


Viterbi Family Center
for Public Opinion
and Policy Research



THE ISRAELI DEMOCRACY INDEX 2024

Tamar Hermann

Lior Yohanani | Yaron Kaplan | Inna Orly Sapozhnikova



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Principal Findings

Chapter 1: How is Israel Doing?

- ❑ A clear majority of the total sample think that Israel's overall situation today is bad or very bad; a minority consider it to be "so-so"; and a negligible minority label it good or very good. May 2024 (when the present survey was conducted) saw a dramatic increase in the share of respondents who define the situation as bad or very bad (from 45% to 60%), and a corresponding decline in the share who characterize it as good or very good (from 22% to 12%).
- ❑ Among Arab interviewees, the majority who hold that Israel's situation today is bad or very bad is greater than that among Jewish respondents (67% and 59%, respectively). A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation shows a substantial majority on the Left and in the Center who see Israel's situation as bad or very bad, as contrasted with less than one-half of respondents on the Right (89%, 74%, and 45%, respectively).
- ❑ The greatest internal existential threat to Israel today, according to Jewish respondents, is "differences of opinion regarding the appropriate balance between Israel as a Jewish state and a democratic state" (29%), followed by low public trust in state institutions (26%). By contrast, in the eyes of Arab interviewees, the primary internal existential threat facing Israel is posed by tensions between Jews and Arabs (39%) and, in second place, Israel's control of the West Bank/Judea and Samaria (19%).
- ❑ As for the greatest external existential threat to Israel, both Jews and Arabs ranked a full-scale, multi-front war in first place (37% and 32%, respectively).
- ❑ The share of respondents who agreed with the statement that "democratic rule in Israel is in grave danger" stood at over one-half of the Jewish sample (54%), and roughly three-quarters of the Arab sample (77.5%) at the time of this survey. A breakdown of Jewish respondents by political orientation

shows a majority on the Left and in the Center who anticipate such a danger (94% and 71%, respectively), as opposed to a minority on the Right (38%).

- ❑ A sizeable majority of Jews and Arabs alike feel part of the State of Israel and its problems (86% and 66%, respectively).
- ❑ Some two-thirds of both Jews and Arabs agree that Israel is a good place to live (65% and 67%, respectively). When analyzing the Jewish sample by political orientation, we found considerable disparities between the camps in the proportions who agree with the above assertion (Right, 74%; Center, 60%; Left, 32%).
- ❑ The share of Jews who are optimistic about Israel's future is larger than that of Arabs (56% versus 35%, respectively). A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation yields sizeable differences between camps (Right, 68%; Center, 48%; Left, 20%).
- ❑ The top reason for optimism cited this year by Jews is "their fellow citizens, the people of Israel, and national unity" (25%). Among Arabs, the reason heading the list is "hope for peace, and an end to the war" (27%).
- ❑ The primary reason for pessimism among Jews is "the political institutions, the leadership, and the current government" (33%); among Arabs, the main reason for pessimism relates to the war and the security situation (41%).

Chapter 2: Democracy, Government, Trust in Institutions

- ❑ Roughly one-third of the total sample agree at present with the assertion that Israelis can always count on the state to come to their aid in times of trouble. This marks a drop in comparison with past findings (46% in 2017; 39% in 2022; and 32% in 2024).
- ❑ As in previous years, the most common response among Jewish interviewees is that the Jewish component of Israel's identity is too strong (about 40%). Roughly one-quarter believe that the democratic component is overly dominant, and some one-fifth hold that there is a good balance between the two elements. Among Arabs, a substantial majority think that the Jewish component is too dominant (72%).
- ❑ The Jewish sample saw declines in the share of respondents who express trust in the following state institutions, compared with the 2023 survey: IDF (from 85.5% to 77%); President of Israel (from 54% to 48%); and the political institutions, namely, the government (from 28% to 19%), the Knesset (from

24% to 13%), and the political parties (13% to 9%). The level of trust in the Supreme Court also dipped slightly (from 42% to 39%). Trust in the media remained largely unchanged (from 25% to 27%), while trust in the police registered an increase (from 35% to 44%).

- ❑ In the Arab sample, none of the eight institutions examined on a recurring basis achieved a trust rating above 30%. In four of the institutions, levels of trust remained quite similar to those of June 2023, while we found changes in the other four: Trust in the IDF and the police rose (IDF, from 21% to 30%; police, from 17% to 22%), while trust in the Knesset and the political parties dropped (Knesset, from 18% to 12%; political parties, from 15% to 11%).

Chapter 3: Society, Citizens, Aliyah, and Emigration

- ❑ The average solidarity rating for Israeli society as a whole is higher this year than last, among both Jewish respondents (5.5 in 2024 versus 4.4 in 2023) and Arab respondents (5.0 in 2024 versus 3.6 in 2023).
- ❑ The share who agree with the statement that Israelis can always count on their fellow Israelis in times of trouble was higher this year than in the past in both the Jewish and Arab samples (Jews, from 68% in 2022 to 81% in 2024; and Arabs, from 39% in 2022 to 62% in 2024).
- ❑ Heading the list of most acute social tensions in Israel in the Jewish sample is that between Right and Left, which in fact registered an increase (from 43% in 2023 to 53% in 2024), whereas for Arab respondents—as in past years—Jewish-Arab tensions are the most severe (53% in 2023; and 55.5% in 2024).
- ❑ Overall, a majority of the public are worried that their lifestyle will be harmed by other groups in Israeli society, with Arabs expressing greater concern on this subject than Jews (80% versus 60%, respectively).
- ❑ A considerable majority of Arab interviewees (77%) hold that most Arab citizens of Israel wish to integrate into Israeli society, while only a minority of Jews agree (42%).
- ❑ A sizeable majority of Arab interviewees also think that Arab citizens of Israel are discriminated against compared with Jewish citizens, as contrasted with less than one-third of Jewish respondents who share this view (82% versus 30.5%, respectively).

- ❑ This year saw a rise in both the Jewish and Arab samples in the share who think it is better for Jews and Arabs in Israel to live separately (Jews, from 41.5% in 2020 to 48% in 2024; Arabs, from 22% in 2020 to 36% in 2024).
- ❑ We found a noticeable increase in the share of Jews who hold that Israel's Arab citizens pose a threat to the country's security, from 41% in 2018 to 53% in 2024. A majority of those who identify with the Right view this statement as accurate, compared with a minority in the Center and on the Left (66%, 41%, and 13.5%, respectively).
- ❑ There is a virtual consensus between Jews and Arabs that civil society organizations serve Israeli society better than state institutions do (Jews, 64%; Arabs, 66.5%).
- ❑ A majority of Jews (73%) think that Israel is the safest place for Jews to live today. A greater share of respondents on the Right feel this way, compared with those from the Center and Left (82%, 64.5%, and 50.5%, respectively).
- ❑ Most Jewish and Arab respondents would rather remain in Israel than move abroad, with a greater share of Arabs than of Jews who would prefer to stay (77% and 64.5%, respectively). In the Jewish sample, the preference for remaining in Israel is considerably greater on the Right (74%) than in the Center or on the Left (56% and 38%, respectively).
- ❑ Some 42% of Jews reported that they do not have a foreign passport and are not considering getting one, compared with 39% who already have a foreign passport (were born with one, or later obtained one), have begun the process of obtaining one, or are considering the possibility. Half the respondents who have taken out a foreign passport, or are considering getting one, did so "to be on the safe side/just in case."

Chapter 4: National Security and the Security Forces

- ❑ Nearly one-half of all interviewees (45%) characterized their sense of personal security as low, while roughly one-third rated it as moderate, and a minority, as high. A low sense of personal security is more prevalent among Arabs than Jews (64% versus 41%, respectively). Among Jewish respondents, a low sense of personal security is more noticeable on the Left than in the Center or on the Right (60%, 46.5%, and 34.5%, respectively).

- ❑ Only about one-quarter of all interviewees rate Israel's military deterrence as quite good/excellent, with slightly over one-third categorizing it as middling, and around a third as quite poor/very poor. No major differences were found between Jews and Arabs in their assessment of Israel's deterrence capabilities.
- ❑ Among Jewish respondents, a small majority (52%) hold that the decisions of Israel's leaders on security matters are influenced by both professional considerations and other factors, and roughly 30%, that such decisions are governed only by other factors. Among Arab interviewees, equal shares (of 41%) think that they are shaped by a combination of both professional considerations and other factors or solely by other factors.
- ❑ We asked interviewees what would best ensure Israel's future security: strengthening the country's military power, or reaching political agreements with states in the region. With regard to the short term, the most common response was strengthening Israel's military power (40%), followed by "both equally" (36%). In the long term, the most frequent response was "both equally" (38%) and, in second place, reaching political agreements (33%).
- ❑ A sizeable majority of Jews (62%) hold that there are security advantages to having civilian settlements close to the country's borders. Breaking down these findings by political orientation reveals a substantial majority on the Right who think that having settlements near the border is important for security reasons, compared with one-half in the Center, and only a minority on the Left (70.5%, 52%, and 41.5%, respectively).
- ❑ A majority of Jews and Arabs agree that if the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency), the police, or the military suspect someone of involvement in terrorist activity, they should be granted full powers to conduct their investigation as they see fit (Jews, 80%; Arabs, 62.5%).
- ❑ A large and consistent majority of Jewish respondents (62%) think that, for security reasons, it is permissible for the state to monitor what citizens post online. Arab interviewees are split almost evenly on this issue, with 47% agreeing and 51% disagreeing with the assertion. Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation, we found a sizeable minority on the Left, as opposed to a majority in the Center and on the Right, who agree with Internet surveillance (44%, 58%, and 68%, respectively).

In this chapter, we focused on assessing the performance of the four security institutions: the IDF, police, Shin Bet (ISA), and Mossad.

□ The IDF

- A large majority of Jews (87%), as contrasted with a minority of Arabs (37%), think that the IDF provides protection and security to the citizens of Israel.
- Trust in the IDF has fallen among Jews, from 85.5% in June 2023 to 77% in 2024.
- We asked respondents to rate the IDF in various areas.¹ Among Jewish respondents, the highest average scores were for moral conduct in wartime (4.43) and combat readiness (4.35). Among Arab interviewees, the highest scores were for combat readiness (2.79) and preventive intelligence (2.71).
- Only 55% of Jews and 30% of Arabs hold that the IDF is politically neutral. A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation shows a majority on the Left and in the Center who view the IDF as politically neutral, as compared with less than one-half who feel this way on the Right (Left, 70%; Center, 65%; Right, 48%).
- A substantial majority of Jews (80%) consider the statements and reports of the IDF to be reliable, while a smaller majority of Arabs (59%) take the opposite view.

□ The police

- Slightly over one-half of Jewish respondents (53%) think that the police provide Israel's citizens with protection and security, as contrasted with a sizeable majority of Arabs (68%) who feel the opposite way.
- A minority of both Jews and Arabs express trust in the police. Nonetheless, in comparison with last year, there has been a rise in the level of trust in this institution in both samples (Jews: from 35% in 2023 to 44% in 2024; Arabs: from 17% in 2023 to 22% in 2024).
- We asked respondents to rate the police in various areas.² In both the Jewish and Arab samples, the average scores for the police were middling

1 The areas surveyed were: combat readiness, preventive intelligence, moral conduct in combat, and compliance with orders and regulations.

2 The areas surveyed were: crime prevention, handling of terrorist attacks, politically nonpartisan law enforcement, fair and equitable policing of all population groups, freedom from political influence, lack of corruption, and policing of demonstrations.

or worse (less than 2.65) and largely similar, with the exception of the handling of terrorist attacks, where Jews gave the police a higher grade (3.52) than in other areas.

- A sizeable, and similar, majority of Jews and Arabs think that the police are not politically neutral (64% and 65%, respectively).
- Roughly half of Jewish respondents consider the statements and reports of the police to be reliable, as compared with a majority (61%) of Arabs who think that they are not reliable.
- In both the Jewish and Arab samples, assessments of how the police treat citizens with whom they come into contact in the course of their work were similarly negative (not so good or not at all good: 58.5% and 56%, respectively).

□ **The Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency)**

- A majority of Jews and Arabs alike report that they know not very much or nothing at all about the roles and activities of the Shin Bet (61% and 68%, respectively).
- Roughly two-thirds (65.5%) of Jews, and about one-quarter of Arabs (26.5%), express trust in the Shin Bet. When breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation, a majority in all three camps indicate that they trust this institution (Left, 71%; Center, 73%; and Right, 62%).
- One-half of Jews think that the Shin Bet is politically neutral, as opposed to a majority of Arabs (61%) who take the opposite view. Analyzing the Jewish sample by political orientation shows that a majority of those who align themselves with the Left or Center hold that the Shin Bet is politically neutral, while less than one-half on the Right feel similarly (60%, 57.5%, and 44.5%, respectively).

□ **The Mossad**

- A majority of both Jews and Arabs report that they know not very much or nothing at all about the roles and activities of the Mossad (63.5% and 70%, respectively).
- Slightly less than three-quarters of Jews (70.5%) and one-third of Arabs (28.5%) state that they trust the Mossad. In all three political camps in the Jewish sample, a majority express trust in this institution (Left, 78%; Center, 74.5%; Right, 68%).

- Just over one-half of Jews (54%) consider the Mossad to be politically neutral, while a majority of Arabs (61%) think it is not. Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation, we found that a majority of those who identify with the Left or Center, compared with just under one-half on the Right, hold that the Mossad is politically neutral (65%, 59%, and 49%, respectively).

Chapter 5: International Indicators

- As in previous years, we examined Israel's scores, as well as its global ranking and its standing relative to the OECD states, in a series of 15 international democracy indicators. (These indicators are always compiled for the previous year, meaning that the data published in 2024 relate to findings from 2023.) Israel earned its highest scores in 2023 in the political participation indicator produced by the Economist Intelligence Unit (94.4), and the political rights indicator compiled by Freedom House (85.0); at the bottom of Israel's score card in 2023 were freedom of the press, measured by Reporters Without Borders (53.2), and the participatory democracy indicator of V-Dem Institute (60.3).
- Compared with 2022, we saw a decline in Israel's scores in eight indicators: civil liberties, freedom of the press, egalitarian democracy, deliberative democracy, functioning of government, rule of law, regulatory quality, and equal distribution of resources. The remaining seven indicators remained largely stable, or registered very slight changes.
- In three of the four V-Dem Institute indicators (with the exception of participatory democracy), there were marked declines from last year, particularly in the assessment of deliberative democracy, where Israel's score showed a steep drop (from 89.2 to 75.9). Likewise, for the first time in more than 50 years, Israel fell from the status of a "liberal democracy" to merely an "electoral democracy" in V-Dem's categorization.
- When comparing Israel's 2023 scores to its multi-year average (up to and including 2022), the following picture emerges: In two indicators, its score was higher than the multi-year average, namely, political participation (+7.5%), and participatory democracy (+3.1%). In nine indicators, its score was lower than the multi-year average—in particular, in two indicators related to democratic rights and freedom: freedom of the press (–28.0%), and civil liberties (–10.1%). And in the remaining four indicators, its score was more or less consistent with the multi-year average.

Introduction

Since the publication of the inaugural *Israeli Democracy Index* in 2003, we have always felt the need to “apologize” in the introduction to our findings for the time lag between the survey on which the *Index* is based and the release of the written report. And in fact, this year’s interval would appear to be more significant than ever: Though we checked on a significant number of survey questions in November 2024 (see the [Democracy Index Selected Findings](#) on the IDI website), most of the analyses in this publication are based on data collected in May 2024, that is, at one of the peaks of the fighting in Gaza—prior to such dramatic events as the elimination of Hamas leaders Haniyeh and Sinwar, and before the opening of a second front in the North, the assassination of Hezbollah leader Nasrallah, and the outbreak of the direct conflict with Iran.

Notwithstanding the above, the materials included in this report are still of great value and relevance, for a number of reasons. Contrary to the expectations of many in Israel and elsewhere, the mid-2024 survey indicates that a significant portion—if not the majority—of the cornerstones of Israeli society remained unchanged between the period preceding the events of October 7, 2023 and the period afterward, and all the more so between May and October 2024. By way of example, the relative proportions of Jews who identify with one of the three main political camps (Right, Center, and Left) have remained largely unchanged over the past several years despite the turmoil that Israeli society has undergone. On certain issues, the gaps between those who align themselves with the different camps have widened, while on others, the sides have actually drawn closer. Among the various explanations for this comparative stability, we can point to the deep sense of crisis prevailing in Israel since late 2019, the five elections held in short succession up to November 2022 (without definitive results), and the harsh reactions to the judicial revolution announced by the Netanyahu government in early 2023. The same stability holds true for the

Jewish and Arab publics: Here too, there are subjects on which positions are closer and those where they are farther apart, but not to an extent that alters the face of Israeli society in any substantial way.

Moreover, the relation between opinions on key political issues such as religion and state, Jewish-Arab relations, or level of trust in the country's institutions and decision-makers, on the one hand, and on the other, sociodemographic markers such as religiosity or political orientation, age or sex, has also remained stable in most of the survey questions. Even regarding public trust, which did decline somewhat following October 7 and the outbreak of the Iron Swords war, the trust ranking of the institutions studied has been largely unchanged, with only minor changes in the levels of trust in each. In other words, both the rifts and the unifying factors that characterize Israeli society—which we have identified and written about in the *Democracy Index* reports of the past few years—may have grown slightly stronger or weaker, but there is virtually no topic in which we found a real reversal of previous trends.

At the same time, we did encounter a number of changes, the bulk of which are to be expected given the circumstances: For example, there has been a drop in the public's rating of Israel's overall situation, and in the assessment of citizens' ability to rely on the state to always come to their aid. Israelis' sense of personal security has shown an understandable and predictable decline, with a concomitant rise in the readiness of certain groups to leave the country.

This year's report consists of four chapters focused on Israeli public opinion, and a fifth chapter presenting Israel's standing in international democracy indicators, structured as follows: Chapter 1 – How is Israel Doing?, dealing with public opinion on general aspects of Israeli democracy; Chapter 2 – Democracy, Government, Trust in Institutions, which addresses the relationship between Israel's citizens and their leadership; Chapter 3 – Society, Citizenship, Aliyah, and Emigration, focused on relations between groups within Israeli society, and the willingness of various groups to remain in Israel or emigrate; Chapter 4 – National Security and the Security Forces, which explores the prevailing opinions of the Israeli public on citizens' personal security, the ability of state institutions to provide a reasonable degree of protection, and the tools that the public is willing to entrust them with for this purpose, against the backdrop of the ongoing war. A further question examined in this latter chapter, in light of

the contentious debate on the subject, is the perceived political neutrality of each of the principal security bodies.

The fifth chapter is different, as noted, as it does not rest on the public opinion survey that forms the basis of the previous chapters, but rather reflects the current view of Israeli democracy among experts and major research institutions such as the World Bank and Freedom House. It should be noted that, for the most part, the indicators published by the institutions whose findings we cite in this report relate to the situation in 2023 (including October–December), and do not address events and developments in 2024. Here too, while the changes may not have been as minimal as in previous years, we did not encounter any major reversals compared with the past.

We hope that you find the material below interesting and informative.

The Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research

November 2024

Methodology

The 2024 *Israeli Democracy Index*, like its predecessors, examines Israeli public opinion on key social and political issues that have taken center stage in Israeli discourse this year. In terms of methodology, the report is based on three main lines of inquiry: (a) questions posed in the past, which enable us to identify long-term trends; (b) new questions focused on social and political issues that lay at the heart of Israel's public agenda this past year; and (c) comparative data collected and analyzed by international research institutes, which offer a sense of the state of Israeli democracy in comparison with other countries through the years.

Data collection

The two polling firms that carried out the field work for this year's survey were Shiluv I²R (Hebrew interviews) and Afkar Research and Knowledge (Arabic interviews). The data were collected between May 16 and May 29, 2024.

The questionnaire

The questionnaire for this year's survey consisted of 59 content questions for Jewish interviewees, and 51 for Arab interviewees, some with multiple subsections. The questionnaires in Hebrew and in Arabic were largely similar, though in certain cases, questions were posed that are applicable only to Jews or to Arabs. This is noted clearly in appendices 1 and 2. In addition, 16 sociodemographic questions were put to Jewish respondents, and 15 to Arab respondents. For all content questions, the response option of "don't know" was presented in the online survey, but not to phone interviewees.

The sample

The total sample for this survey consisted of 1,408 men and women aged 18 and over:

- 1,026 respondents constituting a representative sample of Jews and others, interviewed in Hebrew.³
- 382 respondents constituting a representative sample of Arab citizens of Israel, interviewed in Arabic.

To ensure that both samples accurately represented the proportion of Jews and Arabs in Israel's population, they were weighted by religion, age, and sex.

The maximum sampling error for the total sample is $\pm 2.61\%$ ($\pm 3.06\%$ for the Jewish sample, and $\pm 5.01\%$ for the Arab sample).

Data collection method

The survey in Hebrew was conducted largely online, supplemented by phone interviews in a minority of cases (with Haredi respondents and respondents aged 55 and over). The Arabic survey was conducted by telephone only. The interview method breaks down as follows:

	Internet (%)	Telephone (%)	Total (%)
Hebrew	82.9	17.1	100
Arabic	–	100	100
Total sample	60.4	39.6	100

Data analysis

We analyzed the data using several variables that have proven in other studies to have strong explanatory value in the Israeli context, among them respondents' nationality (Jewish or Arab), religiosity (in the Jewish sample),⁴

3 The category of "others" was adopted by Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) during the 1990s to denote individuals who are not Jewish according to halakha (Jewish religious law) but are not Arab. This pertains mainly to immigrants from the former Soviet Union who were eligible to immigrate to Israel under the Law of Return despite not being considered halakhically Jewish. Like the CBS, we relate to them as part of the Jewish public.

4 The categories for this variable were: Haredi, national religious, traditional religious, traditional non-religious, and secular. The proportion of each group in the various Democracy Index surveys is in accordance with its share of the population in the CBS data.

political orientation (in the Jewish sample),⁵ age, and level of education.⁶ The Arab sample was analyzed on the basis of voting patterns in the 2022 Knesset elections, area of residence, and (in some cases) also religion; however, we limited the use of the latter variable due to the low share of Christians and Druze in the Arab sample (reflecting their low share in the actual population). An additional variable that we employed is that of social location (self-identification with stronger or weaker groups in Israeli society)⁷—a subjective variable that has shown itself to be a good predictor of respondents' opinions. A new variable that appears in this year's report, as a result of the Iron Swords war, relates to those who were evacuated (or who evacuated voluntarily) from the North and South of Israel.⁸ The evacuees who took part in the survey number 76 in total—too small a number for statistical generalizations, but sufficient to provide a general idea of their opinions compared with the rest of the population.

In several places in the text, we also briefly present more advanced statistical analyses, such as factor analysis, to suggest relationships that are not observed using more basic methods.

Navigating the report

To make it easier to navigate the report, two types of references have been inserted beneath each question heading: The first, next to the question number, refers the reader to the page where that question appears in appendix 1 (which contains the questionnaire and the distribution of responses for each content question presented in a three-column format: total sample, Jews, Arabs). The second is used only for recurring questions, and points to the page

5 The categories for this variable were: Left, Center, Right.

6 The variable of education was grouped into two categories: higher education (consisting of partial academic studies without a degree, or full studies with a degree), and non-academic studies (i.e., partial high school without a matriculation certificate, full high school with a matriculation certificate, or post-secondary studies).

7 The categories for this variable were: self-identification with strong group, quite strong group, quite weak group, weak group.

8 Throughout the text, we use the term "evacuees" to refer to both those who were evacuated and those who left their homes voluntarily, as opposed to those respondents or their family members who were not evacuated or did not leave their homes voluntarily.

where that question appears in appendix 2 (a multi-year comparison of data). The references are shown in the text as follows:

Israel's overall situation

Question 1 Appendix 1, page 219 | Appendix 2, page 238

Similarly, next to each question in appendices 1 and 2, there is a reference to the page in the text where that question is discussed.⁹

To make for easier reading, we present the data in whole numbers in the text and accompanying figures, using half-percentage points in rare instances. In the appendices, however, the data are shown to a higher degree of precision—up to one decimal place. Due to this rounding (which, as stated, is intended to assist the reader), there are occasionally very minor differences between the data in the main body of the report and in the appendices.

⁹ Appendix 2 presents questions that have been asked on a recurring basis over the years. In the print version of the Democracy Index, only the data for the past decade appear, while in the online version, all data from past years is provided.

Chapter 1

How is Israel Doing?

In this chapter, we discuss the following topics:

- Israel's overall situation
 - The primary internal and external threats facing Israel
 - Is democratic rule in Israel in danger?
 - Sense of belonging to the State of Israel and its problems
 - Is Israel a good place to live?
 - Optimism/pessimism about Israel's future
-

Israel's overall situation today


Question 1 Appendix 1, p. 219 | Appendix 2, p. 238

Not surprisingly, given the circumstances, the public's assessment of Israel's overall situation today (as reflected in the responses of the total sample) is extremely negative—indeed, only the inaugural *Democracy Index* survey in 2003, conducted in the shadow of the Second Intifada, has produced a more negative assessment. In fact, these two measurements—the initial and the current—are virtually identical in terms of the distribution of interviewees' assessments of the state of the nation. Just as in 2003, a clear majority today hold that the situation is bad or very bad, a minority characterize it as so-so, and an even smaller minority, as good or very good.

Compared with the survey carried out in December 2023 in the wake of the events of October 7 and the outbreak of war, the portrait that emerges from the

present survey (in mid-2024) is a gloomier one, with a surge of 15 percentage points in the share of respondents who define the situation as bad or very bad, and a drop of 10 percentage points in the share who view it as good or very good. The proportion who define the situation as so-so has declined slightly as well.


Figure 1.1 Israel’s overall situation today, 2003–2024 (total sample; %)



A breakdown by nationality shows that the majority of both Arabs and Jews define the situation as bad or very bad; however, the Arab respondents’ perspective is the more negative of the two, with 67% taking this view, compared with 60% of the Jews surveyed.

Breaking down the results in the Jewish sample by self-defined religiosity reveals dramatic differences: While only a minority in all five religious groups characterize Israel’s situation as good or very good, this minority is especially small among traditional non-religious and secular Jews, the majority of whom see the overall situation in Israel as bad or very bad. National religious respondents offer the most positive assessment, with the most frequent response being “so-so,” and equal proportions defining the situation as bad/very bad and good/very good.

Figure 1.2 Israel's overall situation today (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)



A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation shows only a negligible percentage on the Left (2%), and a similar proportion in the Center (4%), who classify Israel's situation as good or very good. On the Right, the corresponding share is somewhat higher, at 16%. The major difference between the camps lies in the percentages who define the country's condition as bad or very bad, with 89% on the Left and 74% in the Center voicing this opinion, compared with less than one-half (45%) on the Right. We also found sizeable gaps between the camps when focusing specifically on secular Jews, who make up the largest group in Israel today (see appendix 3): 92% of secular Jewish respondents who align themselves with the Left consider Israel's overall situation to be bad or very bad, compared with 80% of those who identify with the Center and 67% of those on the Right.

Among Jewish respondents, women are more inclined than men to view the country's condition as bad or very bad (67% and 50%, respectively), while the opposite holds true in the Arab sample, where 72.5% of men and 61% of women take a dim view of Israel's situation.

Analyzing by perceived social location (sense of belonging to stronger or weaker groups in society), we find that respondents in the total sample who associate themselves with weaker social groups have a more negative perspective on Israel's situation than do those who identify with stronger groups (70% versus 57%, respectively).

Although, as noted in the Methodology chapter, the evacuees surveyed are too small a group to support statistical generalizations, it was not surprising to find that the share who characterize the situation as bad or very bad is noticeably higher than in the total sample (68%, as compared with 60%).

Greatest internal existential threat to Israel


Question 22 Appendix 1, p. 223 | Appendix 2, p. 249

Given the profound internal differences of opinion in Israel, we wished to know what Israelis consider to be the greatest existential threat facing Israel from within. As shown in Figure 1.3, disagreements over the optimal balance between the democratic and the Jewish aspects of Israel's identity are seen by Jewish interviewees as the number one internal threat to the state. Opinions on this subject are largely split along the same fault lines as the Left/Right political divide, which is perceived as the most acute source of tension in Israeli society (as shown in chapter 3). By contrast, Israel's control of the West Bank/Judea and Samaria is presently ranked last by Jewish respondents on the scale of domestic threats.

In the eyes of Arab interviewees, tensions between Jews and Arabs in Israel constitute the most serious internal threat. Ranked second in this sample is Israeli control of the West Bank/Judea and Samaria, with differences over the appropriate balance between Israel as a Jewish and a democratic state in last place.

Disagreements over the optimal balance between the democratic and the Jewish aspects of Israel's identity are seen by Jewish interviewees as the number one internal threat to the state. Opinions on this subject are largely split along the same fault lines as the Left/Right political divide, which is perceived as the most acute source of tension in Israeli society.


Figure 1.3 **The greatest internal existential threat facing Israel (Jewish and Arab samples; %)**



A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation shows that, for respondents on the Left, differences of opinion about the desirable balance between Israel as a democratic state and a Jewish state are perceived as the primary internal threat facing Israel, with tensions between Jews and Arabs, and socioeconomic disparities, tying for last place.

In the Center, low public trust in state institutions is seen as the greatest internal threat, while Israeli control over Judea and Samaria and socioeconomic disparities are ranked lowest. On the Right as well, disagreement over the balance between Israel's democratic and Jewish components ranks highest on the scale of threats facing Israel from within, with Israeli control over Judea and Samaria placing last.

Figure 1.4 **The greatest internal existential threat facing Israel** (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



An analysis of the responses in the Jewish sample by religiosity shows that secular Jews rate low public trust in state institutions as the most serious domestic threat to Israel, whereas the traditional religious respondents rank Jewish-Arab tensions in first place. In the other three groups (Haredim, national religious, and traditional non-religious), differences of opinion over the correct balance between Israel's democratic and Jewish components are seen as the greatest threat from within.

We did not find substantial differences in perceptions of the greatest internal threat between those who associate themselves with the stronger groups in Israeli society and those who identify with the weaker ones; however, a slightly higher share of the latter pointed to socioeconomic gaps as the gravest threat facing Israel (12.5% versus 7%).

In both the Jewish and Arab samples, we encountered differences between men and women on this question. Among Jewish respondents, the men viewed disagreements over the ideal balance between the democratic and Jewish facets of Israel as posing the greatest threat (34%), whereas the women cited


low public trust in state institutions (27.4%). In the Arab sample, both men and women see tensions between Jews and Arabs in Israel as the most serious internal threat, but to different degrees (men, 31%; women, 47%).

Greatest external existential threat to Israel

Question 23 Appendix 1, p. 223

As stated, we found a sizeable gap between Jews and Arabs regarding the greatest internal threat to Israel; however, when asked about the most serious external threat, the highest proportion in both groups cited the same concern, namely, a full-scale, multi-front war. At the same time, the Jewish respondents ranked international isolation and boycotts in second place, while the Arabs cited the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.


Figure 1.5 The greatest external existential threat facing Israel (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



A breakdown of the responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation shows that, in the eyes of the Left, the greatest threat is international isolation and boycotts, whereas in the Center and on the Right, it is a full-scale, multi-

front war. Fear of the Iranian nuclear threat is noticeably lower on the Left than in the Center and on the Right, while concerns about the loss of American support are less pronounced on the Right than on the Left or in the Center.

Figure 1.6 **The greatest external existential threat facing Israel** (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



On this question as well, we found differences between men and women, though only in the extent to which an all-out, multi-front war is seen as the greatest external threat, and not its ranking relative to other dangers. While both men and women (Jews and Arabs alike) rated this threat highest, the men expressed somewhat less worry than the women (Jews: men, 34%; women, 39.5%; Arabs: men, 28%; women, 35%).

Is democratic rule in Israel in grave danger?


Question 48 Appendix 1, p. 229 | Appendix 2, p. 253

Once again this year, we asked respondents whether, in their opinion, democratic rule in Israel is in grave danger. It appears that, despite the tumultuous events experienced by Israelis, there were no major differences this year in the share

of both Jews and Arabs who agree that Israeli democracy faces a severe threat. Whereas a December 2023 poll registered a slight decline in the share who perceive such a danger, in this year's survey, the findings returned to their level of June 2023, when the struggle over the government's judicial revolution was in one of its fiercest phases.

As in the past, the share of Arabs who hold that democratic rule in Israel is in grave danger is noticeably greater than the corresponding share of Jews, at roughly three-quarters as opposed to slightly more than one-half. Likewise, the proportion of Arab respondents who take this view has risen since December 2023.


Figure 1.7 **Agree that democratic rule in Israel is in grave danger, 2017–2024** (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



Despite the tumultuous events of the past year, there were no major changes in the share of both Jews and Arabs who agree that Israeli democracy faces a severe threat.

A breakdown of responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation shows statistically significant differences between the three camps. A majority of those who identify with the Center, and even more so on the Left, think that Israeli democracy is in serious danger, as opposed to a minority (albeit a sizeable one) on the Right. In fact, the share of respondents on the Left who feel this way is the highest it has been since we first began posing this question. In this instance, the Center is much closer to the Left than to the Right.

Figure 1.8 **Agree that democratic rule in Israel is in grave danger, 2017–2024** (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



Analyzing the responses in the Jewish sample by religiosity reveals that, as in past surveys, a considerable majority of secular Jews perceive democratic rule in Israel as being under serious threat. Among traditional non-religious and Haredi respondents, approximately one-half share this view, along with a minority of traditional religious and national religious respondents. The most noteworthy finding is the rise (compared with both surveys in 2023) in the share of Haredim who hold that Israeli democracy is in grave danger, perhaps in light of the move to draft young Haredi men into military service. But looking back even further, to 2022, we see that, in fact, an even higher proportion of the Haredi public felt this way under the Bennett-Lapid coalition, perhaps due to concerns regarding the High Court of Justice ruling that won government backing at the time.

Table 1.1 Agree that democratic rule in Israel is in grave danger, 2022–2024 (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)

	2022	June 2023	December 2023	2024
Haredim	55	30	27	47
National religious	36	26	20	20
Traditional religious	60	42	39	39.5
Traditional non-religious	56	50	38	48
Secular	59	78	64	72

A breakdown of secular respondents by political orientation yields another interesting finding: Among secular Jews who identify with the Left, 95% hold that democratic rule in Israel is in grave danger, whereas the corresponding proportions are 78% in the Center and only 49% on the Right.

We also found that women in the Jewish sample are more inclined than men to believe that Israeli democracy is under threat (59% versus 49%, respectively).

In each of the three religious groups in the Arab sample, we found a substantial majority who see Israeli democracy as being in jeopardy (Druze, 90%; Christians, 86%; Muslims, 75%).

Cross-tabulating the responses to this question with the assessment of Israel's overall situation in the total sample, we found that a majority of those who characterize the situation as bad or very bad also think that democracy in Israel is in serious danger. Of those who rate Israel's situation as "so-so," a sizeable minority identify such a danger, while among those who feel that the country is in good or very good condition, only one-third agree with the statement that democratic rule in Israel is in grave danger.

Table 1.2 Agree/disagree that democratic rule in Israel is in grave danger (total sample, by assessment of Israel's overall situation today; %)


Israel's overall situation today	Democratic rule in Israel is in grave danger			
	Agree	Disagree	Don't know	Total
Good/very good	33	64.5	2.5	100
So-so	42	54	4	100
Bad/very bad	70	27	3	100

Sense of belonging to the state

Question 9 Appendix 1, p. 220 | Appendix 2, p. 239

This year as well, we posed a question that has appeared in most of our surveys since 2003: “To what extent do you feel part of the State of Israel and its problems?” The findings show remarkable consistency, given the turmoil that the country has undergone, and is still experiencing. Throughout the years, some 80% to 90% of respondents in the total sample have said that they feel part of the State of Israel and its problems (see appendix 2).

Figure 1.9 To what extent do you feel part of the State of Israel and its problems? (total sample; %)



Nonetheless, not surprisingly, a breakdown of the responses by nationality reveals substantial differences between Jews and Arabs, with the latter feeling less connected to the state. As is evident from the data over the years, the share of Jewish respondents who feel a sense of belonging has remained consistently high: The lowest measurement was in 2014, when “only” 78% responded that they feel part of the state “very much” or “quite a lot,” while the highest was in November 2023, not long after the events of October 7, when 94% expressed this view. With regard to the Arab interviewees, the November 2023 survey yielded the highest-ever share (70%) who responded that they feel part of the state “very much” or “quite a lot.” (In a separate survey during the same period, the finding was 65%, suggesting that this was not a case of measurement error.) In February 2024, we recorded a decline, seemingly indicating a return to the previous situation; however, in May, the percentage rose again. Thus, additional

measurements will be needed to establish whether or not the findings point to a new trend.


Table 1.3 **Feel part of the state and its problems** (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

	2022	June 2023	November 2023	February 2024	2024
Jews	86	85	94	86	86
Arabs	40.5	48	70	46	66

A breakdown of the Arab sample by religion shows that in all three groups, the majority report a sense of belonging to the state and its problems; however, roughly two-thirds of Muslims and Christians offered this response (63.5% and 67%, respectively), whereas the proportion of Druze who feel this way is closer to that of the Jewish sample, at 87%.

Breaking down the Jewish sample by religiosity, we found that, although a majority of Haredim do feel part of the state and its problems, this group stands out for the comparatively low share who responded this way, perhaps due to the fact that this survey was conducted during a period of great tension concerning the issue of Haredi conscription. The gaps between the remaining groups are relatively small, though secular Jews show the weakest sense of identification with the state and its difficulties, outside of the Haredim.

Figure 1.10 **Feel part of the State of Israel and its problems “very much”/ “quite a lot”** (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)




As in the past, an analysis of the Jewish sample by political orientation revealed only minor differences this year, with a majority in all three camps expressing a sense of belonging to the state and its problems (Left, 83%; Center, 85%; Right, 88%). Breaking down the findings among Jewish respondents by age, we found a majority in all age groups who feel this way, though by a smaller margin in the youngest cohort (18–34, 79.5%; 35–54, 92%; 55 and over, 86%). We found a similar picture in the Arab sample, though with smaller proportions (18–34, 60%; 35–54, 69%; 55 and over, 75%).

Is Israel a good place to live?

Question 46 Appendix 1, p. 228 | Appendix 2, p. 252

Once again this year, some two-thirds of Arab and Jewish interviewees responded that Israel is a good place to live. The results this year are at the same level as in 2023, following a decline in both groups in the 2022 survey. This finding seems surprising in light of the present circumstances, and it suggests that this is a fundamental position that is only moderately affected by current events.

Figure 1.11 **Agree that Israel is a good place to live** (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation shows very large disparities. In fact, the share on the Left who hold that Israel is a good place to live (a minority) is roughly one-half the corresponding share in the Center (a majority), and much lower than that on the Right (an even more substantial majority).

Once again this year, some two-thirds of Arab and Jewish interviewees responded that Israel is a good place to live—a surprising finding in light of the present circumstances, suggesting that this is a fundamental position that is only moderately affected by current events.

Table 1.4 **Agree that Israel is a good place to live** (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)

Left	Center	Right
32	60	74

Analyzing the responses in the Jewish sample by religiosity, we found that the national religious group is the most inclined to think that Israel is a good place to live (91%), followed by Haredim (81%) and traditional religious and non-religious Jews (both 72%). Only among the secular respondents is there less than a majority who express this view (48%); however, this group is not uniform. Breaking down the findings by political orientation shows that, of those secular Jews who identify with the Left, a minority of just 28% hold that Israel is a good place to live, as contrasted with 52% from the Center and 57% from the Right.

We found interesting differences in the Jewish sample when examining the results based on age. While a majority in all age groups consider Israel a good place to live, the size of this majority varies greatly between the two younger age groups, on the one hand, and the oldest cohort, on the other; specifically, 59% of 18–34 year olds and 56% of those aged 35–54 think that Israel is a good place to live, while a much larger majority of respondents aged 55 and over (80%) take this view.

Breaking down the responses to this question by assessments of Israel's overall situation today, we found that, of those who consider the country to be in good


or very good shape, 88% think that Israel is a good place to live, compared with 80% of those who label the situation “so-so,” and only 54% of those who characterize it as bad or very bad.

Optimism/pessimism about Israel’s future

Question 79 Appendix 1, p. 236 | Appendix 2, p. 260

As in the 2023 *Democracy Index* survey, the share of optimists about Israel’s future exceeds that of pessimists in the total sample this year. In the previous survey, one-half of respondents took an optimistic point of view, while the proportion was slightly higher this time (at 52.5%), indicating that, despite the events of October 7 and the ensuing war, there has been almost no change in the distribution of opinions on the country’s future in the public as a whole.

Figure 1.12 **Optimistic or pessimistic about Israel’s future, 2023 and 2024**
(total sample; %)




Whereas the majority of Jewish respondents are optimistic about Israel’s future, the majority of Arabs are pessimistic. These findings, too, are nearly identical to last year’s. Among both Jews and Arabs, women tended to be less optimistic than men (Jews: men, 62%; women, 51%; Arabs: men, 37.5%; women, 33%).

Table 1.5 **Optimism/pessimism about Israel's future** (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

	Optimistic	Pessimistic	Don't know	Total
Jews	56	38.5	5.5	100
Arabs	35	59	6	100

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by religiosity points to a minority of optimists among secular respondents, as opposed to a majority in all of the other categories, with the largest majority in the national religious group. Breaking down the responses by political orientation reveals that optimists constitute a minority on the Left, roughly one-half in the Center, and a clear majority on the Right. The analysis of these two variables (religiosity and political orientation) shows that the present findings are virtually the same as last year's, in terms of the relative positions of the various groups.

Figure 1.13 **Optimism about Israel's future** (Jewish sample, by religiosity and political orientation; %)

Breaking down the results by age yields an interesting finding: In the Jewish sample, the intermediate age group are the most pessimistic of the three, followed by the youngest cohort, and far behind them, the oldest group (share of pessimists: 18–34, 42%; 35–54, 50%; 55 and over, 23%). It may be that the oldest respondents have already lived through difficult times, and hence are less negatively affected by the present crisis. In the Arab sample, we found

virtually no differences between age groups, with a majority in all cohorts expressing pessimism.

Not surprisingly, we found an association between the assessment of Israel's overall situation and the degree of optimism or pessimism about the country's future. Thus, of those respondents who characterize the situation as good or very good, 82% are optimistic about the country's future, as opposed to 15% who are pessimistic. Of those who consider the overall situation in Israel to be "so-so," 74% express optimism about the future, and 22% are pessimistic. By contrast, of those who define the condition of the country as bad or very bad, only a minority (36%) are optimistic about its future, while the majority (57%) are pessimistic.

Factor contributing most strongly to optimism/pessimism about Israel's future

Questions 80a–80b Appendix 1, p. 236–237

As in the 2021 survey, we sought to understand what factors played a role in the optimism or pessimism of the respondents, utilizing an open-ended question: "What factor contributes most strongly to your optimism or pessimism about Israel's future?" When the responses were grouped into categories, the primary reason cited in the Jewish sample (as noted, a majority of 56% responded that they are optimistic) was their fellow citizens and the people of Israel. This marks a change from the previous survey, when the most prevalent reason for optimism was the new government (of Bennett and Lapid). Now, as then, the second reason was faith-based: faith in God, redemption, and the like. Additionally, whereas in 2021 (when Israel's security did not appear to be in doubt), the army ranked only sixth as a factor engendering optimism, today (when it is clear that without the army, Israel's situation would be much worse than it is), the IDF has climbed to third place in the ranking. By contrast, the field of high-tech, touted so often in 2021 as a guarantor of Israeli prosperity, disappeared this year from the list of reasons for optimism.

Table 1.6 **Primary reason for optimism about Israel's future, 2021 and 2024**

(Jewish sample; %)

2021	2024
New government / change of government (24%)	Fellow citizens / the people of Israel / national unity (25%)
Faith in God / redemption / Messiah (17%)	Faith in God / redemption / prayer (21%)
Good people / the human factor (16.5%)	IDF / soldiers / security / the defense forces (14%)
Economy / high-tech / development (10%)	The Jewish people / eternity of the Jewish nation / history (13%)
General optimism / positive outlook / hope (8%)	Love of the country / Zionism / we have no other country / no alternative (6.5%)
Security / IDF / strong state (8%)	General optimism / hope (4.5%)
Love of the country / Zionism (6%)	The prime minister / Binyamin Netanyahu / government (2%)
Various other responses / don't know (10.5%)	Various other responses / don't know (14.5%)

A comparison between the 2021 and 2024 surveys regarding the major reasons for pessimism about Israel's future (as stated, the current rate of pessimism among Jewish respondents is 38.5%) finds greater similarity between the two than does the above comparison regarding reasons for optimism. In both surveys, the political establishment, leadership and government are in first place as reasons for pessimism; but whereas in 2021, racism and social divisions stood in second place (presently in fourth place), in 2024, the security situation ranks second (compared with fourth place in 2021).

The primary reason for optimism cited by Jewish respondents was their fellow citizens and the people of Israel. In the Arab sample, the number one reason for optimism today is the hope for peace and an end to the war.

Table 1.7 Primary reason for pessimism about Israel’s future, 2021 and 2024 (Jewish sample; %)

2021	2024
The political situation / new government / state of government institutions (47%)	The government / Knesset / leadership / the ruling regime / corruption / politics (33%)
Racism / lack of solidarity / violence / social divisions (19%)	Security situation / war (20%)
Demographic threats (Haredim / Arabs) (12%)	The prime minister / Benjamin Netanyahu / the Likud (11%)
Security / wars / external threats / world opinion on Israel (11.5%)	Division / polarization / rift in the nation (8.5%)
Economic situation / cost of living / economic disparities (6%)	Relations with Arabs in Israel / Israeli-Palestinian conflict (4%)
Various other responses / don't know (4.5%)	Haredim / Haredization (3%)
	Economic situation (3%)
	Leftists / the anti-government protests (3%)
	The Right / the extreme Right / Ben-Gvir / Smotrich (2.5%)
	International relations (2%)
	Various other responses / don't know (10%)

In the Arab sample (which, as noted, has a 35% minority of optimists), the number one reason for optimism today is the hope for peace and an end to the war. The last time this question was posed (in 2021), hope in general, which is currently in second place, ranked at the top of the list. Interestingly enough, in the Arab sector as well, high-tech did not make this year’s list of reasons for optimism. Faith in God also appears quite frequently this year among the optimistic Arab responses, though to a lesser degree than among Jews.

Table 1.8 Primary reason for optimism about Israel’s future, 2021 and 2024 (Arab sample; %)

2021	2024
General optimism / hope (24%)	End of the war / finding a solution, and the hope for peace (27%)
Economy / high-tech / development (19.5%)	General optimism / hope (20%)
New government / change of government (18%)	A strong state / security (15%)

2021	2024
Security / democracy / state takes care of its citizens (16%)	Faith in God (7%)
Various additional responses / other / don't know (22.5%)	Life in Israel / comparison with other places (4%)
	Fellow citizens (3%)
	Economy / welfare (3%)
	Various additional responses / other / don't know (21%)

As noted earlier, the majority of Arab respondents (59%) are pessimistic about Israel's future. Heading this year's list of reasons for pessimism is the war/security situation, followed by the country's overall situation (which may also include violence and crime, though not many interviewees cited this separately—somewhat surprisingly, given the severity of the problem). The government and the political establishment, which are in first place among Jewish respondents on the list of reasons for pessimism, rated third in importance here, while racism and injustice, which ranked number one in 2021, dropped to the next-to-last place.

Table 1.9 Primary reason for pessimism about Israel's future, 2021 and 2024 (Arab sample; %)

2021	2024
Racism / social problems / sense of injustice (45%)	The war / security situation (41%)
The government / political situation / politicians (29%)	Overall situation (25%)
Economic situation / cost of living / everyday life (20%)	The government / political establishment (9%)
Various additional responses / other / don't know (6%)	Economic situation (6%)
	Racism / injustice (3.5%)
	Violence and crime (1%)
	Various additional responses / other / don't know (14.5%)

Chapter 2

Democracy, Government, Trust in Institutions

In this chapter, we discuss the following topics:

- ❑ Can the state be counted on to come to the aid of its citizens?
 - ❑ Balance between the Jewish and democratic components of Israel
 - ❑ How well is the Opposition performing?
 - ❑ Trust in state institutions:
 - Public trust in state institutions: an overview
 - Trust in the President of Israel
 - Trust in the Supreme Court
 - Trust in the media
 - Trust in the government
 - Trust in the Knesset
 - Trust in Israel's political parties
 - Trust in municipalities/local authorities
 - Trust in the Attorney General
 - Is trust in state institutions on the decline?
 - Factor analysis of trust ratings
-

Can the state be counted on to come to the aid of its citizens?

Question 51 Appendix 1, p. 229 / Appendix 2, p. 254


The magnitude and brutality of Hamas's surprise attack against Israel on October 7; the intelligence breakdown and the failure to defend Israel's residents; the abduction of soldiers and civilians to Gaza; and the feeling in the border communities in both South and North of being ignored and abandoned, all contributed to a crisis in Israeli society. Against this backdrop, we decided to open the discussion in this chapter with a question about the extent of respondents' agreement that citizens of Israel can always rely on the state to come to their aid in times of trouble.

Though only a minority in all previous measurements agreed that the state can be counted on in such situations, in the current survey, only about one-third of the total sample took this position—a finding that points to a continuing downward trend (2017, 46%; 2022, 39%; 2024, 32%). Among Jewish respondents, only about one-quarter today agree that Israel's citizens can rely on the state to help them in times of trouble, while the corresponding share of Arab respondents has risen relative to 2022, returning to the level in 2017. The fact that, once again, the share of Arabs who agree that the state looks out for its citizens is greater than that of Jews is surprising, and we have no explanation to offer for it. One of the reasons that has been put forward—and there may well be some truth to it—is that Arab interviewees interpret the concept of “citizens of Israel” as referring to the Jewish majority and not to them. Another possibility is the improvement in recent years in some of the services provided by the state to its Arab citizens.

Though only a minority in all previous measurements agreed that the state can be counted on to come to the aid of its citizens, in the current survey, only about one-third of the total sample took this position—a finding that points to a continuing downward trend.

Figure 2.1 **Agree/disagree with the statement that citizens of Israel can always count on the state to help them in times of trouble, 2017–2024**

(Jewish and Arab samples; %)



Breaking down the responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation, we found that only a minority in all camps agree with the assertion that the state can be counted on, though there are differences between them: One-third of those who identify with the Right express agreement with the statement, as compared with a very small minority of those who align themselves with the Center or Left. In the latter two groups, there has in fact been a considerable downturn since 2022, whereas on the Right, the findings have remained relatively stable.

Haredi, national religious, and traditional religious respondents are more inclined to agree with the notion that Israelis can always count on the state to come to their aid, as contrasted with traditional non-religious and, especially, secular Jews. Moreover, in comparison with the 2022 survey, this year marked a noticeable increase in the share of Haredi respondents who agree with the statement, which may be attributable to the Haredi parties being part of the government and participating in the running of the state. By contrast, the national religious and traditional religious groups registered a slight decline in the share who agree with the assertion, while there was a steep drop in agreement among secular and traditional non-religious respondents.

Though all age groups showed a downturn compared with the 2022 survey, the older interviewees (55 and over) believe to a greater extent than the younger ones that the state can be relied upon in times of trouble.

And finally, we found that, while those who identify with the stronger groups in society tend to believe more strongly that the state will always come to their aid than do those who feel part of the weaker groups, both categories showed a noticeable falling-off this year in comparison with past surveys.


Table 2.1 Agree that Israel’s citizens can always rely on the state to help them in times of trouble, 2017–2024 (Jewish sample; %)

		2017	2022	2024
Political orientation	Left	33	35.5	10
	Center	36	43	16
	Right	52	35	33
Religiosity	Haredim	32	24	37
	National religious	64	49	44
	Traditional religious	58	39	34
	Traditional non-religious	43.5	40	25
	Secular	35	35	15
Age	18–34	39	25	21
	35–54	42	38	20
	55 and over	47	47	35
Social location	Stronger groups	48	42	28
	Weaker groups	28	28	19

In the Arab sample, we found that a majority in most of the subgroups believe that the citizens of Israel can rely on the state to come to their aid in times of trouble, though we did find differences when analyzing by religion. A larger majority of Druze than of Muslims or Christians expressed agreement with the above statement (78%, 60.5%, and 59%, respectively).

Examining the extent of agreement with the statement among evacuees and non-evacuees in the total sample, we found a higher share of respondents who expressed agreement among the non-evacuees compared with those who had experienced evacuation from their homes.

Figure 2.2 **Agree/disagree with the statement that citizens of Israel can always count on the state to help them in times of trouble** (total sample, by evacuee/non-evacuee; %)



We found further that the general attitude toward the state is closely associated with the sense of being able to rely on it. Thus, a considerable majority of those who characterize Israel’s overall situation as good agree that the state can be counted on, as opposed to a minority of those who offered a negative assessment of the country’s condition. The optimists regarding Israel’s future tend more than the pessimists to feel that the state can be relied on to help its citizens in times of trouble. And finally, those who hold that Israel is a good place to live are inclined to agree more with the above statement than do those who think it is not a good place to live—though in both cases (optimism/pessimism, and whether Israel is/is not a good place to live), only a minority agree that citizens can always rely on the state to help them.

Table 2.2 **Agree/disagree that citizens of Israel can always rely on the state to help them in times of trouble** (total sample, by assorted variables; %)

		Israel’s citizens can always rely on the state to help them in times of trouble			
		Agree	Disagree	Don’t know	Total
Israel’s overall situation today	Good/very good	63	36	1	100
	So-so	36	63	1	100
	Bad/very bad	23.5	74.5	2	100


		Israel's citizens can always rely on the state to help them in times of trouble			
		Agree	Disagree	Don't know	Total
Optimistic or pessimistic about Israel's future	Optimistic	40	58	2	100
	Pessimistic	20.5	78	1.5	100
Israel is a good place to live	Agree	42	56	2	100
	Disagree	12	87	1	100

Balance between the Jewish and democratic components of Israel

Question 12 Appendix 1, p. 221 | Appendix 2, p. 241

The question of whether there is a good balance between the Jewish and the democratic components of the State of Israel has been posed on a recurring basis since 2016. This year, as in previous surveys (with the exception of the 2022 poll, which was apparently an anomaly), the most common position among Jewish respondents (roughly 40%) is that the Jewish component is too dominant, with one-quarter holding that the democratic component is too strong, and about one-fifth indicating that there is a suitable balance between the two.

Figure 2.3 Balance between Jewish and democratic components in Israel, 2016–2024 (Jewish sample; %)



By contrast, in the Arab sample, there has been quite a sizeable and consistent majority over the years (with the exception of the 2022 poll, which showed a rise, and the 2023 poll, a decline) who think that the Jewish component is too dominant in Israel. This majority is reflected in all of the subgroups studied.

Table 2.3 Share who think that the Jewish component is too dominant in Israel, 2016–2024 (Arab sample; %)

2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
80	74	77	77	76	82	86	60	72

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation shows that a considerable majority of those who align themselves with the Left hold that the Jewish component is too dominant in Israel, as contrasted with roughly one-half of respondents in the Center and about one-fifth on the Right. While the Right is split on this issue, the most common opinion in this camp is that the democratic component is overly strong. A point worth noting is the high share of “don’t know” responses in the Center and on the Right, compared with the low proportion on the Left (23%, 19.5%, and 7%, respectively).

Analyzing the results by religiosity shows that roughly one-half of Haredi and national religious respondents think that the democratic component is too dominant in Israel. Among the traditional religious, the most frequently cited position (though not by a majority) is that the democratic component is too strong, and among the traditional non-religious, that the Jewish component is overly dominant. A clear majority of secular respondents believe that the Jewish component is too strong.

Compared with last year, the most common responses in all subgroups have remained relatively constant, though the following changes stood out: There was a slight downturn on the Right in the share who hold that the Jewish component is too dominant (from 25% to 20%); a substantial increase among national religious respondents in the share who hold that there is a good balance between the Jewish and democratic components (from 20% to 32%); and a sizeable decline among the traditional religious in the share who believe that the Jewish component is too strong (from 25% to 15%).

Breaking down the secular Jewish respondents separately by political orientation, we found marked differences between the three camps. A sizeable majority of those who identify with the Left hold that the Jewish component is too dominant in Israel, as opposed to a smaller majority in the Center, and a minority on the Right (89%, 63%, and 38%, respectively).

Table 2.4 **Balance between the Jewish and democratic components in Israel** (Jewish sample, by political orientation and religiosity; %)

		Jewish component is too dominant	Democratic component is too dominant	There is a good balance between the two components	Don't know	Total
Political orientation	Left	81	6	6	7	100
	Center	56	9	12	23	100
	Right	20	35.5	25	19.5	100
Religiosity	Haredim	15	51.5	14	19.5	100
	National religious	5	51	32	12	100
	Traditional religious	15	38.5	23.5	23	100
	Traditional non-religious	34	21	26	19	100
	Secular	60	8.5	12	19.5	100

An analysis of the responses to this question in the total sample by vote in the 2022 Knesset elections shows that a majority of voters for Labor, Ra'am, Hadash-Ta'al, Yesh Atid, and Yisrael Beytenu think that the Jewish element is too dominant, whereas a majority of voters for United Torah Judaism and roughly one-half of voters for Religious Zionism and Shas hold that the democratic component is too strong.

Half of the voters for National Unity believe that the Jewish component is too strong, while Likud voters are split on this issue: over one-quarter of them consider the democratic component to be too dominant, a similar share think that there is a good balance between the Jewish and democratic aspects, and

roughly one-fifth think that the Jewish component is too strong. Here too, it is worth noting the relatively high share of “don’t know” responses among voters for Shas, the Likud, and National Unity.

Table 2.5 **Balance between Jewish and democratic components** (total sample, by vote in 2022 Knesset elections; %)

	Jewish component is too dominant	Democratic component is too dominant	There is a good balance between the two components	Don't know	Total
Ra'am	88	4	6	2	100
Labor	83	2	8.5	6.5	100
Hadash-Ta'al	78	–	19	3	100
Yesh Atid	71	5	6	18	100
Yisrael Beytenu	70	6	9	15	100
National Unity	50	9	21	20	100
Likud	21	30	28	21	100
Shas	10	46	18.5	25.5	100
Religious Zionism	8	52	25	15	100
United Torah Judaism	3	69.5	12	15.5	100

Finally, we cross-tabulated the above findings with the responses to the question on whether democratic rule in Israel is in grave danger. We learned that, of those who agree that democracy in Israel is under serious threat, the majority hold that the Jewish component is too dominant; on the other hand, opinions are divided among those who disagree that democracy in Israel is in danger, with over one-third believing that the democratic component is too strong in Israel, about one-quarter that there is a good balance between the two elements, and one-fifth that the Jewish component is too strong.

Table 2.6 Balance between the Jewish and democratic components in Israel
 (total sample, by agreement/disagreement that democratic rule in Israel is in grave danger; %)


	Jewish component is too dominant	Democratic component is too dominant	There is a good balance between the two components	Don't know	Total
Agree that democracy in Israel is in grave danger	60	12	13	15	100
Disagree that democracy in Israel is in grave danger	20	36	28	16	100

Performance of the Opposition

Question 47 Appendix 1, p. 228 | Appendix 2, p. 253

Revisiting the question of whether the Opposition in Israel is doing its job, we found that, in both the Jewish and Arab samples, a considerable majority think that the Opposition is weak and is not performing well. Among Jews, this represents a significant increase over the 2023 survey findings, and in fact almost a return to the 2017 data, while the Arab results reflect relative stability compared with previous surveys.

Figure 2.4 Is the Opposition in Israel weak and not doing its job?
 2017–2024 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals that the share in all three camps who feel that the Opposition is weak and is not fulfilling its role has grown since last year, in particular among those who identify with the Left or Center.

An analysis of the Jewish sample by religiosity finds that a majority of secular and traditional non-religious Jews hold that the Opposition is not performing well, as contrasted with roughly one-half of traditional religious and Haredi respondents and about one-third of the national religious camp. Among secular and traditional non-religious respondents, there was a substantial increase in the share who consider the Opposition to be weak.

Breaking down the secular respondents separately by political orientation, we found that virtually all those who identify with the Left hold that the Opposition is not doing its job, compared with smaller majorities among those who align themselves with the Center or Right (92%, 73%, and 61%, respectively).

Table 2.7 Agree that the Opposition in Israel is weak and is not doing its job, 2017–2024 (Jewish sample, by political orientation and religiosity; %)


		2017	2023	2024
Political orientation	Left	87	48	90
	Center	68	40	68
	Right	57.5	44	50
Religiosity	Haredim	48	44	48
	National religious	51.5	36	34
	Traditional religious	52	43	49.5
	Traditional non-religious	70	42	59
	Secular	76.5	47	73

We did not find significant differences between subgroups in the Arab sample. Finally, we broke down the responses to this question in the total sample by vote in the 2022 Knesset elections, and found that those who voted for the parties that now form the Opposition are more inclined to think that their Knesset representatives are not doing a good job, compared with those who voted for the Coalition parties, of whom only one-half or less give the Opposition a bad

grade. One possible interpretation is that voters for the Opposition parties would have liked to see their representatives be more effective and combative, while voters for the Coalition parties are content with the Opposition's weakness.

Those who voted for the parties that now form the Opposition are more inclined to think that their Knesset representatives are not doing a good job, compared with those who voted for the Coalition parties, of whom only one-half or less give the Opposition a bad grade.

Figure 2.5 **Agree that the Opposition in Israel is weak and is not doing its job** (total sample, by vote in 2022 Knesset elections; %)



Public trust in state institutions: An overview

Based on the premise that citizens' trust in the state and its institutions is one of the cornerstones of democratic regimes, we returned to our annual question on the extent of public trust in eight key institutions: the IDF, the President

of Israel, the Supreme Court, the police, the government, the Knesset, Israel's political parties, and the media. Once again this year, we revisited two other institutions: the municipality/local authority where respondents reside, and the Attorney General. In addition, for the first time as part of the *Democracy Index* survey, we examined the level of trust in the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) and the Mossad.

Data on the four security-related institutions (the police, the IDF, the Shin Bet, and the Mossad) are addressed only in general terms in this chapter, and are discussed in greater depth in chapter 4 (“National Security and the Security Forces”).


In this chapter, we present the levels of trust in all the institutions surveyed as well as changes in comparison with last year. This year, due to the unique circumstances, we also provide trust ratings from the December 2023 survey (a special poll conducted early in the Iron Swords war);¹⁰ however, as a rule, our basis for comparison is the annual *Democracy Index* survey from June 2023.

As shown in the figure below, the share who express trust in most of the state institutions is significantly greater in the Jewish public than in the Arab one, with the exception of the political bodies—the government, the Knesset, and the political parties—who earned similar (and extremely low) trust ratings from Jews and Arabs alike.

Of the eight institutions examined each year, the IDF maintains its place at the head of the rankings among Jewish respondents, followed at a considerable distance by the President of Israel, the police, and the Supreme Court. In the Arab public, the Supreme Court, which was ranked first in the past, has dropped to second place, with trust in the IDF rising to the top of the list for the first time since we began the surveys in 2003, though it is not yet clear whether this is a one-time result or represents an actual shift.

¹⁰ This survey was conducted for the *Israeli Voice Index* of December 2023. For certain institutions, we also present a comparison with the October 2023 *War in Gaza Survey* focused on the Iron Swords War.

Figure 2.6 Express trust in each of the state institutions* (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



* The darker bars represent the eight institutions examined on a recurring basis, while the lighter ones indicate those institutions that we do not ask about regularly.

In comparison with June 2023, the Jewish sample showed lower levels of trust in the IDF, the President of Israel, and the political bodies (the government, Knesset, and political parties), with trust in the Supreme Court also declining slightly. The extent of trust in the media remained virtually unchanged, and trust in the police registered an upturn.

In the Arab sample, none of the institutions that we examine regularly crossed the 30% mark in terms of trust. As shown in the following table, four institutions remained more or less the same compared with June 2023, and four others saw

changes: trust in the IDF and the police rose, while trust in the Knesset and the political parties diminished.

We found further that, in the Arab public, 49.5% do not express trust in any of the eight recurring institutions, as opposed to a negligible minority of 9% among Jewish respondents who do not express trust in any institution.¹¹

In the Jewish sample, the share who express trust in the various institutions spans a very wide range, from the highest (the IDF, at 77%) to the lowest (the political parties, at 9%); in the Arab sample, the range is smaller, between 30% (IDF) and 11% (political parties).

Table 2.8 Public trust in state institutions examined regularly, 2023–2024*
(total sample; Jewish and Arab samples; %)

Institution	Total sample					Jews					Arabs				
	Ranking	June 2023	Dec. 2023	2024	Change from June 2023	Ranking	June 2023	Dec. 2023	2024	Change from June 2023	Ranking	June 2023	Dec. 2023	2024	Change from June 2023
IDF	1	75	79	69	-	1	85.5	86.5	77	-	1	21	44	30	+
President of Israel	2	48	57	43	-	2	54	61	48	-	5-6	18	38	15	=
Police	3	32	55	41	+	3	35	58.5	44	+	3	17	38	22	+
Supreme Court	4	39	44	37	=	4	42	42.5	39	-	2	26	53	26	=
Media	5	24	31	25	=	5	25	30	27	=	4	17.5	36	16	=
Government	6	27	22	18	-	6	28	23	19	-	5-6	18	19	15	=
Knesset	7	23	20	13	-	7	24	19	13	-	7	18	28	12	-
Political parties	8	13	17	9	-	8	13	15	9	-	8	15	25	11	-

* Changes in levels of trust (signified by + or -) are presented only where sizeable and/or statistically significant differences were found.

¹¹ This refers to respondents who rated their level of trust in each of the eight institutions studied regularly as 1 = not at all or 2 = not so much.

Figure 2.7 Trust each of the institutions studied regularly, 2003–2024

(Jewish sample; %)





Figure 2.8 Trust each of the institutions studied regularly, 2003–2024

(Arab sample; %)




Trust in the President of Israel

Question 16 Appendix 1, p. 222 | Appendix 2, p. 244

The share who express trust in the President of Israel is much higher among Jewish than Arab respondents. In the Jewish sample, there has been a decline in the share who place their trust in this institution compared to June 2023 (from 54% to 48%), while the Arab rating has remained largely the same.

The rise in trust in the President in December 2023 apparently stemmed from the public's urge to coalesce around a unifying national figure in time of crisis. By contrast, today, with the return of the discord that is dividing the public, there has been a noticeable decline in the level of trust in the President, which is now lower than in June 2023.

Figure 2.9 Trust the President of Israel, 2003–2024 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



Breaking down responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation, we find similar levels of trust in the President on the Left and Right, but in both cases lower than in the Center. Compared with the June 2023 survey, there has been a substantial decline in the share who profess faith in the President on the Left and in the Center.

An analysis of the Jewish sample by religiosity indicates low levels of trust in the President among Haredim relative to the other religious groups. In comparison with June 2023, there is a noticeable decline in trust among secular respondents.

Table 2.9 **Trust the President of Israel, 2023–2024** (Jewish sample, by political orientation and religiosity; %)

		June 2023	December 2023	2024
Political orientation	Left	68	80	43
	Center	68	75	58
	Right	46	51	45.5
Religiosity	Haredim	26	34	21
	National religious	47	50	55
	Traditional religious	42	60	49
	Traditional non-religious	54	56	55
	Secular	67	72	50


A breakdown of the Arab sample by religion shows a small minority in each group who express trust in the President of Israel, though the level is slightly higher among Druze respondents.

Table 2.10 **Trust the President of Israel, 2023–2024** (Arab sample, by religion; %)

	June 2023	December 2023	2024
Muslims	19	37	15
Christians	4	22	13.5
Druze	10	54	20

Last, we analyzed the levels of trust in the President of Israel in the total sample by vote in the 2022 Knesset elections. The share who express trust in the President is lowest among those who voted for the Arab and Haredi parties, and highest among voters for the National Unity party.

Figure 2.10 **Trust the President of Israel** (total sample, by vote in 2022 Knesset elections; %)



Trust in the Supreme Court

Question 15 Appendix 1, p. 222 | Appendix 2, p. 243

Among Jewish respondents, there has been a slight decline in the share who express trust in the Supreme Court in comparison with last year. In fact, this year saw the lowest level of trust in this institution since 2003. In the Arab public, trust ratings have returned to June 2023 levels, following a spike in December 2023.

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation and religiosity shows substantial differences between groups. A sizeable majority on the Left, as contrasted with a lesser majority in the Center and a small minority on the Right, express trust in this institution. A majority of secular Jews trust the Supreme Court, as opposed to a minority in the other groups, in particular the Haredi and national religious respondents. Nonetheless, there has been a noticeable decline in trust in the Supreme Court among secular respondents compared with last year. In the other subgroups, the level of trust remains similar to that of June 2023.

Figure 2.11 Trust the Supreme Court, 2003–2024 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)




Table 2.11 Trust the Supreme Court, 2023–2024 (Jewish sample, by political orientation and religiosity; %)

		June 2023	December 2023	2024
Political orientation	Left	80	88	80
	Center	63	67	60
	Right	26	21	21
Religiosity	Haredim	11	2	7
	National religious	16	21	15
	Traditional religious	24	24	22
	Traditional non-religious	36	33	40
	Secular	66.5	67	58.5

A separate analysis of secular Jews based on political orientation shows that, of those who identify with the Left or Center, a considerable majority place their trust in the Supreme Court (83% and 66%, respectively), as opposed to just one-third of those who align themselves with the Right (34.5%).

We found further differences among Jewish respondents when broken down by education and age: Trust in the Supreme Court is greater among those

with higher education (full or partial) than among those without (46% versus 32%, respectively). The share who express trust in the Supreme Court is higher among older respondents than in the youngest cohort (18–34, 33%; 35–54, 43%; 55 and over, 41%).

A breakdown of the Arab sample by religion shows that trust in the Supreme Court among Christian and Muslim respondents dropped sharply in the present survey, reverting to the level of June 2023, following a steep rise in December 2023. Trust among Druze respondents also declined significantly after a steep rise in December 2023, though it remains much higher than it was in June 2023.

Table 2.12 **Trust the Supreme Court, 2023–2024** (Arab sample, by religion; %)

	June 2023	December 2023	2024
Muslims	27	48	25
Christians	26	89	28
Druze	14	71	39

Analyzing trust in the Supreme Court (in the total sample) by vote in the 2022 Knesset elections, we found that voters for Center-Left parties show a very high level of trust in the Supreme Court, while only a negligible minority of voters for Coalition parties (in particular, the Haredi parties and Religious Zionism) express trust in this institution (figure 2.12).

A cross-tabulation in the total sample between trust in the Supreme Court and agreement/disagreement with the statement that democratic rule in Israel is in grave danger shows that those respondents who think that Israeli democracy is under threat express greater trust in the Supreme Court than do those who do not share this view (table 2.13).

Figure 2.12 **Trust the Supreme Court** (total sample, by vote in 2022 Knesset elections; %)




Table 2.13 **Trust the Supreme Court** (total sample, by agreement/disagreement that Israeli democracy is in grave danger; %)

Democratic rule in Israel is in grave danger	Trust the Supreme Court			
	Do trust	Don't trust	Don't know	Total
Agree	47	51	2	100
Disagree	23	75	2	100

Trust in the media

Question 14 Appendix 1, p. 222 | Appendix 2, p. 242

As shown in the following figure, trust in the media has remained largely consistent with the June 2023 survey, in both the Jewish and Arab samples.

Figure 2.13 Trust the media, 2003–2024 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



A breakdown of levels of trust in the media in the Jewish sample by political orientation points to a very low degree of trust on the Right, compared with higher proportions on the Left and in the Center. All three camps returned to the June 2023 levels, following an increase in trust observed among Left and Center respondents in December 2023.

In all groups in the Jewish sample when analyzed by religiosity, only a minority express trust in the media, with especially low proportions among Haredi and the national religious respondents. Here too, levels have reverted back, more or less, to those of June 2023 (with the exception of the traditional religious, who showed a slight increase from December 2023).

Table 2.14 Trust the media, 2023–2024 (Jewish sample, by political orientation and religiosity; %)

		June 2023	October 2023	December 2023	2024
Political orientation	Left	48	61	63	49
	Center	39	56	48.5	39
	Right	15	27	15	16

		June 2023	October 2023	December 2023	2024
Religiosity	Haredim	10	15	5	12
	National religious	6	12	11	8
	Traditional religious	14.5	31	10	20
	Traditional non-religious	27	36.5	21.5	25
	Secular	38	56	51	38

Analyzing secular Jews separately by political orientation, we found that only one-quarter of those who identify with the Right express trust in the media, as compared with higher shares among those who align themselves with the Left or Center (48% and 42%, respectively).

A breakdown of the Arab sample by religion shows only a small minority in all three groups who trust the media, with the lowest share occurring among Muslim respondents (Muslims, 15%; Christians, 25%; Druze, 20%).

Breaking down levels of trust in the media in the total sample by vote in the 2022 Knesset elections reveals that voters for the Arab parties, as well as for the Zionist parties that make up the Coalition (in particular the Haredi and religious Zionist parties), are less inclined to trust the media than are those who voted for the Zionist parties that comprise the Opposition (in particular, Labor voters).

Table 2.15 **Trust the media** (total sample, by vote in 2022 Knesset elections; %)


	Trust the media
Labor	59
Yesh Atid	48
Yisrael Beytenu	39
National Unity	39
Hadash-Ta'al	16
Likud	15
Ra'am	12
Shas	8
United Torah Judaism	8
Religious Zionism	5

Trust in the government

Question 18 Appendix 1, p. 222 | Appendix 2, p. 246

Our findings show a very low share of both Jewish and Arab respondents who express trust in the government. While the level of trust is still somewhat higher among Jews than Arabs, the gap between the two groups has narrowed greatly in the present survey. In the Jewish public, we have seen a continued decline in trust in the government since June 2023.

Figure 2.14 Trust the government, 2003–2024 (Jewish and Arab samples)



A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation indicates that only slightly over one-quarter of those respondents who align themselves with the Right, as opposed to an extremely negligible minority in the Center and on the Left, trust the government. Interestingly, we have seen a downturn in trust among members of all three camps compared with last year; however, in the case of the latter two groups, the levels are so low that there is no real room for them to decline any further (what is known as the “floor effect”).

A breakdown of the findings in the Jewish sample by religiosity shows greater trust in the government among the national religious and traditional religious groups (though still only by a minority), as opposed to a minuscule level among secular respondents, with the Haredim and traditional non-religious

falling somewhere in between. There has been a noticeable drop in trust in the government among Haredim since last year, for reasons related to the so-called Conscription Law.

Table 2.16 **Trust the government, 2023–2024** (Jewish sample, by political orientation and religiosity; %)


		June 2023	October 2023	December 2023	2024
Political orientation	Left	4	4	3	1
	Center	10	8	7	8
	Right	43	31	35.5	28
Religiosity	Haredim	49	35	40	24
	National religious	49	37	42	39
	Traditional religious	41	26	38	31
	Traditional non-religious	28	24	25	23
	Secular	13	9	10	6

Breaking down the secular respondents separately by political orientation, we found a small minority in all three camps who express trust in the government, though the size of this minority is larger among those who identify with the Right compared with the Center and Left (13%, 3.5%, and 1%, respectively).

An analysis of the Arab sample by religion reveals low levels of trust in the government among all three groups, though slightly higher among Druze respondents (Muslims, 14%; Christians, 13%; Druze, 22%).

A breakdown of trust ratings in the government in the total sample by vote in the 2022 Knesset elections yields the following picture: Among voters for the parties that make up the Coalition, confidence in the government is highest among Likud voters (41%), compared with roughly one-third of voters for the Shas and Religious Zionism parties, and only about one-fifth of United Torah Judaism voters. As expected, voters for the Opposition parties registered extremely low levels of trust in the government.

Figure 2.15 **Trust the government** (total sample, by vote in 2022 Knesset election; %)



Cross-tabulating levels of trust in the government with assessments of Israel's overall situation in the total sample, we found that roughly one-half of those who characterize Israel's situation as good or very good express a high degree of trust in the government, as opposed to only one-quarter of those who consider Israel's condition to be so-so, and a very small minority of those who label it as bad or very bad.

Table 2.17 **Trust the government** (total sample, by assessment of Israel's overall situation; %)


Assessment of Israel's overall situation	Trust the government			
	Do trust	Don't trust	Don't know	Total
Good/very good	50.5	45.5	4	100
So-so	27	72	1	100
Bad/very bad	8	91.5	0.5	100

Trust in the Knesset

Question 17 Appendix 1, p. 222 | Appendix 2, p. 245

The Knesset's trust ratings in the present survey are very low, and virtually identical among Jews and Arabs. In fact, the levels of trust in the Knesset in the 2022 and 2024 surveys are the lowest since the inception of the *Democracy Index* in 2003. Among Jews, we have seen a continuing decline—from one-quarter who expressed trust in this institution in June 2023 to a negligible minority in the current measurement. The extent of trust among Arab respondents has largely returned to 2022 levels following a slight rise in December 2023.

Figure 2.16 Trust the Knesset, 2003–2024 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation shows a drop in trust among all three groups in comparison with last year. Analyzing the sample further, on the basis of religiosity, reveals that the national religious express the highest level of trust in the Knesset, and the secular, the lowest. Compared with last year's survey, here too there has been a decline in all subgroups.

Table 2.18 **Trust the Knesset, 2023–2024** (Jewish sample, by political orientation and religiosity; %)


		June 2023	December 2023	2024
Political orientation	Left	7	9	3
	Center	16	14	7
	Right	32	23	18
Religiosity	Haredim	37.5	30	13
	National religious	35	28	27
	Traditional religious	35	33	20
	Traditional non-religious	24	17	17
	Secular	14	10	6

Trust in the political parties

Question 19 Appendix 1, p. 222 | Appendix 2, p. 247

As in past years, the political parties are rated lowest of the eight institutions regularly studied, among Jews and Arabs alike. Moreover, the share who express trust in them is almost identical in both samples.

Figure 2.17 **Trust the political parties, 2003–2024** (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation shows that the share who express trust in the political parties is slightly greater on the Right than on the Left or in the Center.

Further, an analysis by religiosity indicates that Haredi, national religious, and traditional religious respondents have greater faith in the political parties than do their traditional non-religious and secular counterparts. In comparison with last year's results, there has been a noticeable decline in trust on the part of Haredim.

Table 2.19 Trust the political parties, 2023–2024 (Jewish sample, by political orientation and religiosity; %)

		June 2023	December 2023	2024
Political orientation	Left	6	6	7
	Center	10	8	5
	Right	16	21	12
Religiosity	Haredim	23	24.5	13
	National religious	18	30	16
	Traditional religious	13	23	16
	Traditional non-religious	12.5	9	7
	Secular	8.5	10	5

Trust in municipality/local authority

Question 20 Appendix 1, p. 223 | Appendix 2, p. 248

Among Jewish respondents, a high proportion (60%) express trust in their municipality/local authority as opposed to just slightly over one-quarter among Arabs. In this year's survey, the level of trust reflected in the Jewish sample is slightly higher than that of June 2023, while the Arab sample returned to June 2023 levels.

Table 2.20 **Trust the municipality/local authority where they live, 2016–2024** (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

	2016	2018	2020	2021	2022	June 2023	Dec. 2023	2024
Jews	55	60	63	62	51	55	64	59
Arabs	33	19.5	48	32	32	27.5	39	28

A breakdown of responses in the Jewish sample by district shows that those who reside in the Center of the country have greater trust in their municipality/local authority than do those in other parts of Israel. Compared with last year, there has been a decline in trust in their local authorities among residents of the South, which may stem from their wartime performance. The level of trust among residents of the Center, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem rose, while that of Northern residents remained relatively consistent.

Analyzing the Jewish sample by social location, we found that those respondents who identify with the stronger groups in Israeli society report a higher level of trust in their municipality/local authority than do those who identify with the weaker groups (61% versus 54%, respectively).

Table 2.21 **Trust the municipality/local authority where they live** (Jewish sample, by district; %)

	June 2023	December 2023	2024
North	64	62.5	62
Haifa	43	55	49
Center	58	71	66
Tel Aviv	46	62	55
Jerusalem	54	59	60
South	62	66.5	53.5
Judea and Samaria	65	58	60

Analyzing the Arab sample by region did not yield real differences between areas, with levels of trust ranging from 25% to 29%; however, we did find differences when breaking down the results by identification with stronger


or weaker groups. Arab respondents who associate themselves with stronger social groups have greater confidence in their municipality/local authority than do those who identify with weaker groups (34% versus 25%).

Trust in the Attorney General

Question 21 Appendix 1, p. 223 | Appendix 2, p. 248

As in past years, Jews express greater trust in the Attorney General than do Arabs; however, the levels in both groups have remained relatively stable compared with June 2023.

Figure 2.18 Trust the Attorney General, 2008–2024 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals that a majority of those who identify with the Left have faith in the Attorney General, as opposed to roughly one-half in the Center and only about one-fifth on the Right. Compared with last year’s survey, the level of trust has risen slightly on the Left, declined somewhat in the Center, and remained steady on the Right. Analyzing the Jewish sample by religiosity shows that roughly one-half of secular respondents trust the Attorney General, as contrasted with a minority in the other groups, in particular among Haredim, where this minority is extremely small.

Table 2.22 **Trust the Attorney General, 2023 and 2024** (Jewish sample, by political orientation and religiosity; %)

		2023	2024
Political orientation	Left	65	73
	Center	54	47.5
	Right	19	18
Religiosity	Haredim	11	6.5
	National religious	11	10
	Traditional religious	23	19
	Traditional non-religious	28	35
	Secular	53	50


Here too, when analyzing the secular group separately by political orientation, we found that a majority of those who identify with the Left, and roughly half of those who align themselves with the Center, express trust in the Attorney General (73% and 51%, respectively), as opposed to only about one-third on the Right (32%).

And finally, an analysis of the Jewish sample by level of education shows that those respondents with a full or partial academic degree have greater confidence in the Attorney General than do those without higher education (39% versus 27.5%, respectively).

Breaking down the Arab sample by religion, we found sizeable differences between the three groups in the share who place their trust in the Attorney General, though they constitute a minority in all cases (Muslims, 19.5%; Christians, 11%; Druze, 32%).

An analysis of trust in the Attorney General in the total sample by vote in the 2022 Knesset elections found that Yesh Atid voters express the highest level of trust, and Shas voters, the lowest.

Figure 2.19 **Trust the Attorney General** (total sample, by vote in 2022 Knesset elections; %)



We found a strong association between trust in the Attorney General and trust in the Supreme Court. Thus, a substantial majority of respondents overall who expressed faith in the latter also have confidence in the former, and vice versa.

Cross-tabulating between the degree of trust in the Attorney General and agreement/disagreement with the statement that Israeli democracy is in grave danger reveals that those who agree that democratic rule in Israel is under threat place greater faith in the Attorney General than do those who disagree with this assertion; however, in both instances, those who trust the Attorney General are in the minority, while the majority express a lack of trust.

Table 2.23 **Trust the Attorney General** (total sample, by assorted variables; %)

		Trust the Attorney General			
		Do trust	Don't trust	Don't know	Total
Trust the Supreme Court	Do trust	71	24	5	100
	Don't trust	7	90	3	100
Israeli democracy is in grave danger	Agree	40	56	4	100
	Disagree	19	76	5	100


Is trust on the decline?

Each year, we examine whether trust in Israel’s state institutions is waning, holding steady, or on the rise. To answer this question, we have calculated two types of averages:

- a **yearly** average trust rating for **all** the eight institutions studied on a recurring basis (average of the share of respondents who express “quite a lot” or “very much” trust in all the institutions in a given year)
- a **multi-year** average trust rating for **all** the institutions as a whole, across **all** the years surveyed (“the multi-year mean”)

This year, the multi-year mean of these averages stands at 46.3% (compared with 47.0% up to and including 2023). The yearly average for 2024 (32%) is noticeably lower than the multi-year mean of all the averages, and is the lowest to date.

Figure 2.20 **Yearly average level of trust in all the institutions as a whole, 2003–2024*** (total sample, %)




* For 2020 to 2022, we present the average of two surveys (conducted in June and October of each of those years), and for 2023, the average of surveys conducted in June and December of that year.

Among Jewish respondents, the yearly average trust rating in 2024 for all eight institutions examined regularly (35%) is higher than that among Arab respondents (18.5%), though both groups registered a decline.

Among Jewish respondents, the yearly average trust rating in 2024 for all eight institutions examined regularly (35%) is higher than that among Arab respondents (18.5%), though both groups registered a decline: Jews, by 5 percentage points; Arabs, by 8.5 percentage points.

Figure 2.21 **Yearly average level of trust in all the institutions as a whole, 2003–2024** (Jewish and Arab samples, %)



**Multi-year mean level of trust in all the institutions as a whole,
Jewish respondents: 48.3%**

**Multi-year mean level of trust in all the institutions as a whole,
Arab respondents: 35.3%**

Analyzing the yearly average level of trust in all the institutions by political orientation (Jewish sample), we found that in the present survey, like its predecessors, results in the three camps are very similar, with the average trust ratings on the Left and Right actually identical. Nonetheless, the Center, and even more so the Left, registered a decline from last year's average ratings, while no substantial difference was noted on the Right.

Figure 2.22 **Yearly average level of trust in all the institutions as a whole, 2003–2024** (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



The multi-year mean level of trust across all institutions among respondents on the Right is the lowest among the political camps.

Multi-year mean level of trust in all the institutions as a whole, Left: 53.4%


Multi-year mean level of trust in all the institutions as a whole, Center: 51.9%

Multi-year mean level of trust in all the institutions as a whole, Right: 45.8%

In conclusion, we examined the yearly average level of trust in all the institutions as a whole by religiosity (Jewish sample), finding a noticeably lower average trust rating among Haredim when compared with the other groups, where the

averages are clustered very close together. With the exception of the national religious respondents, this year's yearly average levels of trust are the lowest we have measured to date (in both traditional groups, the rating is identical to that of the 2022 survey).

Figure 2.23 **Yearly average level of trust in all the institutions as a whole, 2003–2024 (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)**



Among Haredi respondents, the multi-year, cross-institutional mean level of trust is lower than that of all the other religious groups.

Multi-year mean level of trust in all the institutions as a whole, Haredim: 29.6%

Multi-year mean level of trust in all the institutions as a whole, national religious: 46.7%

Multi-year mean level of trust in all the institutions as a whole, traditional religious and traditional non-religious: 49.7%

Multi-year mean level of trust in all the institutions as a whole, secular: 51.5%

We also calculated the average of the trust ratings awarded to all 12 state institutions surveyed this year (based on the total sample).¹² We divided the respondents into three categories: low level of trust (average 1–1.99, 30%); moderate level of trust (average 2–2.99, 60%), and high level of trust (average 3–4, 10%).

As shown in the table below, the majority of respondents in the Jewish sample are in the moderate category, while the majority of Arab respondents place in the low category of trust.

Though a breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation did not yield major differences between camps, a greater share of those on the Right are located in the low trust category.

An analysis of the Jewish sample by religiosity shows that a majority of Haredim fall into the low category of trust, as opposed to the other subgroups, most of whom rank in the moderate category.

A breakdown of the Arab sample by religion reveals that a majority of Muslims are in the low category in terms of trust, the Christians are split almost evenly between the low and moderate levels, and a majority of the Druze fall in the moderate category.

Analyzing by identification with stronger or weaker groups in society, we find that in both the Jewish and Arab samples, a higher share of those who associate themselves with weaker social groups are found in the low category of trust, as compared with those who feel they belong to the stronger groups.

Table 2.24 **Average level of trust in all 12 state institutions** (by assorted variables; %)

		Low level of trust	Moderate level of trust	High level of trust	Total
Nationality	Jews	24	66	10	100
	Arabs	58	34	8	100

12 This includes the eight institutions examined on a recurring basis, and four additional ones, namely, the municipality/local authority where the respondent resides, the Attorney General, the Shin Bet, and the Mossad. The average is based on the ratings for all 12 institutions using a scale ranging from 1 = do not trust at all to 4 = trust very much, omitting the “don’t know” responses.

		Low level of trust	Moderate level of trust	High level of trust	Total
Political orientation (Jews)	Left	15	78	7	100
	Center	18	67	15	100
	Right	27	63	10	100
Religiosity (Jews)	Haredim	60	39.5	0.5	100
	National religious	17	71	12	100
	Traditional religious	26	64	10	100
	Traditional non-religious	21	64	15	100
	Secular	17	72	11	100
Religion (Arabs)	Muslims	61.5	30.5	8	100
	Christians	46	43	11	100
	Druze	35.5	51.5	13	100
Social location (Jews)	Stronger groups	20	67	13	100
	Weaker groups	31	65	4	100
Social location (Arabs)	Stronger groups	46	42	12	100
	Weaker groups	68	26	6	100

Factor analysis of trust ratings

This year, we sought to reexamine whether the various institutions coalesce into specific “factors,” or themes, with regard to public trust.¹³ To this end, we performed a factor analysis,¹⁴ which revealed that the levels of trust in the institutions studied could be grouped into three separate and distinct factors, with a high cumulative explained variance (68.5%).

The table below presents the factor loading values for each of the variables,¹⁵ showing the extent to which trust in each institution is associated with each

¹³ This process was conducted with the Jewish sample only, due to the low levels of trust in the Arab sample toward all of the institutions surveyed.

¹⁴ Factor analysis is a statistical method used to reduce the number of variables investigated in a study. The reduction is performed by searching for common denominators between responses to survey questions. The common themes that emerge are referred to as “factors.” For each question, the factor loading of the relevant variable reflects the extent to which that variable is related to a given factor. The higher the value, the stronger the relationship to the specific factor.

¹⁵ The factor loading represents the strength of the relationship between each variable and each factor separately. We would expect a high factor loading of a given variable on one factor (meaning a strong relationship), and low factor loadings on all the other factors (weak relationships). A factor loading of 0.4 or higher indicates a correlation between the variable and the factor.

factor. As we can see, the Mossad, the Shin Bet, the IDF, and the police have a high factor loading on the first factor, which we have termed the “security institutions factor.” The Supreme Court, the Attorney General, and the media have a high factor loading on the second factor, which we refer to as the “justice and media factor.” The President of Israel has a lower factor loading value, but sufficiently high to indicate correlation with either the first or second factor; since the factor loading score of this institution was higher for the second factor, we placed it in that category. Regarding the third factor, which we coined the “political factor,” the Knesset, the political parties, and the government all have a very high factor loading on this factor. Additionally, the respondent’s municipality/local authority has a lower factor loading value, but still high enough to indicate correlation with this factor.

Table 2.25 Factor loading in questions on trust in state institutions* (Jewish sample)

	Factor loading		
	1. Security institutions factor	2. Justice and media factor	3. Political factor
Mossad	0.861		
Shin Bet	0.859		
IDF	0.795		
Police	0.674		
Supreme Court		0.879	
Attorney General		0.872	
Media		0.820	
President of Israel	0.442	0.470	
Knesset			0.860
Political parties			0.818
Government			0.780
Municipality/local authority			0.454

* The table shows only factor loadings higher than 0.4.

To test the reliability of the variables of trust in the institutions within each of the factors, we performed a reliability analysis to see if the internal consistency was statistically significant, using Cronbach's alpha.¹⁶

In analyzing the first factor (security institutions), we found a very high reliability coefficient, signifying a highly coherent factor ($\alpha = 0.841$). An analysis of the second factor (justice and media) likewise yields a high reliability coefficient, meaning that here too there is a coherent factor, though to a slightly lesser degree ($\alpha = 0.816$). Factor analysis of the third factor (political) shows a relatively high reliability coefficient, again indicating a coherent factor but to a lesser extent than the two previous ones ($\alpha = 0.719$).

From the table below, we learn that the average level of trust in the first factor (security institutions) is high in all three political camps, but strongest in the Center. With regard to the second factor (justice and media), the average level of trust is higher on the Left than in the other camps. As for the third factor (political), the average levels of trust were low in all three camps, with a higher rating among respondents on the Right.

Breaking down the Jewish sample by religiosity, we found that the average trust ratings in the first factor (security institutions) are higher among national religious, secular, and traditional non-religious respondents than among other groups. In the second factor (justice and media), the average level of trust is highest among secular respondents, while in the third factor (political), it is highest among the national religious.

Finally, we saw that in all three factors, the average levels of trust are higher among those who identify with the stronger groups in Israeli society than among those who associate themselves with the weaker groups.

¹⁶ A Cronbach's alpha value of 0.7 or higher is considered reliable.

Table 2.26 **Average trust ratings for the three factors** (Jewish sample, by assorted variables)

		1. Security institutions factor	2. Justice and media factor	3. Political factor
Political orientation	Left	2.72	2.79	1.71
	Center	3.01	2.55	1.75
	Right	2.89	1.88	2.05
Religiosity	Haredim	2.17	1.44	1.85
	National religious	3.01	1.81	2.29
	Traditional religious	2.93	1.90	2.09
	Traditional non-religious	2.99	2.20	1.99
	Secular	2.99	2.53	1.75
Social location	Stronger groups	2.96	2.23	1.98
	Weaker groups	2.70	2.08	1.80

Chapter 3

Society, Citizenship, Aliyah, and Emigration

In this chapter, we discuss the following topics:

- ❑ Social solidarity in Israel
 - ❑ Mutual assistance between citizens
 - ❑ Most acute social tensions in Israel
 - ❑ Willingness of various groups to compromise
 - ❑ Concerns of future harm to one's preferred lifestyle
 - ❑ Jewish-Arab relations in Israel
 - Desire of Arab citizens of Israel to integrate in Israeli society
 - Are Arab citizens of Israel discriminated against?
 - Opinions on Jews and Arabs living separately
 - Are Arab citizens a security risk?
 - ❑ Importance of civil society organizations
 - ❑ Aliyah, citizenship, emigration:
 - Where is it safer for Jews to live today?
 - Stay in Israel or emigrate?
 - Obtaining a foreign passport, and reasons for doing so
-

Solidarity in Israeli society as a whole

Question 10 Appendix 1, p. 221 | Appendix 2, p. 239

Particularly in times of external conflict, the strength of Israel’s internal solidarity is a crucial factor in its national resilience. We therefore revisited the question of how respondents rate the level of solidarity (sense of “togetherness”) in Israeli society as a whole (Jews, Arabs, and all other citizens from various groups), on a scale from 1 = no solidarity at all to 10 = very high level of solidarity.

In the October and December 2023 surveys, in contrast with that of June 2023, the solidarity scores climbed to unprecedented heights. Such high levels of solidarity are characteristic of societies in times of crisis—a generally short-lived phenomenon known as the “rally ‘round the flag” effect. For this reason, the present drop is not especially surprising.


In the total sample in May 2024, the average social solidarity rating in Israel was 5.4—noticeably higher than in previous years—apparently still influenced by the greater social cohesiveness resulting from the current political and security situation. The solidarity score among Jews stands at 5.5, marking a clear decline from the two previous surveys conducted following the events of October 7, while among Arabs, there has been a very slight dip in comparison with the survey of December 2023.

Figure 3.1 Annual solidarity ratings for Israeli society as a whole, on a scale of 1 to 10, 2011–2024 (Jewish and Arab samples)



We divided the scale into three levels: low score (1–4); moderate (5–6); and high (7–10). As demonstrated in the following figure, the solidarity assessment has shown striking changes over the past year. In June 2023, over 50% of Jewish and Arab respondents alike rated Israeli solidarity as low. By contrast, in the surveys of October and December 2023, following the events of October 7, a majority of 60% of Jews characterized it as high. In the 2024 measurement as well, though there was some decline, a high solidarity rating continued to be the most frequent response in the Jewish sample (though not by a majority), with the share who take this view still higher than that in June 2023. Among Arab respondents, in the post-October 7 surveys, roughly one-quarter of respondents have rated the country’s solidarity as high, compared with a very small minority in June 2023.

Figure 3.2 Solidarity ratings for Israeli society as a whole, 2023 and 2024
(Jewish and Arab samples; %)



Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation, substantial differences emerge. Compared with the June 2023 findings, which (as noted) were particularly low, the average solidarity score in all three camps showed an upturn in the present survey, with a more noticeable rise in the Center and Left than on the Right. Nonetheless, as we found last year, the average solidarity rating on the Left is lower than that in the other two camps, while the gap measured in June 2023 between the Center and the Right was almost negated by the rise in the solidarity rating in the Center.

An analysis of the responses in the Jewish sample by religiosity shows a rise in all groups relative to last year; at the same time, the highest average solidarity scores this year for Israeli society as a whole, as in June 2023, came from the national religious and traditional religious groups, while the lowest ratings were given by secular and Haredi respondents.

Table 3.1 Average solidarity ratings for Israeli society as a whole, 2023 and 2024 (Jewish sample, by political orientation and religiosity; average score on a scale of 1 to 10)

		2023	2024
Political orientation	Left	3.5	4.8
	Center	4.0	5.5
	Right	4.8	5.6
Religiosity	Haredim	4.2	5.3
	National religious	5.3	6.4
	Traditional religious	5.1	5.9
	Traditional non-religious	4.6	5.5
	Secular	3.8	5.3

Given Israel’s current situation, we examined whether there are differences between evacuees and non-evacuees in their assessment of Israel’s social solidarity. We did not find a substantial difference between the groups, though the average score was slightly higher among the former than the latter (5.7 and 5.4, respectively), perhaps due to the assistance offered to evacuees by civil society in Israel.

A breakdown of the Arab sample by religion shows that the average solidarity score among Druze respondents almost doubled from last year’s rating, and is higher in the present survey than the average in the Jewish sample as a whole and in all its political and religious subgroups, with the exception of national religious Jews. Significant increases were also recorded among Christian and Muslim respondents.


As in previous years, Arabs who voted for Zionist parties gave a higher rating to Israel’s overall social solidarity than did voters for Arab parties.

Table 3.2 Average solidarity ratings for Israeli society as a whole, 2023 and 2024 (Arab sample, by religion and vote in 2022 Knesset elections; average score on a scale of 1 to 10)

		2023	2024
Religion	Muslims	3.7	4.9
	Christians	3.8	5.3
	Druze	3.3	6.0
Vote in 2022 Knesset elections	Zionist parties	4.8	5.6
	Arab parties	3.5	4.8
	Didn't vote	3.5	5.0

Breaking down the results on the question of solidarity in both the Jewish and Arab samples by assessment of Israel’s overall situation, we found that in both instances, the more positive the view of Israel’s condition, the higher the social solidarity rating. Nonetheless, interestingly enough, the greatest increase among Jewish respondents (relative to last year) was actually among those who hold that Israel’s situation is bad (from an average solidarity score of 3.3 in 2023 to 5.0 in 2024, reflecting a surge of 50%). In the Arab sample, the converse holds true, with the largest increase (47%) occurring among those who think that Israel’s situation is good.

Figure 3.3 Average solidarity ratings for Israeli society as a whole, on a scale of 1 to 10, 2023 and 2024 (Jewish and Arab samples, by assessment of Israel’s overall situation)




Mutual assistance between citizens

Question 50 Appendix 1, p. 229 | Appendix 2, p. 254

A further measure of the level of social solidarity is the ability to count on others in times of trouble. In 2016, we asked for the first time: “To what extent do you agree or disagree that Israelis can always rely on other Israelis to help them out in times of trouble?” In both the Jewish and Arab samples, we recorded a decline between 2016 and 2022 in the share who agree with this statement. This year, apparently in light of the war and expressions of civil solidarity, the proportion who agree that they can always count on their fellow citizens in times of trouble has risen substantially among Jews and Arabs alike.


Figure 3.4 **Agree that Israelis can always count on their fellow Israelis to help them in times of trouble, 2016–2024** (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



Apparently in light of the war and resultant expressions of civil solidarity, the proportion who agree that they can always count on their fellow citizens in times of trouble has risen substantially among Jews and Arabs alike.

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation shows that the share of respondents who feel they can rely on their fellow Israelis in times of trouble is largest on the Right. Nonetheless, it should be noted that between 2022 and 2024, all three camps saw an upturn in the perception that other Israelis can be counted on when times are hard.

Figure 3.5 **Israelis can always count on their fellow Israelis to help them in times of trouble, 2022 and 2024** (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



Breaking down the findings in the Jewish sample for this same period on the basis of religiosity, we saw a sizeable increase in the perception that Israelis can be relied upon to come to the aid of their fellow citizens, with national religious respondents espousing this view to the greatest extent. In the Arab sample, the minority who agreed in 2022 that Israelis can always rely on other Israelis to help them out in times of trouble swelled to a sizeable majority in 2024 in all religions surveyed.

Table 3.3 **Agree that Israelis can always count on their fellow Israelis to help them in times of trouble, 2022 and 2024** (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)


	2022	2024
Haredim	74	79.5
National religious	79	92
Traditional religious	72	87.5
Traditional non-religious	71	81.5
Secular	61	76

Table 3.4 **Agree that Israelis can always count on their fellow Israelis to help them in times of trouble, 2022 and 2024** (Arab sample, by religion; %)

	2022	2024
Muslims	39	60
Christians	36	65
Druze	46	90

Examining the association between assessments of social solidarity in Israel and the perception that fellow Israelis can always be counted on to help in times of trouble, we found (among both Arabs and Jews) that, the higher the perceived level of solidarity, the greater the belief that Israelis can be relied upon when times are tough. This correlation proved to be stronger in the Arab public.

Figure 3.6 **Agree that Israelis can always count on their fellow Israelis to help them in times of trouble** (Jewish and Arab samples, by assessment of social solidarity; %)



Last, we investigated the association between readiness to depend on other Israelis in times of trouble, and willingness to rely on **the state** when times are hard (the latter question was discussed in chapter 2). Among Jewish respondents, we found a substantial majority of both those who agree and those who disagree that the state can be counted on in times of trouble (though the majority was larger in the former group) who agree that Israelis can always rely

on their fellow citizens when times are tough. In the Arab sample, we found a clearer connection: An overwhelming majority of those who agree that the state can be relied on in times of trouble (as opposed to only about one-quarter of those who disagree with this assertion) also agree that Israelis can rely on their fellow citizens during hard times.

Table 3.5 Israelis can always count on their fellow Israelis to help them in times of trouble (Jewish and Arab samples, by ability to count on the state in times of trouble; %)

		Israelis can always count on their fellow Israelis in times of trouble			
		Agree	Disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	Agree that citizens of Israel can always rely on the state to help in times of trouble	92	7	1	100
	Disagree that citizens of Israel can always rely on the state to help in times of trouble	78	21	1	100
Arabs	Agree that citizens of Israel can always rely on the state to help in times of trouble	86.5	13	0.5	100
	Disagree that citizens of Israel can always rely on the state to help in times of trouble	24	74	2	100


Tensions in Israeli society

Question 11 Appendix 1, p. 221 | Appendix 2, p. 240

Each year, we examine what the Israeli public views as the most acute social tension in Israel today. Since we began addressing this question in 2012, the share of respondents who see tensions between Right and Left as the greatest source of friction in Israeli society has continually climbed (with the exception of a decline in 2021 and 2022, apparently due to the rise in tensions between Jews and Arabs as a result of Operation Guardian of the Walls). In the latest survey (May 2024), an unprecedented share of nearly one-half of respondents held that the most acute tension in Israeli society is between Right and Left. Tension between Jews and Arabs remained in second place, with the proportion

who see it as the most severe unchanged over the last two surveys (at roughly one-third of respondents). At the same time, there has been a slight decline in the share who point to tensions between religious and secular as the most acute, presumably because Right-Left friction has “subsumed” some of the tension between the religious and secular groups.

Figure 3.7 Which of the following is the most acute social tension in Israel today? 2012–2024 (total sample; %)



An unprecedented share of nearly one-half of respondents held that the most acute tension in Israeli society is between Right and Left. Tension between Jews and Arabs remained in second place.


We examined the points of tensions in Israeli society as seen by the Jewish and Arab publics separately. Among Jewish respondents, the share who cite tensions between Right and Left as the most acute rose significantly over the last year, while the proportion who hold that tensions between Jews and Arabs are the primary source of friction has remained unchanged, and the share who see religious-secular tensions as the most severe has declined. The Arab sample, meanwhile, registered a slight rise in the share who see Jewish-Arab tension as the most acute, followed (at a significant distance) by Right-Left tensions, with the proportion who cited the latter as the most severe rising noticeably over the past year (from 14% to 22%). Whereas in 2023, the tension between rich and poor ranked third in intensity among Arab interviewees, in 2024, tension between religious and secular was more frequently cited.

Table 3.6 Most acute social tension in Israel, 2023 and 2024 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

	Jews		Arabs	
	2023	2024	2023	2024
1	Between Right and Left (43)	Between Right and Left (53)	Between Jews and Arabs (53)	Between Jews and Arabs (55.5)
2	Between Jews and Arabs (26)	Between Jews and Arabs (26)	Between Right and Left (14)	Between Right and Left (22)
3	Between religious and secular (19)	Between religious and secular (15)	Between rich and poor (14)	Between religious and secular (9.5)

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation shows that, since the 2015 survey, tensions between Right and Left have been viewed as the most acute in Israeli society by a greater proportion of respondents from the Left than from the Center or Right. At the same time, the past two years have seen a steep rise in all three camps (in particular on the Right) in the share who cite this as the primary source of tension. At present, nearly two-thirds on the Left, and roughly one-half in the Center and on the Right, see friction between Right and Left as the most acute social tension in Israel. In the three political camps, the second most frequently cited point of tension is that between Jews and Arabs (Left, 17%; Center, 22%; Right, 30%), with tensions between religious and secular Jews in third place (Left, 16%; Center, 19.5%; Right, 12%).


Figure 3.8 **Most acute social tension in Israel is between Right and Left, 2012–2024** (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



Analyzing responses in the Jewish sample by religiosity (figure 3.9), we found that the greatest share in all subgroups see tensions between Right and Left as the most acute, followed by tensions between Jews and Arabs, and, in third place, between religious and secular. The proportion who cite friction between Right and Left as the most acute social tension in Israel is lowest among Haredim, with this group also showing the smallest variance between those who view this as the primary source of tension and those who see Jewish-Arab tensions as the most acute. In addition, roughly one-fifth of both secular and Haredi respondents point to tensions between religious and secular as the most severe, as do much smaller shares from the national religious and both traditional groups.

A separate breakdown of responses among secular Jews by political orientation shows that the share who cite Right-Left tensions as the most acute is noticeably higher among respondents on the Left (67%) than among those on the Right or in the Center (47.5% and 44%, respectively). By contrast, Jewish-Arab tension is a more common response on the Right (32%) than it is among secular Jews from the Center and Left (24% and 13%, respectively).

Figure 3.9 Most acute social tension in Israel today (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)



Willingness of various groups to compromise

Questions 58–63 Appendix 1, p. 231–232 | Appendix 2, p. 257–258

Once again this year, we asked Jewish interviewees to respond to the following set of questions: “How willing are members of each of the following groups (Arab citizens of Israel, religious Jews, secular Jews, Haredim, left-wingers, and right-wingers) to compromise on issues important to them in order to find common ground that would allow everyone to live here together?”

The only group considered by a majority of the Jewish sample as willing to compromise “very much” or “quite a lot” on matters that are vital to them are secular Jews (60%), with the lowest share of respondents ascribing such flexibility to the Haredi group (19%). The share who think that right-wingers are willing to compromise on matters important to them is higher than the corresponding share with regard to left-wingers, though in both cases, this is a minority view.

A multi-year overview (table 3.7) shows a decline in the share of respondents who think that Arab citizens of Israel, secular Jews, and left-wingers are willing to compromise, whereas the share who hold that national religious Jews and right-wingers are willing to be flexible has remained largely unchanged (in previous surveys, data were not collected on the readiness of Haredim to compromise).

Figure 3.10 Extent to which each of the following groups is willing to compromise on issues important to them (Jewish sample; %)




Table 3.7 Agree that each of the following groups is willing to compromise on issues important to them (Jewish sample; %)

	2007*	2013*	2024
Arabs	37	39.5	21.5
Secular Jews	70	71	60
National religious Jews	42	41	43
Left-wingers	62	60	33
Right-wingers	43	44	40

* The scale used in these surveys was: very much, quite a lot, not so much, not at all willing to compromise, don't know.

Continuing our analysis, we distinguished between respondents who belonged to a particular group referred to in the question and respondents from the other groups; that is, we looked at how members of a specific group gauge that group's willingness to compromise, as opposed to the assessments of other groups with different political orientations and levels of religiosity.

In each of the groups studied, we found noticeable gaps between the members of a given group, who always judged their willingness to compromise as higher, and respondents from the other groups. When asked about their readiness to compromise, 76% of **secular Jewish** respondents gave themselves high marks for flexibility—the highest self-assessment of all the groups studied. In all

the other groups on the Jewish religious spectrum (with the exception of the secular), an average of roughly one-half hold that secular Jews are willing to compromise. Among the non-secular, we found sizeable differences between groups in the share who believe that secular Jews are willing to be flexible: traditional non-religious, 63%; traditional religious, 51%; Haredim, 36%; national religious, 30%.


Compared with the self-assessment of the other groups, **Haredim** judged their willingness to compromise as extremely low (48%). Within the Haredi group, considerable differences were measured between Ashkenazim (only 43% of whom see Haredim as willing to compromise) and Mizrahim (where 63% share this view). Among all the non-Haredi groups, we found only a minority who hold that Haredim are willing to show flexibility on issues vital to them (traditional religious, 37%; national religious, 24%; traditional non-religious, 18%; secular, 6.5%).

When we asked about the extent of willingness to compromise among the **national religious**, we found a very high share (71%) who assess the members of their own group as being ready to make concessions. By contrast, only a minority in the other groups view the national religious as ready to compromise on matters significant to them, with pronounced differences between them: Haredim and traditional religious, 63%; traditional non-religious, 45%; secular, 24%.

Among respondents from **the Left**, a sizeable majority (72%) see themselves as willing to compromise on matters important to them in order to reach common ground that would allow different groups to coexist; however, just 28% of those who do not define themselves as left-wingers consider the Left to be ready to compromise. Of those who identify with the Right, 19% think that those on the Left are willing to make concessions, whereas in the Center, 46% feel this way.

Of the respondents on **the Right**, over one-half view themselves as being open to compromise, while just 18% of those who do not align themselves with the Right share this assessment. Of those who identify with the Left, 10% hold that those on the Right are ready to compromise, while 21% of those in the Center express a similar view.

Figure 3.11 **Agree that each of the following groups is willing to compromise on issues important to them** (Jewish sample, by religiosity and political orientation; %)



Concerns of future harm to one’s preferred lifestyle

Question 13 Appendix 1, p. 221 | Appendix 2, p. 241

Among the sources of tension between groups in Israeli society is the fear of future harm to one’s preferred lifestyle due to the increasing power of other groups. We posed the following question for the first time in 2017, revisiting it in each of the last three years: “How worried are you that you will be unable to maintain your preferred lifestyle because of the increasing power of certain groups in Israeli society?” Concern about this issue rose sharply among respondents in the total sample between 2017 and 2022; however, no real change was recorded between 2022 and 2023, while in 2024 we saw a slight drop in the share who are worried that their way of life may be harmed (see figure 3.12).

As shown in table 3.8, no substantive difference between Jews and Arabs was recorded in 2017 in the share of respondents who were concerned they would be unable to maintain their desired way of life in future, with only a minority in both groups expressing such fears. In 2022, the level of concern rose markedly in both groups, though more steeply among Arab respondents. Among Jews, a decline in concern was measured over the last two years, while in the Arab

public, the share who are worried has been consistently high (at about 80%) over the last three surveys.

Figure 3.12 Worried/not worried that they will be unable to maintain their preferred lifestyle because of the increasing power of certain groups in Israeli society, 2017–2024 (total sample; %)





Table 3.8 Worried that they will be unable to maintain their desired lifestyle, 2017–2024 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

	2017	2022	2023	2024
Jews	40	68	66	60
Arabs	44	79	80	80

Breaking down the share of respondents who are worried/not worried about the ability to maintain their present lifestyle by the level of overall solidarity in Israel, our expectation was that the higher the assessment of social solidarity, the lower the level of worry about potential harm to one's lifestyle due to the increasing power of other groups. And indeed, some two-thirds of Jews who rated social solidarity as low are fearful that their way of life will be harmed, versus 57.5% of those who assigned higher solidarity scores. Among Arab respondents, the gap is greater, with a larger majority of those who rated social solidarity in Israel as low expressing concern that their lifestyle will be harmed, in comparison with those who consider social solidarity in Israel to be high.

Figure 3.13 **Worried/not worried that they will be unable to maintain their preferred lifestyle** (Jewish and Arab samples, by overall solidarity rating; %)



Between 2017 and 2022, the share of respondents in the Jewish sample who expressed concern about future harm to their desired lifestyle rose considerably in all three political camps, followed by an additional increase on the Left and in the Center in 2023. This year saw a decline in both these camps, though each showed a very high proportion who are fearful of future harm to their lifestyle due to the strengthening of other groups. By contrast, of those who identify with the Right, we recorded significant drops over the last two years—from roughly two-thirds in 2022 (under the Bennett-Lapid government) who feared that their lifestyle could be harmed to one-half in 2024.

Breaking down the Jewish sample by religiosity, we noted a downturn since 2022 in the share who are concerned about future harm to their way of life in the national religious, traditional religious, traditional non-religious, and Haredi groups.¹⁷ In the present survey, a minority of national religious and traditional religious respondents, and half of Haredim, are concerned that their way of life will be harmed. By contrast, a majority of the traditional non-religious, and an even larger majority of secular Jews, are concerned about such an outcome. In addition, within the secular group, we found significant differences between political camps: In all cases, most are fearful, but this majority is especially

¹⁷ With regard to the Haredi respondents, it should be noted that the data were collected prior to the High Court of Justice ruling instructing the state to take steps to draft Haredim, as required by law.

large on the Left and in the Center (89% and 81%, respectively), whereas on the Right, a lower share—though still a sizeable majority—are worried (65%).

Table 3.9 Worried that they will not be able to maintain their desired lifestyle, 2017–2024 (Jewish sample, by political orientation and religiosity; %)

		2017	2022	2023	2024
Political orientation	Left	56.5	80	89	85
	Center	46	67	80	71
	Right	30	67	56	50
Religiosity	Haredim	34	67	55	50
	National religious	22	58	51	30
	Traditional religious	18	69	52	42
	Traditional non-religious	31.5	68	55	58
	Secular	55	71	84	77.5

Do Arab citizens of Israel wish to integrate into Israeli society?


Question 54 Appendix 1, p. 230 | Appendix 2, p. 256

As we saw earlier, one of the most acute social tensions in Israel is between Jews and Arabs. In 2018, we began asking both groups about the extent of their agreement with the statement: “Most Arab citizens of Israel want to integrate into Israeli society and be part of it.” In the first survey with this question, we found no differences between the Jewish and Arab samples in their perceptions of Arabs’ desire to integrate: In both cases, some two-thirds held that the majority of Arabs are interested in integrating into Israeli society; but from 2020 onward—and even more so since 2022—the gap between the two groups has grown. Today, only 42% of Jewish respondents think that the majority of

Today, only 42% of Jewish respondents think that the majority of Arabs want to integrate into Israeli society, while this opinion is held by a large majority of Arab interviewees.


Arabs want to integrate into Israeli society, while this opinion is held by a large majority of Arab interviewees.

Figure 3.14 **Agree that most Arab citizens of Israel wish to integrate into Israeli society, 2018–2024** (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



A breakdown of the Arab sample by age shows that in the youngest age group (18–34), the share who agree that most Arabs wish to integrate is lower than in the older cohorts. Likewise, a smaller share of women than of men believe that Arabs are interested in integration. Nonetheless, it should be noted that in all age groups, and among men and women alike, the proportion who believe that most Arabs wish to be part of Israeli society is very high.

Figure 3.15 **Agree/disagree that most Arab citizens of Israel wish to integrate into Israeli society** (Arab sample, by age and sex; %)



Analyzing the Arab sample by religion, we found that very high shares of Christian and Druze respondents agree that most Arabs want to integrate into Israeli society, compared with a lower share of Muslims. A breakdown of the vote in the 2022 Knesset elections yielded a smaller gap between voters for Zionist parties, who were more strongly in favor of integration, and voters for Arab parties or those who did not vote at all.

Table 3.10 Agree/disagree that most Arab citizens of Israel wish to integrate into Israeli society (Arab sample, by religion and vote in 2022 Knesset elections; %)

		Agree	Disagree	Don't know	Total
Religion	Muslims	74	24.5	1.5	100
	Christians	89	11	–	100
	Druze	87	10	3	100
Vote in 2022 Knesset elections	Zionist parties	85	13	2	100
	Arab parties	75	24	1	100
	Didn't vote	77	21.5	1.5	100

An analysis of the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals substantial gaps between camps, with roughly three-quarters of those who align themselves with the Left agreeing that most Arabs are interested in integrating into Israeli society, as opposed to one-half of respondents from the Center and about one-third from the Right.

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by religiosity shows that only among secular respondents is there a majority (albeit a small one) who hold that most Arabs want to be part of Israeli society, whereas, in the other religious groups, only a minority feel this way. Breaking down the secular group further, significant differences were found between the political camps: A sizeable majority on the Left (75%) agree that most Arabs wish to integrate, as opposed to roughly one-half in the Center (54%) and a minority on the Right (37%).

Table 3.11 Agree/disagree that most Arab citizens of Israel wish to integrate into Israeli society (Jewish sample, by political orientation and religiosity; %)

		Agree	Disagree	Don't know	Total
Political orientation	Left	74	23	3	100
	Center	51	42	7	100
	Right	31	65	4	100
Religiosity	Haredim	33	63	4	100
	National religious	26	70	4	100
	Traditional religious	38	59	3	100
	Traditional non-religious	35	62	3	100
	Secular	53	41	6	100

An analysis of the Jewish and Arab samples by income and education produced interesting findings. As shown in figure 3.16, the lower the income level among Arabs, the stronger the agreement with the proposition that most Arabs are interested in integrating. Similarly, a greater share of Arab respondents without higher education agree that most Arabs wish to play a role in Israeli society than do those with (full or partial) academic education. By contrast, among Jewish respondents, this pattern is reversed, with higher income and education levels associated with greater proportions who agree that Arabs wish to integrate.

We examined the opinions of Arabs and Jews regarding the desire of most Arabs to integrate into Israeli society by their assessment of general Israeli social solidarity as well as their ranking of social tensions in Israel. In both samples (though by a higher margin in the Arab public), the pattern was the same: The higher the solidarity rating, the greater the extent of agreement that most Arabs wish to take part in Israeli society (figure 3.17).

A breakdown of the results by perception of the most acute social tension in Israel yields the following finding (figure 3.17): While a sizeable majority of Arabs who cited friction between Jews and Arabs as the most acute social tension in Israel agree that most Arabs wish to integrate, those who pointed to other tensions as the most acute tended to agree more with this statement. The same trend was observed among Jewish respondents.

Figure 3.16 **Agree that most Arab citizens of Israel wish to integrate into Israeli society** (Jewish and Arab samples, by education and income; %)





Figure 3.17 **Agree that most Arab citizens of Israel wish to integrate into Israeli society** (Jewish and Arab samples, by overall solidarity assessment, and ranking of most acute social tension; %)




Are Arab citizens of Israel discriminated against?

Question 55 Appendix 1, p. 230 | Appendix 2, p. 256

Since 2003, we have posed the question: “Are Arab citizens of Israel discriminated against compared with Jewish citizens?” Two principal findings emerge from the figure below, which presents the share who agree with the claim of unfair treatment over the years: First, a majority of Arab interviewees in all the surveys have held that Arabs do indeed suffer from discrimination. Second, in all the polls—and especially, the two most recent ones, in 2022 and 2024—the share of Jews who agree with the statement is noticeably lower than the corresponding share of Arabs. In fact, in the most recent survey, the proportion of Jews who think that Arab citizens of Israel are discriminated against is the lowest since we first began asking this question.

Figure 3.18 **Agree that Arab citizens of Israel are discriminated against compared with Jewish citizens, 2003–2024** (Jewish and Arab samples; %)




On the Left, more than three-quarters agree that Arab citizens of Israel are treated unfairly, mirroring the finding in the Arab sample. By contrast, only a minority of respondents from the Center and Right think that Arab citizens of Israel suffer from discrimination.

A breakdown of the Arab sample by religion shows moderate differences: The share who think that Arab citizens of Israel are discriminated is lowest among the Druze (75%), compared with 89% of Christians and 82% of Muslims. Additionally, the share who hold that such discrimination exists is higher among those who voted for Arab parties in the 2022 Knesset elections (84%) or who did not vote at all (83%) than it is among voters for Zionist parties (68%). Despite the differences, very high proportions of Arabs in all religious subgroups support the claim of discrimination.


An analysis of the Jewish sample points to tremendous gaps between the three political camps: On the Left, more than three-quarters agree that Arab citizens of Israel are treated unfairly, mirroring the finding in the Arab sample. By contrast, only a minority of respondents from the Center and Right think that Arab citizens of Israel suffer from discrimination. It should be noted that, between 2016 and 2022, there was a significant drop in all political camps in the share who hold that Arab citizens of Israel are discriminated against; however, on the Left and in the Center, there was a further drop between 2022 and the present survey, whereas the level on the Right held steady over the same period.

Figure 3.19 Agree that Arab citizens of Israel are discriminated against compared with Jewish citizens, 2003–2024 (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



A breakdown of the views of both Jews and Arabs on discrimination against Arab citizens of Israel by income and education found positive associations in the Jewish sample; that is, greater agreement with the assertion among respondents with higher education than among those without, and also greater agreement among those earning higher than the median income than among those earning the median income or less. In the Arab sample, we did not find an association between education or income level and perception of discrimination: a solid majority of some 80% across all levels agree that Arab citizens of Israel are discriminated against.

Figure 3.20 **Agree that Arab citizens of Israel are discriminated against compared with Jewish citizens** (Jewish and Arab samples, by education and income; %)




Is it better for Jews and Arabs in Israel to live separately?

Question 56 Appendix 1, p. 231 | Appendix 2, p. 257

Since 2017, we have posed a similar but not identical question to Jews and Arabs. Jews have been asked whether they agree that, in order to preserve **Jewish** identity (and Arabs, to preserve **Arab** identity), it is better for Jews and Arabs in Israel to live separately. In all measurements throughout the years, the share of Jews who favored living separately was higher than that of Arabs; however, in the present survey, the share of respondents who support such a

separation has increased in both groups, in particular among Arabs. Be that as it may, a sizeable minority (44%) in the Jewish sample, and some two-thirds of the Arab sample, disagree with the assertion that Jews and Arabs should live separately in order to preserve their collective and individual identities.

Figure 3.21 Agree that, to preserve Jewish/Arab identity, it is better for Jews and Arabs in Israel to live separately, 2017–2024 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



In the Arab sample, we found that the share of Druze respondents who favor living separately (41%) is higher than that among Muslims (36%) and Christians (33.5%). When we broke down the Muslim respondents by level of religiosity, we found notable differences: Of those who define themselves as religious or very religious, the proportion who support living separately stands at 44%, compared with 38% of Muslims who identify as traditional, and just 11% of those who consider themselves “not at all religious.”¹⁸

Breaking down the Jewish sample by religiosity, we found that secular Jews are the sole group in which only a minority favor Jews and Arabs living separately. In the remaining groups, in particular among Haredim, the majority of respondents support this notion. Analysis by education showed that those with (full or partial) higher education are less likely to support Jews and Arabs living separately than are respondents without an academic education.

¹⁸ We were unable to test the findings by level of religiosity among Druze and Christians due to the small size of these samples.

We wished to examine whether the various ethnic groups in the Jewish sample differ from one another on the question of separation between Jews and Arabs. The data analysis reveals that, in each of the categories studied, the share of Ashkenazim who support Jews and Arabs living separately is lower than that of Mizrahim. Especially sizeable differences were measured between Ashkenazi and Mizrahi traditional religious respondents (50% and 63%, respectively), and between Ashkenazi and Mizrahi recipients of higher education (36% and 52.5%, respectively). Smaller differences were observed between Ashkenazim and Mizrahim in the secular (28% and 34%, respectively) and Haredi groups (77% and 84%, respectively).


Table 3.12 Agree that, to preserve Jewish identity, it is better for Jews and Arabs in Israel to live separately, by ethnicity (Jewish sample, by religiosity, and education; %)

		Total sample	Ashkenazim	Mizrahim	Mixed
Religiosity	Haredim	77	77	84	64
	National religious	60	58	66	46
	Traditional religious	59	50	63	50
	Traditional non-religious	55	48	58	50
	Secular	31	28	34	29.5
Education	Non-academic	55.5	57	60	44
	Higher education (full or partial degree)	41	36	52.5	34

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation revealed, as expected, substantial gaps between respondents on the Left, just 12% of whom think that it would be better for Jews and Arabs to live separately, and those in the Center (37%), and even more so, on the Right (61%).

We wished to examine the opinions of Jews and Arabs on the notion of living separately by their positions on the most acute social tension in Israel. Arabs and Jews who identified Jewish-Arab tensions as the most serious point of friction were more inclined to favor separation between Jews and Arabs than were those who cited a different source of tension as the most severe.

Figure 3.22 Agree that, to preserve Jewish/Arab identity, it is better for Jews and Arabs in Israel to live separately (Jewish and Arab samples, by most acute social tension in Israel; %)



Do Israel's Arab citizens pose a threat to the country's security?

Question 57 Appendix 1, p. 231 | Appendix 2, p. 257

Since 2015, we have asked Jewish respondents on several occasions to express their agreement or disagreement with the statement: "Israel's Arab citizens pose a threat to the country's security." From 2015 to 2018, the share of Jews who held that Arab citizens are a security risk was less than 50%, while in the present survey—six years later—we found a noticeable rise, to slightly over half, in the share who agree with this assertion (figure 3.23).

The share of respondents who agree that Arab citizens of Israel constitute a security risk varies greatly when breaking down this claim by vote in the 2022 Knesset elections (figure 3.24). We found the highest proportion with this opinion among voters for the Haredi parties and for Religious Zionism, and the lowest, among voters for Labor.

Figure 3.23 Israel’s Arab citizens pose a security threat, 2015–2024 (Jewish sample; %)





Figure 3.24 Agree that Israel’s Arab citizens pose a security threat (Jewish sample, by vote in 2022 Knesset elections; %)




Similar disparities emerge when analyzing the Jewish sample by political orientation: On the Left, the share who agree that Arabs pose a security threat stands at 13.5%; in the Center, 41%; and on the Right, 66%.

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by religiosity reveals that the higher the level of religious observance, the greater the share of respondents who agree

that Arab citizens of Israel pose a security risk. Thus, this proportion is largest among Haredim and smallest among secular Jews. The variance within the secular group is extremely high when broken down by political camp: Of secular Jews on the Left, only 11.5% agree that Arabs constitute a security threat, as compared with 35% in the Center, and 54% on the Right. Our analysis shows further that, between 2018 and 2024, the share who consider this to be true increased in all religious subgroups. While the lowest proportion who agree with this assertion is found among secular and traditional non-religious respondents, the relative upturns in these same groups between 2018 and 2024 are the highest: among secular Jews, from 26% to 36%, and among traditional non-religious Jews, from 40.5% to 56%.

Figure 3.25 Agree that Israel’s Arab citizens pose a security threat, 2018–2024 (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)



Among Jewish respondents, a small minority on the Left think that Arab citizens of Israel represent a security risk, a view that is held by more than one-third of those in the Center, and fully two-thirds of those on the Right.

We examined the relation in the Jewish sample between assessment of the security threat posed by Arab citizens of Israel and the extent of agreement with two assertions discussed earlier in this chapter: (1) that most Arab citizens wish to integrate into Israeli society and be part of it; and (2) that to preserve Jewish identity, it is better for Jews and Arabs in Israel to live separately. Our findings show that slightly less than one-third of those Jewish respondents who think that most Arab citizens are interested in being part of Israeli society also hold that Arabs pose a security risk, as contrasted with a sizeable majority who take this view among those who do not agree that most Arabs wish to integrate. In addition, a large majority of those who would prefer seeing Jews and Arabs live separately in order to preserve Jewish identity think that Arab citizens are a security risk, as opposed to roughly one-fifth who feel this way among those who do not favor separation between Jews and Arabs.

Table 3.13 Arab citizens pose a security threat to Israel (Jewish sample, by assorted variables; %)

		Arab citizens pose a threat to Israel’s security			
		Agree	Disagree	Don’t know	Total
Most Arab citizens of Israel wish to integrate into Israeli society and be part of it	Agree	29	69	2	100
	Disagree	73	24.5	2.5	100
To preserve Jewish identity, it is better for Jews and Arabs in Israel to live separately	Agree	82	16	2	100
	Disagree	22	74.5	3.5	100


Do civil society organizations serve Israeli society better than state institutions do?

Question 49 Appendix 1, p. 229

Since the outbreak of the current war, civil society organizations have stood out for their contribution to Israeli society. Their involvement has been felt in numerous areas, from aiding evacuees, via sending food and military equipment to soldiers, to helping with the harvest in farming communities

that suffered damage. In light of their vast impact, and the criticism voiced over the performance of state bodies in this regard, we asked respondents if they agreed or disagreed with the statement that civil society organizations serve Israeli society better than its official institutions. In the total sample, as well as in the Jewish and Arab samples separately, roughly two-thirds of respondents agree that they do.


Figure 3.26 Civil society organizations serve Israeli society better than state institutions do (total sample, Jewish and Arab samples; %)



Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation, we found that a majority in all three camps hold that Israel’s civil society organizations are doing a better job than state institutions, though the gaps between groups are significant, with 92% on the Left agreeing with the claim, as opposed to 73% in the Center, and 53% on the Right.

An analysis of the total sample by vote in the 2022 Knesset elections shows that only among Likud and Religious Zionism voters do less than half agree with this claim, while for all other parties, more than 50% of voters agree.

Figure 3.27 **Agree/disagree that civil society organizations serve Israeli society better than state institutions do** (total sample, by vote in 2022 Knesset elections; %)



When we broke down the Jewish sample by religiosity (figure 3.28), we found a greater degree of agreement about the extent of the contribution of Israel’s civil society organizations among secular and traditional non-religious respondents, as opposed to the other subgroups, in particular the national religious, where only a minority expressed agreement. Breaking down the secular group separately by political orientation, we found that a majority in all three camps agree with the above claim, but by a larger margin among those who identify with the Left than among those in the Center or on the Right (94%, 79%, and 61%, respectively).

We examined whether there is a link between assessments of the contribution of civil society organizations, and belief that the state can always be relied upon to help its citizens in times of trouble (figure 3.29). In the Jewish sample, a considerable majority of those who said that the state cannot be depended on in hard times agree that Israel’s civil society organizations serve society better than state institutions, whereas among those who feel that the state can

be relied upon, opinions are split roughly down the middle. By contrast, among Arab interviewees, a large majority of those who think that the state can be relied upon agree that Israel's civil society organizations are serving society better, as contrasted with about half of those who hold that the state cannot be relied upon.

Figure 3.28 Agree that civil society organizations serve Israeli society better than state institutions do (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)





Figure 3.29 Agree that civil society organizations serve Israeli society better than state institutions do (Jewish and Arab samples, by whether state can be relied on to help its citizens in times of trouble; %)




Where is it safer for Jews to live today?

Question 64 Appendix 1, p. 232

In light of Israel's security situation and the noticeable rise in global antisemitism, we devoted several questions in this year's survey to preferred country of residence. We asked (Jews only): "In your opinion, where is it safer to Jews to live today?" Overall, about three-quarters of Jewish respondents think that Israel is the safest place for Jews today, with a small minority who see no difference in this regard between Israel and other countries, and a negligible minority who hold that it is safer for Jews to live outside of Israel.

Analyzing the respondents to this question by political orientation, there were very sizeable gaps between the camps. While a majority in all three groups hold that Israel is the safest place for Jews, on the Right, we found a sweeping majority who feel this way; in the Center, roughly two-thirds; and on the Left, only about one-half.

Figure 3.30 **Where is it safer for Jews to live today?** (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



About three-quarters of Jewish respondents think that Israel is the safest place for Jews today, with a small minority who see no difference in this regard between Israel and other countries, and a negligible minority who hold that it is safer for Jews to live outside of Israel.

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by religiosity shows that the national religious group has the highest share of respondents who think it is safer for Jews to live in Israel, followed by the traditional groups and Haredim. The proportion who feel this way is lowest in the secular group, though here too, they constitute a majority.

An analysis of the findings by ethnicity finds that Mizrahim are more inclined than the other groups to view Israel as a safer place for Jews to live.

Table 3.14 **Where is it safer for Jews to live today?** (Jewish sample, by religiosity and ethnicity; %)

		Israel	Abroad	Both are equally safe	Don't know	Total
Religiosity	Haredim	70	4	22	4	100
	National religious	87.5	1	10	1.5	100
	Traditional religious	82	6	10	2	100
	Traditional non-religious	83	4	11	2	100
	Secular	63	8	19	10	100
Ethnicity	Ashkenazim	70	5.5	19	5.5	100
	Mizrahim	80	5	12	3	100
	Mixed (Ashkenazi-Mizrahi)	69	3	17	11	100
	FSU immigrant	66	12	16	6	100

The perception that Israel is a safer place to live is more characteristic of the oldest age group than of the younger cohorts (55 and over, 79%; 35–54, 70.5%; 18–34, 69%). Men show a greater tendency than women to think that it is safer to live in Israel than abroad (76% and 70.5%, respectively).

Among evacuees, only 58% indicated that it is safer to live in Israel, compared with roughly three-quarters (74%) of non-evacuees. In addition, we found a noticeable difference between those who associate themselves with the stronger groups in Israeli society (77% of whom cite Israel as a safer place) and those who identify with the weaker groups (64%).


Would you move back to Israel due to rising antisemitism and criticism of Israel?

Question 65 Appendix 1, p. 232

We wondered whether the perception that Israel is the safest place for Jews to live today is also reflected in a preference to move back to the country, if the interviewees were not living in Israel at present. When we asked (Jewish respondents), “If you were living abroad today, would you consider moving back to Israel due to rising antisemitism and criticism of Israel?” most of the interviewees responded in the affirmative.

Our analysis shows a very strong correlation between respondents’ preference for moving back to Israel if already living abroad and their view regarding the safest place for Jews today. Of those who consider Israel to be the safest option for Jews, a decisive majority would consider returning. By contrast, of those who do not think that it is safest for Jews to live in Israel today, only a minority responded that they would contemplate moving back.

Figure 3.31 **Would you consider moving back to Israel?** (Jewish sample, by opinion on where it is safer for Jews to live; %)




On this question as well, we found sizeable gaps between camps when analyzing the Jewish sample by political orientation: On the Right, a considerable majority, and in the Center, a majority (albeit smaller) would consider moving back as a result of antisemitism and criticism of Israel, whereas on the Left, less than half would choose this option. It should be noted that, apparently due

the hypothetical nature of the question, the share of “don’t know” responses was quite high in all camps (Left, 18%; Center, 14%; Right, 11%).

Figure 3.32 **Think/are certain they would consider moving back to Israel**

(Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



Striking differences also come to light when analyzing the Jewish sample by religiosity: Among the national religious and traditional religious, some 80% would consider returning to Israel, compared with two-thirds of Haredim and only a small majority of secular respondents. The share of “don’t knows” is also highest among the secular respondents.

Table 3.15 **Think/are certain they would consider moving back to Israel**

(Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)

	Think/are certain they would consider moving back	Think/are certain they would not consider moving back	Don't know	Total
Haredim	68	23	9	100
National religious	80	6.5	13.5	100
Traditional religious	78	12	10	100
Traditional non-religious	81	10	9	100
Secular	57	26.5	16.5	100

The share of respondents who would consider moving back to Israel is higher in the 55-and-over age group (76%) than in both younger cohorts (35–54, 64%; 18–34, 66%).

We found further that the preference for moving back to Israel is influenced by demographic and financial considerations: Thus, the share of respondents who would weigh returning to Israel is lower among those who have completed full or partial academic studies (64%) than among those without a higher education (73%). Respondents at lower income levels are more likely to consider moving back than are those with higher incomes (below median income, 74%; median income, 66.5%; above median income, 65%).

A breakdown of the findings by social location reveals that the share of respondents who express willingness to move back to Israel is higher among those who identify with the stronger social groups (74%) as opposed to the weaker groups (60%).


Stay in Israel or emigrate?

Question 67 Appendix 1, p. 233 | Appendix 2, p. 259

Once again this year, we revisited the question about preferring to stay in Israel or to move abroad: “If you could receive American citizenship, or that of another Western country, would you prefer to live there or to remain in Israel?” Two-thirds of the total sample (67%) responded that they would prefer to stay in Israel, roughly one-fifth (21%) that they would wish to emigrate, and 12% did not know. This distribution of responses is very similar to the findings in last year’s *Democracy Index* survey, but unlike one year ago, we now find differences when breaking down the Jewish and Arab samples. In the June 2023 survey, the share of Jews who favored remaining in Israel was greater than that of Arabs, whereas in the poll we conducted in November 2023—shortly after the events of October 7 and the outbreak of the war—we saw a noticeable increase in the share of Jews who preferred to remain in Israel, and a slight decline in the corresponding share of Arabs. However, in the present survey (in May 2024, over half a year since the war began), the proportion of Jews who prefer to remain in Israel has dropped significantly, to the lowest point since we began posing this question in 2015. By contrast, the share of Arabs who would prefer to stay has registered an increase, reverting almost to its 2022

level. It is important to note that we found a very high share of “don’t know” responses in the Jewish sample (15%), which may indicate a certain hesitancy over whether to move or remain.

Figure 3.33 **Prefer to remain in Israel, 2015–2024** (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



* Based on the *War in Gaza Survey*.

Conventionally, the inclination to **emigrate** is stronger among young people than in the older age groups—a pattern that was corroborated again this year in both samples. We examined changes in the preference for **remaining** in Israel compared with last year within each age group separately. In the Jewish sample, the youngest age group registered a steep drop in the desire to stay, while in the remaining groups we did not see a major shift. In the Arab sample, there was a noticeable increase in the desire to stay in both the youngest cohort and the 35–54 age group.


Two-thirds of the total sample (67%) responded that they would prefer to stay in Israel, roughly one-fifth (21%) that they would wish to emigrate, and 12% did not know.

Table 3.16 **Prefer to remain in Israel** (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

		2023	2024
Jews	18–34	70	59
	35–54	58	58
	55 and over	83	77.5
Arabs	18–34	52	70
	35–54	65	83
	55 and over	80	84

Noticeable gaps also emerge from a breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation. Whereas in the Right and Center, the majority would prefer to remain in Israel (around three-quarters on the Right and just over half in the Center), only a minority of respondents on the Left expressed this view. This finding points to a dramatic change from past surveys, in which the Left also expressed a preference to stay in the country. In addition, despite a singular rise in the November 2023 survey, there has been a drop in all three camps in the share who would rather remain in Israel, relative to previous measurements.

Figure 3.34 **Prefer to remain in Israel, 2023 and 2024** (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



* Based on the *War in Gaza Survey*.

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by religiosity shows that, in all groups with the exception of the secular, there is a substantial majority who favor remaining in Israel, in particular among the national religious. In the secular group, less than one-half chose the option of remaining in Israel. This group is also characterized by a very high share of “don’t know” responses.

Analyzing the secular group separately by political orientation, we found that only one-half (51%) of secular respondents who identify with the Right would choose to stay in Israel, with lower shares in the Center, and especially on the Left, expressing this view (46% and 36.5%, respectively).

Table 3.17 **Prefer to stay in Israel or emigrate** (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)

	Stay	Emigrate	Don't know	Total
Haredim	79	15	6	100
National religious	87.5	8	4.5	100
Traditional religious	78	10	12	100
Traditional non-religious	75	15	10	100
Secular	46	30.5	23.5	100

A breakdown of the findings by ethnicity shows that only a minority of FSU immigrants—albeit a sizeable one (46%)—would prefer to remain in Israel if they had the opportunity to receive citizenship in a Western country, as opposed to a majority in the other subgroups (Mizrahim, 71%; Ashkenazim, 65%; mixed Ashkenazi/Mizrahi, 57%).

In the Arab sample, the share of interviewees who favor remaining in Israel is especially high among the Druze (90%), while lower among Muslims (76%) and Christians (72%). Likewise, the share who would prefer to stay is slightly higher among Arabs who voted for Zionist parties than among those who voted for Arab parties (85% and 78%, respectively).

As in the previous question, the distribution of responses in the Jewish sample by level of education shows that those with full or partial academic studies are less inclined to remain in Israel than are those without higher education (62% and 68%, respectively). This pattern is even more striking among Arab interviewees (full or partial academic studies, 69%; no higher education, 80%).

It was found further that Jews who associate themselves with stronger groups in society are more likely to prefer remaining in Israel than are those who identify with weaker groups (69% and 55%, respectively). We did not find a similar effect of social location in the Arab sample.

To learn which opinions are associated with a preference for staying or leaving, we cross-tabulated this question with others in the survey. In the Jewish sample, we found a very strong relation with the question of where it is safer for Jews to live today. As expected, those who hold that it is safer to live in Israel express a greater preference for staying there; by contrast, the majority of those who responded that it was safer to live elsewhere would prefer to emigrate.

Table 3.18 Prefer to stay in Israel or emigrate (Jewish sample, by opinion on where it is safer for Jews to live; %)

		Stay	Emigrate	Don't know	Total
Where is it safer for Jews to live today?	In Israel	76	11	13	100
	Abroad	31.5	61.5	7	100
	Both are equally safe	37	44.5	18.5	100

In the total sample, we found a very strong relation between the preference to remain or emigrate and agreement/disagreement with the statement that Israel is a good place to live: Of those who agree with this assertion, the majority (80%) favor remaining in Israel, compared with only a minority (41.5%) of those who disagree with it.


Additionally, we found an association between the desire to stay or go and agreement/disagreement with the claim that democratic rule in Israel is in grave danger: While a majority in both groups would opt to remain in Israel, this majority is noticeably smaller among those who agree with the assertion that Israeli democracy is in danger, as contrasted with those who do not agree with this assessment (59% and 78%, respectively).

Another variable for which we found a link—though less strong than expected—with readiness to emigrate is the sense of belonging to the state and its problems: 85% of interviewees who would prefer to remain in Israel feel part of the state, compared with 74% of those who would prefer to leave.

We also looked at the relation between the wish to stay or go and the fear of harm to one’s desired lifestyle due to the increasing power of other groups. No significant differences were measured in the Arab sample: Among both those who are worried and those who are not worried, about one-fifth would prefer to emigrate, and roughly three-quarters, to remain in Israel. Among Jewish respondents, the majority in both groups would prefer to stay in Israel, though there is a considerable difference in the size of that majority: only 57% of those who are worried about harm to their lifestyle would choose to stay, as opposed to 76% of those who did not express such concerns. Put differently, 26% of those who are worried about damage to their way of life would wish to emigrate, as contrasted with just 12% of those who do not share these fears.

We examined this association further in the Jewish sample by breaking it down based on political orientation. On the Left, we found a similar share of interviewees who would prefer to emigrate among both those who are worried and those who are not worried about possible harm to their desired way of life. By contrast, in the Center and on the Right, we found that the wish to emigrate is much more common among those who are concerned that their lifestyle might be threatened.

Figure 3.35 **Prefer to stay in Israel or emigrate** (Jewish sample, by political orientation and concerns about maintaining one’s desired lifestyle; %)




Would you want your children to continue living in Israel?

Question 66 Appendix 1, p. 232

We asked our respondents if they would want their children to continue living in Israel. In both the Jewish and Arab samples, a substantial majority answered in the affirmative (Jews, 78%; Arabs, 83%). Moreover, the majority in both groups are **certain** that they would want their children to remain in Israel, though this majority is greater in the Arab sample than in the Jewish one.

Figure 3.36 Would want/not want their children to continue living in Israel (Jewish and Arab samples; %)




A breakdown of the Jewish sample indicates that a majority in all three camps would want their children to continue living in Israel, albeit of different sizes: a sweeping majority on the Right, two-thirds in the Center, and only a small majority on the Left.

Analyzing the Jewish sample by religiosity, we also found a majority in all groups who think or are certain that they would want their children to remain to live in Israel, though this majority is significantly smaller among secular respondents than in the other groups.

Breaking down the secular group separately by political orientation revealed a clear majority on the Right and in the Center who would prefer to see their children living in Israel (70% and 60%, respectively), though the corresponding figure on the Left is only about half (51.5%).

A breakdown of the Jewish sample indicates that a majority in all three camps would want their children to continue living in Israel, albeit of different sizes: a sweeping majority on the Right, two-thirds in the Center, and only a small majority on the Left.


Figure 3.37 **Would want/not want their children to continue living in Israel**
(Jewish sample, by religiosity and political orientation; %)



The share of respondents who would like their children to continue living in Israel is higher in the oldest age group than in the younger cohorts (55 and over, 88%; 35–54, 71%; 18–34, 75%).

We sought to examine responses to this question among interviewees with children of different ages or without children. In the latter group as well as those with young children (up to age 13), the desire to have their children live in Israel was lower, rising in tandem with the age of the children.

Figure 3.38 **Think/are certain they would want their children to continue living in Israel** (Jewish sample, by age of children living at home; %)



The share of respondents who would prefer their children to continue living in Israel is slightly lower among those with full or partial higher education than among those without academic studies (74% versus 82%, respectively). In addition, we found that those with a lower income show a greater tendency to want their children to remain in Israel (below median income, 83%; median income or above median income, 74%).

Breaking down the Jewish sample by ethnicity, the group that stands out are immigrants from the former Soviet Union, who are the least interested in having their children remain in Israel (FSU immigrants, 52%; mixed Ashkenazi/Mizrahi, 73%; Ashkenazim, 78%; Mizrahim, 85%). The share who would like their children to stay in Israel is slightly higher among native-born Israelis than among those who were born outside of Israel, though the gap between the two groups is not large (79% and 73%, respectively). By contrast, we found a noticeable difference in the Jewish sample when analyzing by identification with stronger or weaker social groups (83% versus 68%, respectively).

Examining whether there is a difference between evacuees and non-evacuees in the total sample on this question, we found that 69% of the former would want their children to remain in Israel, compared with 79% of the latter.

An analysis of the Arab sample by religion shows a majority in all groups who would like their children to remain in Israel. This majority is especially large among Druze respondents (90%), followed closely by Muslims (83%), and then by Christians (with “only” 75%).

The share of interviewees who would like their children to stay in Israel is slightly lower among younger Arabs than in the older age groups (18–34, 78%; 35–54, 89%; 55 and over, 84%). In the Arab sample as well, we found a sizeable gap between those with (full or partial) higher education and those without, in terms of wanting their children to remain in Israel (70% versus 88%).

Among Arabs who voted for Zionist parties in the 2022 Knesset elections, a decisive majority of 90% would like their children to stay in Israel. A lower share of voters for Ra’am and Hadash-Ta’al (83% and 78%, respectively), and a much smaller share of Balad voters (57%), feel this way.

Do you have, or are you considering obtaining, a foreign passport?

Question 68 Appendix 1, p. 233

This year, we asked Jewish respondents for the first time if they have a foreign passport, and if not, if they are considering obtaining one. In the Jewish sample overall, a large group, though not a majority (42%), responded that they do not have a foreign passport and are not considering getting one; however, a virtually identical share of respondents (39%) reported that they already have a foreign passport, have begun the process of obtaining one, or are considering the possibility (figure 3.39).

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation (figure 3.40) reveals that, on the Right and in the Center, respondents who are not considering obtaining a foreign passport constitute the largest group. On the Left, by contrast, a small minority are not thinking about doing so, while the most frequent response is that they already possess a foreign passport (the latter consisting of those who were born with a foreign passport combined with those who later obtained one). Similarly, we found a larger share on the Left than in the Center or on the Right who have already begun the process of obtaining a foreign passport or are considering doing so (36%, 29%, and 19%, respectively).

Figure 3.39 **Do you have, or are you considering obtaining, a foreign passport?** (Jewish sample; %)





Figure 3.40 **Do you have, or are you considering obtaining, a foreign passport?** (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



Analyzing the Jewish sample by religiosity, we found a majority in all groups, with the exception of the secular, who responded that they do not have a foreign passport and are not considering obtaining one. By contrast, among secular respondents, only about one-quarter gave this answer, whereas over one-third expressed interest in obtaining a foreign passport (are considering getting one or have already begun the process).

Table 3.19 Do you have, or are you considering obtaining, a foreign passport? (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)

	Don't have a foreign passport and are not considering getting one	Considering getting one, but have not yet taken steps	Have begun the process of getting a foreign passport	Already have a foreign passport	Not applicable/ don't know	Total
Haredim	62	7	1	18	12	100
National religious	56	10	1	14	19	100
Traditional religious	55	12	4	11	18	100
Traditional non-religious	51	14.5	3	9	22.5	100
Secular	26	26	11	18	19	100

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by ethnicity shows that only among Mizrahim is there a majority who do not have a foreign passport and are not considering obtaining one (55.5%), as compared with roughly one third in the other groups (Ashkenazim, 35%; FSU immigrants, 33.5%; mixed Ashkenazi/Mizrahi, 33%).

As expected, a higher share of foreign-born than of Israeli-born respondents possess a foreign passport (29.5% versus 12%, respectively). Nonetheless, we did not find noticeable gaps between the two groups in their intention to take out a foreign passport, among those who do not yet have one.

Breaking down the responses by age, we did not find real differences between groups in the share of those who already have a foreign passport (14%–15% in all groups); however, there were sizeable gaps with respect to intentions in this regard: In the younger age groups, some one-third are interested in taking out

a foreign passport, meaning they have begun the process or are considering doing so (18–34, 32%; 35–54, 29%), whereas in the oldest cohort (55 and over), only 10.5% are interested in obtaining one.

Analyzing on the basis of educational level reveals a slightly greater share of respondents with a foreign passport among those with full or partial higher education than among those without academic studies (17% and 12%, respectively). Additionally, we found a gap—though not a large one—between the former and the latter in the intention to obtain such a passport (27% versus 22%, respectively). Breaking down the responses by income level, we found that, the higher the income bracket, the greater the proportion of foreign passport holders (below median income, 11%; median income, 15%; above median income, 17%). The same holds true for the intention to take out a foreign passport (below median income, 22%; median income, 19%; above median income, 31%).

We examined whether there is a connection between the preference to remain in Israel or emigrate, and the desire to obtain a foreign passport. Not surprisingly, we found that, of those who would opt to stay in Israel, over one-half are not considering taking out a foreign passport. By contrast, of those who would prefer to emigrate, only about one-quarter are not interested in obtaining a foreign passport.

Table 3.20 **Do you have, or are you considering obtaining, a foreign passport?** (Jewish sample, by preference to remain in Israel or emigrate; %)


	Don't have a foreign passport and are not considering getting one	Considering getting one, but have not yet taken steps	Have begun the process of getting a foreign passport	Already have a foreign passport	Not applicable/ don't know	Total
Prefer to remain	54	11	3.5	14	17.5	100
Prefer to emigrate	23	35.5	11	11	19.5	100

Reasons for obtaining a foreign passport

Question 69 Appendix 1, p. 233

We asked those respondents who have a foreign passport or are considering obtaining one (i.e., those who have begun the process or are thinking of it), what their primary reason is for doing so.¹⁹ Half of this group said they took out a foreign passport or are considering doing so “to be on the safe side.” The remaining reasons were selected less often.

Figure 3.41 Why did you take out, or are you considering taking out, a foreign passport? (Jewish sample; %)



Women tend more than men to choose the reason “to be on the safe side” (57% versus 43%, respectively). Likewise, this reason is more characteristic of the youngest age group (18–34, 56%; 35–54, 47%; 55 and over, 46%).

¹⁹ In the survey, we also offered the response choice of “I have a foreign passport from birth.” Those who gave this answer were omitted from the analysis of the reasons for taking out a foreign passport.

As might be expected, the second most common reason—“so that my children will have a foreign passport”—was more typical of older than of younger respondents (55 and over, 21%; 35–54, 15%; 18–34, 6%).

Breaking down the results in the Jewish sample by political orientation, we found that in the Center and on the Left, the majority have, or are considering obtaining, a foreign passport “to be on the safe side,” whereas on the Right, less than half chose this option. A noticeably higher share on the Right (compared with the other camps) pointed to “the security situation” as influencing their decision, while “social/political” reasons was a more popular response among Left and Center respondents.

Table 3.21 Why do you have, or are you considering obtaining, a foreign passport? (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)

	Left	Center	Right
To be on the safe side/just in case	54	58	45
So that my children will have a foreign passport	15	8	15
Due to the security situation	9	9	16
Due to the social/political situation	12	10	5
Due to the economic situation	6	8	6
To study/work abroad	3	2	6
Don't know / other	1	5	7

Chapter 4

National Security and the Security Forces

In this chapter, we discuss the following topics:

Personal and national security

- Sense of personal security
- Israel's military deterrence
- Local government, and residents' security
- Leaders' considerations on decisions about security matters
- Strengthening Israel's military power or reaching political agreements with neighboring states?
- Importance of civilian settlements near Israel's borders

Security forces

- Trust in security forces (IDF, police, Shin Bet): an overview
- IDF
- Police
- Shin Bet
- Mossad
- Granting the security forces full powers to conduct investigations and monitor online activity

Personal and national security

Personal security

Question 2 Appendix 1, p. 219

We asked: “On a scale from 1 = very low to 5 = very high, how would you rate your sense of personal security today?” The greatest share of respondents in the total sample characterized their sense of security as quite or very low, with only a minority stating that it was quite or very high (for an overall average of 2.65). Breaking down the responses by nationality (figure 4.1), we found a sizeable gap between Jewish and Arab respondents. Among Jews, 41% rated their sense of personal security as low; roughly one-third, as moderate; and about one-quarter, as high (overall average, 2.77). By contrast, the majority of Arabs (approximately two-thirds) report a low level of personal security; about one-quarter, a moderate level; and only a small minority, a high level (overall average, 2.09). Presumably, in addition to the factors common to both Jews and Arabs (such as the security situation in Israel’s North and South), the sense of personal security among Arab respondents receives such a poor rating due to the high incidence of crime in Arab society.

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation (figure 4.2) shows that the sense of personal security is noticeably lower on the Left than in the Center or on the Right. In fact, a majority of respondents from the Left, less than one-half from the Center, and only about one-third from the Right, cite a low level of personal security. Respondents on the Right were the most inclined to report a high level of personal security (average: Left, 2.34; Center, 2.53; Right, 2.96); still, only a minority in all three camps rate their sense of security as high.

Among Jews, 41% rated their sense of personal security as low; roughly one-third, as moderate; and about one-quarter, as high (overall average, 2.77). By contrast, the majority of Arabs (approximately two-thirds) report a low level of personal security; about one-quarter, a moderate level; and only a small minority, a high level.

Figure 4.1 Sense of personal security (total sample; Jewish and Arab samples; %)





Figure 4.2 Sense of personal security (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



An analysis of the Jewish sample by religiosity reveals that the share of respondents who report a high level of personal security is greatest among Haredim, and smallest among secular Jews.

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation shows that the sense of personal security is noticeably lower on the Left than in the Center or on the Right.

Table 4.1 **Sense of personal security** (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)

	Low sense of personal security	Moderate sense of personal security	High sense of personal security	Don't know	Total
Haredim	18	23	54	5	100
National religious	14	37.5	48	0.5	100
Traditional religious	37.5	28	34.5	-	100
Traditional non-religious	46	32.5	20	1.5	100
Secular	53	33	13	1	100

In the Jewish sample, we found a clear difference between men and women, with the latter feeling less secure: 35% of men indicated a low level of personal security, 31%, a moderate level, and 33%, a high level, as compared with corresponding figures among women of 47% reporting a low level of personal security, 32%, a moderate level, and 20%, a high level. The Arab sample did not yield statistically significant differences between the two sexes.

A breakdown of the Arab sample by religion shows that roughly two-thirds of Muslims and Christians, and a much smaller share of Druze (about one-half), report a low sense of personal security.

In the Arab sample, we did not find major differences between the age groups on this issue. Among Jewish respondents, however, a low sense of personal security was the most common option reported in the young and intermediate cohorts, whereas a high sense of security was most common in the oldest group.

Table 4.2 **Sense of personal security** (Jewish sample, by age; %)

	Low sense of personal security	Moderate sense of personal security	High sense of personal security	Don't know	Total
18–34	43	35	21	1	100
35–54	51	29	20	–	100
55 and over	28	31	38	3	100

We examined whether the sense of personal security correlates with responses to the question of whether Israel is a good place to live. In the total sample, we found that, of those who cite a low level of personal security, only about one-half (48%) state that Israel is a good place to live, as opposed to a substantial majority who feel this way among those who report a moderate or high level of security (72% and 89%, respectively).

Cross-tabulating Jewish respondents' sense of personal security with their answers to the question of where it is safer for Jews to live (see chapter 3 for a detailed analysis of this question), we found that, while a majority across the board hold that Israel is the safest place for Jews, the greater the sense of personal security, the stronger the belief that Israel is the safest option for Jews today: 86% of those interviewees who report a high level of personal security; 78%, a moderate level; and 61%, a low level, indicated that it is safest today for Jews to live in Israel. As shown in the table below, analyzing the results in the opposite direction yields the following finding: Of those who hold that it is safer to live in Israel, only about one-third report a low sense of personal security, whereas double this share of those who believe that it is safer to live elsewhere rate their sense of personal security as low.

Table 4.3 Sense of personal security, by opinion on where it is safer for Jews to live today (Jewish sample; %)

Where is it safer for Jews to live today?	Low sense of personal security	Moderate sense of personal security	High sense of personal security	Don't know	Total
In Israel	34	34	31	1	100
Abroad	68	19	12	1	100
Both are equally safe	57	26	16	1	100
Don't know	58	34	6	2	100

We also found substantial gaps based on sense of personal security with regard to preference for remaining in Israel or living in another country (see chapter 3 for a detailed analysis of this question). Thus, 27.5% of those who report a low sense of personal security would prefer to live elsewhere, as compared with 18% of those who feel a moderate level of security, and just 11.5% of those who rate their personal security as high.

Surprisingly enough, when analyzing perceptions of personal security by whether interviewees have a reinforced safe room in their home (“mamad”) or a public shelter nearby, we found no association between them. The share who report a low, moderate, or high sense of security yielded very similar results on the second question, whereas we expected that those who lack access to some form of shelter would feel more personally threatened. It may well be that the analysis needs to be performed in the opposite direction, to test whether a low sense of security causes people to ensure that they have access to a safe room or shelter, and therefore those who lack such access tend to be—those whose sense of personal security is higher from the outset. Another possibility is that one’s sense of personal security stems more from the broader public space than from the home environment.

Factors causing worry about physical security

Questions 3–7 Appendix 1, p. 219–220

We wished to know which factors are the greatest source of worry concerning respondents’ physical security. The possible reasons that we presented were as follows: crime/criminal violence; terrorism; military attack on Israel; a full-scale, multi-front war; and the large number of weapons circulating among citizens.

We asked separately about each of the factors cited, and, as shown in the following figure, each of them is cause for alarm among most of the interviewees, with terrorism emerging as the most worrisome in the total sample. However, Arabs are much more worried than Jews on two points: crime/criminal violence, and the large number of weapons in the hands of citizens (figure 4.3).

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation (figure 4.4) shows that a majority in all three camps are concerned for their personal security for nearly all of the reasons listed, with the largest majority in each case among respondents on the Left. However, regarding the prevalence of weapons, only a small minority on the Right express concern about this issue, as contrasted with majorities on the Left and in the Center.

Figure 4.3 Quite or very worried about physical security for each of the following reasons (total sample; Jewish and Arab samples; %)






Figure 4.4 Quite or very worried about physical security for each of the following reasons (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



In most cases, in both the Jewish and Arab samples, women are more worried than men about each of the factors cited.

Figure 4.5 **Quite or very worried about physical security for each of the following reasons** (Jewish and Arab samples, by sex; %)




Israel's military deterrence

Question 44 Appendix 1, p. 228

The events of October 7, and the ensuing war in the country's South and North, have led many to question whether Israel has lost its deterrent capabilities. We therefore asked: "On a scale from 1 = very poor to 5 = excellent, how would you rate Israel's current military deterrence?" We found that slightly more than one-third of the total sample categorize Israel's military deterrence as middling and another one-third as quite poor/very poor, with just one-quarter rating it as quite good or excellent. There is virtually no difference between Jews and Arabs in the distribution of responses to this question (the averages for the total, Jewish, and Arab samples are all 2.82).

Slightly more than one-third of the total sample categorize Israel's military deterrence as middling and another one-third as quite poor/very poor, with just one-quarter rating it as quite good or excellent.

Figure 4.6 Israel's current military deterrence (total sample; %)



A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation shows that the Left offers a lower assessment of Israel's military deterrence than do the Center or Right (averages: Left, 2.44; Center, 2.88; Right, 2.86).


Analyzing the findings in the total sample regarding sense of personal security by opinion of Israel's deterrence, we found that, of those who rate the country's deterrent capabilities as quite or very poor, a majority (59%) report a low sense of personal security, compared with 42% among those who assess Israel's deterrence as moderate, and only 29% among those who rate it as high.

Involvement of local government in security matters

Question 8 Appendix 1, p. 220

Recently, the question of the responsibility of local governments for the security of citizens who live within their boundaries (for example, by establishing and maintaining local civilian emergency squads) has been the focus of considerable attention. Accordingly, we asked: “In light of the security situation, should local governments also deal with security matters within their physical jurisdiction, given that this will come at the expense of other areas of responsibility such as education or urban beautification?” Given the prevailing sense of lack of personal security discussed earlier, and the widespread assessment that Israel’s military deterrence has been eroded, it is not surprising that a substantial majority of Jews and Arabs alike (82%) hold that local governments should play a role in security matters, even if this entails less attention to their other municipal responsibilities.

Figure 4.7 **Should local governments also deal with security matters within their boundaries?** (total sample; %)



A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals a majority in all three camps who hold that local governments should be involved in the security of the residents within their jurisdiction; however, this majority is markedly smaller among respondents on the Left than in the Center or on the Right (63% versus 85% and 86%, respectively).


Are security-related decisions by Israel's leaders based solely on professional considerations?

Question 45 Appendix 1, p. 228

Given the current widespread criticism of the judgment of Israel's top leaders, we asked: "In your opinion, are the decisions of Israel's elected leaders on security matters influenced solely by professional considerations, or also by other factors (personal and other interests)?" While a small majority of Jews hold that a mixture of professional considerations and other factors are at play, among Arab respondents, equal proportions believe that such decisions are based on both professional considerations and other factors or solely on other factors. In other words, the Arab assessment is that well-reasoned, professional considerations are not at the crux of decision-making on security issues in Israel, though among Jewish respondents as well, only a minority hold that the country's elected leaders are guided primarily by pertinent considerations when deciding on security matters.

Figure 4.8 Are the decisions of Israel's elected leaders on security matters influenced solely by professional considerations, or also by other factors?

(Jewish and Arab samples; %)



A breakdown of responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation shows that, on the Left, a clear majority think that decisions on security are influenced solely by personal or other factors, while in the Center the most frequent response (one-half of those surveyed) is a mix of professional and other considerations, a view also shared by a majority on the Right. In other words, even on the Right, only a minority—though a larger one than on the

Left or in the Center—think that security-related decisions by Israel’s elected leaders are based solely on professional factors.

Table 4.4 Are the decisions of Israel’s elected leaders on security matters influenced solely by professional considerations, or also by other factors?

(Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)

	Left	Center	Right
Solely by professional considerations	3	5.5	19
By both professional and other considerations	32	50	58
Solely by other considerations	63	41	16
Don’t know	2	3.5	7
Total	100	100	100

Analyzing the responses concerning Israel’s military deterrence by the factors affecting decision-making on security matters, we found that, of those who think the country’s leaders make such decisions based on professional considerations alone, the most common response is that the country’s deterrence capabilities are quite good or excellent. By contrast, of those respondents who hold that the leaders are guided solely by other factors, a high proportion think that Israel’s deterrence is quite poor or very poor, while among those who believe that the leadership is influenced by both professional and other considerations, the most frequent response is that Israel’s level of deterrence is middling.

Table 4.5 Assessment of Israel’s military deterrence, by considerations affecting decisions of its leaders on security matters (total sample; %)

Are decisions of Israel’s elected leaders on security matters influenced solely by professional considerations, or also by other factors?	Israel’s military deterrence				
	Quite poor/ very poor	Middling	Quite good/ excellent	Don’t know	Total
Solely by professional considerations	28	29	41	2	100
By both professional and other considerations	30	43	26	1	100
Solely by other considerations	47.5	32	18	2.5	100


Strengthening Israel's military power or reaching political agreements?

Questions 70–71 Appendix 1, p. 234

We posed the question: “In your opinion, what will best ensure Israel’s future security in the short and the long term?” The response choices offered were: strengthening Israel’s military power, reaching political agreements with states in the region, and both equally. We found interesting and substantial differences between the options favored for the short and the long term, and of course, between various groups in Israeli society. As shown in the figure below, the most frequent response in the total sample was that strengthening Israel’s military power offers the best guarantee of security in the short term, followed closely by “both equally.” The least common response regarding Israel’s short-term security was reaching political agreements.

With regard to the long term, however, the distribution of responses changes greatly, with the highest proportion of interviewees answering that the best way to ensure Israel’s long-term security is a combination of strengthening its military power and reaching political agreements. Rated second is the option of reaching political agreements, and only lastly, strengthening Israel’s military power. In other words, there is widespread acknowledgment among the Israeli public of the value of political agreements with other states in the region, and these are seen as the best safeguard of the country’s security in the long run.

Figure 4.9 What will best ensure Israel’s future security in the short and the long term? (total sample; %)



Comparing the distribution of responses between the Jewish and Arab samples reveals that, among Arab interviewees, only a small minority think that strengthening Israel’s military might is the best guarantee of the country’s security in either the short or the long term. Among Jewish respondents, by contrast, strengthening Israel’s military power is viewed as the best short-term answer to its security problem, while in the long term, a mix of greater military power and political agreements is thought to offer the strongest guarantee of future security.

Table 4.6 What will best ensure Israel’s future security in the short and the long term? (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

	Short term	Long term
Jews	Greater military power: 47% Both options equally: 34.5% Political agreements: 14% Don’t know: 4.5%	Both options equally: 37% Political agreements: 31.5% Greater military power: 25% Don’t know: 6.5%
Arabs	Political agreements: 45% Both options equally: 42% Greater military power: 6% Don’t know: 7%	Both options equally: 43% Political agreements: 42% Greater military power: 7% Don’t know: 7%

A breakdown of the responses in the Jewish sample for both time frames shows considerable differences between political camps, highlighting the gap between Center and Left, despite the tendency in public discourse to conflate the two. On the Left, in both the short and long term, political agreements are seen as the best guarantee of Israel’s security, while strengthening its military might is in third place. In the Center, in both the short and long term, the preferred solution is a combination of increasing Israel’s military might and reaching political agreements. In second place in this camp, in the short term, is strengthening the country’s military power, while in the long term, this option falls to third place. And on the Right, the option of greater military power is preferred by a clear majority for the short term, followed by a mix of increased military strength and political agreements. In the long term, this combination rises to first place on the Right, and strengthening Israel’s military power drops to second place.

Table 4.7 What will best ensure Israel's future security in the short and the long term? (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)

	Short term	Long term
Left	Political agreements: 45.5% Both equally: 32% Greater military power: 17.5% Don't know: 5%	Political agreements: 56% Both equally: 34% Greater military power: 6% Don't know: 4%
Center	Both equally: 45% Greater military power: 38% Political agreements: 14% Don't know: 3%	Both equally: 44.5% Political agreements: 32.5% Greater military power: 18% Don't know: 5%
Right	Greater military power: 58% Both equally: 31% Political agreements: 7% Don't know: 4%	Both equally: 35% Greater military power: 33% Political agreements: 27% Don't know: 5%

We examined whether there were differences between the positions of those who were evacuated from their homes and those who were not. In the short term, the evacuees showed a greater preference than the non-evacuees for strengthening Israel's military might as a guarantee of future security (52% versus 39.5%). By contrast, in the long term, the former were more inclined than the latter to favor the option of political agreements (41% versus 33%).

Cross-tabulating the responses above with the question on Israel's military deterrence, we found no substantial differences regarding the best guarantee of Israel's security (political agreements or increased military power), in either the short or long term, between those who characterize Israel's deterrent capabilities as poor, middling, or good.


Importance of civilian settlements near Israel's borders

Question 72 Appendix 1, p. 234

In response to recent events, we posed the following question: "Zionism originally attributed security importance to settlement close to the country's borders. Given the events of October 7, are there still security advantages today in having civilian Israeli settlements close to the border?" In the total sample, the majority stated that they think or are certain that there are such advantages, with roughly one-third answering in the negative. A relatively high proportion of respondents in both the Jewish and Arab samples opted for the

response choice of “don’t know,” apparently influenced by the traumatic events experienced on or following October 7 by citizens who resided close to the southern and northern borders. However, there was a considerable gap between Jews and Arabs on this question. Among Jews, a sizeable majority responded that such settlements are advantageous for security, whereas the larger share of Arabs answered that they are not.

Figure 4.10 **Are there security advantages today in having civilian settlements close to the border?** (total sample; Jewish and Arab samples; %)



A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals that the Left is split equally between those who think/are certain that there is an advantage to having civilian settlements on the borders and those who hold there is not. In the Center, a small majority—and on the Right, a substantial majority—hold that such settlements have security value. We did not find a difference on this question between the responses of those who were evacuated from their homes and those who were not.

Table 4.8 **Are there security advantages today in having civilian settlements close to the border?** (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)


	Think/certain there are	Think/certain there are not	Don't know	Total
Left	41.5	41	17.5	100
Center	52	34	14	100
Right	70.5	18	11.5	100

Security forces

As discussed in chapter 2, the present survey showed a clear decline in public trust in the IDF. With regard to the police, there was a downturn in public trust compared with the special poll in December, but not in comparison with June 2023. The few measurements that we have of public trust in the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) show a consistent pattern, while we do not have any previous surveys on trust in the Mossad, so that we cannot speak of any trend there.

Overall, it can safely be stated that trust in the security forces as a whole is markedly higher among Jews than among Arabs (average: Jews, 64.3%; Arabs, 26.8%), though the order of the ranking is the same for both groups: IDF, Mossad, Shin Bet, and lagging far behind, the police. In the Arab public, there are only minor differences in the (low) levels of public trust in the various security forces; in other words, while the police rank at the bottom of the list, the difference between them and the other institutions is negligible. We will be discussing each of the security forces separately below.

Figure 4.11 **Trust the IDF, police, Shin Bet, and Mossad** (total sample; Jewish and Arab samples; %)



The IDF


IDF as providing security and protection to citizens of Israel

Question 43 Appendix 1, p. 227

Few would question that the events of October 7 damaged the public perception of the IDF's ability to protect the citizens of Israel. We wished to learn to what

extent the IDF is seen today as a body that provides protection and security to the country’s citizens. It emerges that a majority of roughly three-quarters of the total sample hold that it still fulfills this function.

Figure 4.12 **Extent to which the IDF provides security and protection to Israel’s citizens (total sample; %)**



Among Jewish respondents, there is almost complete agreement that the IDF provides security and protection to the country’s citizens; however, only a minority of slightly more than one-third of Arabs share this view. At the same time, breaking down the Arab sample by religion reveals a substantial difference between Muslims and Christians, on the one hand—only a minority of whom think that the IDF provides security and protection to citizens of the state “very much” or “quite a lot” (Muslims, 33%; Christians, 39%)—and Druze respondents, on the other, where the majority (77%) hold this opinion.

Table 4.9 **Extent to which the IDF provides security and protection to Israel’s citizens (Jewish and Arab samples; %)**

	Very much/ quite a lot	Not so much/ not at all	Don't know	Total
Jews	87	12	1	100
Arabs	37	61	2	100

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by religiosity shows a majority in all of the groups who think that the IDF provides security and protection “very much” or “quite a lot”; however, among Haredi respondents, the share who feel this way is slightly more than three-quarters, whereas in the other groups, it exceeds 85%. There are only minor differences between the political camps in the Jewish sample on this question (Left, 83%; Center and Right, 88%).


We wished to learn if there was a difference on this question between respondents from the total sample who were evacuated from their homes and those who were not. And in fact, a majority in both groups feel that the IDF provides protection and security to the country’s citizens, though by a smaller margin among the former than the latter (73% versus 79.5%, respectively).

Trust in the IDF

Question 25 Appendix 1, p. 224 | Appendix 2, p. 251

As shown in the following figure, and discussed earlier (in chapter 2), the IDF has experienced a significant decline in public trust. In fact, the share of Jews who expressed trust in the IDF in May is the lowest it has been since the inception of the *Democracy Index* surveys in 2003. Nonetheless, it still earns the highest level of trust of all the state institutions surveyed this year.

Figure 4.13 Trust the IDF, 2003–2024 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



A breakdown of responses in the Jewish sample by religiosity shows that approximately one-half of Haredim express trust in the IDF, as opposed to roughly 80% in all other groups. Analyzing the Jewish respondents by political orientation reveals that the level of trust is lowest on the Left, and highest in the Center, with the Right falling in the middle, albeit slightly closer to the Center. (It should be noted that the Right encompasses a high proportion of Haredim, whose trust in the army is, as stated, relatively low.) Analyzing the Jewish sample by age, we find a majority in all age groups who express confidence in the IDF, though this majority is slightly larger in the older cohorts.

Table 4.10 **Express trust in the IDF** (Jewish sample, by religiosity, political orientation, and age; %)

		Trust the IDF
Religiosity	Haredim	50
	National religious	83
	Traditional religious	81
	Traditional non-religious	82
	Secular	80
Political orientation	Left	69
	Center	82.5
	Right	78
Age	18–34	71
	35–54	79
	55 and over	81

Cross-tabulating the responses on optimism/pessimism about Israel’s future with the extent of trust in the IDF among Jews, we found that, among those who express trust in the IDF, a majority (59%) are optimistic about the country’s future, while of those who do not have faith in the army, only a minority (44%) are optimistic.

A breakdown of the Arab interviewees by religion shows, as expected, sizeable differences: Among Muslims and Christians, only a minority express trust in the IDF (26% and 34%, respectively), as compared with a clear majority of Druze respondents (64%).


Rating the IDF in various areas

Questions 28–31 Appendix 1, p. 224–225

We asked the interviewees to rate the IDF in the following areas, on a scale from 1 = very poor to 5 = excellent: combat readiness, preventive intelligence, moral conduct in combat, and compliance with orders and regulations. As shown in the figure below, the Jewish sample awarded higher scores than the Arab sample in all of the above areas. The greatest gap was on the subject of moral conduct, where the IDF's average score was the highest among the Jews and the lowest among the Arabs.


In the Jewish sample, the second-highest average score was in the area of combat readiness, and the third, in compliance with orders and regulations. The IDF received the lowest average score for preventive intelligence, a result presumably influenced by the events of October 7. In the Arab sample, the variance between the average scores was very small, though combat readiness was in first place, followed by preventive intelligence, complying with orders and regulations, and finally, as stated, moral conduct in combat.

Figure 4.14 Average ratings for the IDF in the following areas, from 1 = very poor to 5 = excellent (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation shows that in all three camps, the IDF scores lowest in the area of preventive intelligence. Additionally, the Left assigns the lowest ratings in all areas, whereas the Center and Right give scores that are very similar, and higher than on the Left. The most pronounced gap between the Left, on the one hand, and the Center and Right, on the other, is in the matter of moral conduct in time of war, with the Left giving the IDF a noticeably lower score than the other two camps.

Figure 4.15 **Average ratings for the IDF in the following areas, from 1 = very poor to 5 = excellent (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)**




Cross-tabulating the level of trust in the IDF with the ratings in the four areas surveyed reveals that combat readiness is the factor with the greatest influence on trust in the military. Thus, only 26% of those who assign the IDF a low score for combat readiness express trust in the army, compared with those who give it a low rating for moral conduct during wartime (31.5%), compliance with orders and regulations (41%), and preventive intelligence (55%).

Is the IDF politically neutral?

Question 75 Appendix 1, p. 235

In light of the accusations frequently leveled of late (primarily in right-wing circles) of a supposed political agenda on the part of the IDF's top brass, we wished to know to what extent the Israeli public views the IDF as nonpartisan in this respect. To our surprise, we found that there is not a consensus among the Israeli public that the IDF is politically neutral, with 55% of Jews and only 30% of Arabs taking this view. Whereas a significant majority of Jewish respondents in the Center and on the Left hold that the IDF is "quite" or "very much" nonpartisan, the Right is split almost equally between those who feel this way and those who think that the army is "not so much" or "not at all" politically neutral. Breaking down the data further, it may be worth noting that, even among Left and Center respondents, only a minority think that the IDF is "very much" nonpartisan (Left, 28%; Center, 30%; Right, 21%).

Figure 4.16 Extent of the IDF's political neutrality (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)




We found a strong, albeit predictable, association in the Jewish sample between perceptions of the IDF's political neutrality and the degree of trust in that institution. Thus, of those respondents who hold that the IDF is free of political agendas, 86% express trust in it, as contrasted with just 65% of those who consider it "not so much" or "not at all" nonpartisan.

Reliability of IDF statements and reports

Question 41 Appendix 1, p. 227

When analyzing the survey results on the basis of nationality, it emerges that a large majority of Jewish respondents judge the IDF’s statements and reports to be credible (though the largest share hold that they are “quite” as opposed to “very” reliable), while a majority of Arab interviewees consider them unreliable. A breakdown of responses in the Arab sample by religion shows only a minority of Muslims and Christians who find the IDF’s statements and reports to be trustworthy (33% and 45.5%, respectively), as contrasted with a majority of Druze respondents who view them as reliable (71%).

Figure 4.17 Reliability of IDF statements and reports (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation, we find a majority in all groups who consider the IDF’s statements and reports reliable, albeit by a lesser margin on the Left than in the Center or on the Right. As in the overall Jewish sample, the most frequent response in all three camps is “quite” reliable rather than “very” reliable.

Table 4.11 Reliability of IDF statements and reports (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)

	Very reliable	Quite reliable	Not so reliable	Not at all reliable	Don't know	Total
Left	24	44	20	10	2	100
Center	37	47	11.5	2.5	2	100
Right	38	44	13	4	1	100

Interestingly, the share of Jewish women who hold that the statements and reports emanating from the IDF are reliable exceeds the share among Jewish men (84% versus 76.5%, respectively). By contrast, a breakdown of the corresponding data in the Arab sample shows a lower share of women than of men who consider the IDF's statements to be reliable (33% and 42%, respectively).

Examining the association between the question of the IDF's political neutrality and the perceived reliability of its statements and reports, we found that, of those who hold that it does not have a political agenda, a substantial majority of 86% consider its statements to be credible, as opposed to only 57.5% of those who think that the IDF is not a nonpartisan body.

Table 4.12 **Reliability of IDF statements and reports, by assessment of political neutrality** (total sample; %)

Extent of IDF's political neutrality	Reliability of IDF statements and reports			
	Quite/very reliable	Not so/not at all reliable	Don't know	Total
Quite a lot/very much	86	13	1	100
Not so much/not at all	57.5	40	2.5	100

Examining the association between the general level of trust in the IDF and respondents' assessments of various aspects of its performance, we found a strong correlation between trust in the IDF and three factors: (1) the extent to which the IDF is seen as providing protection and security; (2) rating of its combat readiness; and (3) perceived reliability of IDF statements and reports. At the same time, weaker connections were revealed between the extent of trust in the IDF and such values-based and ethical factors as moral conduct in time of war, and compliance with orders and regulations. Further, there was found to be a tenuous association between the level of trust in the IDF and the perception of its political neutrality.


The police

The police as providing protection and security to citizens of Israel

Question 42 Appendix 1, p. 227

As we saw above, a majority of the Israeli public holds that the IDF provides security and protection to the citizens of Israel. This is not the case with respect to the police, with the total sample split down the middle between those who think that the police force is fulfilling this function and those who believe the opposite (49% and 50%, respectively). As expected, an analysis of the responses shows a marked difference between Jews and Arabs. Among Jewish respondents, a small majority think that the police do in fact provide citizens of the state with security and protection, whereas among Arab respondents, a clear majority take the opposite view, namely, that it is not performing this major task.

Figure 4.18 Extent to which the police provide security and protection to Israel's citizens (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



Positions within the Jewish sample, when analyzed by political orientation, differ greatly between the camps: On the Left, only a small minority (28.5%), and in the Center, a larger minority of 43%, consider the police to be successful at providing protection and security to Israeli citizens, while on the Right a sizeable majority (63%) subscribe to this view. A similar variance is found when breaking down Jewish respondents by religiosity. Among Haredi and secular

Jews, only a minority (albeit sizeable) hold that the police provide security and protection to the country's citizens, compared with a majority who feel this way in the national religious and both traditional groups.

Table 4.13 **Think that the police provide security and protection to Israel's citizens** (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)

Haredim	National religious	Traditional religious	Traditional non-religious	Secular
47	68.5	65	57.5	44.5


Treatment of citizens by the police

Question 39 Appendix 1, p. 227

The police are the security force whose treatment of citizens when they seek assistance, or in other face-to-face encounters, is perhaps the most crucial to the relationship between both parties. Accordingly, we asked: "To the best of your knowledge, is the overall treatment by police officers of citizens with whom they come into contact in their work very good, quite good, not so good, or not at all good?" As shown in the following figure, the assessment tends toward the negative, that is, the majority hold that police treatment of citizens whom they encounter on the job is not good. In the total sample, just 38% consider it to be very good or quite good, compared with 58% who view it as not so good or not at all good.

A breakdown of Jewish and Arab responses to this question yielded distributions that were more similar than might be expected. Here too, the answers skewed toward the negative. The most surprising finding, however, is that the Jewish assessment of police treatment of citizens is even slightly poorer than that given by Arab respondents, perhaps because the former group expect better treatment than they feel they receive.


Figure 4.19 Assessment of police officers’ treatment of citizens with whom they come into contact (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation shows that only a negligible share on the Left hold that police treatment of citizens is quite or very good (8%), as contrasted with 30% in the Center and 46% on the Right.

An analysis of the Jewish sample based on religiosity also reveals sizeable differences: Only small (and virtually identical) proportions of Haredi and secular Jews consider police treatment of citizens to be quite or very good, while the share who feel this way among national religious and both groups of traditional respondents is substantially higher.

Figure 4.20 Think that police officers’ treatment of citizens with whom they come into contact is quite good/very good (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)




Trust in the police

Question 24 Appendix 1, p. 224 | Appendix 2, p. 250


As shown in the following figure, the level of trust in the police among Jews is double that among Arabs, though, in both cases, we are speaking of a minority. Likewise, while in both the Jewish and Arab samples, there was a noticeable decline in trust in the police between the December 2023 poll and the present survey, even after this drop, the share of Jews who express trust in this body is nonetheless higher than that in June 2023 (44% versus 35%), as is the corresponding share among Arabs (22% versus 17%).

Figure 4.21 **Trust the police, 2003–2024** (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



A breakdown of responses in the Jewish sample by religiosity shows Haredi and secular Jews reporting the lowest levels of trust, though the share among the latter is three times that of the former. Among national religious and both groups of traditional respondents, the majority express trust in the police.

Figure 4.22 **Trust the police** (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)



Analyzing the levels of trust among Jewish respondents by political orientation, we found a small minority on the Left, a large minority in the Center, and slightly over one-half on the Right who express confidence in the police.

Table 4.14 **Trust the police** (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)

Left	Center	Right
17	41	52.5

We found substantial differences in levels of trust in the police when analyzing on the basis of social location: Among both Jews and Arabs, those who identify with the stronger groups in Israeli society place greater faith in the police (Jews: strong groups, 46%; weak groups, 37%; Arabs: strong groups, 33%; weak groups, 15%).

A breakdown of the Arab sample by religion shows that only a minority in all three groups express trust in the police, and that this minority is especially small among Muslim respondents (19%) as compared with Christians and Druze (37% in both cases).


Rating the police in various areas

Questions 32–38 Appendix 1, p. 225–226

As in the questions on the IDF's functioning in various areas, we asked the respondents to rate the performance of the police in several areas: crime prevention, handling of terrorist attacks, politically nonpartisan law enforcement, fair and equitable policing of all population groups, freedom from political influence, lack of corruption, and policing of demonstrations.


As with the IDF, the average scores for the police are lower in the Arab sample than in the Jewish sample, though the average ratings in both groups are middling or less, and within each sample the scores are very similar for all the areas surveyed—with the exception of the handling of terrorist attacks, for which Jewish respondents awarded the police higher marks than for the other areas. The handling of terrorist attacks is also the area with the greatest disparity between the average scores given by Jews and Arabs. The second largest gap is in the scores assigned for crime prevention, which is also the area with the lowest average score from Arab respondents.

Figure 4.23 Average ratings for the police in the following areas, from 1 = very poor to 5 = excellent (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals that the Left awards the police the lowest scores, and the Right, the highest scores, with the Center falling closer to the Right than to the Left. The highest average score in all three camps is for the handling of terrorist attacks. On the Left and in the Center, the lowest average score is for freedom from political influence (though with a relatively large gap between the two camps), whereas on the Right, it is for fair and equitable policing of all groups.

Figure 4.24 **Average ratings for the police in the following areas, from 1 = very poor to 5 = excellent** (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)




Is the police force politically nonpartisan?

Question 76 Appendix 1, p. 235

In both the Jewish and Arab samples, the majority responded that the police force is not politically neutral (64% and 65%, respectively).

Figure 4.25 Extent of the police's political neutrality (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation yields results that are at once predictable and also somewhat unexpected: As anticipated, on the Left and in the Center, only a negligible minority consider the police to be quite or very nonpartisan; the surprise lies in the fact that, even among those who identify politically with the Right, only about one-third hold that Israel's police force is impartial, meaning that the majority consider it to be politically biased.

Table 4.15 Share of respondents who view the police as politically neutral (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)

Left	Center	Right
12	27	34


Reliability of police statements and reports

Question 40 Appendix 1, p. 227

We asked respondents about their view of the reliability of police statements and reports, comparing it with the same question regarding the IDF. Our findings show that, in the case of the police force, only about one-half of Jews think that its accounts are reliable, as opposed to a majority of 80% who feel similarly about the IDF. With respect to the Arab sample, we found the reliability ratings

of the police to be similar to those of the IDF; that is, slightly higher than one-third think that the statements of both organizations are reliable.

Figure 4.26 **Reliability of police statements and reports** (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



Analyzing assessments of the reliability of police statements and reports in the Jewish sample on the basis of political orientation reveals that less than one-quarter on the Left hold them to be trustworthy, compared with a solid majority on the Right, with the Center falling somewhere in between.

Table 4.16 **Consider police statements and reports to be reliable** (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)

Left	Center	Right
23	41	62

We then examined whether there is an association between assessments of the police’s political neutrality and of the reliability of its reports and statements. We found that, of those who consider the police to be nonpartisan, the majority hold that statements and reports issued by it are credible, while of those who believe that it is not a politically neutral body, the majority deem them to be unreliable.

Table 4.17 **Reliability of police statements and reports** (total sample, by extent of political neutrality; %)

Extent of police's political neutrality	Reliability of police statements and reports			
	Quite or very reliable	Not so or not at all reliable	Don't know	Total
Quite or very neutral	71	28	1	100
Not so or not at all neutral	38	61	1	100

As stated, whereas in the past when examining the security forces, we focused on the public standing of the IDF and the police, this year we also included the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) and the Mossad—two bodies whose roles and activities are largely cloaked in secrecy. We therefore began by examining the interviewees' assessments of their knowledge of both these organizations.


Familiarity with the roles and activities of the Shin Bet and the Mossad

Questions 73, 74 Appendix 1, p. 234–235

We asked: "How much do you think you know about the roles and activities of the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency)/the Mossad?" A majority in both the Jewish and Arab samples responded that they know only a little or nothing at all about both these bodies. Interestingly enough, the differences between the two samples on this question are negligible (figure 4.27).

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation shows that a greater share of respondents on the Left and Right than in the Center say that they know quite a lot or a lot about the roles and activities of the Shin Bet (Left, 44%; Center, 33.5%; Right, 42%). With regard to the Mossad, the share who state that they are knowledgeable about its assignments and activities is slightly greater on the Left and on the Right than in the Center (Left, 41%; Center, 32%; Right, 38%).

Figure 4.27 **Extent of knowledge about the roles and activities of the Shin Bet and the Mossad** (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



Comparing the responses of men and women on these questions, we found that, in both the Jewish and Arab samples, women are less inclined than men to state that they are familiar with the roles and activities of the two bodies, though the gap between men and women in the Jewish sample is larger (Shin Bet – Jews: men, 47%; women, 32%; Arabs: men, 34.5%; women, 29%; Mossad – Jews: men, 43%; women, 30%; Arabs: men, 34%; women, 25.5%).

A breakdown of responses in the Jewish sample by religiosity yielded an interesting, and somewhat puzzling, result: Haredim, who do not serve in the IDF and whose access to the Shin Bet and Mossad is therefore limited, responded to only a slightly lesser extent than the other groups that they know quite a lot or a lot about the roles and activities of both these agencies. The national religious group has the largest share of respondents who expressed familiarity with the workings of these two agencies.

Table 4.18 **Know quite a lot or a lot about the roles and activities of the Shin Bet and the Mossad** (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)

	Know quite a lot or a lot about the roles and activities of the Shin Bet	Know quite a lot or a lot about the roles and activities of the Mossad
Haredim	31	32.5
National religious	46	41

	Know quite a lot or a lot about the roles and activities of the Shin Bet	Know quite a lot or a lot about the roles and activities of the Mossad
Traditional religious	42	37
Traditional non-religious	40	40
Secular	38	34

The Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency)

Trust in the Shin Bet


Question 26 Appendix 1, p. 224 | Appendix 2, p. 252

We began measuring the extent of trust in the Shin Bet only in 2022, on the assumption that the level of public trust is less relevant in the case of a secret organization of this type. However, given the political debate about the agency, we have revisited this question periodically. It should be borne in mind that less than 40% of respondents (Jews, 39%; Arabs, 32%) attest that they know quite a lot or a lot about the roles and activities of this body, suggesting that the responses regarding trust represent, at best, merely impressions.

Our principal finding here is the consistency over time in both the Jewish and Arab publics on this subject; however, the level of trust expressed is markedly greater among Jews than among Arabs (figure 4.28). An additional finding of interest is that, between 2022 and December 2023, we recorded a decline in trust in the Shin Bet in the Jewish sample, apparently as a result of the events of October 7. Subsequent months saw a slight recovery, but the share of respondents expressing trust in the Shin Bet has not returned to 2022 levels. We did not find a corresponding pattern in the Arab sample, and in fact there was even a slight upturn between 2022 and 2023.

A breakdown of responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation shows that a majority in all three camps express trust in the Shin Bet, though by a smaller measure on the Right than in the Center or on the Left (Right, 62%; Center, 73%; Left, 71%).

Figure 4.28 **Trust the Shin Bet, 2022–2024** (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



An analysis of the Arab sample by religion reveals that only a minority in all religious groups trust the Shin Bet, though this minority is much larger among Druze respondents than among Christians and Muslims (47%, 36%, and 23%, respectively).


We did not find a noticeable difference in the level of trust in the Shin Bet between those who profess greater awareness of its roles and activities (67% of whom say they trust the Shin Bet) and those who say they are less aware of what it does (65%).

Is the Shin Bet politically neutral?

Question 77 Appendix 1, p. 235


The total sample is split on this question, with results slightly favoring the perception of the Shin Bet as a nonpartisan body (46% versus 42%). In addition, whereas one-half of the Jewish sample think that the Shin Bet does not have a political agenda, a majority of Arab respondents take the opposite view, namely, that the Shin Bet is not neutral.

Figure 4.29 **Extent of political neutrality of the Shin Bet (Jewish and Arab samples; %)**



Breaking down the responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation, we found a majority on the Left and in the Center who consider the agency to be nonpartisan, while less than half of respondents on the Right share this view.

Figure 4.30 **Extent of political neutrality of the Shin Bet (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)**



The lowest share of respondents who hold that the Shin Bet is politically neutral was found among Haredim, and the highest, among secular Jews.

Table 4.19 **Think that the Shin Bet is politically neutral** (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)

Haredim	National religious	Traditional religious	Traditional non-religious	Secular
39	45	45	52	55

Breaking down the responses on trust in the Shin Bet by perception of its political neutrality, we found that, of those respondents who consider it to be nonpartisan, 82% express trust in it, as opposed to just 46% of those who view it as politically biased.

The Mossad

Trust in the Mossad

Question 27 Appendix 1, p. 224

As part of our deeper exploration this year of the issue of the security forces and security in general, we also investigated the public's perception of the Mossad. As noted, the present survey is the first to include this institution in our ranking of levels of trust. Accordingly, the data analysis regarding this organization is still strictly preliminary. Here too, it is worth repeating what was stated above, namely, that only about one-third of respondents (Jews, 36.5%; Arabs, 30%) attest that they know a lot or quite a lot about the Mossad's roles and activities.

As stated in chapter 2, 63% of the total sample responded that they trust the Mossad. In this case as well, we encountered a sizeable gap between Jews and Arabs (figure 4.31): Whereas a solid majority of Jews express faith in the Mossad, only a small minority of Arabs share this view.

As shown in figure 4.32, in all three Jewish political camps, a majority express trust in the Mossad; at the same time, this majority is larger among Left and Center respondents than among those on the Right.

Figure 4.31 Trust the Mossad (Jewish and Arab samples; %)





Figure 4.32 Trust the Mossad (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



Breaking down the question of trust in the Mossad in the Jewish sample by level of knowledge of its functions and activities, we found that, as with the Shin Bet, there is no difference between those who claim greater familiarity with what the Mossad does, and those who do not, with 70% expressing trust in this body in both cases.

Is the Mossad politically neutral?

Question 78 Appendix 1, p. 235

Roughly one-half (49%) of respondents in the total sample hold that the Mossad is a nonpartisan body, with slightly over one-third (37.5%) indicating that it is not politically neutral, and the remainder (13.5%) choosing the option of “don’t know.”

In this instance as well, there is a vast difference between Jews and Arabs. Among Jewish respondents, a majority (albeit not a large one, at 54%), view the Mossad as politically neutral, compared with just 28% of Arabs.

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation shows that, here too, a majority on the Left and in the Center believe that the Mossad is a neutral body, whereas on the Right, only about one-half take this stance (65%, 59%, and 49%, respectively).

As with the other security forces, we found a very sizeable difference in Jewish respondents' level of trust in the Mossad between those who think that it has a political agenda and those who consider it neutral. Of those in the former group, just 52% express trust in the institution, as contrasted with 85.5% of those who see it as nonpartisan.

The following table summarizes the distribution of respondents who think that the four security institutions surveyed are politically neutral. Currently, the police rank lowest in this regard, in particular among Jews (among Arabs, the results are similar to the other security forces). It is noteworthy that, on the Right, there is not a single security body perceived as political neutral by even 50% of those surveyed (with only about one-third rating the police as nonpartisan).

Table 4.20 Think that each of these security forces is politically neutral
(Jewish and Arab samples; %)

	Nationality		Political orientation (Jewish respondents)		
	Arabs	Jews	Left	Center	Right
IDF	30	55	70	65	48
Police	28	29.5	12	27	34
Shin Bet	29	50	60	57.5	44.5
Mossad	28	54	65	59	49

Should the security forces be granted full powers to conduct investigations as they see fit?


Question 52 Appendix 1, p. 230 | Appendix 2, p. 255

We revisited a past question this year, though in slightly different form, asking respondents to what extent they agree or disagree with the following

statement: “If the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency), the police, or the IDF suspect someone of involvement in terrorist activity, they should be granted full powers to conduct their investigation as they see fit.” The intent of this question is to gauge to what degree the public is willing to grant the security forces a free hand in efforts to prevent terrorist attacks. Unlike the two previous measurements, here we removed the final section: “without any legal constraints.” The omission was in response to criticism that the original wording was too extreme—an argument that may be corroborated by the present survey data, which are substantially different from earlier survey results.²⁰

As stated, there is a noticeable difference in the distribution of responses, with the share who currently agree with the statement much larger than in the past; however, we have no way of knowing whether the shift is due to the change in wording or the difference in circumstances. In 2010, 53% of Jews and 38% of Arabs responded in the affirmative, and in 2016, 51% of Jews and 24% of Arabs, whereas this year, 80% of Jews and 62.5% of Arabs agreed with the abridged—and obviously more moderate—version. In other words, the size of the majority among Jewish respondents who agreed with this statement climbed steeply this year, while the minority among Arabs became a majority.

Figure 4.33 If the Shin Bet, the police, or the army suspect someone of involvement in terrorist activity, they should be granted full powers to conduct their investigation as they see fit (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



²⁰ The data from previous surveys can be found in appendix 2.

A breakdown of responses to this question in the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals a majority in all three camps who agree with the statement; however, this majority is much larger among interviewees from the Center and Right than among those on the Left, a majority of whom did not express agreement with the previous version of the question.

Table 4.21 Agree that if the Shin Bet, the police, or the army suspect someone of involvement in terrorist activity, they should be granted full powers to conduct their investigation as they see fit (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)

Left	Center	Right
58.5	83	83.5

Monitoring citizens' online activity

Question 53 Appendix 1, p. 230 | Appendix 2, p. 255


We continued to examine how much freedom of action the public is willing to grant the state, or more precisely, the security forces, asking respondents to what extent they agree or disagree with the following statement: "For security reasons, it is permissible for the state to monitor what citizens post online." Here too, a majority of Jewish respondents (similar in size to that in past years) are willing to permit the monitoring of online activity to serve the security needs of the state (figure 4.34). The Arab public is split on this question, though a greater share than might have been expected favor granting such powers.

A breakdown of responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals a minority on the Left, a small majority in the Center, and a sizeable majority on the Right who agree with state monitoring of online postings.

Table 4.22 Agree that, for security reasons, it is permissible for the state to monitor what citizens post online (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)

Left	Center	Right
44	58	68

Figure 4.34 **Agree that, for security reasons, it is permissible for the state to monitor what citizens post online, 2014–2024** (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



In an effort to understand whether those respondents who expressed agreement with granting a free hand in investigations also agree with online monitoring, we cross-tabulated the responses to both these questions in the total sample, finding a consistent pattern: A large majority of those who agree to grant full powers to the security forces to conduct investigations as they see fit also agree with the monitoring of online posts; conversely, of those who do not agree that the security forces should be given a free hand in their investigations, a large majority also disagree with online monitoring.

Table 4.23 **Agree that, for security reasons, it is permissible for the state to monitor what citizens post online** (total sample, by responses on freedom of action in investigations; %)

	Agree with online monitoring	Disagree with online monitoring	Don't know	Total
Agree with granting full powers to security forces to conduct investigations as they see fit	69	28	3	100
Disagree with granting full powers to security forces to conduct investigations as they see fit	29	69	2	100

International Indicators

Preoccupation with the state of democracy, and the transformations it is undergoing, is not unique to Israel. Throughout the world, quality of government is a major issue, commanding the attention of decision-makers, academia, the media, and the general public alike. Accordingly, along with the opinions of the Israeli public, we present in this chapter a set of international indicators pertaining to Israel's democratic performance, published by research institutes from around the world. These assessments, compiled on the basis of professional surveys, public opinion polls, and official statistics, enable us to examine the present state of Israeli democracy in comparison with the past, with other countries around the globe, and with fellow OECD members.

The reader should bear in mind that the findings presented in these international indicators are from the previous year; thus, the indicators published this year (2024) relate to the global state of democracy in 2023.

As in previous years, we review 15 indicators in six areas:

1. Democratic rights and freedoms (political rights, civil liberties, freedom of the press)
2. The democratic process (voice and accountability, political participation, egalitarian democracy, participatory democracy, deliberative democracy, democratic political culture)
3. Governance (functioning of government, rule of law)
4. Corruption (control of corruption, perception of corruption)
5. Regulation (regulatory quality)
6. Economic equality (equal distribution of resources)

For each of the 15 indicators, we present five ratings: (1) Israel's **score** for 2023; (2) Israel's **score** this year compared with past years; (3) Israel's **global ranking** in relation to the other countries included in each indicator; (4) Israel's **ranking** among the 38 member states of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); and (5) **changes in Israel's ranking** relative to all countries surveyed, in 2023 as compared with 2022.

The distinction between **scores** and **ranking** is important: The score is compiled for a given country in a given year, whereas the ranking relates to the country's standing relative to the other countries surveyed. This means that a country's score can remain unchanged year after year, but if other countries improve or decline in their democratic performance, then that country's ranking will change. And conversely, a score can change, but if the scores of all the other countries in that indicator change in the same direction, then its ranking may remain the same. The score is presented as an absolute number between 0 and 100, whereas the ranking is given in two forms: an absolute number and a percentile.

A note on methodology: Each of the research institutes that compile the indicators uses its own scale to present its scores, in some cases 0–10, in others 0–40, 0–60, 0–1, and so on. To make it easier to compare Israel's scores across the various indicators, we have standardized the scores on a uniform scale from 0 to 100. The higher the score, the better the quality of democracy in a given country. The table below presents Israel's scores and its ranking in the various indicators.

Table 5.1 **Israel's ranking in international indicators, 2023**


		Global ranking*	Percentile— all countries surveyed	OECD ranking (out of 38 countries)	Percentile— OECD countries	Israel's standardized score (0–100)
Democratic rights and freedoms	Political rights (Freedom House)	57–62/210	70–73	31	18	85.0
	Civil liberties (Freedom House)	85–86/210	59–60	35	8	66.7
	Freedom of the press (Reporters Without Borders)	101/180	44	35	8	53.2



		Global ranking*	Percentile— all countries surveyed	OECD ranking (out of 38 countries)	Percentile— OECD countries	Israel's standardized score (0–100)
Democratic process	Voice and accountability (World Bank)	64/205	69	33	13	62.8
	Political participation (Economist Intelligence Unit)	3/167	98	3	92	94.4
	Egalitarian democracy (V-Dem)	51/179	72	32	16	76.2
	Participatory democracy (V-Dem)	49–50/179	72–73	32	16	60.3
	Deliberative democracy (V-Dem)	64–65/179	64	32	16	75.9
	Democratic political culture (Economist Intelligence Unit)	24–42/167	75–86	19–28	50–26	68.8
Governance	Functioning of government (Economist Intelligence Unit)	25–30/167	82–85	20–24	47–37	75.0
	Rule of law (World Bank)	49/213	77	28	26	65.6
Corruption	Control of corruption (World Bank)	46/213	78	23	39	66.6
	Perception of corruption (Transparency International)	33/180	82	23	39	62.0
Regulation	Regulatory quality (World Bank)	34/213	84	25	34	72.4
Economic equality	Equal distribution of resources (V-Dem)	61/179	66	32	16	79.0


* The number following the slash denotes the number of countries included in that indicator.

Figure 5.1 Israel's percentile in the international indicators, 2023



Israeli democracy earned its highest scores in 2023 in the political participation indicator (compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit), and the political rights indicator (produced by Freedom House). Its lowest scores this year were in freedom of the press (Reporters Without Borders), and participatory democracy (V-Dem).

Figure 5.2 Israel's scores in the international indicators, 2023



Democratic Rights and Freedoms

Freedom in the World is a report compiled annually by Freedom House based on expert assessments. It comprises two sets of indicators that reflect countries' performance in the areas of political rights and civil liberties, respectively.

Political rights

Institution: Freedom House


Israel's score: 85

No. of countries included in indicator: 210

Israel's ranking among all countries surveyed: 57–62 (70th–73rd percentile)

Israel's ranking among OECD members: 31 (18th percentile)

Figure 5.3 Distribution of scores in political rights indicator, 2023




The political rights indicator examines the extent to which a given country meets the following criteria: free and fair elections; unhindered competition between political parties; actual power of elected representatives; and a strong and influential opposition. In addition, it assesses the level of corruption; the safeguarding of minority rights; whether the country is subject to military rule; and whether there is foreign intervention in its affairs.

Israel's score in the political rights indicator has remained stable since 2021 (at 85), ranking it this year at 57–62 (70th–73rd percentile) among all countries surveyed. Among OECD countries, it ranks near the bottom of the list, in 31st

place (18th percentile), above seven other member states: Poland, South Korea, the United States, Colombia, Mexico, Hungary, and Turkey.

Figure 5.4 Israel's score in political rights indicator, 2003–2023



Civil liberties

Institution: Freedom House


Israel's score: 66.7

No. of countries included in indicator: 210

Israel's ranking among all countries surveyed: 85–86 (59th–60th percentile)

Israel's ranking among OECD members: 35 (8th percentile)


Figure 5.5 Distribution of scores in civil liberties indicator, 2023



The **civil liberties indicator** reflects the extent to which a country upholds such democratic rights as freedom of expression, the press, movement, religion, and association, along with academic freedom and marital and family rights. Also assessed in this indicator are independence of the judicial system; personal security; equality before the law; absence of political violence; property rights; and gender equality.

Israel's score in the civil liberties indicator for 2023 is 66.7, marking a slight downturn from 2022 and representing its lowest grade since 2003. Of the countries included in this indicator, Israel ranks 85–86 (59th–60th percentile). Its score is noticeably lower than that of the other OECD states, placing it 35th out of 38 (8th percentile), ahead of only Colombia, Mexico, and Turkey.

Figure 5.6 Israel's score in civil liberties indicator, 2003–2023



Freedom of the press

Institution: Reporters Without Borders


Israel's score: 53.2

No. of countries included in indicator: 180

Israel's ranking among all countries surveyed: 101 (44th percentile)

Israel's ranking among OECD members: 35 (8th percentile)


Figure 5.7 Distribution of scores in freedom of the press indicator, 2023



The *World Press Freedom Index*, published by Reporters Without Borders, assesses reporters' freedom of activity in 180 countries around the globe. It is calculated based on an analysis of objective quantitative data—for example, the number of journalists injured over the past year—combined with the opinions of media experts in such areas as media independence, representation of different opinions, censorship, and transparency.

Israel's score in this indicator for 2023 is 53.2. This represents its lowest grade since 2003, continuing a downward trend that began in 2020. In comparison with the other countries surveyed, we are seeing a drop in Israel's ranking (from 86th in 2021 to 97th in 2022, and 101st in 2023). Relative to the other OECD states, its position is extremely low (35), topping only Colombia, Mexico, and Turkey.

Figure 5.8 Israel's score in freedom of the press indicator, 2003–2023



Democratic Process

Voice and accountability

Institution: World Bank


Israel's score: 62.8

No. of countries included in indicator: 205

Israel's ranking among all countries surveyed: 64 (69th percentile)

Israel's ranking among OECD members: 33 (13th percentile)


Figure 5.9 Distribution of scores in voice and accountability indicator, 2023



The **voice and accountability indicator** of the World Bank is based on expert assessments, public opinion polls, and official statistics. It examines the extent to which citizens are able to influence the composition and policies of the government, as well as levels of freedom of expression, association, and the press.

Israel's rating in this indicator has changed little over the years. Its score this year is 62.8 (compared with 63.6 in 2022), positioning it in 64th place compared with the other countries surveyed. Among OECD states, it remains in 33rd place, above only Poland, Hungary, Colombia, Mexico, and Turkey.

Figure 5.10 Israel's score in voice and accountability indicator, 2003–2023



Political participation

Institution: Economist Intelligence Unit


Israel's score: 94.4

No. of countries included in indicator: 167

Israel's ranking among all countries surveyed: 3 (98th percentile)

Israel's ranking among OECD members: 3 (92nd percentile)


Figure 5.11 Distribution of scores in political participation indicator, 2023



The **political participation indicator** of the Economist Intelligence Unit is based on a combination of expert assessments, public opinion polls, and official statistics that measure the following parameters: voter turnout; minorities' voting rights and right of association; the proportion of women in parliament; party membership rates; citizens' level of interest in current affairs in general and the political system in particular; political engagement; readiness to participate in legal demonstrations; and government encouragement of political participation.

Israel's score this year in political participation is identical with last year's (94.4), but lower than in 2021, when it received the maximum possible score of 100. This positions Israel in third place relative to all countries surveyed and to the OECD member states, slightly behind Norway and New Zealand.

Figure 5.12 Israel's score in political participation indicator, 2006–2023



Egalitarian democracy

Institution: V-Dem Institute


Israel's score: 76.2

No. of countries included in indicator: 179

Israel's ranking among all countries surveyed: 51 (72nd percentile)

Israel's ranking among OECD members: 32 (16th percentile)


Figure 5.13 Distribution of scores in egalitarian democracy indicator, 2023



The **Egalitarian Component Index**, one of several democracy indicators compiled by the V-Dem (Varieties of Democracy) Institute, is based on a worldwide survey of experts. Its underlying principle is the belief that equal distribution of resources between groups contributes to political equality, and hence to the quality of democracy in a given country. Thus, the indicator examines to what extent all groups in a given society have an equal chance to play a role in the political sphere, run for office, express their opinions, and influence decision-making.

Israel scored 76.2 in 2023—its lowest rating in this indicator since 2003. It registered a noticeable drop in the global ranking, from 40th place in 2022 to 51st place this year (that is, from the 78th to 72nd percentile); however, it showed a smaller decline relative to the OECD countries, from 30th place in 2022 to 32nd place this year (21st to 16th percentile), positioning it ahead of Chile, the United States, Hungary, Turkey, Colombia, and Mexico.

Figure 5.14 Israel's score in egalitarian democracy indicator, 2003–2023



Participatory democracy

Institution: V-Dem Institute


Israel's score: 60.3

No. of countries included in indicator: 179

Israel's ranking among all countries surveyed: 49–50 (72nd–73rd percentile)

Israel's ranking among OECD members: 32 (16th percentile)


Figure 5.15 **Distribution of scores in participatory democracy indicator, 2023**



The V-Dem Institute's **Participatory Component Index** (PCI) is based on the premise that in a substantive democracy, citizens' political involvement should not be confined to voting in elections every few years but must also include active, ongoing participation in the political process. Thus, the PCI measures citizens' participation in civil society organizations as well as in regional and local government.

This year, as in 2021, Israel earned its highest grades since 2003 (60.6 in 2021, and 60.3 in 2023). Though its score remains virtually unchanged since last year, it climbed slightly in the global ranking (from 52nd place to 49–50). By contrast, its position relative to the other OECD states has held steady, in 32nd place.

Figure 5.16 Israel's score in participatory democracy indicator, 2003–2023



Deliberative democracy

Institution: V-Dem Institute


Israel's score: 75.9

No. of countries included in indicator: 179

Israel's ranking among all countries surveyed: 64–65 (64th percentile)

Israel's ranking among OECD members: 32 (16th percentile)

Figure 5.17 Distribution of scores in deliberative democracy indicator, 2023




The **Deliberative Component Index (DCI)** of the V-Dem Institute centers on the political decision-making process. A deliberative democracy is one in which political decisions are made in a public process focused on the common

good, as opposed to being shaped by partisan or narrow political interests, or imposed from the top down. Democratic deliberation is measured by the extent to which political elites share with the public the reasoning behind their positions on key issues under discussion, acknowledge opposing views, and are open to respectful dialogue with those who disagree with them.

Israel's score this year in the DCI is 75.9, marking a steep drop from 89.2 last year, and its lowest grade since 2003. Similarly, it experienced a dramatic decline in ranking among all countries surveyed in this indicator, from 25th place to 64–65 (86th to 64th percentile). Among OECD states, Israel dropped from 18th to 32nd place (53rd to 16th percentile), ahead of countries with lower democratic standing such as Poland, Colombia, Slovakia, Mexico, Hungary, and Turkey.

Figure 5.18 Israel's score in deliberative democracy indicator, 2003–2023



Democratic political culture

Institution: Economist Intelligence Unit


Israel's score: 68.8

No. of countries included in indicator: 167

Israel's ranking among all countries surveyed: 24–42 (75th–86th percentile)

Israel's ranking among OECD members: 19–28 (26th–50th percentile)


Figure 5.19 **Distribution of scores in democratic political culture indicator, 2023**



The **democratic political culture indicator**, compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit, is based on expert assessments and public opinion polls. It considers the following parameters: citizens' support for a democratic regime, and their opposition to rule by a "strong leader," a military regime, or technocratic leadership; the perception (or lack thereof) that democracy is beneficial to public order and economic prosperity; and the separation of church and state.

Israel's score for 2023 is 68.8, a grade that has held steady since 2021. Among the other countries surveyed as well as its fellow OECD members, Israel's ranking this year has remained relatively consistent.

Figure 5.20 **Israel's score in democratic political culture indicator, 2006–2023**



Governance

Functioning of government

Institution: Economist Intelligence Unit


Israel's score: 75

No. of countries included in indicator: 167

Israel's ranking among all countries surveyed: 25–30 (82nd–85th percentile)

Israel's ranking among OECD members: 20–24 (37th–47th percentile)


Figure 5.21 **Distribution of scores in functioning of government indicator, 2023**



The Economist Intelligence Unit's **functioning of government indicator** is based on expert assessments, public opinion polls, and official statistics that reflect the level of democratic performance and the effectiveness of government institutions in numerous areas. These include the government's ability to set policy, free of pressure from vested interests; separation of powers, based on a system of checks and balances; parliamentary oversight of government; involvement of the military or other extrapolitical entities in politics; the degree of government transparency and accountability; the extent of government corruption; and the level of public trust in state institutions.

Israel's score in this indicator this year is 75, marking a slight decline from last year and a return to its ratings of 2020 and 2021. Compared with last year, this lowers Israel's global ranking among all countries surveyed from 20–26 to 25–30. Among OECD states, Israel has dropped from the 18–20 slot to 20–24, on par with Costa Rica, Austria, the United Kingdom, and Spain.

Figure 5.22 Israel's score in functioning of government indicator, 2006–2023



Rule of law

Institution: World Bank


Israel's score: 65.6

No. of countries included in indicator: 213

Israel's ranking among all countries surveyed: 49 (77th percentile)

Israel's ranking among OECD members: 28 (26th percentile)


Figure 5.23 Distribution of scores in rule of law indicator, 2023



The World Bank's **rule of law indicator**, based on a combination of expert assessments, public opinion polls, and statistical data, measures the extent to which citizens and government bodies have confidence in, and abide by, the country's laws. In addition, it examines the areas of contract enforcement, property rights, functioning of the police force and the legal system, and prevention of crime and violence.

Israel's score in 2023 was 65.6, which was reflected in a drop from 42nd place in the global ranking in 2022 to 49th place this year (80th to 77th percentile), along with a decline from 26th to 28th place (32nd to 26th percentile) among OECD states.

Figure 5.24 Israel's score in rule of law indicator, 2003–2023



Corruption

Control of corruption

Institution: World Bank


Israel's score: 66.6

No. of countries included in indicator: 213

Israel's ranking among all countries surveyed: 46 (78th percentile)

Israel's ranking among OECD members: 23 (39th percentile)


Figure 5.25 Distribution of scores in control of corruption indicator, 2023



The **control of corruption indicator**, issued annually by the World Bank, examines a wide range of variables, from the incidence of corruption at the local and regional level to the influence of elites and private interests on the conduct of the state and its leaders. The data, which are drawn from various sources (research institutes, NGOs, international organizations, and private companies), are combined with the opinions of experts in assorted fields and a survey of the general public. It should be noted that in this indicator specifically, the higher the score, the lesser the extent of corruption.

Israel's score for 2023 is 66.6, slightly higher than in 2022 and consistent with 2021. Israel retains last year's global ranking of 46, while dipping slightly in the OECD ranking, from 22nd to 23rd place.

Figure 5.26 Israel's score in control of corruption indicator, 2003–2023



Perception of corruption

Institution: Transparency International


Israel's score: 62

No. of countries included in indicator: 180

Israel's ranking among all countries surveyed: 33 (82nd percentile)

Israel's ranking among OECD members: 23 (39th percentile)


Figure 5.27 **Distribution of scores in perception of corruption indicator, 2023**



The **Corruption Perceptions Index**, produced by Transparency International, is based on an analysis of indicators published by 12 independent research institutes around the world. It presents expert assessments of the extent of corruption in the public sector, with an emphasis on abuse of power for personal gain; bribery; mechanisms to expose corruption and prosecute those suspected of corruption; protection of whistleblowers; and nepotism in the civil service, among other areas.

Israel's score for 2023 in perception of corruption is 62, similar to last year's grade. Its global ranking is 33 (82nd percentile), and among OECD states, it places 23rd (39th percentile), positioning it below South Korea and above Lithuania and Portugal (whose rankings were tied).

Figure 5.28 Israel's score in perception of corruption indicator, 2003–2023



Regulation

Regulatory quality

Institution: World Bank


Israel's score: 72.4

No. of countries included in indicator: 213

Israel's ranking among all countries surveyed: 34 (84th percentile)

Israel's ranking among OECD members: 25 (34th percentile)


Figure 5.29 Distribution of scores in regulatory quality indicator, 2023



The **regulatory quality indicator**, compiled by the World Bank, assesses the extent to which the government formulates regulations and implements policies that promote private-sector development. It examines various aspects of regulation, such as price controls, discriminatory taxation, efficiency of tax collection, ease of doing business, and competitiveness of the local market.

Israel's score this year in regulatory quality is 72.4, marking a slight decline from last year's grade of 74.2. In the global ranking, Israel fell from 30th place in 2022 to 34th in 2023. Among OECD states as well, it dropped from the 22nd slot last year to 25th this year.

Figure 5.30 Israel's score in regulatory quality indicator, 2003–2023



Economic Equality

Equal distribution of resources

Institution: V-Dem Institute


Israel's score: 79

No. of countries included in indicator: 179

Israel's ranking among all countries surveyed: 61 (66th percentile)


Israel's ranking among OECD members: 32 (16th percentile)

Figure 5.31 **Distribution of scores in equal distribution of resources indicator, 2023**



The **equal distribution of resources** index is an additional democracy indicator produced by the V-Dem Institute. It examines the extent to which basic resources necessary to exercise democratic rights and freedoms are made available to citizens. This indicator includes, among other factors, levels of poverty and economic disparities; equality of access to food, education, and healthcare; distribution of social/political power between different groups; and the correspondence between these power differentials and economic gaps. Israel's score in 2023 in the equal distribution of resources index is 79, marking a downturn from last year and its lowest grade since 2003. This trend is also reflected in a drop in Israel's ranking relative to the other countries surveyed, from 47 to 61 (74th to 66th percentile). Likewise, its ranking among OECD states dipped from 28 to 32 (26th to 16th percentile), placing it above Hungary, Chile, the United States, Turkey, Colombia, and Mexico.

Figure 5.32 **Israel's score in equal distribution of resources indicator, 2003–2023**



Overview of International Indicators

Overall, assessments of the quality of Israeli democracy in 2023 dropped somewhat in eight of the 15 indicators when compared with last year, while the remaining seven remained largely stable or with very slight changes (table 5.2).

Three of the four V-Dem indicators (with the exception of participatory democracy) showed marked declines from last year, in particular deliberative democracy, in which Israel's score plummeted. In a similar vein, for the first time in more than 50 years, Israel dropped from the status of "liberal democracy" to that of "electoral democracy" according to V-Dem's categorization. While Israel is viewed as a country with free, democratic, and competitive elections, it is not necessarily seen as upholding such principles as checks and balances, restriction of government power, and safeguarding of human and civil rights.

If we compare Israel's scores this year in each of the 15 indicators with the multi-year average score up to and including 2022 (table 5.3), the following picture emerges: In two indicators, Israel scored higher in 2023 than the multi-year average; in nine of the indicators (primarily those concerned with democratic rights and freedoms), it scored lower; and in the remaining four indicators, its scores remained similar to the multi-year average.

Table 5.2 Israel's global ranking in 2023 indicators compared with 2022¹⁸

	Indicator	2023 score	2023 ranking*	2023 percentile	2022 score	2022 ranking*	2022 percentile	Change in score
Democratic rights and freedoms	Political rights (Freedom House)	85.0	57–62/ 210	70–73	85.0	58–64/ 210	70–72	=
	Civil liberties (Freedom House)	66.7	85–86/ 210	59–60	71.7	78–80/ 210	62–63	↓
	Freedom of the press (Reporters Without Borders)	53.2	101/180	44	57.6	97/180	46	↓
Democratic process	Voice and accountability (World Bank) ²²	62.8	64/205	69	63.6	67/208	68	=
	Political participation (Economist Intelligence Unit)	94.4	3/167	98	94.4	3/167	98	=
	Egalitarian democracy (V-Dem)	76.2	51/179	72	80.4	40/179	78	↓
	Participatory democracy (V-Dem)	60.3	49–50/ 179	72–73	59.8	52/179	71	=
	Deliberative democracy (V-Dem)	75.9	64–65/ 179	64	89.2	25/179	86	↓
	Democratic political culture (Economist Intelligence Unit)	68.8	24–42/ 167	75–86	68.8	26–41/ 167	75–84	=

21 In certain instances, earlier data in some of the indicators undergo revisions; for example, if new information is received after the fact. Accordingly, there may be differences in the previous year's data appearing in a table from a given year, compared with the data presented in the earlier report.

22 In this year's voice and accountability indicator, there was only a negligible decline from last year's score; hence it was not presented as a change in score in the relevant column. While there was an apparent drop in ranking, this may be due to the fact that 205 countries were examined in this indicator in 2023, as opposed to 208 last year.

	Indicator	2023 score	2023 ranking*	2023 percentile	2022 score	2022 ranking*	2022 percentile	Change in score
Governance	Functioning of government (Economist Intelligence Unit)	75.0	25–30/167	82–85	78.6	20–26/167	84–88	↓
	Rule of law (World Bank)	65.6	49/213	77	68.8	42/213	80	↓
Corruption	Control of corruption (World Bank)	66.6	46/213	78	65.6	46/213	78	=
	Perception of corruption (Transparency International)	62.0	33/180	82	63.0	31–32/180	82–83	=
Regulation	Regulatory quality (World Bank)	72.4	34/213	84	74.2	30/213	86	↓
Economic equality	Equal distribution of resources (V-Dem)	79.0	61/179	66	83.5	47/179	74	↓

* The number following the slash denotes the number of countries included in that indicator.

↑ improvement compared with 2022

= no substantial change compared with 2022

↓ decline compared with 2022

Table 5.3 **Israel's scores in the 2023 indicators compared with the multi-year average (up to and including 2022)**

	Indicator	2023 score	Multi-year average score (up to and including 2022)*	Change (in %)
Democratic rights and freedoms	Political rights (Freedom House)	85.0	89.6	↓ -5.1
	Civil liberties (Freedom House)	66.7	74.2	↓ -10.1
	Freedom of the press (Reporters Without Borders)	53.2	73.9	↓ -28.0
Democratic process	Voice and accountability (World Bank)	62.8	63.5	↓ -1.1
	Political participation (Economist Intelligence Unit)	94.4	87.8	↑ +7.5
	Egalitarian democracy (V-Dem)	76.2	81.5	↓ -6.5
	Participatory democracy (V-Dem)	60.3	58.5	↑ +3.1
	Deliberative democracy (V-Dem)	75.9	81.0	↓ -6.3
	Democratic political culture (Economist Intelligence Unit)	68.8	74.2	↓ -7.3
Governance	Functioning of government (Economist Intelligence Unit)	75.0	74.4	= +0.8
	Rule of law (World Bank)	65.6	68.8	↓ -4.7
Corruption	Control of corruption (World Bank)	66.6	67.1	= -0.75
	Perception of corruption (Transparency International)	62.0	61.4	= +1.0
Regulation	Regulatory quality (World Bank)	72.4	73.0	= -0.8
Economic equality	Equal distribution of resources (V-Dem)	79.0	85.6	↓ -7.7

* The multi-year average does not include the latest measurement.

↑ improvement in Israel's score compared with the multi-year average (up to and including 2022)

= no substantial change (above 1%) in Israel's score compared with the multi-year average (up to and including 2022)

↓ decline in Israel's score compared with the multi-year average (up to and including 2022)

Appendices

Appendix 1

Questionnaire and Distribution of Responses

(total sample, Jewish sample, Arab sample; %)

1. How would you characterize Israel's overall situation today?

[Discussion on p. 25](#)

	Very good	Good	So-so	Bad	Very bad	Don't know	Total
Jews	2.8	8.3	29.7	29.7	29.0	0.5	100
Arabs	4.8	9.9	18.4	22.1	44.8	0.0	100
Total sample	3.2	8.6	27.8	28.4	31.7	0.3	100

2. On a scale from 1 = very low to 5 = very high, how would you rate your sense of personal security today?

[Discussion on p. 144](#)

	1 – Very low	2	3	4	5 – Very high	Don't know	Total
Jews	15.3	25.7	31.7	19.0	7.1	1.2	100
Arabs	49.7	13.7	22.6	6.3	7.7	0.0	100
Total sample	21.1	23.7	30.2	16.8	7.2	1.0	100

How worried are you at present about each of the following issues in terms of your physical security:

3. Crime/criminal violence

[Discussion on p. 148](#)

	Very worried	Quite worried	Not so worried	Not at all worried	Don't know	Total
Jews	27.4	37.3	25.8	8.8	0.7	100
Arabs	72.5	20.9	2.9	3.7	0.0	100
Total sample	35.1	34.5	21.9	8.0	0.5	100

4. Terrorism

[Discussion on p. 148](#)

	Very worried	Quite worried	Not so worried	Not at all worried	Don't know	Total
Jews	50.8	35.3	9.6	3.9	0.4	100
Arabs	56.3	27.2	8.0	7.4	1.1	100
Total sample	51.7	34.0	9.3	4.5	0.5	100

5. Military attack on Israel (from an enemy state or terrorist organization)

[Discussion on p. 148](#)

	Very worried	Quite worried	Not so worried	Not at all worried	Don't know	Total
Jews	41.0	39.3	13.7	5.1	0.9	100
Arabs	44.9	29.4	13.2	11.0	1.5	100
Total sample	41.6	37.6	13.6	6.1	1.1	100

6. Full-scale multi-front war

[Discussion on p. 148](#)

	Very worried	Quite worried	Not so worried	Not at all worried	Don't know	Total
Jews	44.3	37.4	13.3	4.7	0.3	100
Arabs	52.5	26.9	10.7	9.2	0.7	100
Total sample	45.6	35.6	12.9	5.5	0.4	100

7. The large number of weapons circulating among citizens

[Discussion on p. 148](#)

	Very worried	Quite worried	Not so worried	Not at all worried	Don't know	Total
Jews	20.4	24.1	29.3	25.0	1.2	100
Arabs	72.8	19.9	4.5	2.8	0.0	100
Total sample	29.3	23.4	25.1	21.2	1.0	100

8. In light of the security situation, should local governments also deal with security matters within their physical jurisdiction, given that this will come at the expense of other areas of responsibility such as education or urban beautification?

[Discussion on p. 152](#)

	Certain they should	Think they should	Think they should not	Certain they should not	Don't know	Total
Jews	34.3	47.7	10.6	1.9	5.5	100
Arabs	66.5	15.6	5.8	11.6	0.5	100
Total sample	39.8	42.2	9.8	3.6	4.6	100

9. To what extent do you feel part of the State of Israel and its problems?

[Discussion on p. 36](#)

	Very much	Quite a lot	Not so much	Not at all	Don't know	Total
Jews	52.1	33.9	9.8	2.6	1.6	100
Arabs	30.8	35.1	21.2	11.6	1.3	100
Total sample	48.5	34.1	11.7	4.1	1.6	100

10. How would you rate the level of solidarity (sense of “togetherness”) of Israeli society as a whole (Jews, Arabs, and all other citizens), where 1 = no solidarity at all and 10 = very high level of solidarity?

[Discussion on p. 90](#)

	1 – No solidarity at all	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 – Very high level of solidarity	Don't know	Total	Mean rating (1–10)
Jews	7.3	3.8	9.5	11.1	14.1	15.2	16.9	12.6	4.3	3.6	1.6	100	5.52
Arabs	17.8	3.3	6.6	8.0	30.6	5.1	8.1	6.6	2.6	10.3	1.0	100	5.01
Total sample	9.1	3.7	9.0	10.6	16.9	13.5	15.4	11.6	4.0	4.8	1.4	100	5.43

11. Which of the following is the most acute social tension in Israel today?

[Discussion on p. 97](#)

	Between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim	Between religious and secular Jews	Between Right and Left	Between rich and poor	Between Jews and Arabs	Don't know	Total
Jews	1.3	14.8	53.2	0.9	26.2	3.6	100
Arabs	2.3	9.5	21.7	3.8	55.5	7.2	100
Total sample	1.5	13.9	47.8	1.4	31.2	4.2	100

12. Israel is defined as a Jewish and democratic state. Do you feel there is a good balance today between the Jewish and the democratic components?

[Discussion on p. 51](#)

	There is a good balance between the two components	The Jewish component is too dominant	The democratic component is too dominant	Don't know	Total
Jews	19.1	37.3	24.8	18.8	100
Arabs	17.7	72.1	5.5	4.7	100
Total sample	18.8	43.2	21.5	16.5	100

13. How worried are you that you will be unable to maintain your preferred lifestyle because of the increasing power of certain groups in Israeli society that advocate a different way of life from yours?

[Discussion on p. 104](#)

	Very worried	Quite worried	Not so worried	Not at all worried	Don't know	Total
Jews	23.2	37.0	24.0	14.4	1.4	100
Arabs	43.3	36.9	11.3	8.5	0.0	100
Total sample	26.6	37.0	21.8	13.4	1.2	100

To what extent do you trust each of the following individuals or institutions?

14. The media

[Discussion on p. 67](#)

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know	Total
Jews	40.6	31.2	21.2	5.4	1.6	100
Arabs	47.0	36.1	10.2	5.6	1.1	100
Total sample	41.7	32.1	19.4	5.4	1.4	100

15. The Supreme Court

[Discussion on p. 64](#)

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know	Total
Jews	37.3	21.4	20.7	18.2	2.4	100
Arabs	42.8	29.2	16.4	10.1	1.5	100
Total sample	38.3	22.7	20.0	16.8	2.2	100

16. The President of Israel

[Discussion on p. 62](#)

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know	Total
Jews	21.0	26.4	29.4	18.9	4.3	100
Arabs	55.3	26.5	8.4	7.0	2.8	100
Total sample	26.8	26.4	25.9	16.9	4.0	100

17. The Knesset

[Discussion on p. 73](#)

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know	Total
Jews	47.7	37.7	10.6	2.6	1.4	100
Arabs	55.0	31.0	8.4	4.1	1.5	100
Total sample	48.9	36.6	10.2	2.9	1.4	100

18. The government

[Discussion on p. 70](#)

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know	Total
Jews	54.2	25.8	12.3	6.5	1.2	100
Arabs	54.5	29.2	10.5	4.3	1.5	100
Total sample	54.2	26.4	12.0	6.2	1.2	100

19. The political parties

[Discussion on p. 74](#)

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know	Total
Jews	48.4	39.5	8.0	1.1	3.0	100
Arabs	54.3	32.5	7.4	3.8	2.0	100
Total sample	49.4	38.4	7.9	1.5	2.8	100

20. Your municipality or local authority

Discussion on p. 75

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know	Total
Jews	12.7	26.4	38.2	20.4	2.3	100
Arabs	37.2	34.5	18.1	9.9	0.3	100
Total sample	16.9	27.8	34.8	18.6	1.9	100

21. The Attorney General

Discussion on p. 77

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know	Total
Jews	41.0	20.1	16.2	16.9	5.8	100
Arabs	46.8	30.9	12.2	7.7	2.4	100
Total sample	42.0	22.0	15.5	15.3	5.2	100

22. In your opinion, what is the greatest internal existential threat facing Israel?

Discussion on p. 28

	Israel's control of the West Bank/ Judea and Samaria	Socioeconomic disparities in Israeli society	Tensions between Jews and Arabs in Israel	Differences of opinion regarding the appropriate balance between Israel as a Jewish state and a democratic state	Low public trust in state institutions	Other	Don't know	Total
Jews	6.1	7.5	19.9	29.2	25.7	7.9	3.7	100
Arabs	18.6	12.8	38.8	8.7	13.7	2.1	5.3	100
Total sample	8.3	8.4	23.1	25.7	23.6	7.0	3.9	100

23. In your opinion, what is the greatest external existential threat facing Israel?

Discussion on p. 31

	The Iranian nuclear threat	International isolation and boycotts	The Israeli-Palestinian conflict	A full-scale multi-front war	Loss of American support for Israel	Other	Don't know	Total
Jews	12.7	16.7	16.1	37.0	12.1	3.2	2.2	100
Arabs	6.4	9.4	22.6	31.6	17.4	3.1	9.5	100
Total sample	11.6	15.5	17.3	36.1	13.0	3.2	3.3	100

To what extent do you trust each of the following institutions?

24. The police

[Discussion on p. 171](#)

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know	Total
Jews	18.9	35.6	29.8	14.5	1.2	100
Arabs	42.1	35.2	13.4	8.5	0.8	100
Total sample	22.9	35.5	27.0	13.5	1.1	100

25. The IDF

[Discussion on p. 161](#)

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know	Total
Jews	7.4	14.4	31.9	45.3	1.0	100
Arabs	35.0	32.5	16.7	13.0	2.8	100
Total sample	12.1	17.5	29.3	39.8	1.3	100

26. The Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency)

[Discussion on p. 179](#)

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know	Total
Jews	11.8	19.0	30.7	34.8	3.7	100
Arabs	37.5	30.8	14.3	12.2	5.2	100
Total sample	16.1	21.0	27.9	31.0	4.0	100

27. The Mossad

[Discussion on p. 182](#)

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know	Total
Jews	8.9	16.1	27.2	43.3	4.5	100
Arabs	35.6	29.7	14.9	13.6	6.2	100
Total sample	13.5	18.4	25.1	38.2	4.8	100

On a scale from 1 = very poor to 5 = excellent, how would you rate the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in the following areas:

28. Combat readiness

[Discussion on p. 163](#)

	1 – Very poor	2	3	4	5 – Excellent	Don't know	Total	Mean rating (1–5)
Jews	0.9	2.5	10.5	31.7	52.8	1.6	100	4.35
Arabs	29.7	11.7	25.3	7.1	22.1	4.1	100	2.79
Total sample	5.8	4.0	13.0	27.5	47.6	2.1	100	4.09

29. Preventive intelligence

Discussion on p. 163

	1 – Very poor	2	3	4	5 – Excellent	Don't know	Total	Mean rating (1–5)
Jews	7.7	11.7	26.8	29.1	20.6	4.1	100	3.45
Arabs	29.0	12.8	24.8	10.4	16.6	6.4	100	2.71
Total sample	11.3	11.9	26.5	25.9	19.9	4.5	100	3.33

30. Moral conduct in combat

Discussion on p. 163

	1 – Very poor	2	3	4	5 – Excellent	Don't know	Total	Mean rating (1–5)
Jews	2.0	2.3	9.0	23.2	62.0	1.5	100	4.43
Arabs	44.3	11.1	20.8	8.7	9.5	5.6	100	2.24
Total sample	9.2	3.8	11.0	20.7	53.1	2.2	100	4.07

31. Compliance with orders and regulations

Discussion on p. 163

	1 – Very poor	2	3	4	5 – Excellent	Don't know	Total	Mean rating (1–5)
Jews	2.6	5.0	19.5	37.9	31.9	3.1	100	3.94
Arabs	32.4	11.5	25.4	10.1	15.5	5.1	100	2.63
Total sample	7.7	6.1	20.5	33.2	29.1	3.4	100	3.73

On a scale from 1 = very poor to 5 = excellent, how would you rate the police in the following areas:

32. Crime prevention

Discussion on p. 173

	1 – Very poor	2	3	4	5 – Excellent	Don't know	Total	Mean rating (1–5)
Jews	19.9	24.6	32.3	16.8	4.1	2.3	100	2.60
Arabs	60.3	14.4	14.7	5.2	4.9	0.5	100	1.79
Total sample	26.8	22.9	29.3	14.8	4.2	2.0	100	2.46

33. Handling of terrorist attacks

Discussion on p. 173

	1 – Very poor	2	3	4	5 – Excellent	Don't know	Total	Mean rating (1–5)
Jews	7.1	8.2	26.9	34.6	19.0	4.2	100	3.52
Arabs	45.8	14.3	19.4	10.0	9.2	1.3	100	2.22
Total sample	13.7	9.3	25.7	30.4	17.4	3.5	100	3.30

34. Politically nonpartisan law enforcement

[Discussion on p. 173](#)

	1 – Very poor	2	3	4	5 – Excellent	Don't know	Total	Mean rating (1–5)
Jews	25.1	20.3	27.0	15.8	6.5	5.3	100	2.56
Arabs	41.9	18.3	24.5	6.8	7.2	1.3	100	2.18
Total sample	28.0	20.0	26.6	14.2	6.6	4.6	100	2.49

35. Fair and equitable policing of all population groups

[Discussion on p. 173](#)

	1 – Very poor	2	3	4	5 – Excellent	Don't know	Total	Mean rating (1–5)
Jews	26.0	23.2	24.9	13.9	6.3	5.7	100	2.48
Arabs	44.6	17.9	23.1	6.8	6.4	1.2	100	2.11
Total sample	29.2	22.3	24.6	12.7	6.3	4.9	100	2.42

36. Freedom from political influence

[Discussion on p. 173](#)

	1 – Very poor	2	3	4	5 – Excellent	Don't know	Total	Mean rating (1–5)
Jews	26.5	19.4	25.1	15.2	6.0	7.8	100	2.51
Arabs	44.2	17.9	21.3	9.3	5.1	2.2	100	2.11
Total sample	29.5	19.1	24.5	14.2	5.8	6.9	100	2.44

37. Lack of corruption

[Discussion on p. 173](#)

	1 – Very poor	2	3	4	5 – Excellent	Don't know	Total	Mean rating (1–5)
Jews	19.9	20.4	28.2	16.6	5.2	9.7	100	2.63
Arabs	43.8	18.6	23.4	6.3	5.1	2.8	100	2.08
Total sample	24.0	20.1	27.4	14.8	5.2	8.5	100	2.53

38. Policing of demonstrations

[Discussion on p. 173](#)

	1 – Very poor	2	3	4	5 – Excellent	Don't know	Total	Mean rating (1–5)
Jews	27.1	22.2	25.0	16.8	6.6	2.3	100	2.52
Arabs	44.9	14.0	22.3	9.4	7.6	1.8	100	2.19
Total sample	30.2	20.8	24.5	15.5	6.8	2.2	100	2.47

39. To the best of your knowledge, is the overall treatment by police officers of citizens with whom they come into contact in their work:

[Discussion on p. 169](#)

	Very good	Quite good	Not so good	Not at all good	Don't know	Total
Jews	5.8	31.1	40.6	17.5	5.0	100
Arabs	5.1	36.9	28.2	28.3	1.5	100
Total sample	5.7	32.1	38.5	19.4	4.3	100

40. How reliable do you consider the statements and reports of the police?

[Discussion on p. 175](#)

	Very reliable	Quite reliable	Not so reliable	Not at all reliable	Don't know	Total
Jews	11.6	39.3	31.7	15.4	2.0	100
Arabs	6.6	29.6	26.3	34.6	2.9	100
Total sample	10.8	37.7	30.8	18.7	2.0	100

41. How reliable do you consider the statements and reports of the IDF?

[Discussion on p. 166](#)

	Very reliable	Quite reliable	Not so reliable	Not at all reliable	Don't know	Total
Jews	35.9	44.3	13.8	4.3	1.7	100
Arabs	9.3	28.2	25.1	34.1	3.3	100
Total sample	31.4	41.5	15.7	9.4	2.0	100

42. To what extent does Israel's police force provide protection and security to the citizens of Israel?

[Discussion on p. 168](#)

	Very much	Quite a lot	Not so much	Not at all	Don't know	Total
Jews	15.1	37.8	35.7	10.4	1.0	100
Arabs	7.0	22.8	34.8	33.4	2.0	100
Total sample	13.7	35.3	35.5	14.3	1.2	100

43. To what extent does the IDF provide protection and security to the citizens of Israel?

[Discussion on p. 159](#)

	Very much	Quite a lot	Not so much	Not at all	Don't know	Total
Jews	45.9	41.1	10.5	1.9	0.6	100
Arabs	13.8	23.3	32.3	28.4	2.2	100
Total sample	40.4	38.1	14.2	6.4	0.9	100

44. On a scale from 1 = very poor to 5 = excellent, how would you rate Israel's current military deterrence?

[Discussion on p. 150](#)

	1 – Very poor	2	3	4	5 – Excellent	Don't know	Total	Mean rating (1–5)
Jews	15.2	19.8	36.1	21.1	5.7	2.1	100	2.82
Arabs	21.8	12.6	40.2	11.1	13.6	0.7	100	2.82
Total sample	16.4	18.6	36.8	19.4	7.0	1.8	100	2.82

45. In your opinion, are the decisions of Israel's elected leaders on security matters influenced solely by professional considerations or also by other factors (personal and other interests)?

[Discussion on p. 153](#)

	Solely by professional considerations	By both professional and other considerations (personal and other interests)	Solely by other considerations (personal and other interests)	Don't know	Total
Jews	13.5	52.3	29.2	5.0	100
Arabs	12.7	41.1	41.0	5.2	100
Total sample	13.4	50.4	31.2	5.0	100

46. To what extent do you agree or disagree that Israel is a good place to live?

[Discussion on p. 38](#)

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	28.3	36.7	25.6	8.0	1.4	100
Arabs	26.5	40.8	19.7	12.8	0.2	100
Total sample	28.0	37.4	24.6	8.8	1.2	100

47. To what extent do you agree or disagree that the Opposition in Israel is weak, and is not doing its job?

[Discussion on p. 55](#)

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	23.2	36.5	18.9	11.3	10.1	100
Arabs	31.4	40.7	13.8	10.9	3.2	100
Total sample	24.6	37.2	18.0	11.2	9.0	100

48. To what extent do you agree or disagree that democratic rule in Israel is in grave danger?

[Discussion on p. 32](#)

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	27.8	26.2	19.6	22.9	3.5	100
Arabs	36.0	41.5	13.2	7.5	1.8	100
Total sample	29.2	28.8	18.5	20.3	3.2	100

49. To what extent do you agree or disagree that civil society organizations serve Israeli society better than state institutions do?

[Discussion on p. 120](#)

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	35.6	28.0	17.7	8.3	10.4	100
Arabs	22.5	43.9	19.4	10.2	4.0	100
Total sample	33.3	30.7	18.0	8.7	9.3	100

50. To what extent do you agree or disagree that Israelis can always count on their fellow Israelis to help them in times of trouble?

[Discussion on p. 94](#)

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	37.7	43.3	14.1	3.0	1.9	100
Arabs	23.9	38.3	23.5	12.4	1.9	100
Total sample	35.3	42.4	15.8	4.6	1.9	100

51. To what extent do you agree or disagree that citizens of Israel can always rely on the state to come to their aid in times of trouble?

[Discussion on p. 47](#)

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	6.8	18.7	37.1	35.4	2.0	100
Arabs	17.0	44.3	23.3	14.6	0.8	100
Total sample	8.5	23.0	34.8	31.9	1.8	100

52. To what extent do you agree or disagree that if the Shin Bet (ISA), the police, or the army suspect someone of involvement in terrorist activity, they should be granted full powers to conduct their investigation as they see fit? [Discussion on p. 184](#)

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	40.8	39.2	12.9	4.6	2.5	100
Arabs	24.5	37.9	16.6	17.5	3.5	100
Total sample	38.0	39.0	13.5	6.8	2.7	100

53. To what extent do you agree or disagree that for security reasons, it is permissible for the state to monitor what citizens post online? [Discussion on p. 186](#)

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	25.3	36.9	21.3	12.2	4.3	100
Arabs	16.3	30.6	28.6	22.7	1.8	100
Total sample	23.8	35.8	22.5	14.0	3.9	100

54. To what extent do you agree or disagree that most Arab citizens of Israel want to integrate into Israeli society and be part of it? [Discussion on p. 107](#)

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	9.6	32.4	33.4	19.9	4.7	100
Arabs	26.7	50.1	13.2	8.5	1.5	100
Total sample	12.5	35.4	29.9	18.0	4.2	100

55. To what extent do you agree or disagree that Arab citizens of Israel are discriminated against compared with Jewish citizens? [Discussion on p. 112](#)

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	9.3	21.1	27.2	38.3	4.1	100
Arabs	36.9	44.8	12.7	4.9	0.7	100
Total sample	14.0	25.1	24.8	32.6	3.5	100

56. (Jewish respondents) To what extent do you agree or disagree that to preserve Jewish identity, it is better for Jews and Arabs in Israel to live separately?

[Discussion on p. 114](#)

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	24.4	23.8	27.8	16.0	8.0	100

(Arab respondents) To what extent do you agree or disagree that to preserve Arab identity, it is better for Arabs and Jews in Israel to live separately?

[Discussion on p. 114](#)

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Arabs	7.9	28.4	34.3	28.5	0.9	100

57. (Jewish respondents) To what extent do you agree or disagree that Israel's Arab citizens pose a threat to the country's security?

[Discussion on p. 117](#)

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	26.5	26.5	31.2	12.0	3.8	100

58. (Jewish respondents) In your opinion, how willing are Arab citizens of Israel to compromise on issues important to them in order to find common ground that would allow everyone to live here together?

[Discussion on p. 101](#)

	Very much	Quite a lot	Not so much	Not at all	Don't know	Total
Jews	3.5	18.0	37.3	35.1	6.1	100

59. (Jewish respondents) In your opinion, how willing are national religious Jews to compromise on issues important to them in order to find common ground that would allow everyone to live here together?

[Discussion on p. 101](#)

	Very much	Quite a lot	Not so much	Not at all	Don't know	Total
Jews	11.3	32.1	32.4	21.0	3.2	100

60. (Jewish respondents) In your opinion, how willing are secular Jews to compromise on issues important to them in order to find common ground that would allow everyone to live here together?

[Discussion on p. 101](#)

	Very much	Quite a lot	Not so much	Not at all	Don't know	Total
Jews	18.0	42.0	28.1	8.8	3.1	100

61. (Jewish respondents) In your opinion, how willing are Haredim to compromise on issues important to them in order to find common ground that would allow everyone to live here together?

[Discussion on p. 101](#)

	Very much	Quite a lot	Not so much	Not at all	Don't know	Total
Jews	6.1	13.2	28.5	48.5	3.7	100

62. (Jewish respondents) In your opinion, how willing are left-wingers to compromise on issues important to them in order to find common ground that would allow everyone to live here together?

[Discussion on p. 101](#)

	Very much	Quite a lot	Not so much	Not at all	Don't know	Total
Jews	9.0	24.3	28.9	33.5	4.3	100

63. (Jewish respondents) In your opinion, how willing are right-wingers to compromise on issues important to them in order to find common ground that would allow everyone to live here together?

[Discussion on p. 101](#)

	Very much	Quite a lot	Not so much	Not at all	Don't know	Total
Jews	11.5	28.1	35.5	21.4	3.5	100

64. (Jewish respondents) In your opinion, where is it safer for Jews to live today?

[Discussion on p. 124](#)

	Israel	Abroad	Both are safe to the same degree	Don't know	Total
Jews	73.0	5.5	15.5	6.0	100

65. (Jewish respondents) If you were living abroad today, would you consider moving back to Israel due to rising antisemitism and criticism of Israel?

[Discussion on p. 126](#)

	Certain I would	Think I would	Think I would not	Certain I would not	Don't know	Total
Jews	33.4	35.3	13.2	5.4	12.7	100

66. Would you want your children to continue living in Israel?

[Discussion on p. 134](#)

	Certain I would	Think I would	Think I would not	Certain I would not	Don't know	Total
Jews	55.2	22.8	10.2	3.9	7.9	100
Arabs	65.8	17.0	7.7	9.0	0.5	100
Total sample	57.0	21.8	9.8	4.8	6.6	100

67. If you could receive American citizenship, or that of another Western country, would you prefer to live there or to remain in Israel?

[Discussion on p. 128](#)

	I would prefer to live there	I would prefer to remain in Israel	Don't know	Total
Jews	20.5	64.5	15.0	100
Arabs	22.2	77.0	0.8	100
Total sample	20.8	66.6	12.6	100

68. (Jewish respondents) Do you have, or are you considering obtaining, a foreign passport?

[Discussion on p. 137](#)

	I don't have a foreign passport, and am not considering getting one	I'm considering it, but have not yet taken steps to get one	I've begun the process of getting a foreign passport	I have a foreign passport	Not applicable (I'm not entitled to hold a foreign passport)	Don't know	Total
Jews	42.4	17.7	6.2	14.7	14.9	4.1	100

69. (Jewish respondents who have a foreign passport, have begun the process of getting one, or are considering the possibility) Why do you have, or are you considering obtaining, a foreign passport? Indicate the primary reason:

[Discussion on p. 141](#)

	Jews
To be on the safe side/just in case	40.5
I have a foreign passport from birth/received it as a child	19.3
So that my children will have a foreign passport	10.1
Due to the security situation	10.0
Due to the social/political situation	6.3
Due to the economic situation	5.3
To study abroad	2.4
To serve as an emissary (for a Jewish or Israeli organization) or to relocate for work purposes	1.0
Other	3.4
Don't know	1.7
Total	100

**70. In your opinion, what will best ensure Israel’s future security
in the short term?**

[Discussion on p. 155](#)

	Strengthening Israel’s military power	Reaching political agreements with states in the region	Both equally	Don’t know	Total
Jews	47.2	13.8	34.5	4.5	100
Arabs	6.2	45.2	41.8	6.8	100
Total sample	40.2	19.1	35.7	5.0	100

**71. In your opinion, what will best ensure Israel’s future security
in the long term?**

[Discussion on p. 155](#)

	Strengthening Israel’s military power	Reaching political agreements with states in the region	Both equally	Don’t know	Total
Jews	24.9	31.5	37.2	6.4	100
Arabs	7.2	42.3	43.4	7.1	100
Total sample	21.9	33.3	38.2	6.6	100

72. Zionism originally attributed security importance to settlement close to the country’s borders. Given the events of October 7, are there still security advantages today in having civilian Israeli settlements close to the border?

[Discussion on p. 157](#)

	Certain there are	Think there are	Think there are not	Certain there are not	Don’t know	Total
Jews	34.6	26.8	18.0	7.4	13.2	100
Arabs	13.2	25.2	28.7	21.5	11.4	100
Total sample	31.0	26.5	19.8	9.8	12.9	100

**73. How much do you think you know about the roles and activities of
the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency)?**

[Discussion on p. 177](#)

	Know a lot	Know quite a lot	Know only a little	Know nothing at all	Total
Jews	12.0	27.2	48.8	12.0	100
Arabs	6.0	25.8	31.8	36.4	100
Total sample	11.0	27.0	45.9	16.1	100

74. How much do you think you know about the roles and activities of the Mossad?

[Discussion on p. 177](#)

	Know a lot	Know quite a lot	Know only a little	Know nothing at all	Total
Jews	11.3	25.3	49.1	14.3	100
Arabs	5.2	24.4	32.3	38.1	100
Total sample	10.2	25.1	46.2	18.5	100

75. In your opinion, to what extent is the IDF nonpartisan (that is, not identified with any political agenda, either on the Right or Left)?

[Discussion on p. 165](#)

	Very much	Quite a lot	Not so much	Not at all	Don't know	Total
Jews	24.6	30.6	23.4	15.3	6.1	100
Arabs	7.5	22.6	32.8	29.0	8.1	100
Total sample	21.7	29.3	25.0	17.6	6.4	100

76. In your opinion, to what extent is Israel's police force nonpartisan (that is, not identified with any political agenda, either on the Right or Left)?

[Discussion on p. 174](#)

	Very much	Quite a lot	Not so much	Not at all	Don't know	Total
Jews	9.5	19.6	38.1	26.1	6.7	100
Arabs	8.2	20.0	35.6	28.7	7.5	100
Total sample	9.3	19.7	37.7	26.6	6.7	100

77. In your opinion, to what extent is the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) nonpartisan (that is, not identified with any political agenda, either on the Right or Left)?

[Discussion on p. 180](#)

	Very much	Quite a lot	Not so much	Not at all	Don't know	Total
Jews	20.5	29.5	21.7	16.4	11.9	100
Arabs	7.8	20.7	31.1	30.4	10.0	100
Total sample	18.3	28.0	23.3	18.8	11.6	100

78. In your opinion, to what extent is the Mossad nonpartisan (that is, not identified with any political agenda, either on the Right or Left)?

[Discussion on p. 183](#)

	Very much	Quite a lot	Not so much	Not at all	Don't know	Total
Jews	24.0	29.6	18.5	14.3	13.6	100
Arabs	8.0	20.0	29.7	31.3	11.0	100
Total sample	21.3	27.9	20.4	17.1	13.3	100

79. In general, are you optimistic or pessimistic about Israel's future?

[Discussion on p. 40](#)

	Very optimistic	Quite optimistic	Quite pessimistic	Very pessimistic	Don't know	Total
Jews	18.5	37.5	29.5	9.1	5.4	100
Arabs	6.7	28.4	35.4	23.4	6.1	100
Total sample	16.5	36.0	30.5	11.5	5.5	100

80a. (For those who responded "quite" or "very optimistic") Specify the factor that contributes most strongly to your optimism about Israel's future:

[Discussion on p. 42](#)

	Jews
Fellow citizens / the people of Israel / national unity	25.3
Faith in God / redemption / prayer	21.3
IDF / soldiers / security / the defense forces	13.9
The Jewish people / eternity of the Jewish nation / history	13.1
Love of the country / Zionism / we have no other country / no alternative	6.4
General optimism / hope	4.5
The prime minister / Benjamin Netanyahu / the government	2.3
Various other responses	9.3
Don't know	3.9
Total	100

	Arabs
End of the war / finding a solution, and the hope for peace	26.7
General optimism / hope	19.8
A strong state / security	15.0
Faith in God	6.6
Life in Israel / comparison with other places	3.7
Fellow citizens	2.9
Economy / welfare	2.9
Unspecified	8.0
Various other responses	3.0
Don't know	11.4
Total	100

80b. (For those who responded “quite” or “very pessimistic”) Specify the factor that contributes most strongly to your pessimism about Israel’s future: [Discussion on p. 42](#)

	Jews
The government / Knesset / leadership / the ruling regime / corruption / politics	32.8
Security situation / war	20.0
The prime minister / Benjamin Netanyahu / the Likud	11.1
Division / polarization / rift in the nation	8.5
Relations with Arabs in Israel / Israeli-Palestinian conflict	3.8
Haredim / Haredization	3.4
Economic situation	3.0
Leftists / the anti-government protests	2.9
The Right / the extreme Right / Ben-Gvir / Smotrich	2.5
International relations	2.3
Various other responses	7.9
Don’t know	1.8
Total	100

	Arabs
The war / security situation	40.6
Overall situation	24.9
The government / political establishment	9.1
Economic situation	5.7
Racism / injustice	3.5
Violence and crime	1.4
Unspecified	7.8
Various other responses	1.7
Don’t know	5.3
Total	100

81. Societies throughout the world are divided into stronger and weaker groups. Which group in Israeli society do you feel you belong to?

	Strong group	Quite strong group	Quite weak group	Weak group	Don’t know	Total
Jews	15.1	48.7	18.7	3.9	13.6	100
Arabs	17.1	25.3	26.0	27.9	3.7	100
Total sample	15.5	44.7	20.0	8.0	11.8	100

Appendix 2

Distribution of 2024 Survey Results Compared with Previous Years

(total sample; Jewish sample; Arab sample; %)

1. How would you characterize Israel's overall situation today?

[Discussion on p. 25](#)

		2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	June 2023	December 2023*	2024	
Total sample	Good + very good	11	13	30	22	15	28	31	40	28	38	35	44	41	37	48	53	50	37	31	25	21	22	12	
	So-so	26	33	35	38	34	36	38	35	41	40	41	37	39	40	33	30	31	40	42	37	34	31.5	28	
	Bad + very bad	63	53	35	39	50	34	29	24	30	20	22	17	18	23	17	16	18	22	26	37	45	45	60	
	Don't know	0	1	0	1	1	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	1	1	1	1	1	0	1.5	0
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Good + very good	10	13	28	22	12	27	31	37	29	38	37	43	44	36	49	56	50	39	32	27	21	24	11	
	So-so	27	35	37	39	35	37	42	39	43	41	43	38	38	41	33	29	33	41	45	39	36	33.5	30	
	Bad + very bad	62	52	34	39	53	36	26	23	27	19	18	17	16	22	16	14	16	19	22	34	42	41	59	
	Don't know	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	0	1	1.5	0	
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Good + very good	16	15	36	26	28	37	35	55	22	37	27	55	29	39	42	39	48	29	24	18	18	9	15	
	So-so	18	23	27	35	33	31	13	16	32	38	31	27	40	32	33	32	22	37	27	30	23	22	18	
	Bad + very bad	66	62	37	39	37	28	50	25	46	25	39	18	29	28	24	26	29	34	48	52	59	65	67	
	Don't know	0	0	0	0	2	4	2	4	0	0	3	0	2	1	1	3	1	0	1	0	0	4	0	
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Source: Israeli Voice Index.

9. To what extent do you feel part of the State of Israel and its problems?

[Discussion on p. 36](#)

		2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2019	2020	2021	2022	June 2023	November 2023*	February 2024**	2024
Total sample	Very much + quite a lot	90	88	86	87	78	76	84	83	85	83	77	75	79	77	76	79	76	79	79	90	79	83
	Not so much + not at all	10	12	9	13	20	22	16	16	15	16	20	22	19	22	23	20	22	20	19	8	19	16
	Don't know	0	0	5	0	2	2	0	1	0	1	3	3	2	1	1	1	2	1	2	2	2	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Very much + quite a lot	94	91	88	91	84	80	88	87	91	88	83	78	88	84	83	85	82	86	85	94	86	86
	Not so much + not at all	6	8	6	9	16	19	12	12	9	10	16	18	10	15	16	14	16	12	12	5	12	12
	Don't know	0	1	6	0	0	1	0	1	0	2	1	4	2	1	1	1	2	2	3	1	2	2
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Very much + quite a lot	53	66	69	51	48	50	51	53	48	45	44	59	32	39	42	43	43	41	48	70	46	66
	Not so much + not at all	46	34	29	49	49	47	46	46	51	54	51	38	67	59	58	56	53	58	51	24	50	33
	Don't know	1	0	2	0	3	3	3	1	1	1	5	3	1	2	0	1	4	1	1	6	4	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Source: War in Gaza Survey

** Source: Israeli Voice Index

10. How would you rate the level of solidarity (sense of "togetherness") of Israeli society as a whole (Jews, Arabs, and all other citizens), where 1 = no solidarity at all and 10 = very high level of solidarity?

[Discussion on p. 90](#)

		2011	2014	2015	2020	2021	2022	June 2023	October 2023*	December 2023**	2024
Total sample	Mean rating (1–10)	4.78	4.71	5.13	5.35	4.86	4.5	4.26	6.79	6.46	5.43
Jews	Mean rating (1–10)	4.83	4.83	5.26	5.46	5.01	4.65	4.39	7.18	6.68	5.52
Arabs	Mean rating (1–10)	4.49	3.99	4.48	4.76	4.09	3.75	3.62	4.77	5.19	5.01

* Source: War in Gaza Survey

** Source: Israeli Voice Index

11. Which of the following is the most acute social tension in Israel today?

Discussion on p. 97

		2012	2015	2016	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	June 2023	December 2023*	2024
Total sample	Between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim	3	4	1	5	3	3	2	2	3	2	1.5
	Between religious and secular Jews	20	10	11	25	22	17	11	6	18	9	14
	Between Right and Left	9	18	24	32	37	39	32	24	39	42	48
	Between rich and poor	13	13	8	5	5	8	3	4	6	2	1
	Between Jews and Arabs	48	47	53	30	27	28	46	61	31	34	31
	Don't know	7	8	3	3	6	5	6	3	3	11	4.5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim	3	4	1	3	3	4	2	2	3	2	1
	Between religious and secular Jews	21	10	11	24	24	19	12	6	19	9	15
	Between Right and Left	9	20	27	36	40	42	36	26	43	46	53
	Between rich and poor	14	14	8	6	4	8	3	4	4	2	1
	Between Jews and Arabs	47	44	50	28	23	25	43	60	26	31.5	26
	Don't know	6	8	3	3	6	2	4	2	5	9.5	4
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim	4	1	1	16	2	2	3	3	3	4	2
	Between religious and secular Jews	16	12	10	27	13	11	10	6	12	7	9.5
	Between Right and Left	9	8	6	12	21	22	12	15	14	21	22
	Between rich and poor	8	7	8	1	8	12	4	6	14	3	4
	Between Jews and Arabs	50	64	68	43	44	48	64	65	53	47.5	55.5
	Don't know	13	8	7	1	12	5	7	5	4	17.5	7
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Source: Israeli Voice Index

12. Israel is defined as a Jewish and democratic state. Do you feel there is a good balance today between the Jewish and the democratic components?

[Discussion on p. 51](#)

		2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Total sample	There is a good balance between the two components	26	27	28	28	20	19	18	22	19
	The Jewish component is too dominant	45	47	45	47	47	45	38	44	43
	The democratic component is too dominant	23	20	21	18	23	22	25	21	21.5
	Don't know	6	6	6	7	10	14	19	13	16.5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	There is a good balance between the two components	29	29	30	31	22	21	20	21	19
	The Jewish component is too dominant	39	42	39	41	42	38	29	41	37
	The democratic component is too dominant	25	23	24	20	25	24	30	24	25
	Don't know	7	6	7	8	11	17	21	14	19
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	There is a good balance between the two components	7	16	17	13	9	8	7	27	18
	The Jewish component is too dominant	80	74	77	77	76	82	86	60	72
	The democratic component is too dominant	9	6	5	8	14	7	3	9	5.5
	Don't know	4	4	1	2	1	3	4	4	4.5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

13. How worried are you that you will be unable to maintain your preferred lifestyle because of the increasing power of certain groups in Israeli society that advocate a different way of life from yours?

[Discussion on p. 104](#)

		2017	2022	2023	2024
Total sample	Very worried + quite worried	41	70	69	64
	Not so worried + not at all worried	58	27	29	35
	Don't know	1	3	2	1
	Total	100	100	100	100
Jews	Very worried + quite worried	40	68	66	60
	Not so worried + not at all worried	59	28	31	38
	Don't know	1	4	3	2
	Total	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Very worried + quite worried	44	79	80	80
	Not so worried + not at all worried	53	20	19	20
	Don't know	3	1	1	0
	Total	100	100	100	100

To what extent do you trust each of the following individuals or institutions:

14. The media

Discussion on p. 67

		2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	June 2023	October 2023*	December 2023**	2024
Total sample	Not so much + not at all	51	49	49	56	54	62	64	65	47	52	50	67	63	75	71	68	62	65	71	76	74	59	66.5	74
	Very much + quite a lot	49	51	50	44	44	37	34	34	52	46	47	30	36	24	28	31	36	33	27	22	24	38	31	25
	Don't know	0	0	1	0	2	1	2	1	1	2	3	3	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	3	2.5	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Not so much + not at all	52	51	53	59	57	64	64	64	49	54	51	68	66	74	69	66	62	65	68	74	72	59	68	72
	Very much + quite a lot	48	49	47	40	42	36	36	35	50	43	47	28	33	26	30	33	36	33	30	24	25	39	30	27
	Don't know	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	3	2	4	1	0	1	1	2	2	2	2	3	2	2	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Not so much + not at all	48	36	33	37	35	55	68	72	36	39	45	60	48	83	82	81	60	65	83	86	82	59	60	83
	Very much + quite a lot	52	63	67	63	57	43	25	25	63	60	48	37	51	15	18	18	36	35	16	14	18	34	36	16
	Don't know	0	1	0	0	8	2	7	3	1	1	7	3	1	2	0	1	4	0	1	0	0	7	4	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Source: War in Gaza Survey

** Source: Israeli Voice Index

15. The Supreme Court

Discussion on p. 64

		2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	June 2023	December 2023*	2024
Total sample	Not so much + not at all	30	21	28	31	37	49	40	44	27	23	32	32	32	41	40	45	42	44	49	56	57	51	61
	Very much + quite a lot	70	76	71	67	58	47	51	52	69	73	61	61	62	56	56	52	55	54	47	41	39	44	37
	Don't know	0	3	1	2	5	4	9	4	4	4	7	7	6	3	4	3	3	2	4	3	4	5	2
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Not so much + not at all	31	21	28	32	39	47	38	39	26	24	30	31	32	41	41	42	43	46	49	56	54	54	59
	Very much + quite a lot	69	76	71	65	57	50	54	56	69	72	63	62	62	57	57	55	55	52	48	41	42	42.5	39
	Don't know	0	3	1	3	4	3	8	5	5	4	7	7	6	2	2	3	2	2	3	3	4	3.5	2
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Not so much + not at all	24	18	27	27	29	62	61	69	30	19	43	37	32	42	39	61	37	38	51	57	70	34.5	72
	Very much + quite a lot	76	81	73	73	64	35	29	26	69	78	50	60	63	52	54	36	56	60	44	40	26	53	26
	Don't know	0	1	0	0	7	3	10	5	1	3	7	3	5	6	7	3	7	2	5	3	4	12.5	2
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Source: Israeli Voice Index

16. The President of Israel

Discussion on p. 62

		2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	June 2023	December 2023*	2024
Total sample	Not so much + not at all	32	25	34	32	74	52	38	29	21	19	24	25	22	36	29	35	28	39	36	42	47	36	53
	Very much + quite a lot	67	69	64	64	20	46	58	68	78	79	73	69	70	61	65	61	66	58	56	51	48	57	43
	Don't know	1	6	2	4	6	2	4	3	1	2	3	6	8	3	6	4	6	3	8	7	5	7	4
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Not so much + not at all	28	22	31	28	76	49	33	22	15	14	19	22	16	30	24	27	23	34	32	35	40	33	47
	Very much + quite a lot	71	73	68	68	19	49	63	75	84	84	79	71	76	68	71	68	71	63	60	58	54	61	48
	Don't know	1	5	1	4	5	2	4	3	1	2	2	7	8	2	5	5	6	3	8	7	6	6	5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Not so much + not at all	57	44	55	55	63	67	68	68	54	44	51	39	56	66	56	72	53	68	52	77	77	51.5	82
	Very much + quite a lot	42	51	45	43	28	29	23	27	44	52	42	56	39	26	34	26	37	29	35	17	18	38	15
	Don't know	1	5	0	2	9	4	9	5	2	4	7	5	5	8	10	2	10	3	13	6	5	10.5	3
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Source: Israeli Voice Index

17. The Knesset

Discussion on p. 73

		2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	June 2023	December 2023*	2024
Total sample	Not so much + not at all	48	53	60	67	65	70	61	61	47	44	45	59	61	72	72	71	68	67	68	83	74	75	85.5
	Very much + quite a lot	51	46	39	33	32	28	36	36	52	53	52	35	35	27	26	28	29	32	27	14	23	20	13
	Don't know	1	1	1	0	3	2	3	3	1	3	3	6	4	1	2	1	3	1	5	3	3	5	1.5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Not so much + not at all	47	55	61	69	68	69	59	58	45	44	43	61	62	71	71	69	68	67	68	82	73	77	85
	Very much + quite a lot	52	43	38	31	30	30	38	39	53	53	54	35	34	28	27	30	30	32	29	15	24	19	13
	Don't know	1	1	1	0	1	1	2	3	2	3	3	4	4	1	2	1	2	1	3	3	3	4	2
	Total	100	99	100	100	99	100	99	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Not so much + not at all	57	40	52	57	49	77	72	74	55	46	53	52	53	77	76	83	67	67	70	87	79	63	86
	Very much + quite a lot	43	59	46	42	42	20	18	21	44	51	39	36	44	18	19	16	24	31	22	11	18	28	12
	Don't know	0	1	2	1	9	3	10	5	1	3	8	12	3	5	5	1	9	2	8	2	3	9	2
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Source: Israeli Voice Index

18. The government

Discussion on p. 70

		2003	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	June 2023	October 2023*	December 2023**	2024
Total sample	Not so much + not at all	45	57	60	67	74	66	66	48	41	42	59	61	71	70	68	67	71	66	77	71	79	74	81
	Very much + quite a lot	55	42	39	30	25	31	33	51	57	54	38	36	27	29	30	30	28	27	21	27	18	22	18
	Don't know	0	1	1	3	1	3	1	1	2	4	3	3	2	1	2	3	1	7	2	2	3	4	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Not so much + not at all	42	57	61	69	74	64	62	46	37	39	61	60	70	69	65	67	70	65	75	69	78	74	80
	Very much + quite a lot	58	42	38	30	26	33	37	54	60	58	37	37	29	30	34	30	29	29	23	28	20.5	23	19
	Don't know	0	1	1	1	0	3	1	0	3	3	2	3	1	1	1	3	1	6	2	3	1.5	3	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Not so much + not at all	70	57	57	60	74	77	84	61	57	59	49	65	75	75	84	66	75	70	90	80	82	70	84
	Very much + quite a lot	30	42	43	32	23	16	11	36	40	33	43	30	20	23	15	28	25	18	10	18	7.5	19	15
	Don't know	0	1	0	8	3	7	5	3	3	8	8	5	5	2	1	6	0	12	0	2	10.5	11	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Source: War in Gaza Survey

** Source: Israeli Voice Index

19. The political parties

Discussion on p. 74

		2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	June 2023	December 2023*	2024
Total sample	Not so much + not at all	67	72	77	77	77	83	75	72	61	62	57	71	82	79	80	75	78	79	88	82	75	88
	Very much + quite a lot	32	27	21	22	21	15	20	24	36	34	38	19	14	15	16	15	19	15	9	13	17	9
	Don't know	1	1	2	1	2	2	5	4	3	4	5	10	4	6	4	10	3	6	3	5	8	3
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Not so much + not at all	67	73	78	79	78	82	76	71	60	62	59	73	81	78	79	75	81	80	87	81	78	88
	Very much + quite a lot	33	25	20	20	21	16	20	25	36	34	37	15	14	15	16	14	17	15	9	13	15	9
	Don't know	0	2	2	1	1	2	4	4	4	4	4	12	5	7	5	11	2	5	4	6	7	3
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Not so much + not at all	72	65	72	65	71	87	74	75	67	61	47	58	85	81	84	71	67	77	91	84	58	87
	Very much + quite a lot	28	34	28	35	21	11	16	19	32	36	43	40	12	16	15	20	30	15	8	15	25	11
	Don't know	0	1	0	0	8	2	10	6	1	3	10	2	3	3	1	9	3	8	1	1	17	2
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Source: Israeli Voice Index

20. Your municipality or local authority

[Discussion on p. 75](#)

		2016	2018	2019*	2020	2021	2022	June 2023	December 2023**	2024
Total sample	Not so much + not at all	47	46	42	38	40	50	48	35	45
	Very much + quite a lot	52	53	56	61	57	48	50	60	53
	Don't know	1	1	2	1	3	2	2	5	2
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Not so much + not at all	44	39	41	35	35	46	43	32	39
	Very much + quite a lot	55	60	56	63	62	51	55	64	59
	Don't know	1	1	3	2	3	3	2	4	2
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Not so much + not at all	66	79	46	52	64	68	71	52	72
	Very much + quite a lot	33	19	52	48	32	32	28	39	28
	Don't know	1	2	2	0	4	0	1	9	0
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Source: Tamar Hermann et al., *Jews and Arabs: A Conditional Partnership 2019*.

** Source: Israeli Voice Index

21. The Attorney General

[Discussion on p. 77](#)

		2008	2009	2011	2017	2018	2019*	2020	2022	2023	2024
Total sample	Not so much + not at all	58	43	25	48	50	43	53	65	60	64
	Very much + quite a lot	34	46	64	42	42	46	42	26	31	31
	Don't know	8	11	11	10	8	11	5	9	9	5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Not so much + not at all	56	38	22	48	45	41	52	62	56	61
	Very much + quite a lot	35	50	67	44	47	49	44	27	34	33
	Don't know	9	12	11	8	8	10	4	11	10	6
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Not so much + not at all	69	72	43	50	78	52	58	78	81	78
	Very much + quite a lot	24	15	50	31	19	28	34	18	16	20
	Don't know	7	13	7	19	3	20	8	4	3	2
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Source: Tamar Hermann et al., *Jews and Arabs: A Conditional Partnership 2019*.

22. In your opinion, what is the greatest internal existential threat facing Israel?

Discussion on p. 28

		2023	2024
Total sample	Israel's control of the West Bank/Judea and Samaria	8.5	8
	Socioeconomic disparities in Israeli society	17	8
	Tensions between Jews and Arabs in Israel	26	23
	Differences of opinion regarding the appropriate balance between Israel as a Jewish state and a democratic state	24	26
	Low public trust in state institutions	16	24
	Other	5	7
	Don't know	3.5	4
	Total	100	100
Jews	Israel's control of the West Bank/Judea and Samaria	5	6
	Socioeconomic disparities in Israeli society	18	7.5
	Tensions between Jews and Arabs in Israel	24.5	20
	Differences of opinion regarding the appropriate balance between Israel as a Jewish state and a democratic state	27	29
	Low public trust in state institutions	16	26
	Other	6	8
	Don't know	3.5	4
	Total	100	100
Arabs	Israel's control of the West Bank/Judea and Samaria	25	19
	Socioeconomic disparities in Israeli society	11	13
	Tensions between Jews and Arabs in Israel	33.5	39
	Differences of opinion regarding the appropriate balance between Israel as a Jewish state and a democratic state	9.5	9
	Low public trust in state institutions	16	14
	Other	1	2
	Don't know	4	4
	Total	100	100

To what extent do you trust each of the following institutions?

24. The police

Discussion on p. 171

		2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2022	2021	2022	June 2023	October 2023*	December 2023**	2024
Total sample	Not so much + not at all	34	34	44	56	57	67	58	57	42	37	38	49	54	59	58	52	55	56	61	66	67	44	41	58
	Very much + quite a lot	66	65	56	43	40	32	38	41	56	61	59	47	42	40	40	47	43	43	37	32	32	52	55	41
	Don't know	0	1	0	1	3	1	4	2	2	2	3	4	4	1	2	1	2	1	2	2	1	4	4	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Not so much + not at all	32	33	43	56	58	67	56	54	39	37	36	51	54	57	56	47	54	54	56	62	64	37	38.5	55
	Very much + quite a lot	68	66	56	42	40	31	40	45	59	61	62	45	42	42	42	52	44	44	42	36	35	59	58.5	44
	Don't know	0	1	1	2	2	2	4	1	2	2	2	4	4	1	2	1	2	2	2	2	1	4	3	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Not so much + not at all	43	38	46	51	53	63	73	73	60	36	50	41	54	72	69	80	61	66	85	86	82	77	55	77
	Very much + quite a lot	57	60	54	48	40	33	19	23	39	62	44	57	44	27	29	18	38	33	14	13	17	17	38	22
	Don't know	0	2	0	1	7	4	8	4	1	2	6	2	2	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	6	7	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Source: War in Gaza Survey

** Source: Israeli Voice Index

25. The IDF

Discussion on p. 161

		2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	June 2023	October 2023*	December 2023**	2024
Total sample	Not so much + not at all	16	14	22	21	25	29	19	19	13	13	16	14	14	17	17	22	16	21	18	25	24	20	16	30
	Very much + quite a lot	83	85	78	78	73	70	79	79	86	85	82	82	84	82	81	78	82	75	79	73	75	77	79	69
	Don't know	1	1	0	1	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	4	2	1	2	0	2	4	3	2	1	3	5	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Not so much + not at all	10	7	15	14	20	21	11	10	6	5	8	10	6	9	11	10	9	14	9	14	13	12	10	22
	Very much + quite a lot	89	93	84	86	80	78	88	89	94	94	91	88	93	90	88	89	90	82	90	85	86	87	86.5	77
	Don't know	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	4	1	1	1	1	3.5	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Not so much + not at all	62	51	54	60	57	71	75	70	53	52	56	38	56	62	49	79	54	60	64	82	76	62	44	67.5
	Very much + quite a lot	37	44	46	40	35	25	14	23	42	42	35	51	37	32	41	19	41	35	24	15	21	23	44	30
	Don't know	1	5	0	0	8	4	11	7	5	6	9	11	7	6	10	2	5	5	12	3	3	15	12	2.5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Source: War in Gaza Survey

** Source: Israeli Voice Index

26. The Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency)

Discussion on p. 179

		March 2022*	December 2023*	March 2024**	2024
Total sample	Not so much + not at all	26	31	31	37
	Very much + quite a lot	67	59	61	59
	Don't know	7	10	8	4
	Total	100	100	100	100
Jews	Not so much + not at all	20	27.5	25	31
	Very much + quite a lot	75	65	69	65.5
	Don't know	5	7.5	6	3.5
	Total	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Not so much + not at all	56	46	63	68
	Very much + quite a lot	27	30	22	26.5
	Don't know	17	24	15	5.5
	Total	100	100	100	100

* Source: Israeli Voice Index

** Source: War in Gaza Survey

46. To what extent do you agree or disagree that Israel is a good place to live?

Discussion on p. 38

		2017	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Total sample	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	84	76	74	62	67	65
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	15	23	23	36	32	33
	Don't know	1	1	3	2	1	2
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	86	76	76	64	67	65
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	13	23	22	34	31	34
	Don't know	1	1	2	2	2	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	73	78	66	52	65	67
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	27	22	28	47	35	32.5
	Don't know	0	0	6	1	0	0.5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

47. To what extent do you agree or disagree that the Opposition in Israel is weak, and is not doing its job?

[Discussion on p. 55](#)

		2017	2023	2024
Total sample	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	67	49	62
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	26	43	29
	Don't know	7	8	9
	Total	100	100	100
Jews	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	66	43	60
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	28	47	30
	Don't know	6	10	10
	Total	100	100	100
Arabs	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	71	74	72
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	20	25	25
	Don't know	9	1	3
	Total	100	100	100

48. To what extent do you agree or disagree that democratic rule in Israel is in grave danger?

[Discussion on p. 32](#)

		2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	June 2023	December 2023*	2024
Total sample	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	45	46	54	53	49	59	59	51	58
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	51	50	44	45	48	36	38	43	39
	Don't know	4	5	2	2	3	5	3	6	3
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	41	41	52	50	44	55	55	47	54
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	56	54	47	49	53	40	41	49	42.5
	Don't know	3	5	1	1	3	5	4	4	3.5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	65	70	66	73	75	80	75	72	77.5
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	26	29	28	25	23	18	23	14	21
	Don't know	9	1	6	2	2	2	2	14	1.5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Source: Israeli Voice Index

50. To what extent do you agree or disagree that Israelis can always count on their fellow Israelis to help them in times of trouble?

[Discussion on p. 94](#)

		2016	2017	2022	2024
Total sample	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	71	67	63	78
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	28	30	33	20
	Don't know	1	3	4	2
	Total	100	100	100	100
Jews	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	75	70	68	81
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	25	28	29	17
	Don't know	0	2	3	2
	Total	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	52	52	39	62
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	45	44	53	36
	Don't know	3	4	8	2
	Total	100	100	100	100

51. To what extent do you agree or disagree that citizens of Israel can always rely on the state to come to their aid in times of trouble?

[Discussion on p. 47](#)

		2017	2022	2024
Total sample	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	46	39	32
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	53	57	67
	Don't know	1	4	1
	Total	100	100	100
Jews	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	43	37	25.5
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	56	60	72.5
	Don't know	1	3	2
	Total	100	100	100
Arabs	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	61	52	61
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	37	44	38
	Don't know	2	4	1
	Total	100	100	100

52. To what extent do you agree or disagree that if the Shin Bet (ISA), the police, or the army suspect someone of involvement in terrorist activity, they should be granted full powers to conduct their investigation as they see fit?

[Discussion on p. 184](#)

		2010*	2016*	2024
Total sample	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	50	47	77
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	43	52	20
	Don't know	7	1	3
	Total	100	100	100
Jews	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	53	51	80
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	43	48	17.5
	Don't know	4	1	2.5
	Total	100	100	100
Arabs	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	38	24	62
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	42	72	34
	Don't know	20	4	4
	Total	100	100	100

* In the 2010 and 2016 *Israeli Democracy Index*, the question included the phrase "without any legal constraints."

53. To what extent do you agree or disagree that for security reasons, it is permissible for the state to monitor what citizens post online?

[Discussion on p. 186](#)

		2014	2015	2016	2024
Total sample	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	57	56.5	58	60
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	36	38	41	36.5
	Don't know	7	5.5	1	3.5
	Total	100	100	100	100
Jews	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	59	59	58	62
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	34.5	35	40	33.5
	Don't know	6.5	6	2	4.5
	Total	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	47	43	53	47
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	48	54	44	51
	Don't know	5	3	3	2
	Total	100	100	100	100

54. To what extent do you agree or disagree that most Arab citizens of Israel want to integrate into Israeli society and be part of it?

[Discussion on p. 107](#)

		2018	2020	2022	2024
Total sample	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	67	60	46	48
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	31	36	49	48
	Don't know	2	4	5	4
	Total	100	100	100	100
Jews	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	67	57	40	42
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	31	39	54	53
	Don't know	2	4	6	5
	Total	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	66	81	75	77
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	34	18	24	22
	Don't know	–	1	1	1
	Total	100	100	100	100

55. To what extent do you agree or disagree that Arab citizens of Israel are discriminated against compared with Jewish citizens?

[Discussion on p. 112](#)

		2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2011	2012	2014	2015	2016	2022	2024
Total sample	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	55	63	55	53	53	50	40	50	45	40	59	58	40	39
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	45	35	44	46	43	47	56	47	52	56	34	40	57	57
	Don't know	0	3	1	1	4	3	3	3	3	4	7	1	4	4
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	51	58	50	48	49	47	36	45	38	36	54	53	31	30.5
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	49	39	48	50	48	50	62	52	58	60	38	46	65	65.5
	Don't know	0	3	1	1	4	3	2	3	3	4	8	1	4	4
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	90	89	79	81	74	66	70	76	75	57	87	91	83	82
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	10	10	21	19	19	30	18	21	23	39	11	9	16	17
	Don't know	0	1	1	0	6	3	12	3	3	4	3	1	1	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

56. (Jewish respondents) To what extent do you agree or disagree that to preserve Jewish identity, it is better for Jews and Arabs in Israel to live separately?

[Discussion on p. 114](#)

		2017*	2018	2020	2024
Jews	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	52	43	41.5	48
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	45	53	54	44
	Don't know	3	4	4.5	8
	Total	100	100	100	100

(Arab respondents) To what extent do you agree or disagree that to preserve Arab identity, it is better for Arabs and Jews in Israel to live separately?

[Discussion on p. 114](#)

		2017*	2018	2020	2024
Arabs	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	22	29.5	22	36
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	77	70.5	77.5	63
	Don't know	1	0	0.5	1
	Total	100	100	100	100

* Source: Tamar Hermann et al., *Jews and Arabs: A Conditional Partnership 2017*.

57. (Jewish respondents) To what extent do you agree or disagree that Israel's Arab citizens pose a threat to the country's security?

[Discussion on p. 117](#)

		2015	2016	2018	2024
Jews	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	39	43.5	41	53
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	55	56	58	43
	Don't know	6	0.5	1	4
	Total	100	100	100	100

58. (Jewish respondents) In your opinion, how willing are Arab citizens of Israel to compromise on issues important to them in order to find common ground that would allow everyone to live here together?

[Discussion on p. 101](#)

		2007	2013	2024
Jews	Very much + quite a lot	37	39.5	21.5
	Not so much + not at all	57.5	52	72.5
	Don't know	5.5	8.5	6
	Total	100	100	100

59. (Jewish respondents) In your opinion, how willing are religious Jews to compromise on issues important to them in order to find common ground that would allow everyone to live here together?

[Discussion on p. 101](#)

		2007	2013	2024
Jews	Very much + quite a lot	42	41	43
	Not so much + not at all	51	49	53
	Don't know	7	10	4
	Total	100	100	100

60. (Jewish respondents) In your opinion, how willing are secular Jews to compromise on issues important to them in order to find common ground that would allow everyone to live here together?

[Discussion on p. 101](#)

		2007	2013	2024
Jews	Very much + quite a lot	70	71	60
	Not so much + not at all	23	19	37
	Don't know	7	10	3
	Total	100	100	100

62. (Jewish respondents) In your opinion, how willing are left-wingers to compromise on issues important to them in order to find common ground that would allow everyone to live here together?

[Discussion on p. 101](#)

		2007	2013	2024
Jews	Very much + quite a lot	62	60	33
	Not so much + not at all	27	29	62
	Don't know	11	11	5
	Total	100	100	100

63. (Jewish respondents) In your opinion, how willing are right-wingers to compromise on issues important to them in order to find common ground that would allow everyone to live here together?

[Discussion on p. 101](#)

		2007	2013	2024
Jews	Very much + quite a lot	43	44	40
	Not so much + not at all	48.5	45	57
	Don't know	8.5	11	3
	Total	100	100	100

67. If you could receive American citizenship, or that of another Western country, would you prefer to live there or to remain in Israel? [Discussion on p. 128](#)

		2015	2017	2019	2021	2022	June 2023	November 2023*	2024
Total sample	I would prefer to live there	12	15	13	17	18	21	11	21
	I would prefer to remain in Israel	84	81	84	72	69	69	77	67
	Don't know	4	4	3	11	13	10	12	12
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	I would prefer to live there	11	15	12	18	18	18	8	20.5
	I would prefer to remain in Israel	84	81	84	70	67	70	80.5	64.5
	Don't know	5	4	4	12	15	12	11.5	15
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	I would prefer to live there	15	18	14	15	17	38	26	22
	I would prefer to remain in Israel	83	81	84	81	80	62	59	77
	Don't know	2	1	2	4	3	0	15	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Source: War in Gaza Survey

79. In general, are you optimistic or pessimistic about Israel's future?

Discussion on p. 40

		2009*	2011*	2012	2014*	2016	2017	2018*	2021	2022	2023	October(1) 2023**	October(2) 2023**	November 2023**	2024
Total sample	Very optimistic + quite optimistic	79	58	76	73	67	68	70	63	49	50	64	61	64	52.5
	Very pessimistic + quite pessimistic	18	38	22	24	30	29	24	30	43	45	26.5	32	27	42
	Don't know	3	4	2	3	3	3	6	7	8	5	9.5	7	9	5.5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Very optimistic + quite optimistic	81	63	79	73	70	71	75	67	51	52	68	65.5	72	56
	Very pessimistic + quite pessimistic	15	34	18	24	28	26	21	27	41	43	23	27	20	38.5
	Don't know	4	3	3	3	2	3	4	6	8	5	9	7.5	8	5.5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Very optimistic + quite optimistic	65	36	60	72	51	50	44	42	37	40	44	36	27	35
	Very pessimistic + quite pessimistic	33	59	39	24	43	46	44	50	56	58	46	54	60	59
	Don't know	2	5	1	4	6	4	12	8	7	2	10	10	13	6
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Source: Israel Democracy Institute, Peace Index: April 2009, January 2011, April 2014, April 2018.

** Source: War in Gaza Survey: October 15–17, 2023; October 18–19, 2023; November 5–6, 2023.

81. Societies throughout the world are divided into stronger and weaker groups. Which group in Israeli society do you feel you belong to?

		2012	2013	2014	2015	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2024
Total sample	Strong group + quite strong group	65	55	58	60	61	73	67	59	68	59	60
	Weak group + quite weak group	29	37	31	34	31	22	26	33	23	33	28
	Don't know	6	8	11	6	8	5	7	8	9	8	12
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Strong group + quite strong group	68	57	61	65	66	75	73	63	72	62	64
	Weak group + quite weak group	25	34	29	28	26	20	19	29	19	29	23
	Don't know	7	9	10	7	8	5	8	8	9	9	13
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Strong group + quite strong group	49	41	45	31	39	60	36	40	52	44	42
	Weak group + quite weak group	48	49	46	66	56	36	59	59	45	52	54
	Don't know	3	10	9	3	5	4	5	1	3	4	4
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Appendix 3

Sociodemographic Breakdown and Self-Definitions

(total sample; Jewish sample; Arab sample; %)²⁴

Nationality	Total sample
Jews	83.0
Arabs	17.0
Total	100

Sex	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Men	49.2	49.1	49.6
Women	50.8	50.9	50.4
Total	100	100	100

Age	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
18–24	15.5	14.2	21.7
25–34	19.5	18.5	24.6
35–44	18.2	18.3	17.9
45–54	16.0	15.9	16.1
55–64	12.0	12.2	11.2
65 and over	18.8	20.9	8.5
Total	100	100	100

Education	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Partial high school, without matriculation	10.9	8.1	24.8
Full high school with matriculation certificate	25.7	22.1	43.7
Post-secondary	13.9	15.5	5.8
Post-secondary yeshiva	2.0	2.4	–
Partial academic education (no degree)	5.9	6.5	3.2
Full academic degree (B.A. or higher)	40.2	43.8	22.3
Declined to respond	1.4	1.6	0.2
Total	100	100	100

²⁴ To ensure that the Jewish and Arab samples accurately represented their proportion of the population in Israel based on Central Bureau of Statistics data, both samples were weighted by nationality, sex, age, religiosity (Jews), and religion (Arabs).

Median monthly household income*	Jews
Far below the median income	15.1
Slightly below the median income	15.7
Similar to the median income	22.8
Slightly above the median income	26.8
Far above the median income	10.6
Declined to respond	9.0
Total	100

* The median gross monthly household income for Jews in Israel (relative to which half the public earns more and half the public earns less) is NIS 16,500 for a family, and NIS 9,000 for a single-person household. Respondents were asked to rate their overall household income (of all household members) based on the above categories.

Religiosity	Jews
Haredi	11.4
National religious / Haredi leumi	12.2
Traditional religious	12.1
Traditional non-religious	20.8
Secular	43.4
Other	0.1
Total	100

Ethnicity	Jews
Ashkenazi	36.3
Mizrahi	38.4
Mixed (Ashkenazi and Mizrahi)	14.1
FSU immigrant	6.8
Ethiopian	0.8
Don't know/declined to respond	1.6
Other	2.0
Total	100

Political orientation	Jews
Left	12.4
Center	27.1
Right	58.1
Don't know/ declined to respond	2.4
Total	100

Political orientation by religiosity (Jewish sample)	Haredi	National religious / Haredi leumi	Traditional religious	Traditional non-religious	Secular
Left	1.4	2.6	3.5	4.6	24.2
Center	17.7	6.8	15.3	26.5	38.9
Right	72.5	88.0	79.5	67.9	35.4
Don't know/ declined to respond	8.4	2.6	1.7	1.0	1.5
Total	100	100	100	100	100

District	Jews
North	9.8
Haifa	10.9
Center	28.8
Tel Aviv	22.2
Jerusalem	9.9
South	13.7
Judea and Samaria	4.7
Total	100

Median monthly household income*	Arabs
Far below the median income	19.9
Slightly below the median income	19.1
Similar to the median income	38.4
Slightly above the median income	7.9
Far above the median income	8.0
Declined to respond	6.7
Total	100

* The median gross monthly household income for Arabs in Israel (relative to which half the public earns more and half the public earns less) is NIS 10,500 for a family, and NIS 7,000 for a single-person household. Respondents were asked to rate their overall household income (of all household members) based on the above categories.

Religion	Arabs
Muslim*	81.5
Christian	9.0
Druze	8.7
Don't know / declined to respond / other	0.8
Total	100

*Includes Bedouin

Religiosity	Arabs
Very religious	2.0
Religious	24.0
Traditional	58.3
Not at all religious	13.8
Don't know / declined to respond	1.9
Total	100

Area of residence ²⁵	Arabs
Galilee	54.0
"Triangle"*	22.7
Negev	12.4
Mixed cities	10.9
Total	100

* The "Triangle" is an area in central Israel with a largely Arab population, including the major Arab towns of Tayibe, Tira, Baqa al-Gharbiyye, and Umm al-Fahm.

Do you have children currently living at home?*	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
I don't have any children	35.7	34.7	40.9
I have children, but they don't live at home	16.4	18.6	5.6
Yes, ages 0–5	17.6	17.8	16.5
Yes, ages 6–13	18.3	17.5	21.9
Yes, ages 14–18	13.6	12.9	17.1
Yes, ages 19–24	11.4	10.7	14.8
Yes, age 25 and over	8.0	8.1	8.0

* The total is greater than 100% due to the possibility of citing more than one age group, in keeping with the number of children in the family.

Were you born in Israel?	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Born in Israel	88.0	85.7	99.5
Born outside of Israel	12.0	14.3	0.5
Total	100	100	100

Do you have a "mamad" (reinforced safe room in your home) or a public shelter nearby?	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
I have a safe room in my home	56.0	56.7	52.7
I have a public shelter nearby	28.5	32.0	11.6
I do not have a safe room in my home or a public shelter nearby	15.5	11.3	35.7
Total	100	100	100

25 In the Jewish sample, we refer to six districts, in accordance with the categories of the Central Bureau of Statistics, whereas in the Arab sample, we refer to four areas of residence, since the bulk of the Arab population is concentrated in the Galilee and Triangle areas. The Arab sample does not include Arab residents of east Jerusalem.

Were you or members of your immediate family evacuated from, or did you voluntarily leave, your home due to the Iron Swords war?	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
We were not evacuated, nor did we voluntarily leave our home	94.3	93.8	96.7
We were evacuated from our home in the North	1.4	1.4	1.1
We were evacuated from our home in the South	1.8	1.9	1.8
We voluntarily left our home in the North	0.9	1.1	–
We voluntarily left our home in the South	1.5	1.7	0.2
Other	0.1	0.1	–
Total	100	100	100

(Jews) Have you performed mandatory military service in the IDF? (Arabs) Have you served in the IDF?	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Yes, full military service	56.3	66.8	4.8
Yes, partial military service	3.6	4.0	1.3
I performed national/civilian service	6.3	7.1	2.3
No, I did not serve	33.0	21.1	91.6
Other / I am currently serving	0.8	1.0	–
Total	100	100	100

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The Israel Democracy Institute (IDI) is an independent center of research and action dedicated to strengthening the foundations of Israeli democracy. IDI works to bolster the values and institutions of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. A non-partisan think-and-do tank, the Institute harnesses rigorous applied research to influence policy, legislation, and public opinion. The Institute partners with political leaders, policymakers, and representatives of civil society to improve the functioning of the government and its institutions, confront security threats while preserving civil liberties, and foster solidarity within Israeli society. The State of Israel recognized the positive impact of IDI's research and recommendations by bestowing upon the Institute its most prestigious award, the Israel Prize for Lifetime Achievement.

The Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research (IDI) conducts rigorous empirical research on the attitudes of the Israeli public regarding the functioning of the country's democratic system and the commitment of Israeli society to core democratic values. Data Israel: The Louis Guttman Social Research Database, maintained by the Center, presents current and historical survey data and other materials collected since 1949 by the Center for Applied Social Research founded by Prof. Guttman, which have been donated to the Israel Democracy Institute. The Viterbi Center strives to enrich the public discourse in Israel on social and policy issues by generating, analyzing, and publicizing authoritative information, and placing it at the disposal of researchers, journalists, and interested members of the public in Israel and around the world.

The Israeli Democracy Index offers an annual assessment of the quality of Israeli democracy. Since 2003, an extensive survey has been conducted on a representative sample of Israel's adult population. The project aims to explore trends in Israeli society on fundamental questions relating to the realization of democratic goals and values, and the performance of government systems and elected officials. Analysis of the survey results is intended to enhance public debate on the status of democracy in Israel, and create a comprehensive source of relevant information.