, in the secular group, we saw a drop in the share who feel that Israel is a good place to live. Once again, we found differences within the secular group when broken down by political orientation: Among secular respondents on the Left, just 38% think that Israel is a good place to live, and in the Center, 51%, as contrasted with those on the Right, where the majority climbs to 62%.

Table 1.13 / Agree that Israel is a good place to live, 2022 and 2023 (Jewish sample, by political orientation and religiosity; %)

		2022	2023
Political orientation	Left	65	43
	Center	66	58
	Right	64	77
Religiosity	Haredim	62	90
	National religious	80	91.5
	Traditional religious	64	74
	Traditional non-religious	58	66
	Secular	62.5	51

When we cross-tabulated the responses here with those on the question of whether Israeli democracy is in grave danger, we found that a majority feel Israel is a good place to live, regardless of whether they believe that Israel's democratic system is in danger; however, this majority is substantially higher (81%) among those who do not see a threat than among those who do (58%).

Table 1.14 / Israel is a good place to live (total sample, by agreement/disagreement that democratic rule in Israel is in grave danger; %)

	Israel is a good place to live				
	Agree	Disagree	Don't know	Total	
Democratic rule in Israel is in grave danger	Agree	58	41	1	100
	Disagree	81	19	–	100

We also cross-tabulated the extent of agreement/disagreement with the statement that Israel is a good place to live with responses to the question on staying in Israel or emigrating. Our findings show that, of those who think that Israel is a good place to live, a very large majority are interested in remaining, whereas respondents who disagree that Israel is a good place to live are split almost evenly between those who would prefer to stay and those who would wish to emigrate.

Table 1.15 / If you could receive American citizenship, or that of another Western country, would you prefer to live there or to remain in Israel? (total sample, by agreement/disagreement that Israel is a good place to live; %)

	Prefer to stay or emigrate				
	Stay	Emigrate	Don't know	Total	
Israel is a good place to live	Agree	83	12	5	100
	Disagree	42.5	41	16.5	100

Israel in international indicators

As noted in the Methodology section (p. 17), this year's *Democracy Index* does not include a separate chapter describing how Israel is ranked in international democracy indicators. The data are cited here in brief solely to provide continuity between the more detailed analyses in 2022 and in next year's report (which will contain the data from 2023). The following indicators reflect Israel's comparative standing in 2022. As in recent years, it generally ranks around the midpoint globally, and in a less favorable position relative to the other OECD states.

This year, we again present 15 international indicators in 6 areas:

1. Democratic rights and freedoms (political rights, civil liberties, freedom of the press)
2. The democratic process (voice and accountability, political participation, egalitarian democracy, participatory democracy, deliberative democracy, democratic political culture)
3. Governance (functioning of government, rule of law)
4. Corruption (perception of corruption, control of corruption)
5. Regulation (regulatory quality)
6. Economic equality (equal distribution of resources)

For each of the 15 indicators, we present four ratings: (1) Israel's **score** for 2022; (2) Israel's **global ranking** relative to the other countries included in each indicator; (3) Israel's **ranking** among the 38 member states of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); and (4) **changes in Israel's global ranking** for 2022 as compared with 2021.


The distinction between **scores** and **ranking** is important: The score is compiled for a given country in a given year, whereas the ranking relates to the country's standing relative to the other countries surveyed. In other words, a country's score can remain unchanged year after year, but if other countries improve or decline in their democratic performance, then that country's ranking will change. And conversely, a score can change, but if the scores of all the other countries change in the same direction, then its ranking may remain the same. The score is presented as an absolute number between 0 and 100, whereas the ranking is given in two forms: an absolute number and a percentile.

A note on methodology: Each of the research institutes responsible for these indicators uses its own scale to present its scores, in some cases 0–10, in others 0–40, 0–60, 0–1, and so on. To make it easier to compare

Israel's scores across the various indicators, we standardized these scores on a uniform scale from 0 to 100. The higher the score, the better the quality of democracy in a given country. Israel's scores in the various indicators are presented in Figure 1.12 (below).


Israel's highest scores in 2022 are in the political participation indicator produced by the Economist Intelligence Unit (94.4), the deliberative democracy indicator published by V-Dem (85.2), and the political rights indicator from Freedom House (85). Israeli democracy scored lowest this year in the freedom of the press indicator compiled by Reporters Without Borders (57.6).

Figure 1.12 / Israel's scores in the international indicators, 2022



Of the 15 indicators, Israel ranked highest in political participation, compared with almost all countries surveyed and the OECD states.

Figure 1.13 / Israel's percentile in the international indicators, 2022



Once again this year, an overview of the quality of Israeli democracy in various areas reveals mixed trends compared with 2021, showing improvement in 5 out of the 15 indicators, decline in 3, and no change in the remaining 7.

Table 1.16 / Israel's global ranking in 2022 indicators compared with 2021

Indicator	2022			2021			Change	
	Score	Global ranking	Percentile— all countries surveyed	Score	Global ranking	Percentile— all countries surveyed		
Democratic rights and freedoms	Political rights (Freedom House)	85.0	58–64/210	70–72	85.0	58–64/210	70–72	=
	Civil liberties (Freedom House)	71.7	78–80/210	62–63	70.0	81–84/210	60–61	⬆️
	Freedom of the press (Reporters Without Borders)	57.6	97/180	46	59.6	86/180	52	⬇️
Democratic process	Voice and accountability (World Bank)	63.4	68/208	67	63.4	68/208	67	=
	Political participation (Economist Intelligence Unit)	94.4	3/167	98	100	1–2/167	99–100	⬇️
	Egalitarian democracy (V-Dem)	81.4	37/179	79	81.4	38/179	79	=
	Participatory democracy (V-Dem)	59.9	51/179	72	60.6	50/179	72	=
	Deliberative democracy (V-Dem)	85.2	40/179	78	79.2	57/179	68	⬆️
	Democratic political culture (Economist Intelligence Unit)	69.0	26–41/167	75–84	69.0	28–40/167	76–83	=
Governance	Functioning of government (Economist Intelligence Unit)	78.6	20–26/167	84–88	75	25–28/167	83–85	⬆️
	Rule of law (World Bank)	69.0	41/213	81	68.2	40/211	81	=
Corruption	Control of corruption (World Bank)	65.6	46/213	78	66.6	43/211	80	⬇️
	Perception of corruption (Transparency International)	63.0	31–32/180	82–83	59.0	36–38/180	79–80	⬆️
Regulation	Regulatory quality (World Bank)	74.2	30/213	86	74.0	33/211	84	⬆️
Economic equality	Equal distribution of resources (V-Dem)	83.7	45–46/179	74–75	83.7	46–47/179	74	=

*

- ⬆️ Improvement in Israel's ranking compared with 2021
- = No change in Israel's ranking compared with 2021
- ⬇️ Decline in Israel's ranking compared with 2021

Chapter 2 / Democracy, Government, Citizens

In this chapter, we discuss the following topics:

- Essential components of a democracy, and extent to which they are upheld in Israel
- Which form of government is most suitable for Israel?
- Are majority decisions inherently democratic?
- Rating Israeli democracy
- Balance between the Jewish and democratic components of the State of Israel
- More rights for Jewish than non-Jewish citizens?
- Role of Jewish religious law in Israel's legal system
- Supreme Court intervention in government decisions
- Equality before the law
- Upholding of human and civil rights in Israel
- Are human and civil rights organizations causing damage to Israel?
- Is the Opposition doing its job?
- Dismantle everything and start over?

In this chapter, we will attempt to explore perceptions of the term “democracy” in the Israeli public as a whole and among different groups in particular, from the essential characteristics of a democratic regime and the extent to which each of these is upheld in Israel today, to an assessment of the Opposition’s performance.


The respondents were presented with six characteristics, and asked to note to what extent they see each of them as essential to democracy: free and fair elections by secret ballot, as prescribed by law; checks and balances between all three branches of government (legislative, executive, and judicial); freedom of expression for all opinions; separation of religion and state; absence of large income disparities between groups; and equality before the law, without regard to religion, race, ethnicity, or sex. The opinion of the majority was that all these characteristics are crucial, with the exception of limited income disparities, which only about one-half of the interviewees cited as an essential component of democracy. In first place in the ranking of critical democratic principles was free and fair elections by secret ballot, followed (in descending order) by freedom of expression, equality before the law, and separation of powers between branches of state. A little over one-half consider the separation of religion and state to be an essential aspect of democratic rule, while a slightly lower percentage see small income gaps as the most important.

Essential components of a democracy

Questions 41–46

Appendix 1,
pp. 190–191

Figure 2.1 / To what extent is each of the following an essential component of democracy? (total sample; %)




As shown above, the greatest share of respondents hold that free and fair elections by secret ballot as prescribed by Israeli law are an essential element of a democratic regime. However, we found a substantial difference on this point between Jewish interviewees (88% of whom see it as vital) and Arab interviewees (of whom just 58% take this view). Moreover, while over two-thirds of Jewish interviewees indicated that this characteristic is “very much” essential, only about one-quarter of Arab respondents opted for this response choice.

Free and fair elections by secret ballot

Question 41

Appendix 1, p. 190

Figure 2.2 / To what extent are free and fair elections by secret ballot, as prescribed by law, an essential component of democracy? (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



Breakdowns of the Jewish sample by political orientation, religiosity, sex, age, and ethnicity yielded only minor differences, with over 80% of respondents in each subgroup citing free elections by secret ballot as a vital aspect of democratic rule. An analysis of the Arab sample indicated some difference between men and women, with the latter assigning greater importance to free elections as an essential feature of democracy (52% versus 64%, respectively).

Freedom of expression for all opinions

Question 43

Appendix 1, p. 190

The freedom to express all opinions is ranked second in importance among the characteristics vital to a democracy. Here too, a considerable majority of Jewish respondents take this view (78%) as compared with slightly over one-half of Arab respondents (53.5%).


Breaking down the Jewish sample by religiosity, we found that the secular respondents are the most inclined to believe that freedom of expression is essential, while the Haredim are the least. An analysis of the findings by political orientation shows that respondents on the Left feel more strongly than those from the Center or Right that this is a vital feature of democracy; however, a majority of all the religious and political subgroups see freedom of expression as crucial.

Table 2.1 / Consider freedom of expression to be an essential component of democracy (Jewish sample, by religiosity and political orientation; %)

Religiosity	Haredim	66
	National religious	73.5
	Traditional religious	76
	Traditional non-religious	76
	Secular	84
Political orientation	Left	91
	Center	79
	Right	76

Among Jewish respondents, the higher the level of education, the greater the agreement with the importance of freedom of expression, while among Arabs, the converse holds true, with the more educated agreeing less with this premise. The gap is particularly salient among those with a bachelor's degree or higher: Here, the share of Jewish respondents who consider freedom of expression to be a vital characteristic of democracy is double that among Arabs (84% as opposed to 42%, respectively).

Figure 2.3 / Consider freedom of expression to be an essential component of democracy (Jewish and Arab samples, by level of education; %)



Equality before the law, without regard to religion, race, ethnicity, or sex, is in third place in the list of crucial elements of a democracy. While a large majority of Jewish respondents (73%) consider this to be a vital element, only about one-half of Arabs (49%) hold the same opinion.


A breakdown by vote in the 2022 Knesset elections shows that those who voted for an Arab or Haredi party are the least likely to view equality before the law as a vital aspect of a democracy. More broadly, this element is considered a vital component of democracy by roughly 80% or more of those who voted for parties from the Center or Left, and by about two-thirds of voters on the Right.

Equality before the law

Question 46

Appendix 1, p. 191

Figure 2.4 / Consider equality before the law to be an essential component of democracy (total sample, by vote in 2022 Knesset elections; %)



Breaking down the Jewish sample by religiosity and political orientation, we found agreement in all groups that equality before the law is a crucial element of a democratic regime; however, this opinion was strongest among secular and left-wing respondents, and weakest among Haredim and those on the Right.

Table 2.2 / Consider equality before the law to be an essential component of democracy (Jewish sample, by religiosity and political orientation; %)

Religiosity	Haredim	57
	National religious	69.5
	Traditional religious	70
	Traditional non-religious	73
	Secular	79
Political orientation	Left	86
	Center	76
	Right	69.5


Checks and balances

Question 42

Appendix 1, p. 190

A system of checks and balances stands in fourth place in the ranking of essential components of a democratic regime. Roughly two-thirds of Jewish respondents (67%) hold that it is vital, compared with only a slim majority of Arab respondents (54%).

Figure 2.5 / To what extent are checks and balances between all three branches of government (legislative, executive, and judicial) an essential component of democracy? (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



A breakdown of the Jewish sample by religiosity shows that Haredim are the only group in which a majority do not consider checks and balances between the various branches of government to be vital. In each of the three political camps in this sample, a majority view this as an essential element of democracy, though the size of the majority is largest on the Left and smallest on the Right.

Table 2.3 / Consider checks and balances to be an essential component of democracy (Jewish sample, by religiosity and political orientation; %)

Religiosity	Haredim	30
	National religious	70
	Traditional religious	63
	Traditional non-religious	63
	Secular	72
Political orientation	Left	79.5
	Center	69
	Right	65


Whereas a sizeable majority of those surveyed are in agreement that the previous four characteristics are essential to a democracy, in the case of separation of religion and state, the share who hold this view is only slightly greater than half. The difference between Jewish and Arab respondents on this point is not pronounced (Jews, 55%; Arabs, 49.5%). More sizeable gaps were found between different religious groups in the Jewish sample, where a large majority of secular respondents and a small majority of the traditional non-religious think that separation of religion and state is crucial to a democratic regime, while a majority of Haredim and national religious disagree. Traditional religious respondents are split more or less evenly on this issue.

Separation of religion and state

Question 44

Appendix 1, p. 190


Figure 2.6 / Consider separation of religion and state to be an essential component of democracy (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)



We also found substantial differences in the Jewish sample when breaking down the responses by political camp: The share on the Left who consider separation of religion and state to be vital to democracy is almost double that on the Right (85% versus 44%, respectively), while the Center falls somewhere between the two (67%).

Analyzing the results by vote in the 2022 Knesset election shows that a very large majority of voters for Labor and Yesh Atid think that separation of religion and state is central to a democratic regime, as opposed to roughly one-third or less of voters for the Haredi and national religious parties.

Figure 2.7 / Consider separation of religion and state to be an essential component of democracy (total sample, by vote in 2022 Knesset elections; %)



Only about one-half (49%) of respondents consider it vital in a democracy that there not be large income disparities between groups, with this variable considered the least essential of the six presented. In this regard, there was almost no difference between Jewish and Arab respondents (49% and 51%, respectively); nor were differences found between men and women, younger and older respondents, and voters for the various parties. The sole variable for which we found discrepancies between groups was in political orientation (in the Jewish sample): A majority on the Left (63%) and in the Center (54%) hold that avoiding large income gaps is crucial to a democratic regime, as compared with a minority on the Right (44%).

Absence of large income gaps between groups

Question 45

Appendix 1, p. 191

Necessity of the various components to a democratic regime: An overview


We formulated a new variable made up of the five elements considered essential for a democracy: free and fair elections by secret ballot; checks and balances; freedom of expression for all opinions; separation of religion and state; and equality before the law. Each of the respondents was assigned a score of 1 if they answered that a given characteristic was vital to democratic rule, and 0 if they answered that it was not vital.

Over 40% of the respondents indicated that all five of the elements are crucial to a democracy, while 6% said that none of them are. The mean of the responses (between 0 and 1) was relatively high (0.72), and the median, even higher (0.80), reflecting the great importance that the respondents attach to the various components.⁷

We divided the respondents into three categories: those who think that all the components are important; those who, on average, rate their importance as “quite a lot” or “very much”; and those who consider all of the components to be “not so much” or “not at all” essential. A breakdown by nationality shows that whereas 43% of Jewish respondents hold that all five of the elements cited are essential to a democracy, just 29.5% of Arabs concur. Almost 40% of Jews, as opposed to 23.5% of Arabs, think that the components presented are “quite essential” or “very essential.” The most frequent response among Arab interviewees (47%), and the least common among Jews (18%), was that the various components are “not so much” or “not at all” vital to a democratic regime.

⁷ The mean was calculated for the five values on a binary scale between 0 = not essential to democracy and 1 = essential to democracy, while the median is the value found at the midpoint of the distribution, in the 50th percentile.

Figure 2.8 / To what extent are the various components essential to a democracy? Average across the five components (total sample; Jewish and Arab samples; %)



Breaking down the Jewish sample by religiosity, it emerges that a majority of the secular respondents indicated that all five of the components are essential to a democracy, as compared with a minority in the other religious groups. An analysis by political orientation shows that three-quarters on the Left and over one-half in the Center think that all five of the elements are crucial, as opposed to less than one-third on the Right.


Table 2.4 / Consider all five of the components presented to be essential to democracy (total sample, by vote in 2022 Knesset elections; Jewish sample, by religiosity and political orientation; %)

Vote in 2022 Knesset elections	Coalition	27
	Opposition	57
Religiosity (Jewish sample)	Haredim	24
	National religious	16
	Traditional religious	30
	Traditional non-religious	43
	Secular	61
Political orientation (Jewish sample)	Left	74.5
	Center	55
	Right	31

Analyzing the results by vote in the 2022 Knesset elections reveals that whereas only about one-quarter (27%) of those who voted for parties that entered the Coalition indicated that all five of the elements presented are essential to a democracy, a majority (57%) of voters for parties that now form the Opposition selected all five as vital.

A breakdown of the average of the five components by vote in the 2022 elections shows that the party with the highest average (that is, the party with the greatest share who agree that all five elements are essential to a democracy) is Labor, followed by Yesh Atid and National Unity, whose voters also expressed strong support for each of the various hallmarks of democracy individually. Lower (though still relatively high) average scores were found among voters for parties on the Right (Likud, Religious Zionism, and Yisrael Beytenu), with intermediate-level averages among voters for the Haredi parties. The lowest level of agreement with the proposition that all five aspects are vital to a democracy was found among voters for the Arab parties, and in particular, voters for Hadash-Ta'al, who hold that most of these characteristics are not vital to a democratic regime.

Figure 2.9 / Level of importance of various components of a democracy (total sample, by vote in 2022 Knesset elections; average score, where 0 = no component is essential and 1 = all components are essential)




Continuing our examination of public perceptions regarding the above components of democratic rule, we asked to what extent each of them is actually upheld in Israel. In only one of the six cases—free and fair elections by secret ballot—did we find a majority who think that it is applied in practice in Israel. Nearly one-half of respondents said that there is freedom of expression for all opinions in Israel, while only a minority indicated that the remaining democratic principles are upheld.

To what extent are each of the above components upheld in Israel?

Questions 47–52

Appendix 1,
pp. 191-192

Figure 2.10 / To what extent are each of the following democratic principles upheld in Israel? (total sample; %)




Is the principle of free and fair elections by secret ballot upheld in Israel?

Question 47

Appendix 1, p. 191


As stated, a considerable majority of the total survey sample think that Israel holds free and fair elections by secret ballot, as prescribed by Israeli law; however, the difference between Jews and Arabs on this point is substantial: While the vast majority of Jewish respondents (81%) indicated that Israel holds elections as required by law, only a minority of Arabs responded similarly (42%).

Figure 2.11 / To what extent does Israel uphold free and fair elections by secret ballot? (Jewish and Arab samples; %)




Breaking down the responses of Jews and Arabs by level of education, we see that in the Jewish sample, the higher the level of education, the greater the percentage who think that the principle of elections by secret ballot is upheld; whereas in the Arab sample, this finding is inverted, such that the higher the level of education, the weaker the belief that this aspect of democracy is maintained.

Figure 2.12 / Think that Israel upholds free and fair elections by secret ballot (Jewish and Arab samples, by level of education; %)



A strong association was found between the opinion that free and fair elections by secret ballot are essential to a democracy and the belief that this principle is upheld in practice in Israel: A clear majority of those who think that such elections are vital to democracy also hold that this aspect of democracy is applied in Israel. By contrast, of those who do not consider this element to be crucial, a large majority hold that it is not maintained in Israel.

Figure 2.13 / Extent to which free and fair elections by secret ballot are seen as being upheld in Israel (total sample, by extent to which such elections are considered essential to democracy; %)



Is the principle of freedom of expression for all opinions upheld in Israel?


Question 49

Appendix 1, p. 192

Our respondents are divided over whether freedom of expression for all opinions is upheld in Israel today: Roughly one-half (49%) think that it is, while a similar share (47.5%) hold the opposite view. The gap between Jews and Arabs on this point is considerable: Among Jewish respondents, a small majority (52%) think that there is freedom of expression for all views in Israel, compared with just one-third of Arabs (33%). In the Jewish sample, Haredim are the group with the smallest share (35%) who hold that freedom of expression for all opinions is maintained in Israel, compared with a majority, though small, in all the other religious groups (national religious, 56%; traditional religious, 53%; traditional non-religious, 56%; secular, 54%).

Here too, we found a strong association between respondents' views on whether freedom of expression is vital to democracy and whether this principle is indeed upheld in Israel today: A majority of those who believe that freedom of expression is essential to democratic rule also think that Israel enables this freedom in practice. We found further that a very substantial majority of those who believe that freedom of expression is not crucial to democracy likewise indicated that it is not applied in Israel.

Figure 2.14 / Extent to which freedom of expression is seen as being upheld in Israel (total sample, by extent to which freedom of expression is considered essential to democracy; %)



Roughly one-half of the total survey sample (49%) hold that the principle of checks and balances between all three branches of government (legislative, executive, and judicial) is upheld “not so much” or “not at all,” compared with a sizeable minority (40%) who indicated that it is applied “quite a lot” or “very much.” Once again, the share of Arabs who think that checks and balances are maintained in Israel today is lower than that of Jews, though the results are quite close (Jews, 41%; Arabs, 37%).

We did not find differences between the three Jewish political camps on this question. It is safe to assume that this stems from the opposing perspectives: Apparently, a high share of left-wing and secular respondents believe that checks and balances between the three branches of government are not maintained due to the power held by the legislative and executive branches (the Knesset and the government), whereas on the Right, and in the Haredi and national religious populations, a high share of respondents think that this principle is not upheld because the judicial branch is too strong.

Just one-third of respondents—Jews and Arabs alike—believe that the principle of equality before the law is upheld in Israel today. A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals that only a minority in all three camps think so, although the share is slightly larger on the Right and in the Center than on the Left. Analyzing the results in the Jewish sample by religiosity, we see that Haredi, traditional non-religious, and secular respondents believe less strongly than the other groups that Israel maintains equality before the law. We found further that, among Jews, the share of men who think that there is equality before the law in Israel

Is the principle of checks and balances upheld in Israel?

Question 48

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Is the principle of equality before the law upheld in Israel?

Question 52

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
exceeds that of women, while among Arabs, the opposite is true, with the proportion of women who hold this view surpassing that of men.

Table 2.5 / Think that equality before the law is upheld in Israel, without regard to religion, race, ethnicity, or sex (total sample, by nationality; Jewish sample, by political orientation, religiosity, and sex; Arab sample, by sex; %)

Nationality	Jews	33
	Arabs	34
Political orientation (Jewish sample)	Left	24
	Center	34
	Right	36
Religiosity (Jewish sample)	Haredim	29
	National religious	38
	Traditional religious	42
	Traditional non-religious	32
	Secular	31
Sex(Jewish sample)	Men	39
	Women	28
Sex(Arab sample)	Men	26.5
	Women	41


We found the largest majority who think that equality before the law is not upheld in Israel among those respondents who hold that it is not vital to democratic rule; yet, even among those who say that this principle is essential to democracy, a majority (albeit smaller) believe that it is not maintained in Israel. Moreover, almost two-thirds of respondents who consider equality before the law to be “very essential” to democracy think that it is not upheld in Israel.

Figure 2.15 / Extent to which equality before the law is seen as being upheld in Israel (total sample, by extent to which equality before the law is considered essential to democracy; %)



The issue of separation of religion and state is one that greatly preoccupies Israeli society in general, and the political arena in particular. In the present survey, we found only a minority of both Jewish and Arab respondents who see this principle as being upheld in Israel today.

Figure 2.16 / To what extent does Israel uphold separation of religion and state? (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



Is the principle of separation of religion and state upheld in Israel?

Question 50

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
A majority of the Jewish public (65%) think that separation of religion and state is not maintained in Israel. As shown in the breakdown of responses by political orientation, the proportion on the Right who believe that such a separation exists is double or more that on the Left and in the Center, though this is a minority view in all three camps.

Table 2.6 / Think that separation of religion and state is upheld in Israel (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)

Left	13
Center	18.5
Right	36


An analysis of the Jewish sample based on religiosity reveals that less than one-fifth of secular respondents think that there is separation of religion and state in Israel today, as opposed to roughly 40% of those in the traditional religious, national religious, and Haredi groups.

Figure 2.17 / Think that separation of religion and state is upheld in Israel (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)



A breakdown of the perceived extent to which this principle is upheld in Israel today by the extent to which it is seen as essential to democracy shows that a majority of both groups—those respondents who consider separation of religion and state to be a vital aspect of democracy and those who take the opposite view—think that separation between religion and state is not maintained in Israel today.

Figure 2.18 / Extent to which separation of religion and state is seen as being upheld in Israel (total sample, by extent to which separation of religion and state is considered essential to democracy; %)



As stated, of the six components of democracy presented to interviewees, the sole one considered to be essential by only a minority of respondents is the absence of large income disparities between groups; similarly, only a minority believe that this principle is upheld in practice. For some reason, among Arab interviewees, whose economic status is lower than that of Jews, the proportion who hold that income disparities between groups in Israel are minimal is greater than that among Jewish respondents. We observed a similar phenomenon when analyzing the Jewish sample on the basis of religiosity: Haredim, who constitute the poorest group in Jewish society, are more inclined than other groups to state that income gaps in Israel are small.

Is the principle of small income disparities upheld in Israel?

Question 51

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
Table 2.7 / Think that there is an absence of large income disparities in Israel (total sample, by nationality; Jewish sample, by political orientation and religiosity; %)

Nationality	Jews	19
	Arabs	33
Political orientation (Jewish sample)	Left	11
	Center	17
	Right	23

Religiosity (Jewish sample)	Haredim	28
	National religious	26
	Traditional religious	21
	Traditional non-religious	18
	Secular	15

To summarize, for most of the principles studied, there is a substantial gap between the share of respondents who view it as essential to democracy and those who think it is upheld in practice in Israel today. The exception to the rule is free and fair elections by secret ballot, as prescribed by law.

Figure 2.19 / Consider these principles to be essential to democracy, and think that each is upheld in Israel today (total sample; %)




Application of democratic principles in Israel: An overview

We created a variable based on the five principles about which the respondents were asked whether they are upheld in Israel today.⁸ Here too, each respondent received a score for each of the five components: 1, if they indicated that it was upheld in Israel today “quite a lot” or “very much”; or 0, if they felt it was upheld “not so much” or “not at all.” Only 10% of respondents think that all of these principles are in fact upheld in Israel today (as contrasted with roughly 40% who consider all of them to be essential to a democracy). On the other hand, a similar share (13%) stated that they are not maintained at all, and a further 37% that they are maintained only partially. The mean for the five principles is 0.48, meaning that, on average, the respondents think that less than half of them are applied in practice in Israel today.

Breaking down responses by nationality reveals that among both Jews and Arabs, only a small minority think that all these components are very much upheld in Israel. However, while the Jewish sample is almost equally divided between those who think that these components are upheld to a fairly large or very large degree and those who think that they are upheld not at all or not so much, in the Arab sample, there is a solid majority who think that all these components are not upheld at all or are upheld only to a small extent.

Figure 2.20 / Extent to which the various components of democratic rule are upheld in Israel today—average across the five components (total sample; Jewish and Arab samples; %)



⁸ The principle of “absence of large income disparities between groups” was not included in this calculation, since it was not perceived by the majority of respondents as being essential to democracy.

Form of government most suitable for Israel

Question 34


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We presented four types of government, and asked the respondents which they considered the most suitable for Israel: direct democracy (citizens participate in important decisions between elections, for example, by referendum); representative democracy (elected representatives make decisions between elections); rule by experts (professional experts serve as ministers, e.g., an economist as finance minister, or a physician as health minister); and a strong leader (who makes all major decisions independently).

In the total sample, direct democracy and representative democracy were the most popular options, with a slight difference between them (31% and 29%, respectively). In third place was rule by experts (21%), with only a very slim minority (9%) indicating that a strong leader would be the form of government most suited to Israel.

Among Jewish respondents, representative democracy (32%) and direct democracy (31%) were ranked first and second, while among Arab respondents, direct democracy and a strong leader were at the top of the list, with 31.5% and 26%, respectively.

Figure 2.21 / What is the form of government most suitable to Israel under the present circumstances? (total sample; Jewish and Arab samples; %)



Breaking down the responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation, we found that the preferred form of government on both the Left and the Right is representative democracy, and in the Center, direct democracy. Analysis on the basis of religiosity shows that the Haredi, traditional non-religious, and secular groups are each split almost equally between direct democracy and representative democracy, while the national religious prefer representative democracy, and the traditional religious, direct democracy.

Table 2.8 / Which of the following forms of government is the most suitable for Israel under the present circumstances? (Jewish sample, by political orientation and religiosity; %)

		Direct democracy	Representative democracy	Rule by experts	Strong leader	Don't know	Total
Political orientation	Left	25	32.5	30	5	7.5	100
	Center	37	27	24	3	9	100
	Right	30.5	34	18	8	9.5	100
Religiosity	Haredim	32	33	8	10.5	16.5	100
	National religious	27	44	16	4	9	100
	Traditional religious	37	30.5	15.5	8.5	8.5	100
	Traditional non-religious	33	31	21	4	11	100
	Secular	30	28	27	6	9	100


We asked whether “decisions made by a government that has a majority in the Knesset are inherently democratic” or “decisions that are opposed to fundamental democratic values such as minority rights and freedom of expression are **not** democratic, even if they are passed by the government and a Knesset majority.” We found that the largest share of respondents (roughly one-half of the total sample) favor the second statement, which would seem to indicate a better understanding of the essence of democracy. Only one-third support the first assertion, namely, that any decision passed by a majority vote is democratic. Among Jewish respondents, the gap between those who support each of these positions is relatively small (11 percentage points). By contrast, in the Arab sample, the disparity is much larger (39 percentage points), with a clear preference for the argument that a majority decision can be undemocratic if it violates basic democratic principles.

Are majority decisions inherently democratic?

Question 33

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Figure 2.22 / Which of these positions do you agree with more? (total sample; %)


Breaking down the Jewish sample by religiosity reveals that a majority of religious respondents (Haredi, national religious, and traditional religious) think that any decision made by a majority of the Knesset is, by nature, democratic, while an even larger majority of the secular interviewees make the legitimacy of such a decision contingent on its alignment with democratic principles. The traditional non-religious group leans slightly toward the latter position. An analysis based on political orientation reveals a considerable majority from the Left and Center who favor the view that decisions by a Knesset majority are democratic only if they do not run counter to democratic principles. On the Right, there is a tendency to view any decision made by a government with a parliamentary majority as democratic.

Table 2.9 / Which of these positions do you agree with more? (Jewish sample, by religiosity and political orientation; %)

		Any decisions made by a Knesset majority are democratic	Decisions that are made by the majority but violate basic democratic principles are not democratic	Don't know	Total
Religiosity	Haredim	58	14	28	100
	National religious	52	27	21	100
	Traditional religious	58	27	15	100
	Traditional non-religious	39	45	16	100
	Secular	16.5	69	14.5	100
Political orientation	Left	8	84	8	100
	Center	21	64	15	100
	Right	50	32	18	100

Breaking down the responses to this question by the extent to which the five elements cited earlier are perceived as essential to a democracy, it emerges that, of those who believe that a decision is democratic only if it takes democratic principles into account, a slight majority (50.5%) think that all five components are crucial for democratic rule. By contrast, only 29% of those who believe that any decision made by a Knesset majority is democratic think that all five components are essential for democratic rule.

Figure 2.23 / Support/oppose the statement that decisions made by a government with a majority in the Knesset are inherently democratic, even if they violate democratic principles (total sample, by assessment of the extent to which the five elements cited earlier are perceived as essential to a democracy [average of the 5 scores]; %)



Rating Israeli democracy


Question 5

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
On several previous occasions, we have posed the question: “How would you rate Israeli democracy today on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 = poor and 5 = excellent?” The first time that we asked, in 2010, 42% of respondents assigned it a rating of good or excellent (4–5), but this share has been dropping since then, to this year’s low point of close to just one-quarter. Moreover, in 2023, for the first time, the share of respondents who think that Israeli democracy is in a bad way now exceeds the share who think it is in good shape. The Arab sample registered a particularly sharp rise of almost 30 percentage points between 2019 and 2023 in the share who give Israeli democracy a negative rating, compared with a more moderate increase of 10 percentage points in the Jewish sample.

Figure 2.24 / How would you rate Israeli democracy today? 2010–2023 (total sample; %)



A breakdown of voting patterns in the 2022 Knesset elections shows that the most common response among voters for Coalition parties is that the state of democracy in Israel is good (43%), with only a minority labeling it as bad (29%). By contrast, a majority of voters for Opposition parties indicated that Israeli democracy today is in a bad way (59%).

Figure 2.25 / How would you rate Israeli democracy today? (total sample, by vote in 2022 Knesset elections; %)




A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals a rise of over 10 percentage points in all three camps between 2019 and 2023 in the share who give Israeli democracy a low rating, with a considerable majority on the Left, more than one-half in the Center, and roughly one-third on the Right who take this view. Analyzing the Jewish sample by religiosity, we find an increase of over 15 percentage points in the proportion of secular respondents who rate Israeli democracy poorly, while among Haredim, this rating has dipped slightly (by 4 percentage points).

Table 2.10 / Assign a low rating to Israeli democracy, 2019 and 2023 (total sample, by nationality; Jewish sample, by political orientation and religiosity; %)

		2019	2023
Nationality (total sample)	Jews	34	44
	Arabs	38	67
Political orientation (Jewish sample)	Left	56	70
	Center	41	52.5
	Right	20	34
Religiosity (Jewish sample)	Haredim	39	35
	National religious	12	25
	Traditional religious	23	34
	Traditional non-religious	32	39
	Secular	41	56.5


We asked: “How worried are you that democratic rule in Israel is going to be harmed, and Israel will become a failed state?” In the total sample, we found a sizeable majority (64%) who are concerned, though the share of Arab respondents who expressed worry is larger than that of Jewish respondents.

Figure 2.26 / How worried are you that democratic rule in Israel is going to be harmed, and Israel will become a failed state? (Jewish and Arab samples; %)




We found a close association between religiosity (in the Jewish sample) and the extent of worry about the future of Israeli democracy. A substantial majority of secular respondents and a sizeable majority of the traditional non-religious are concerned that democratic rule in Israel will be harmed, as contrasted with a majority of Haredi and national religious respondents who do not share this fear. The traditional religious are split more or less evenly on this issue.

Figure 2.27 / Worried that democratic rule in Israel is going to be harmed and Israel will become a failed state (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)



We found marked differences between political camps, with a sweeping majority (93%) from the Left, and a substantial majority (81%) from the Center, who are concerned that democratic rule in Israel is at risk. On the other hand, only a minority—albeit a sizeable one—on the Right (46%) are concerned by such a prospect. A similar picture emerges when breaking down the findings by vote in the 2022 Knesset elections. A majority of voters for Opposition parties are worried, as opposed to a minority of Coalition party voters.

Figure 2.28 / Worried that democratic rule in Israel is going to be harmed, and Israel will become a failed state (total sample, by vote in 2022 Knesset elections; %)




Jewish and/or democratic?

In the discussion below, we will present several questions from the survey that address the relationship between the Jewish and democratic aspects of Israel's identity as a state.

In the surveys that we conducted between 2016 and 2021, the most common position among Jewish respondents was that the Jewish component in Israel was too dominant (roughly 40%), with about one-quarter who held that its democratic aspect was too strong, and a similar share who thought there was a good balance between the two. The results in 2022, however, showed a striking shift: A virtually identical proportion indicated that both the Jewish and the democratic elements of Israel's identity were too strong (29% and 30%, respectively). In this year's survey, once again, the largest share hold that the Jewish component is too dominant (40.5%), and a much smaller share feel this way about the democratic aspect (24%). This year also saw a return to the smaller proportion of respondents who think that the country has struck the right balance between the two. In other words, last year's survey results were apparently anomalous.

Figure 2.29 / Is there a good balance today between the Jewish and democratic components of Israel's identity? 2016–2023 (Jewish sample; %)



Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation, we found that the share who think the Jewish component is too strong increased in all three camps this year, with the steepest climb in the Center. Analysis of this sample by religiosity shows that, while the share who hold that the Jewish aspect of the state is too dominant rose this year in all five groups, the secular respondents are the only group in which a majority take this view.


Table 2.11 / Is there a good balance today between the Jewish and democratic components of Israel's identity? 2022 and 2023 (Jewish sample, by political orientation and religiosity; %)

			Jewish component is too strong	Democratic component is too strong	There is a good balance between the two components
Political orientation	Left	2022	71.5	5	14
		2023	81	1	10.5
	Center	2022	43	14	23
		2023	58.5	13	14
	Right	2022	16	41	20
		2023	25	34	26

			Jewish component is too strong	Democratic component is too strong	There is a good balance between the two components
Religiosity	Haredim	2022	6	69	8
		2023	13	55	17.5
	National religious	2022	6	47	20
		2023	12	50	20
	Traditional religious	2022	15	44	18.5
		2023	25	33	26
	Traditional non-religious	2022	25	25	25
		2023	36	16	29
	Secular	2022	48.5	12	20
		2023	64	7.5	16.5

A breakdown by vote in the 2022 Knesset elections shows that the most common response among those who voted for a Coalition party is that the democratic element is too strong. In second place among these voters is the view that there is a good balance between the Jewish and democratic components, and in third place, that the Jewish aspect is too strong. By contrast, among Opposition party voters, the picture is the reverse: A considerable majority hold that the Jewish component is too dominant, followed by the position that the two elements are balanced, and lastly, that the democratic aspect is too strong.

Figure 2.30 / Is there a good balance today between the Jewish and democratic components of Israel's identity? (total sample, by vote in 2022 Knesset elections; %)



We cross-tabulated this question with opinions on the extent to which separation of religion and state is upheld in Israel. In all three groups (those who feel that the Jewish aspect is too strong, that the democratic one is too strong, and that there is a good balance between the two), over one-half indicated that separation of religion and state is not maintained in Israel today, though with considerable differences between the groups: Over three-quarters of those who believe that the Jewish component is overly dominant think that separation of religion and state is inadequate, as compared with slightly over one-half in each of the other groups.

Table 2.12 / Is there a good balance today between the Jewish and democratic components of Israel's identity? (total sample, by extent to which separation of religion and state are seen as being upheld in Israel; %)

	Separation of religion and state is not upheld in Israel	Separation of religion and state is upheld in Israel	Don't know	Total
Jewish component is too strong	76.5	21.5	2	100
Democratic component is too strong	55	39	6	100
There is a good balance between the two	52	45	3	100

Should Jews have more rights than non-Jews?


Question 29

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Following record proportions of Jewish respondents in 2022 who agreed with the assertion that Jewish citizens of Israel should have more rights than non-Jewish citizens, there was a dip in this perception in the present survey, though a sizeable minority of Jews still hold this opinion.

Figure 2.31 / Agree that Jewish citizens of Israel should have more rights than non-Jewish citizens, 2009–2023 (Jewish sample; %)



The differences between subgroups on this question are substantial, with a breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation showing a majority on the Right who feel that Jews in Israel should have more rights than Arabs, compared with a small minority on the Left and in the Center. Analyzing the results by religiosity reveals that a majority of Haredi, national religious, and traditional religious respondents hold this view, with support dropping to just under half among the traditional non-religious, and only about one-quarter among secular respondents.


Table 2.13 / Agree that Jewish citizens of Israel should have more rights than non-Jewish citizens, 2022 and 2023 (Jewish sample, by political orientation and religiosity; %)

		2022	2023
Political orientation	Left	11	13
	Center	33.5	25
	Right	62	58

	2022	2023	
Religiosity	Haredim	69	69
	National religious	67	67
	Traditional religious	67	57
	Traditional non-religious	52	47
	Secular	29.5	23

Jewish respondents were asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the statement that “legislation and legal interpretation in Israel should be based primarily on Jewish religious law (*mishpat ivri*).” A minority agree with this assertion; however, the share who disagree has grown by 14 percentage points since 2013.

Figure 2.32 / Should legislation and legal interpretation in Israel be based primarily on Jewish religious law? 2013 and 2023 (Jewish sample; %)



As expected, a breakdown of the Jewish sample on the basis of religiosity reveals vast differences between groups, with a large majority of Haredi, national religious, and traditional religious respondents indicating that the basis for legislation and legal interpretation should be Jewish religious law, while just a tiny minority among the secular agree with this notion, along with a larger minority of the traditional non-religious.


Role of Jewish religious law in Israel's legal system

Question 32

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
Figure 2.33 / Agree that legislation and legal interpretation in Israel should be based primarily on Jewish religious law (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)



A similar portrait emerges from a breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation, in the form of widespread disagreement with the statement on the Left (91%) and in the Center (77%) contrasted with a slim majority who support it on the Right (55%).

A large majority of those respondents who agree that legislation in Israel should be based on Jewish religious law also favor greater rights for Jews than for non-Jewish citizens. Conversely, a sizeable majority of those who disagree with the first assertion oppose the notion that Jewish citizens should enjoy greater rights than non-Jewish ones.

Figure 2.34 / Agree or disagree that legislation and legal interpretation in Israel should be based primarily on Jewish religious law (Jewish sample, by agreement that Jews should have greater rights than non-Jews; %)



This year, as in 2021, slightly over half the respondents said that Israel's Supreme Court intervenes too much in government decisions. At the same time, there was a slight increase in the share who disagree with this position, at the expense of the "don't know" group.


Supreme Court intervention in government decisions

Question 38

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Figure 2.35 / Do you agree or disagree that the Supreme Court intervenes too much in government decisions? 2021 and 2023 (total sample; %)



A breakdown of the findings by vote in the 2022 Knesset elections shows broad-based agreement with the claim that the Supreme Court intervenes excessively in government decisions among voters for parties in the Coalition (74%), as opposed to considerable disagreement among Opposition party voters (68%). Further analysis on the basis of religiosity in the Jewish sample reveals similar differences: A sizeable majority of the more religious subgroups (Haredim, national religious, and traditional religious), along with a smaller majority of the traditional non-religious, hold that the Supreme Court intervenes too much in government decisions. By contrast, only a minority of secular respondents think that Israel's Supreme Court is overly interventionist.

Analysis of secular respondents by political orientation shows that, while only a very small minority of secular Jews from the Left and Center (6% and 18%, respectively) support the assertion of excessive interventionism, over one-half of secular respondents who identify with the Right hold that the Supreme Court intervenes too much in government decisions (53%).

Table 2.14 / Agree that the Supreme Court intervenes too much in government decisions, 2021 and 2023 (total sample, by vote in 2022 Knesset elections; Jewish sample, by political orientation and religiosity; %)

		2021	2023
Vote in 2022 Knesset elections	Coalition	–	74
	Opposition	–	25

		2021	2023
Political orientation (Jewish sample)	Left	13	11
	Center	35	29
	Right	69	68
Religiosity (Jewish sample)	Haredim	82	68
	National religious	82	77
	Traditional religious	66	67
	Traditional non-religious	54	59
	Secular	31	27

Opinions on whether the Supreme Court intervenes excessively in government decisions were found to be connected with both the degree of trust in the Supreme Court (as presented in chapter 3, pp. 95) and the extent of support for the claim that legislation and legal interpretation should be based primarily on Jewish religious law. Thus, while a substantial majority of those who agree with the latter assertion think that the Supreme Court intervenes too much in government decisions, only a minority of those who strongly disagree with basing Israel's legal system on Jewish religious law hold that the Supreme Court oversteps its bounds.

Table 2.15 / Agree that the Supreme Court intervenes too much in government decisions (Jewish sample, by extent of agreement that legislation and legal interpretation in Israel should be based primarily on Jewish religious law; %)

	Agree that the Supreme Court intervenes too much in government decisions	
Legislation and legal interpretation in Israel should be based primarily on Jewish religious law	Strongly agree	76
	Somewhat agree	71
	Somewhat disagree	50
	Strongly disagree	22

We asked if the courts extend equal treatment to defendants from different backgrounds and sectors. As early as 2019, roughly one-half of respondents answered that the courts do not treat all defendants equally; in the present survey, this share now stands at almost two-thirds (!).


Equal treatment in court for defendants from all sectors?

Question 40

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Figure 2.36 / Do the courts in Israel accord equal treatment to defendants from all backgrounds and sectors? 2019 and 2023 (total sample; %)



A comparison of this year's findings with the 2019 survey results shows further that the steep drop in the share of respondents who think that Israeli courts treat all defendants in the same way is noticeable in both the Jewish and Arab samples. A decrease in the proportion who hold this opinion was also recorded in all three political camps in the Jewish sample, with the sharpest decline among respondents from the Center. Moreover, four years ago, the Right was the sole group in which only a minority felt the courts treated all defendants equally, while today, this is the prevailing view in all three camps.

Table 2.16 / Think/certain that the courts in Israel accord equal treatment to defendants from all backgrounds and sectors, 2019 and 2023 (total sample, by nationality; Jewish sample, by religiosity and political orientation; %)

		2019	2023
Nationality	Jews	44	28.5
	Arabs	45	28
Religiosity (Jewish sample)	Haredim	9	13
	National religious	30	22
	Traditional religious	37	27
	Traditional non-religious	52	27
	Secular	55	36
Political orientation (Jewish sample)	Left	60	46
	Center	54	37
	Right	31	22


Upholding of human and civil rights

Question 37

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
Human and civil rights are the cornerstones of a democracy. While a majority of respondents feel that the State of Israel upholds their rights, a sizeable minority take the opposite view. We found only a small difference between the share of Jews and of Arabs who believe that the state respects their human and civil rights (Jews, 59%; Arabs, 55%), but in both cases these are small majorities.

Figure 2.37 / To what extent do you feel that Israel upholds your human and civil rights? (total sample; %)



A breakdown of the Jewish sample by religiosity shows that one-half or more in all the groups think that the state upholds their rights, with the national religious feeling this way to the greatest extent, and the groups at either end of the spectrum (Haredi and secular), the least.

Figure 2.38 / Feel that Israel upholds their human and civil rights (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)



A breakdown of the secular respondents by political orientation indicates that a majority of those on the Right (62%) are of the opinion that Israel upholds their human and civil rights, compared with a minority of their counterparts on the Left (39%). The secular interviewees who identify with the Center are split on this issue, with 48% feeling that Israel does respect their rights.

Do human rights organizations cause damage to the state?


Question 30

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In this year's survey, we examined once again whether human rights organizations such as B'Tselem and the Association for Civil Rights in Israel are seen by our respondents as causing damage to the state. As in all our surveys since 2010, a majority of Jewish interviewees hold that these organizations do in fact cause harm to the state; however, the share who take this view is slightly lower this year (at 60%) than last year (66%). A majority of Arabs (61%) do not agree with the assertion that human and civil rights organizations are damaging to the state.

Figure 2.39 / Agree that human and civil rights organizations cause damage to the state, 2010–2023 (Jewish sample; %)



A breakdown of the Jewish sample by religiosity demonstrates that a majority in all of the groups agree with the claim that Israel's human rights organizations are harming the state, with the exception of the secular, where a (sizeable) minority feel this way. Relative to last year's survey, there has been a decline in the share of respondents who agree with this assertion in all of the groups apart from the national religious.


Table 2.17 / Agree that human and civil rights organizations cause damage to the state, 2022 and 2023 (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)

	2022	2023
Haredim	73	64
National religious	82	83
Traditional religious	75	67
Traditional non-religious	77	73
Secular	51	44

In the Jewish sample, we found considerable differences between political camps on this issue, with a substantial majority on the Right (75%) who agree that such organizations cause harm to the state, as opposed to just one-half in the Center (50.5%) and a very small minority (15%) on the Left. A breakdown of the secular respondents by political camp yielded similar results: 72.5% of those who align themselves with the Right hold that Israel's human and civil rights organizations are damaging to the state, as opposed to 43% from the Center and 11% from the Left.

The level of political involvement among Israel's younger generation is a subject of great interest in Israeli society. The debate surrounding this issue intensified over the last year in light of the protests against the government's actions, which were initially led largely by older adults but later saw a dramatically increased presence of young people. In response to the question in this year's survey on whether older or younger Israelis are more interested in politics, the two most common perceptions were that older people are more interested (37%) and that young and old are equally interested (36.5%). Only a small proportion indicated that young people show greater interest in politics than their elders.

Figure 2.40 / Is there a difference today between younger and older Israelis in their level of interest in politics? (total sample; %)




Interest in politics among younger versus older Israelis

Question 19

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A breakdown of the responses by age showed virtually no differences between age groups in the Jewish sample; among Arab interviewees, however, the oldest cohort was more likely than the younger ones to say that older adults are more interested in politics.

Figure 2.41 / Is there a difference today between younger and older Israelis in their level of interest in politics? (Jewish and Arab samples, by age; %)



Is the Opposition doing its job?


Question 21

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Appendix 2, p. 210

We examined the public's perception of how well the current parliamentary Opposition is fulfilling its role. The total sample is split on this question, with the greater proportion (48.5%) agreeing with the statement that "the Opposition in Israel is weak, and is not doing its job," compared with a slightly lower share (43%) who disagree. Whereas in the 2017 survey, a majority of two-thirds of Jewish respondents agreed with this assertion, today the share who disagree slightly outstrips those who agree. By contrast, among the Arabs surveyed, a substantial majority still hold the statement to be true.

Figure 2.42 / Is the Opposition in Israel weak, and not doing its job? 2017 and 2023 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



One of the few areas in this survey where voters for the Coalition and Opposition parties are closely aligned is in the share who feel that the Opposition is weak and doing a poor job (48% and 44%, respectively). A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation shows further that a similar proportion in each of the camps view the Opposition as weak and under-performing.

Table 2.18 / Agree that the Opposition in Israel is weak, and is not doing its job, 2017 and 2023 (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)

	2017	2023
Left	87	48
Center	68	40
Right	57.5	44

We decided to revisit a question posed in last year's survey: To what extent do respondents agree or disagree with the statement that "it would be best to dismantle all the country's political institutions and start over from scratch"? As in 2022, a minority of the total sample agreed with this proposition. Among Jewish respondents, only about one-third expressed the opinion that all the country's political institutions should be dismantled and rebuilt; among Arabs, meanwhile, not only did we find a majority who agree with this statement, but the size of this majority has grown slightly since last year.


Dismantle everything and start over?

Question 31

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Figure 2.43 / Agree that it would be best to dismantle all the country's political institutions and start over, 2022 and 2023 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals that there has been a rise on the Left since last year in the proportion who favor a full “restart”; on the Right, which showed the greatest support for such a move last year, there has been a decline; and in the Center, which expresses the strongest agreement with this notion, there has not been a significant change compared with 2022.

An analysis of the Jewish sample by religiosity shows that among Haredi, national religious, and traditional respondents, there has been a noticeable decline since last year in the share who hold that all political institutions should be discarded, whereas among the secular, there has been an increase in the share who support such a move. Moreover, while secular support for the notion of starting over from scratch was the lowest last year, today it is the highest. It would seem that these shifts stem from the changes in the political constellation (from the Bennett-Lapid government to the Netanyahu government).

Table 2.19 / Agree that it would be best to dismantle all political institutions and start over from scratch, 2022 and 2023 (Jewish sample, by political orientation and religiosity; %)

		2022	2023
Political orientation	Left	21.5	30
	Center	37	39
	Right	46	33

	2022	2023	
Religiosity	Haredim	41	27
	National religious	41	23.5
	Traditional religious	43	34
	Traditional non-religious	50	33
	Secular	35.5	40

In the total sample, a breakdown of opinions on this issue by the rating of Israeli democracy shows that a majority—albeit not a large one—of those who gave Israeli democracy a low grade agree that all the country's political institutions should be demolished and reconstructed (54.5%), as opposed to less than one-quarter of those respondents who graded Israeli democracy as so-so or good (24% and 21%, respectively).

We found further that, of those who agree that it would be best to do away with all of the political institutions and start fresh, about one-third (32%) indicated that, given the opportunity to receive American citizenship or that of another Western country, they would opt to move there, as compared with 15% who would prefer to emigrate, of those who do not agree that Israel's political system should be abolished.

Chapter 3 / Trust in State Institutions

In this chapter, we discuss the following topics:


- Public trust in state institutions: An overview
- Trust in the IDF
- Trust in the President of Israel
- Trust in the Supreme Court
- Trust in the police
- Trust in the government
- Trust in the media
- Trust in the Knesset
- Trust in Israel's political parties
- Trust in municipalities/local authorities
- Trust in the Attorney General
- Is trust in state institutions on the decline?
- Factor analysis of trust ratings

Based on the premise that citizens' trust in the state and its institutions is one of the cornerstones of a democratic regime, and given the unprecedented internal crisis presently affecting Israel and the schism between opponents and supporters of the proposed judicial reforms, we revisited (as is our annual practice) the levels of public trust in eight key institutions: the IDF, the President of Israel, the Supreme Court, the police, the government, the Knesset, the political parties, and the media. In addition, this year we examined the degree of trust in two institutions that we study less frequently: the municipality/local authority where the respondent resides, and the Attorney General.

In this chapter, we will review the levels of trust in all of these institutions in 2023, and the changes in trust in each of them separately, mainly relative to the 2022 survey.

Public trust in state institutions: An overview

As shown in the figure below, the share of Jewish respondents who express trust in each of the state institutions studied is significantly higher than that of Arab respondents, with the exception of the political parties, which earned similar levels of trust in both samples.

Figure 3.1 / Express trust in each of the state institutions (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

Note: The darker-colored bars indicate the eight institutions examined on a regular basis, and the lighter ones, the institutions that we do not study every year.

Among Jewish respondents, the IDF is at the top of the trust rankings, while among Arabs, the Supreme Court is in the corresponding slot (though only about one-quarter of Arab respondents expressed trust in it). As in previous years, the political parties are at the bottom of the list in both samples.

A comparison with last year's survey shows that, despite the country's internal crisis surrounding the proposed judicial reforms, the trust ratings in the Jewish sample for four institutions (the IDF, Supreme Court, police, and the media) have remained relatively stable. By contrast, there was a modest rise in confidence in the major

political bodies, namely, the government, Knesset, and political parties, and a drop in trust in the President of Israel.

Among Arab interviewees, none of the institutions studied on a recurring basis exceeded a trust rating of 30%. As with the Jewish respondents, here too, we see an increase this year in trust in political bodies, and a more moderate rise in trust in the IDF, as contrasted with a substantial decline in Arab interviewees' faith in the Supreme Court (by 14 percentage points since last year, and by 34 percentage points over the last three years). The degree of trust in the other institutions among Arab respondents has held relatively steady. We found further that nearly half (45%) of Arab interviewees do not trust any of the eight institutions studied regularly, as opposed to just 6% of the Jewish respondents.⁹

In the Jewish sample, the trust ratings for these institutions span a very wide range, from 85.5% to 13%, while among Arab respondents, the spread is narrower, ranging from 26% to 15%.

Table 3.1 / Public trust in state institutions, 2022 and 2023 (total sample; Jewish and Arab samples; %)

Institution	Total sample				Jews				Arabs			
	Ranking	2022	2023	Change	Ranking	2022	2023	Change	Ranking	2022	2023	Change
IDF	1	73	75	=	1	85	85.5	=	2	15	21	+
President of Israel	2	51	48	=	2	58	54	-	3-5	17	18	=
Supreme Court	3	41	39	=	3	41	42	=	1	40	26	-
Police	4	32	32	=	4	36	35	=	7	13	17	=
Government	5	21	27	+	5	23	28	+	3-5	10	18	+
Media	6	22	24	=	6	23.5	25	=	6	14	17.5	=
Knesset	7	14	23	+	7	15	24	+	3-5	10.5	18	+
Political parties	8	9	13	+	8	9	13	+	8	8	15	+

Note: Changes in levels of trust (signified by + or -) are presented only where sizeable and/or statistically significant differences were found.

⁹ This refers to respondents who rated their level of trust in each of the eight institutions studied regularly as 1 = not at all or 2 = not so much.

Figure 3.2 / Trust each of the state institutions studied, 2003–2023 (Jewish sample; %)





Figure 3.3 / Trust each of the state institutions studied, 2003–2023 (Arab sample; %)



Trust in the IDF


Question 12

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Among Jewish respondents, despite the judicial reform crisis, and some spillover effect from the ensuing protests into the ranks of the armed forces, the share who place their trust in the IDF this year is the same as in last year's survey. A very large majority expressed confidence in the military, earning it first place in the ranking of trusted institutions. The IDF's trust rating among Arab respondents is much lower this year than among Jews, though it rose notably by 6 percentage points compared with last year's survey, returning to its 2021 level, for reasons that are presently unclear to us.

Figure 3.4 / Trust the IDF, 2003–2023 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation, we found a substantial majority in all three camps who trust the IDF; however, the majority is smaller among those who identify with the Left, where the level of trust has declined since last year. On the Right and in the Center, the levels have remained relatively unchanged.


Similarly, a breakdown of the Jewish sample by religiosity shows a sizeable majority in all the groups who express confidence in the IDF; but, like last year, this majority is smallest among the Haredim. The findings in all the groups are relatively stable compared with last year, with the exception of the traditional religious, where we encountered an unexplained decline.

Table 3.2 / Trust the IDF (Jewish sample, by political orientation and religiosity; %)

		2022	2023
Political orientation	Left	87	79
	Center	89	88.5
	Right	84	87
Religiosity	Haredim	64	67
	National religious	86	87
	Traditional religious	88.5	82
	Traditional non-religious	86.5	91
	Secular	88	88


An analysis of the Arab sample by religion reveals that, in all three groups, only a small minority trust the IDF at this time. The decline in trust in the army is especially dramatic among Druze respondents, which is not surprising given the worsening relations between the Druze community and the state in recent years, following the passage of the Nation-State Law in 2018.

Figure 3.5 / Trust the IDF, 2003–2023 (Arab sample, by religion; %)



To conclude, we broke down the level of trust among respondents in the total sample by vote in the 2022 Knesset elections. Among voters for the Zionist parties, trust in the IDF is high, in particular those who voted for the National Unity Party, the Religious Zionist Party, and Yesh Atid. By contrast, just slightly over half of voters for United Torah Judaism express trust in the IDF, and very low levels of trust were recorded among voters for Hadash-Ta'al and Ra'am.

Figure 3.6 / Trust the IDF (total sample, by vote in 2022 Knesset elections; %)



Trust in the President of Israel

Question 10

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In the Jewish sample this year, we found a decline in trust in the President of Israel (from 58% last year to 54% currently), continuing a trend that started in 2019. The drop this year may be the result of the President's involvement in efforts to resolve the judicial reform crisis.

The share of Arab respondents who express trust in the President of Israel is similar to that in 2022, and much lower than that among Jews.

Figure 3.7 / Trust the President of Israel, 2003–2023 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

Breaking down the trust ratings for the President of Israel in the Jewish sample by political orientation, we found them to be lower on the Right than in the Left or Center, where the ratings are identical. Relative to last year, we saw a drop of 15 percentage points on the Left (from 83% last year to 68% this year), with levels among respondents from the Right and Center holding relatively steady.


A breakdown of the Jewish sample by religiosity indicates a drop in trust among Haredim from 33.5% last year to 26% this year—a lower level than in the other religious groups. Among both national religious and traditional religious respondents, trust in the President dropped by 9 percentage points from last year, with the other groups relatively unchanged.

Table 3.3 / Trust the President of Israel, 2022 and 2023 (Jewish sample, by political orientation and religiosity; %)

		2022	2023
Political orientation	Left	83	68
	Center	72	68
	Right	49	46
Religiosity	Haredim	33.5	26
	National religious	56	47
	Traditional religious	51	42
	Traditional non-religious	50	54
	Secular	71	67


A breakdown of the Arab sample by religion reveals a very small minority in all three groups who have confidence in the President, with Muslims expressing a slightly higher level of trust. Since 2020, we have seen an extended decline in trust among Christians, and an even sharper plunge among Druze (from 66.5% in 2020 to 10% in 2023).

Figure 3.8 / Trust the President of Israel, 2003–2023 (Arab sample, by religion; %)



And finally, we broke down the level of trust in the President of Israel in the total sample by vote in the 2022 Knesset elections. Trust ratings are highest among voters for Center-Left parties, and lowest among voters for Arab and Haredi parties.

Figure 3.9 / Trust the President of Israel (total sample, by vote in 2022 Knesset elections; %)



Among Jewish respondents, levels of trust in the Supreme Court have remained virtually the same as last year. This finding is noteworthy in light of the fact that this institution has been at the heart of the political controversy that gave rise to the protests against the judicial reforms.

By contrast, among Arab interviewees, there has been a striking decline in trust in the Supreme Court, from 40% last year to roughly one-quarter this year, continuing a steep drop that began in 2020. This is also the lowest level of trust in this institution recorded in over ten years (identical to that in 2010). It should be noted, however, that, in spite of the above, the Supreme Court retains its first-place ranking among Arab respondents in terms of trust.


Trust in the Supreme Court

Question 8

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Appendix 2, p. 201

Figure 3.10 / Trust the Supreme Court, 2003–2023 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation and religiosity reveals substantial differences between the groups. In all three political camps, levels of trust have remained largely unchanged since last year: A large majority on the Left have faith in the Supreme Court, compared with a small minority on the Right. Meanwhile, a majority of secular respondents express confidence in the institution as opposed to a minority in the other religious groups, particularly the Haredim and national religious. This year, we also witnessed a decline in the share of traditional religious respondents who trust the Supreme Court.

Breaking down the secular respondents by political orientation, we found a large majority who have confidence in the Supreme Court among those who align themselves with the Left or Center; however, of those who identify with the Right, only about one-half trust this institution (Left, 83.5%; Center, 77%; Right, 48%).

Table 3.4 / Trust the Supreme Court, 2022 and 2023 (Jewish sample, by political orientation and religiosity; %)


		2022	2023
Political orientation	Left	84	80
	Center	61	63
	Right	26	26

		2022	2023
Religiosity	Haredim	6	11
	National religious	18	16
	Traditional religious	32.5	24
	Traditional non-religious	34	36
	Secular	63	66.5

We found differences among Jewish respondents based on education, such that the higher the level of education, the greater the trust in the Supreme Court, broken down as follows: full high school or less, 33%; post-secondary/partial academic, 43%; bachelor’s degree or higher, 50.5%. The exception to this pattern are respondents whose highest level of education was in post-secondary yeshivot (largely Haredim, with corresponding opinions), of whom only 19% express trust in the Supreme Court.


A breakdown of the Arab sample by religion reveals that roughly one-quarter of Muslims and Christians trust the Supreme Court, compared with an even smaller minority of Druze. In all three groups, there has been a continuous decline in trust since 2020, but the drop has been most pronounced among the Druze, perhaps because their petitions against the Nation-State Law have been rejected by the Supreme Court.

Figure 3.11 / Trust the Supreme Court, 2003–2023 (Arab sample, by religion; %)



We broke down the levels of trust in the Supreme Court in the total sample by vote in the 2022 Knesset elections. Whereas voters for the Opposition parties strongly trust the Supreme Court, only a small minority of voters for the Coalition parties—most notably, the Haredi parties and the Religious Zionist Party—share this view.

Figure 3.12 / Trust the Supreme Court (total sample, by vote in 2022 Knesset elections; %)



We cross-tabulated the question on trust in the Supreme Court with other queries relating to the judicial sphere, as discussed in chapter 2, “Democracy, Government, Citizens” (agreement/disagreement with the notion that the Supreme Court intervenes too much in decisions made by the government, and equal treatment by the courts of defendants from all backgrounds and sectors). It emerges that a majority of those who disagree with the claim of over-interventionism in government’s decisions by the Supreme Court express trust in that institution, while by contrast, only about one-fifth of those who hold that the Supreme Court is too activist say they trust the Court. Similarly, a majority of those who think that the courts treat all defendants equally have faith in the Supreme Court, compared with only about one-third among those who think that the courts do not offer equal treatment to all.

In addition, we cross-tabulated the responses in the Jewish sample to the question of trust in the Supreme Court with positions on the statement that legislation and legal interpretation in Israel should be based primarily on Jewish religious law. We found that a majority of those who disagree with this assertion express trust in the Supreme Court, as contrasted with a small minority of those who think that Israeli law should largely be based on Jewish religious law.

And finally, since the Supreme Court is one of the mainstays of a democracy, we cross-tabulated the level of trust in that institution with the extent of agreement with the statement that democratic rule in Israel is in grave danger. We found that those who perceive Israeli democracy to be at risk have greater faith in the Supreme Court than those who do not share this view.

Table 3.5 / Trust the Supreme Court (total sample, by selected questions; %)

		Trust in Supreme Court			
		Trust	Don't trust	Don't know	Total
Supreme Court intervenes too much in government decisions	Agree	20	76	4	100
	Disagree	64	34	2	100
The courts afford equal treatment to defendants from all backgrounds and sectors	Think/certain they do	60	37	3	100
	Think/certain they do not	29	68	3	100
Democratic rule in Israel is in grave danger	Agree	52	46	2	100
	Disagree	21.5	74	4.5	100
Legislation and legal interpretation in Israel should be based primarily on Jewish religious law*	Agree	16	81	3	100
	Disagree	62	35	3	100

* This question was posed to Jewish respondents only.

Since the start of the civil protests, and the demonstrations for and against the proposed judicial reforms, the Israel Police has been called upon to maintain public order and employ harsh enforcement measures, often drawing criticism about its conduct and its treatment of the protestors. Despite this, the share of respondents in the Jewish sample who express trust in the police has remained nearly the same as last year, though it is relatively low, at only slightly over one-third. Among Arab interviewees, the proportion who trust the police is much lower than that among Jews, though here too, the level has remained steady.

Trust in the police

Question 9

Appendix 1, p. 181

Appendix 2, p. 202

Figure 3.13 / Trust the police, 2003–2023 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation, we did not find major differences between the three camps this year; however, compared with last year, trust in the police declined by 12 percentage points on the Left, while there was virtually no change in the other two camps.

A further breakdown of the Jewish sample by religiosity shows that only a minority in all the groups have faith in the police, with the Haredim least of all (though their level of trust actually rose by ten percentage points from that of last year).


Table 3.6 / Trust the police, 2022 and 2023 (Jewish sample, by political orientation and religiosity; %)

		2022	2023
Political orientation	Left	48	36
	Center	40	38
	Right	32	33
Religiosity	Haredim	11	21
	National religious	31.5	35
	Traditional religious	38	29
	Traditional non-religious	39	37
	Secular	41	39

An analysis of the Arab sample by religion indicates that a very small minority in all three groups express trust in the police (Muslims, 19%; Druze, 10%; Christians, 8%).

And finally, we broke down the levels of trust in police in the total sample by vote in the 2022 Knesset elections. The results show that only a minority of voters for all the political parties have confidence in this institution. Noteworthy in this context is the very low level of trust among voters for United Torah Judaism and Ra'am.

Figure 3.14 / Trust the police (total sample, by vote in 2022 Knesset elections; %)




The present survey was conducted roughly six months into the term of the right-wing government led by Binyamin Netanyahu. At this time, the level of trust in the government among both Jews and Arabs was low, though it was higher among Jewish respondents. Nonetheless, in both samples, there was a rise in trust in the government compared with 2022, when the Bennett-Lapid government was in power. We do not have a satisfactory explanation at this point for the increased trust in the government among Arab interviewees.

Trust in the government

Question 13

Appendix 1, p. 182

Appendix 2, p. 206

Figure 3.15 / Trust the government, 2003–2023 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

The very sizeable gaps between political camps in the Jewish sample in terms of trust in the government stem largely from the composition of the government at the time of our survey. While in the 2022 survey, under the Bennett-Lapid government, the level of trust in the government was high on the Left and very low on the Right, those results were reversed in the present poll. On the Right, faith in the government has greatly increased, while on the Left it has plunged to a very small minority. The Center has also experienced a substantial decline in trust in the government in comparison with last year's survey.

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by religiosity points to higher levels of trust in the government among Haredi, national religious, and traditional religious respondents (and a very noticeable rise in trust among these three groups compared with last year), and to lower levels among the traditional non-religious, and especially the secular interviewees, whose faith in the government has dropped significantly since last year.

Table 3.7 / Trust the government, 2022 and 2023 (Jewish sample, by political orientation and religiosity; %)


		2022	2023
Political orientation	Left	60	4
	Center	38	10
	Right	12	43
Religiosity	Haredim	2.5	49
	National religious	12.5	49
	Traditional religious	11	41
	Traditional non-religious	18	28
	Secular	39	13

Examining the level of trust in the government among secular respondents based on their political affiliation, we found that, of those who identify with the Left and Center, only a negligible minority have faith in the present government (1% and 5%, respectively), as contrasted with one-third of those who align themselves with the Right.

A breakdown of the Arab sample by religion reveals similarly low levels of trust in the government in all three groups (Muslims, 18%; Druze, 15%; Christians, 12%).

We also analyzed the levels of trust in the government in the total sample by vote in the 2022 Knesset elections. For all parties that make up the Coalition, the level of trust expressed by voters does not reach the 50% mark, with the exception of Likud voters, who barely crossed this threshold (with 53%). At the same time, trust ratings for the government are very low among voters for the Opposition parties, in particular Yesh Atid and Labor.

Figure 3.16 / Trust in the government (total sample, by vote in 2022 Knesset elections; %)



We cross-tabulated between levels of trust in the government and extent of agreement with the statement that democratic rule in Israel is in grave danger. Our findings show that those who hold that Israeli democracy is not at risk have greater faith in the government than do those who believe that democracy in Israel is under threat.

In addition, we examined levels of trust in the government by extent of agreement with the proposition that it would be best to dismantle all the country's political institutions and start over from scratch. We found that a higher share of those who disagree with this assertion express trust in the government than do those who agree with the idea of tearing everything down. We saw further that, of those who agree that decisions made by a government that has a majority in the Knesset are inherently democratic, just under one-half have confidence in the government, as opposed to a very small minority who trust the government among those who hold that decisions that run counter to basic democratic values are not democratic, even if they are passed by the government and a Knesset majority.

Table 3.8 / Trust the government (total sample, by selected questions; %)

		Trust in government			
		Trust	Don't trust	Don't know	Total
Democratic rule in Israel is in grave danger	Agree	11	87.5	1.5	100
	Disagree	51	46	3	100
It would be best to dismantle all the country's political institutions and start over from scratch	Agree	20	79	1	100
	Disagree	33	66	1	100
Agree that:	Decisions made by a government that has a majority in the Knesset are inherently democratic	47	50	3	100
	Decisions that run counter to basic democratic values are not democratic, even if they are passed by the government or a Knesset majority	12	87	1	100

In both the Jewish and Arab samples, trust in the media has remained relatively stable since last year; however, it should be noted that, due to language differences, Jews and Arabs do not consume the same media, meaning that the two groups are likely referring to different media sources.

Trust in the media

Question 7

Appendix 1, p. 180

Appendix 2, p. 200

Figure 3.17 / Trust the media, 2003–2023 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

Breaking down the findings in the Jewish sample by political orientation, we find very low levels of trust in the media on the Right, as contrasted with greater trust on the Left and in the Center. Compared with last year, the Right and Center have remained relatively stable in this respect, while the level of trust in the media on the Left has declined, perhaps due to the greater representation of right-wing views in the media in recent months.

National religious, Haredi, and traditional religious respondents have less faith in the media than do traditional non-religious, and especially secular, interviewees.

Here too, we broke down the secular respondents by political affiliation, and found that only about one-quarter of those who align themselves with the Right express confidence in the media, compared with much higher shares among those who identify with the Center or Left (44% and 49%, respectively).

Table 3.9 / Trust the media, 2022 and 2023 (Jewish sample, by political orientation and religiosity; %)


		2022	2023
Political orientation	Left	54.5	48
	Center	35	39
	Right	14	15

		2022	2023
Religiosity	Haredim	4	10
	National religious	12	6
	Traditional religious	14	14.5
	Traditional non-religious	19.5	27
	Secular	37	38

Analyzing the Arab sample by religion, we learned that trust in the media is very low in all three groups, with only minor differences between them: Muslims, 19%; Druze, 15%; Christians, 10%.


In the total sample, breaking down the level of trust in the media by vote in the 2022 Knesset elections reveals that the trust ratings among voters for the Zionist parties in the Opposition, in particular Yesh Atid and Labor, are higher than those among voters for the Arab parties and for the parties that make up the Coalition.

Figure 3.18 / Trust the media (total sample, by vote in 2022 Knesset elections; %)



The Knesset, Israel's legislature, does not garner a high degree of public trust. The gap between Jews and Arabs in this regard is small, and, as was the case regarding trust in the government, both samples have registered an increase since the 2022 survey—a finding for which we have no explanation at present.

Figure 3.19 / Trust in the Knesset, 2003–2023 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



As in the findings on trust in the government, a breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation shows greater trust in the Knesset on the Right than in the Center or in the Left. Moreover, in comparison with last year's survey, trust in the Knesset has increased on the Right, while dropping sharply on the Left.

Analyzing the Jewish sample by religiosity, we find that the Haredi, national religious, and traditional religious respondents place greater faith in the Knesset than do the traditional non-religious, and especially the secular. Likewise, trust in the Knesset has grown since last year in most of the religious groups, with the exception of the secular.

Breaking down the secular respondents by political orientation reveals that one-quarter of those who identify with the Right express trust in the Knesset, while only a very small minority from the Center and the Left do likewise (11% and 6%, respectively).

Trust in the Knesset

Question 11

Appendix 1, p. 181


Appendix 2, p. 204

Table 3.10 / Trust the Knesset, 2022 and 2023 (Jewish sample, by political orientation and religiosity; %)

		2022	2023
Political orientation	Left	20.5	7
	Center	19	16
	Right	13	32
Religiosity	Haredim	10	37.5
	National religious	16.5	35
	Traditional religious	15.5	35
	Traditional non-religious	12.5	24
	Secular	17	14

Breaking down the Arab sample by religion, we again found a low degree of trust in the Knesset in all three groups, though the level was higher among Muslim respondents (Muslims, 21%; Druze, 10%; Christians, 0%). There has been an ongoing decline in trust in the Knesset among Druze respondents since 2020 (from 28% that year to 22% in 2021, 20% in 2022, and just 10% in 2023).

A breakdown of the total sample by vote in the 2022 elections shows that the share of respondents who express trust in the Knesset, among voters for all the parties, does not exceed 40%, meaning that the level of trust is low across the board. It should be noted that there is greater faith in the Knesset among voters for the Coalition parties, in particular the Likud, and lower among voters for the Opposition parties.

Figure 3.20 / Trust the Knesset (total sample, by vote in 2022 Knesset elections; %)

As with trust in the government, we cross-tabulated the level of trust in the Knesset in the total sample with positions on the statement that it is best to dismantle all of the country's political institutions and start over from scratch. We found that a greater share of those who disagree with this notion trust the Knesset than do those who agree with it. Further, of those who agree that decisions made by a government that has a majority in the Knesset are inherently democratic, a greater share express trust in the Knesset, compared with a very small minority of those who hold that decisions that are opposed to basic democratic values are not democratic, even if passed by the government and a Knesset majority. That being said, a large majority of both groups do not have confidence in the Knesset, though this majority is greater among those who think that decisions that are opposed to basic democratic values are not democratic.

And finally, examining the levels of trust in the Knesset by trust in the government, we found that a majority of those who express faith in the government take a similar view regarding the Knesset.

Table 3.11 / Trust the Knesset (total sample, by selected questions; %)

		Trust in Knesset			
		Trust	Don't trust	Don't know	Total
It would be best to dismantle all the country's political institutions and start over from scratch	Agree	17	81	2	100
	Disagree	29	69	2	100
Agree that:	Decisions made by a government that has a majority in the Knesset are inherently democratic	37	61	2	100
	Decisions that run counter to basic democratic values are not democratic, even if they are passed by the government or a Knesset majority	14	85	1	100
Trust in government	Trust	61	36	3	100
	Don't trust	8	90	2	100

Trust in the political parties


Question 14

Appendix 1, p. 182

Appendix 2, p. 207

Once again this year, of the eight state institutions examined regularly, the political parties rank lowest. As in 2022, the trust ratings in both the Jewish and Arab samples are similar, though somewhat higher among Arab interviewees. Both samples registered an increase in trust in the political parties compared with last year.

Figure 3.21 / Trust the political parties, 2003–2023 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation shows a higher level of trust in the political parties among respondents on the Right than in the Center and, especially, on the Left. In addition, trust in the parties has grown stronger since last year on the Right, while it has weakened on the Left.

Breaking down the Jewish sample by religiosity reveals that the Haredi and national religious respondents have greater trust in the parties than do the other religious groups, and that the trust ratings in both these groups have risen since last year's survey.


Table 3.12 / Trust the political parties, 2022 and 2023 (Jewish sample, by political orientation and religiosity; %)

		2022	2023
Political orientation	Left	13	6
	Center	11	10
	Right	9	16
Religiosity	Haredim	9	23
	National religious	8	18
	Traditional religious	12	13
	Traditional non-religious	6	12.5
	Secular	11	8.5

Breaking down the Arab sample by religion, we find that trust in the political parties is very low in all three groups, though it is higher among Muslims (at 17%, compared with 5% of Druze, and 4% of Christians).

An analysis of the level of trust in the political parties in the total sample by vote in the 2022 Knesset elections shows that voters for the Coalition parties, in particular United Torah Judaism, have greater faith in the parties than do voters for the Opposition parties; nonetheless, in all cases, only a small minority express trust.

Figure 3.22 / Trust the political parties (total sample, by vote in 2022 Knesset elections; %)



As stated, in addition to the eight institutions surveyed on a recurring basis, this year we examined the extent of trust in the municipality/local authority where the respondent resides, as well as trust in the Attorney General.

Among Jewish respondents, the share who express trust in the municipality/local authority where they reside is consistently higher than that among Arab interviewees. Furthermore, there has been more consistency in the level of trust among Jews than among Arabs.

**Trust in
municipality/local
authority**

Question 15

Appendix 1, p. 182

Appendix 2, p. 208

Table 3.13 / Trust the municipality/local authority where they live, 2016–2023 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

	2016	2018	2020	2021	2022	2023
Jews	55	60	63	62	51	55
Arabs	33	19.5	48	32	32	27.5

A breakdown of responses in the Jewish sample by district shows that those who reside in the North, the South, or Judea and Samaria have greater trust in their municipality/local authority than do those in other districts, with residents of Haifa and Tel Aviv demonstrating the lowest level of confidence in their local authority.

To conclude, we analyzed respondents' degree of trust in their municipality/local authority by its socioeconomic ranking.¹⁰ We found only minor differences in this regard, with the exception of localities at the very top of the scale, where levels of trust were much higher than for those with a lower ranking.

Table 3.14 / Trust the municipality/local authority where they live (Jewish sample, by district of residence and socioeconomic ranking; %)

District of residence	North	64
	Haifa	43
	Center	58
	Tel Aviv	46
	Jerusalem	54
	South	62
	Judea and Samaria	65
Socioeconomic ranking of locality/ municipality/local authority	Low (1–3)	55
	Medium (4–6)	55
	High (7–8)	52
	Very high (9–10)	70

¹⁰ Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics divides all localities in Israel into socioeconomic "clusters," ranked from 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest).

A breakdown of the Arab sample by area of residence reveals a slightly higher level of trust among residents of the Galilee (where most of the Arab population in Israel is concentrated) than in other areas, in particular compared with residents of mixed cities. Overall, however, the local authorities in all areas earned only low to very low levels of trust from their Arab residents.

Table 3.15 / Trust the municipality/local authority where they reside (Arab sample, by area of residence; %)

Galilee	30
“Triangle”*	27
Negev	27
Mixed cities	19

* The “Triangle” is an area in central Israel with a largely Arab population, including the major Arab towns of Tayibe, Tira, Baqa al-Gharbiyye, and Umm al-Fahm.

Trust in the Attorney General


Question 16

Appendix 1, p. 182

Appendix 2, p. 208

The Jewish respondents in our survey trust the Attorney General to a greater extent than do the Arab respondents. Compared with last year, trust among Jews has grown slightly, while there has been no substantive change among Arabs.

Figure 3.23 / Trust the Attorney General, 2008–2023 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation, we see that a majority of those who identify with the Left trust the Attorney General, as opposed to slightly more than half from the Center and only about one-fifth from the Right. Analyzing by religiosity reveals that secular respondents have greater confidence in this office than do all the other groups.


Here too, we broke down just the secular respondents by their political affiliation, and found that a majority of those who align themselves with the Left or Center have great faith in the Attorney General (68.5% and 65%, respectively), as compared with only about one-third (33%) from the Right.

Table 3.16 / Trust the Attorney General, 2022 and 2023 (Jewish sample, by political orientation and religiosity; %)

		2022	2023
Political orientation	Left	64.5	65
	Center	40.5	54
	Right	16	19
Religiosity	Haredim	4	11
	National religious	10	11
	Traditional religious	15	23
	Traditional non-religious	22	28
	Secular	45	53

Analyzing the Arab sample by religion revealed only minor differences between groups in the trust ratings for the Attorney General, and in all three cases, the ratings were very low (Muslims, 16%; Christians, 14%; Druze, 11%).

In the total sample, we broke down the results further by vote in the 2022 Knesset elections, and found the highest degree of trust among Yesh Atid voters, and the lowest, among voters for Religious Zionism. It is noteworthy that Yisrael Beytenu is the only Zionist party in the Opposition for which less than half of its voters trust the Attorney General.

Figure 3.24 / Trust the Attorney General (total sample, by vote in 2022 Knesset elections; %)

We found a strong association between trust in the Attorney General and in the Supreme Court: A sizeable majority of those who trust the Supreme Court also trust the Attorney General. A cross-tabulation between the degree of trust in the Attorney General and the extent of agreement with the assertion that democratic rule in Israel is in grave danger reveals that those respondents who hold that Israeli democracy is at risk have greater trust in the Attorney General than do those who take the opposite view.

Table 3.17 / Trust the Attorney General (total sample, by selected questions; %)

		Trust in the Attorney General			
		Trust	Don't trust	Don't know	Total
Trust the Supreme Court	Trust	65	28	7	100
	Don't trust	8	85	6	100
Democratic rule in Israel is in grave danger	Agree	41.5	50	8.5	100
	Disagree	16	77	7	100


Is trust on the decline?

Once again this year, we examined whether trust in Israel's state institutions is waning, holding steady, or rising compared with past years. To answer this question, we calculated two types of averages:

- **yearly** average trust rating for **all** the eight institutions studied on a recurring basis
- **multi-year** average trust rating for **all** the institutions as a whole (average of the share of respondents who express quite a lot or very much trust in all the institutions examined each year) for **all** the years surveyed (2003–2023)

This year's average level of trust across all eight institutions is virtually identical to last year's (35% versus 34.5%). In the figure below, the curved line represents the yearly averages for all the institutions for 2003–2023, and the straight line, the multi-year mean of these averages, which stands at 46.9% this year. The yearly overall average for 2023 (35%, as noted) is noticeably lower than the multi-year mean of all the averages, in a continuation of the trend we have seen since 2016.


Figure 3.25 / Yearly average level of trust in all the institutions as a whole, compared with overall multi-year average, 2003–2023 (total sample; %)



Note: For 2020–2022, we present the average of two surveys, conducted in June and October of each of those years.

Among Jewish respondents, the average cross-institutional trust rating for 2023 (38%) is higher than that among Arab respondents (19%), though the findings in both samples have remained relatively stable since last year.

Figure 3.26 / Yearly average level of trust in all the institutions as a whole, 2003–2023 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)




**Multi-year average level of trust in all the institutions as a whole,
Jewish respondents: 48.9%**

**Multi-year average level of trust in all the institutions as a whole,
Arab respondents: 35.7%**

In addition, we analyzed the yearly average levels of trust in all the institutions by political orientation (Jewish sample), with the results showing all three camps drawing closer together. Particularly noticeable this year is the sharp drop in the average yearly trust rating on the Left, and the parallel rise on the Right, presumably owing to the outcome of the 2022 elections and the change in the ruling coalition. Among respondents from the Center, we recorded a slight decline in the average yearly level of trust.

Figure 3.27 / Yearly average level of trust in all the institutions as a whole, 2003–2023 (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



The multi-year average level of trust among Haredi respondents is the lowest of the religious groups. Among secular, traditional, and national religious respondents, the average yearly trust rating for 2023 is lower than the multi-year mean of the averages, while among Haredim, it is almost equal to it:

**Multi-year average level of trust in all the institutions as a whole,
Haredim: 30.1%**

**Multi-year average level of trust in all the institutions as a whole,
national religious: 47.0%**

**Multi-year average level of trust in all the institutions as a whole,
traditional: 50.3%**

**Multi-year average level of trust in all the institutions as a whole,
secular: 52.2%**

In addition, we calculated the average yearly level of trust in all ten state institutions surveyed this year (using the total sample).¹¹ We divided the respondents into three categories: low level of trust (average 1–1.99, 28%); moderate level of trust (average 2–2.99, 63%), and high level of trust (average 3–4, 9%).

11. The average was calculated on the basis of a scale ranging from 1 = not at all to 4 = very much, omitting the “don’t know” responses.

As shown in the table below, when the data are broken down by nationality, the majority of respondents in the Jewish sample are located in the moderate category, while the majority of Arab respondents fall into the low category.

Though a breakdown of the trust ratings in the Jewish sample by political orientation did not yield major differences between camps, the share of those on the Right who are in the low trust category is larger than the equivalent shares of those in the Center or on the Left.

Analysis of the findings in the Jewish sample by religiosity shows that the proportion of Haredi respondents who fall into the low trust category is higher than the equivalent proportions of the other religious groups.

Table 3.18 / Average level of trust in all ten state institutions (total sample, by nationality; Jewish sample, by political orientation and religiosity; %)

		Low level of trust	Moderate level of trust	High level of trust	Total
Nationality	Jews	22.5	68	9.5	100
	Arabs	57	38	5	100
Political orientation (Jewish)	Left	16	73	11	100
	Center	17	70	13	100
	Right	25	67	8	100
Religiosity (Jewish)	Haredim	41.5	54	4.5	100
	National religious	24	72	4	100
	Traditional religious	26	63	11	100
	Traditional non-religious	20	70	10	100
	Secular	17	71	12	100

Factor analysis of trust ratings

Prior to 2022, when analyzing the survey questions on the subject of trust, we related to trust in each institution separately, reviewing the trends and changes that affected it over the years. Since last year, we have also sought to explore whether the various institutions coalesce into certain “factors,” or themes, in relation to public trust.¹² For this purpose, we performed a factor analysis,¹³ which revealed that the levels of trust in the institutions

¹² This process was conducted with the Jewish sample only, due to the low levels of trust in the Arab sample regarding all of the institutions surveyed.

¹³ Factor analysis is a statistical method used to reduce the number of variables investigated in a study. The reduction is performed by searching for common denominators between responses to survey questions. The common themes that emerge are referred to as “factors.” For each question, the factor loading of the relevant variable (see following footnote) quantifies the extent to which that variable is related to a given factor. The higher the value, the stronger the relationship to the specific factor.

surveyed could be grouped into two separate and distinct factors, with a high cumulative explained variance (58.4%).

The table below presents the factor loading values for each of the two factors found,¹⁴ representing the extent to which trust in each institution is related to the factor. As we can see, the Supreme Court, Attorney General, media, and President of Israel have high factor loading, or correlation, with the first factor, which can be termed the “law and justice factor.” The factor loading values of the police and IDF are lower, but still high enough to indicate correlation with this factor. The second factor is the “political factor,” for which the Knesset, the government, and the political parties have a very high factor loading. The respondent’s municipality/local authority has a lower factor loading score, but sufficiently high to indicate correlation with this factor. In other words, all the institutions listed under the first factor in the table below are associated (in terms of public trust) with that factor, and the same with regard to the second factor.

Table 3.19 / Factor loading in questions on trust in state institutions (Jewish sample)

	Factor loading	
	1. Law and justice factor	2. Political factor
Supreme Court	0.871	
Attorney General	0.851	
Media	0.775	
President of Israel	0.753	
Police	0.520	
IDF	0.430	
Knesset		0.832
Government		0.819
Political parties		0.765
Municipality/local authority		0.471

Note: The table shows factor loadings higher than 0.4.

To test the reliability of the variables of trust in the institutions within each of the factors, we performed a reliability analysis to see if the internal consistency was statistically significant, using Cronbach’s alpha.¹⁵

¹⁴ The factor loading of each variable quantifies the extent to which the variable is related to a given factor. We would expect high factor loadings (meaning a strong relationship) between a certain variable and one particular factor, and low loadings (or a weak relationship) with all the other factors. A factor loading of 0.4 or higher indicates a correlation between the variable and the factor.

¹⁵ A Cronbach’s alpha value of 0.7 or higher is considered reliable.

In analyzing the first factor (law and justice), we found a very high reliability coefficient, signifying a highly coherent factor ($\alpha = 0.825$). An analysis of the second factor (political) likewise yields a high reliability coefficient, meaning that here too there is a coherent factor, though to a slightly lesser extent ($\alpha = 0.725$). And finally, we calculated an average trust rating in the Jewish sample for each of the two factors.¹⁶ We found that the average level of trust was higher in the first factor (law and justice) than in the second one (political) (2.47 and 2.10, respectively).

From an analysis of the following table, we see that the average trust ratings of those respondents who identify with the Left or Center are higher in the first factor (law and justice) than in the second (political). While the average trust ratings of respondents on the Right are similar in both factors, the average level of trust in the case of the second factor (political) is higher on the Right than on the Left or Center.

In addition, we analyzed the average trust ratings in the Jewish sample by religiosity. Here, we found that the average levels of trust among secular and traditional non-religious respondents are higher in the first factor (law and justice), while those among Haredi and national religious respondents are higher in the second factor (political).

Table 3.20 / Average trust ratings for the two factors (Jewish sample, by political orientation and religiosity)

		1. Law and justice factor	2. Political factor
Political orientation	Left	2.83	1.81
	Center	2.77	1.91
	Right	2.28	2.26
Religiosity	Haredim	1.90	2.35
	National religious	2.21	2.34
	Traditional religious	2.24	2.24
	Traditional non-religious	2.48	2.13
	Secular	2.78	1.91

¹⁶ As noted earlier, the average was calculated on a scale from 1 = not at all to 4 = very much, omitting the “don’t know” responses.

Chapter 4 / Israeli Society

In this chapter, we discuss the following topics:

- Social solidarity in Israel
- Feeling like a minority in Israel
- Most acute social tensions in Israel
- Mixed marriages between Arabs and Jews
- Ability to maintain one's desired way of life
- Concerns about future financial security

In 2023, the judicial reforms promoted by the government, and the ensuing public protests, altered the social climate in Israel. Long-standing differences came to a head, and the polarization between different groups and sectors in Israeli society intensified. All this had an impact on the public's perception of social solidarity in Israel. In a question we have posed repeatedly in the *Democracy Index* since 2011, respondents are asked to rate the level of solidarity (sense of "togetherness") of Israeli society on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 = no solidarity at all and 10 = a very high level of solidarity. This year, as in 2022, we asked survey participants to rate the level of solidarity of both Israeli society as a whole (Jews, Arabs, and all other citizens), and of Jewish society specifically.

In the total sample, the average social solidarity rating in Israel is very low this year, and in fact, the lowest since we first began addressing this subject in 2011. Four consecutive surveys since 2020 have shown a continuing decline in assessments of the level of solidarity in Israeli society among Jews and Arabs alike. The average solidarity rating given by Jewish respondents for Israeli society as a whole has dropped by a full point, from the midpoint of the range (5.5) to the lower half of the scale (4.4). The corresponding rating by Arab interviewees, which was already lower than that of the Jews, has fallen from 4.8 to 3.6.

The rating given by Jewish respondents for intra-Jewish solidarity is higher than the score they assign to Israeli society as a whole. Over the years, the average score for intra-Jewish solidarity (approximately 6) was above the midpoint of the scale, and remained relatively stable through 2022. This year, however, it plunged even more sharply than the rating of solidarity for Israeli society as a whole (from 5.9 last year to 5.2 currently).

Social solidarity

Questions 3, 4

Appendix 1,
pp. 179-180

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
Figure 4.1 / Annual solidarity ratings for Israeli society as a whole, and Jewish society specifically, 2011–2023 (Jewish and Arab samples; average score on a scale of 1 to 10)



Note: The question on intra-Jewish solidarity was posed to Jewish respondents only.

We divided the general Israeli solidarity scale into three levels: low (1–4), moderate (5–6), and high (7–10). As shown in the figure below, Arab respondents' assessment of social solidarity in Israel as a whole has not changed substantially since last year. Among Jews as well, there has been no dramatic shift, though last year, only a minority of Jews (albeit a large one) rated it as low, whereas currently, over half of Jewish respondents take this view. The change is even more striking with regard to intra-Jewish solidarity: Last year, Jewish respondents tended to rate it more favorably (45% gave it a high score, compared with 24% who assigned it a low one), while this year, the share who rate it as low (38.5%) exceeds those who give it a high or moderate score (30% and 29%, respectively).

Figure 4.2 / Solidarity ratings for Israeli society as a whole, and Jewish society specifically, 2022 and 2023 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals noticeable differences in perceptions of national solidarity, with a steep drop this year in the rating on the Left, a more moderate decline in the Center, and a slight rise on the Right, as contrasted with 2022, when we encountered virtually no disparities between the camps. As for intra-Jewish solidarity, we found a decrease in the average score in all camps, though it was most pronounced on the Left.

In addition, we broke down the solidarity ratings in the Jewish sample by religiosity. This year, as in 2022, the highest scores in both types of solidarity were found among national religious respondents, and the lowest, in the secular group. Among Haredi respondents, there were prominent increases in the average scores for both types of solidarity. The general solidarity rating rose slightly among the national religious, and did not change among the traditional religious; however, the average score for intra-Jewish solidarity declined in these groups. The traditional non-religious group showed a moderate downturn in the general solidarity score, and a more marked decline in intra-Jewish solidarity, while secular respondents registered a sharp drop in both scores.

Within the secular group, we found noticeable differences when analyzing by political orientation. The average solidarity ratings for Israeli society as a whole were 3.3 on the Left, 3.7 in the Center, and 4.35 on the Right among secular Jews; and for intra-Jewish solidarity, the average ratings were 3.7, 4.3, and 5.1 on the secular Left, Center, and Right, respectively.

Table 4.1 / Solidarity ratings for Israeli society as a whole, and Jewish society specifically, 2022 and 2023 (Jewish sample, by political orientation and religiosity; average score on a scale of 1 to 10)

		Average solidarity rating for general Israeli society		Average solidarity rating for Jewish Israeli society	
		2022	2023	2022	2023
Political orientation	Left	4.6	3.5	5.2	4.0
	Center	4.9	4.0	5.6	4.6
	Right	4.6	4.8	6.3	5.7
Religiosity	Haredim	3.4	4.2	5.4	5.6
	National religious	4.9	5.3	6.8	6.4
	Traditional religious	5.0	5.1	6.4	5.9
	Traditional non-religious	4.9	4.6	6.3	5.3
	Secular	4.7	3.8	5.5	4.4

In the Arab sample, as noted, we did not find major changes in the solidarity rating for general Israeli society compared with last year. Breaking down the data by religion, we see that, as in 2022, a majority of Muslims and Christians gave Israeli solidarity a low grade. We encountered a significant difference from last year only among Druze respondents, where the proportion who rated general social solidarity in Israel as low soared from 42.5% to 71.5%, with a corresponding decline in the share who assessed it as moderate or high.


Table 4.2 / Solidarity ratings for Israeli society as a whole, 2022 and 2023 (Arab sample, by religion; %)

		Low (1–4)	Moderate (5–6)	High (7–10)	Don't know	Average score
Muslims	2022	63	25	12	0	3.6
	2023	57	33	10	0	3.7
Christians	2022	64.5	20.5	15	0	3.9
	2023	60.5	25	14.5	0	3.8
Druze	2022	42.5	31	26.5	0	4.3
	2023	71.5	19	9.5	0	3.3

As in previous years, Arab respondents who voted for Zionist parties assign a higher solidarity rating to general Israeli society than do Arabs who voted for Arab political parties (average of 4.8 versus 3.5, respectively).

As shown in the figures below, in all the surveys where this topic was addressed, the more positive the assessment of Israel's overall situation, the higher the social solidarity rating given by respondents. The distribution of general solidarity ratings in the total sample has not changed since last year, either among those who characterize Israel's situation as good or those who see it as bad. By contrast, an analysis of intra-Jewish solidarity ratings shows sizeable differences from last year's findings. Among Jews who have a favorable view of Israel's situation, we found a significant rise in solidarity ratings, with the average score in this group reaching 7 this year. And conversely, of those respondents who labeled the country's situation as bad, the intra-Jewish solidarity rating dropped very steeply, yielding an average score this year of only 4. The solidarity score also went down in the group who characterize Israel's overall situation as "so-so." In other words, we identify a deepening of the divide between that portion of the Jewish public who see Israel's general situation in positive terms and those who take the opposite view, including in their positions on the extent of solidarity between Jews in Israel.

Figure 4.3 / Solidarity ratings for Israeli Jewish society and for Israeli society as a whole, 2011–2023 (total sample and Jewish sample, by assessment of Israel's overall situation; average score on a scale of 1 to 10)



Who feels like a minority?


Question 24

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
Against the backdrop of the heated public debate in Israel during much of 2023 concerning majority-minority relations, we examined who in Israeli society feels that they belong to a minority group, and who does not. It emerges that, since we last asked this question, in 2019, the share of respondents who feel they belong to a minority group has increased in both the Jewish and Arab samples. Whereas roughly one-half of Arab interviewees felt this way in the earlier survey, today a majority of approximately two-thirds express this sentiment. In the Jewish sample, the proportion who feel like a minority still stands at less than one-half, but here too, this represents an increase, from less than one-third in 2019 to nearly 40% this year.

Figure 4.4 / Feel like a minority in Israeli society, 2019 and 2023 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation shows a rise in the sense of marginalization in all three camps, though at present the feeling is more characteristic of the Left than of the Center or Right. Nearly two-thirds of respondents from the Left feel like a minority in Israeli society, compared with some 40% from the Center and only about one-third from the Right.

Figure 4.5 / Feel like a minority in Israeli society, 2019 and 2023 (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



Analyzing the Jewish sample by religiosity, we encountered a similar increase in the sense of being a minority among all of the groups. This year, as in 2019, the Haredi and secular groups have the highest share of respondents who feel marginalized (53% and 43%, respectively), compared with approximately one-third in the other groups. The steepest rise since the 2019 survey was recorded in the national religious and traditional religious groups, where the share who feel they are a minority doubled this year.


A breakdown of the secular group by political orientation shows striking differences, with almost two-thirds of those on the Left (62.5%) feeling part of a minority, compared with 41% in the Center and less than one-third (30%) on the Right (a percentage similar to that found among the national religious and traditional groups).

An analysis of the Jewish sample by ethnicity reveals that Ashkenazim and FSU immigrants experience a greater sense of minority status than do others, with the steepest climb recorded in the latter group, where the proportion of those who feel like a minority has doubled since 2019.

Table 4.3 / Feel like a minority in Israeli society, 2019 and 2023 (Jewish sample, by religiosity and ethnicity; %)

		2019	2023
Religiosity	Haredim	46	53
	National religious	16	33
	Traditional religious	16	30
	Traditional non-religious	26	28
	Secular	35	43
Ethnicity	Ashkenazi	37	44
	Mizrahi	23	30
	Mixed	25	38
	FSU immigrant	21	42

We examined the association between the feeling of being a minority in Israeli society and the sense of belonging to the state and its problems. As expected, the subjective experience of minority status is higher among those interviewees who say that they do not feel part of the state. Interestingly, the gap in the sense of marginalization between those who do and those who do not feel part of the state has narrowed since the previous survey, and the rise in the share who feel like a minority among those who feel part of the state is much greater than the corresponding increase among those who do not feel part of the state (an increase of 12 percentage points versus just 3).

Figure 4.6 / Feel like a minority in Israeli society, 2019 and 2023 (total sample, by feeling a part of the state and its problems; %)


Breaking down the Arab sample by religion, we found that 60%–65% in each of the groups this year report feeling like a minority. In retrospect, the greatest increase in the sense of belonging to a minority has been among Muslim respondents. Analyzing the findings by level of education reveals that the feeling of being a minority rises in tandem with education. We also found considerable gaps in the sense of minority status when analyzing by age: Roughly one-half of young Arabs (18–34) feel like a minority, and this share has not changed greatly since the previous survey. At the same time, a decisive majority of the older cohorts also feel this way (70% in the 35–54 age group, and 81% among those aged 55 and over), with these proportions having risen substantially since 2019. A breakdown by income level shows that the sense of being a minority is strongest among those with the highest incomes.

Table 4.4 / Feel like a minority in Israeli society, 2019 and 2023 (Arab sample, by religion, level of education, age, and income level; %)

		2019	2023
Religion	Muslims	47	65
	Christians	68	60
	Druze	69	61
Level of education	Full high school or less	36.5	61
	Post-secondary/partial academic	67	67
	Bachelor's degree or higher	81	80
Age	18–34	50	53
	35–54	53	70
	55+	61.5	81
Income level	Below average	50	54
	Average	39.5	67
	Above average	69	86

We examined whether there is a difference in the perception of overall social solidarity in Israel between respondents who feel like a minority and those who do not, and found that a majority of the former group (63%) assess the level of social solidarity as being low, while less than half of the latter group (46.5%) take this view.

Figure 4.7 / Level of solidarity in Israeli society as a whole (total sample, by feeling of belonging to a minority group; %)



Most acute social tension in Israel


Question 18

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Each year, we look at the most acute social tension in Israel, as perceived by the general public. After a steady increase between 2012 and 2020 in the share of respondents who think that the highest level of tension is between Right and Left, this proportion dropped in 2021 and 2022, apparently in the wake of the disturbances of May 2021 and the resulting rise in tensions between Jews and Arabs, which were indeed considered by the greatest share of respondents to be the most serious source of friction during those two years. This year, tensions between Right and Left have returned to the head of the list of tensions in Israeli society, with a definite upswing (from one-quarter who saw them as such last year to almost 40% this year). Concurrently, there has been a relatively steep rise in the share who cite the tensions between secular and religious Jews as the most severe—from a negligible share (6%) to almost one-fifth of the sample (18%). Jewish-Arab tensions ranked second this year (after tensions between Right and Left); but the proportion of respondents who see them as the most acute is half of what it was last year, dropping from a majority of 61% to roughly one-third.

Figure 4.8 / Which of the following is the most acute social tension in Israel today? 2012–2023 (total sample; %)




We also examined the assessments of tensions in Israel society in the Jewish and Arab samples separately. In 2022, friction between Jews and Arabs was seen as the primary source of tension by a similar proportion of both Jewish and Arab respondents. This year, the share who point to this as the most serious flashpoint declined in both samples: Among Arabs, we saw a moderate decrease, while among Jews, the drop was steeper. The share of respondents who consider the most serious tensions to be between Right and Left has climbed considerably in the Jewish sample, whereas in the Arab sample it has remained unchanged. As in 2022, tensions between religious and secular Jews take third place in the Jewish sample, though the share who see this as the most acute source of friction has risen since last year. Tensions between rich and poor have placed third in the Arab sample for the last two years, though the share who label them the most severe has risen since 2022.

Table 4.5 / Most acute social tension in Israel, 2022 and 2023 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

	Jews		Arabs	
	2022	2023	2022	2023
1	Jews and Arabs (60)	Right and Left (43)	Jews and Arabs (65)	Jews and Arabs (53)
2	Right and Left (26)	Jews and Arabs (26)	Right and Left (15)	Right and Left (14)
3	Religious and secular (6)	Religious and secular (19)	Rich and poor (6)	Rich and poor (14)

A breakdown of the findings in the Jewish sample by political orientation shows that, since the 2015 survey, respondents from the Left have tended to a greater extent than those from the other two camps to identify Right-Left tensions as the most acute; nonetheless, these tensions head the list in all three camps.

Figure 4.9 / Most acute social tension in Israel today is between Right and Left, 2012–2023 (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)

In comparison with last year's findings: On the Left, tensions between Right and Left have remained in first place, with one-half citing them as the most acute (versus roughly 40% last year); tensions between religious and secular have climbed to second place; and Jewish-Arab tensions have dropped to third place. In the Center as well, tensions between Right and Left are at the top of the list this year, followed by religious-secular tensions. Tensions between Jews and Arabs, which last year were rated by a majority of this camp as the most acute, have dropped to third place. On the Right, too, tensions between Right and Left have risen to first place, while Jewish-Arab tensions have dropped to second place, and tensions between religious and secular have remained in third place .

Table 4.6 / Most acute social tension in Israel, 2022 and 2023 (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)

	Left		Center		Right	
	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023
1	Right and Left (43)	Right and Left (51)	Jews and Arabs (53)	Right and Left (44)	Jews and Arabs (69)	Right and Left (42)
2	Jews and Arabs (30)	Religious and secular (24)	Right and Left (29.5)	Religious and secular (24)	Right and Left (22)	Jews and Arabs (32)
3	Religious and secular (13)	Jews and Arabs (13)	Religious and secular (7)	Jews and Arabs (21)	Religious and secular (4)	Religious and secular (17)

Additionally, we examined perceptions in the Jewish sample by religiosity, finding a noticeable increase across the board in the share of respondents who cite tensions between Right and Left as the most severe. Last year, Haredim were the only group in which more than 10% pointed to tensions between religious and secular as the most acute; however, this year, this was the option selected by almost one-fifth of respondents in all the groups (Haredim, 19.5%; national religious, 18%; traditional religious, 16%; traditional non-religious, 15%; and secular, 22%).

A breakdown of responses in the Jewish sample by age shows that Right-Left tensions were selected by all cohorts as the most serious; but the share who see them as such is slightly higher in the 55-and-over age group. By contrast, the youngest cohort shows the greatest tendency to view Jewish-Arab tensions as the most acute, ranking them almost as highly as Right-Left tensions.

Figure 4.10 / Most acute social tension in Israel (Jewish sample, by age; %)



As noted, roughly one-half of Arab interviewees cite Jewish-Arab tensions as the most acute source of friction in Israeli society. This year, the share who take this view is slightly larger among Druze respondents, and slightly smaller among Christian respondents (Druze, 58%; Muslims, 53%; Christians, 47%).

Intermarriage between Arabs and Jews


Questions 25a, 25b

Appendix 1, p. 185

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The supreme sign of receptivity to close relations between social groups is intermarriage with “the other.” Among Arab respondents, we have always found a low degree of openness to marriage to Jews, and among Jews, almost a total lack of willingness to countenance marriage with Arabs. In this year’s survey, we examined opinions in the Jewish sample concerning organizations that seek to break apart couples comprising Jewish women with Arab men, or Jewish men with Arab women. As shown in the figure below, the Jewish public is divided in its stance toward these organizations. Relative to our previous survey on this topic, in 2015, there has been a slight increase in support for organizations that aim to separate mixed couples, and some decrease in the opposition to such groups.

Figure 4.11 / Do you support or oppose Jewish organizations that act to separate Jewish women and Arab men, or Jewish men and Arab women, who are living together? 2015 and 2023 (Jewish sample; %)



Note: In 2015, the question was worded slightly differently: “Do you support or oppose organizations such as Lehava that engage in various activities to prevent Jewish women from marrying Arab men?”

As expected, when breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation, we found substantial differences on this question: A majority of respondents on the Right support Jewish organizations that aim to break apart mixed couples, as contrasted with a minority in the Center and a negligible minority on the Left. Moreover, since the 2015 survey, there has been a rise in the level of support on the Right, compared with a decline among respondents from the Center and Left.

Analysis of the Jewish sample by religiosity reveals a majority in all groups (with the exception of the secular) who are in favor of organizations that act to separate mixed couples. This majority is especially large among national religious and Haredi respondents (at 80% and 76%, respectively), and smaller among the traditional religious (57%) and traditional non-religious (51%). In the secular public, only a small minority (17%) back organizations of this type; moreover, the size of this minority has declined since the previous survey. By contrast, in both traditional groups (religious and non-religious), we found a very noticeable rise in support for such organizations—from a minority to a majority.


Table 4.7 / Support Jewish organizations that act to separate mixed Jewish-Arab couples, 2015 and 2023 (Jewish sample, by political orientation and religiosity; %)

		2015	2023
Political orientation	Left	12	7
	Center	27	20
	Right	53	63
Religiosity	Haredim	88	76
	National religious	71	80
	Traditional religious	45	57
	Traditional non-religious	37	51
	Secular	25	17


We examined which additional subgroups in the Jewish sample are more in favor of organizations that seek to separate mixed couples, and found that men support them to a greater extent than women (50% versus 38%), and young people more than the older age groups (52% of the 18–34 cohort; 44% of those aged 35–54; and 36% of the 55+ age group). Mizrahim tend to back such groups more than do other ethnic groups (Mizrahim, 56%; Ashkenazim, 42%; mixed ethnicity, 35%; FSU immigrants, 24%). Additionally, we found that the lower the income level, the higher the support for groups that promote separation (below-average income, 54%; average income, 46%; above-average income, 35%).

We found a strong positive association between support (or opposition) for organizations that work to separate mixed Jewish-Arab couples, and agreement (or disagreement) with the assertion that Jewish citizens of Israel should have more rights than non-Jewish citizens. In other words, the greater the support for this claim, the greater the backing for such organizations, and vice versa.

Figure 4.12 / Position on Jewish organizations that act to separate mixed Jewish-Arab couples (Jewish sample, by position on whether Jewish citizens of Israel should have more rights than non-Jewish citizens; %)



We asked the Arab interviewees two questions on this topic: (1) whether they support or oppose marriage between Arab men and Jewish women; and (2) whether they support or oppose marriage between Jewish men and Arab women. A majority of Arab respondents are opposed to both types of intermarriage; however, there is a slightly higher level of opposition to marriage between Jewish men and Arab women than to marriage between Arab men and Jewish women.

Figure 4.13 / Position on mixed marriages between Jews and Arabs (Arab sample; %)

Breaking down the responses in the Arab sample by several demographic characteristics, we found that in nearly all the subgroups, a majority of respondents are opposed to mixed marriages. The groups that expressed less opposition were those aged 55 and over, those who reside in mixed cities in Israel, and those who voted for Zionist parties in the most recent elections (2022). Arab women are more strongly against mixed marriages than are Arab men.

Table 4.8 / Oppose mixed marriages (Arab sample, by sex, age, religion, area of residence, and vote in 2022 Knesset elections; %)

		Marriage between Jewish men and Arab women	Marriage between Arab men and Jewish women
Sex	Men	61	58
	Women	68	61
Age	18–34	68	64
	35–54	69	64
	55+	51	44

		Marriage between Jewish men and Arab women	Marriage between Arab men and Jewish women
Religion	Muslim	68	61
	Christian	50	54
	Druze	58	58
Area of residence	Galilee	68	64
	“Triangle”	62	58
	Negev	68	56.5
	Mixed cities	51	47
Vote in 2022 Knesset elections	Arab parties	71.5	67
	Zionist parties	52	41

Ability to maintain one's desired way of life


Question 54

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Appendix 2, p. 223

One of the sources of tension between different groups in Israeli society, and one of the major barriers to closer ties between them, is the desire to maintain one's preferred way of life, and the concern that it will not be possible to do so because of the growing influence of other groups. We posed the following question for the first time in 2017, and again in 2022 and this year: “How worried are you that you will be unable to maintain your desired lifestyle because of the increasing power of certain groups in Israeli society?” As shown in the figure below, the share of the total sample who expressed worry in this regard climbed steeply between 2017 and 2022, from a minority of roughly 40% to a majority of about 70%, and remained at a similar level this year.

Figure 4.14 / How worried are you that you will be unable to maintain your desired way of life because of the increasing power of certain groups in Israeli society? 2017–2023 (total sample; %)




As shown in the following table, in 2017 we did not find a significant difference between Jews and Arabs in their concern about being able to maintain their desired way of life in future. In 2022, the share who were worried rose markedly in both samples, though more sharply among Arab respondents; however, this year there was virtually no change among either Arabs or Jews relative to last year.

Table 4.9 / Worried about being unable to maintain their desired way of life, 2017–2023 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

	2017	2022	2023
Jews	40	68	66
Arabs	44	79	80

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation yielded some noteworthy findings. Between 2017 and 2022, the share of respondents who were worried about being unable to maintain their desired lifestyle rose considerably in all three camps, most of all on the Right (from one-third to two-thirds). Yet, this year, the proportion of those concerned continued to rise in the Center and on the Left, while on the Right there was a noticeable decline—though more than half of right-wing respondents are still worried.

Figure 4.15 / Worried about being unable to maintain their desired way of life, 2017–2023 (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)




A similar picture emerged when analyzing the Jewish sample by religiosity. In 2022, we recorded a steep increase in all groups, relative to 2017, in the share who feared being unable to maintain their desire lifestyle. This year, the only group whose level of worry has continued to rise (and very noticeably so) is that of the secular respondents. In the other groups, the share who express concern has declined, and now stands at roughly 50%.

Table 4.10 / Worried about being unable to maintain their desired way of life, 2017–2023 (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)

	2017	2022	2023
Haredim	34	67	55
National religious	22	58	51
Traditional religious	18	69	52
Traditional non-religious	31.5	68	55
Secular	55	71	84

We examined the relation between concern about losing the ability to maintain one's desired way of life and the feeling of belonging to a minority group in Israeli society. The following figure shows that among both those who feel part of a minority and those who do not, the majority are worried that their ability to maintain their lifestyle will be curtailed in future, though this majority is larger in the group that feels like a minority (79%) than in the group that does not (62%).

Figure 4.16 / Worried about being unable to maintain their desired way of life (total sample, by self-definition as part of a minority group; %)



We also looked at the relation between worry about maintaining one's preferred way of life and other demographic variables. In the Jewish sample, women are more concerned than men about such an eventuality (71% versus 62%); Mizrahim are less worried than the other ethnic groups surveyed (FSU immigrants, 75%; mixed ethnicity, 72.5%; Ashkenazim, 70%; Mizrahim, 58%); and high-income earners are more worried than those at lower income levels (above-average income, 76%; average income, 62.5%; below-average income, 58%).

In the Arab sample, unlike the Jewish one, men are more concerned than women about their lifestyle being threatened (84% and 76%, respectively); young people are more worried than their older counterparts (85.5% in the 18–34 age group; 76% in the 35–54 cohort; and 75.5% among those aged 55 and over); and Muslims and Druze are more concerned than Christians (Muslims, 82%; Druze, 82.5%; Christians, 66%).

We examined whether there is an association between fears of infringement on one's lifestyle and the desire to emigrate or remain in Israel. A decisive majority of those who would prefer to emigrate (81%) are worried about possible harm to their way of life due to the growing strength of certain groups in Israeli society, compared with a smaller majority (64%) among those who would rather remain in Israel. Interestingly, between 2017 and 2022, we witnessed a very steep rise (almost twofold) in concern that their lifestyle may be threatened among those who would prefer to remain in Israel. This year's findings remained relatively stable compared with last year's, but they still represent a sizeable increase over 2017.

Table 4.11 / Worried about being unable to maintain their desired way of life, 2017–2023 (total sample, by desire to emigrate or to remain in Israel; %)

	2017	2022	2023
Prefer to emigrate	61.5	81	81
Prefer to remain in Israel	36	67	64

Future financial support for children


Question 55

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Appendix 2, p. 224

Feeling that one's future is financially secure is no less important than feeling certain of being able to maintain one's desired way of life. The first question that we posed on the subject of financial security relates to the ability of respondents to support their children in future. As shown in the figure below, some three-quarters of this year's interviewees are worried that they will be unable to financially support their children—a much larger share than in the previous survey in 2017, when 60% expressed concern.

Figure 4.17 / How worried are you that you will be unable to financially support your children in future? 2017 and 2023 (total sample; %)



A substantial increase in the share of respondents who are concerned that they will be unable to support their children in future was recorded in both the Jewish and Arab samples, but the proportion in the latter group is higher: This year, 84% of Arab interviewees are worried about this prospect, compared with 72% of Jews.

Table 4.12 / Worried that they will be unable to financially support their children in future, 2017 and 2023 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

	2017	2023
Jews	58	72
Arabs	69	84

Breaking down the Jewish sample by assorted sociodemographic variables, we found large and statistically significant differences by age: The oldest cohort (55 and over), whose children are presumably already adults, are less worried about supporting their children in future. The steepest rise in the share of those expressing concern, relative to 2017, is found in the 35–54 age group, who presumably have children who are not yet financially established. Women are more worried than men about being unable to support their children in future, though the share who feel this way has gone up considerably among men as well as women.


An analysis of the Jewish sample by religiosity reveals a high share this year (close to 80%) of secular and traditional non-religious respondents who are feeling uncertain about their ability to provide for their children in future. In the other groups, some 60% expressed concern. It is interesting to note that in 2017, the share of respondents who were worried was similar in all the groups (at about 60%), with the exception of the Haredim, where the proportion was much lower (less than half). This year, we recorded a noticeable increase in the Haredi, traditional non-religious, and secular groups, while there was virtually no change among the national religious and traditional religious respondents.

Table 4.13 / Worried that they will be unable to financially support their children in future, 2017 and 2023 (Jewish sample, by age, sex, and religiosity; %)

		2017	2023
Age	18–34	61	74
	35–54	62	81
	55+	52	59
Sex	Men	54	65
	Women	63	78
Religiosity	Haredim	44	60
	National religious	65	61
	Traditional religious	60	63
	Traditional non-religious	62	77
	Secular	59	78

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation shows that in 2023, the extent of concern grew larger in all camps; however, the increase on the Left was the most pronounced (from close to one-half to a decisive majority of 80%), moving this camp to the top of the list of those worried about such a situation. Breaking down the findings by income level reveals a slightly different picture: While in the previous survey, Jews with above-average incomes were less worried than lower-income earners about being unable to financially support their children, this year we saw the same degree of concern at all income levels.

Figure 4.18 / Worried that they will be unable to financially support their children in future, 2017 and 2023 (Jewish sample, by political orientation and income level; %)



As noted, the vast majority of Arabs (84%) are worried about being unable to support their children in future. This share is especially high in the youngest cohort (aged 18–34), which also registered a dramatic increase compared with the previous survey, in 2017. The proportion of concerned respondents also rose very sharply in the 55+ age group. At the same time, in the 35–54 cohort, the share who express concern is lower, and has not changed substantially since 2017. In contrast to our findings in the Jewish sample, Arab women tend to report less worry in this regard, while Arab men showed a very steep rise in concern. It is worth noting that among Arab respondents, similar to Jews, we did not encounter a significant relation this year between the degree of concern about the ability to provide financial support to children in future, and the level of income. While in 2017, we identified a strong positive association between the two variables, this year, the share of concerned parents rose significantly (almost doubling) among high-income earners, such that the findings were largely similar across the various income levels.

Table 4.14 / Worried that they will be unable to financially support their children in future, 2017 and 2023 (Arab sample, by age, sex and income level; %)

		2017	2023
Age	18–34	66	92
	35–54	78	74
	55+	56	83
Sex	Men	65	89
	Women	74	78.5
Income level	Below average	77	88
	Average	67	77
	Above average	46	83

We continued to explore the subject of financial uncertainty, this time focusing on concern about the ability to live in dignity in old age. As in the previous question, here too we found that roughly three-quarters of the total sample this year are worried that they will be unable to live out their days in dignity. This represents a striking increase since the previous survey (when only a small majority of 56% was recorded).


Ability to live in dignity in old age

Question 56

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Appendix 2, p. 224

Figure 4.19 / How worried are you that you will be unable to live in dignity in your old age? 2017 and 2023 (total sample; %)



This year saw a significant increase in the share who expressed concern in this area in both the Jewish and Arab samples. As with the question of financial support for children, here too the proportion of worried respondents is higher in the Arab sample, though the gap between Arabs and Jews is relatively small this year due to the considerable upswing (nearly 20 percentage points) in the Jewish sample.

Table 4.15 / Worried that they will be unable to live in dignity in their old age, 2017 and 2023 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

	2017	2023
Jews	55	73
Arabs	63	78


In a breakdown of the Jewish sample by age, sex, and religiosity, we found a substantial rise since 2017 in the share of respondents in all groups who are worried they will be unable to live decently in their old age. Thus, the proportion who expressed concern rose in all age groups, though the youngest cohort provided the greatest increase. Women are more worried than men about future financial insecurity, though both sexes registered an upturn since the 2017 survey. In terms of religiosity, the secular and traditional non-religious groups have the highest share of concerned respondents this year, and these are also the groups with the largest increase since 2017. The other groups also showed a rise; however, the share of those who are concerned among Haredim remained low compared with the other groups, perhaps thanks to the well-developed infrastructure of mutual support in Haredi society.

Table 4.16 / Worried that they will be unable to live in dignity in their old age, 2017 and 2023 (Jewish sample, by age, sex, and religiosity; %)

		2017	2023
Age	18–34	53	76
	35–54	63.5	82
	55+	46.5	61
Sex	Men	50	65.5
	Women	59	81
Religiosity	Haredim	33	50
	National religious	56	66
	Traditional religious	62	67
	Traditional non-religious	56	81
	Secular	58	79

Here too, as in the previous question, we found a very clear positive association six years ago between income level and degree of concern about the financial future, while this year, the share of respondents who are worried that they will be unable to maintain an acceptable standard of living in their old age is almost identical at all income levels (roughly three-quarters). Breaking down the responses by political orientation reveals that, as was the case in 2017, the differences between political camps are not significant. In 2023, the share of those who are concerned on the Left and in the Center (around 80%) remains higher than the equivalent share on the Right (70%).

Figure 4.20 / Worried that they will be unable to live in dignity in their old age, 2017 and 2023 (Jewish sample, by political orientation and income level; %)




In the Arab sample, we found a very steep rise in the share who are concerned about future financial insecurity in the youngest age group (18–34). The corresponding share in the oldest cohort is lower, though it also reaches almost three-quarters this year. We did not find a significant gap in this regard between men and women, though the share who expressed concern rose in both groups. A finding that we saw already in the analysis of the preceding question—a rise in the share of worried Arab respondents at all income levels—is particularly noticeable among those with above-average incomes.

Table 4.17 / Worried that they will be unable to live in dignity in their old age, 2017 and 2023 (Arab sample, by age, sex, and income level; %)

		2017	2023
Age	18–34	55	82
	35–54	73.5	76
	55+	56	70
Sex	Men	66	79.5
	Women	60	76
Income level	Below average	70	82
	Average	50	69.5
	Above average	50	80

We compiled the results from the two questions relating to respondents' financial future: worry about being able to financially support their children, and worry about being able to live in dignity in their old age. In both the Jewish and Arab samples, roughly two-thirds indicated concern in both these areas, with the proportion slightly higher among Arab respondents.

Figure 4.21 / Worried/not worried about financial issues (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



Chapter 5 / Education and Culture

In this chapter, we discuss the following topics:

- Equal opportunity in the state education system
- Discussing political issues in the classroom
- Civics and democracy studies, or Jewish history and love of the land?
- State funding for arts and culture, and its impact on content

The education system is, in large part, a reflection of Israel's political climate. A school system grounded on democratic values is possible only under democratic rule, and the converse holds true as well: In a country that is not democratic, it is doubtful that an education system that inculcates such values can exist. One of the core principles of democracy is equality, including in the school system. We therefore posed the question: "In your opinion, does Israel's state education system today offer equal opportunity in practice to children from all backgrounds and sectors?" The 2023 survey findings show that a small majority (53%) of the total sample think or are certain that the system is not equal for all students.


Equal opportunity in state education

Question 39

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Figure 5.1 / Does Israel's state education system today offer equal opportunity in practice to children from all backgrounds and sectors? (total sample; %)



At the same time, this year's data show some improvement in the public's assessment of the system: In answer to a very similar question in 2019 ("In your opinion, does Israel's education system offer genuine equal opportunity for children from all backgrounds and sectors?"), a larger majority (roughly two-thirds) thought at the time that the school system did not truly provide equal opportunity.

Table 5.1 / Does Israel's state education system today offer equal opportunity in practice to children from all backgrounds and sectors? 2019 and 2023 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

		There is equal opportunity	There is not equal opportunity	Don't know	Total
Jews	2019	30	68.5	1.5	100
	2023	37	54	9	100
Arabs	2019	34	64	2	100
	2023	46.5	53	0.5	100

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals that respondents from the Left and Center are more inclined to perceive the system as being unequal than those on the Right: Three-quarters of those on the Left, a majority (though smaller) in the Center, and close to one-half on the Right hold that equal opportunity for all students does **not** exist in the state education system at present. However, in all three political camps, there has been a decline in recent years in the share of respondents who assert that equality is not being put into practice.

Table 5.2 / Think that the state education system does not offer equal opportunity, 2019 and 2023 (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)

	2019	2023
Left	85	75
Center	69	57
Right	63	48

Breaking down the findings in the Jewish sample by religiosity, it emerges that only among the secular respondents is there a majority (62%) who hold that there is an absence of equal opportunity in the education system, while only about half feel this way in the remaining religious groups (traditional non-religious, 48%; traditional religious, 46%; national religious, 48%; Haredim, 49%).

Analyzing the secular group by political orientation, we found a majority (of varying sizes) in all camps who point to a lack of equal opportunity in the education system; yet, this majority is greater among secular respondents from the Left and Center (76% and 62%, respectively) than among those from the Right (53%).

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by education shows that the higher the level of education, the stronger the perception that there is no equal opportunity in the country's state education system (full high school or less, 47%; yeshiva high school, 51%; post-secondary or partial academic, 55%; bachelor's degree or higher, 58.5%).

An analysis of the Jewish sample by age shows that the greatest share of respondents who see inequality in the education system is found in the 35–54 age group—the cohort that apparently has the most contact with the system, as parents of school-age children (at 60%, versus 53% and 48%, respectively, for respondents aged 18–34 and 55+). We did not find significant differences in this regard between men and women, or among respondents from different income levels.

By contrast, in the Arab sample, income level was one of the primary variables associated with views on equal opportunity in the education system: A majority of 64% of low income earners think that such equality does not exist, compared with a sizeable minority (47%) of those with average incomes, and 43% of those with above-average incomes. Interviewees with academic degrees are slightly more inclined to note a lack of equality than those with lower levels of education (full high school or less, 50%; post-secondary/partial academic, 49%; bachelor's degree or higher, 58%). The share who hold that equal opportunity does not exist is highest among Christians (62%), as compared with Muslims (54.5%) and Druze (just 35%).

We examined whether there is a connection between the perception of unequal opportunity in the education system and responses to other questions, and found that it is closely associated with the corresponding assessment of the legal system (chapter 2, question 40, p. 77): A small majority (61%) of those respondents who hold that the courts do not offer equal treatment to defendants from all backgrounds and sectors also feel this way with regard to the education system. Conversely, those who think that the courts treat all defendants equally tend to take a similar view of the education system.

An additional variable that correlates significantly with a sense of equal opportunity in the education system is the view that Israel upholds the human and civil rights of its residents (chapter 2, question 37, p. 79). Whereas respondents who believe that the country respects their civil rights are evenly split between those who think that the education system is egalitarian and those who do not, among those who feel that the state does not uphold their rights, there is a clear tendency to see the education system as unequal.

Table 5.3 / Perception of equal opportunity in the state education system (total sample, by assessment of equal treatment before the courts, and by the sense that human and civil rights are upheld; %)

		There is equality in the education system	There is not equality in the education system	Don't know	Total
Do the courts accord equal treatment to defendants from all backgrounds and sectors?	Yes	55	41	4	100
	No	32	61	7	100
To what extent does the state uphold your human and civil rights?	Upholds	45	47	8	100
	Does not uphold	29.5	64.5	6	100

Debating burning political issues in the classroom

Question 26


Appendix 1, p. 185

Appendix 2, p. 213

Freedom of expression and pluralism, which are democratic principles of the utmost importance, are reflected, inter alia, in the ability to hold in-depth discussions of pressing issues where every participant can voice their opinion. Such debates encourage critical discourse, and have the capacity to generate consensus as a foundation for coexistence. In the context of the protests against the judicial reforms, the education system—and teachers themselves—are grappling, on an almost daily basis, with the discussion of burning issues in junior high school and high school classrooms. While discussions of this type promote dialogue, if they are not guided properly by the teaching staff, they are liable to degenerate into stormy exchanges. There are also those who argue that discussion of political issues is not part of the formal curriculum, and should thus be left outside the classroom.

We therefore asked the survey participants: “Should teachers in junior high and high schools discuss burning political issues with their students, in the appropriate classes?” We found that two-thirds of the total sample hold that teachers should speak with their students about current affairs, while roughly one-third believe that such discussions are undesirable. Public support for classroom debate on political issues has decreased slightly since the last time we posed this question, in 2011, when three-quarters of the total sample supported this notion.

Figure 5.2 / Should teachers in junior high and high schools discuss burning political issues with their students, in the appropriate classes? 2011 and 2023 (total sample; %)



In the Jewish sample, less than two-thirds (64%) think that pressing political issues should be discussed with junior high and high school students. This represents a certain decline since 2011, when the share of Jews who held this view stood at 77%; however, it is still the majority opinion. By contrast, the Arab sample registered a slight increase in 2023, from 71% in 2011 to 75% this year.


In the Jewish sample, we found that the older the respondents, the greater their support for classroom discussions on burning political issues, with 60% backing in the 18–34 age group, 66% among those aged 35–54, and 67% in the 55+ cohort; yet, in the Arab sample, we encountered the opposite trend, with higher age groups expressing less support for such classroom debates: 81% in the 18–34 cohort, 78.5% in the 35–54 age group; and 56% among respondents aged 55 and over.

Jewish and Arab women alike tend to be more supportive than men of discussing pressing political topics at school, though a majority across the board are in favor (Jews: women, 69%; men, 60%; Arabs: women, 79%; men, 71%).

In the Jewish sample, the most salient differences were found when breaking down the data by religiosity. Support for classroom discussion of political issues is strongest in the secular group, where more than three-quarters (77%) back the idea. Among national religious and traditional non-religious respondents as well, the majority hold that political matters should be discussed with students (65% in both groups); however, this view is shared by only a minority—albeit a sizeable one—of the traditional religious (46%), and an even smaller share (roughly one-third) of Haredim.

A breakdown of the findings in the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals that a majority in all three camps think teachers should talk with students in junior high and high school about current affairs; but on the Left, a decisive majority favor this course of action, compared with about two-thirds in the Center, and a slim majority on the Right.

Figure 5.3 / Think or are certain that burning political issues should be discussed with junior high and high school students during the appropriate classes (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



We found further, in the Jewish sample, that the higher the levels of income and education, the greater the backing for classroom discussion of political topics. Support is especially low (at 37%) among those who have studied in post-secondary yeshivot, who for the most part are Haredim.

Table 5.4 / Think or are certain that burning political issues should be discussed with junior high and high school students during the appropriate classes (Jewish sample, by level of income and education; %)


Income	Below average	55
	Average	67
	Above average	72
Education	Full high school or less	55
	Post-secondary/partial academic	68
	Bachelor's degree or higher	72

In the Arab sample, we did not find a clear association between support for political discussion in the school setting, and income, education, or religion.

The state education system, which is entrusted with educating the younger generation, is expected to strike the right balance between instilling democratic values and Jewish values. Jewish respondents were asked if they agree with the idea that it is better to cut back on civics and democracy studies, and devote more hours to Jewish history and love of the Land of Israel. We found that a majority (62%) disagree with this assertion—a proportion slightly greater than in 2019, when 58% were opposed.

A breakdown of the sample by religiosity points to sizeable disparities between the groups: A very large majority of secular respondents, and a clear majority of traditional non-religious, are against reducing civics and democracy studies in favor of additional hours of Jewish history and love of the land. At the same time, a substantial majority of Haredim agree with such a change, while the national religious and traditional religious are almost evenly split between those who agree and those who disagree, with a slight edge for those who are opposed.

Figure 5.4 / It is better to cut back on civics and democracy studies, and devote more hours to Jewish history and love of the Land of Israel (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)



Similarly, we found significant differences when analyzing based on political orientation: A substantial majority of respondents from the Left and Center disagree with the proposition that civics and democracy studies should be reduced, and more hours added to the study of Jewish history and love of the land, while only around one-half on the Right take this position. Nonetheless, opposition to this notion has grown in all three camps since 2019.

Table 5.5 / Disagree that it is better to cut back on civics and democracy studies, and devote more hours to Jewish history and love of the Land of Israel (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)

	2019	2023
Left	87	94
Center	70	79
Right	39.5	49

A breakdown of the total sample by sex shows a significant gap between men and women on the subject of reducing civics and democracy studies. A considerable majority (70%) of women disagree with such a move, while a majority of men share this view but by a smaller margin (55%). As with the question of equal opportunity in the education system, here too we found a more unequivocal stance in the 35–54 age group, many of whom are parents to school-age children. A considerable majority of this group (71%) are opposed to reducing civics and democracy studies, as contrasted with relatively small majorities of 57% in the 18–34 cohort, and 59% in the oldest age group (55 and over).

On this question, much like the previous one (concerning classroom discussion of pressing political issues), we found that the higher the level of respondents' income and education, the greater their tendency to oppose reducing civics and democracy studies. As expected, here too, those who completed post-secondary yeshivot (that is, mainly Haredi men) run counter to this trend, with only about one-quarter disapproving of such cutbacks.


Table 5.6 / Disagree that it is better to cut back on civics and democracy studies, and devote more hours to Jewish history and love of the Land of Israel (Jewish sample, by income and education; %)

Income	Below average	52
	Average	59
	Above average	72
Education	Full high school or less	55
	Post-secondary/partial academic	66
	Bachelor's degree or higher	70

To understand the connection between respondents' perceptions of the definition of Israel as a "Jewish and democratic state" and their desire to influence the balance between the two components by way of the country's school system, we cross-tabulated the responses to the question of whether there is a good balance

between the Jewish and the democratic aspects of the state’s identity, and the responses regarding a reduction in civics and democracy studies and an increase in the study of Jewish history and love of the land. We found that a majority of those who hold that the democratic component is too strong agree with the idea of cutting back on civics and democracy studies in favor of Jewish history and love of the land, while a larger majority of those who feel that the Jewish element is too strong disagree with this proposal.

Figure 5.5 / It is better to cut back on civics and democracy studies, and devote more hours to Jewish history and love of the Land of Israel (Jewish sample, by position on the appropriate balance between the Jewish and democratic components of Israel’s identity; %)



We asked whether the state should fund cultural and artistic institutions and activities. Our findings show that a substantial majority (81% of the total sample) believe that it should; however, this majority is slightly smaller than the last time it was measured, five years ago, when 85% favored such funding. The share who hold that the state should fund arts and culture is lower this year in the Jewish sample than in the Arab one (79% and 94%, respectively).


State funding of arts and culture?

Question 27

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Figure 5.6 / Should the state fund cultural and artistic institutions and activities? 2018 and 2023 (total sample; %)



A breakdown of the Jewish sample by religiosity reveals that, in all the religious groups with the exception of Haredim, the majority are in favor of state funding for cultural and artistic institutions, with the largest majority found among secular respondents (90%). A comparison with the previous measurement, in 2018, shows a shift only in the two traditional groups, where the share who support this position has declined significantly. Likewise, an analysis based on political orientation reveals a majority who favor state funding of arts and culture in all three camps, with a decisive majority on the Left and smaller majorities in the Center and on the Right, in proportions similar to those of five years ago.

Table 5.7 / Think or are certain that the state should fund cultural and artistic institutions and activities, 2018 and 2023 (Jewish sample, by religiosity and political orientation; %)

		2018	2023
Religiosity	Haredim	64	62
	National religious	74	73
	Traditional religious	86	69.5
	Traditional non-religious	87	75
	Secular	91	90
Political orientation	Left	95	94
	Center	90	83.5
	Right	78	74

Breaking down the Jewish sample by sex, we found that women tend more than men to support state funding of cultural and artistic institutions (85.5% and 72%, respectively), while a breakdown by age reveals that the level of support is lower in younger age groups than in older cohorts (70% in the 18–34 age group, versus 82% and 85%, respectively, among respondents aged 35–54 and 55+). This marks a noticeable decline among younger respondents since the previous occasion on which we asked this question, when 80% held that the state should fund arts and culture; by contrast, the older cohorts show little change from the 2018 levels (86% in the 35–54 age group, and 89% among respondents aged 55 and over).

We also found differences when breaking down the Jewish sample by level of education and income. When analyzed by education, the gaps were relatively moderate (high school or less, and post-secondary, 78%; bachelor’s degree or higher, 84%), while the disparities between income levels were more striking: below average, 71%; average, 76%; above average, 89%.

A breakdown of the Arab sample by various demographic variables yields a very high share in all subgroups (over 90%) who hold that the state should fund cultural and artistic institutions and activities.

We have seen that there is broad-based support for state funding of artistic and cultural institutions. A further question in this context concerns the right of the state to be involved in determining cultural and artistic content in the institutions and activities that it finances. We therefore posed the question: “At present, the state funds cultural and artistic institutions and activities. In your opinion, does this give it the right to be involved in determining the cultural and artistic content of these institutions and activities?” In the total sample, a small majority (53%) think or are certain that the state does not have the right to intervene in cultural content, as opposed to a sizeable minority (42%) who take the opposite view. In comparison with the previous survey on this question five years ago, there has been a slight shift in the direction of opposing state involvement in cultural and artistic content.


**State involvement
in determining
cultural content**

Question 28

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
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Figure 5.7 / Does the state’s funding of culture and art give it the right to be involved in determining cultural and artistic content? 2018 and 2023 (total sample; %)



A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation yielded the most notable gaps between groups. On the Right, a majority—albeit a slim one—think that the state has the right to be involved in cultural and artistic content in cases where it funds or subsidizes such activities, in contrast with the Center and Left, where a decisive majority are opposed to state involvement in this context. Nonetheless, it is also worth noting that there has been a decline on the Right since 2018 in the share who favor state involvement in determining cultural content.

Figure 5.8 / Does the state's funding of culture and art give it the right to be involved in determining cultural and artistic content? 2018 and 2023 (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



An analysis of the findings in the Jewish sample based on religiosity shows that the secular respondents are the only group in which a majority hold that the state's funding of arts and culture does not give it the right to be involved in content. The traditional non-religious group is divided on this issue, while only a minority in the other religious groups would deny the state the right to have a say in this area.

Table 5.8 / The state's funding of arts and culture does **not** give it the right to be involved in determining cultural and artistic content, 2018 and 2023 (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)

	2018	2023
Haredim	40	42.5
National religious	18	32
Traditional religious	40	38
Traditional non-religious	50	50
Secular	72.5	71

Additional breakdowns of the Jewish sample reveal that women are more opposed than men to state involvement in artistic content (59% and 49%, respectively), and that older adults are more against it than their younger counterparts (47% in the 18–34 age group, compared with 57% and 58%, respectively, in the 35–54 and 55+ cohorts). In addition, the higher the level of income and education, the greater the tendency to oppose state intervention in cultural content.

Table 5.9 / The state’s funding of arts and culture does **not** give it the right to be involved in determining cultural and artistic content (Jewish sample, by income and education; %)

Income	Below average	48
	Average	51
	Above average	61
Education	Full high school or less	47.5
	Post-secondary/partial academic	61
	Bachelor’s degree or higher	57

We found further that, of those respondents in the total sample who favor state funding of culture and the arts, the majority are opposed to state involvement in content, whereas a (small) majority of those who are against such funding in fact believe that the state’s financial support of culture gives it the right to be involved in determining artistic content.

Table 5.10 / Approval or disapproval of state involvement in cultural and artistic content (total sample, by position on state funding of cultural and artistic institutions and activities; %)

	Funding gives the state the right to determine content	Funding does not give the state the right to determine content	Don’t know	Total
The state should fund artistic and cultural institutions and activities	40	57	3	100
The state should not fund artistic and cultural institutions and activities	53	42.5	4.5	100

Chapter 6 / Toward a New Social Contract?

In this chapter, we discuss the following topics:

- Is there a national consensus in Israel today?
- Was there such a consensus in the past?
- Public interest in politics
- Politicians' attentiveness to the public
- Importance of a constitution for Israel, and the chances of one being enacted within the next ten years
- Likelihood of a “new social contract” following the protests against the judicial reforms

The events of the first half of 2023 refocused public attention on a range of issues and questions concerning the character and future course of the State of Israel that were long neglected due to more immediate concerns, and perhaps for fear that addressing them head-on might expose unbridgeable differences. We have repeatedly examined some of these issues in our annual *Democracy Index* (among them, the balance between the Jewish and democratic aspects of Israel's identity, the most acute social tension in Israel, and the desire to remain in Israel or to emigrate), and presented a comparison of the findings from 2003 through 2022 in the *Israeli Democracy Index 2022*, marking twenty years of this project.

In the preceding chapters of this year's report, we saw the depth of the polarization, the enormity of the gap in expectations between the various camps, and the extent to which each side is entrenched in its own positions. We saw further the decline in the sense of internal solidarity, and the great fears for the future. This leads us to the question of whether, given all this, there is still a willingness to make the effort to build a common foundation suited to our times, be it substantive, in the form of a constitution, or largely procedural. For this reason, beyond the usual annual analyses drawn from current events, we attempted in the present *Index* to conduct an initial examination of whether there is an emerging aspiration in the Israeli public to formulate a new social contract—between the leadership and the citizenry, or between different groups of citizens.

Establishing a new social contract requires a basis of shared values. Hence we posed the question: “Do you feel that there is a common set of values and understandings shared by a majority of Israelis today (a national consensus)?” In the total sample, a majority—albeit not large (57%)—hold that such a basis does not exist at present, meaning that, in their view, the foundation of values on which to build a broad consensus is lacking. Yet, perhaps there is some small consolation in the fact that the greater share of respondents (42%) chose the “softer” response option of “I think there is not” (versus some 15% who stated “I'm certain there is not”), suggesting that they are not entirely convinced that all is lost.


An interesting finding, which will need to be revisited in future, is that a greater proportion of Jewish than of Arab respondents hold that there is not a national consensus at present (59% versus 48%, respectively).

Is there a national consensus?

Question 60


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Figure 6.1 / Hold that there is **not** a common set of values and understandings shared by a majority of Israelis today (a national consensus) (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



In keeping with the findings presented earlier in this report, a breakdown of the results in the Jewish sample by political orientation shows that the more pessimistic respondents in this regard hail from the Left and Center, though in all three camps, a majority believe that there is not a set of common values and understandings held by most Israelis.

Figure 6.2 / Hold that there is **not** a common set of values and understandings shared by a majority of Israelis today (a national consensus) (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



A breakdown of the Jewish sample by religiosity reveals that secular respondents feel especially strongly that there is no consensus; but here too, the largest share opted for the less certain response choice. The national religious are the least pessimistic of all the religious subgroups on this question.

Table 6.1 / Hold that there is **not** a common set of values and understandings shared by a majority of Israelis today (a national consensus) (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)

	Certain there is not	Think there is not	Total
Haredim	24	35	59
National religious	8	37	45
Traditional religious	11	39	50
Traditional non-religious	12.5	41	53.5
Secular	20	50	70

Among Jewish young people, the share who hold that there is no national consensus in Israel today is noticeably lower than that in the two older cohorts (52% in the 18–34 age group, versus 59.5% among those aged 35–54, and 66.5% in the 55-and-over group). In other words, members of the older groups, who lived during times when the real, or imagined, sense of common values was stronger, are more pessimistic than their younger counterparts. Among Arab interviewees, the differences between age groups are negligible.

We broke down the responses to this question by two variables that we considered relevant for understanding the differences on this subject between various groups in the Israeli public. Accordingly, among those respondents who rate the level of social solidarity in Israel as low or middling, we found a majority who hold that there is not a shared value base. By contrast, among those who give social solidarity a high score, only a minority take this view. The same holds true when we break down the responses to the consensus question by the perception of Israel's overall situation today: Of those who characterize the country's position as good, only a minority hold that there is no foundation of common values, compared with much higher proportions who feel this way among those respondents who view Israel's overall situation as so-so or bad.

Table 6.2 / Is there a common set of values and understandings shared by a majority of Israelis today (a national consensus)? (total sample, by selected variables; %)

		Is there a national consensus in Israel today?			
		Think/certain there is	Think/certain there is not	Don't know	Total
Solidarity level of Israeli society as a whole	Low (1–4)	27	67.5	5.5	100
	Middling (5–6)	37	52	11	100
	High (7–10)	57	36	7	100
Israel's overall situation today	Good	54	40	6	100
	So-so	36	54	10	100
	Bad	24	69	7	100


Certain groups in Israeli society tend to wax nostalgic about a past (perhaps imagined) when there was supposedly broad-based agreement about basic values—that is, a solid national consensus. We asked: “To the best of your knowledge, was there a national consensus among a majority of the Israeli public in the past?” In the total sample, a small majority (54.5%) think or are certain that there was, while a minority (27%) think or are certain that there was not, and a relatively high proportion of respondents selected the response “don’t know.” In other words, there seems to be only a very modest level of nostalgia for the past.

Was there a national consensus in the past?

Question 61

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Figure 6.3 / Was there a national consensus among a majority of the Israeli public in the past? (total sample; %)



We did not find any real difference between Jews and Arabs in the proportion of those who think a shared national consensus existed in the past (54% and 57%, respectively). However, there were differences between political camps in the Jewish sample: On the Left, which was historically the dominant political camp in Israel, roughly two-thirds of respondents (64%) hold that there used to be a national consensus in Israel, compared with more than half (58%) in the Center, and about one-half on the Right (52%).

Once again, we found differences by age in the Jewish sample: Older respondents, to a much larger extent than their younger counterparts, think or are certain that a national consensus existed in Israel in the past (18–34 age group, 45.5%; 35–54, 54%; 55+, 64%). On this question as well, the differences between age groups in the Arab sample are very slight.

Cross-tabulating the responses to the last two questions, we found that, of those who hold that there is a national consensus in Israel today, a considerable majority also believe that there was a shared set of values in the past. By contrast, among those who think that there is no shared foundation of values today in Israel, opinions about the past are divided, with a slightly greater proportion of respondents (though still not a majority) holding that such a consensus did once exist.

Table 6.3 / Was there a national consensus among a majority of Israelis in the past, by opinion on whether such a consensus exists today? (total sample; %)

		Was there a national consensus among a majority of the Israeli public in the past?			
		Think/certain there was	Think/certain there was not	Don't know	Total
Is there a national consensus in Israel today?	Think/certain there is	75	16	9	100
	Think/certain there is not	49	38	13	100


Public interest in politics

Question 58

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The Israeli public is known for its high level of political awareness, all the more so following many months of intense protest and impassioned public debate surrounding the judicial reforms put forward by the government. We wished to know whether, in the opinion of the respondents, the Israeli public's interest in politics has increased, decreased, or stayed the same in the wake of the demonstrations. In this case, we found a high level of agreement: In the total sample, some two-thirds (64%) hold that the public's interest in politics rose with the wave of anti-reform protests; less than a quarter (23%) believe that it remained unchanged; and only a small proportion (8%) think that it decreased. This assessment is shared by all three political camps in the Jewish sample.

Figure 6.4 / Hold that the Israeli public's interest in politics has increased following the protests against the judicial reforms (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



A breakdown of the Jewish sample by age shows no differences between the groups in their assessment of the level of interest in politics on the part of the Israeli public, with a sizeable majority in all age groups saying that it had increased: 68%, 70%, and 68.5%, respectively, in the 18–34, 35–54, and 55+ age groups.

Apparently because the Arab public in Israel was less exposed to the anti-reform protests, the share of Arab interviewees who hold that the level of interest in politics has increased is significantly lower than the corresponding share of Jews (41% versus 69%).

Politicians' attentiveness to the public


Question 59

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The formulation of a new social contract calls for collaboration between citizens and political leaders. Consequently, we posed the question: "In your opinion, since the start of the protests against the judicial reforms, has politicians' attentiveness to the demands of the public increased, decreased, or remained the same?" In the total sample, the most common opinion is that the level of attentiveness of the leadership has not changed (42%), while one-third (34%) think that it has declined, and only slightly less than one-fifth (17%), that it has increased.

Jewish and Arab positions on this question differ, with a majority of Arab interviewees holding that politicians' attentiveness has remained the same, while Jewish respondents are split between those who think it has not changed and those who feel it has decreased.

Figure 6.5 / In your opinion, since the start of the protests against the judicial reforms, has politicians' attentiveness to the demands of the public increased, decreased, or remained the same? (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



In the Jewish sample, we found differences on this question between the political camps: Among respondents from the Left and Center, the highest proportion hold that politicians' responsiveness to the public has declined, while on the Right, the sense is that it has remained the same.

Table 6.4 / In your opinion, since the start of the protests against the judicial reforms, has politicians' attentiveness to the demands of the public increased, decreased, or remained the same? (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)

	Increased	Stayed the same	Decreased	Don't know	Total
Left	12	33	50	5	100
Center	15	36	43	6	100
Right	20	43	31	6	100

As illustrated in the following table, for the most part, perceptions of the public's level of interest in politics go hand in hand with assessments of the leadership's attentiveness, with the exception of those respondents who feel that public interest has increased, of whom only a minority think that leaders' responsiveness has risen in tandem. By contrast, a majority of those respondents who hold that public interest in politics has stayed the same also think this way regarding the extent of politicians' attentiveness, and likewise, a majority of those who think that interest in politics has waned, identify a similar pattern in the attention paid by politicians' to the public.

Table 6.5 Israeli public's level of interest in politics (total sample, by politicians' level of attentiveness to the public; %)

	Politicians' level of attentiveness to the public					
	Increased	Stayed the same	Decreased	Don't know	Total	
Israeli public's interest in politics	Increased	22	39	35	4	100
	Stayed the same	11	58	28	3	100
	Decreased	5	36	58	1	100

Does Israel need a constitution?

Question 35


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For years, the question of whether a constitution is crucial to the functioning of democracy in Israel has remained unresolved, along with the related question of whether it is even possible to enact one, since at the natural juncture for such a step—when Israel became an independent state—power struggles between proponents and opponents (particularly in Haredi circles) of a constitution, led to its deferral. We therefore asked: “Israel has not had a constitution since its founding. In your view, how important is it that Israel have a constitution?” Roughly three-quarters (73%) of the total sample responded that it is quite or very important (hereafter conflated to “important”). Among Arab interviewees, the share who consider it important is 78%, and among Jews, 72%.

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by religiosity shows that today as well, the proportion of Haredim who attach importance to a constitution is the lowest among the religious groups; however, at least according to this survey, almost half their number are in favor. Among secular respondents, a decisive majority hold that it is important that Israel have a constitution.

Figure 6.6 / Consider it important that Israel have a constitution (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)



While a considerable majority in all three political camps in the Jewish sample believe it is important for Israel to have a constitution, this share is larger among respondents from the Left and Center, and smaller on the Right (86%, 83%, and 65.5%, respectively).

As shown in the following table, a substantial majority of those who agree that democratic rule in Israel is in grave danger consider it important that Israel have a constitution, as compared with a noticeably smaller majority among those who do not agree that Israeli democracy is at risk.

Table 6.6 / Is it important that Israel have a constitution? (total sample, by agreement/disagreement that democratic rule in Israel is in grave danger; %)

	Is it important that Israel have a constitution?				
	Important	Not important	Don't know	Total	
Israeli democracy is in grave danger	Agree	84	10	6	100
	Disagree	59.5	29	11.5	100


Likelihood that Israel will have a constitution within ten years

Question 36

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Although (as we saw above) a substantial majority of the survey respondents hold that it is important for Israel to have a constitution, only a minority (roughly one-fifth) anticipate that one will be enacted in the coming decade. The majority believe that the chances of a constitution being passed into law are low to non-existent.

Figure 6.7 / What is the likelihood that Israel will have a constitution within ten years? (total sample; %)



We did not encounter differences on this question when breaking down the Jewish sample by religiosity. Similarly, we did not find differences regarding the probability of a constitution being enacted between those respondents who considered such a move important and those who did not.

Table 6.7 / What is the likelihood that Israel will have a constitution within ten years? (total sample, by importance attached to enacting a constitution; %)

	Likelihood of a constitution within ten years				
	High	Low	Don't know	Total	
Is it important that Israel have a constitution?	Important	26	62	12	100
	Not important	11	73	16	100


Likelihood of a new social contract between citizens and the government

Question 62

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Given the gloomy national mood at the time the survey was conducted, we examined whether there is nonetheless some small glimmer of hope that the political struggles will bring about a positive recalibration of the relationship between the public and their political leaders. We therefore posed the question: "In your opinion, what is the likelihood that Israel's recent political battles will give rise to a 'new social-political contract' between citizens and the government?" Based on the responses, a majority of 65% think that the chances of such a scenario are not high.


Figure 6.8 / What is the likelihood that Israel’s recent political battles will give rise to a “new social-political contract” between citizens and the government? (total sample; %)



Somewhat surprisingly, there is virtually no difference between the three political camps in the Jewish sample on this question: In each case, roughly two-thirds hold that the likelihood of such a contract between citizens and the leadership is low (Left, 66%; Center, 65%; Right, 65%). The same holds true regarding voters for Coalition and Opposition parties (62% and 68%, respectively).

If not between citizens and the government, then perhaps a new contract will emerge between different groups of citizens? We asked: “In your opinion, what is the likelihood that Israel’s recent political battles will give rise to a ‘new social-political contract’ between the different groups in Israeli society?” The results were very similar to those in the previous question, with some two-thirds of respondents (66%) holding that the chances of this happening are poor.

Figure 6.9 / What is the likelihood that Israel’s recent political battles will give rise to a “new social-political contract” between the different groups in Israeli society? (total sample; %)



Likelihood of a new social contract between groups in Israeli society

Question 63

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A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals that, in each of the three camps, a majority hold that the chances of a new social contract between the various groups are low, with the Left being the most pessimistic, at 75%, compared with 68% in the Center and 66% on the Right.

Cross-tabulating the findings on the likelihood of a new social-political contract between groups in Israeli society with responses on the chances of such a contract between citizens and the government, we found the two assessments to be closely connected.

Table 6.8 / Likelihood of a new social-political contract between different groups in society (total sample, by likelihood of a new social-political contract between citizens and the government; %)

	Likelihood of a new social-political contract between different groups in society				
	High	Low	Don't know	Total	
Likelihood of a new social-political contract between citizens and government	High	67	32	1	100
	Low	13	85.5	1.5	100

To summarize this chapter and the previous ones, the public climate (as it emerges from the survey results) is marked by profound differences of opinion. In fact, the prevailing sentiment is that there is no basis for planning a common future, with no small number of Israelis doubtful that such a basis ever existed. On the one hand, many perceive a rise in the public's level of interest in politics; yet on the other, they do not see a parallel, or corresponding, rise in the degree of attentiveness to the public on the part of those who hold the reins of power. If this is indeed the case, there is little chance that this increased public interest will translate into the forging of a new social contract.

And finally, it would seem that the debate over the need for a constitution has made inroads into public discourse, with a growing realization among most groups in Israeli society of the importance of such a step; however, only a small proportion of the population see the enactment of a constitution as an attainable goal in the short term. In light of the above, the Israeli public—at least at the theoretical level—does not see the situation (as it stood at the time of our survey) as conducive to bringing about positive systemic change in the foreseeable future.

Appendices

Appendix 1 / Questionnaire and Distribution of Responses (total sample, Jewish sample, Arab sample; %)

1. How would you characterize Israel's overall situation today?

	Very good	Good	So-so	Bad	Very bad	Don't know	Total
Jews	4.1	17.1	35.7	24.7	17.6	0.8	100
Arabs	4.2	13.4	22.7	28.5	30.2	1.0	100
Total sample	4.1	16.5	33.5	25.3	19.7	0.9	100

Discussion
on p. 20

2. To what extent do you feel part of the State of Israel and its problems?

	Very much	Quite a lot	Not so much	Not at all	Don't know	Total
Jews	41.9	43.4	10.0	2.1	2.6	100
Arabs	17.9	29.7	33.7	17.2	1.5	100
Total sample	37.9	41.1	14.0	4.6	2.4	100

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on p. 23

3. How would you rate the level of solidarity (sense of "togetherness") of Israeli society as a whole (Jews, Arabs, and all other citizens), where 1 = no solidarity at all and 10 = very high level of solidarity?

	1 – No solidarity/ sense of togetherness at all	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 – Very high level of solidarity	Don't know	Total	Mean rating (1–10)
Jews	11.4	9.0	17.9	13.8	15.6	10.3	9.8	6.0	2.0	1.5	2.7	100	4.39
Arabs	32.1	4.9	9.4	12.1	25.1	6.2	4.7	2.7	1.0	1.8	0.0	100	3.62
Total sample	14.9	8.3	16.5	13.5	17.2	9.7	9.0	5.4	1.8	1.5	2.2	100	4.26

Discussion
on p. 123

Discussion
on p. 123

4. (Jewish respondents) How would you rate the level of solidarity (sense of “togetherness”) of Jewish society in Israel?

	1 – No solidarity/ sense of togetherness at all	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 – Very high level of solidarity	Don't know	Total	Mean rating (1–10)
Jews	6.8	5.7	12.6	13.3	17.2	12.0	13.1	10.7	3.7	2.7	2.2	100	5.16

Discussion
on p. 64

5. How would you rate Israeli democracy today on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 = very poor and 5 = excellent?

	1 – Very poor	2	3	4	5 – Excellent	Don't know	Total	Mean rating (1–5)
Jews	18.4	25.2	23.8	19.8	9.8	3.0	100	2.77
Arabs	56.2	10.9	22.5	4.4	5.9	0.1	100	1.93
Total sample	24.7	22.8	23.6	17.3	9.2	2.4	100	2.63

Discussion
on p. 28

6. If you could receive American citizenship, or that of another Western country, would you prefer to live there or to remain in Israel?

	I would prefer to live there	I would prefer to remain in Israel	Don't know	Total
Jews	17.9	70.3	11.8	100
Arabs	37.6	62.4	0.0	100
Total sample	21.2	69.0	9.8	100

To what extent do you trust each of the following individuals or institutions?

Discussion
on p. 104

7. The media

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know	Total
Jews	33.7	38.3	21.2	3.9	2.9	100
Arabs	35.3	46.6	13.5	4.0	0.6	100
Total sample	34.0	39.7	20.0	3.9	2.4	100

8. The Supreme Court

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know	Total
Jews	27.6	26.4	22.7	19.2	4.1	100
Arabs	32.0	38.3	22.2	3.4	4.1	100
Total sample	28.4	28.3	22.6	16.6	4.1	100

Discussion
on p. 95

9. The police

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know	Total
Jews	18.6	45.1	28.3	6.4	1.6	100
Arabs	47.0	34.8	14.2	2.9	1.1	100
Total sample	23.3	43.4	26.0	5.8	1.5	100

Discussion
on p. 99

10. The President of Israel

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know	Total
Jews	14.2	26.3	29.9	24.0	5.6	100
Arabs	50.2	26.9	11.6	6.2	5.1	100
Total sample	20.1	26.4	26.9	21.0	5.6	100

Discussion
on p. 92

11. The Knesset

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know	Total
Jews	29.1	43.9	20.0	4.2	2.8	100
Arabs	47.4	31.8	14.5	3.5	2.8	100
Total sample	32.1	41.9	19.1	4.1	2.8	100

Discussion
on p. 107

12. The IDF

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know	Total
Jews	3.9	9.3	26.8	58.7	1.3	100
Arabs	43.6	32.7	15.6	5.3	2.8	100
Total sample	10.5	13.2	24.9	49.8	1.6	100

Discussion
on p. 90

Discussion
on p. 101

13. The government

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know	Total
Jews	38.3	30.6	19.9	8.6	2.6	100
Arabs	47.2	33.1	14.0	4.2	1.5	100
Total sample	39.8	31.0	18.9	7.8	2.5	100

Discussion
on p. 110

14. The political parties

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know	Total
Jews	35.2	46.2	10.9	1.9	5.8	100
Arabs	46.3	37.2	11.1	3.9	1.5	100
Total sample	37.0	44.7	10.9	2.2	5.2	100

Discussion
on p. 112

15. Your municipality or local authority

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know	Total
Jews	12.2	30.6	38.1	16.6	2.5	100
Arabs	38.6	32.8	20.7	6.8	1.1	100
Total sample	16.6	31.0	35.2	14.9	2.3	100

Discussion
on p. 114

16. The Attorney General

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know	Total
Jews	31.1	25.2	19.6	14.0	10.1	100
Arabs	47.9	32.7	14.1	2.2	3.1	100
Total sample	33.9	26.5	18.7	12.0	8.9	100

Discussion
on p. 26**17. What is the greatest existential threat facing Israel from within?**

	Israel's control of the West Bank/ Judea and Samaria	Socioeconomic disparities in Israeli society	Jewish-Arab tensions within Israel	Differences of opinion regarding the appropriate balance between Israel as a Jewish state and a democratic state	Low public trust in state institutions	Other	Don't know	Total
Jews	5.3	18.3	24.5	26.6	16.0	5.8	3.5	100
Arabs	24.8	10.9	33.5	9.6	15.7	1.4	4.1	100
Total sample	8.5	17.0	26.0	23.8	16.0	5.2	3.5	100

18. Which of the following is the most acute social tension in Israel today?Discussion
on p. 132

	Between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim	Between religious and secular Jews	Between Right and Left	Between rich and poor	Between Jews and Arabs	Don't know	Total
Jews	2.7	19.3	43.4	4.3	26.3	4.0	100
Arabs	2.9	11.7	14.3	13.6	52.6	4.9	100
Total sample	2.7	18.0	38.6	5.8	30.7	4.2	100

19. In your opinion, is there a difference today between younger and older Israelis in their level of interest in politics?Discussion
on p. 81

	Younger people are more interested	Older people are more interested	Young and old are equally interested	Don't know	Total
Jews	13.4	36.0	36.3	14.3	100
Arabs	19.3	40.5	37.3	2.9	100
Total sample	14.4	36.8	36.5	12.5	100

Discussion
on p. 33

20. To what extent do you agree or disagree that Israel is a good place to live?

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	25.5	41.5	25.1	6.4	1.5	100
Arabs	15.7	49.2	24.1	11.0	--	100
Total sample	23.9	42.8	24.9	7.1	1.3	100

Discussion
on p. 82

21. To what extent do you agree or disagree that the Opposition in Israel is weak, and is not doing its job?

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	17.0	26.4	31.5	15.4	9.7	100
Arabs	31.5	42.7	16.9	8.0	0.9	100
Total sample	19.4	29.1	29.0	14.2	8.3	100

Discussion
on p. 157

22. (Jewish respondents) To what extent do you agree or disagree that it's better to cut back on civics and democracy studies, and devote more hours to Jewish history and love of the Land of Israel?

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	15.6	15.5	30.2	32.2	6.5	100

Discussion
on p. 24

23. To what extent do you agree or disagree that democratic rule in Israel is in grave danger?

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	28.9	26.3	15.9	25.4	3.5	100
Arabs	35.0	40.4	19.1	4.1	1.6	100
Total sample	29.9	28.6	16.4	21.8	3.3	100

24. Many Israelis feel that they belong to a minority group in Israeli society. Do you also feel this way?

Discussion
on p. 128

	Very much	Quite a lot	Not so much	Not at all	Don't know	Total
Jews	14.5	23.8	24.8	31.9	5.0	100
Arabs	36.5	28.3	22.2	13.0	--	100
Total sample	18.2	24.6	24.4	28.8	4.0	100

25a. (Jewish respondents) Do you support or oppose Jewish organizations that act to separate Jewish women and Arab men, or Jewish men and Arab women, who are living together?

Discussion
on p. 136

	Strongly support	Somewhat support	Somewhat oppose	Strongly oppose	Don't know	Total
Jews	27.1	17.0	14.4	30.3	11.2	100

25b. (Arab respondents) Do you support or oppose marriage between:

Discussion
on p. 136

Arabs	Strongly support	Somewhat support	Somewhat oppose	Strongly oppose	Don't know	Total
Jewish men and Arab women	6.5	21.1	24.2	40.5	7.7	100
Arab men and Jewish women	9.8	23.0	25.7	33.7	7.8	100

26. In your opinion, should teachers in junior high and high schools discuss burning political issues with their students, in the appropriate classes?

Discussion
on p. 154

	I'm certain they should	I think they should	I think they should not	I'm certain they should not	Don't know	Total
Jews	23.7	40.6	19.8	10.6	5.3	100
Arabs	53.4	21.4	13.5	11.0	0.7	100
Total sample	28.6	37.4	18.8	10.7	4.5	100

Discussion
on p. 159

27. In your opinion, should the state fund cultural and artistic institutions and activities?

	I'm certain it should	I think it should	I think it should not	I'm certain it should not	Don't know	Total
Jews	36.6	42.3	12.7	4.4	4.0	100
Arabs	75.6	18.4	4.6	1.4	--	100
Total sample	43.1	38.3	11.4	3.9	3.3	100

Discussion
on p. 161

28. At present, the state funds cultural and artistic institutions and activities. In your opinion, does this give it the right to be involved in determining the cultural and artistic content of these institutions and activities?

	I'm certain it does	I think it does	I think it does not	I'm certain it does not	Don't know	Total
Jews	10.7	29.7	30.4	23.6	5.6	100
Arabs	30.1	20.9	26.1	22.9	--	100
Total sample	13.9	28.2	29.7	23.5	4.7	100

Discussion
on p. 72

29. To what extent do you agree or disagree that Jewish citizens of Israel should have more rights than non-Jewish citizens?

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	23.9	19.5	23.2	28.7	4.5	100
Arabs	9.1	22.9	26.0	40.6	1.4	100
Total sample	21.5	20.1	23.7	30.7	4.0	100

30. To what extent do you agree or disagree that human and civil rights organizations, such as the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) and B'Tselem, cause damage to the state?

Discussion
on p. 80

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	.Total
Jews	43.0	17.1	16.2	13.5	10.2	100
Arabs	8.0	24.0	40.0	21.2	6.8	100
Total sample	37.2	18.3	20.2	14.8	9.5	100

31. To what extent do you agree or disagree that it would be best to dismantle all the country's political institutions and start over from scratch?

Discussion
on p. 83

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	15.8	18.2	29.8	27.0	9.2	100
Arabs	19.7	38.9	29.6	8.5	3.3	100
Total sample	16.4	21.7	29.8	23.9	8.2	100

32. (Jewish respondents) To what extent do you agree or disagree that legislation and legal interpretation in Israel should be based primarily on Jewish religious law (mishpat ivri)?

Discussion
on p. 73

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	19.6	18.9	21.9	32.4	7.2	100

33. Which of these statements more accurately represents your views?

Discussion
on p. 61

	Decisions made by a government that has a majority in the Knesset are inherently democratic	Decisions that are opposed to fundamental democratic values such as minority rights and freedom of expression are not democratic, even if they are passed by the government and a Knesset majority	Don't know	Total
Jews	35.9	46.8	17.3	100
Arabs	28.0	67.3	4.7	100
Total sample	34.6	50.2	15.2	100

Discussion
on p. 60

34. In your opinion, which of these four forms of government is the most suitable for Israel under the present circumstances?

	Direct democracy (citizens participate in important decisions between elections as well, for example, by referendum)	Representative democracy (elected representatives make decisions between elections)	Rule by experts (professional experts serve as ministers, e.g., an economist as finance minister, or a physician as health minister)	A strong leader who makes all major decisions independently	Don't know	Total
Jews	31.1	31.7	20.9	6.0	10.3	100
Arabs	31.5	17.8	22.5	25.8	2.4	100
Total sample	31.2	29.4	21.2	9.3	8.9	100

Discussion
on p. 172

35. Israel has not had a constitution since its founding. In your view, how important is it that Israel have a constitution?

	Very important	Quite important	Not so important	Not at all important	Don't know	Total
Jews	39.4	32.7	10.6	6.5	10.8	100
Arabs	42.7	35.3	11.8	7.9	2.3	100
Total sample	39.9	33.2	10.8	6.7	9.4	100

Discussion
on p. 174

36. In your opinion, what is the likelihood that Israel will have a constitution within ten years?

	Very high	Quite high	Quite low	Very low	Don't know	Total
Jews	3.5	13.7	35.4	26.9	20.5	100
Arabs	16.8	27.9	28.1	21.8	5.4	100
Total sample	5.7	16.0	34.2	26.0	18.1	100

37. To what extent do you feel that Israel upholds your human and civil rights?

Discussion
on p. 79

	Very much	Quite a lot	Not so much	Not at all	Don't know	Total
Jews	12.7	45.9	30.0	8.6	2.8	100
Arabs	21.2	33.7	25.3	19.3	0.5	100
Total sample	14.1	43.9	29.2	10.4	2.4	100

38. Do you agree or disagree that the Supreme Court intervenes too much in decisions made by the government?

Discussion
on p. 75

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	32.7	17.0	20.8	21.4	8.1	100
Arabs	24.0	42.2	26.2	5.4	2.2	100
Total sample	31.3	21.2	21.7	18.7	7.1	100

39. In your opinion, does Israel's state education system truly offer equal opportunity to children from all backgrounds and sectors?

Discussion
on p. 151

	I'm certain it does	I think it does	I think it does not	I'm certain it does not	Don't know	Total
Jews	8.6	28.0	34.3	19.4	9.7	100
Arabs	20.1	26.5	27.5	25.2	0.7	100
Total sample	10.5	27.8	33.2	20.4	8.1	100

40. In your opinion, do the courts in Israel accord equal treatment to defendants from all backgrounds and sectors?

Discussion
on p. 77

	I'm certain they do	I think they do	I think they do not	I'm certain they do not	Don't know	Total
Jews	5.3	23.2	31.7	31.1	8.7	100
Arabs	14.5	13.8	32.2	36.8	2.7	100
Total sample	6.8	21.7	31.8	32.1	7.6	100

Discussion
on p. 41

To what extent do you consider each of the following to be an essential component of democracy?

41. Free and fair elections by secret ballot, as prescribed by law

	Very much	Quite a lot	Not so much	Not at all	Don't know	Total
Jews	68.6	19.8	5.2	2.2	4.2	100
Arabs	27.3	30.9	29.3	11.9	0.6	100
Total sample	61.7	21.6	9.2	3.8	3.7	100

Discussion
on p. 44

42. Checks and balances between all three branches of government (legislative, executive, and judicial)

	Very much	Quite a lot	Not so much	Not at all	Don't know	Total
Jews	40.2	26.8	13.6	7.1	12.3	100
Arabs	21.9	31.7	33.3	10.0	3.1	100
Total sample	37.1	27.6	16.9	7.6	10.8	100

Discussion
on p. 42

43. Freedom of expression for all opinions

	Very much	Quite a lot	Not so much	Not at all	Don't know	Total
Jews	49.5	28.5	13.1	5.8	3.1	100
Arabs	20.4	33.1	37.2	9.3	--	100
Total sample	44.7	29.2	17.1	6.4	2.6	100

Discussion
on p. 45

44. Separation of religion and state

	Very much	Quite a lot	Not so much	Not at all	Don't know	Total
Jews	31.7	23.0	18.8	20.4	6.1	100
Arabs	16.9	32.7	36.6	11.9	1.9	100
Total sample	29.2	24.6	21.7	19.0	5.5	100

45. Absence of large income disparities between groups

	Very much	Quite a lot	Not so much	Not at all	Don't know	Total
Jews	21.2	27.8	22.0	21.3	7.7	100
Arabs	23.4	27.8	34.4	13.6	0.8	100
Total sample	21.6	27.8	24.0	20.0	6.6	100

Discussion
on p. 47

46. Equality before the law for all, regardless of religion, race, ethnicity, or sex

	Very much	Quite a lot	Not so much	Not at all	Don't know	Total
Jews	54.5	18.2	12.8	10.9	3.6	100
Arabs	22.6	26.0	34.0	15.7	1.7	100
Total sample	49.2	19.5	16.4	11.7	3.2	100

Discussion
on p. 43

And to what extent are each of the following upheld in practice in Israel?

47. Free and fair elections by secret ballot, as prescribed by law

	Very much	Quite a lot	Not so much	Not at all	Don't know	Total
Jews	52.4	29.0	9.8	4.2	4.6	100
Arabs	13.4	28.2	41.7	15.4	1.3	100
Total sample	45.9	28.9	15.1	6.1	4.0	100

Discussion
on p. 50

48. Checks and balances between all three branches of government (legislative, executive, and judicial)

	Very much	Quite a lot	Not so much	Not at all	Don't know	Total
Jews	14.0	26.6	31.9	15.0	12.5	100
Arabs	8.4	28.7	45.8	14.5	2.6	100
Total sample	13.1	26.9	34.2	14.9	10.9	100

Discussion
on p. 53

Discussion
on p. 52

49. Freedom of expression for all opinions

	Very much	Quite a lot	Not so much	Not at all	Don't know	Total
Jews	21.0	31.4	28.1	15.4	4.1	100
Arabs	7.6	25.3	50.0	17.0	0.1	100
Total sample	18.8	30.4	31.7	15.7	3.4	100

Discussion
on p. 55

50. Separation of religion and state

	Very much	Quite a lot	Not so much	Not at all	Don't know	Total
Jews	9.2	19.1	30.3	34.9	6.5	100
Arabs	10.0	25.4	46.7	17.9	--	100
Total sample	9.3	20.2	33.0	32.1	5.4	100

Discussion
on p. 57

51. Absence of large income disparities between groups

	Very much	Quite a lot	Not so much	Not at all	Don't know	Total
Jews	7.7	11.7	25.6	50.0	5.0	100
Arabs	8.4	24.2	42.0	24.7	0.7	100
Total sample	7.8	13.8	28.3	45.8	4.3	100

Discussion
on p. 53

52. Equality before the law for all, regardless of religion, race, ethnicity, or sex

	Very much	Quite a lot	Not so much	Not at all	Don't know	Total
Jews	12.2	21.3	33.6	27.5	5.4	100
Arabs	8.3	25.7	38.5	26.7	0.8	100
Total sample	11.5	22.0	34.4	27.3	4.8	100

53. Israel is defined as a Jewish and democratic state. Do you feel there is a good balance today between the Jewish and the democratic components?

Discussion
on p. 68

	There is a good balance between the two components	The Jewish component is too dominant	The democratic component is too dominant	Don't know	Total
Jews	20.8	40.5	23.8	14.9	100
Arabs	26.5	59.5	9.0	5.0	100
Total sample	21.8	43.7	21.3	13.2	100

54. How worried are you that you will be unable to maintain your preferred lifestyle because of the increasing power of certain groups in Israeli society that advocate a different way of life from yours?

Discussion
on p. 140

	Very worried	Quite worried	Not so worried	Not at all worried	Don't know	Total
Jews	34.7	31.5	16.0	15.1	2.7	100
Arabs	38.5	41.8	17.5	1.4	0.8	100
Total sample	35.3	33.2	16.3	12.8	2.4	100

55. How worried are you that you will be unable to financially support your children in future?

Discussion
on p. 144

	Very worried	Quite worried	Not so worried	Not at all worried	Don't know	Total
Jews	43.3	28.4	15.3	9.9	3.1	100
Arabs	42.3	41.7	14.5	1.0	0.5	100
Total sample	43.1	30.6	15.2	8.4	2.7	100

56. How worried are you that you will be unable to live in dignity in your old age?

Discussion
on p. 147

	Very worried	Quite worried	Not so worried	Not at all worried	Don't know	Total
Jews	44.0	29.0	15.8	9.5	1.7	100
Arabs	39.7	37.9	19.9	2.5	--	100
Total sample	43.3	30.5	16.5	8.3	1.4	100

Discussion
on p. 66

57. How worried are you that democratic rule in Israel is going to be harmed, and Israel will become a failed state?

	Very worried	Quite worried	Not so worried	Not at all worried	Don't know	Total
Jews	40.3	20.7	15.8	20.7	2.5	100
Arabs	39.8	41.4	16.8	2.0	--	100
Total sample	40.2	24.1	16.0	17.6	2.1	100

Discussion
on p. 170

58. In your opinion, since the start of the protests against the judicial reforms, has the Israeli public's interest in politics:

	Increased	Remained the same	Decreased	Don't know	Total
Jews	68.8	18.7	7.6	4.9	100
Arabs	40.6	44.0	12.0	3.4	100
Total sample	64.1	22.9	8.3	4.7	100

Discussion
on p. 170

59. In your opinion, since the start of the protests against the judicial reforms, has politicians' attentiveness to the demands of the public:

	Increased	Remained the same	Decreased	Don't know	Total
Jews	17.0	39.6	36.1	7.3	100
Arabs	17.1	55.8	24.5	2.6	100
Total sample	17.1	42.3	34.2	6.4	100

Discussion
on p. 165

60. Do you feel that there is a common set of values and understandings shared by a majority of Israelis today (a national consensus)?

	I'm certain there is	I think there is	I think there is not	I'm certain there is not	Don't know	Total
Jews	5.5	25.6	43.4	15.9	9.6	100
Arabs	22.8	29.0	36.9	10.8	0.5	100
Total sample	8.3	26.2	42.3	15.1	8.1	100

61. To the best of your knowledge, was there a national consensus among a majority of the Israeli public in the past?

Discussion
on p. 168

	I'm certain there was	I think there was	I think there wasn't	I'm certain there wasn't	Don't know	Total
Jews	12.2	42.1	19.7	4.9	21.1	100
Arabs	26.4	30.7	34.5	7.0	1.4	100
Total sample	14.5	40.2	22.2	5.3	17.8	100

62. In your opinion, what is the likelihood that Israel's recent political battles will give rise to a "new social-political contract" between citizens and the government?

Discussion
on p. 174

	Very high	Quite high	Quite low	Very low	Don't know	Total
Jews	3.7	19.6	46.5	18.0	12.2	100
Arabs	9.4	23.8	55.1	10.2	1.5	100
Total sample	4.7	20.3	47.9	16.7	10.4	100

63. In your opinion, what is the likelihood that Israel's recent political battles will give rise to a "new social-political contract" between the different groups in Israeli society?

Discussion
on p. 175

	Very high	Quite high	Quite low	Very low	Don't know	Total
Jews	4.1	19.0	45.7	21.1	10.1	100
Arabs	10.7	27.8	51.3	8.7	1.5	100
Total sample	5.2	20.4	46.6	19.0	8.8	100

64. In general, are you optimistic or pessimistic about Israel's future?

Discussion
on p. 31

	Very optimistic	Quite optimistic	Quite pessimistic	Very pessimistic	Don't know	Total
Jews	17.1	35.3	32.5	10.2	4.9	100
Arabs	12.2	28.2	41.9	16.6	1.1	100
Total sample	16.3	34.1	34.1	11.3	4.2	100

Appendix 2 / Distribution of 2023 Survey Results Compared with Previous Years (total sample; Jewish sample; Arab sample; %)

Discussion
on p. 20

1. How would you characterize Israel's overall situation today?

		2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Total sample	Good + very good*	11	13	30	22	15	28	31	40	28	38	35	44	41	37	48	53	50	37	31	25	21
	So-so	26	33	35	38	34	36	38	35	41	40	41	37	39	40	33	30	31	40	42	37	34
	Bad + very bad*	63	53	35	39	50	34	29	24	30	20	22	17	18	23	17	16	18	22	26	37	45
	Don't know	0	1	0	1	1	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	0	2	1	1	1	1	1	0
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Good + very good*	10	13	28	22	12	27	31	37	29	38	37	43	44	36	49	56	50	39	32	27	21
	So-so	27	35	37	39	35	37	42	39	43	41	43	38	38	41	33	29	33	41	45	39	36
	Bad + very bad*	62	52	34	39	53	36	26	23	27	19	18	17	16	22	16	14	16	19	22	34	42
	Don't know	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	0	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Good + very good*	16	15	36	26	28	37	35	55	22	37	27	55	29	39	42	39	48	29	24	18	18
	So-so	18	23	27	35	33	31	13	16	32	38	31	27	40	32	33	32	22	37	27	30	23
	Bad + very bad*	66	62	37	39	37	28	50	25	46	25	39	18	29	28	24	26	29	34	48	52	59
	Don't know	0	0	0	0	2	4	2	4	0	0	3	0	2	1	1	3	1	0	1	0	0
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Up until 2013, the response choices were "quite good" and "quite bad."

Discussion
on p. 23**2. To what extent do you feel part of the State of Israel and its problems?***

		2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Total sample	Very much + quite a lot	90	88	86	87	78	76	84	83	85	83	77	75	79	77	76	79	76	79	79
	Not so much + not at all	10	12	9	13	20	22	16	16	15	16	20	22	19	22	23	20	22	20	19
	Don't know	0	0	5	0	2	2	0	1	0	1	3	3	2	1	1	1	2	1	2
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Very much + quite a lot	94	91	88	91	84	80	88	87	91	88	83	78	88	84	83	85	82	86	85
	Not so much + not at all	6	8	6	9	16	19	12	12	9	10	16	18	10	15	16	14	16	12	12
	Don't know	0	1	6	0	0	1	0	1	0	2	1	4	2	1	1	1	2	2	3
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Very much + quite a lot	53	66	69	51	48	50	51	53	48	45	44	59	32	39	42	43	43	41	48
	Not so much + not at all	46	34	29	49	49	47	46	46	51	54	51	38	67	59	58	56	53	58	51
	Don't know	1	0	2	0	3	3	3	1	1	1	5	3	1	2	0	1	4	1	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* In 2003–2013, 5 response categories were presented: to a very large extent, to a large extent, to some extent, to a small extent, and to a very small extent. For purposes of comparison, we distributed the responses of “to some extent” proportionately between those who answered “to a large extent” and those who answered “to a small extent.”

3. How would you rate the level of solidarity (sense of “togetherness”) of Israeli society as a whole (Jews, Arabs, and all other citizens), where 1 = no solidarity at all and 10 = very high level of solidarity”?Discussion
on p. 123

		2011	2014	2015	2020	2021	2022	2023
Total sample	Mean rating (1–10)	4.78	4.71	5.13	5.35	4.86	4.5	4.26
Jews	Mean rating (1–10)	4.83	4.83	5.26	5.46	5.01	4.65	4.39
Arabs	Mean rating (1–10)	4.49	3.99	4.48	4.76	4.09	3.75	3.62

Discussion
on p. 123

4. (Jewish respondents) How would you rate the level of solidarity (sense of “togetherness”) of Jewish society in Israel?

		2011	2012	2014	2018	2019	2022	2023
Jews	Mean rating (1–10)	5.79	6.17	6.11	5.74	6.00	5.93	5.16

Discussion
on p. 64

5. How would you rate Israeli democracy today on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 = very poor and 5 = excellent?

		2018	2019	2023
Total sample	1 = very poor	18	17	25
	2	13	18	23
	3	33	31	24
	4	23	21	17
	5 = excellent	13	13	9
	Don't know	0	0	2
	Total	100	100	100
	Mean rating (1–5)	3.01	2.95	2.63
Jews	1 = very poor	14	15	18
	2	12	19	25
	3	33	30	24
	4	27	23	20
	5 = excellent	14	12	10
	Don't know	0	1	3
	Total	100	100	100
	Mean rating (1–5)	3.14	2.99	2.77
Arabs	1 = very poor	35	27	56
	2	16	11	11
	3	34	36	23
	4	6	12	4
	5 = excellent	9	14	6
	Don't know	0	0	0
	Total	100	100	100
	Mean rating (1–5)	2.36	2.75	1.93

6. If you could receive American citizenship, or that of another Western country, would you prefer to live there or to remain in Israel?

Discussion
on p. 28

		2015	2017	2019	2021	2022	2023
Total sample	I would prefer to live there	12	15	13	17	18	21
	I would prefer to remain in Israel	84	81	84	72	69	69
	Don't know	4	4	3	11	13	10
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	I would prefer to live there	11	15	12	18	18	18
	I would prefer to remain in Israel	84	81	84	70	67	70
	Don't know	5	4	4	12	15	12
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	I would prefer to live there	15	18	14	15	17	38
	I would prefer to remain in Israel	83	81	84	81	80	62
	Don't know	2	1	2	4	3	0
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Discussion
on p. 112

15. Your municipality or local authority

		2016	2018	2019*	2020	2021	2022	2023
Total sample	Not so much + not at all	47	46	42	38	40	50	48
	Very much + quite a lot	52	53	56	61	57	48	50
	Don't know	1	1	2	1	3	2	2
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Not so much + not at all	44	39	41	35	35	46	43
	Very much + quite a lot	55	60	56	63	62	51	55
	Don't know	1	1	3	2	3	3	2
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Not so much + not at all	66	79	46	52	64	68	71
	Very much + quite a lot	33	19	52	48	32	32	28
	Don't know	1	2	2	0	4	0	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Source: Tamar Hermann et al., *Jews and Arabs: A Conditional Partnership 2019*.

Discussion
on p. 114

16. The Attorney General

		2008	2009	2011	2017	2018	2019*	2020	2022	2023
Total sample	Not so much + not at all	58	43	25	48	50	43	53	65	60
	Very much + quite a lot	34	46	64	42	42	46	42	26	31
	Don't know	8	11	11	10	8	11	5	9	9
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Not so much + not at all	56	38	22	48	45	41	52	62	56
	Very much + quite a lot	35	50	67	44	47	49	44	27	34
	Don't know	9	12	11	8	8	10	4	11	10
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Not so much + not at all	69	72	43	50	78	52	58	78	81
	Very much + quite a lot	24	15	50	31	19	28	34	18	16
	Don't know	7	13	7	19	3	20	8	4	3
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Source: Tamar Hermann et al., *Jews and Arabs: A Conditional Partnership 2019*.

Discussion
on p. 33

20. To what extent do you agree or disagree that Israel is a good place to live?

		2017	2020	2021	2022	2023
Total sample	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	84	76	74	62	67
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	15	23	23	36	32
	Don't know	1	1	3	2	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	86	76	76	64	67
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	13	23	22	34	31
	Don't know	1	1	2	2	2
	Total	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	73	78	66	52	65
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	27	22	28	47	35
	Don't know	0	0	6	1	0
	Total	100	100	100	100	100

Discussion
on p. 82

21. To what extent do you agree or disagree that the Opposition in Israel is weak, and is not doing its job?

		2017	2023
Total sample	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	67	49
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	26	43
	Don't know	7	8
	Total	100	100
Jews	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	66	43
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	28	47
	Don't know	6	10
	Total	100	100
Arabs	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	71	74
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	20	25
	Don't know	9	1
	Total	100	100

Discussion
on p. 128

24. Many Israelis feel that they belong to a minority group in Israeli society. Do you also feel this way?

		2019	2023
Total sample	Very much + quite a lot	34	43
	Not so much + not at all	65	53
	Don't know	1	4
	Total	100	100
Jews	Very much + quite a lot	30	38
	Not so much + not at all	69	57
	Don't know	1	5
	Total	100	100
Arabs	Very much + quite a lot	53	65
	Not so much + not at all	46	35
	Don't know	1	0
	Total	100	100

Discussion
on p. 136

25a. (Jewish respondents) Do you support or oppose Jewish organizations that act to separate Jewish women and Arab men, or Jewish men and Arab women, who are living together?

		2015*	2023
Jews	Strongly support + Somewhat support	37	44
	Somewhat oppose + Strongly oppose	50	45
	Don't know	13	11
	Total	100	100

* In the *Israeli Democracy Index 2015*, the question was worded: "Do you support or oppose organizations such as Lehava that engage in various activities to prevent Jewish women from marrying Arab men?"

26. In your opinion, should teachers in junior high and high schools discuss burning political issues with their students, in the appropriate classes?

Discussion
on p. 154

		2011*	2023
Total sample	I'm certain they should + I think they should	76	66
	I think they should not + I'm certain they should not	22	29
	Don't know	2	5
	Total	100	100
Jews	I'm certain they should + I think they should	77	64
	I think they should not + I'm certain they should not	21	30
	Don't know	2	6
	Total	100	100
Arabs	I'm certain they should + I think they should	71	75
	I think they should not + I'm certain they should not	29	25
	Don't know	0	0
	Total	100	100

* In the *Israeli Democracy Index 2011*, the question was worded: "In your opinion, should teachers discuss burning political issues with pupils during the appropriate classes in school?"

Discussion
on p. 159

27. In your opinion, should the state fund cultural and artistic institutions and activities?

		2018*	2023
Total sample	I'm certain it should + I think it should	85	81
	I think it should not + I'm certain it should not	14	15
	Don't know	1	4
	Total	100	100
Jews	I'm certain it should + I think it should	85	79
	I think it should not + I'm certain it should not	14	17
	Don't know	1	4
	Total	100	100
Arabs	I'm certain it should + I think it should	84	94
	I think it should not + I'm certain it should not	14	6
	Don't know	2	0
	Total	100	100

* In the *Israeli Democracy Index 2018*, the question was worded: "Since the state budget is limited, do you feel that the government should or should not fund/subsidize cultural activities?"

28. At present, the state funds cultural and artistic institutions and activities. In your opinion, does this give it the right to be involved in determining the cultural and artistic content of these institutions and activities?

Discussion
on p. 161

		2018*	2023
Total sample	I'm certain it does + I think it does	48	42
	I think it does not+ I'm certain it does not	50	53
	Don't know	2	5
	Total	100	100
Jews	I'm certain it does + I think it does	44	40
	I think it does not+ I'm certain it does not	54	54
	Don't know	2	6
	Total	100	100
Arabs	I'm certain it does + I think it does	69	51
	I think it does not+ I'm certain it does not	30	49
	Don't know	1	0
	Total	100	100

* In the *Israeli Democracy Index 2018*, the question was worded: "If the state provides funding for artistic and cultural activities and institutions, should it also have a say in their artistic content?"

29. To what extent do you agree or disagree that Jewish citizens of Israel should have more rights than non-Jewish citizens?

Discussion
on p. 72

		2009	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017*	2018	2019**	2021	2022	2023
Jews	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	36	49	35	25	29	40	27	34	42	49	43
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	62	47	63	71	70	56	72	61	53	46	52
	Don't know	2	4	2	3	1	4	1	5	5	5	5
	Total	100	100	100	99	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	23	31	23	4	NA	NA	NA	NA	14	11	32
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	60	61	65	94	NA	NA	NA	NA	81	88	67
	Don't know	17	8	12	2	NA	NA	NA	NA	5	1	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	NA	NA	NA	NA	100	100	100

* Source: Tamar Hermann et al., *Jews and Arabs: A Conditional Partnership 2017*.

** Source: Tamar Hermann et al., *Jews and Arabs: A Conditional Partnership 2019*.

31. To what extent do you agree or disagree that it would be best to dismantle all the country's political institutions and start over from scratch?

Discussion
on p. 83

		2010*	2022	2023
Total sample	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	37	43	38
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	59	46	54
	Don't know	4	11	8
	Total	100	100	100
Jews	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	40	41	34
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	57	47	57
	Don't know	3	12	9
	Total	100	100	100
Arabs	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	25	55	59
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	68	42	38
	Don't know	7	3	3
	Total	100	100	100

* In the *Israeli Democracy Index 2010*, 5 response categories were presented: definitely disagree, disagree, not sure, agree, definitely agree. For purposes of comparison, we distributed the "not sure" responses proportionately between those who expressed agreement and those who expressed disagreement.

32. To what extent do you agree or disagree that legislation and legal interpretation in Israel should be based primarily on Jewish religious law (*mishpat ivri*)?

Discussion
on p. 73

		2013*	2023
Jews	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	50	39
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	40	54
	Don't know	10	7
	Total	100	100

* In the *Israeli Democracy Index 2013*, the question was worded: "Legislation and judicial interpretation in Israel should be based on the Jewish legal system."

Discussion
on p. 61

33. Which of these statements more accurately represents your views?

		2013*	2017**	2023
Total sample	Decisions made by a government that has a majority in the Knesset are inherently democratic	45	33	35
	Decisions that are opposed to fundamental democratic values such as minority rights and freedom of expression are not democratic, even if they are passed by the government and a Knesset majority	35	54	50
	Don't know	20	13	15
	Total	100	100	100
Jews	Decisions made by a government that has a majority in the Knesset are inherently democratic	45	36	36
	Decisions that are opposed to fundamental democratic values such as minority rights and freedom of expression are not democratic, even if they are passed by the government and a Knesset majority	35	52	47
	Don't know	20	13	17
	Total	100	100	100
Arabs	Decisions made by a government that has a majority in the Knesset are inherently democratic	41	20	28
	Decisions that are opposed to fundamental democratic values such as minority rights and freedom of expression are not democratic, even if they are passed by the government and a Knesset majority	36	67	67
	Don't know	23	13	5
	Total	100	100	100

* In the *Israeli Democracy Index 2013*, the response choices were: (1) "Decisions made by the government and Knesset, elected by the majority in free elections, are by definition democratic"; and (2) "Decisions that conflict with such values as equality before the law, minority rights, or freedom of expression are not democratic, even if made by a government and Knesset elected by the majority in free elections."

** In the *Israeli Democracy Index 2017*, the second response choice was: "Decisions that run counter to such values as minority rights and freedom of expression are non-democratic, even if they are made by a government with a Knesset majority."

35. Israel has not had a constitution since its founding. In your view, how important is it that Israel have a constitution?

Discussion
on p. 172

		2010*	2023
Total sample	Very important + quite important	75	73
	Not so important + Not at all important	17	18
	Don't know	8	9
	Total	100	100
Jews	Very important + quite important	78	72
	Not so important + Not at all important	14	17
	Don't know	8	11
	Total	100	100
Arabs	Very important + quite important	52	78
	Not so important + Not at all important	41	20
	Don't know	7	2
	Total	100	100

* In the *Israeli Democracy Index 2010*, respondents were asked: "How important is it to you that Israel should have a constitution? The 5 response choices were: extremely important, important, so-so, not important, not at all important. For purposes of comparison, we distributed the "so-so" responses proportionately between those who considered it important that Israel have a constitution and those who considered it unimportant.

Discussion
on p. 75

38. Do you agree or disagree that the Supreme Court intervenes too much in decisions made by the government?

		2021	2023
Total sample	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	52	52
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	36	41
	Don't know	12	7
	Total	100	100
Jews	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	52	50
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	38	42
	Don't know	10	8
	Total	100	100
Arabs	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	56	66
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	25	32
	Don't know	19	2
	Total	100	100

Discussion
on p. 151

39. In your opinion, does Israel's state education system truly offer equal opportunity to children from all backgrounds and sectors?

		2016	2019*	2023
Total sample	I'm certain it does+ I think it does	40	31	38
	I think it does not+ I'm certain it does not	54	68	54
	Don't know	6	1	8
	Total	100	100	100
Jews	I'm certain it does+ I think it does	39	30	37
	I think it does not+ I'm certain it does not	55	69	54
	Don't know	6	1	9
	Total	100	100	100
Arabs	I'm certain it does+ I think it does	46	34	47
	I think it does not+ I'm certain it does not	50	64	53
	Don't know	4	2	0
	Total	100	100	100

* In the *Israeli Democracy Index 2019*, the question was worded: "In your opinion, does Israel's education system truly offer equal opportunity for children from all backgrounds and sectors?"

40. In your opinion, do the courts in Israel accord equal treatment to defendants from all backgrounds and sectors?

Discussion
on p. 77

		2019	2023
Total sample	I'm certain they do+ I think they do	44	29
	I think they do not+ I'm certain they do not	49	64
	Don't know	7	7
	Total	100	100
Jews	I'm certain they do+ I think they do	44	29
	I think they do not+ I'm certain they do not	50	63
	Don't know	6	8
	Total	100	100
Arabs	I'm certain they do+ I think they do	45	28
	I think they do not+ I'm certain they do not	42	69
	Don't know	13	3
	Total	100	100

54. How worried are you that you will be unable to maintain your desired lifestyle because of the increasing power of certain groups in Israeli society that advocate a different way of life from yours?

Discussion
on p. 140

		2017	2022	2023
Total sample	Very worried+ Quite worried	41	70	69
	Not so worried+ Not at all worried	58	27	29
	Don't know	1	3	2
	Total	100	100	100
Jews	Very worried+ Quite worried	40	68	66
	Not so worried+ Not at all worried	59	28	31
	Don't know	1	4	3
	Total	100	100	100
Arabs	Very worried+ Quite worried	44	79	80
	Not so worried+ Not at all worried	53	20	19
	Don't know	3	1	1
	Total	100	100	100

Discussion
on p. 144

55. How worried are you that you will be unable to financially support your children in future?

		2016*	2017	2023
Total sample	Very worried+ Quite worried	60	60	74
	Not so worried+ Not at all worried	38	38	24
	Don't know	2	2	2
	Total	100	100	100
Jews	Very worried+ Quite worried	60	58	72
	Not so worried+ Not at all worried	38	40	25
	Don't know	2	2	3
	Total	100	100	100
Arabs	Very worried+ Quite worried	63	69	84
	Not so worried+ Not at all worried	35	28	16
	Don't know	2	3	0
	Total	100	100	100

* Based on a social survey conducted prior to the Eli Hurvitz Conference on Economy and Society 2016.

Discussion
on p. 147

56. How worried are you that you will be unable to live in dignity in your old age?

		2016*	2017	2023
Total sample	Very worried+ Quite worried	60	56	74
	Not so worried+ Not at all worried	39	43	25
	Don't know	1	1	1
	Total	100	100	100
Jews	Very worried+ Quite worried	60	55	73
	Not so worried+ Not at all worried	38	44	25
	Don't know	2	1	2
	Total	100	100	100
Arabs	Very worried+ Quite worried	55	63	78
	Not so worried+ Not at all worried	45	36	22
	Don't know	0	1	0
	Total	100	100	100

* Based on a social survey conducted prior to the Eli Hurvitz Conference on Economy and Society 2016.

Discussion
on p. 31**64. In general, are you optimistic or pessimistic about Israel's future?**

		2009*	2011*	2012	2014*	2016	2017	2018*	2021	2022	2023
Total sample	Very optimistic + Quite optimistic	79	58	76	73	67	68	70	63	49	50
	Very pessimistic + quite pessimistic	18	38	22	24	30	29	24	30	43	45
	Don't know	3	4	2	3	3	3	6	7	8	5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Very optimistic + Quite optimistic	81	63	79	73	70	71	75	67	51	52
	Very pessimistic + quite pessimistic	15	34	18	24	28	26	21	27	41	43
	Don't know	4	3	3	3	2	3	4	6	8	5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Very optimistic + Quite optimistic	65	36	60	72	51	50	44	42	37	40
	Very pessimistic + quite pessimistic	33	59	39	24	43	46	44	50	56	58
	Don't know	2	5	1	4	6	4	12	8	7	2
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Source: IDI *Peace Index*: April 2009, January 2011, April 2014, April 2018.

Appendix 3 / Sociodemographic Breakdown and Self-Definitions (total sample; Jewish sample; Arab sample; %)

Nationality	Total sample
Jews	83.3
Arabs	16.7
Total	100

Sex	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Men	49.5	49.3	50.7
Women	50.5	50.7	49.3
Total	100	100	100

Age	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
18–24	14.4	12.9	21.9
25–34	19.8	18.4	26.4
35–44	19.6	19.5	19.9
45–54	16.0	16.1	15.9
55–64	12.2	13.1	8.0
65+	18.0	20.0	7.9
Total	100	100	100

Education	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Elementary or partial high school	10.5	8.4	21.4
Full high school with matriculation certificate	21.3	18.1	36.8
Post-secondary	15.6	16.7	10.0
Post-secondary yeshiva	2.9	3.5	–
Partial academic education (no degree)	7.3	6.6	10.9
Full academic degree, bachelor's or higher	40.0	44.2	18.9
Don't know / declined to respond	2.4	2.5	2.0
Total	100	100	100

Monthly household income*	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Far below average	16.6	16.4	17.9
Slightly below average	17.1	16.2	21.9
About average	25.7	23.1	38.3
Slightly above average	21.3	23.8	8.5
Far above average	11.5	12.5	6.5
Don't know / declined to respond	7.8	8.0	6.9
Total	100	100	100

* The average (median) monthly household income in Israel these days is about NIS 16,000 (gross), and in single-person households, about NIS 8,000 (gross). Respondents were asked to rate their overall household income (of all household members) based on the above categories.

Religion	Arabs
Muslim	78.6
Christian	10.0
Druze	10.0
Don't know / declined to respond / other	1.4
Total	100

Religiosity	Jews
Haredi	11.2
National religious / Haredi leumi	11.5
Traditional religious	12.3
Traditional non-religious	19.4
Secular	45.6
Total	100

Ethnicity	Jews
Ashkenazi	41.9
Mizrahi	32.5
Mixed / both	15.5
FSU Immigrant	4.8
Ethiopian	0.4
Israeli	1.9
Other	0.7
Don't know / declined to respond	2.3
Total	100

Political orientation, by religiosity (Jewish sample)*	Haredi	National religious / Haredi leumi	Traditional religious	Traditional non-religious	Secular	Total
Left	8.0	3.5	0.8	4.1	28.1	15.0
Center	9.7	7.0	18.7	26.3	34.6	25.1
Right	77.9	87.0	76.4	68.0	33.1	56.4
Don't know / declined to respond	4.4	2.5	4.1	1.6	4.2	3.5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Every effort was made to obtain as representative a sample of the population as possible; however, some degree of sampling error is of course always present.

District	Jews
Jerusalem	9.1
North	9.6
Haifa	12.2
Center	29.4
Tel-Aviv	22.2
South	12.4
Judea and Samaria	5.1
Total	100

Area of residence	Arabs
Galilee	51.7
Triangle	24.4
Negev	12.9
Mixed cities	11.0
Total	100

The Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research – Research Team

Prof. Tamar Hermann, academic director of the Viterbi Family Center, is a senior fellow at the Israel Democracy Institute and a full professor of political science at the Open University of Israel. Her fields of expertise include public opinion research, civil society, and extraparliamentary politics.

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The Israel Democracy Institute (IDI) is an independent center of research and action dedicated to strengthening the foundations of Israeli democracy. IDI works to bolster the values and institutions of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. A non-partisan think-and-do tank, the Institute harnesses rigorous applied research to influence policy, legislation, and public opinion. The Institute partners with political leaders, policymakers, and representatives of civil society to improve the functioning of the government and its institutions, confront security threats while preserving civil liberties, and foster solidarity within Israeli society. The State of Israel recognized the positive impact of IDI's research and recommendations by bestowing upon the Institute its most prestigious award, the Israel Prize for Lifetime Achievement.

The Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research conducts rigorous empirical research on the attitudes of the Israeli public regarding the functioning of the country's democratic system and the commitment of Israeli society to core democratic values. Data Israel: The Louis Guttman Social Research Database, maintained by the Center, presents current and historical survey data and other materials collected since 1949 by the Center for Applied Social Research founded by Prof. Guttman, which have been donated to the Israel Democracy Institute. The Viterbi Center strives to enrich the public discourse in Israel on social and policy issues by generating, analyzing, and publicizing authoritative information, and placing it at the disposal of researchers, journalists, and interested members of the public in Israel and around the world.

The Israeli Democracy Index offers an annual assessment of the quality of Israeli democracy. Since 2003, an extensive survey has been conducted on a representative sample of Israel's adult population. The project aims to explore trends in Israeli society on fundamental questions relating to the realization of democratic goals and values, and the performance of government systems and elected officials. Analysis of the survey results is intended to enhance public debate on the status of democracy in Israel, and create a comprehensive source of relevant information.

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