



Viterbi Family Center
for Public Opinion
and Policy Research



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THE ISRAELI DEMOCRACY INDEX 2025

Tamar Hermann

Lior Yohanani | Yaron Kaplan | Inna Orly Sapozhnikova



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Principal Findings

Chapter 1: How is Israel Doing?

- ❑ The Israeli public's assessment of the country's overall situation has improved somewhat: The proportion of Israelis who characterize it as good or very good rose from 12% last year to 20% this year, with the share who define it as bad or very bad decreasing from 60% to roughly one-half.
- ❑ At the same time, a majority of Arab respondents (64%), and nearly one-half of Jews (45%), still consider the country's situation to be bad or very bad.
- ❑ Among Jewish respondents, a sweeping majority on the Left, and a majority in the Center (80% and 61%, respectively), hold that the situation is bad or very bad, as opposed to a minority on the Right (30.5%).
- ❑ Over half of the general public (54%) see their personal situation as good or very good, while just 10% define it as bad or very bad. Arab respondents tend more than Jewish respondents to take a negative view of their personal situation.
- ❑ A majority of Jews and Arabs alike agree that Israel is a good place to live (66% and 62%, respectively). In the Jewish public, there is a sizeable difference between political camps on this point, with a substantial majority on the Right (77%), a small majority in the Center (56%), and a minority on the Left (35%) who feel this way.
- ❑ A majority of Jews (72%) think that it is safer today for them to live in Israel than abroad. Only about one-half of Arabs think that Israel is the safest place for them to live.
- ❑ A large majority of Jewish respondents are proud to be Israeli (83%), compared with a minority of Arabs (44%). Among Jews, secular respondents report the lowest level of pride (74%), compared with the other religious

groups (national religious and traditional religious, 92% in both groups; traditional non-religious, 91.5%; and Haredim, 81%).

- ❑ A substantial majority of Jews (87%) feel part of the state and its problems, as contrasted with slightly more than half of Arabs (54%).
- ❑ Both Jews and Arabs are optimistic about Israel's ability to defend itself in the near future (79.5% and 72%, respectively); to preserve its standing as a leading high-tech nation (77% and 72%, respectively); and to sign peace agreements with additional Arab states (Jews, 64% and 79%, respectively). A majority of Jews and Arabs alike anticipate increased "religionization" (69% and 61%, respectively).
- ❑ A majority of Jews and Arabs prefer to remain in Israel rather than emigrating; in fact, we found a rise this year in the share who would opt to stay (Jews, from 64.5% in 2024 to 72% currently; Arabs, from 77% to 82%).
- ❑ A majority of Jews (57%), as opposed to a sizeable minority of Arabs (45%) are optimistic about Israel's future. Among Jews, a considerable majority on the Right (70%) expressed optimism, as opposed to a minority in the Center (44%) and on the Left (27%).

Chapter 2: The State

- ❑ In the Jewish sample this year, three institutions crossed the midway mark in terms of their public trust rating: the IDF, the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency), and respondents' municipality/local authority. Among Arab interviewees, no institution attained a trust rating of 50% or above.
- ❑ This year saw a rise in the share of the Jewish public who express trust in the IDF, the Attorney General, the government, and the Knesset; at the same time, we recorded a decline in trust in the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency), the President of Israel, and the police.
- ❑ Among Arab respondents, we found an increase in the level of trust in six institutions: the Supreme Court, the President of Israel, the Attorney General, the media, the Knesset, and the political parties. In the remaining institutions surveyed, the results remained relatively unchanged.
- ❑ This year as well, the prevailing opinion among Jewish respondents is that the Jewish component of Israel's identity is too dominant (44%). Roughly one-quarter think that the democratic element is too strong, and approximately one-fifth believe that there is a good balance between the two components.

Among Arabs, a substantial majority (80%) think that the Jewish aspect is too dominant.

- ❑ Nearly one-half (46%) of Jews hold that the state ensures the security of its citizens, as compared with one-third of Arabs. In the Jewish sample, a majority on the Right (59%) think that the state is fulfilling this function, as contrasted with a minority of 30% in the Center and 20% on the Left.
- ❑ As a whole, the public's assessment of the state's ability to ensure the welfare of its citizens is much lower, with less than one-quarter (23%) considering it successful in this regard.
- ❑ Like last year, only about one-third of all respondents agreed with the statement that citizens of Israel can always rely on the state to come to their aid in times of trouble.
- ❑ Roughly one-half of the general public agree with the notion that it would be best to dismantle all of Israel's political institutions and start over from scratch.

Chapter 3: Democracy and Freedom of Expression

- ❑ Since 2018, there has been an ongoing decline in Israeli Jews' assessment of the country's democracy, to the point where only one-quarter today characterize it as good or excellent. Among Arabs, the share who assign it a similar rating stands at just one-fifth.
- ❑ Slightly less than one-half of the general public (45%) hold that Israeli democracy is in worse shape than other democracies, while 26% think it is in better shape, and 24% that it is in similar condition.
- ❑ A large majority of the total sample (roughly 70%) think that the challenges facing Israeli democracy stem from factors unique to Israel; meanwhile, roughly one-quarter believe that other democracies are contending with the same factors as Israel.
- ❑ Roughly one-half of Jews and three-quarters of Arabs agree with the statement: "Decisions that are opposed to fundamental democratic values such as minority rights and freedom of expression are not democratic, even if they are passed by the government or a Knesset majority."
- ❑ A large majority of the total sample (71%, breaking down into: Jews, 69%; Arabs, 78%) think that it is important for Israel to have a constitution. At the same time, only one-fifth of the general public believe chances are good

that one will be formulated within the next ten years (Jews, 18.5%; Arabs, 28.5%).

- ❑ One-half of Jews and a small majority of Arabs (55.5%) agree that the Supreme Court intervenes too much in decisions made by the government. Among Jews, a sizeable majority on the Right (72%) think this way, as opposed to the Left and Center, where a large majority take the opposite view (87.5% and 70%, respectively).
- ❑ Only a minority—even smaller than when we last asked this question, in 2016—hold that “no one in Israel is hesitant to express their political opinions” (Jews, dropping from 37% to 19% at present; and Arabs, from 27% to 16%). Among Jews, a majority on the Left think that people on the Left are more hesitant, whereas on the Right, the largest share (though not a majority) think that people on the Right are more cautious about expressing their views.
- ❑ A majority of Arabs (70%), and roughly one-half of Jews, agree that it is better not to express their political opinions in the presence of people they don’t know.
- ❑ Some 80% of Jews, versus a much smaller majority (57%) of Arabs, think that there are people in Israel who take advantage of freedom of expression to harm the state.
- ❑ Roughly three-quarters of Arabs hold that freedom of expression in Israel is more limited than in other democracies, while among Jews, a minority (43.5%) think that this freedom is greater in Israel, and slightly less than one-third, that it is similar to other democracies.
- ❑ A sweeping majority (some 90%) of Jews, and roughly three-quarters of Arabs, hold that the use of violence for political ends is never justified.
- ❑ As in past surveys, about two-thirds of Jews agree that human and civil rights organizations cause damage to the state, while just one-third of Arabs share this view. Among Jews, 80% on the Right feel this way, as opposed to roughly one-half in the Center and only about one-fifth on the Left.
- ❑ A small majority (55%) of the general public agree that “Israeli media portray the situation in the country as much worse than it really is.” Among Jews surveyed, a substantial majority on the Right (72%) share this view, compared with a minority in the Center and on the Left (36% and 21%, respectively).

- ❑ A majority of Jews and Arabs alike believe that the state does not have the right to be involved in determining the content broadcast by public media outlets despite the fact that they receive state funding (59.5% and 71%, respectively). Jews on the Right are split on this question, while a large majority on the Left and in the Center oppose state involvement in media content (91.5% and 76.5%, respectively).
- ❑ A majority of both Jews and Arabs think that the state does not have the right to play a role in determining the cultural and artistic content of cultural institutions that enjoy government funding (54% and 58%, respectively).

Chapter 4: United or Divided?

- ❑ For the first time since the inception of the *Democracy Index* surveys, Jews and Arabs this year offered the same solidarity ratings for Israeli society as a whole. Among Jews on the Left, the assessment of solidarity was lower than that given in the Center or on the Right.
- ❑ In both the Jewish and Arab publics, a sizeable majority expressed agreement with the statement that Israelis can always count on their fellow citizens to help them in times of trouble (79% and 64.5%, respectively).
- ❑ In the Jewish sample, friction between Right and Left headed the list of most acute social tensions in Israel, at 55%; among Arabs, Jewish-Arab tensions were considered to be the most acute by 54% of those surveyed.
- ❑ Roughly one-half of Jews would find it difficult to accept political views contrary to their own in a romantic partner or spouse, but in other relationships (such as neighbors or similar), only a small minority would consider it a problem. Only a negligible minority of Arabs responded that they would find it hard to accept opposing political views in all types of relationships, including romantic ones.

Chapter 5: Jewish-Arab relations

- ❑ A majority of Jews (63%) hold that Israel acts democratically toward Arab citizens as well as Jews, but this share is showing a downward trend. Only about one-third of Arabs have expressed this view since 2018. Among Jews on the Right, a substantial majority (73%) believe that Israel is democratic to its Arab citizens, as opposed to slightly over half in the Center (53.5%) and a little less than half on the Left (45%).

- ❑ Virtually all of the Arabs surveyed (90%) favor the integration of Arab citizens into Israeli society, as opposed to only about one-half of Jews.
- ❑ Some three-quarters of Arabs think that most Arab citizens of Israel wish to integrate into Israeli society, as contrasted with a minority of Jews (37%) who share this view.
- ❑ Almost one-half of Arabs (46%) believe that the majority of Jewish citizens of Israel would like Arabs to integrate into Israeli society and be part of it, as contrasted with just one-quarter (25.5%) of Jews.
- ❑ A majority of Arabs (70%) think it is possible to combine Palestinian identity with loyalty to the State of Israel, as opposed to a very small minority of Jews who hold this view (16%). In all three Jewish political camps, there has been a consistent decline in the share of respondents who believe that the two can be merged.
- ❑ Roughly one-half of Jews (48.5%) support separation between Jews and Arabs in order to preserve Jewish identity. Conversely, only one-quarter of Arabs favor such separation for the preservation of Arab identity. About two-thirds of Jews on the Right support the notion of Jews and Arabs living separately, compared with a minority in the Center (28%) and on the Left (21%).
- ❑ About one-half of Jews surveyed agree that the government should encourage Arab citizens to emigrate from Israel, marking a steep rise from the last time this question was posed (2019, 36%; 2025, 53%).
- ❑ A considerable majority of Arabs (86%) support the inclusion of Arab parties in the government, as opposed to just over one-quarter of Jews (27%). In the Jewish sample, a majority on the Left (72%) favor bringing Arab parties into the government, as contrasted with less than one-half in the Center (43%) and a scant minority on the Right (11%).

Chapter 6: Elections on the Horizon

- ❑ A majority of the public feel that there is no party that closely represents their views (Jews, 67.5%; Arabs, 76%).
- ❑ Two-thirds of Jews (68%) and one-half of Arabs (50.5%) think that the next Knesset elections will be free and fair.
- ❑ Roughly one-half or more of the public hold that it is quite or very likely that foreign or domestic entities will attempt to sway Israel's elections (domestic entities: Jews, 58%; Arabs, 51%; foreign entities: Jews, 50%; Arabs, 47%).

- ❑ Among Jewish respondents, the factors with the greatest impact on their decision about which party to vote for are (in descending order) the party platform on foreign policy and security; religion and state; and the economy and high cost of living. Among Arabs, one salient factor stands out: the party's position on the economy and the cost of living.
- ❑ Roughly three-quarters of Arabs consider the party's stance on the fight against crime to be a major factor in deciding which party to vote for.
- ❑ 40% of all respondents surveyed agree with the statement: "It makes no difference who you vote for; it doesn't change the situation."

Chapter 7: International Indicators

- ❑ The international democracy indicators are always compiled for the preceding year, meaning that the indicators published in 2025 relate to the state of democracy in 2024.
- ❑ Once again this year, we examined Israel's scores as well as its international standing in two categories: its overall global ranking, and its ranking relative to the OECD states.
- ❑ We studied Israel's scores in 11 international democracy indicators. It earned its highest scores in the political participation indicator of the Economist Intelligence Unit (94.4), and the political rights indicator produced by Freedom House (85.0). Israel's lowest scores were for freedom of the press, measured by Reporters Without Borders (51.1), and for participatory democracy, in the indicator compiled by V-Dem Institute (60.1).
- ❑ Compared with 2023, we saw an upturn in three indicators, and a decline in two, with the other six remaining largely stable or registering only minor changes.
 - According to the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Israel has long been classified as a "flawed democracy." In the latest report, its scores were on par with the preceding year in all three areas presented here: political participation (the indicator in which Israel scored highest); democratic political culture; and functioning of government.
 - In the *Freedom in the World* report compiled by Freedom House, which assesses countries' performance in two major areas—political rights and civil liberties—Israel continues to be classified as a "free" (as opposed to "not free") country. Nonetheless, though there has been no change in

the political rights indicator since the previous report, there has been a slight decline in Israel's civil liberties score.

- In the freedom of the press indicator produced by Reporters Without Borders, Israel's score has continued to drop.
 - By contrast, in Transparency International's perception of corruption indicator, Israel showed an upturn this year, that is, Israel's situation in this regard has improved.
 - In two out of four V-Dem Institute indicators (egalitarian democracy and deliberative democracy), Israel's scores rose slightly, while in the participatory democracy and equal distribution of resources indicators, they remained stable. Despite this, Israel is still categorized in V-Dem's report as an "electoral democracy," one level below "liberal democracy."
- Comparing Israel's scores in this year's democracy indicators with its multi-year averages reveals that in three indicators, its current scores are higher than the multi-year average: political participation (+7.0%); participatory democracy (+3.8%); and perception of corruption (+4.2%). In six other indicators, Israel's scores this year are lower than its multi-year average—most notably, in freedom of the press (–29.9%) and civil liberties (–11.9%). The remainder of the current scores are close to the multi-year average.

Introduction

In many ways, 2025—which is the focus of this report—marked a continuation of 2024. Much of the year was characterized by an intensive and prolonged war effort, which included exposure of the general public to painful attacks, on this occasion chiefly from the direction of Iran. At the same time, internal differences of opinion persisted over the question of who was primarily responsible for Israel's lack of preparedness for the October 7 attacks. There were also continued, and even more intensive, widespread civil protests calling for the return of the hostages, even if this meant giving up on the other stated goal of the Israel-Hamas War, of toppling Hamas. Although, as in 2024, the government's attempts to implement the judicial reform/overhaul were paused for most of the year, they cast a shadow over the Israeli political arena that took on a more solid form in the latter part of the year, when the initiators of these efforts resumed them, with all that this implies. The immediate outcome was harsher opposition to the government among certain segments of the public, and deeper internal rifts.

The fact that the events of 2025 were, as noted, largely a continuation of those in 2024 presumably contributed to the strong similarity between the findings of the 2024 and 2025 surveys. The latter, conducted in May, 2025, was the twenty-third such poll carried out as part of the Israel Democracy Institute's annual *Democracy Index* report. In general, we observed similar manifestations of general dissatisfaction along with a substantial gap between assessments of the national situation (poor) and respondents' personal situation (good, though not excellent). Trust in the various state institutions remains low, even showing a slight (though not dramatic) decline in certain cases, while social solidarity ratings have stayed at low-to-intermediate levels. As in 2024, many respondents think that the state does a better job of ensuring their security than their welfare, and a majority say that they can depend more on their fellow

citizens than on the state and its institutions to help them in time of need. This conclusion was undoubtedly reinforced by the blow inflicted on October 7. As in previous years, the most acute social tension in Israel is seen by Jewish respondents as that between Right and Left. The share of Jews who are in favor of coalitions with Arab political parties remains low, and has even declined, while the percentage of Jews who favor living separately from Arabs is slowly but steadily climbing. It should be noted that in the Arab public, the most acute social tension is considered to be that between Jews and Arabs, yet the desire for coexistence and integration remains very high.

Gaps between the three political camps in the Jewish public, and between Jews and Arabs, are reflected in virtually all responses to the questions presented. In addition, the overlap (primarily among Jews) between respondents' religiosity and the political camps with which they align themselves remains consistent. Likewise, in the Arab public, we see the same differences as in the past between voters for the various parties in the 2022 Knesset elections as well as between religious groups.

However, not all the findings are negative—as seen in the large shares of respondents (indeed, even larger this year in some cases) who prefer to remain in Israel rather than emigrate, who express a sense of belonging to the state, and who feel that Israel is a good place to live. Interestingly enough, the international indicators have also shown very little change, despite the worsening of Israel's standing on the world stage.

As of this writing, a ceasefire agreement has been signed, and the return of the living and the murdered hostages is nearing an end, which can be expected to calm matters somewhat and improve the national mood; but, at the same time, the country is entering the pre-election period, which tends to fan the flames of polarization. The findings presented in this report should therefore serve primarily as a point of reference for what Israelis of various groups have experienced recently, and perhaps—with the necessary dose of academic caution—also as a basis for anticipating what will happen in Israel's public sphere in the near future.

It is our hope that you find this report interesting and informative.

The Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research
November 2025

Methodology

The 2025 *Israeli Democracy Index*, like its predecessors, examines Israeli public opinion on key social and political issues that have been at the center of Israeli discourse and actions this year. In terms of methodology, the report is based on three main lines of inquiry: (a) questions posed in the past, which enable us to identify long-term trends; (b) new questions focused on social and political issues that lay at the heart of Israel's public agenda this past year; and (c) comparative data collected and analyzed by international research institutes, which offer a sense of the state of Israeli democracy relative to other countries over time.

Data collection

The two polling firms that carried out the field work for this year's survey were Midgam Research and Consulting (Hebrew interviews) and Afkar Research and Knowledge (Arabic interviews). The data were collected between May 4 and May 28, 2025. Interviews in Arabic were conducted by native Arabic speakers.

The questionnaire

The questionnaire for this year's survey consisted of 74 content questions, worded very similarly in Hebrew and in Arabic, though in certain cases, questions were adjusted for Jews and Arabs. This is noted clearly in appendices 1 and 2. For all content questions, the response option of "don't know" was presented in the online survey, but not to phone interviewees.

The sample

The total sample for the survey consisted of 1,569 men and women aged 18 and over:

- ❑ 1,205 respondents constituting a representative sample of Jews and others, interviewed in Hebrew.¹
- ❑ 364 respondents constituting a representative sample of Arab citizens of Israel, interviewed in Arabic.

To ensure that both samples accurately represented the proportion of Jews and Arabs in Israel's population, they were weighted by religion, age, and sex.

The maximum sampling error for the total sample is $\pm 2.47\%$ ($\pm 2.82\%$ for the Jewish sample, and $\pm 5.14\%$ for the Arab sample).

Data collection method

The bulk of the interviews in Hebrew were conducted via an online survey panel, supplemented by phone interviews in a minority of cases (with Haredi respondents and those aged 55 and over). The Arabic survey was conducted by telephone only. The interview method breaks down as follows:

	Internet (%)	Telephone (%)	Total (%)
Hebrew	81.4	18.6	100
Arabic	–	100	100
Total sample	62.5	37.5	100

Data analysis

We analyzed the data using variables that have proven themselves in other studies and in our previous surveys to have strong explanatory value in the Israeli context, among them respondents' nationality (Jewish or Arab), religiosity (in the Jewish sample),² political orientation (in the Jewish sample),³

1 The category of "others" was adopted by Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) during the 1990s to denote individuals who are not Jewish according to halakha (Jewish religious law) but are not Arab. This pertains mainly to immigrants from the former Soviet Union who were eligible to immigrate to Israel under the Law of Return despite not being considered halakhically Jewish. Like the CBS, we relate to them as part of the Jewish public.

2 The categories for this variable were: Haredi (Ultra-Orthodox), national religious, traditional religious, traditional non-religious, and secular. The proportion of each group in the various Democracy Index surveys is in accordance with its share of the population in CBS data.

3 The categories for this variable were: Left, Center, and Right.

age, and level of education.⁴ The Arab sample was analyzed on the basis of voting patterns in the 2022 Knesset elections, area of residence, and (in some cases) religion as well; however, we limited the use of the latter variable due to the small proportion of Christians and Druze in the Arab sample (reflecting their share of the population).

An additional variable that we employed once again is that of social location (self-identification with stronger or weaker groups in Israeli society)⁵—a subjective variable that has shown itself in past surveys to be a good predictor of respondents' opinions.

Navigating the report

To make it easier to navigate the report, two types of references have been inserted beneath each question heading: The first, next to the question number, refers the reader to the page where that question appears in appendix 1, which contains the questionnaire and the distribution of responses for each content question, presented in a three-line format: total sample, Jews, Arabs. The second is used only for recurring questions, and points to the page where that question appears in appendix 2, which presents a multi-year comparison of data. The references are shown in the text as follows:

Israel's overall situation

Question 1 Appendix 1, page 000 | Appendix 2, page 000

Similarly, next to each question in appendices 1 and 2, there is a reference to the page in the text where that question is discussed.⁶

To make for easier reading, we present the data in whole numbers in the text and accompanying figures, using half-percentage points in rare instances. In the appendices, by contrast, the data are shown to a higher degree of precision—

4 The variable of education was grouped into two categories: academic education (consisting of partial academic studies without a degree, or full studies with a degree), and non-academic education (partial high school without a matriculation certificate, full high school with a matriculation certificate, or post-secondary studies).

5 The categories for this variable were: identification with strong group, quite strong group, quite weak group, and weak group.

6 Appendix 2 presents questions that have been asked on a recurring basis over the years. In the print version of the *Democracy Index*, only the data for the past decade appear, while in the online version, all data from previous years is provided.

up to one decimal place. Due to this rounding (which, as stated, is intended to assist the reader), there are occasionally very minor differences between the data in the main body of the report and in the appendices.

Appendix 3 presents sociodemographic data on the survey sample.

Chapter 1

How is Israel Doing?

In this chapter, we discuss the following topics:

- ☐ Israel's overall situation
 - ☐ Israelis' personal situation
 - ☐ Is Israel a good place to live?
 - ☐ Where is it safer to live?
 - ☐ Pride in being Israeli
 - ☐ Sense of connection to the State of Israel and its problems
 - ☐ Young people's contribution to the country today as compared with the past
 - ☐ Israel's future in the coming years, regarding various issues
 - ☐ Staying or leaving?
 - ☐ Optimism/pessimism about Israel's future
-


Israel's overall situation today

Question 1 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??

As always, we opened this year's survey with the following question to "see which the way the wind is blowing": "How would you characterize Israel's overall situation today?" Almost half of the total respondents sampled (48%) defined the situation as bad or very bad, while 31% classified it as so-so, and 20% as good or very good. While the results still lean toward the negative, this distribution reflects a **significant improvement** over last year, when the

share of the total sample who characterized the state of affairs as bad or very bad reached the unprecedented level of 60%, while those who defined it as good or very good hit a record-breaking low of 12%. In other words, there is a substantial decline this year in the percentage who classify Israel's current situation as bad or very bad, a slight upturn in the share who see it as so-so, and a more noticeable increase in the proportion who label it as good or very good.

Figure 1.1 Israel's overall situation today, 2003–2025 (total sample; %)




The survey findings point to sizeable differences of opinion between Jews and Arabs. Whereas the most popular view in both groups is that the situation is bad or very bad, this position is held by around two-thirds of Arab respondents, versus less than one-half of Jews. Compared with last year's results, the proportion of Arabs who define the state of affairs in Israel as bad or very bad has remained largely unchanged, with a slight decline (from 67% last year to 64% this year), as contrasted with a considerable drop among Jewish respondents (from 60% last year to 45% this year).

Moreover, the largest share of Arab respondents classify Israel's situation as very bad (40%), while the largest share of Jews view it as so-so (34%).

There is a substantial decline this year in the percentage who classify Israel's current situation as bad or very bad, a slight upturn in the share who see it as so-so, and a more noticeable increase in the proportion who label it as good or very good.


Figure 1.2 **Israel's overall situation today** (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals the expected differences: The Left shows the highest share of respondents who define Israel's situation as bad or very bad, and the Right, the lowest, with the Center falling somewhere in between, but closer to the Left. In all camps, we see a decline in the share who take this view, with the greatest drop occurring on the Right (Left: from 89% last year to 80% this year; Center: from 74% to 61%; Right: from 45% to 30.5%). The percentage who define the situation as good or very good continues to be extremely low on the Left, at 2% for the second year in a row. In the Center, there has been a slight increase, though the share remains low (10% this year, up from 4% last year), while the Right has shown the steepest climb (from 16% to 30%).

The Left shows the highest share of respondents who define Israel’s situation as bad or very bad, and the Right, the lowest, with the Center falling somewhere in between, but closer to the Left.

Figure 1.3 Israel’s overall situation today (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



An analysis of the Jewish sample by self-defined religiosity reveals that the share who categorize the state of the country as good or very good declines along the continuum from Haredi to secular; however, it is a minority view in all camps.

Table 1.1 Israel’s overall situation today is good or very good (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)

	Haredim	National religious	Traditional religious	Traditional non-religious	Secular
Israel’s situation is good or very good	42	36	22	25	9

Since secular Jews in Israel are evenly divided, for the most part, among the three political camps, we wished to know whether secular respondents who see themselves on the Left are similar or different in their assessment of Israel's current state of affairs compared with secular Jews who align themselves with the Center or Right. Among left-wing secular Jews, 80% define the country's situation as bad or very bad, as compared with 70% of their counterparts from the Center, but just 51% on the Right. On the other hand, whereas the view of Israel's overall situation among secular respondents from the Left and Center is similar to that of the total Jewish sample in those camps, secular respondents from the Right differed from right-wing respondents in the full Jewish sample, with the share of those who classified the situation as bad or very bad noticeably greater in the former group than in the latter (51% versus 30.5%, respectively). In other words, their secular perspective shifted their assessment of the country's situation in a more negative direction relative to their non-secular counterparts on the Right.

While we did not find substantial differences between men and women in the Arab sample this year, there were considerable differences in the Jewish sample. As we saw last year, Jewish women show a much greater tendency than Jewish men to see the situation in a more negative light. Nonetheless, both Jewish men and Jewish women show a decline from last year in the share who define the situation as bad or very bad (women: from 67% to 54%; men: from 50% to 36%).

Table 1.2 Israel's overall situation today (Jewish and Arab men and women; %)


	Good/ very good	So-so	Bad/ very bad	Don't know	Total
Jewish men	29	35	36	-	100
Jewish women	13	33	54	-	100
Arab men	18	18	63.5	0.5	100
Arab women	15	20	65	-	100

Israelis’ personal situation

Question 2 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??

We examined whether respondents’ assessments of the country’s situation corresponded with those of their personal situation. Looking at the longitudinal figure below, it is immediately clear that the downward trend since 2018 among those who define their personal situation as good or very good has not halted but significantly slowed between 2020 and 2025, as compared with the “nosedive” between 2018 and 2020. Despite all that has happened in the past two years, there has been only a slight drop since the previous measurement in 2022, with a majority still taking a positive view of their personal situation.


Figure 1.4 Define their personal situation as good or very good, 2014–2025
(total sample; %)



Despite all that has happened in the past two years, there has been only a slight drop since 2022, with a majority still taking a positive view of their personal situation.

When we compare respondents' assessments of their personal situation with their opinion of the state of the country, we can see clearly that the former lean much more toward the positive than the latter. In the total sample, a majority (54%) define their personal situation as good or very good (as opposed to 20% regarding the country as a whole), while only a small minority (10%) label their own situation as bad or very bad, as contrasted with 48% when it comes to Israel's overall state of affairs.

Figure 1.5 Israel's overall situation compared with respondent's personal situation (total sample; %)



A comparison of respondents' assessments of their personal situation today with the previous findings on this question (in 2022) shows virtually the same distribution (good/very good: 58% in 2022 and 54% in 2025; so-so: 33% and 36%, respectively; bad/very bad: 9% and 10%, respectively). In other words, all the events that have occurred between 2023 and 2025—including the judicial reform/overhaul, the October 7 attacks, and the Israel-Hamas War—have not affected how the Israeli public characterize their personal situation.

The distribution of responses regarding one's personal situation was similar between Jews and Arabs, though not identical: Whereas 54.5% of Arabs and 54% of Jews classify their personal situation as good or very good, 19% of Arab respondents define their situation as bad or very bad as compared with only 8% of Jews who take this view.

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation shows that on the Left and in the Center, the greatest share define their personal situation as so-so, while on the Right, a majority view it as good or very good. The proportion of respondents on the Left who define their personal situation as bad or very bad is double that on the Right.

Table 1.3 Personal situation Jewish sample, by political orientation (%)

	Left	Center	Right
Good/very good	42	42.5	62
So-so	44	48.5	32
Bad/very bad	14	9	6
Total	100	100	100

We examined whether there is a difference between men and women in their assessment of their personal situation: Among both Arab and Jewish interviewees, the share of men who classified their situation as good or very good was roughly 7 percent higher than that of women (total sample: men, 57.5%, women, 51%).

Comparing between respondents on the basis of income level, we found, as expected, that the higher the income, the more positive the assessment of one's personal situation, though the differences between groups among Jews were minor: Of those whose income is lower than the median in Israel, 48% consider their situation to be good or very good, compared with 51.5% of those at the median income level, and 60% of those above the median. The share of those who view their situation as bad or very bad is negligible for all three income levels, with only minor differences between them (below the median, 11%; median, 6%; above the median, 7%). Among Arab interviewees, the differences between the income sub-groups were slightly greater, but followed the same general pattern. Thus, 45% of those earning below the median, 53% of those with median incomes, and 64.5% of those above the median income classify their situation as good or very good.

Breaking down the responses to the question of personal situation by age, we found that among both Arabs and Jews, the youngest age group have the most positive view of their situation, followed by the oldest cohort. The intermediate

age group tended less than the two extremes to assess their situation as positive. At the same time, the share of Arab interviewees who define their situation as bad or very bad is noticeably higher in all age groups than that of Jews.

Table 1.4 **Personal situation** (Jewish and Arab samples, by age; %)

	Jews 18–34	Jews 35–54	Jews 55 and over	Arabs 18–34	Arabs 35–54	Arabs 55 and over
Good/very good	60	49	54	61	44	59
So-so	32	42	39	25	32	22
Bad/very bad	8	9	7	14	24	19
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

As we saw with the state of the nation, a breakdown of responses in the Jewish sample by religiosity regarding personal situation shows that the share who define the latter as good or very good declines as we move along the continuum from Haredi to secular. The share of Haredim who are satisfied with their personal situation is in fact double that of secular Jews.

Table 1.5 **Personal situation is good or very good** (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)

	Haredim	National religious	Traditional religious	Traditional non-religious	Secular
Personal situation is good/very good	85	67	57	52	43

As noted, we asked the relevant survey respondents (non-Haredi Jews aged 18–54) whether they had served as reservists in the IDF during the Israel-Hamas War, comparing the responses of those who had served with those who had not.

Breaking down the responses to the question of personal situation by age, we found that among both Arabs and Jews, the youngest age group have the most positive view of their situation.

It emerged that the differences between the two groups in their assessment of their personal situation were minor, with the majority in both cases defining their situation as good or very good. In fact, the share of those who expressed a positive view of their situation was even slightly higher among those who had served than among those who had not (52% versus 50%). Nonetheless, the proportion who classified their situation as bad or very bad was slightly higher among those who had served than among those who had not.

Table 1.6 Personal situation, by IDF reserve service during Israel-Hamas War (non-Haredi Jews; %)

	Good/very good	So-so	Bad/very bad	Total
Served	52	37	11	100
Did not serve	50	42	8	100

We cross-tabulated the responses to the question on the Israel's overall situation with those on the respondents' personal situation to see whether there is a connection between the two. We found that those who define their own situation as good or very good are split into three almost-equal groups in terms of their characterization of the state of the nation. By contrast, those who classify their personal situation as so-so or bad/very bad are concentrated heavily (with a substantial majority) in the group who define the country's situation as bad or very bad.

Table 1.7 Israel's overall situation today, by assessment of personal situation (total sample; %)

	Personal situation is good/very good	Personal situation is so-so	Personal situation is bad/very bad
Country's situation is good/very good	34	4	3
Country's situation is so-so	33.5	33	11
Country's situation is bad/very bad	32	63	86
Don't know	0.5	-	-
Total	100	100	100


Is Israel a good place to live?

Question 25 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??

The responses to this question, which we revisit here for the seventh time since 2017, have been almost identical among both Jews and Arabs over the last three years. Once again, the majority (the relative size of which alternates between the two groups) hold that Israel is a good place to live. A fascinating finding is that the events of October 7, as well as the internal crises that Israel has experienced in recent years, affected this majority only on the margins of both groups.

In 2025, 66% of Jewish respondents, and 62% of Arab interviewees, agree that Israel is a good place to live.


Figure 1.6 Agree that Israel is a good place to live, 2017–2025 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



As opposed to the similarity in the responses of Jews and Arabs, we found sizeable differences when breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation: This year, as in the past, a considerable majority on the Right and a small majority in the Center think that Israel is a good place to live, while only a minority on the Left share this view.

This year, as in the past, a considerable majority on the Right and a small majority in the Center think that Israel is a good place to live, while only a minority on the Left share this view.

Figure 1.7 **Agree that Israel is a good place to live, 2017–2025** (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



In the Jewish sample, we also found substantial differences between responses when analyzing on the basis of religiosity. In all the groups, with the exception of secular Jews, a clear majority hold that Israel is a good place to live.

Table 1.8 **Agree that Israel is a good place to live** (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)

Haredim	National religious	Traditional religious	Traditional non-religious	Secular
89	82	73	75	49

A breakdown of the responses by social location (self-identification with stronger or weaker groups in society) shows that both Jews and Arabs who

associate themselves with the stronger groups are more inclined to state that Israel is a good place to live (in both cases, 73%), as compared with those who identify with the weaker groups (Jews, 52%; Arabs, 53%).

Where is it safer to live?

Question 62⁷ Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??

We asked Jews and Arabs separately where it was safer for them to live, as a group—in Israel, or elsewhere in the world (posing the question to Jews regarding Jews, and Arabs regarding Arabs). The options presented were: in Israel, in a different country, or in both locations to the same degree. Among Jews, a large majority answered that it was safer for them to live in Israel, while among Arabs, only a small majority chose this response. At the same time, the share of Arabs who feel safer living somewhere other than Israel is almost four times greater than the corresponding share of Jews (23% versus 6%). It should be noted that this question was also posed to a sample of Jewish respondents in May 2024, when national morale was at one of its lowest ebbs due to the military quagmire in Gaza, and prior to the successful campaign against Hezbollah was launched in the North (and of course, long before the Rising Lion campaign against Iran). The distribution of responses at the time was virtually identical to the present one. It seems that, despite everything, a majority of the public feel safer in Israel than elsewhere.


Here too, the gaps between political camps in the Jewish sample are very sizeable: On the Left, only slightly more than half (51%), and in the Center, a majority of roughly two-thirds (65%), responded that it is safer for Jews to live in Israel, whereas on the Right, a substantial majority (81%) take this view.

We found considerable differences between Arab religious groups as well: Among Muslims, 52% think that it is safer for Arabs to live in Israel, with the majority rising to 68% among Druze respondents; however, only a minority of Christians (albeit a large one, at 46.5%) answered that Israel is the safest place for them.

7 It should be emphasized that this question was posed prior to Operation Rising Lion, during which the home front sustained major blows.

Among Jews, a large majority said that it was safer for them to live in Israel, while among Arabs, only a small majority chose this response.

Figure 1.8 **Where is it safer to live?** (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



A breakdown of the Jewish sample by residential district did not yield any real differences, despite the reasonable expectation that residents of the North and South, who were harmed or were evacuated during the Israel-Hamas War, would feel less safe in Israel.

Pride in being Israeli

Question 3 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??

The question of whether respondents are proud to be Israeli has been asked frequently in the past. With regard to the Jewish public, we have found only slight fluctuations through the years. In the Arab population, by contrast, the rises and falls have been quite dramatic, though the share who take pride in being Israeli has always been lower than the corresponding share among Jews.

This year as well, a large majority of Jews (83%) say they are proud to be Israeli, and only a small minority are not proud. Among Arabs, the share who are not proud to be Israeli (48%) exceeds that of those who do feel proud (44%). Likewise, it should be noted that, among Arabs, the largest proportion responded that they are not at all proud to be Israeli, whereas among Jews, the lion's share was made up of those who are very proud.

Figure 1.9 Quite or very proud to be Israeli, 2003–2025 (Jewish and Arab

samples; %)





Figure 1.10 How proud are you to be Israeli? (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



This year as well, a large majority of Jews (83%) are proud to be Israeli, and only a small minority are not proud. Among Arabs, the share who are not proud to be Israeli (48%) exceeds that of those who do feel proud (44%).

In the Arab public, we found large differences between the three religions on the question of pride in being Israeli: Among Muslims, just 30% expressed pride, as contrasted with 56% of Christians and 77% of Druze.


Analyzing the Jewish sample by political orientation, we found a majority in all three camps who state that they are quite or very proud to be Israeli; however, there are differences in the size of this majority, and even more so, in the proportion of those who are **very** proud. On the Right, the share of respondents who are very proud to be Israeli is three times greater than on the Left, and 1.5 times greater than in the Center.

Table 1.9 **Proud to be Israeli** (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)

	Quite and very proud to be Israeli (in parentheses: very proud)
Left	63 (20)
Center	76 (40)
Right	90 (59.5)

When we analyze the responses in the Jewish sample on the basis of religiosity, it emerges that a majority in all groups are quite or very proud to be Israeli, though this majority is smallest among secular Jews—even smaller than among Haredim.

Figure 1.11 Quite or very proud to be Israeli (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)




Sense of connection to the State of Israel and its problems

Question 6 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??

As we saw with regard to pride in being Israeli, the Jewish public has remained highly consistent over the years on the question of feeling part of the State of Israel and its problems, with a very sizeable majority answering in the affirmative. Again, among Arab interviewees, the fluctuations over time have been greater, with the sense of belonging always weaker than among Jews. Moreover, whereas the Jewish sample has held steady in its responses since 2022, we encountered a decline of 12 percentage points relative to last year in the share of the Arab public who feel part of the State of Israel and its problems. This may be tied to the fact that last year’s finding was unusually high (for reasons unknown), though this year’s measurement was also one of the highest since we began tracking this question.

A breakdown of the Arab responses by religion shows a majority in all three religious groups who feel a sense of belonging to Israel, though this is lowest among Muslims and highest among Druze (Muslims, 52.5%; Christians, 56.5%; Druze, 68%).

Figure 1.12 **Feel part of the State of Israel and its problems, 2003–2025**
(Jewish and Arab samples; %)



We found virtually no differences between political camps in the Jewish public: in all three, a similarly large majority feel part of the State of Israel and its problems (Left, 86%; Center, 84%; Right, 89.5%). Likewise, a breakdown of the Jewish sample by religiosity did not yield major differences between groups, with a majority in all of them expressing a sense of belonging; however, this majority is noticeably smaller in the case of the Haredim, at 75%, as compared with the national religious (92%), traditional religious (87%), traditional non-religious (91%), and secular (87%) groups.

Analysis on the basis of social location found substantial differences, primarily among Arab interviewees. Thus, among those Arabs who self-identify with the weaker groups in society, only a minority report a sense of belonging to the State of Israel and its problems.


Table 1.10 **Feel part of the State of Israel and its problems** (Jewish and Arab samples, by social location; %)

	Jews	Arabs
Identify with stronger groups	92	63
Identify with weaker groups	78	44

We found virtually no differences between political camps in the Jewish public: in all three, a similarly large majority feel part of the State of Israel and its problems.

A breakdown of the findings by age shows that in all cohorts, the sense of belonging is higher among Jews than among Arabs; however, in both populations the share who feel part of the State of Israel is considerably smaller in the youngest age group, constituting a minority in the Arab public, though still a majority in the Jewish public.

Figure 1.13 Feel part of the State of Israel and its problems (Jewish and Arab samples, by age; %)




Young people's contribution to the state, compared with the past

Question 31 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??

Given the previous finding, and the frequent claim in Israeli public discourse that young people today are less concerned with political and social affairs than in years gone by, we asked to what extent respondents agree or disagree with the following statement: "Young people are less willing to contribute to

the state today than in the past.” The distribution of responses in the Jewish sample was the inverse of that in the Arab population; among Jews, the majority do not agree that today’s young people are less willing to contribute than in the past, whereas among Arabs, the majority agree that this is in fact the case.

Figure 1.14 To what extent do you agree/disagree that young people today are less willing than in the past to contribute to the state (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



Comparing the distribution of responses in 2025 with that of the previous measurement in 2019, we found no real change among Arab interviewees, while there was a dramatic shift among Jews. As opposed to the past, a majority of the latter now hold that it is not true that young people today are less willing to contribute to the state, perhaps as a result of young people’s civic engagement following the events of October 7, and the bravery and sacrifice displayed by young soldiers in the ensuing war.


Table 1.11 Agree that young people today are less willing than in the past to contribute to the state, 2019 and 2025 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

	2019	2025
Jews	52	30
Arabs	65	67

A majority of Jews now hold that it is not true that young people today are less willing to contribute to the state, perhaps as a result of young people’s civic engagement following the events of October 7, and the bravery and sacrifice displayed by young soldiers in the ensuing war.

Breaking down the responses to this question by age, we found that, among Jews, young people are actually more critical of themselves than are their elders; among Arabs, by contrast, the differences between cohorts are negligible, with a majority in all groups who agree that young people today are less willing than in the past to contribute to the state.

Figure 1.15 **Agree that young people today are less willing than in the past to contribute to the state** (Jewish and Arab samples, by age; %)



What lies ahead?

Questions 68–72 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??


We questioned interviewees about what future they expect for Israel with regard to five issues:

1. Strengthening of Israel's religious-Jewish character
2. Israel's ability to defend itself militarily and in terms of security
3. Signing peace agreements with additional Arab states
4. Increased international isolation of Israel
5. Israel's continued standing as a leading high-tech nation

We found differences between Jewish and Arab respondents on some of these issues, most saliently with regard to Israel's international isolation.

The smallest gap between the predictions of Jews and Arabs was in the context of Israel's ability to preserve its status as a leading high-tech nation, with only 5 percentage points separating the Jewish and Arab respondents. By contrast, the largest disparity (25%) was found on the question of Israel's isolation on the international stage; only one-third of Jews anticipated that it would increase in the near future, while a majority of Arabs took this view.

Figure 1.16 **Think/are certain that the following will happen in the next 10–15 years** (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



Strengthening of Israel’s religious-Jewish character

The majority of both Jews and Arabs (though by a greater margin among Jews) think or are certain that Israel’s religious-Jewish character will become more pronounced.

A breakdown of the responses to this question in the Jewish sample by religiosity shows that a majority in all groups hold that this will be the trend in the near future. But readers should not be misled by the similarity in the percentages, as there is reason to assume that the meaning attached to this forecast differs from group to group. In other words, within the more religious groups, this is seen as a positive development, whereas among secular Jews, it is viewed in a negative light.

Table 1.12 Think or are certain that Israel’s religious-Jewish character will be strengthened in the near future (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)

Haredim	National religious	Traditional religious	Traditional non-religious	Secular
78	74	71	68.5	65

Israel will be capable of defending itself militarily and in terms of security

The share of Jews who think or are certain that Israel will be able to defend itself in the near future is the highest among all the five issues surveyed (79.5%). This confidence is also shared by a considerable (though slightly smaller) majority of Arab respondents (72%).

The majority of both Jews and Arabs (though by a greater margin among Jews) think or are certain that Israel’s religious-Jewish character will become more pronounced.

In all three political camps in the Jewish sample, we found a majority who share this view, though by a slightly higher margin on the Right (Left, 74%; Center, 74.5%; Right, 84%).

An analysis of the Jewish sample by religiosity reveals that national religious respondents are the most optimistic in this regard (86.5%), and secular respondents, the least—though here too, a sizeable majority (76%) expressed optimism about Israel's ability to defend itself militarily in the near future. The remaining groups fell in the intermediate range.

Peace agreements will be signed with additional Arab states

On this topic, Arab interviewees are more optimistic than Jews (by a gap of 15 percentage points); nevertheless, in both groups, a clear majority predict a positive future (79% and 64%, respectively).

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation showed an unexpected result: Perhaps due to certain statements by the prime minister regarding his intention to seek the expansion of the Abraham Accords, respondents on the Right are more optimistic than in the Center or on the Left that peace agreements will be signed in the near future with additional Arab states (67% versus 59% in both of the other camps).

Of the groups in the Jewish sample analyzed by religiosity, Haredim are the most optimistic that peace accords will be signed with more Arab states in the next 5–10 years, while secular respondents take the least positive view (though in all cases, a majority are optimistic). Breaking down the secular group by political orientation, we found that those who identify with the Right are slightly more optimistic that peace agreements will be signed in the foreseeable future, compared with those who align themselves with the Left or Center (62% and 58%, respectively).

Table 1.13 Think or are certain that peace agreements will be signed with additional Arab states in the near future (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)

Haredim	National religious	Traditional religious	Traditional non-religious	Secular
71	64	64	69	60

Israel will be more isolated internationally than today

As stated, the greatest disparity between Jewish and Arab assessments was found on this issue. Among Jews, a minority of only about one-third (34%) think that Israel's international isolation will grow, as contrasted with a clear majority of Arabs (59%) who think that Israel can expect increased isolation in future.

We found sizeable differences on this question between camps in the Jewish sample: On the Left, a small majority (54%), and in the Center, less than one-half (43%) foresee increased isolation, whereas on the Right, only one-quarter take this view; that is, they are the most optimistic about what lies ahead for Israel.

Israel will maintain its standing as a leading high-tech nation

A substantial majority in both the Jewish and Arab publics are optimistic that Israel will be able to preserve its status as a world leader in high-tech, and, as stated, the gap between the two groups is the smallest among the five topics surveyed (77% versus 72%, respectively). On this issue as well, respondents on the Right are more optimistic than the other two camps in the Jewish sample, with 83% thinking that Israel will retain its leading edge, compared with 72% in the Center and 60% on the Left.


Summing up the picture that emerges from this set of questions, the forecasts of the Jewish public are optimistic for the most part, with the possible exception of the "religionization" of Israel, which, from the perspective of the secular group, is not seen as good news. On the whole, the optimism of the right-wing camps exceeds that of the Center and Left. The Arab public is also optimistic in most areas, though it is unclear whether it views the increased isolation of Israel in the international sphere as a positive or negative development.

Prefer to stay in Israel, or leave?

Question 63 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??

Once again this year, we revisited the question: “If you could receive American citizenship, or that of another Western country, would you prefer to live there or to remain in Israel?” And once again, the stated preference of the majority of both Jews and Arabs is to remain in Israel.⁸ Among Jews, there has been a noticeable upturn from recent measurements (2023 and 2024) in the share of respondents who prefer to remain in Israel. Among Arabs as well, we found an increase in the share who express interest in staying in Israel, even surpassing the corresponding percentage of Jews.

Figure 1.17 **Prefer to remain in Israel, 2015–2025** (Jewish and Arab samples; %)




As in past years, we found considerable differences between political camps in the Jewish sample regarding the preference to stay or go, under the circumstances presented in the question, though the figure below shows an increase over last year in all camps in the share who would prefer to stay. The greatest upswing is on the Left (by 20 percent, compared with 8 percent in the Center and 5 on the Right); still, the share who expressed a preference for remaining in Israel is lowest on the Left.

⁸ For a more extensive discussion of this topic, see the research report “Stay or Go? A Mapping of Israelis’ Considerations and Opinions Regarding Moving Abroad,” available on the Israel Democracy Institute website at <https://en.idi.org.il/articles/62287>.

Once again this year, the stated preference of the majority of both Jews and Arabs is to remain in Israel.

Figure 1.18 **Prefer to remain in Israel** (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



The disparity between religious groups in the Jewish sample on this question is substantial: Among Haredim, a sweeping majority (92%) prefer to remain in Israel, alongside a very sizeable majority of national religious, traditional religious, and traditional non-religious respondents (88%, 85%, and 79%, respectively); among secular respondents, however, just 56% feel this way.

Age emerges as a highly influential factor in the preference to remain in Israel or leave, though the majority across all cohorts in both the Jewish and Arab publics prefer to stay. In all age groups, the share of Arabs who would prefer to stay surpasses the corresponding share of Jews.

Table 1.14 **Prefer to remain in Israel** (Jewish and Arab samples, by age; %)

	18–34	35–54	55 and over
Jews	67	67	83
Arabs	75	83	95

Is there a connection between assessments of Israel's overall situation and the preference to remain or to emigrate? This year as well, we found a strong correlation. Thus, of those respondents who characterize Israel's situation as good or very good, 92% would prefer to remain; of those who view it as so-so, the corresponding share drops to 79%; and among those who define it as bad or very bad, just 63% would opt to stay.

Breaking down the preference to stay or go by personal situation, we found, as expected, an association between the two. While a majority across all categories indicated a preference for remaining in Israel, this majority is clearly larger among those who define their personal situation as good or very good, as contrasted with those who characterize it as so-so or bad/very bad.

Table 1.15 **Prefer to remain in Israel** (total sample, by assessment of personal situation; %)

	Personal situation is good/very good	Personal situation is so-so	Personal situation is bad/very bad
Prefer to remain in Israel	83	64	63

Optimistic or pessimistic about Israel’s future?


Question 74 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??

A small—and virtually unchanged—majority of Jews (57%, versus 56% last year) expressed optimism about Israel’s future. Among Arab interviewees, by contrast, optimists constitute a (sizeable) minority, though the size of this minority has grown since last year (45% versus 35%).

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by religiosity reveals that optimism about Israel’s future is highest among Haredim, and lowest among secular Jews. In all groups, with the exception of the secular, a majority feel optimistic, though there was a slight downturn compared with last year in the national religious and traditional religious groups. Among traditional non-religious and secular respondents, however, there was a small rise in optimism.

A small majority of Jews expressed optimism about Israel's future. Among Arab interviewees, by contrast, optimists constitute only a minority, though the size of this minority has grown since last year.

Figure 1.19 **Optimistic about Israel's future** (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



An analysis of the findings based on political orientation shows a majority only on the Right who feel optimistic about Israel's future, coupled with a sizeable minority in the Center, and a small minority on the Left, though the latter in fact registered the largest increase over last year (with a rise of 7 percentage points). Breaking down the **secular group** by political orientation shows only a minority in all camps who express optimism, though this minority is largest among secular respondents who identify with the Right (Left, 26%; Center, 36%; Right, 48%).


Table 1.16 **Optimistic about Israel’s future, 2024 and 2025** (Jewish sample, by religiosity and political orientation; %)

		Optimistic about Israel’s future, 2024	Optimistic about Israel’s future, 2025
Religiosity	Haredim	77	78
	National religious	88.5	76.5
	Traditional religious	73	67
	Traditional non-religious	59	67
	Secular	35	38.5
Political orientation	Right	68	70
	Center	48	44
	Left	20	27

A breakdown of the Arab sample by religion reveals only a minority among Muslims and Christians who are optimistic about Israel’s future (42% and 47%, respectively), whereas the corresponding finding among Druze shows a resounding majority (81%)—larger than the equivalent shares in all the Jewish groups across the religious spectrum.

Cross-tabulating the sense of optimism or pessimism about Israel’s future with the preference to remain in Israel or leave, we found a strong correlation between the two. Thus, of those respondents in the total sample who expressed optimism, a considerable majority wish to remain in Israel; by contrast, of those who feel pessimistic, less than two-thirds would opt to stay.

Figure 1.20 **Prefer to remain in Israel** (total sample, by optimistic/pessimistic about Israel’s future; %)



Chapter 2

The State

In this chapter, we discuss the following topics:

- ☐ Trust in state institutions
 - Overview
 - IDF
 - Supreme Court
 - President of Israel
 - Police
 - Media
 - Government
 - Knesset
 - Political parties
 - Respondents' municipality/local authority
 - Attorney General
 - Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency)
 - Do young people have less trust than their elders in state institutions?
 - Is trust on the decline?
 - ☐ Balance between the Jewish and democratic components in Israel
 - ☐ Israel's success in ensuring the security and welfare of its citizens
 - ☐ Can citizens count on the state to help them?
 - ☐ Should we dismantle everything and start over from scratch?
-

Public trust in state institutions: An overview

Based on the understanding that public trust in the state and its major institutions is a key factor in the robustness of a democratic regime, once again

this year we measured the level of public trust in the eight institutions that we examine on a recurring basis: the IDF, President of Israel, Supreme Court, police, government, Knesset, political parties, and media. We also included three additional bodies in this year's survey: respondents' municipality/local authority, the Attorney General, and the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency).


Among Jewish respondents, only three institutions crossed the halfway mark in terms of public trust (the IDF, Shin Bet, and municipality/local authority). In the Arab public, no institution earned even a 50% trust rating. The share of Jews who express trust in the various institutions exceeds that of Arabs in all cases, with the exception of the political parties. Moreover, the share of Jews who place their trust in the state's institutions spans a very wide range: from 83.5% (IDF) to 9% (political parties). Among Arabs, the range is much narrower: from 40% (Supreme Court) to 17% (political parties). In other words, the majority do not trust any institution, with minor differences between one body and the next.

Breaking down the trust ratings in the Arab sample by religion, we found that, for most of the institutions, the levels of trust among Druze respondents are higher than those measured in the Muslim or Christian publics.

In the Jewish sample, we generally broke down the questions about trust on the basis of two variables found in the past to be the most influential in this context: religiosity and political orientation. In the breakdown by religiosity, we found differences between subgroups, which we will be reviewing in detail for each institution separately later in this chapter. We have chosen to place our focus here on the disparities between the two extremes: Haredi and secular Jews. Levels of trust in the political institutions (government, Knesset, and political parties) are higher among Haredim than among secular respondents. On the other hand, secular Jews express greater trust in all the remaining institutions surveyed, with the exception of the police and municipality/local authority, where the trust ratings in both groups are quite similar.

Among Jewish respondents, only three institutions crossed the halfway mark in terms of public trust. In the Arab public, no institution earned even a 50% trust rating.

Figure 2.1 Express trust in each of the state institutions (Jewish and Arab samples; %)




Note: The darker bars represent the eight institutions examined on a recurring basis, while the lighter ones indicate those institutions that we do not ask about regularly.

Table 2.1 Express trust in each of the state institutions (Haredi and secular Jews; %)

	IDF	Shin Bet	Supreme Court	Attorney General	Municipality/local authority	President of Israel	Media	Police	Government	Knesset	Political parties
Haredim	61	24	3	1	54	15	2	35.5	45	34.5	14
Secular	87	75	66	65	57.5	47	42.5	31	9	8	5

Analysis of the Jewish sample by political orientation shows very high and identical levels of trust in the IDF across all camps, though in the Center and on the Right, it ranks first in trust, and on the Left, only third. For the remaining institutions, we found noticeable differences. Respondents in the Center, and even more so on the Left, expressed very high levels of trust in the judicial institutions (Supreme Court and Attorney General) and the Shin Bet, whereas on the Right, we found greater trust in the political institutions (government, Knesset, and political parties) and the police.

Figure 2.2 **Express trust in each of the state institutions** (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



Notes: The darker bars represent the eight institutions examined on a recurring basis, while the lighter ones indicate those institutions that we do not ask about regularly. It should be noted that the survey was conducted before David Zini was appointed head of the Shin Bet.

2025 Survey Compared with Previous Years

In the Jewish sample, this year saw an increase in trust in the IDF, Attorney General, government, and Knesset, coupled with a decline in trust in the Shin Bet, President of Israel, and police. The IDF continues to rank highest in terms of trust.

Among Arab respondents, we found increased trust in most of the institutions surveyed (including a sharp rise in trust in the Attorney General and in the Supreme Court), though these may turn out to be skewed results from this particular measurement.

In conclusion, we found that a relatively high share of Arabs (29%) do not express trust in any of the institutions studied, as opposed to a negligible minority of Jews (4%).⁹

Table 2.2 **Public trust in state institutions, 2024 and 2025** (total sample; Jewish and Arab samples; %)


Institution	Total sample				Jews				Arabs			
	Ranking	2024	2025	Change	Ranking	2024	2025	Change	Ranking	2024	2025	Change
IDF	1	69	75	+	1	77	83.5	+	4	30	33	=
Shin Bet	2	59	54	-	2	65.5	60	-	5-7	26.5	26	=
Municipality/ local authority	3	53	53	=	3	59	57	=	3	28	33.5	=
Supreme Court	4	37	41.5	+	4-5	39	42	=	1	26	40	+
President of Israel	5-6	43	39	-	4-5	48	42	-	5-7	15	26	+
Attorney General	5-6	31	39	+	6	33	39.5	+	2	20	35	+
Police	7	41	37	-	7	44	39	-	8	22	25	=
Media	8	25	27	=	8	27	27	=	5-7	16	26	+
Government	9	18	22	+	9	19	23	+	9	15	18.5	=
Knesset	10	13	17	+	10	13	17	+	10	12	17.5	+
Political parties	11	9	10	=	11	9	9	=	11	11	17	+

Note: Changes in levels of trust (signified by + or -) are presented only where statistically significant differences were found.

⁹ This refers to respondents who rated their level of trust in all 11 institutions studied as 1 = not at all or 2 = not so much.


The two figures below show the shares of respondents who express trust in the eight institutions examined on a recurring basis since 2003.¹⁰ One of the more surprising findings is that the institutions' trust rankings, as well as the gaps between them, have remained virtually unchanged (with the exception of the police, whose public standing improved immediately following the events of October 7, though much of this gain was later eroded).

Figure 2.3 Express trust in each of the state institutions surveyed on a recurring basis, 2016–2025 (Jewish sample; %)



¹⁰ For greater clarity, the figures on trust in this chapter present only measurements from the past decade (2016–2025). The complete set of data appear in appendix 2 in the digital version of this report, on the Israel Democracy Institute website.

Figure 2.4 Express trust in each of the state institutions surveyed on a recurring basis, 2016–2025 (Arab sample; %)



We will now move on to the level of trust in each institution separately.

Trust in the IDF

Question 19 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??

In the Jewish sample, the IDF garners the highest level of trust of all institutions surveyed, even registering an increase over last year. Among the Arab public, the share who express trust in the IDF has remained consistently much lower than that of Jewish respondents.

Trust in the IDF cuts across all political camps in the Jewish sample, with respondents from the Left, Center, and Right expressing the same degree of trust (84%). On the Left, there has even been a significant rise in trust, from 69% in 2024 to 84% in 2025. The Right also recorded an increase, though more moderate, in the share who express trust in the IDF.

Figure 2.5 Express trust in the IDF, 2016–2025 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)




Table 2.3 Express trust in the IDF, 2023–2025 (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)

	June 2023	2024	2025
Left	79	69	84
Center	88.5	82.5	84
Right	87	78	84

In the Jewish sample, we found further that a majority in all the religious subgroups trust the IDF. This majority is smaller among Haredim, though it has risen from 50% in 2024 to 61% in 2025.

In the Jewish sample, the IDF garners the highest level of trust. The share of Arab respondents who express trust in the IDF has remained consistently much lower than that of Jewish respondents.

Table 2.4 Express trust in the IDF, 2023–2025 (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)

	June 2023	2024	2025
Haredim	67	50	61
National religious	87	83	84
Traditional religious	82	81	85
Traditional non-religious	91	82	88.5
Secular	88	80	87

In terms of their degree of trust in the IDF, we did not find differences between those who performed reserve duty during the Israel-Hamas war and those who did not (85% versus 84%, respectively).¹¹

A breakdown of responses in the Arab sample by religion reveals only a minority of Muslims and Christians who express trust in the IDF, as contrasted with a substantial majority (which has even grown since last year) among Druze respondents.

Table 2.5 Express trust in the IDF, 2024 and 2025 (Arab sample, by religion; %)

	2024	2025
Muslims	26	28
Christians	34	34
Druze	64	84

Breaking down the Arab sample by vote in the 2022 Knesset elections reveals sizeable differences, with a large majority of voters for Zionist parties expressing trust in the IDF (90%), as opposed to a minority of those who voted for Arab parties or did not vote at all (20% and 29%, respectively).


¹¹ The reference is to non-Haredi Jews aged 18–54.

Trust in the Supreme Court

Question 15 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??

Our findings indicate relative stability in the share of Jews who express trust in the Supreme Court, along with a rise in trust among Arab respondents. In fact, this year, the levels of trust in this institution in both the Jewish and Arab publics were virtually identical. We do not have an explanation at this point for the steep rise in trust among Arab respondents.


Figure 2.6 Express trust in the Supreme Court, 2016–2025 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



A considerable majority on the Left express trust in the Supreme Court today, as in previous years, compared with a smaller majority in the Center and only a minority on the Right. The Center is the only camp that showed (upward) fluctuation this year. This consistency within camps suggests that attitudes toward the Supreme Court are actually part of a broader worldview regarding Israeli democracy.

A considerable majority on the Left continue to express trust in the Supreme Court, compared with a smaller majority in the Center and only a minority on the Right.

Figure 2.7 **Express trust in the Supreme Court, 2016–2025** (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)




A breakdown of the Jewish sample by religiosity shows that a majority of secular respondents trust the Supreme Court, as contrasted with a minority in the other groups; this holds true in particular with regard to Haredim, of whom only a negligible minority express trust in this institution. It is reasonable to assume that the consistently low level of trust in the Supreme Court on the part of Haredim reflects their sense that the institutions responsible for the rule of law represent—to an excessive degree, in their view—liberal values at the expense of Jewish ones.

Table 2.6 Express trust in the Supreme Court, 2023–2025 (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)

		2023	2024	2025
Religiosity	Haredim	11	7	3
	National religious	16	15	19
	Traditional religious	24	22	21
	Traditional non-religious	36	40	40
	Secular	66.5	58.5	66

Analyzing the extent of trust in the Supreme Court in the total sample by vote in the 2022 Knesset elections shows, as expected, that voters for Opposition parties feel greater trust in the Supreme Court than do voters for Coalition parties.

Figure 2.8 Express trust in the Supreme Court (total sample, by vote in 2022 Knesset elections; %)



Next, we broke down the secular respondents by their political affiliation. Of those who identify with the Left or Center, a large majority express trust in the Supreme Court, as opposed to a minority among those who align themselves with the Right (87%, 77%, and 42%, respectively). Stated otherwise, political identity outweighs religiosity, at least in this case.


Analysis of the Arab sample by religion reveals that in all three religious groups, there was a significant increase in trust in the Supreme Court this year. Moreover, a majority of Druze respondents (61%) express trust in this institution, as contrasted with a minority of Muslims and Christians, whose levels of trust are nearly identical (at 38% and 37%, respectively).

Trust in the President of Israel

Question 17 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??

In the Jewish sample, trust in the President continued to decline this year; by contrast, among Arabs, we saw a rise in the level of trust in this institution as well. Despite this, the degree of trust in the President of Israel in the Arab public is still low, both overall and when compared with the Jewish public.

Figure 2.9 Express trust in the President of Israel, 2016–2025 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



A breakdown of level of trust in the President in the Jewish sample by political orientation indicates a continuing downward trend in the Center (though this camp still has the highest share who express trust in the President among all three camps) as well as on the Right. Among respondents on the Left, the results remain unchanged since 2024.

Table 2.7 Express trust in the President of Israel, 2023–2025 (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)

	2023	2024	2025
Left	68	43	43
Center	68	58	52
Right	46	45.5	38

Analyzing the Jewish sample by religiosity, we found that, while the share of Haredim who trust the President of Israel is particularly low, a decline was recorded this year in all subgroups in this category.


A breakdown of levels of trust in the President of Israel by vote in the 2022 Knesset elections (total sample) shows that National Unity is the only party for which a majority of voters express trust in the President. Less than half of voters for the other parties report trusting the President “very much” or “quite a lot.” The lowest degree of trust was measured among voters for Arab and Haredi parties.

Table 2.8 Express trust in the President of Israel, 2023–2025 (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)

	2023	2024	2025
Haredim	26	21	15
National religious	47	55	40
Traditional religious	42	49	44
Traditional non-religious	54	55	47
Secular	67	50	47

Figure 2.10 Express trust in the President of Israel (total sample, by vote in 2022

Knesset elections; %)



A breakdown of the Arab sample by religion shows only a minority—albeit larger than last year's—in all three groups who express trust in the President of Israel.

Table 2.9 Express trust in the President of Israel, 2024 and 2025 (Arab sample, by religion; %)


	2024	2025
Muslims	15	25
Christians	13.5	25
Druze	20	38.5

Trust in the police

Question 16 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??

In both the Jewish and Arab publics, only a minority currently express trust in the police. In the Jewish sample, the downward trend in this area is continuing, while among Arabs, the level of trust in the police has climbed slightly, but remains lower than in the past.


Figure 2.11 Express trust in the police, 2016–2025 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



In the Jewish public, trust in the police is highest among those on the Right, though it has fallen somewhat this year. The lowest level of trust was measured on the Left, with the Center falling somewhere in between. The drop in trust on the Left and in the Center apparently stems from the perception that this institution has become severely politicized.

In both the Jewish and Arab publics, only a minority currently express trust in the police.

Figure 2.12 **Express trust in the police, 2016–2025 (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)**




Analyzing the Jewish sample by religiosity, the groups with the highest share who express trust in the police are the traditional religious and traditional non-religious, while the lowest share is found among the secular. Among Haredim, we observed a noticeable rise in trust compared with the two previous surveys.

An examination of levels of trust in the police in the total sample by vote in the 2022 Knesset elections reveals an interesting finding: It is actually Likud voters—and not voters for the Religious Zionism party, which is led in part by National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir—who give the highest trust rating to the police. Apart from voters for the Likud, a majority of whom express trust in the police, only a minority of voters for the other parties feel similarly.

Table 2.10 **Express trust in the police, 2023–2025 (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)**

	2023	2024	2025
Haredim	21	13	35.5
National religious	35	60	40
Traditional religious	29	56	54
Traditional non-religious	37	57	50
Secular	39	38	31

Figure 2.13 **Express trust in the police** (total sample, by vote in 2022 Knesset elections; %)




A breakdown of the Arab sample by religion shows that only a minority in all three groups express trust in the police (Druze, 39%; Muslims, 24%; Christians, 22%).

Trust in the media

Question 14 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??

The share of respondents who express trust in the media is virtually the same in the Jewish and Arab samples, and constitutes a minority in both cases; but whereas in the Jewish sample, the level of trust remains the same as last year, in the Arab public, here too there has been some increase in trust.

Figure 2.14 Express trust in the media, 2016–2025 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



On the Left (in the Jewish sample), roughly one-half of respondents express trust in the media, as opposed to a very small minority on the Right, with the Center falling in between. Analyzing this question by religiosity shows that only a minority in all groups place their trust in the media, though there is a substantial gap between those who give the highest trust rating (secular Jews) and those who give the lowest (Haredim and the national religious).

A breakdown of the findings among secular respondents by political orientation yields the following: Slightly over one-quarter of secular Jews on the Right (29%) express trust in the media (twice the share on the Right as a whole), as contrasted with roughly one-half of those who identify with the Left or Center (54% and 49%, respectively). Here too, political affiliation takes precedence over religiosity.

On the Left (in the Jewish sample), roughly one-half of respondents express trust in the media, as opposed to a very small minority on the Right, with the Center falling in between.

Table 2.11 Express trust in the media, 2024 and 2025 (Jewish sample, by political orientation and religiosity; %)


		2024	2025
Political orientation	Left	49	53
	Center	39	42
	Right	16	14
Religiosity	Haredim	12	2
	National religious	8	9
	Traditional religious	20	14
	Traditional non-religious	25	27
	Secular	38	42.5

Trust in the government

Question 20 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??

In both the Jewish and Arab samples, only a minority trust the government, with a very minimal increase over last year.


Figure 2.15 Express trust in the government, 2016–2025 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



In the Jewish sample, the trust rating is highest on the Right, but here too, only about one-third report having trust in the government. In the Center and on the Left, the corresponding share is extremely low. To illustrate the link

between political affiliation and degree of trust—particularly in the case of the political institutions—let us note the spike in trust in government among Left and Center respondents during the Bennett-Lapid government, and the nosedive in trust on the Right during the same period; and the converse, with the formation of the right-wing government in 2022.


Figure 2.16 Express trust in the government, 2016–2025 (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



Predictably enough, levels of trust in government are higher among voters for Coalition parties; but here too, the highest share (among voters for United Torah Judaism) is only one-half, meaning that even among those who voted for the parties that make up the Coalition, there is not a majority who trust the government.

In the Jewish sample, the trust rating is highest on the Right, but here too, only about one-third report having trust in the government. In the Center and on the Left, the corresponding share is extremely low.

Figure 2.17 **Express trust in the government** (total sample, by vote in the 2022 Knesset elections; %)



In the Jewish sample, the highest levels of trust in the government are found among Haredi, national religious, and traditional religious respondents, compared with a very small minority in the secular group. The trust rating from Haredim has returned to the level measured in 2023—apparently due to a sense of representation and belonging, stemming from inclusion in government and participation in decision-making, political achievements and budgets secured for the Haredi community, and so on.

Table 2.12 **Express trust in the government, 2023–2025** (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)

	2023	2024	2025
Haredim	49	24	45
National religious	49	39	36
Traditional religious	41	31	36
Traditional non-religious	28	23	26
Secular	13	6	9


A breakdown of the Arab sample by religion reveals low levels of trust in government in all three groups (Druze, 29%; Muslims, 18%; Christians, 13%).

Trust in the Knesset

Question 18 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??

The level of trust in the Knesset remains very low, and again this year, is almost the same in the Jewish and Arab publics—though there has been a slight increase in trust within both groups.

Figure 2.18 Express trust in the Knesset, 2016–2025 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



In all three political camps in the Jewish sample, only a negligible minority report trust in the Knesset, though by a slightly higher proportion on the Right.


Table 2.13 Express trust in the Knesset, 2023–2025 (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)

	2023	2024	2025
Left	7	3	4
Center	16	7	12
Right	32	18	23

The level of trust in the Knesset remains very low, and again this year, is virtually the same in both the Jewish and Arab publics.

Levels of trust in the Knesset are higher among those who voted for the parties that comprise the Coalition, in particular United Torah Judaism voters, though here too, they are still a minority.

Figure 2.19 **Express trust in the Knesset** (total sample, by vote in 2022 Knesset elections; %)



Haredim are the group with the highest level of trust in the Knesset, and secular respondents, the lowest. Also with regard to the Knesset, trust among Haredim has greatly increased since 2024, and has now returned to 2023 levels.

Table 2.14 Express trust in the Knesset, 2023–2025 (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)

	2023	2024	2025
Haredim	37.5	13	34.5
National religious	35	27	20
Traditional religious	35	20	20
Traditional non-religious	24	17	23
Secular	14	6	8


In the Arab public, levels of trust in the Knesset are low in all three religious groups (Druze, 19%; Muslims, 18%; Christians, 9.5%).

Trust in the political parties

Question 21 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??

Among Jews and Arabs alike, Israel's political parties continue to rank lowest of all state institutions in terms of public trust. We found further that, though only a minority express trust in the parties, this is the sole institution that garners a higher trust rating among Arabs than among Jews.

Figure 2.20 Express trust in the political parties, 2016–2025 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)




A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation shows a slightly higher degree of trust in the political parties among respondents on the Right than those from the Left or Center, though only a small minority in all three camps express trust.

Table 2.15 **Express trust in the political parties, 2024 and 2025** (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)

	2024	2025
Left	7	3.5
Center	5	6
Right	12	12

In the case of every party, only a small minority of voters (ranging from 4% to 20%) say they trust Israel’s political parties.

Figure 2.21 **Express trust in the political parties** (total sample, by vote in 2022 Knesset elections; %)



Israel's political parties continue to rank lowest of all state institutions this year in terms of public trust.

As stated, apart from the eight state institutions that we examine on a recurring basis, this year we studied the level of trust in three additional bodies: respondents' municipality/local authority, the Attorney General, and the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency).

Trust in municipality/local authority

Question 22 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??

This year, much like 2024, a majority of Jews expressed trust in their municipality/local authority, as opposed to only a minority of Arab respondents.

In the Jewish sample, we found a link between respondents' degree of trust in their municipality/local authority and its socioeconomic ranking:¹² The higher the Socioeconomic ranking of a locality, the greater its residents' trust in their municipality/local authority.

We did not break down the Arab sample by this variable, since most Arab localities fall in the low- to mid-range of Israel's socioeconomic rankings.

¹² Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics divides all localities in Israel into socioeconomic "clusters," ranked from 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest).

This year as well, a majority of Jews expressed trust in their municipality/local authority, as opposed to only a minority of Arab respondents.

Figure 2.22 Express trust in their municipality/local authority, 2020–2025
(Jewish and Arab samples; %)




Table 2.16 Express trust in the municipality/local authority where they reside (Jewish sample, by socioeconomic ranking; %)


Socioeconomic ranking of locality/ local authority/municipality/	Low ranking (1–3)	49
	Mid-low (4–6)	55
	Mid-high (7–8)	60
	High (9–10)	67

Trust in the Attorney General

Question 23 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??

In both the Jewish and Arab samples, a similar minority trust the Attorney General. Nonetheless, we found a rise in the level of trust in both publics this year (an increase of 6.5 percent among Jews, and 15 percent among Arabs).

Figure 2.23 Express trust in the Attorney General, 2022–2025 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



A large majority of Jewish respondents on the Left and in the Center trust the Attorney General, as contrasted with only about one-fifth on the Right. Of those who identify with the Left or Center, there was even a noticeable increase in trust compared with 2024, though the trust rating has remained consistently low on the Right.

In both the Jewish and Arab samples, a similar minority trust the Attorney General. Nonetheless, we found a rise in the level of trust in both publics this year.

Table 2.17 **Express trust in the Attorney General, 2023–2025** (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)

	2023	2024	2025
Left	65	73	84
Center	54	47.5	64
Right	19	18	19

Roughly two-thirds of secular Jews express trust in the Attorney General, as opposed to the much lower trust ratings in the other religious groups—in particular Haredim, whose level of trust is close to zero.

Table 2.18 **Express trust in the Attorney General, 2023–2025** (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)

	2023	2024	2025
Haredim	11	6.5	1
National religious	11	10	14
Traditional religious	23	19	18
Traditional non-religious	28	35	36
Secular	53	50	65

The majority of voters for the parties that comprise the Opposition report that they trust the Attorney General, particularly those who voted for the Labor Party. At the same time, a small minority of voters for the Coalition parties also express the same view.


A substantial majority of secular respondents who align themselves with the Left and Center trust the Attorney General (89% and 75%, respectively), as opposed to a minority among secular Jews on the Right (40%—a share twice as high as that on the Right as a whole).

In the Arab sample, about one-half of Druze respondents express trust in the Attorney General, compared with a minority among Christians and Muslims (51%, 37%, and 32%, respectively). A breakdown by vote in the 2022 Knesset elections shows a higher level of trust among Arabs who voted for Zionist

parties than among those who voted for Arab parties or those who did not vote at all (73%, 34%, and 22%, respectively).

Figure 2.24 **Express trust in the Attorney General** (total sample, by vote in 2022

Knesset elections; %)



As expected, we found a strong association in the total sample between levels of trust in the Attorney General and in the Supreme Court. Accordingly, a considerable majority of respondents who trust the Supreme Court also trust the Attorney General, and vice versa.

Table 2.19 **Trust in the Attorney General** (total sample, by trust in the Supreme

court; %)


		Trust in the Attorney General			
		Trust	Don't trust	Don't know	Total
Trust in the Supreme Court	Trust	82.5	14	3.5	100
	Don't trust	6	90.5	3.5	100

Trust in the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency)

Question 24 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??

The survey findings show, as expected, that the share who trust the Shin Bet is significantly higher among Jews than among Arabs; however, there is a continuing downward trend in trust in this institution among Jewish respondents, whereas in the Arab public, the trust ratings have remained relatively stable.

Figure 2.25 Express trust in the Shin Bet, 2022–2025 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



A breakdown of the findings on trust in the Shin Bet in the Jewish sample by political orientation shows a large majority on the Left and in the Center who place their trust in the Shin Bet, as opposed to only about one-half on the Right. Compared with 2024, we saw a substantial rise in trust this year among those who identify with the Left, alongside a considerable decline on the Right (it should be noted that the survey was conducted prior to the appointment of David Zini as head of the Shin Bet).

Table 2.20 **Express trust in the Shin Bet, 2024 and 2025** (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)

	2024	2025
Left	71	85
Center	73	72.5
Right	62	49

Three-quarters of secular Jews, and a smaller majority of traditional non-religious Jews, express trust in the Shin Bet, compared with roughly one-half of the traditional religious and national religious groups and only about one-quarter of Haredim.

Table 2.21 **Express trust in the Shin Bet, 2024 and 2025** (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)

	2024	2025
Haredim	33	24
National religious	65	48
Traditional religious	61	51
Traditional non-religious	67	60
Secular	75	75


In the Arab sample, much like last year, only a minority in all three religious groups trust the Shin Bet; however, this minority is considerably greater among Druze respondents (42%) than among Christians or Muslims (28% and 24%, respectively).

Trust in the Shin Bet is significantly higher among Jews than among Arabs; however, there is a continuing downward trend in trust in this institution among Jewish respondents.

Average levels of trust in the institutions surveyed

We calculated the average trust rating in the total sample for all 11 state institutions examined in this report, dividing the respondents into three categories: low level of trust (average of 1–1.99; 30%); moderate level of trust (average of 2–2.99; 62%); and high level of trust (average of 3–4; 8%). Whereas the majority of Jewish respondents—over two-thirds—fall into the moderate category, slightly more than half of Arab respondents rank in the low trust category.

Figure 2.26 **Average level of trust in all the institutions surveyed** (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



The majority of Jewish respondents in all political camps fall into the moderate category of trust, though this majority is smallest on the Right. At the same time, the share of respondents on the Right who place in the low category of trust is three times higher than the corresponding share on the Left, and almost double the share of those in the Center. A majority of Haredim are in the low category of trust, while the majority of respondents in all the other religious subgroups are in the moderate category. Overall, the higher the level of religiosity, the lower the level of trust.

As stated, the majority of Jewish respondents are in the moderate category of trust; however, this majority is larger among those who identify with the stronger groups in society than among those who associate themselves with

the weaker groups. Meanwhile, roughly one-third of the latter, as opposed to only about one-fifth of the former, are found in the low trust category.

Figure 2.27 Average levels of trust in all the institutions surveyed (Jewish sample, by political orientation and religiosity; %)




Table 2.22 Average levels of trust in all the institutions surveyed (Jewish sample, by social location; %)

	Low level of trust	Moderate level of trust	High level of trust	Total
Identify with stronger groups	21	71	8	100
Identify with weaker groups	32	62	6	100


A breakdown of the Arab sample by religion indicates that a majority of Muslims, and over one-half of Christians, fall into the category of low level of trust, whereas roughly one-half of Druze respondents are classified as having a moderate level of trust.

Most Arab respondents who voted for Arab parties in the 2022 Knesset elections or who did not vote at all are in the low category of trust. By contrast, over one-

half of those who voted for Zionist parties are in the moderate trust category, and roughly one-quarter even fall into the high trust category (a greater share than in the Jewish sample).

Figure 2.28 Average levels of trust in all 11 institutions surveyed

(Arab sample, by religion and by vote in 2022 Knesset elections; %)



Do young people have less trust in state institutions than their elders?


We focused this year on how the age of respondents affects their trust in state institutions. In the Jewish sample, a breakdown of levels of trust by age group reveals that in each of the three cohorts, the IDF tops the list of trusted institutions. In second and third place in all age groups are the Shin Bet and municipality/local authority, though not in the same order.

We saw further that respondents aged 55 and over tend to express greater trust in the following state institutions than do the two younger groups, in particular those aged 18–34: the IDF, Shin Bet, municipality/local authority, Supreme Court, Attorney General, President of Israel, and the media.

We chose to concentrate on levels of trust in the youngest age group (18–34) in the Jewish sample, comparing between two extremes of religiosity: Haredi and secular Jews. In the case of the political institutions (the government, Knesset, and political parties), the level of trust among young Haredim is higher than

that among young secular respondents. With regard to the other institutions, young secular Jews display greater trust, with the exception of the police and municipality/local authority, where the share who express trust is relatively similar in both groups.

Figure 2.29 Express trust in each of the institutions surveyed (Jewish sample, by age; %)



Note: The darker bars represent the eight institutions examined on a recurring basis, while the lighter ones indicate those institutions that we do not ask about regularly.

Table 2.23 Express trust in each of the institutions surveyed (Jews; %)

	Secular Jews (age 18–34)	Haredi Jews (age 18–34)
IDF	83	53
Shin Bet	71	19.5
Supreme Court	52	1
Municipality/local authority	48	51
Attorney General	45	1
President of Israel	42	14
Police	36.5	38
Media	35	0
Government	9	38.5
Knesset	10	39
Political parties	7	17


In the youngest age group in the Arab sample, the Supreme Court earned the highest level of trust, followed by the IDF and Attorney General. The Supreme Court also ranks first in the intermediate age group (35–54), followed by the municipality/local authority and IDF. In the oldest cohort (55 and over), the Attorney General heads the trust ratings, with the Supreme Court and municipality/local authority in second and third place, respectively.

In the Arab sample, we found further that in the youngest age group (18–34), levels of trust are considerably lower than in the two older cohorts with regard to the President of Israel, media, municipality/local authority, judicial institutions (Attorney General and Supreme Court), and the IDF.

Breaking down the Jewish sample by age, we found that a majority of respondents in all three age groups fall into the category of moderate level of trust; however, the youngest cohort (18–34) has a larger share of respondents in the low trust category than the two older groups.

In the Arab sample, the largest share in all age groups are in the low trust category, though this share is greatest in the youngest age group.

Figure 2.30 Express trust in each of the institutions surveyed (Arab sample, by age; %)



Note: The darker bars represent the eight institutions examined on a recurring basis, while the lighter ones indicate those institutions that we do not ask about regularly.

Breaking down the Jewish sample by age, we found that a majority of respondents in all three age groups fall into the category of moderate level of trust; however, the youngest cohort has a larger share of respondents in the low trust category. In the Arab sample, the largest share in all age groups are in the low trust category, though this share is greatest in the youngest age group.

Table 2.24 **Express trust in all 11 state institutions** (Jewish and Arab samples, by age; %)

		Low level of trust	Moderate level of trust	High level of trust	Total
Age (Jews)	18–34	34.5	60.5	5	100
	35–54	29	66	5	100
	55 and over	12	77	11	100
Age (Arabs)	18–34	57	33	10	100
	35–54	52	32	16	100
	55 and over	49	38.5	12.5	100

Is trust on the decline?


Each year, we examine whether trust in Israel's state institutions is waning. To answer this question, we have calculated two types of averages:

- a **yearly** average trust rating **for all eight institutions** studied on a recurring basis (average of the share of respondents who express “quite a lot” or “very much” trust in all of the institutions in a given year)
- a **multi-year** average trust rating **for the eight institutions**, across all the years surveyed (the multi-year “average of averages”)

This year, the multi-year average stands at 45.8%, and the yearly average for 2025, at 34%. The current yearly average is almost identical to that of last year (33%), but lower by 11.8 percent than the multi-year average. In other words, the average trust rating did not decline this year, and even rose very slightly over 2024's; however, relative to all the other yearly averages, this represents a low rating.


The yearly average trust rating for 2025 is 35% among Jewish respondents—noticeably higher than that in the Arab public, which saw a slight rise this year (to 25%).

Figure 2.31 Yearly average level of trust in all the institutions surveyed regularly, 2003–2025 (total sample; %)



Note: For 2020–2024, the figure shows the average of the results of the main survey conducted each year and of the validation survey carried out in October or December of that year.

Figure 2.32 Yearly average level of trust in all the institutions surveyed regularly, 2003–2025 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



Examining the average yearly trust ratings of the eight institutions studied regularly by political orientation (in the Jewish sample), we found that the average yearly trust ratings in all three camps have matched closely over the years, even showing largely similar fluctuations (though, as we saw earlier, when looking at each institution separately, the differences between camps are substantial).


Figure 2.33 Yearly average level of trust in all the institutions surveyed regularly, 2003–2025 (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



Analysis of the yearly averages in the Jewish sample by religiosity reveals that, again this year, the average yearly trust rating among Haredi respondents is lower than the averages of the other subgroups.

In the Jewish sample, the average yearly trust ratings in all three camps have matched closely over the years, even showing largely similar fluctuations.

Figure 2.34 Yearly average level of trust in all the institutions surveyed regularly, 2003–2025 (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)¹³



To conclude, we examined the yearly averages of the eight recurring institutions by age. In the Jewish sample, we have not found substantial differences between the three age groups over the years.

In the Arab sample, there have been noticeable fluctuations in the yearly average trust ratings in all three age groups. This year, the yearly averages of the 35–54 and 55+ age groups are identical, and slightly higher than the average for the 18–34 cohort.

¹³ To make it easier to compare the average yearly trust ratings over the years, we combined the traditional religious and traditional non-religious categories into one group. This is because up to the 2011 *Democracy Index*, a single “traditional” category was used, which was then split into two separate groups beginning with the 2012 *Index*.

Figure 2.35 Yearly average level of trust in all the institutions surveyed regularly, 2003–2025 (Jewish sample, by age; %)




Figure 2.36 Yearly average level of trust in all the institutions surveyed regularly, 2003–2025 (Arab sample, by age; %)



Another way to look at the findings is by comparing between the yearly rating and the multi-year average trust rating for the various institutions. The following figure compares the 2025 rating with the multi-year averages for Jews and for Arabs.¹⁴

Figure 2.37 Express trust in each of the institutions surveyed regularly, 2025 rating compared with the multi-year average (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



14 The multi-year average trust rating is based on all *Democracy Index* surveys from 2003 through 2024, excluding that year's validation survey. For the three non-recurring institutions (the Attorney General, municipality/local authority, and Shin Bet), the average is based on a more limited number of surveys.

Relative to 2024, there has been no decline this year in the total sample's yearly average trust ratings for the institutions studied on a recurring basis; in fact, there has been a very slight increase.

In the Jewish public, this year's trust ratings for the IDF, municipality/local authority, and Attorney General are quite similar to the multi-year average, while for all the remaining institutions, the levels of trust this year were lower than the multi-year averages. The greatest disparities between this year's ratings and the multi-year averages in the Jewish sample are in the level of trust in the President of Israel and the Knesset.

Among Arab respondents, this year saw trust levels higher than the multi-year average with regard to the Attorney General, and trust levels matching the multi-year average for the municipality/local authority, IDF, and Shin Bet. In the other institutions studied, this year's trust ratings were lower than the multi-year average.

To summarize, an examination of the total sample's yearly average trust ratings for the institutions studied on a recurring basis shows no decline this year from 2024, and even a very slight increase (34% in 2025, compared with 33% in 2024). A similar pattern is seen in the Jewish public as well, where the yearly average has remained consistent at 35% in the last two surveys. By contrast, Arab respondents showed a small increase, from 22.5% in 2024 to 25% in 2025.

We will now move on to some additional questions that explore the relationship between Israeli citizens and the state.

Balance between the Jewish and democratic components in Israel


Question 13 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??

Israel's political situation over the last few years has heightened the tensions between those who would emphasize the country's Jewish character and those who prioritize its democratic nature. For this reason, we again revisited the

following question: Do you feel there is a good balance today between the Jewish and the democratic components in Israel?

Since this question was first posed in 2016, with the exception of 2022, the most frequent response in the Jewish sample has consistently been that the Jewish component is too dominant in Israel. In fact, this year's results show the highest share ever who feel this way (44% in 2025, compared with a multi-year average of 38.6% for 2016–2024). Much like last year, roughly one-quarter of Jewish respondents hold that the democratic component is too dominant, and only about one-fifth, that there is a good balance between the two elements. Another important finding is the gradual decline in the share of respondents who think that Israel has struck the right Jewish/democratic balance, and the overall rise in those who choose the response of “don't know.”

Figure 2.38 Is there a good balance today between the Jewish and democratic components in Israel? 2016–2025 (Jewish sample; %)



In the Arab public, a clear majority over the years have held that the Jewish component is too dominant.

Since this question was first posed, the most frequent response in the Jewish sample has consistently been that the Jewish component is too dominant in Israel.

Table 2.25 Think that the Jewish component is too dominant in Israel, 2016–2025 (Arab sample; %)

2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
80	74	77	77	76	82	86	60	72	80

In all three camps, the share this year who think that the Jewish component is too strong is higher than the multi-year average. A substantial majority of Jewish respondents on the Left hold that the Jewish component in Israel is overly dominant. In the Center as well, this is the majority view, though by a smaller margin. By contrast, the Right is divided on this question, though the most common opinion is that the democratic aspect is too strong.

As expected, a clear majority of Haredi respondents hold that the democratic aspect is too strong in Israel. This is also the most frequent response (though not a majority position) among national religious Jews.

Traditional religious respondents are split almost evenly on this question. In the traditional non-religious group, the most common opinion is that the Jewish element is too strong. Meanwhile, secular respondents are the mirror image of the Haredim, with a clear majority who hold that the Jewish component is too dominant. In most of the religiosity subgroups (with the exception of Haredim), the share who think that the Jewish component in Israel is too strong is higher this year than the multi-year average.

A separate breakdown of the secular group by political orientation yields a large majority of the secular Left who hold that the Jewish component is too strong in Israel, as opposed to a smaller majority in the Center and only about one-half on the Right (89%, 76%, and 51%, respectively).

Table 2.26 Is there a good balance today between the Jewish and democratic components in Israel? (Jewish sample, by political orientation and religiosity; %)*

			Jewish component is too dominant	Democratic component is too dominant	There is a good balance between the two components	Don't know	Total
Political orientation	Left	2025	85	4.5	4.5	6	100
		Multi-year average	77.6	4.4	12.3	5.7	100
	Center	2025	61	12	14	13	100
		Multi-year average	52.7	12.8	21.5	13	100
	Right	2025	28	33	24	15	100
		Multi-year average	21.3	35.7	30.6	12.4	100
Religiosity	Haredim	2025	5	73	11.5	10.5	100
		Multi-year average	7.9	62.5	15.7	13.9	100
	National religious	2025	14	41	29	16	100
		Multi-year average	8.6	45.9	33.3	12.2	100
	Traditional religious	2025	28	29	25	18	100
		Multi-year average	21.5	33.1	31.5	13.9	100
	Traditional non-religious	2025	40	17	28	15	100
		Multi-year average	34.4	20.2	31.3	14.1	100
	Secular	2025	69	7.5	12	11.5	100
		Multi-year average	60.8	9.0	19.6	10.6	100

* Multi-year average for 2016–2024.

A comparison between national religious and secular Jews with the same level of education shows that religiosity is a more influential variable than education.¹⁵

¹⁵ We did not include Haredim in this comparison because their numbers are too low to analyze in a sample of respondents with academic/partial academic education.

Table 2.27 Is there a good balance today between the Jewish and democratic components in Israel? (national religious and secular Jews, by education; %)

		Jewish component is too dominant	Democratic component is too dominant	There is a good balance between the two components	Don't know	Total
National religious	Non-academic education	11	43	27	19	100
	Academic education	16	40	29	15	100
Secular	Non-academic education	65	8.5	13	13.5	100
	Academic education	71	7	11.5	10.5	100

To conclude, we cross-tabulated the responses in the total sample on the balance between the Jewish and democratic components in Israel with responses to two other questions: (a) assessment of Israel's overall situation today; and (b) optimism/pessimism regarding Israel's future. We found that a large majority of those who characterize Israel's situation as bad/very bad hold that the Jewish component is too strong, compared with a minority among those who rate its situation as so-so or good/very good. Conversely, a higher share of those who view Israel's situation as good/very good think that the democratic component is too dominant. A sizeable majority of those who are pessimistic about Israel's future think that the Jewish component is too strong, as contrasted with a minority of those who are optimistic.

Table 2.28 Balance between the Jewish and democratic components in Israel (total sample; %)

		Is there a good balance today between the Jewish and democratic components in Israel?				
		Jewish component is too dominant	Democratic component is too dominant	There is a good balance between the two components	Don't know	Total
Assessment of Israel's overall situation today	Good/very good	22	38	31	9	100
	So-so	37	25	23.5	14.5	100
	Bad/very bad	70	10	8.5	11.5	100
Optimism/pessimism about Israel's future	Optimistic	36	27	25	12	100
	Pessimistic	69	12	8	11	100

A large majority of those who characterize Israel's situation as bad/very bad think that the Jewish component in Israel is too strong, as opposed to a minority among those who rate its situation as so-so or good/very good.


Israel's success at ensuring the security of its citizens

Question 43 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??

Over the last few years, Israel has been grappling with a series of complex security and societal challenges, which have seriously tested the state. How well is it doing at ensuring the security and the welfare of the public—two key elements at the heart of the social contract between the state and its citizens?

The share of Jews who think that the State of Israel successfully ensures the security of its citizens (46%) is considerably greater than the share of Arabs (33%). While compared with the last time this question was asked (in 2022), the assessment of the country's success at this task has improved in both groups, here too the shares are much lower than the collective multi-year averages (Jews, 61.2%; Arabs, 45.2%). We found further that, despite the fact that Israel has been at war since 2023 (the current survey was conducted prior to Operation Rising Lion against Iran), the public's sense that the state ensures the security of its citizens has increased in comparison with the previous survey.


Figure 2.39 Agree that Israel ensures the security of its citizens, 2019–2025 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation shows that a majority of respondents on the Right hold that the State of Israel successfully ensures the security of its citizens, as opposed to less than one-third in the Center and only one-fifth on the Left.


Compared with the 2022 survey (conducted late in the term of the Bennett-Lapid government), there have been sharp drops in the share of respondents from the Center and Left who agree that the state is safeguarding the security of its citizens, whereas we found a steep rise in the corresponding share on the Right.

Figure 2.40 Agree that Israel ensures the security of its citizens, 2019–2025 (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



A greater perception of success was found among voters for Coalition parties (in the total sample) compared with voters for Opposition parties, of whom only a minority think that the state ensures the security of its citizens.

Figure 2.41 Agree that Israel ensures the security of its citizens (total sample, by vote in 2022 Knesset elections; %)



In the Jewish sample, we found that roughly two-thirds of Haredi and national religious respondents hold that the state successfully ensures the security of its citizens, as opposed to about one-half of traditional Jews (both religious and non-religious) and less than one-third of secular Jews. Breaking down the secular group separately by political orientation, we saw that a higher share of those who align themselves with the Right hold that the state is carrying out this task successfully, compared with lower shares in the Center and on the Left (44%, 24%, and 18%, respectively).

Continuing with the Jewish sample, we found further that men are more inclined than women to think that the state successfully ensures the security of its citizens. Additionally, the sense of security is higher among those who associate themselves with the stronger groups in society, relative to those who identify with the weaker groups.

Table 2.29 Agree that Israel ensures the security of its citizens, 2022 and 2025 (Jewish sample, by religiosity, sex, and social location; %)

		2022	2025
Religiosity	Haredim	23	68
	National religious	32	65
	Traditional religious	30	51
	Traditional non-religious	37	52
	Secular	52	30
Sex	Men	46	51
	Women	34	40
Social location	Identify with stronger groups	46	50
	Identify with weaker groups	30	39.5

In the Arab sample, roughly two-thirds of Druze respondents think that the state provides security for its citizens, as opposed to less than half of Christians and slightly more than one-quarter of Muslims (67%, 44%, and 28.5%, respectively). Additionally, we found that over one-half of Arab voters for Zionist parties hold that the state is successfully carrying out this task, as opposed to a minority among those who did not vote in the 2022 Knesset elections or who voted for Arab parties (55%, 30%, and 24%, respectively).

Finally, we cross-tabulated the total sample results on this question with assessments of Israel's overall situation today, optimism/pessimism regarding Israel's future, and degree of trust in the IDF. The great majority of those who characterize Israel's present situation as good/very good hold that the state is ensuring the security of its citizens, as contrasted with only about one-half of those who define the situation as so-so, and just one-fifth of those who rate it as bad/very bad. The majority of those who are optimistic about Israel's future think that the state successfully ensures its citizens' security, as opposed to only about one-fifth of the pessimists. And roughly one-half of respondents who express trust in the IDF hold that the state is fulfilling its mission in this regard, compared with only slightly more than a quarter of those who do not trust the IDF.

Table 2.30 Agree that Israel ensures the security of its citizens (total sample, by assorted variables; %)

		To what extent does Israel ensure the security of its citizens?			
		Very much/ quite a lot	Not so much/ not at all	Don't know	Total
Assessment of Israel's overall situation today	Good/very good	84.5	15.5	--	100
	So-so	53	45	2	100
	Bad/very bad	20	79	1	100
Optimism/pessimism regarding Israel's future	Optimistic	61	38	1	100
	Pessimistic	21	78	1	100
Trust in the IDF	Trust	48	51	1	100
	Don't trust	29	71	1	100

Israel's success at ensuring the welfare of its citizens

Question 44 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??

Over the years, the share of respondents who think that the state successfully ensures the welfare of its citizens has been considerably **lower** than the share who think that it successfully ensures their security. This year, only about one-quarter of the total sample think that the state takes care of the welfare of its citizens—the same proportion as in the 2022 survey.

A breakdown of responses in the Jewish and Arab samples points to a consistent gap between them. In all surveys, including the present one, Arab respondents give a higher rating than Jews regarding Israel's success in ensuring the welfare of its citizens, perhaps because their expectations of the state in this regard

The share of respondents who think that the state successfully ensures the welfare of its citizens is considerably lower than the share who think it successfully ensures their security.

are lower. Nonetheless, the steep and continuous drop since 2019 in the share of Arabs who agree that the state ensures the welfare of its citizens should be noted.

Figure 2.42 Agree that Israel ensures the security/welfare of its citizens, 2019–2025 (total sample; %)





Figure 2.43 Agree that Israel ensures the welfare of its citizens, 2019–2025 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



Only a minority of Jews in all three political camps think that the state successfully ensures the welfare of its citizens, though the share is higher on the Right, and particularly low on the Left. As on the subject of maintaining its citizens' security, this year saw a clear increase over 2022 in the share of respondents on the Right who hold that the state is capable of ensuring the welfare of its citizens, as opposed to a steep drop in the corresponding share in the Center and on the Left.

Table 2.31 Agree that Israel ensures the welfare of its citizens, 2022 and 2025 (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)

	2022	2025
Left	30	6
Center	24	14
Right	18.5	28

In the Jewish sample, we found further that the share who think that the state takes care of its citizens' welfare is higher among Haredi and national religious respondents, and especially low among secular Jews. In addition, a greater proportion of respondents who identify with stronger groups in society affirm the state's ability to look out for the welfare of its citizens than do those who identify with weaker groups.

Table 2.32 Agree that Israel ensures the welfare of its citizens, 2022 and 2025 (Jewish sample, by religiosity and by social location; %)

		2022	2025
Religiosity	Haredim	16	36
	National religious	26	38
	Traditional religious	19	28
	Traditional non-religious	20	26.5
	Secular	22	8
Social location	Identify with stronger groups	28	25
	Identify with weaker groups	10	17

Here too, we found that Jewish men are more likely to think that the state ensures the welfare of its citizens than are Jewish women (24% versus 18.5%, respectively).

In the Arab sample, a majority of Druze, as opposed to only about one-third of Christians and Muslims, hold that the state is managing to look out for the welfare of its citizens (58%, 32%, and 31%, respectively). Again, much like the question on safeguarding citizens’ security, half of Arab voters for Zionist parties think that the state is fulfilling its mission of ensuring citizens’ welfare, as contrasted with a minority of those respondents who did not vote in the 2022 Knesset elections or who voted for Arab parties (50%, 31%, and 25%, respectively).

To conclude, we cross-tabulated responses on the state’s ability to look out for the welfare of its citizens with assessments of its success in ensuring their security. Contrary to expectations, both among respondents who feel that Israel is safeguarding the security of its citizens and among those who think it is not, the majority think that the state is **not** succeeding in ensuring the welfare of its citizens.

Table 2.33 **Israel’s ability to ensure the welfare of its citizens** (total sample, by the state’s ability to safeguard their security; %)

		To what extent does Israel ensure the welfare of its citizens?			
		Very much/ quite a lot	Not so much/ not at all	Don’t know	Total
To what extent does Israel ensure the security of its citizens?	Very much/ quite a lot	46	53	1	100
	Not so much/ not at all	6	93.5	0.5	100


Can citizens rely on the state to help them in times of trouble?

Question 33 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??

Once again, we asked about the extent to which respondents agree that: “Citizens of Israel can always rely on the state to come to their aid in times of

trouble.” This year as well, only about one-third of the total sample expressed agreement with this assertion.

Figure 2.44 Citizens of Israel can always rely on the state to help them in times of trouble, 2017–2025 (total sample; %)



In all political camps in the Jewish sample, only a minority agree that the state can be relied upon in times of trouble. Nonetheless, respondents on the Right express greater agreement with the statement, while the level of agreement on the Left is particularly low, with the Center falling in between the two.

We saw further that the share who think that the state can be counted on to come to the aid of its citizens in time of need is higher among those who identify with stronger social groups than those who identify with weaker groups; however, both subgroups registered an increase this year in the share who hold this opinion.

Table 2.34 Agree that citizens of Israel can always rely on the state to help them in times of trouble, 2024 and 2025 (Jewish sample, by political orientation and by social location; %)

		2024	2025
Political orientation	Left	10	10
	Center	16	22
	Right	33	37
Social location	Identify with stronger groups	28	33
	Identify with weaker groups	19	26

In all political camps in the Jewish sample, only a minority agree that the state can be relied upon in times of trouble.

To conclude this section, we cross-tabulated the responses to this question in the total sample with several other questions: assessment of Israel's overall situation today, degree of trust in the government, and opinions on Israel's success in ensuring the security and welfare of its citizens. The results were predictable: Those who took a more positive stance on the other questions also gave a more favorable response regarding the ability of Israeli citizens to rely on the state to help them in times of trouble.

Table 2.35 Citizens of Israel can always rely on the state to help them in times of trouble (total sample, by assorted variables; %)


		Citizens of Israel can always rely on the state to help them in times of trouble			
		Agree	Disagree	Don't know	Total
Assessment of Israel's overall situation today	Good/very good	65.5	32.5	2	100
	So-so	35.5	62	2.5	100
	Bad/very bad	22	77.5	0.5	100
Trust in the government	Trust	65.5	32.5	2	100
	Don't trust	26	73	1	100
Extent of agreement that Israel ensures the security of its citizens	Somewhat/strongly agree	54.5	43.5	2	100
	Somewhat/strongly disagree	20	79	1	100
Extent of agreement that Israel ensures the welfare of its citizens	Somewhat/strongly agree	70	27	3	100
	Somewhat/strongly disagree	24	75	1	100

Should we dismantle everything and start over from scratch?

Question 73 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??

Again this year, we asked respondents the extent of their agreement or disagreement with the statement: “It would be best to dismantle all the country’s political institutions and start over from scratch.” Nearly one-half of both Jewish and Arab respondents expressed agreement with this far-reaching proposal. This year, for the first time, the proportions who agree are almost equal in both samples, as the result of a substantial increase in the share of Jews who support the statement.

Figure 2.45 Agree it would be best to dismantle all political institutions and start over from scratch, 2022–2025 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



Breaking down the responses to this question in the Jewish sample by political orientation and by religiosity, we did not find significant differences between subgroups, but the share who agree is lowest among national religious respondents, and highest among secular and traditional non-religious.

In the Jewish sample, we found further that those respondents who identify with weaker groups in society express greater agreement than do those who identify with stronger groups (54% and 43%, respectively), and that women tend to agree with the idea more than men (52% and 41%, respectively).

Table 2.36 Agree it would be best to dismantle all political institutions and start over from scratch, 2023 and 2025 (Jewish sample, by political orientation and religiosity; %)

		2023	2025
Political orientation	Left	30	48
	Center	39	50
	Right	33	45
Religiosity	Haredim	27	43.5
	National religious	23.5	38
	Traditional religious	34	42
	Traditional non-religious	33	49.5
	Secular	40	50

Finally, we cross-tabulated the responses to this question in the total sample with several other questions: assessment of Israel's overall situation today, degree of trust in the government, and level of optimism/pessimism regarding Israel's future. Over one-half of respondents who characterize Israel's situation today as bad/very bad agree with the notion of dismantling Israel's political institutions and starting over, as opposed to a sizeable minority of those who consider it so-so, and less than one-third of those who rate Israel's situation as good/very good. As expected, we found that the share who agree with the above statement is higher among respondents who are pessimistic about Israel's future, and also among those who do not trust the government.

Table 2.37 It would be best to dismantle all political institutions and start over from scratch (total sample, by assorted variables; %)

		It would be best to dismantle all political institutions and start over from scratch			
		Agree	Disagree	Don't know	Total
Assessment of Israel's overall situation	Good/very good	31	61	8	100
	So-so	44	43.5	12.5	100
	Bad/very bad	55	35	10	100
Trust in the government	Trust	31	59.5	9.5	100
	Don't trust	51	38	11	100
Optimism/pessimism about Israel's future	Optimistic	39	51.5	9.5	100
	Pessimistic	57	33	10	100

Chapter 3

Democracy and Freedom of Expression

In this chapter, we discuss the following topics:

- ☐ Respondents' ratings of Israeli democracy
 - ☐ Fear of expressing political opinions in general, and in the presence of strangers
 - ☐ Abuse of freedom of expression to harm the state
 - ☐ Use of violence for political ends
 - ☐ Do human and civil rights organizations cause damage to the state?
 - ☐ Permissible sources of donations to nonprofits and civil society organizations
 - ☐ Reliability of Israeli media's portrayal of the country's situation
 - ☐ State funding of public media and cultural and artistic institutions, and its right to be involved in determining content
 - ☐ What constitutes a democratic decision?
 - ☐ Supreme Court intervention in government decisions
 - ☐ The need for a constitution, and likelihood of enacting one
 - ☐ The state of democracy in Israel compared with other democracies
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
Rating of Israeli democracy

Question 7 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??

We revisited the following question this year: "How would you rate Israeli democracy today on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 = very poor and 5 = very good?"

The scores were grouped into three categories: poor or very poor (1–2); so-so (3); good or very good (4–5). Less than one-quarter of Jews, and less than one-fifth of Arabs, gave Israeli democracy a score of good or very good this year. Much higher shares—nearly one-half of Jews, and over 60% of Arabs—assigned it a grade of poor/very poor.


Figure 3.1 How would you rate Israeli democracy today? (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



An examination of Israeli democracy ratings over time shows a steady decline among Jewish respondents, from over 40% who gave it high scores in 2018 to less than one-quarter today. There has been fluctuation in views in the Arab public; however, the share of Arab respondents who awarded scores of good or very good has been consistently lower than that of Jewish respondents over all the years surveyed. Nonetheless, in 2025 we saw the smallest gap between the two samples, primarily as a result of the gradual drop in scores from Jewish respondents.


Less than one-quarter of Jews, and less than one-fifth of Arabs, gave Israeli democracy a score of good or very good this year.

Figure 3.2 Rate Israeli democracy as good or very good, 2018–2025 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



A breakdown of the Jewish sample by religiosity reveals that Israeli democracy earns its worst ratings at the two “extremes”—Haredi and secular—where over 50% rate Israeli democracy as poor or very poor. At the same time, one-quarter of Haredim—almost double the share of secular respondents—award it a score of good or very good. National religious Jews are the only group in which the share who give Israeli democracy a good or very good rating exceeds the proportion who assign it a grade of so-so or poor/very poor. Traditional religious Jews are the only group in which the share who give Israeli democracy a good or very good rating exceeds the proportion who assign it a grade of so-so or poor/very poor.

Figure 3.3 Rating of Israeli democracy today (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)



An analysis of the Jewish sample by political orientation shows that a majority of respondents in the Center, and even more so on the Left, rate Israeli democracy as poor/very poor, and only a small minority, as good or very good. On the right, the picture is more balanced, with roughly one-third awarding a score of poor/very poor; one-third, good/very good; and one-third, so-so.

Table 3.1 Rating of Israeli democracy today (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)

	Good/ very good	So-so	Poor/ very poor	Don't know	Total
Left	5	23	71	1	100
Center	14	30	55	1	100
Right	33	31	34	2	100

A breakdown of the Arab sample by religion indicates that a similar majority in all groups give Israeli democracy a score of poor/very poor, with slight differences (Muslims, 62%; Christians, 56%; and Druze, 55%). By contrast, there are substantial gaps between the share of Muslims and Christians who rate Israeli democracy as good or very good (18% and 15.5%, respectively) as compared with Druze (36%), while 19% of Muslims, 28% of Christians, and 9% of Druze assign it a grade of “so-so.”

Analyzing the total sample by vote in the 2022 Knesset elections shows sizeable gaps between voters for the Coalition parties: Among those who voted for the Likud or Religious Zionism, the largest share (above 40%) rate Israeli democracy as good or very good, as contrasted with less than one-third of voters for the Haredi parties. It is worth noting that over one-half of voters for United Torah Judaism give democracy in Israel a grade of poor/very poor—similar to, and even higher than, the share of voters for National Unity and Yisrael Beytenu.

In both the Jewish and Arab samples, we found a noticeable association—particularly in the Arab public—between self-defined social location and rating of Israeli democracy. Nearly three-quarters of Arab respondents who associate themselves with the weaker groups in Israeli society rate democracy in Israel as poor/very poor, as opposed to less than half of those who identify with the stronger groups. In the Jewish sample, while the differences are substantial,

the disparities between those who identify with the stronger or weaker groups are smaller.

Figure 3.4 Rating of Israeli democracy today (total sample, by vote in 2022 Knesset elections; %)






Figure 3.5 Rating of Israeli democracy today (Jewish and Arab samples, by social location; %)



The higher the rating assigned to Israeli democracy, the greater the sense of optimism about the future of the country.

Among both Jews and Arabs, we found a strong positive correlation between respondents' rating of Israeli democracy and their sense of optimism or pessimism regarding Israel's future: The higher the rating assigned to Israeli democracy, the greater the sense of optimism about the future of the country.

Figure 3.6 **Optimistic about Israel's future** (Jewish and Arab samples, by rating of Israeli democracy today; %)



Political climate and freedom of expression

In this section, we examine the political climate in Israel through the prism of freedom of expression, and fear of expressing political opinions.

Fear of expressing political opinions

Question 32 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??

This year, we revisited a question from 2016: "In your opinion, who is more hesitant to express their political opinions in Israel today—people on the Right,

or people on the Left?” The most striking finding, common to both Jews and Arabs, is the sharp decline in the share of respondents who think that no one in Israel is hesitant to express their political opinions: from 37% of Jews in 2016 to 19% in 2025, and from 27% to 16% of Arabs. Among Jews, there was also a steep rise over the same period in the share who hold that people on the Right are more hesitant to express their opinions (from 19% to 30%)—similar to the proportion who now associate such concern with people on the Left. By contrast, among Arab respondents, the share who hold that those on the Left are more uncomfortable speaking out rose from 32% to 42%, while only 12% think that people on the Right are more fearful in this regard.

Table 3.2 Who is more hesitant to express their political opinions in Israel today? 2016 and 2025 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

		2016	2025
Jews	No one in Israel is hesitant to express their political opinions	37	19
	People on the Right are more hesitant	19	30
	People on the Left are more hesitant	30	28
	Everyone is equally hesitant to express their political opinions	13	17
	Don't know	1	6
	Total	100	100
Arabs	No one in Israel is hesitant to express their political opinions	27	16
	People on the Right are more hesitant	8	12
	People on the Left are more hesitant	32	42
	Everyone is equally hesitant to express their political opinions	17	20.5
	Don't know	16	9.5
	Total	100	100

The most striking finding, common to both Jews and Arabs, is the sharp decline in the share of respondents who think that no one in Israel is hesitant to express their political opinions.

In the Jewish sample, the current findings point to marked differences between political camps on this question. On the Left, a large majority think that their camp is more fearful of expressing their opinions, whereas on the Right, the highest share—albeit not a majority—think that those on the Right are actually more hesitant. In the Center, the largest share of respondents hold that such hesitation is more prevalent among those on the Left. The steepest drop in the sense that no one is afraid to express their political views appears on the Right—from 44% to 23%—though declines were also recorded on the Left and in the Center. In other words, the data indicate an overall increase in fear of expressing political opinions, with each camp seeing itself as the most restricted in this regard.

Haredim feel the most strongly that people on the Right are more hesitant to express their opinions (70%), while roughly one-half of secular respondents think that those on the Left are more fearful. In the remaining groups, despite differences, the greatest share think that people on the Right are more fearful.

Figure 3.7 Who is more hesitant to express their political opinion in Israel today? 2016 and 2025 (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)




Table 3.3 Who is more hesitant to express their political opinions in Israel today? (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)

	No one in Israel is hesitant to express their political opinions	People on the Right are more hesitant	People on the Left are more hesitant	Everyone is equally hesitant to express their political opinions	Don't know	Total
Haredim	12	70	3	12	3	100
National religious	23	48	6.5	15	7.5	100
Traditional religious	21	40.5	11	21.5	6	100
Traditional non-religious	23	28	22	18.5	8.5	100
Secular	17	11	49	17	6	100

Breaking down the secular group by political orientation reveals that the share of secular respondents on the Right who think that people on the Left are more hesitant to express their political opinions (28.5%) is similar to, and even slightly higher than, the share who hold that those on the Right are more hesitant (24%). Secular Jews who associate themselves with the Left or the Center are especially inclined to think that people on the Left are more fearful of expressing their opinions (74.5% and 54%, respectively).

An analysis based on age group shows that the predominant view among younger Jews (aged 18–34) is that those on the Right are more hesitant to express their opinions (43%)—a significantly higher proportion than in the older age groups (35–54, 26%; 55 and over, 21%). On the other hand, in the oldest age group (many of whom identify with the Left), there is a greater tendency to see those on the Left as more uncomfortable about expressing themselves (34%, versus 29% in the 35–54 age group, and 21% in the 18–34 cohort). We encountered a similar pattern in the Arab public: The older the age group, the stronger the perception that those on the Left are more hesitant to express their opinion, ranging from 36% in the youngest group to 41% in the intermediate cohort, and 54% in the oldest age group.


Prefer not to express political opinions in the presence of strangers

Question 11 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??

Once again, we asked respondents about the extent to which they agree with the statement: “I prefer to keep quiet and not express my political opinions in the presence of people I don’t know.” The findings indicate a growing fear of expressing political views in front of unfamiliar people, regardless of the respondents’ identity. In 2016 and 2017, the share of Jews who agreed with this statement was consistent, at slightly over one-third; however, this year, over one-half of Jews surveyed agree with this assertion. The Arab public also registered a rise (to 70%) in the share who agree that it is preferable not to express political opinions in the presence of strangers, though in this case the more significant jump took place roughly a decade ago.


A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation and religiosity shows that roughly one-half in all groups prefer to avoid expressing their political views in the presence of people they don’t know. A slightly greater share (60%) was found among those who associate themselves politically with the Center.

Figure 3.8 Agree that it is preferable to keep quiet and not express one’s political opinions in the presence of strangers, 2016–2025 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



The findings indicate a growing fear of expressing political views in front of unfamiliar people, regardless of the respondents' identity.

Figure 3.9 Agree that it is preferable to keep quiet and not express one's political opinions in the presence of strangers (Jewish sample, by political orientation and religiosity; %)




Jewish women are slightly more hesitant than Jewish men to express political opinions in front of strangers (56% versus 49%, respectively). In the Arab public, we did not find gender differences on this point.

A breakdown of the Arab sample by religion reveals substantial differences between Muslims and Christians, on the one hand, of whom large shares prefer to refrain from expressing political opinions in the presence of strangers (73% and 72%, respectively), and Druze on the other, who are split on the subject (agree that it is preferable to refrain from such expression, 49%; disagree that it is preferable, 48%). Among Arab respondents with an academic education, the share who avoid expressing opinions in the presence of strangers (79%)

exceeds the share of those without higher education (65%). No differences were found in the Jewish public on the basis of education.

As expected, we found an association between the tendency to refrain from expressing political opinions in front of strangers and the rating of Israeli democracy. Among Jews, those who rate Israeli democracy as poor/very poor are more likely to keep silent in front of strangers; but even among those who give the country's democracy a good grade, close to half prefer not to express their political views in front of people they don't know. The Arab public shows a similar pattern, but more pronounced: In all categories, the share who prefer to remain silent outstrips the corresponding share among Jews.

Figure 3.10 Agree that it is preferable to keep quiet and not express one's political opinions in the presence of strangers (Jewish and Arab samples, by rating of Israeli democracy; %)




Abuse of freedom of expression to harm the state

Question 26 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??

We examined the share of respondents who agree with the statement: "There are people in Israel who take advantage of freedom of expression to harm the state." A substantial majority of Jews (79%) agree with this assertion, including almost half who "strongly agree." Among Arabs, a majority—though much smaller—express agreement (57%). This disparity may stem from differing interpretations of abuse of freedom of expression on the part of both groups.

Figure 3.11 There are people in Israel who take advantage of freedom of expression to harm the state (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation indicates that a decisive majority on the Right agree with the assertion that there are those in Israel who abuse freedom of expression; in the Center, the level of agreement is more moderate, at roughly three-quarters; and on the Left, opinions are split more or less evenly.

An analysis of the Jewish public by religiosity shows a similar pattern: The more religious the group, the greater the tendency to view freedom of expression as being exploited against the state. Thus, the share who agree with the statement is highest among Haredim, and lowest—though still quite high—among secular respondents.

A breakdown by vote in the 2022 Knesset elections reveals that a clear majority of voters for almost all parties—in particular those who voted for Coalition parties—think that freedom of expression is being abused in Israel to harm the state. It may well be that each side thinks that the other side is taking advantage of freedom of expression.

Figure 3.12 There are people in Israel who take advantage of freedom of expression to harm the state (Jewish sample, by political orientation and religiosity; %)





Figure 3.13 There are people in Israel who take advantage of freedom of expression to harm the state (total sample, by vote in 2022 Knesset elections; %)



A breakdown by vote in the 2022 Knesset elections reveals that a clear majority of voters for almost all parties—in particular those who voted for Coalition parties—think that freedom of expression is being abused in Israel to harm the state.


Use of violence for political ends

Question 28 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??

We asked respondents to what extent they agreed with the statement: “The use of violence for political ends is never justified.” In the Jewish public, 89.5% agree with this assertion, as do a majority—albeit smaller—of Arabs (73%). The fact that roughly one-quarter of Arabs disagree with it is cause for concern, meaning they can conceive of a situation in which the use of violence is justified in order to achieve political goals.

Figure 3.14 The use of violence for political ends is never justified

(Jewish and Arab samples; %)



We have revisited this question several times since 2003 (see appendix 2 for the distribution of responses over the years). The three most recent measurements (in 2019, 2022, and 2025) show a large share of Jews who reject violence as a means of attaining political objectives, with a substantial rise between 2019 and 2022. By contrast, among Arabs, the share who reject violence has declined significantly in the latest survey as compared with the two previous ones.

Table 3.4 Agree that the use of violence for political ends is never justified, 2019–2025 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

	2019	2022	2025
Jews	77	90	89
Arabs	85	88	73

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation and religiosity shows a broad consensus on rejecting the use of violence as a means of achieving political goals, with the share who express agreement with this assertion in all political camps at 88%–91%, and in all religious groups, 85.5%–93%. Nonetheless, an examination of the last three surveys reveals a rise between 2019 and 2022 in the share of respondents who agree that the use of political violence is unacceptable, followed by a relative leveling-off between 2022 and 2025. The overall increase in the share who reject violence presumably comes in response to the worsening of the political polarization in Israel and the fears of escalating violence in the public sphere during this period.

Table 3.5 Agree that the use of violence for political ends is never justified, 2019–2025 (Jewish sample, by political orientation and religiosity; %)

		2019	2022	2025
Political orientation	Left	87	96	88
	Center	75	91	88
	Right	74	89.5	91
Religiosity	Haredim	73	93	93
	National religious	76	92	92
	Traditional religious	75	86	85.5
	Traditional non-religious	78	89	91
	Secular	77	91	88

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation and religiosity shows a broad consensus on rejecting the use of violence as a means of achieving political goals.

To summarize this section, the findings show that there has been a marked decline over the last decade in the sense among the Israeli public that it is possible to freely express political opinions, with each political camp feeling that it is the primary casualty. This phenomenon is accompanied by a noticeable increase, across all groups, in the tendency to refrain from expressing political opinions in the presence of strangers. At the same time, differences in the understanding of freedom of expression are also emerging: It seems that religious and right-wing Jews are more inclined to see freedom of expression as a tool that is being abused to the detriment of the state. Despite this, there is a wide-ranging consensus on rejecting the use of violence for political ends.

Boundaries of freedom of expression and state involvement

The questions discussed in this section explore the accepted boundaries of freedom of expression in the eyes of the public, and opinions on the desired role of oversight institutions in the democratic sphere.


Do human and civil rights organizations cause damage to the state?

Question 30 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??

Once again this year, we examined the extent of agreement with the statement that human and civil rights organizations, such as the Association for Civil Rights in Israel and B'Tselem, cause damage to the state. The findings in the last three surveys indicate substantial and consistent differences between Jews and Arabs, with results holding steady within each group. In the Jewish public,

roughly two-thirds of respondents think that human rights organizations cause damage to the state, while in the Arab public, only about one-third feel this way, with this latter share even showing a slight downward trend.


Figure 3.15 Agree/disagree that human and civil rights organizations cause damage to the state, 2022–2025 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation points to sizeable and relatively stable differences between the camps. Since we began asking this question, a large majority on the Right have indicated their belief that human rights organizations are damaging to the state, whereas on the Left, the thinking is the opposite. In the Center, roughly one-half of respondents in all three surveys have expressed the view that these organizations are harmful to the state.

Roughly two-thirds of Jewish respondents think that human rights organizations cause damage to Israel, while in the Arab public, only about one-third feel this way.

Figure 3.16 Agree that human and civil rights organizations cause damage to the state, 2022–2025 (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)




Analysis of the Jewish sample by religiosity shows that the greatest share in all camps agree with the statement in question; however, in the Haredi, national religious, traditional religious and traditional non-religious groups, a majority take this view (79%, 84%, 70%, and 74%, respectively), while among secular respondents, less than half feel this way (agree, 49%; disagree, 42%).

A breakdown of the Arab sample by religion reveals a majority in all groups who disagree with the statement (Druze, 77%; Muslims, 65%; Christians, 59%).

Examining the results by vote in the 2022 Knesset elections, we found a sizeable majority of voters for all Coalition parties who agree that human and civil rights organizations are damaging to the state. By contrast, those who voted for the Opposition parties present a more diverse picture: The majority of voters for Yisrael Beytenu and National Unity agree that these organizations cause harm to the state; however, among voters for the other Opposition parties, the majority—or the highest share (48%), in the case of Yesh Atid voters—think the opposite.

Figure 3.17 Agree that human and civil rights organizations cause damage to the state (total sample, by vote in 2022 Knesset elections; %)




Acceptable sources of donations to nonprofit groups and civil society organizations

Questions 38–41 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??

Public discussion in Israel regarding sources of funding for nonprofit groups and civil society organizations revolves around the question of whether these organizations should be permitted to accept donations from any source, or should be prohibited from accepting donations from certain funders.


Among Jewish respondents, private Israeli foundations and donors are considered the most legitimate source of funding. Funding from private foreign foundations and donors is supported to a lesser degree, though still by a majority. By contrast, international foundations and organizations are seen as a legitimate source by just slightly over half of respondents. The most controversial source of funding is from other states or governments; in this case, the share who are opposed is greater than the share who are in favor.

Figure 3.18 From which sources should nonprofit groups and civil society organizations be permitted to accept donations? (Jewish sample; %)




In the Arab public, very similar (and uniformly high) shares of respondents hold that nonprofit groups and civil society organizations should be allowed to accept donations from all four funding sources.

Figure 3.19 From which sources should nonprofit groups and civil society organizations be permitted to accept donations? (Arab sample; %)



A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals complex patterns. With regard to donations from Israeli foundations and private donors, the shares in favor are high, and comparable in all three camps (at roughly three-quarters). The camps are also largely similar when it comes to donations from other states or governments (opposed: Left, 44%; Center, 43%; Right, 46%). Substantial differences between the groups arise in the case of donations from foreign foundations and private donors, and from international foundations and organizations; regarding these, the Left shows greater openness (compared with the Center and Right), presumably since these are the primary sources of funding for the organizations associated with this camp.

Figure 3.20 From which sources should nonprofit groups and civil society organizations be permitted to accept donations? (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



Among Arab respondents, we found a clear association between opinions on whether human and civil rights organizations cause damage to the state, and the legitimacy of accepting donations from various sources: Those who think that human rights organizations are not harmful are more open to accepting

donations from all sources cited. In the Jewish public, there is a similar, though less pronounced, pattern regarding donations from foreign sources. The exception is donations that come from Israeli foundations and private donors: Among both those who hold that human rights organizations cause damage to the state and those who take the opposite stance, high (and similar) shares of respondents think that these should be permitted.

Table 3.6 Think/certain that nonprofit groups and civil society organizations should be permitted to accept donations from various SOURCES (Jewish and Arab samples, by whether human and civil rights organizations cause damage to the state; %)

	Do human and civil rights organizations cause damage to the state?			
	Jews		Arabs	
	Cause damage	Do not cause damage	Cause damage	Do not cause damage
From Israeli foundations and private donors	75	71	56	73
From foreign foundations and private donors	63	70	57	71
From other states/governments	40	45	58	67
From international foundations and organizations	51	62	61	74


Reliability of information in Israeli media on the country's situation

Question 29 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??

Once again, we examined the extent of agreement with the assertion that Israeli media portray the country's situation as much worse than it really is. As in previous surveys, this year as well, we found a small majority who agree that Israeli media paint an overly negative picture of the local reality. The differences between Jews and Arabs on this question are negligible.

This year as well, we found a small majority who agree that Israeli media paint an overly negative picture of the local reality.


Figure 3.21 **Israeli media portray the country's situation as much worse than it really is, 2017–2025** (total sample; %)



A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation shows a majority of respondents on the Right who think that Israeli media present Israel's situation as worse than it is, while in the Center and on the Left, only a minority take this view. The same holds true when analyzing on the basis of religiosity: The more stringent the level of religious observance, the greater the share who agree that the media offer a negative misrepresentation; only among secular Jews is there a majority (60%) who disagree with the above assertion.

In the Arab public, the share who agree that the media provide an unnecessarily negative portrayal is highest among Druze respondents (at 68%), with 55% of Muslims and 44% of Christians taking this view.


Figure 3.22 Agree that Israeli media portray the country's situation as much worse than it really is (Jewish sample, by political orientation and religiosity; %)



Does age play a role? In the Jewish public, the answer is yes: A majority (63.5%) of the youngest age group (18–34) agree that the media misrepresent reality, compared to a smaller majority (56%) of the intermediate cohort (35–54), and 47% of the oldest group (55 and over). (Those who disagree constitute 31.5%, 40%, and 49% of the respective age groups.) In the Arab sample, we did not find differences on the basis of age.

Among Jewish respondents, we found a clear association between degree of trust in the media and extent of agreement that Israeli media describe the country's situation as more negative than it is: Of those who do not trust the media, a large majority think that Israeli media portray things as worse than they are, whereas less than one-quarter of those who do trust the media feel this way. In the Arab public, the link is weaker: Of those who do not trust the media, a small majority hold that they are overly negative in their presentation, while of those who do express trust in the media, similar shares express agreement and disagreement with this assertion.

Figure 3.23 Agree that Israeli media portray the country's situation as much worse than it really is (Jewish and Arab samples, by degree of trust in the media; %)




State funding of public media, and its right to be involved in determining content

Question 59 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??

We posed the question: "At present, the state subsidizes such media outlets as Kan (the Israeli Public Broadcasting Corporation) and Galei Tzahal (Israeli Army Radio). In your opinion, does this give it the right to be involved in determining the content broadcast by these media?" A majority of respondents from the total sample (61.5%) believe that the state does not have the right to be involved in the content of public media outlets, despite its role in funding them, whereas 33.5% hold that the state does have the right to do so. Among Jews, the majority (59.5%) think that there is no place for such involvement, while among Arabs, the share who feel this way is even higher (71%).

A majority of respondents from the total sample believe that the state does not have the right to be involved in the content of public media outlets, despite its role in funding them.

Figure 3.24 Extent of agreement that state funding of public media gives it the right to be involved in determining content (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



A large majority of Jewish respondents in the Center, and even more so on the Left, are opposed to state involvement in determining media content (76.5% and 91.5%, respectively). By contrast, the Right is split on this issue, with 48% holding that the state has the right to get involved in content, and 45%, that it does not have the right to do so.

In the Jewish sample, we found a link between religiosity and opinions on government involvement in media content: Roughly three-quarters of Haredim think that the state has the right to be involved in content, while in the national religious and traditional religious groups, opinions are distributed evenly, with a slightly greater margin holding that there is room for the state to be involved if it is providing funding. Among traditional non-religious and secular respondents, however, the majority think that the state does not have the right to get involved in content even if it is subsidizing public media outlets.

A breakdown of the Arab sample by religion reveals considerable differences: Among Christians and Muslims, a substantial majority think that the state should not be involved in determining content (81% and 71%, respectively), while among Druze, the picture is more balanced, with 48% holding that the state does have the right to intervene and 52% taking the opposite view.

Cross-tabulating this question with two others on the subject (degree of trust in the media, and whether Israeli media portray the situation as worse than it really is), we found a strong correlation in both cases. Some 80% of those

who express trust in the media and of those who do not agree that the media misrepresent Israel’s situation are opposed to state involvement in media content. Meanwhile, even among those who do not trust the media and those who hold that they are portraying the situation as worse than it really is, one-half or more think that state intervention in content is not called for.

Figure 3.25 State funding of public media gives it the right to be involved in determining content (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)




Table 3.7 The state’s right to be involved in determining content in public media (total sample, by degree of trust in the media, and by extent of agreement that the media portray the situation as much worse than it really is; %)


		Does state funding of public media give it the right to be involved in determining content?			
		Think it does	Think it does not	Don't know	Total
Trust in media	Not so much/ not at all	39.5	55	5.5	100
	Quite a lot/ very much	18.5	79	2.5	100
The media portray the situation as worse than it really is	Somewhat disagree/ strongly disagree	18	78	4	100
	Somewhat agree/ strongly agree	46	50	4	100

State funding of culture and the arts, and its right to be involved in determining content

Question 51 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??

We posed a similar question concerning cultural and artistic institutions and activities: Does state funding of these institutions grant it the right to be involved in cultural and artistic content? Much like the opinions above regarding the state's right to intervene in media content, here too a majority of the public (54.5%) are opposed to its involvement in artistic and cultural content, while 36.5% support such intervention. A majority—albeit not a large one—of Jews (54%), and a similar share of Arabs (58%), think that the state does not have the right to play such a role. Notably, state involvement in media content (discussed above) evokes greater opposition among Jewish respondents than does such involvement in culture or the arts.

Figure 3.26 Does state funding of cultural and artistic institutions and activities give it the right to be involved in determining content? (Jewish and Arab samples; %)




Here too, an analysis of the Jewish sample by political orientation shows that a majority in the Center, and an even greater majority on the Left, are opposed to state involvement in the content of cultural and artistic institutions and activities that it supports financially (63% and 85%, respectively). The Right is divided on this question, with 46% thinking that the state has the right to intervene in content, while 43% take the opposite view.

A majority in the Center, and an even greater majority on the Left, are opposed to state involvement in the content of cultural and artistic institutions and activities that it supports financially (63% and 85%, respectively). The Right is divided on this question.

A breakdown of the Arab sample by religion reveals that a sizeable majority of Christians (69%) and a small majority of Muslims (56%) are opposed to state involvement in determining content even when it is funding the activities. The Druze community is split: 49% hold that the state does not have the right to play a role in content, while 48% believe that it is entitled to do so.

We found a high degree of overlap between the two questions dealing with the right of the state to be involved in content due to the funding that it provides, in both the media and cultural/artistic institutions. Accordingly, some three-quarters of those who hold that the state has the right to intervene in media content also support state involvement in the content of artistic and cultural institutions and activities, and a similar proportion of those who are opposed to state involvement in the media are also not in favor of such involvement in cultural and artistic content.

Figure 3.27 The state's right to be involved in cultural and artistic content
(total sample, by opinions on the state's right to be involved in media content; %)



To summarize this section, we found significant differences in basic perceptions of the boundaries of freedom of expression and government oversight of activities in various institutions: Religious and right-wing respondents tend to view freedom of expression as a means through which negative elements cause harm to the state, and display greater readiness for state oversight and involvement in the content of institutions that benefit from its financial support. By contrast, secular respondents, along with those from the Center and Left, see freedom of expression as a basic value that requires protection from government intervention. The Arab public, as a minority who feel that their freedom of expression is limited, are consistently opposed to restrictions and open to foreign sources of funding.

What constitutes a democratic decision?

Question 42 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??

Once again, we asked respondents which of the following two statements more accurately reflects their views: (1) Decisions made by a government that holds a majority in the Knesset are inherently democratic; and (2) Decisions that are opposed to fundamental democratic values such as minority rights and freedom of expression are not democratic, even if they are passed by the government with a Knesset majority. Roughly one-half of Jews and three-quarters of Arabs think that decisions that run counter to basic democratic values should not be considered democratic even when passed by a government that rests on a parliamentary majority. Only one-third of Jews and about one-fifth of Arabs take the opposing view.

Roughly one-half of Jews and three-quarters of Arabs think that decisions that run counter to basic democratic values are not democratic even when passed by a parliamentary majority.

This question has been posed several times since 2013, and—with the exception of that year—the results have been consistent in both groups: Approximately one-half of Jews, and two-thirds or more of Arabs, think that fundamental democratic principles are more important than the will of the majority.

Figure 3.28 What constitutes a democratic decision? (Jewish and Arab samples; %)





Figure 3.29 Agree that decisions that are opposed to fundamental democratic values are not democratic even if they are passed by the government or a Knesset majority, 2013–2025 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



In the Jewish sample, roughly two-thirds of Haredim believe that decisions based on a parliamentary majority are the ultimate guiding principle in a democracy, while only about one-quarter hold that there are fundamental values that are no less important, which must form the basis of democratic decisions. Among national religious and traditional religious respondents, the highest share consider decisions made by a Knesset majority to be inherently democratic. The traditional non-religious are split on this question, while a large majority of secular respondents hold that basic democratic principles should prevail over the will of a parliamentary majority.

In the Center, and even more so on the Left, a substantial majority hold that decisions that go against basic democratic principles are not democratic even if they are passed by a Knesset majority. By contrast, on the Right, the greatest share—though not a majority—believe that any decision passed by a Knesset majority is democratic.

Examining the positions of secular respondents alone, by their political orientation, yields a particularly interesting finding. The differences between the secular Left and Center, on the one hand, and the secular public as a whole, on the other, are relatively small; however, the secular Right shows a striking disparity: Whereas on the Right in general, only slightly less than half (47%) believe in the primacy of decisions made by a parliamentary majority, and roughly one-third (36%) hold that basic democratic values are more important than a Knesset majority, on the secular Right the picture is reversed: the majority (57%) believe that fundamental democratic values are of greater importance than decisions passed by a Knesset majority, and only about one-quarter (26.5%) give priority to decisions made by a Knesset majority. In other words, the secular Right tend to take a more liberal stance on this subject than do the Right as a whole.

Table 3.8 What constitutes a democratic decision? (Jewish sample; %)

	Decisions made by a government that rests on a Knesset majority are inherently democratic	Decisions that are opposed to basic democratic values such as minority rights and freedom of expression are not democratic, even if they are passed by the government or a Knesset majority	Don't know	Total
Haredim	64.5	26.5	9	100
National religious	46	29	25	100
Traditional religious	43	35	22	100
Traditional non-religious	41	43	16	100
Secular	14.5	72.5	13	100
Left	6	86	8	100
Center	16	70	14	100
Right	47	36	17	100

Supreme Court intervention in government decisions

Question 34 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??

We examined whether or not, in the eyes of the public, the Supreme Court intervenes too much in decisions made by the government. This year, as in previous surveys, one-half of Jewish respondents agree that the Supreme Court indeed intervenes in government decisions to too great a degree, while 43% disagree. So too this year, a greater share of Arabs than of Jews think that the Supreme Court is overly interventionist. We do not have a satisfactory explanation for this pattern, and in light of its repeated occurrence, we feel that in-depth study is called for in order to better understand the subject.

An examination of the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals a polarized public. A substantial majority on the Left and in the Center (87.5% and 70%, respectively) do not agree that the Supreme Court intervenes too much in decisions made by the government, whereas on the Right, a considerable majority (72%) think that it in fact intervenes excessively.


An analysis of the findings in the Jewish sample by religiosity shows that only among the secular public is there a large majority (68%) who disagree that the Supreme Court intervenes too much. In all of the remaining groups, most of the respondents think that there is too much Supreme Court intervention (Haredim, 93.5%; national religious, 75%; traditional religious, 71%; traditional non-religious, 54.5%).

Surprisingly enough, as stated, a high proportion of Arabs agree that the Supreme Court is overly interventionist. A breakdown of the Arab sample by religion reveals that the greatest share who feel this way is found among Druze respondents (71%), followed by Christians (62%) and Muslims (54%).

In the Jewish public, the share who believe that the Supreme Court intervenes too much in government decisions correlates negatively with the age of the respondents. A majority (59%) of young people (aged 18–34) agree with this assertion, as compared with half (51%) of the intermediate age group (35–54) and a minority (41%) of the oldest cohort (55 and over). In the Arab sample, we did not find substantial differences on the basis of age.

Level of education also plays a role: A majority of Jews without an academic education (58%) agree that the Supreme Court intervenes excessively in government decisions, compared with 43% of Jews with higher education. Here as well, we did not find significant differences in the Arab sample when analyzing by this variable.


Figure 3.30 Agree that the Supreme Court intervenes too much in government decisions, 2021–2025 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



A large majority on the Left and in the Center do not agree that the Supreme Court intervenes too much in decisions made by the government, whereas on the Right, a large majority think that it in fact intervenes excessively.


We examined whether there is a link between opinions about what constitutes a democratic decision and positions regarding Supreme Court intervention in government decisions. Among Jews, the correlation is clear: A large majority of those respondents who believe that basic democratic values outweigh decisions made by a government that rests on a Knesset majority disagree with the assertion that the Supreme Court is overly interventionist. By contrast, among those who consider a government decision of this type to be democratic, the picture is reversed, with the majority holding that the Supreme Court intervenes too much. Among Arab respondents, we did not find a correlation between the responses on these two questions.

Figure 3.31 Agree that the Supreme Court intervenes too much in government decisions (Jewish and Arab samples, by opinions on what constitutes a democratic decision; %)



We examined further whether there is a link between the degree of trust in the Supreme Court (discussed in the previous chapter) and the assertion that the Supreme Court intervenes too much in government decisions. Among Jewish respondents, the connection is clear and predictable: A very large majority of those who do not express trust in the Supreme Court think that it intervenes too much, and conversely, a very large majority of those who do trust the Supreme Court do not agree with this claim. Among Arab respondents, we did not find any link between level of trust in the Supreme Court and agreement with the statement.

Figure 3.32 Agree that the Supreme Court intervenes too much in government decisions (Jewish and Arab samples, by degree of trust in the Supreme Court; %)



The need for a constitution, and likelihood of enacting one

Questions 60–61 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??

We asked: “Israel has not had a constitution since its founding. In your view, how important is it that Israel have a constitution?” There is a high level of agreement on this issue, with 69% of Jews and 78% of Arabs considering a constitution to be important.

On the three occasions that we posed this question, the opinions of the Jewish public have been more or less consistent, whereas among Arab respondents, the share of agreement over the need for a constitution was identical in 2023 and in the present survey, whereas in the 2010 measurement, the proportion who agreed was considerably lower.

Figure 3.33 How important is it that Israel have a constitution? (total sample; %)





Figure 3.34 Agree that it is important for Israel to have a constitution, 2010–2025 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



A breakdown of the Jewish sample by religiosity reveals that less than one-half of Haredim see having a constitution as important, while over one-third are opposed to the notion. National religious respondents show a small majority in favor of a constitution and a relatively high share who chose the option of “don’t know.” The two traditional groups—and to an even greater extent, the secular public—display a clear majority in favor of a constitution. A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals similarly high shares of respondents on the Left and in the Center who favor a constitution. By contrast, the Right displays a lesser—though still significant—degree of support, again with a high proportion of “don’t know” responses.

Table 3.9 How important is it that Israel have a constitution? (Jewish sample, by religiosity and political orientation; %)


		Quite or very important	Not so or not at all important	Don't know	Total
Religiosity	Haredim	48.5	37	14.5	100
	National religious	51	24	25	100
	Traditional religious	66	16	18	100
	Traditional non-religious	72	14	14	100
	Secular	80	8	12	100
Political orientation	Left	86	8	6	100
	Center	82	7	11	100
	Right	60.5	21.5	18	100

Breaking down the Arab sample by religion, we found high shares in all groups who agree that a constitution is needed: Christians (91%), followed by Druze (83.5%) and Muslims (77%).

Examining the findings by age reveals an interesting pattern among Jews and Arabs alike: In the oldest age group (55 and over), the share in favor of a constitution is significantly higher than in the younger cohorts, perhaps because the young respondents have not been exposed to a concrete discussion of the need for a constitution. The age gap is particularly noticeable among Jews. Also striking among Jewish respondents is the high share of the youngest and intermediate age groups who selected the “don’t know” response.

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals similarly high levels of support for a constitution on the Left and in the Center. By contrast, there is less—though still significant—support on the Right.

Figure 3.35 **How important is it that Israel have a constitution?** (Jewish and Arab samples, by age; %)




We examined a possible association between opinions on the importance of a constitution and views on what qualifies as a democratic decision (whether decisions passed by a parliamentary majority supersede basic democratic principles). We found that those who think that government decisions that run counter to basic democratic principles—even if based on a Knesset majority—are not democratic, display significantly greater support for a constitution (79%) compared with those who think that any government decision based on a Knesset majority is democratic (62.5%). The connection is logical: Those who believe in the need for limitations on the power of the majority see a constitution as an important tool for ensuring the protection of fundamental democratic values and basic rights.

And what are the chances that Israel will gain a constitution in the next ten years? Though a majority of the public consider it important to have a constitution, they are not optimistic about it happening, and only a minority of respondents (20%) think that such a scenario is likely within a decade, while roughly two-thirds think that chances are low, and some 20% say they “don’t know.” Arab respondents are slightly more optimistic, with 28.5% believing that chances are high that Israel will put a constitution in place in the foreseeable future, as opposed to just 18.5% of Jews.

Table 3.10 **How important is it that Israel have a constitution?** (total sample, by what constitutes a democratic decision; %)

		How important is it that Israel have a constitution?			
		Quite/very important	Not so/not at all important	Don't know	Total
Is every decision by an elected government in the Knesset democratic, or are there more important values?	Decisions that are opposed to basic democratic values are not democratic	79	12.5	8.5	100
	Decisions passed by a Knesset majority are always democratic	62.5	25.5	12	100


Figure 3.36 **What are the chances that Israel will have a constitution within the next ten years?** (total sample; %)



Though a majority of the public consider it important for Israel to have a constitution, they are not optimistic about it happening, and only 20% of respondents think this is likely within a decade.

In the Jewish sample, all subgroups across the board are pessimistic about the likelihood of a constitution being enacted in the near future. The share of secular respondents who think that chances are good is particularly low, while the highest share was found in the traditional non-religious group. A breakdown by political orientation reveals that the Right is more optimistic than the Center or Left regarding the chances that Israel will gain a constitution in the coming decade.


Figure 3.37 Think that chances are high that Israel will have a constitution within the next ten years (Jewish sample, by religiosity and political orientation; %)



Analyzing the Arab sample by religion shows only slight differences: 31% of Christians, 29% of Muslims, and 26% of Druze believe that there is a strong likelihood of a constitution being enacted within the next ten years.

Examining the link between opinions on the importance of having a constitution and the expectation that this will occur within the next decade, we found that neither those who consider it important nor those who feel the opposite are optimistic about the chances of achieving this goal within the foreseeable future.

Figure 3.38 What are the chances that Israel will have a constitution within the next ten years? (total sample, by importance attached to enacting one; %)



Summarizing this section, the findings show a society divided in its views of what constitutes a democracy. The question of whether decisions made by a parliamentary majority are inherently democratic, or whether they are superseded by fundamental democratic values, splits Israeli society along religious and political fault lines: The religious and right-wing publics tend to give primacy to the principle of majority rule, whereas secular and left-wing Jews hold that there are other values that should be taken into account. A similar divide exists with regard to the Supreme Court: Those who support the preeminence of basic democratic values over majority-based decisions consider it to be a legitimate mechanism of government oversight, whereas those who believe that decisions based on a Knesset majority should take priority see it as overly interventionist. Despite this rift, the notion of a constitution earns support across the political spectrum.

Israeli democracy compared with other democracies

Is Israeli democracy better or worse than other democracies?


Question 8 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??

In recent years, numerous democracies around the world have been grappling with such challenges as a rise in populism, diminished separation of powers

in government, and declining public trust in leadership. We asked survey respondents whether they think that Israeli democracy is in better or worse shape than other democracies around the world. In the total sample, the highest share think that the state of democracy in Israel is worse (45%), roughly one-quarter that it is in fact better (26%), and an additional quarter consider it on par with other democracies (24%).

The differences between Jews and Arabs on this subject are not substantial. Among Arabs, roughly one-half (51%) hold that Israeli democracy is in worse shape than others, as contrasted with 29% who think that it is in better shape, and 17% who believe that it is the same. Among Jews, less than one-half (44%) believe that it is worse than other democracies, 25% that it is better, and 25% that it is the same.

Figure 3.39 Is Israeli democracy in better or worse shape than other democracies? (total sample; %)




In the Jewish sample, despite sizeable differences between the two camps, the majority of respondents from the Center and Left hold that Israeli democracy is in worse shape than that of other countries. By contrast, on the Right, the picture is more balanced: About one-third think that Israeli democracy is worse than others, and one-third, that it is better, with the remainder responding that it is the same or that they don't know. Among Haredim, and even more so among secular Jews, a much greater share of respondents hold that Israeli democracy is worse than other democracies. In the other religious groups, the findings are more evenly distributed.

Table 3.11 **Is Israeli democracy in better or worse shape than other democracies?** (Jewish sample, by political orientation and religiosity; %)

		Worse	The same	Better	Don't know	Total
Political orientation	Left	74	17.5	6.5	2	100
	Center	54.5	23	17	5.5	100
	Right	32.5	28	33	6.5	100
Religiosity	Haredim	43	22	29	6	100
	National religious	27	29.5	33	10.5	100
	Traditional religious	27.5	33	33	6.5	100
	Traditional non-religious	36	25	33	6	100
	Secular	57	23	16	4	100

Examining the link between assessments of Israeli democracy compared with other democracies, and desire to move to another Western country (chapter 1), we found, as expected, that roughly one-quarter of Jewish respondents who consider Israeli democracy to be worse than others expressed willingness to relocate overseas, as opposed to just 8% of those who see Israeli democracy as better. Among Arabs, we did not find a similar association.

Figure 3.40 **Prefer to move to another country** (Jewish and Arab samples, by assessment of the shape of Israeli democracy compared with others; %)



The majority of respondents from the Center and Left hold that Israeli democracy is in worse shape than that of other countries. By contrast, on the Right, about one-third think that Israeli democracy is worse than others, and one-third, that it is better.

Freedom of expression in Israel compared with other democracies

Question 10 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??

While the differences between Jews and Arabs in their assessment of the state of Israeli democracy compared with other democracies are relatively small, with regard to freedom of expression in Israel relative to other democracies, we found significant differences between the two groups. Whereas nearly three-quarters of Arabs think that freedom of expression in Israel is more limited than in other democracies (including over one-half who hold that it is “much more limited”), among Jews, the highest proportion (43.5%) think that freedom of expression in Israel is actually more extensive than elsewhere, almost one-third think that it is similar to other democracies, and only about one-quarter think that it is more limited.

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals that over one-half of respondents on the Right hold that freedom of expression in Israel is more extensive than in other democracies, while on the Left, only a small minority take this view, with the majority split between those who think that it is similar to other democracies and those who feel that it is more limited. In the Center, the picture is more balanced, though slightly favoring those who hold that freedom of expression in Israel is more limited.

Analyzing the Jewish sample by religiosity, we found that over one-half of the national religious and both traditional groups hold that freedom of expression is more extensive in Israel than in other democracies, while the lowest share think that it is more limited. Haredi and secular Jews display a different

pattern from the other groups, with smaller shares who think that freedom of expression in Israel is more extensive than that in other democratic countries.

Figure 3.41 Freedom of expression in Israel today compared with other democracies (Jewish and Arab samples; %)





Figure 3.42 Freedom of expression in Israel today compared with other democracies (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



Nearly three-quarters of Arabs think that freedom of expression in Israel is more limited than in other democracies, whereas the highest proportion of Jews think that freedom of expression in Israel is actually more extensive than elsewhere.

Table 3.12 **Freedom of expression in Israel today compared with other democracies** (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)


	More extensive	Similar to other democracies	More limited	Don't know	Total
Haredim	36	23	33	8	100
National religious	63.5	22.5	10	4	100
Traditional religious	59	24.5	14.5	2	100
Traditional non-religious	53	26	18	3	100
Secular	31	35	31	3	100

Breaking down the Arab sample by religion, Druze respondents show the highest share (45.5%) who think that freedom of expression is broader in Israel than elsewhere. By contrast, Muslims and Christians take the opposite view, with a decisive majority in both groups holding that freedom of expression in Israel is more limited than in other democracies (77% and 63%, respectively).

We examined the association between the responses to the previous two questions: (a) the state of democracy in Israel compared with other countries; and (b) freedom of expression in Israel relative to other democracies. In the Jewish public, as expected, a substantial majority of those who hold that democracy in Israel is in better shape than other democracies also think that there is greater freedom of expression in Israel. Surprisingly, however, even among Jews who believe that Israeli democracy is in worse shape than other democracies, a relatively high share (approximately one-third) hold that there is greater freedom of expression in Israel than elsewhere.

Among Arab respondents, a different picture emerges: Even among those who think that Israeli democracy is in better shape than other democracies, a large majority (62%) hold that freedom of expression in Israel is more limited. Of those who believe that democracy in Israel is in worse shape than elsewhere, the contrast is all the more marked, with a much greater majority (85%) thinking that freedom of expression in Israel is more limited.

Figure 3.43 Freedom of expression in Israel today compared with other democracies (Jewish and Arab samples, by state of Israeli democracy compared with other democracies; %)



Challenges facing Israeli democracy compared with other democracies


Question 9 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??

We asked survey respondents whether, in their opinion, the challenges facing Israeli democracy stem more from factors unique to Israel or from factors confronting other democracies as well. In both the Jewish and Arab publics, more than two-thirds think that the challenges to Israeli democracy stem from factors that are specific to Israel.

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by religiosity shows strong similarity between the various groups. In the Haredi, national religious, and both traditional groups, roughly two-thirds attribute the country's challenges to factors that are unique to Israel, while among secular respondents, the share who feel this way is even higher (75%).

Figure 3.44 Do the challenges facing Israeli democracy stem more from factors unique to Israel, or factors confronting other democracies as well?

(Jewish and Arab samples; Jews, by religiosity; %)



In both the Jewish and Arab publics, more than two-thirds think that the challenges to Israeli democracy stem from factors that are specific to Israel.

To summarize, the Israeli public is critical of the state of democracy in Israel: Nearly one-half believe that it is in worse shape than other democracies, with Arabs taking an even more negative stance than Jews. Among Jews, those on the Left and in the Center, more than those on the Right, rate Israeli democracy as worse than other democracies. The differences of opinion are even more stark on the question of freedom of expression: Whereas Jews tend to view freedom of expression in Israel as more extensive than in other countries, Arabs see it as more limited. On the Right (among Jews), the majority think that freedom of expression is greater in Israel, while on the Left and in the Center, the lowest share take this view. Nonetheless, there is a broad consensus regarding the uniqueness of the challenges confronting Israeli democracy, with the majority believing that these stem from factors specific to Israel. This perception may reflect acknowledgment of the singular complexity of Israel's situation, but at the same time, may make it more difficult to learn from the experience of other democracies and to adopt successful solutions from other countries and apply them to local problems.

Chapter 4

United or Divided?

In this chapter, we discuss the following topics:

- ❑ Social solidarity in Israel
 - ❑ Mutual assistance between citizens
 - ❑ Most acute social tensions in Israel
 - ❑ Willingness to accept other political opinions
 - ❑ Stronger and weaker groups in Israeli society
-

Social solidarity in Israel


Question 4 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??

The extent of social solidarity in Israel is a controversial and emotionally “loaded” topic. On the one hand, the country has a strong ethos of mutual concern and assistance and of social cohesiveness, as manifest in community support and volunteerism, particularly during emergencies. On the other hand, the multiplicity of identities, cultures, and narratives—coupled with rising social and political tensions stemming from frequent security crises, intense differences of opinion in the public sphere, and economic disparities—are generating severe and ongoing polarization and division.

From time to time, respondents to the annual *Democracy Index* are asked to assess the level of solidarity (sense of “togetherness”) of Israeli society as a whole (Jews, Arabs, and all other citizens) on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 = no solidarity at all and 10 = very high level of solidarity. The figure below presents changing trends in solidarity assessments in both the Jewish and Arab publics in recent years.

In all previous surveys, the perception of Israeli social solidarity has been higher among Jews than among Arabs (multi-year average for the past five years: Jews, 5.5; Arabs, 4.5). This held true until the present assessment, which showed parity between the two populations for the first time, primarily due to the lower solidarity rating given by Jewish interviewees. Apparently due to the ongoing political crisis, repeated elections, and the judicial reform/overhaul, which worsened divides in the country, both groups registered a gradual and almost parallel downturn in their view of Israeli solidarity between 2020 and 2023, reaching a nadir in June 2023. As a result of the events of October 7 and the ensuing war, a steep rise occurred in the assessment of Israeli social solidarity, particularly among Jews, but also to some extent among Arabs. However, not long afterward, solidarity levels as perceived by Jews started to drop, culminating in an average rating in 2025 only slightly greater than that on the eve of the war. By contrast, among Arab interviewees, assessments of the level of solidarity have remained stable since the war's inception, returning in fact to the 2020 level.


Figure 4.1 **Average social solidarity ratings, 2020–2025** (Jewish and Arab samples)



We divided the scale into three levels of solidarity: low score (1–4), moderate (5–6), and high (7–10). As shown in the figure below, the share who assigned a low score rose this year, making it the most frequent response (above 40%) among Jews and Arabs alike. The Jewish sample registered a downturn in the share

who rate Israel's solidarity level as high; at the same time, the corresponding share of Arabs showed virtually no change from last year, but declined in the moderate range. As a result, there is almost no difference between the two groups in 2025 in the distribution of solidarity levels.

Figure 4.2 Social solidarity ratings, 2024 and 2025 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



We examined whether there are differences between various demographic sub-groups in their assessment of Israeli social solidarity. As in past years, we found very sizeable disparities when analyzing the Jewish sample on the basis of religiosity, with the highest average rating among national religious Jews, and the lowest, among secular and Haredi respondents. As shown in the table below, close to half of the national religious group offer a **high** assessment of social solidarity in Israel, as opposed to only a minority who feel this way in the other groups. Conversely, the greatest share of secular and Haredi respondents (roughly one-half) rate Israeli solidarity as **low**.

Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation, we found a divide between the Left, where a clear majority (close to 60%) hold that social solidarity in Israel is low, and both the Center and Right, in which only a minority (albeit a large one, at roughly 40%) take this view. While the Center and Right are closer to each other in their assessments of social solidarity, nonetheless there is a difference: On the Right, roughly one-third rate the level of solidarity as high, as contrasted with just one-fifth among respondents in the Center.

A separate breakdown of **secular respondents** by political orientation shows that differences between the camps are shrinking, though the gap between the Left and the two other political camps in the secular public is still considerable (low solidarity ratings: Left, 60%; Center, 46%; Right, 49%).

Table 4.1 Social solidarity ratings in Israel (Jewish sample, by religiosity and political orientation)

		Low (1–4)	Moderate (5–6)	High (7–10)	Don't know	Average score
		%				
Religiosity	Haredim	48.5	24.5	23	4	4.2
	National religious	32	20	48	0	5.8
	Traditional religious	38	31	29	2	5.0
	Traditional non-religious	37	29	34	0	5.3
	Secular	50	32	17.5	0.5	4.4
Political orientation	Left	59	27	14	0	4.1
	Center	42.5	35	22	0.5	4.8
	Right	41	26	32	1	5.0

Additional breakdowns in the Jewish sample reveal that men tend to assign a slightly higher solidarity rating than do women (5.0 versus 4.6, respectively). Similarly, older respondents offer a more positive assessment of Israeli social solidarity compared with younger ones (ages 18–34, 4.6; 35–54, 4.7; 55 and over, 5.0). We did not find differences based on ethnicity, education, or income level. In the Arab sample, similar to last year, we found that the average solidarity rating among Druze is substantially higher than among Muslims and Christians. Interestingly enough, this year's rating in each of the Arab religious groups surpassed that of secular and Haredi Jews. As in previous years, Arabs who voted for Zionist parties in the most recent national elections rate Israeli social solidarity higher than do Arabs who voted for Arab parties or did not vote at all.

Table 4.2 Social solidarity ratings in Israel (Arab sample, by religion and vote in 2022 Knesset elections)

		Low (1–4)	Moderate (5–6)	High (7–10)	Don't know	Average score
		%				
Religion	Muslims	45	29	26	0	4.8
	Christians	53	19	28	0	4.7
	Druze	39	22.5	38.5	0	5.5
Vote in 2022 Knesset elections	Zionist parties	37	20	43	0	5.7
	Arab parties	49	28	23	0	4.5
	Didn't vote	46	27	25	2	4.7


Unlike the Jewish sample, we did not find differences when breaking down the Arab sample by sex or age. However, analysis on the basis of education and income level shows noticeable disparities. Arabs with an academic education assign a lower solidarity rating than do those with a non-academic education (4.2 versus 5.1, respectively). Likewise, Arabs at a higher income level rate Israel's social solidarity as lower, compared with Arabs with a lower income (above-median income, 3.9; median income, 5.2; below-median income, 5.1). In other words, Arabs with a higher socioeconomic status are inclined to view the level of social solidarity in Israel as lower than do Arabs from the lower socioeconomic classes.

In all the demographic groups examined above, in both the Jewish and Arab samples, we saw a decline this year in the average social solidarity rating in comparison with the previous survey. (In fact, this marks a continuation of the decline in perceived social solidarity following its apex at the war's outset.)

The sense of social solidarity is one of the key variables in understanding the public mood in Israel, and it is safe to assume that it is associated with other factors measured in the *Index*. Much like previous years, we found a strong correlation between solidarity ratings and assessment of Israel's overall situation: Among those who characterize the state of the nation as good or very good, the majority rate the country's solidarity as high; and conversely, of those who see Israel's circumstances as bad or very bad, the majority hold that the level of solidarity in Israeli society is low. The connection between

solidarity ratings and respondents' perceptions of their personal situation is less pronounced: In all groups, including those who consider their personal situation to be good, only a minority hold that there is a high level of social solidarity in Israel.

Figure 4.3 Social solidarity ratings in Israel (total sample, by assessment of Israel's overall situation and respondent's personal situation; %)



Examining the relation between solidarity ratings and other parameters that reflect the prevailing mood in Israeli society, we found that respondents who are optimistic regarding Israel's future, on average, rate the country's social solidarity as higher than do pessimists. Further, those who hold that Israel is a good place to live tend, on average, to assign a higher solidarity score than do those who take a different view. In addition, the sense of being part of the state and its problems goes hand in hand with a higher assessment of social solidarity, compared with those who do not express this feeling of belonging.

In all the demographic groups examined above, in both the Jewish and Arab samples, we saw a decline this year in the average social solidarity rating in comparison with the previous survey.

Table 4.3 **Average solidarity ratings in Israeli society** (total sample, by response to selected questions)


Response to selected questions		Average rating
In general, are you optimistic or pessimistic about Israel’s future?	Optimistic	5.3
	Pessimistic	4.1
Israel is a good place to live	Agree	5.2
	Disagree	4.0
To what extent do you feel part of the State of Israel and its problems?	Very much/quite a lot	5.0
	Not so much/not at all	3.9

Mutual assistance in times of trouble

Question 27 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??

Once again, as in previous years, we asked about a specific aspect of solidarity—mutual assistance: “To what extent do you agree or disagree that Israelis can always count on other Israelis to help them in times of trouble?” A solid majority in both samples expressed agreement with this statement, though by a greater margin among Jewish respondents. It emerges further that, unlike the question on social solidarity, here the findings were virtually identical with last year’s; that is, regarding mutual assistance, we did not encounter a decline from last year’s high scores that were given in response to events at that time.

Figure 4.4 **Agree that Israelis can always count on other Israelis to help them in times of trouble, 2016–2025** (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation, we found a majority in all three camps who hold that Israelis can always rely on fellow Israelis to come to their aid, though this majority is greatest on the Right and smallest on the Left (Right, 83%; Center, 76%; Left, 68%). We did not see noticeable differences compared with last year in any of the camps.

Analysis of the Jewish sample based on religiosity shows either a lack of change or slight drop in most of the groups compared with last year—with the exception of Haredi respondents, who registered a noticeable increase, bringing them in line with the national religious, meaning that both these groups are the most inclined to agree with the statement that Israelis can count on each other.

Table 4.4 Agree that Israelis can always count on other Israelis to help them in times of trouble, 2022–2025 (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)

		2022	2024	2025
Religiosity	Haredim	74	79.5	87
	National religious	79	92	87
	Traditional religious	72	87.5	82
	Traditional non-religious	71	81.5	82
	Secular	61	76	72

In the Arab sample, there were no significant changes in 2025 on this question among Muslims or Christians, whereas there was a decline among Druze, though the share who agree with the statement remains the highest of the three. The strong agreement in all of the groups supports the theory that 2024's findings were not a one-time occurrence at a time of heightened civic solidarity.

Table 4.5 Agree that Israelis can always count on other Israelis to help them in times of trouble, 2022–2025 (Arab sample, by religion; %)

		2022	2024	2025
Religion	Muslims	39	60	64
	Christians	36	65	59
	Druze	46	90	74

A breakdown of the Arab sample by vote in the 2022 Knesset elections reveals that those who voted for Zionist parties are more inclined to agree with the statement that Israelis can always rely on their fellow Israelis in time of need (81%), relative to those who voted for Arab parties (59%) and those who did not vote (63%).

We wished to see if there is an association between the extent of agreement with the statement that Israelis can rely on the state in times of trouble and the assertion that they can count on their fellow citizens. The findings show that, among Jews and Arabs alike, a large majority of those who believe that they can rely on the state in time of need also feel that they can count on other Israelis in the same circumstances. But when looking at the positions of those who **do not** rely on the state, a different picture emerges: In the Jewish sample, of those who **do not** think that they can count on the state in times of trouble, a majority (albeit smaller, at 73%) believe that their fellow Israelis can be counted on; while in the Arab sample, by contrast, a clear majority do not share this view.

Table 4.6 Israelis can always count on other Israelis to help them in times of trouble (Jewish and Arab samples, by view on whether Israelis can always rely on the state in time of need; %)

		Israelis can always count on other Israelis in times of trouble			Total
		Agree	Disagree	Don't know	
Jews	Agree that Israeli citizens can always rely on the state in time of need	94	5.5	0.5	100
	Disagree that Israeli citizens can always rely on the state in time of need	73	26	1	100
Arabs	Agree that Israeli citizens can always rely on the state in time of need	80	15.5	4.5	100
	Disagree that Israeli citizens can always rely on the state in time of need	37	60	3	100

A breakdown of the Arab sample by vote in the 2022 Knesset elections reveals that those who voted for Zionist parties are more inclined to agree with the statement that Israelis can always rely on their fellow Israelis in time of need, relative to those who voted for Arab parties and those who did not vote.

Social tensions in Israel

Question 12 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??


Each year, we examine the question of which social tension in Israel is seen by respondents as the most acute. In 2025, the greatest share of the public (roughly one-half) continue to perceive the tension between Right and Left as the most severe. This represents an ongoing trend of noticeably increasing tensions in this regard since 2022, alongside a deepening of the political crisis. At the same time, there has been a slight decrease in the perception of Jewish-Arab tensions as the most acute, and a moderate increase in the share who cite religious-secular tensions as the most prominent.

In the Jewish sample, over one-half place Right-Left tensions at the top of the list, with tensions between Jews and Arabs, and between religious and secular Jews, tied in second place. Among Arabs, Jewish-Arab tensions are seen as the most acute, followed by tensions between Right and Left.

Table 4.7 The most acute social tension in Israel (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

	Jews	Arabs
1	Between Right and Left (55)	Between Jews and Arabs (54)
2	Between Jews and Arabs (20)	Between Right and Left (21)
3	Between religious and secular Jews (20)	Between religious and secular Jews (10.5)


Figure 4.5 The most acute social tension in Israel, 2012–2025 (total sample; %)



The years from 2022 to 2024 saw a sharp increase in all three political camps (in the Jewish sample) in the perception of Right-Left tensions as the most acute in Israeli society; in 2025, however, the level of tension in this area remained almost unchanged across all camps. Interestingly, the Center is closer to the Right than to the Left on this question.

In the Jewish sample, over one-half place Right-Left tensions at the top of the list, with tensions between Jews and Arabs, and between religious and secular Jews, tied in second place. Among Arabs, Jewish-Arab tensions are seen as the most acute, followed by tensions between Right and Left.

Figure 4.6 **The most acute social tension in Israel is between Right and Left, 2022–2025** (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



Clear differences have emerged this year between the Jewish political camps with regard to Jewish-Arab tensions as well. The share who consider this to be the most acute source of friction has remained virtually unchanged on the Right, and declined substantially in the Center and on the Left.

Table 4.8 **The most acute social tension in Israel is between Jews and Arabs** (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)

	2024	2025
Left	17	6
Center	22	12
Right	30	27

As we saw earlier, the perception of tensions between religious and secular Jews as the most severe in Israeli society intensified this year, presumably due to the conflict over Haredi conscription. Breaking down the responses in the Jewish sample by religiosity, we see a rise among all groups in the share who place this source of friction at the top of the list, with the most noticeable increase among the national religious and traditional non-religious respondents. Nonetheless, as in last year's survey, the highest proportions who pointed to this as the primary source of tension are to be found at the two "extremes," that is, among the Haredi and secular respondents.

Table 4.9 **The most acute social tension in Israel is between religious and secular Jews** (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)

	2024	2025
Haredim	19	25
National religious	7	14
Traditional religious	5	9
Traditional non-religious	11	20
Secular	20	23

Notably, in all religious groups in the Jewish sample, tension between Right and Left tops the scale, with close to one-half (or slightly more) pointing to it as the most acute source of friction (Haredim, 46%; national religious, 57%; traditional religious, 54%; traditional non-religious, 51.5%; secular, 58.5%). Jewish-Arab tensions are in second place in all groups with the exception of the secular, who rank relations between religious and secular Jews as the second most severe source of friction.


Breaking down the Arab sample by religion reveals that the share of Druze who think that Jewish-Arab tensions are the most acute in Israeli society is significantly smaller than that of Muslims and Christians: Only around one-third of Druze cited it this year, compared with the previous measurement in 2024, when around half took this view. We see from earlier surveys that, in the past, Druze respondents were very similar to the other two Arab religious groups in their ranking of Jewish-Arab tensions; thus, we cannot be sure whether this year's finding is an anomaly or the beginning of a shift. This year, 39% of Druze respondents rated Right-Left tensions as the most serious in Israeli society (slightly higher than the share who pointed to Jewish-Arab tensions), marking a substantial rise in comparison with last year (26%).

Table 4.10 **The most acute social tension in Israel is between Jews and Arabs** (Arab sample, by religion; %)

	2024	2025
Muslims	56.5	56
Christians	52.5	59
Druze	51	35


We found a striking disparity between age groups in the Jewish sample: Younger Jews tend to see Jewish-Arab tensions as the most acute point of friction to a much greater degree than do the oldest cohort. The Arab sample showed a similar pattern, though the proportions among Arab respondents were larger overall, and the differences between age groups were less salient.

Figure 4.7 **The most acute social tension in Israel is between Jews and Arabs** (Jewish and Arab samples, by age; %)



Cross-tabulating the responses regarding social tensions with those on solidarity, we found a clear association in the Arab sample between overall solidarity ratings and the importance attributed to Jewish-Arab tensions: Among Arabs who consider social solidarity in Israel to be high, only one-third hold that the most acute tension is between Jews and Arabs, compared with double that share (roughly two-thirds) among those who rate the level of solidarity as low. By contrast, in the Jewish sample, no clear relation was found between assessments of the level of solidarity in Arab society and the perception that the tension between Jews and Arabs is the most acute. This finding may indicate that, when Jews are asked about Israeli society in general, some respondents may relate this primarily to intra-Jewish cohesiveness.

Figure 4.8 **The most acute social tension in Israel is between Jews and Arabs** (Jewish and Arab samples, by social solidarity rating; %)



Willingness to accept people with different political opinions

Questions 64–67 Appendix 1, p. ??


This year, we examined for the first time the willingness of Israelis to tolerate “the other,” in the sense of different political opinions. We asked survey participants to what extent it would be difficult for them to accept someone with political views that are contrary to their own, in various types of relationships: romantic partner/spouse, close friend, neighbor in the same building, and coworker.

The response of the Arab survey participants on the question of political disagreements was much more moderate than that of the Jews, and only a negligible minority (less than 10%) responded that it would be quite or very difficult for them to accept political views opposed to their own at each of the levels of closeness proposed. For this reason, the analysis of this set of questions will focus on the Jewish sample only.

Almost one-half of Jewish respondents stated that opposing political views would make it difficult for them to choose a particular romantic partner or spouse—a finding that points to a profound social/political divide; however, the majority of Jewish survey participants are willing to accept someone with

political views contrary to their own as a close friend. Regarding less intimate relationships (building neighbors or coworkers), respondents displayed greater tolerance, with the vast majority stating that opposing political views would not pose a difficulty for them.


Figure 4.9 To what extent would it be difficult for you to accept someone with opposing political views, as a... (Jewish sample; %)



A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals that resistance to accepting opposing political views in a romantic partner or spouse is strongest on the Left and on the Right, and more moderate in the Center. As for resistance to accepting a close friend with contrary political opinions, we found no difference between Center and Right (roughly one-quarter expressed discomfort in both camps), while respondents on the Left display less tolerance, with over one-third objecting in such a case.

Almost one-half of Jewish respondents stated that opposing political views would make it difficult for them to choose a particular romantic partner or spouse—a finding that points to a profound social/political divide.

Figure 4.10 **Unwillingness to accept opposing political views in various types of relationships** (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



Analyzing the Jewish sample by sex, we found that over one-half of women (56%) are unwilling to be in a romantic relationship with a person from the opposite end of the political spectrum, as opposed to a minority (40%) of men who responded similarly. This can be indicative of greater sensitivity among women to compatibility of values and identities in romantic relationships. Alternatively, men may think that they are less susceptible to the influence of a partner with views that differ from their own, due to traditional perceptions of dominance or the different roles of men and women in a relationship. As shown in the table below, there is a sizeable disparity between men and women on this point in all three political camps, and it is most striking on the Left.

Table 4.11 **Difficulty accepting opposing political views in a romantic partner/spouse** (Jewish sample, by political orientation and sex; %)

	Left	Center	Right
Men	44	31	42
Women	72	48	58

Breaking down the Jewish sample by age, we found that respondents aged 55 and over display a greater level of tolerance toward a romantic partner with opposing political views than do their younger counterparts. This pattern holds true across all political camps, though the difference between age groups is more pronounced on the Right than in the Center or on the Left.

Table 4.12 Difficulty accepting opposing political views in a romantic partner/spouse (Jewish sample, by political orientation and age; %)

	Left	Center	Right
18–34	60	46	59
35–54	66	42	52
55 and over	50	36	34

Based on an analysis of the Jewish sample by religiosity, difficulty accepting individuals with contrary political views as a romantic partner/spouse is relatively low among traditional non-religious and national religious respondents (40% and 44%, respectively), and comparatively higher in the other groups (Haredim, 52%; traditional religious, 51%; secular, 51%).

As we saw earlier, the willingness to accept an individual with opposing political views as a close friend is relatively high compared with readiness to accept such a person as a romantic partner or spouse, with roughly three-quarters of all Jews willing to accept such a friendship. Additionally, as shown in figure 4.10 above, resistance to a friendship of this type is higher on the Left than in the Center or on the Right. Here too, as in romantic relationships, women are slightly less open than men to a close friendship with someone whose political views are opposed to their own (with 29% and 23% expressing unwillingness, respectively).

With regard to accepting neighbors or coworkers with contrary political views, we found very high levels of tolerance (close to 90%) across all demographic groups in the Jewish sample.

Stronger and weaker groups in Israeli society


Question 5 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??

Another question posed in the *Democracy Index* survey almost every year examines respondents' self-defined social location—that is, their sense of centrality versus marginalization—as follows: "Societies throughout the world are divided into stronger and weaker groups. Which group in Israeli society do you feel you belong to?" Over time, and this year as well, we have found that the majority of respondents in the total sample characterize themselves as

belonging to the strong or quite strong group (multi-year average, approximately 60%; 2025, 61%).

The most striking and consistent difference in this regard is between Jews and Arabs (multi-year average: Jews, 66%; Arabs, 44%).¹⁶ This year, 65% of Jews expressed identification with the stronger groups in Israeli society, as opposed to just 43% of Arabs. The distribution of responses in the Jewish public has not shown any change over the past several years, while the Arab public has migrated to the extremes: from the “quite weak” to the “weak” group, and from the “quite strong” to the “strong” group.¹⁷

Figure 4.11 Which group in Israeli society do you feel you belong to? (Jewish and Arab samples; %)




We examined the association between identification with stronger or weaker groups, and assorted sociodemographic variables. Among both Jews and Arabs, we did not find significant differences based on age or sex. By contrast, in the Jewish sample, there is a clear connection between the feeling of belonging to weaker social groups and the socioeconomic standing of the respondents as expressed in education and income level. The higher the income, the greater the share who report a sense of belonging to the stronger groups, while the same holds true for those with an academic education as compared with those

¹⁶ Multi-year average of surveys from 2012 through 2025.

¹⁷ This trend was recorded in all Arab religious groups: Muslims, Christians, and Druze.

with a lower level of education. In 2022, we found particularly large disparities between groups with different income and education levels, while 2024 broke this pattern, with income and education exerting substantially less impact: The differences between groups based on level of education disappeared entirely, while the gaps based on income level contracted. Apparently, the political and social crisis, the events of October 7, and the Israel-Hamas war had an impact on the sense of identification with stronger groups, such that socioeconomic status became less significant. In 2025, however, the familiar trends reappeared, with substantial gaps based on education, and even larger disparities based on income, though not to the same degree as in the past.

Figure 4.12 Sense of belonging to stronger groups in society (Jewish sample, by education and income; %)



A breakdown of the Jewish sample by religiosity reveals that, in recent years, a sense of identification with the stronger groups in society has been more characteristic of the national religious.

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by religiosity reveals that, in recent years, a sense of identification with the stronger groups in society has been more characteristic of the national religious. This year as well, despite a slight dip, national religious respondents lead the list of religious groups in their feeling of belonging to the stronger social groups. We did not find major gaps between the remaining groups. Throughout the years surveyed, Haredim have shown the lowest level of identification with strong social groups, though this measure rose considerably in 2024, and held steady in 2025. Traditional respondents, in particular the traditional religious, also registered an upswing between 2022 and 2025 in their sense of belonging to the stronger groups.

Analyzing the Jewish sample by political orientation, the most notable finding is the drop in the share of respondents on the Left who identify with the stronger social groups. Whereas in the past, the sense of identification with these groups was more characteristic of the Left than of the Center or Right (multi-year average, 2012–2022: Left, 73.3; Center, 67.2; Right, 66.2), since 2024, the gaps have shrunk, with the share who feel that they belong to the stronger groups now similar in all three camps.

Table 4.13 Sense of belonging to stronger groups in society (Jewish sample, by religiosity and political orientation; %)

		2022	2024	2025
Religiosity	Haredim	54	61	60
	National religious	75	72	71
	Traditional religious	56	66	65
	Traditional non-religious	60	62	65
	Secular	65	63	64
Political orientation	Left	73	61	63
	Center	62	65	62.5
	Right	62	64	66

In the Arab public, we did not find an association between identification with stronger groups and socioeconomic variables such as education or income; however, substantial differences emerged on the basis of religion and vote in the most recent Knesset elections (2022). Druze respondents tend more than

Muslims and Christians to feel a sense of belonging to the stronger groups in Israeli society.


A particularly significant connection was also found between identification with stronger groups and vote in the 2022 elections, with a majority of Arab respondents who voted for Zionist parties seeing themselves as part of the stronger groups, as opposed to roughly one-third of those who voted for Arab parties, and around 40% of those who did not vote at all. Moreover, among those who voted for Zionist parties, there was a sharp increase in the sense of identification with the stronger groups, to more than three-quarters of those surveyed in 2025.

Table 4.14 Sense of belonging to stronger groups in society (Arab sample, by religion and vote in 2022 Knesset elections; %)

		2024	2025
Religion	Muslims	41	41
	Christians	37	47
	Druze	57	61
Vote in 2022 Knesset elections	Zionist parties	57	77
	Arab parties	31	36
	Didn't vote	45	41

Based on the data presented above, two elements can be identified as influencing the sense of belonging to the stronger groups in Israeli society: socioeconomic factors, and those related to religious and political identity. We saw that in the Jewish sample, socioeconomic factors play an important role, though in recent years, self-identification with stronger social groups has also been greatly affected by religious and political identity. In the Arab sample, the latter are the most influential determinants of the sense of belonging to stronger groups. Continuing the discussion of solidarity in Israeli society, which we analyzed at the start of this chapter, we examined the association between perceived solidarity levels and the sense of belonging to stronger or weaker social groups. The data demonstrate an especially strong link between the two: In both the Jewish and Arab publics, the greater the self-identification with stronger groups, the higher the rating of social solidarity.

Figure 4.13 **Social solidarity ratings in Israel** (Jewish and Arab samples, by sense of belonging to stronger or weaker social groups; %)



Analyzing the Jewish sample by political orientation, the most notable finding is the drop in the share of respondents on the Left who identify with the stronger social groups.

Chapter 5

Jewish-Arab Relations

In this chapter, we discuss the following topics:

- ❑ Is Israel democratic toward its Arab citizens as well?
 - ❑ Integration of Arabs in Israeli society
 - ❑ A complicated identity: loyalty to both the Palestinian people and the State of Israel?
 - ❑ Separation between Jews and Arabs
 - ❑ Should Arab citizens be encouraged to emigrate?
 - ❑ Inclusion of Arab parties in the government
-

As we saw in the previous chapter, most Arabs view friction between Jews and Arabs as the most acute social tension in Israel, whereas among Jews (who constitute the majority group in Israel), it is ranked second, after internal Jewish tensions between political camps. This chapter therefore offers an in-depth examination of the attitudes of Jews and Arabs on such issues as the status of Arab citizens in Israel, their integration into Israeli society, the possibility of a complex identity (simultaneously Palestinian and Israeli), and political partnership.

The findings point to a substantial disparity, with Arabs more concerned than Jews about the tension between the two nationalities and their treatment by the State of Israel, even as they express largely positive opinions regarding integration into society, loyalty to the State of Israel, and political

participation—patterns that have held steady this year. By contrast, in the Jewish sample, there is a continuing decline in the following areas: perception of the state as democratic toward Arabs as well as Jews; the belief that most Arabs are interested in integrating into Israeli society, and are capable of being faithful to the State of Israel while feeling part of the Palestinian people; and support for including Arab parties in the government. This is coupled with a rise in approval of physical separation between Jews and Arabs, and even of encouraging Arab citizens to emigrate from Israel. Predictably enough, we found sizeable gaps between political camps; yet, the overall downturn is noticeable in all three—including the Left. We found further that younger Jews tend toward more skeptical, hardline positions than their elders regarding the integration of Arabs and the possibility of a dual identity.

Is Israel democratic toward its Arab citizens as well?


Question 46 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??

One of the key yardsticks of the functioning of a democracy is the way in which it treats its minorities. Comprising roughly 21% of the state's citizens, the Arab public in Israel is a large and significant minority. In this context, we examined to what extent Jews and Arabs alike agree or disagree with the statement that Israel acts democratically toward both its Jewish and Arab citizens. The majority of Jews surveyed hold that Israel is also democratic toward Arabs; however, the share who think this way has shown a slight downward trend in recent years. Among Arabs, only about one-third agree with this assertion—a share that has remained largely stable since the question was first introduced in 2018.

The majority of Jews think that Israel is also democratic toward Arabs; however, the share who think this way has shown a slight downward trend in recent years. Among Arabs, only about one-third agree with this assertion.

Figure 5.1 Agree that Israel is democratic toward Arab citizens, 2018–2025


(Jewish and Arab samples; %)



A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation shows that, on the Right, there has been a clear majority over the years who hold that Israel is also democratic toward its Arab citizens. By contrast, in the Center, which in the past had a majority who shared this view, only slightly more than half agree with it today. On the Left, less than one-half now agree with this statement.

Figure 5.2 Agree that Israel is democratic toward Arab citizens

(Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



An analysis of the Jewish sample by religiosity indicates that a majority in all religious groups hold that Israel is democratic toward Arabs as well as Jews, though among secular respondents, this majority is relatively small, at just 55%, as contrasted with the traditional non-religious (71%), traditional religious (67%), national religious (73%), and Haredim (70%).

In the Arab sample, we found this year that over half of Druze respondents agree with the assertion that Israel is also democratic toward Arabs, compared to only about one-third of Muslims, and an even lower share of Christians.

Table 5.1 Agree that Israel is democratic toward Arab citizens, 2018–2025

(Arab sample, by religion; %)


		2018	2020	2022	2025
Religion	Muslims	32	33	26	32
	Christians	32	33	29	28
	Druze	39	49	56	55

Breaking down the Arab sample by vote in the 2022 Knesset elections, we found a minority in all groups who agree that Arab citizens of Israel are treated democratically, though this minority is largest among Arabs who voted for Zionist parties (40%), smaller among those who did not vote (35%), and smallest among those who voted for Arab parties (25%). An analysis by level of education shows that only a minority in all categories think that Israel is democratic toward Arabs as well, but this minority is smaller among those with an academic education (at just 25%) than among those with a non-academic education (38%).

We examined whether there is an association between agreement with the assertion that Israel is democratic toward Arabs, and respondents' rating of Israeli democracy in general (see discussion in chapter 3). In both the Jewish and Arab samples, we found a positive correlation between the two, but the link is more pronounced in the latter group. In the Jewish sample, even among respondents who awarded low scores to Israeli democracy, the majority consider Israel to be democratic toward its Arab citizens, whereas among Arabs, we found such a majority only among those who rated the country's democracy as good or very good.

In the Jewish sample, even among respondents who awarded low scores to Israeli democracy, the majority consider Israel to be democratic toward its Arab citizens, whereas among Arabs, we found such a majority only among those who rated the country's democracy as good or very good.

Figure 5.3 Is Israel democratic toward its Arab citizens? (Jewish and Arab samples, by rating of Israeli democracy today; %)




Integration of Arabs in Israeli society

Questions 37, 45, 49 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??

The issue of integration of Arab citizens in Israeli society was examined by means of three interrelated questions. The first focuses on the personal opinion of the interviewee: "Do you agree that Arab citizens of Israel should integrate into Israeli society?" The two other questions address perceptions of the majority opinion in both the Arab and Jewish publics: "Do most **Arab** citizens of Israel want to integrate into Israeli society and be part of it?" and "Do most **Jewish** citizens of Israel want Arabs to integrate into Israeli society and be part of it?"

A breakdown of responses to the first question yields a striking disparity between Jews and Arabs: An overwhelming majority of the latter (90%) think that Arabs should integrate, whereas only one-half of Jews agree with this view.


Figure 5.4 Should Arab citizens of Israel integrate into Israeli society and be part of it? (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



As for assessments of the majority opinion regarding the integration of Arabs in Israeli society, we found more positive views among Arabs than among Jews. Both Jews and Arabs believe that Arabs are more eager to integrate than Jews are to have them do so. Roughly three-quarters of Arab respondents hold that most Arabs wish to integrate, as opposed to only a minority of Jews who think this way. Nearly half of Arabs believe that most Jews support the integration of Arabs, as contrasted with only about one-quarter of Jews themselves who take this view.


Both Jews and Arabs believe that Arabs are more eager to integrate than Jews are to have them do so. Nearly half of Arabs believe that most Jews support the integration of Arabs, as contrasted with only about one-quarter of Jews themselves who take this view.

Figure 5.5 Positions on integration of Arab citizens in Israeli society (Jewish and Arab samples; %)




In past years as well, we examined the extent of agreement with the notion that most Arab citizens of Israel wish to integrate into Israeli society. The first time this question was posed (in 2018), roughly two-thirds of both Jews and Arabs supported this assertion; in subsequent years, there was an increase followed by a leveling-out in the share of Arabs who agreed with it, and concurrently, a steady decline among Jews, resulting in only a minority today who agree that most Arabs wish to integrate.

Figure 5.6 Think that most Arab citizens of Israel want to integrate into Israeli society, 2018–2025 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



As expected, in the Jewish sample we found substantial gaps between political camps. In response to the question about their personal opinion, a decisive majority of respondents on the Left, and a large majority in the Center, expressed support for the integration of Arabs in Israeli society, as opposed to only about one-third on the Right. A similar disparity was found when assessing the desire of Arabs to integrate into Israeli society: On the Left, roughly two-thirds think that most Arabs wish to integrate, compared with about one-half in the Center, and just one-quarter on the Right. A different pattern emerged when it came to respondents' perceptions of the majority opinion in the Jewish public: In all three political camps, only a minority believe that most Jews support the integration of Arabs in Israeli society, with a slightly higher share in the Center than on the Left or Right.

Figure 5.7 Positions on integration of Arab citizens in Israeli society (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



Over the years, the share of Jewish respondents who believe that Arabs want to integrate into Israeli society has trended downward in all three political camps. In 2018, a majority across the board held this view, whereas this year, we found a clear majority only on the Left. Interestingly enough, when this question was first posed (in 2018), the share of Jews on the Left and in the Center who believed that most Arabs wish to integrate was greater than that

among the Arabs themselves. At a later point, from 2020 through 2024, the share on the Left who thought that most Arabs wish to integrate was similar to that among Arab respondents; however, this year, even on the Left, the share of respondents who hold that Arabs are interested in integrating (65%) is considerably lower than that among Arabs themselves (73.5%).

Table 5.2 Think that most Arab citizens of Israel want to integrate into Israeli society, 2018–2025 (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)

	2018	2020	2022	2024	2025
Left	87	82.5	77	74	65
Center	75.5	65	53	51	51.5
Right	57	47	29	31	25

Breaking down the results in the Jewish sample by religiosity, we found a sizeable majority in favor of the integration of Arabs in Israeli society only in the secular group. Roughly half of traditional non-religious respondents share this view, as opposed to only a minority in the remaining groups.

Perceptions regarding the desire of Arabs to integrate show a similar pattern, with roughly one-half of secular respondents, and only a minority in the other groups, believing that Arabs wish to integrate. Notably, when respondents were asked if, in their opinion, most Jews support the integration of Arabs, the picture is more uniform: In all groups, including the secular, only a minority think that most Jews would like Arabs to integrate. In other words, even when their personal support for Arab integration is strong, many respondents do not believe that this view is shared by most of the Jewish public.

A decisive majority of respondents on the Left, and a large majority in the Center, expressed support for the integration of Arabs in Israeli society, as opposed to only about one-third on the Right.

Figure 5.8 **Support the integration of Arab citizens into Israeli society**
(Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)




Table 5.3 **Positions on the integration of Arab citizens in Israeli society**
(Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)

	Think that most Arab citizens of Israel want to integrate into Israeli society	Think that most Jewish citizens of Israel want Arabs to integrate into Israeli society
Haredim	14	16
National religious	28	25
Traditional religious	22	21
Traditional non-religious	39	28
Secular	49	28

Additionally, we found a somewhat surprising gap between the sexes in the Jewish sample, with most men (57%) favoring the integration of Arabs as compared with only a minority of women (44%). Substantial disparities were also found when breaking down the findings by age: There is twice as much support for Arab integration among respondents aged 55 and over (68%) than in the youngest age cohort (18–34, 34%), with the intermediate age group (35–54) falling in between, at 49%. Indeed, in all three political camps, younger respondents are less in favor of the integration of Arab citizens than their older counterparts.

Table 5.4 Support the integration of Arab citizens in Israeli society (Jewish sample, by political orientation and age; %)

	18–34	35–54	55 and over
Left	78.5	86	95.5
Center	62	69	78
Right	21	36	50

Support for Arab integration is greater among Jews with an academic education (full or partial) than among those with a non-academic education (61% versus 40%, respectively), and among those with higher income levels (above-median income, 61%; median income, 47%; below-median income, 40%).

The most noticeable differences were found when breaking down the results by age, with Jews aged 55 and over tending to take a more positive stance—whether with respect to the views of Arabs themselves or the attitude of Jews toward Arab integration. These differences between the 55+ age group and the younger respondents were found in all three political camps.

Table 5.5 Positions on the integration of Arab citizens in Israeli society (Jewish sample, by age; %)

	Think that most Arab citizens of Israel want to integrate into Israeli society	Think that most Jewish citizens of Israel want Arabs to integrate into Israeli society
18–34	22	17
35–54	34	19
55 and over	53	40

Opinions among Arab respondents are more uniform. In all subgroups, we found a decisive majority (over 85%) who think that Arab citizens should integrate into Israeli society and be part of it. In terms of the perceived majority positions as well, we did not find noticeable differences between the various groups. There was a considerable gap only with regard to level of education: Arabs with an academic education tend less than those lacking higher education to believe in both the desire of most Arabs to integrate in Israeli society and the desire of most Jews for them to do so.

Table 5.6 Positions on the integration of Arab citizens in Israeli society
(Arab sample, by education; %)

	Think that most Arab citizens of Israel want to integrate into Israeli society	Think that most Jewish citizens of Israel want Arabs to integrate into Israeli society
Academic education (full or partial)	65	38
Non-academic education	78	51

We examined the association between positions on Arab integration and perceptions of social tensions in Israel, dividing the respondents into two groups: those who think that the tension between Jews and Arabs is the most acute, and those who rank other sources of friction most highly. Among Jews who consider Jewish-Arab tensions to be the most critical, less than one-third (30%) favor the integration of Arab citizens in Israeli society, while among Jews who cite another source of tension as primary, the majority (56%) support Arab integration.

Among Arabs, perceptions of the most acute social tension have a noticeable effect on how Jewish positions are viewed: Only a minority of respondents who defined the tension between Jews and Arabs as the most severe believe that most Jews support integration (39%), as compared with more than half of those who pointed to a different source of tension (52%).


In a similar vein, only in the Arab public did we find a link between the perceived stance of most Jews on Arab integration and the extent of agreement with the assertion that Israel is democratic toward Arabs as well. Among respondents who hold that Israel is democratic toward Arabs, roughly two-thirds (68%) also think that most Jewish citizens of Israel would like Arabs to integrate into Israeli society and be part of it. On the other hand, of those respondents who do not agree that Israel is democratic to Arabs, only about one-third (35%) believe that most Jews wish to see Arabs integrate into Israeli society.

Summarizing our analysis of Arab integration in Israeli society, we found substantial differences of views between Jews and Arabs. Whereas a sweeping majority of Arabs see integration as desirable, the Jewish public is divided on

this issue, with only about one-half in favor of Arab integration. Moreover, Arabs are more optimistic about the positions of both groups: They believe more strongly in the desire of Arabs to integrate and in the willingness of Jews to accept them, whereas Jews express greater skepticism regarding both the Arab wish to integrate and the support of most of the Jewish public for Arab integration.

Figure 5.9 Positions on the integration of Arab citizens in Israeli society

(Jewish and Arab samples, by most acute social tension; %)




Arabs are more optimistic about the positions of both groups: They believe more strongly in the desire of Arabs to integrate and in the willingness of Jews to accept them, whereas Jews express greater skepticism regarding both the Arab wish to integrate and the support of most of the Jewish public for Arab integration.

Sense of belonging to the Palestinian people, and loyalty to Israel

Question 50 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??

Once again, we asked: “Is it possible for an Arab citizen of Israel who feels part of the Palestinian people to also be a loyal citizen of the State of Israel?” Over the years, a majority of Arabs (as contrasted with a minority of Jews) have responded in the affirmative; however, following the events of October 7, there was a noticeable drop in both groups in the level of agreement that such a complex identity is possible. In the Jewish public, the decline in the share who believe in this possibility has continued into 2025 as well, whereas among Arabs, this year has seen a renewed belief that civic loyalty to Israel can be combined with Palestinian identity.

Figure 5.10 Think that an Arab citizen of Israel who feels part of the Palestinian people can also be a loyal citizen of the State of Israel, 2019–2025 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)




* *A Conditional Partnership: Jews and Arabs in Israel* surveys. The 2021 data represent an average of two measurements, conducted in April and August 2021.

** *Israeli Voice Index* surveys.

As expected, we found a sizeable gap on this question between political camps in the Jewish sample: On the Left, nearly one-half of respondents believe in the

possibility of a complex Israeli-Palestinian identity, as opposed to only about one-fifth in the Center and a negligible minority on the Right. Nonetheless, there has been a consistent decline across all camps in the share who hold that those who feel part of the Palestinian people can also be loyal citizens of Israel, meaning that this year, for the first time, there is not a majority—even on the Left—who believe that such a thing is possible.

Figure 5.11 Think that an Arab citizen of Israel who feels part of the Palestinian people can also be a loyal citizen of the State of Israel, 2019–2025 (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



Breaking down the Jewish sample by age and religiosity, we found only a minority in all subgroups who think that dual Israeli-Palestinian loyalty is possible. This minority is larger in the 55 and over age group (at 26%) than in the two younger cohorts: 35–54 (13%); and 18–34 (9%). Likewise, it is larger among secular respondents than in the other religious groups (26% versus 6%–10%, respectively).

On the Left, nearly one-half of respondents believe in the possibility of a complex Israeli-Palestinian identity, as opposed to only about one-fifth in the Center and a negligible minority on the Right.

In the Arab sample, we found no differences when analyzing by sex, age, education, and income, nor on the basis of voting patterns in the 2022 Knesset elections (Arab versus Zionist parties). A breakdown by religion reveals that the share who think that a complex identity is possible is higher among Muslims than among Christians or Druze, though in all three groups, this share is a majority (72%, 59%, and 61%, respectively).

Cross-tabulating between the responses on the possibility of a compound identity and on support for Arab integration into Israeli society, we found that among Jews who believe that Arabs who feel a sense of belonging to the Palestinian people can also be loyal citizens of Israel, an overwhelming majority (91%) think that Arab citizens should integrate in Israeli society. By contrast, among Jews who do not believe in such a possibility, over one-half (55%) are opposed to integration. In the Arab public, a majority of those who believe that it is possible to maintain dual loyalty, as well as those who do not, are in favor of integration (94% and 80%, respectively).

Should Jews and Arabs live separately?

Question 47a and 47b Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??

Once again, we examined the practical aspect of coexistence, that is, whether Jews and Arabs should live separately or together. Jews were asked if they agreed/disagreed that “to preserve Jewish identity, it is better for Jews and Arabs in Israel to live separately,” while Arabs were asked whether, “to preserve Arab identity, it is better for Arabs and Jews in Israel to live separately.”

In all our surveys over the years, the share of Jews who favored living separately exceeded that of the Arab respondents. This year, the share of Jews who support separation reached roughly one-half. In the Arab sample, only a minority of respondents have favored separation through the years—a share that even dropped substantially this year.

Predictably enough, when we broke down the responses of the Jewish sample in the last three surveys by political orientation, we found noticeable differences. A majority on the Right support living separately, with this share rising at a slow but steady rate. On the Left, just a small minority favor separation, though the level of support clearly increased this year. In the Center, only a minority in all three surveys support the notion of living separately; however,

this camp shows the greatest fluctuation: Following the events of October 7, support for separation rose, but it has declined this year relative to 2024, and is now approaching the level on the Left.

Figure 5.12 Agree that, to preserve Jewish/Arab identity, it is better for Jews and Arabs in Israel to live separately, 2017–2025 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)






Figure 5.13 Agree that, to preserve Jewish identity, it is better for Jews and Arabs in Israel to live separately, 2020–2025 (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



Younger Jews express greater support than their elders for separation between Jews and Arabs, with a clear majority aged 18–34 who think that it is better for Jews and Arabs to live separately, just half with this view in the 35–54 age group, and only a minority in the oldest cohort (55 and above).

Substantial gaps emerged when breaking down the Jewish sample by age: Younger Jews express greater support than their elders for separation between Jews and Arabs, with a clear majority aged 18–34 who think that it is better for Jews and Arabs to live separately, just half with this view in the 35–54 age group, and only a minority in the oldest cohort (55 and above).

Figure 5.14 To preserve Jewish identity, is it better for Jews and Arabs in Israel to live separately? (Jewish sample, by age; %)



In all three political camps, a greater share of younger than of older respondents support the separation of Jews and Arabs.

Breaking down the results in the Jewish sample by religiosity, we found that only in the secular group do a minority (32%) support separation between Jews and Arabs. Among the traditional non-religious, close to one-half (48%)


favor separation, whereas in the remaining groups, a definite majority express support for it (traditional religious, 65%; national religious, 61%; Haredim, 79%). The share in favor of separation is lower among Jews with an academic education than among those with a non-academic education (41% versus 56%, respectively).

Table 5.7 Agree that, to preserve Jewish identity, it is better for Jews and Arabs in Israel to live separately (Jewish sample, by political orientation and age; %)

	18–34	35–54	55 and over
Left	34	25	12
Center	32	31	24
Right	74	61	53

As we saw earlier, the majority of Arabs are opposed to separation between Jews and Arabs, with this share increasing this year across all Arab religious groups.

Figure 5.15 Disagree that, to preserve Arab identity, it is better for Arabs and Jews in Israel to live separately (Arab sample, by religion; %)



A breakdown of the Arab sample by place of residence shows that a majority in all areas are against separation, though this majority is larger among residents of the Negev and the mixed cities than in Galilee and the Triangle.

Table 5.8 **Disagree that, to preserve Arab identity, it is better for Arabs and Jews in Israel to live separately** (Arab sample, by area of residence; %)

Negev	80.5
Mixed cities	80
Galilee	74
Triangle	67

Cross-tabulating between opinions on the integration of Arabs in Israeli society and support or opposition for living separately, we found a strong correlation in the Jewish sample between the two topics: Of those respondents who think that Arabs should integrate, a clear majority are opposed to physical separation between Jews and Arabs, whereas, of those who do not think that Arabs should integrate, a decisive majority favor such a separation. In the Arab sample, the association is less marked, with respondents tending to be opposed to separation in any case, though, of those who do not think that Arabs should integrate into Israeli society, the share who are against physical separation is lower.

Table 5.9 **To preserve Jewish/Arab identity, is it better for Jews and Arabs in Israel to live separately?** (Jewish and Arab samples, by support for Arab integration into Israeli society; %)


		To preserve Jewish/Arab identity, it is better for Jews and Arabs in Israel to live separately			Total
		Agree	Disagree	Don't know	
Jews	Agree that Arabs should integrate into Israeli society	21	68	11	100
	Disagree that Arabs should integrate into Israeli society	82	14	4	100
Arabs	Agree that Arabs should integrate into Israeli society	23	76	1	100
	Disagree that Arabs should integrate into Israeli society	44	53	3	100

Should the government encourage Arab citizens to emigrate?

Question 36 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??

Once again this year, we asked Jewish respondents to what extent they agree or disagree that the government should encourage Arab citizens to emigrate. After a gradual decline in the share of those in favor of encouraging Arab emigration over the past two decades, 2025 saw a steep increase in support relative to the previous measurement in 2019.


Figure 5.16 Agree that the government should encourage Arab citizens to emigrate, 2005–2025 (Jewish sample; %)



A breakdown by political orientation shows that the share who support encouraging Arab emigration has climbed since 2019 in all camps, though only on the Right has there been a majority in favor in the last two surveys.

After a gradual decline in the share of those in favor of encouraging Arab emigration over the past two decades, 2025 saw a steep increase in support relative to the previous measurement in 2019.

Figure 5.17 **Agree that the government should encourage Arab citizens to emigrate** (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)




Breaking down the results by age group, we found that here too, as with other topics in this chapter, older Jews take a more moderate stance toward Arab citizens of Israel than do younger respondents. In the Jewish sample as a whole, nearly two-thirds (65%) of young people aged 18–34 agree that the government should encourage Arabs to emigrate, compared with slightly more than half (54%) of those aged 35–54, and only a minority of those in the 55-and-over age group (40%). This pattern among the age groups holds true across all three political camps.

Analyzing the Jewish sample by religiosity, secular respondents are the only group in which a minority (34.5%) agree that Arab emigration should be encouraged; in all other religious groups, a clear majority support such a move (traditional non-religious, 58%; traditional religious and national religious, 68%; and Haredim, 78%).

A breakdown by vote in the 2022 Knesset elections reveals that, of those who voted for Coalition parties, the share who support encouraging the emigration of Arabs ranges between a decisive majority (Religious Zionism, United Torah Judaism, and Shas) and a smaller majority (Likud). Of those who voted for Opposition parties, the level of support varies from a large minority (Yisrael Beytenu) to only a negligible one (Labor).

Figure 5.18 Agree that the government should encourage Arab citizens to emigrate (Jewish sample, by vote in 2022 Knesset elections; %)



Of those Jewish respondents who support the integration of Arabs, only a minority favor encouraging them to emigrate, as opposed to a large majority among those who do not support such integration. We found further that a majority of those who think that Arabs should live separately from Jews support encouraging emigration, as opposed to only a minority among those who are opposed to separation. Likewise, a clear majority of Jews who do not believe that Arab citizens of Israel can hold a dual identity favor encouraging Arabs to emigrate, as contrasted with a minority among those who think that Arab loyalty to the state is possible.

Of those Jewish respondents who support the integration of Arabs, only a minority favor encouraging them to emigrate, as opposed to a large majority among those who do not support such integration.

Table 5.10 **Should the government encourage Arab citizens to emigrate?**

(Jewish sample, by views on various questions on Arab-Jewish relations; %)

		The government should encourage Arabs to emigrate			Total
		Agree	Disagree	Don't know	
Arab citizens should integrate into Israeli society	Agree	28	61	11	100
	Disagree	81	15	4	100
It is better for Jews and Arabs to live separately	Agree	77	18	5	100
	Disagree	27	65.5	7.5	100
Arab citizens of Israel who feel part of the Palestinian people can also be loyal citizens of Israel	Agree	18	75	7	100
	Disagree	62	29	9	100


Inclusion of Arab parties in the government

Question 48 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??

Over the years, a large majority of the Arab public have supported bringing Arab parties into the government, whereas only a minority of Jews have been in favor. In recent years, support for inclusion of Arab parties in the government has been steadily on the rise among Arabs, while there has been a degree of fluctuation in Jewish public opinion on this issue. We recorded a considerable decline this year in the share of Jews who favor including Arab parties as compared with the previous measurement in May 2023.

Over the years, a large majority of the Arab public have supported bringing Arab parties into the government, whereas only a minority of Jews have been in favor. A breakdown of the findings in the Jewish sample by political orientation shows a decline in support in all three camps for including Arab parties in the government.

Figure 5.19 Support bringing Arab parties into the government, 2003–2025 (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



* Based on surveys in *Jews and Arabs: A Conditional Partnership*.

** Based on February 2021 survey in *Israeli Voice Index*.


A breakdown of the findings in the Jewish sample by political orientation shows a decline in support in all three camps for bringing Arab parties into the government, though the drop on the Left was only slight, leaving a majority of almost three-quarters who favor such inclusion. The decrease in the Center is more striking: In 2023, over half supported bringing Arab parties into the government, whereas this year, the shares of proponents and opponents are equal. On the Right, a substantial majority are against including Arab parties in the government, with this majority growing noticeably over the last two years.

Analysis of the Jewish sample by religiosity reveals only a minority who support bringing Arab parties into the government: secular, 44%; traditional non-religious, 20%; traditional religious, 14%; national religious, 13%; and Haredim, 5%.

Breaking down the Jewish sample by vote in the 2022 Knesset elections, we found that 80% of voters for the Labor party support bringing Arab parties into the government. Of those who voted for other Opposition parties, only about one-half or less favor such inclusion (Yesh Atid, 48%; Yisrael Beytenu,

41%; National Unity, 40%). Among Coalition party voters, only a scant minority support such a move (Shas, 10%; Likud, 9%; United Torah Judaism and Religious Zionism, both 5%).

Figure 5.20 Do you support or oppose bringing Arab parties into the government? 2023 and 2025 (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)



Analyzing the Arab sample on the basis of assorted demographic variables, we found a large majority in all categories who approve of bringing Arab parties into the government, with no significant gaps between groups. A breakdown by vote in the 2022 Knesset elections also does not yield major differences in levels of support among Arab respondents: voters for Zionist parties, 92.5%; voters for Arab parties, 87%; did not vote, 83%.

As expected, in both the Jewish and Arab publics, we found a very strong link between support for inclusion of Arab parties in the government and support for integration of Arabs in Israeli society. Among Jews, there is almost wall-to-wall opposition to bringing Arab parties into the government among respondents who do not think that Arabs should be integrated into Israeli society. By contrast, one-half of those Jews who favor social integration of Arabs also support including Arab parties in government. Arab respondents who do not agree that Arabs should integrate into Israeli society are divided over whether Arab parties should join the government, whereas among those who do wish to integrate, a decisive majority favor inclusion in the government.

Table 5.11 **Do you support or oppose bringing Arab parties into the government?** (Jewish and Arab samples, by support for integration of Arabs in Israeli society; %)

		Support or oppose bringing Arab parties into the government			Total
		Support	Oppose	Don't know	
Jews	Agree that Arabs should integrate into Israeli society	50	38	12	100
	Disagree that Arabs should integrate into Israeli society	4	94	2	100
Arabs	Agree that Arabs should integrate into Israeli society	90	9	1	100
	Disagree that Arabs should integrate into Israeli society	50	47	3	100

We examined further whether there is an association between support for the inclusion of Arab parties in government and opinions on the possibility of a complex Israeli-Palestinian identity. Among Jews, we found that around three-quarters of those who believe that such an identity is possible also favor bringing Arab parties into the government; however, of those who do not think it is possible for Arabs to hold both identities, three-quarters are opposed to including Arab parties in government. In the Arab public, a majority in both groups support having Arab parties in government.

As expected, in the Jewish sample, those respondents who favor encouraging Arab citizens to emigrate, and who support separation between Jews and Arabs, tend to oppose bringing Arab parties into the government.

Table 5.12 **Do you support or oppose bringing Arab parties into the government?** (Jewish sample, by positions on encouraging Arab emigration, and on separation between Jews and Arabs in Israel; %)

		Support or oppose bringing Arab parties into the government			Total
		Support	Oppose	Don't know	
The government should encourage Arab emigration	Agree	10	85	5	100
	Disagree	53	37	10	100
It is better for Jews and Arabs in Israel to live separately	Agree	10.5	87	2.5	100
	Disagree	49	40	11	100

To summarize, the findings point to a deep and systematic divide between Jews and Arabs in their respective perceptions of relations between them, reflecting a severe crisis of trust. In the Arab public, the stated desire for social integration and political collaboration has remained consistent, but is accompanied by notable mistrust in both the democratic character of Israel and the views of the Jewish majority. On the other hand, a large share of Jews cast doubt on the willingness of Arabs to integrate into Israeli society.

In the Jewish public, political orientation is a major factor shaping opinions: On the Left, large shares of respondents support democratic equality for Arabs, social integration, and political partnership, whereas on the Right, there is a stronger tendency to doubt Arab loyalty and to favor separation and the encouragement of emigration. For the most part, positions in the Center fall somewhere in between, leaning slightly toward the Left. In addition, we found that younger Jews, as compared with their older counterparts, are inclined to take more skeptical, hardline positions regarding the integration of Arabs in Israeli society, and the possibility of being loyal to the state while also feeling part of the Palestinian people.

Chapter 6

Elections on the Horizon

In this chapter, we discuss the following topics:

- ☐ Is there a political party that closely represents your views?
 - ☐ Fairness of the next elections
 - ☐ Likelihood of distorted election results
 - ☐ What influences the public's choice of which party to vote for?
 - ☐ Impact of the party's platform on crime (Arab sample)
 - ☐ Does it matter who you vote for?
-

Given the increasing talk (at the time of writing) of the possibility of early elections, and the fact that even if such a move is not imminent, elections are slated to take place in 2026 in any event, we included a number of questions in this year's survey about voters' expectations from the coming elections, and the factors that would presumably affect their decision on which party to vote for.

Is there a political party that closely represents your views?

Question 52 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??


In chapter 3, we saw that, as in the past, trust in the political parties is extremely low. For this reason, we wished to know whether there are parties that respondents see as accurately representing their views. This question is being posed for the seventh time since 2003, and, as shown in the figure below,

the overall share of those who responded in the affirmative (meaning that such a party exists) has hit the lowest point since the inception of the *Democracy Index* surveys.

In the total sample, we found that only a minority of respondents this year (26%) feel there is a party that closely represents them, while larger proportions responded that there is a party that partly represents their views, or that there is no party that adequately represents them (35% and 34%, respectively).

The differences between Jews and Arabs are striking, with consistently lower shares of Arabs than of Jews feeling well represented politically throughout the years. In fact, in recent years, there has been a gradual convergence of the Jewish and Arab publics in terms of their poor perception of the representativeness of Israel's political parties.


Figure 6.1 Agree that there is a party that closely represents their views, 2003–2025 (total sample; %)



Nonetheless, a comparison between the distribution of responses in the two sectors shows a clear majority of Arabs who think that there is no party that accurately represents their views, while less than one-third of Jews say the same. A breakdown of the Arab sample by religion reveals that Christians registered the highest share who feel that no party adequately represents them (65%), though a majority of Muslims and Druze also responded similarly (59% and 55%, respectively)

A clear majority of Arabs think that there is no party that accurately represents their views, while less than one-third of Jews say the same.

Figure 6.2 Is there a political party in Israel today that closely represents your views? (Jewish and Arab samples; %)




A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation shows that the share of respondents who feel there is a party that closely represents them is lowest in the Center, and highest on the Left (roughly one-third)—apparently due to the merger of Meretz with the Labor party, which may have breathed fresh hope into left-wing voters—with the Right falling in between the two. The proportion of respondents who feel represented in part is equal on the Right and in the Center (at 40%), and lower on the Left. Of those who responded that no party accurately represents their views, the share is slightly greater in the Center than in the other two camps, though the differences are negligible.

Table 6.1 Is there a political party in Israel today that closely represents your views? (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)

	Left	Center	Right
There is a party that closely represents my views	34	20.5	29
There is a party that partly represents my views	36	40	40
There is no party that closely represents my views	27	31.5	27
Don't know	3	8	4

Analyzing the Jewish sample by religiosity, we found that Haredim feel the most satisfied with their political representation, while national religious respondents are the most inclined to feel that no party represents them accurately. The latter result may be attributable to the lack of a religious Zionist party in the last elections that was not associated with the extreme Right. With the exception of the Haredi respondents, the most common response in all the religious groups is that there is a party that partially represents their views.

Figure 6.3 Is there a political party in Israel today that closely represents your views? (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)




Fairness of the next elections

Question 55 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??

In public discourse in Israel, there are those who express the view that, due to the weakening of Israeli democracy, the next elections—if they take place at all—will not be fair, nor will they be an accurate reflection of the true distribution of political preferences. We therefore posed the question: “In your opinion, will the next Knesset elections be free and fair?” A solid majority of the total sample (65%) responded positively, meaning that the talk of “flawed” elections does not reflect the predominant public view, though it should also be noted that more than one-quarter of those polled are concerned in this regard. However, there are pronounced differences between the assessments of Jewish and Arab respondents: Among Jews, a majority of over two-thirds answered that they expect the next elections to be free and fair, compared with only about one-half of Arab respondents who share this view.

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation yields a majority across all camps who think or are certain that the coming elections will be free and fair, though this majority is particularly large on the Right.

Figure 6.4 Think or are certain that the next Knesset elections will be free and fair (total sample; Jewish and Arab samples; Jews, by political orientation; %)



The talk of “flawed” elections does not reflect the predominant public view, though it should also be noted that more than one-quarter of respondents are concerned.

Likelihood of distorted election results


Questions 56–57 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??

In a similar vein, we posed two additional questions: “How likely is it that **Israeli** political individuals or groups will attempt to sway the results of the next elections by improper means?” and “How likely is it that **foreign** political entities (for example, other states) will attempt, in various ways, to sway the results of the next elections in Israel?” We found that, on the whole, Arabs are slightly less concerned than Jews about possible domestic or foreign intervention in the election results, though in both cases, almost one-half or more of respondents rate the chances of this happening as quite or very likely.

As shown in the figure below, with regard to Israeli entities liable to interfere in the electoral process, respondents on the Left are more suspicious than those in the Center or on the Right. By contrast, when it comes to foreign elements, the share who think that outside influence is quite or very likely is highest on the Right, and lowest in the Center, with the Left falling somewhere in between. Likewise, we can see that the fear of intervention in the election results by domestic forces is greater in all camps than the fear concerning foreign entities.

Not surprisingly, we found an association between both sources of concern: 68% of those who think that Israeli entities will attempt to influence the elections also hold that foreign elements will try to do the same, while 77.5% of those who think that outside entities will try to sway the elections also fear the same from domestic actors.

Figure 6.5 Think that it is quite or very likely that Israeli or foreign entities will attempt to sway the election results (Jewish and Arab samples; Jews, by political orientation; %)



What influences the public's choice of which party to vote for?

Questions 53 and 58 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??


We wished to know what influences voters in deciding which party to vote for, posing two questions on the subject. First, referring to parties and their platforms, we asked: “Which of the following factors will most strongly influence your decision about which party to vote for in the next elections?” The response choices presented were:

1. The party's positions on foreign policy and security
2. The party's positions on religion and state
3. The party's positions on the economy and the high cost of living
4. The party's positions on the climate crisis
5. The identity of the party leader
6. In any case, I will vote for the same party I voted for in the last elections
7. Don't intend to vote/don't know

In the Jewish public, a virtually identical share of interviewees consider three factors to be of prime importance (all of them connected with policy): the party positions on foreign policy and security, on religion and state, and on the

economy and the high cost of living (20%, 19%, and 19%, respectively). Slightly below them is the personal factor: the individual heading the party. Among Arab survey participants, one issue stands out, namely, the party's platform on the economy and the high cost of living, with roughly one-third (the largest share) who cited it as the most significant in deciding which party to vote for.

Figure 6.6 Most influential factors in deciding which party to vote for in the next elections (Jewish and Arab samples; %)




Breaking down the responses of the Jewish sample by political orientation, we found that the greatest share of those who identify with the Left report that the party's platform on religion and state is the deciding factor for them when choosing which party to vote for; those who align themselves with the Center cite the party's positions on the economy and the high cost of living; and those who situate themselves on the Right are most influenced by the party's stance on foreign policy and security.

The greatest share of those on the Left report that the party's platform on religion and state is the deciding factor for them when choosing which party to vote for; those in the Center cite the party's positions on the economy and the high cost of living; and those on the Right are most influenced by the party's stance on foreign policy and security.

One noteworthy finding is that, unlike many Western countries, in Israel the climate crisis barely plays a role in deciding which party to vote for. In the total sample, only 1% (!) reported that a given party's policy on this issue would affect their vote. Even more surprisingly, among voters who identify with the Left—a political camp known worldwide for placing the environment at the center of its ideology—the share of respondents who cited a party's policy on the climate crisis as a key factor in deciding their vote did not even reach the level of the total sample. Another unexpected finding, given what we know about the priorities of young people globally, is that the youngest age group in our survey (18–34) does not attach greater importance than the older cohorts to a party's positions on the climate crisis.

We wondered whether identification with stronger or weaker groups in Israeli society affects the order of priorities when voting for a particular political party, and in particular, the emphasis it places on the economy and the cost of living. We found that, among Jewish respondents who align themselves with stronger groups, the factor most crucial to them in deciding which party to vote for is its stance on issues of foreign policy and security. By contrast, those who align themselves with weaker social groups most often cited the party's positions on religion and state. With regard to a party's positions on the economy and the cost of living, we found only a negligible difference in voting patterns between the two categories (aligned with stronger groups, 18.5%; and with weaker groups, 21%).

Figure 6.7 Most influential factors (in party platforms) in deciding which party to vote for in the next elections (Jewish sample, political orientation; %)




As opposed to the above, in the Arab public, party policy on the economy and cost of living was the major deciding factor for respondents who aligned themselves with stronger and weaker social groups alike, with the former citing this subject as their highest priority to a greater extent than the latter (36.5% versus 30%, respectively). We further examined whether there is an association between the factors influencing the choice of whom to vote for and the respondent's level of income. Among Jews, we did not find differences between the various earning levels regarding the impact of a party's stance on the economy; however, among Arab respondents, those with median and below-median incomes attached greater importance to this issue than did those with incomes above the median level (36%, 38%, and 22%, respectively).

The second question posed in this context was: “Which of the following issues/ events will have the greatest impact on your decision about which party to vote for in the next elections?”

1. The events of October 7
2. The judicial reform/overhaul
3. Anti-government protests
4. Legislation on Haredi conscription
5. PM Netanyahu’s trial
6. The high cost of living
7. The return of the hostages


Figure 6.8 Most influential issues/events in deciding which party to vote for in the next elections (Jewish and Arab samples; %)



Among Arab respondents, in keeping with the previous question (in which, as stated, the greatest share cited a party's platform on the economy and the cost of living as the factor determining their vote), here too, the largest proportion—roughly one-half—reported that the high cost of living is the most important subject for them in deciding whom to vote for. Among Jews, five main factors were chosen by virtually identical shares of respondents: the return of the hostages, the events of October 7, legislation on Haredi conscription, the high cost of living, and the judicial reform/overhaul.

A breakdown of the responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals that the two chief factors determining the vote in each of the camps are: on the Left, the return of the hostages and the judicial reform/overhaul; in the Center, the return of the hostages and the Haredi conscription law; and on the Right, the high cost of living and the events of October 7. It is interesting to note the gap between the greater importance attributed to the return of the hostages by those on the Left and in the Center (27% and 28%, respectively) as compared with the Right (12%). This disparity exemplifies the politicization of this issue.

Figure 6.9 Most influential issues/events in deciding which party to vote for in the next elections (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)




The party agenda on crime and vote in the next elections

(Arab sample)

Question 54 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??

We posed an additional question, to Arab respondents only: “To what extent will a party’s platform on the fight against crime in Arab society be a major factor in deciding who to vote for in the next elections?” The data show that a clear majority (close to three-quarters of respondents) attach great importance to this issue.

Figure 6.10 To what extent will a party’s platform on the fight against crime in Arab society be a major factor in deciding who to vote for in the next elections? (Arab sample; %)




An analysis of the results by religion reveals that a majority in all three groups surveyed strongly prioritize the problem of crime; however, this majority is smallest among Muslims (71%) and largest among Druze (81%), with Christians falling in between (78%). We did not encounter differences on the basis of sex, though in earlier surveys, Arab women showed greater sensitivity to this issue than did men. The differences between age groups did not follow a consistent pattern (18–34, 74.5%; 35–54, 69%; 55 and over, 74%).

Does it matter who you vote for?

Question 35 Appendix 1, p. ?? | Appendix 2, p. ??

Concluding this chapter on the subject of elections, we will now discuss the extent to which respondents agreed or disagreed with the statement: “It makes no difference who you vote for; it doesn’t change the situation”—a question that has been posed 13 times to date in the *Democracy Index* surveys. As shown in figure 6.11 below, the share who agree with this assertion has not changed dramatically over the years, with an average of 40.6% in the total samples (lowest value, 29%; highest value, 49%). Interestingly enough, there seems to be no clear association with whether the question was posed during an election year. Thus, for example, in 2009—an election year—almost one-half of respondents (a record) agreed that it makes no difference who people vote for, as it won’t change the situation. By contrast, in 2015, which was also an election year, only 29% agreed with this assertion. At the same time, in 2020—at the height of the political crisis that led to several rounds of elections—the share who answered in the affirmative rose to 46%.

Figure 6.11 Agree that it doesn’t matter who you vote for; it won’t change the situation, 2003–2025 (total sample; %)



In this year's survey, 40% of the total sample agreed with the statement presented, and 56% disagreed with it. Among Jews, the share who disagreed was much higher than the share who agreed, while among Arabs, the proportions were almost equal.

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation shows that the share of respondents who hold that it makes no difference who one votes for is lowest on the Left (at 15%), and highest on the Right (43%), with the Center in between (36%). The large proportion on the Right who agree with the assertion that elections do not change anything may be explained by the trickle-down effect of the "Deep State" campaign by the leadership of this camp, according to which, even if the Right wins an election, its rivals will still hold the reins of power in the country, and will control the situation in keeping with their interests. Validation of this finding can be found when comparing the shares of Ashkenazim and of Mizrahim who agree with the statement in question: In the former group, seen as being more closely aligned with the Center and Left, 35% express agreement, compared with 43% among the latter, who are more frequently identified politically with the Right.¹⁸

A breakdown of the findings by age shows that the share who agree with the statement, among both Jews and Arabs, is higher in the two younger age groups than among their older counterparts.

Table 6.2 Agree that it makes no difference who you vote for; it doesn't change the situation (Jewish and Arab samples, by age; %)

	Jews	Arabs
18–34	40	50
35–54	43	50
55 and over	31.5	37

¹⁸ According to data collected in the present survey, 18.5% of Ashkenazim identify with the Left, 31% with the Center, and 49% with the Right. By contrast, among Mizrahim, 5% align themselves with the Left, 20% with the Center, and 73% with the Right.

In examining whether there is a link between identification with stronger or weaker social groups and agreement with the statement that a person's vote will have no impact on the country's situation, we found that those who associate themselves with the weaker groups expressed greater agreement with this assertion than those who identify with the stronger groups.

Table 6.3 **Agree that it makes no difference who you vote for; it doesn't change the situation** (Jewish and Arab samples, by identification with stronger or weaker social groups; %)

	Jews	Arabs
Identify with stronger groups	35	41
Identify with weaker groups	46	53

A cross-tabulation of the above question with agreement or disagreement on dismantling all of the country's political institutions and starting over from scratch (for the latter question, see chapter 2) reveals some confluence between the two, though not total.

Thus, of those who agree that it makes no difference who people vote for, a majority of 57% also agree that Israel's political institutions should all be abolished and built anew, as opposed to 35% of those who disagree that everything should be discarded. Among those who disagree with the assertion that elections do not make a difference, opinions are split, with a greater tendency to disagree that all political institutions should be eliminated and rebuilt from the ground up.

Table 6.4 **Agree that all Israel's political institutions should be dismantled and rebuilt** (total sample, by responses to the statement: "It makes no difference who you vote for—it doesn't change the situation"; %)

	Agree that all Israel's political institutions should be dismantled and rebuilt	Disagree that all Israel's political institutions should be dismantled and rebuilt	Don't know	Total
Agree that it makes no difference who you vote for; it doesn't change the situation	57	35	8	100
Disagree that it makes no difference who you vote for; it doesn't change the situation	41	49	10	100

International Indicators

In addition to the opinions of the Israeli public, this year we again present a set of international indicators pertaining to Israel's democratic performance, published by research institutes from around the world. These assessments, compiled on the basis of professional surveys, public opinion polls, and official statistics, enable us to examine the present state of Israeli democracy in comparison with the past, with other countries around the globe, and with fellow OECD member states.

The reader should bear in mind that the international indicators report on findings from the previous year; in other words, the indicators published this year (2025) relate to the global state of democracy in 2024.

What do we measure?

This year, we present 11 international indicators (detailed below) grouped into five areas:¹⁹

1. Democratic rights and freedoms (political rights, civil liberties, freedom of the press)
2. The democratic process (political participation, egalitarian democracy, participatory democracy, deliberative democracy, democratic political culture)
3. Governance (functioning of government)
4. Corruption (perception of corruption)
5. Economic equality (equal distribution of resources)

¹⁹ In the past, this chapter also reported on the World Bank's *Worldwide Governance Indicators*. Since these had not yet been published when we went to press, we were unable to include them this year.

For each of the 11 indicators, we present five ratings: (1) Israel's **score** for 2024; (2) Israel's **score** this year compared with past years; (3) Israel's **global ranking** in relation to all the other countries included in each indicator; (4) Israel's **ranking** among the 38 member states of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD); and (5) **changes in Israel's ranking** relative to all countries surveyed, in 2024 as compared with 2023.

The distinction between **scores** and **ranking** is important: The score is compiled for a given country in a given year, whereas the ranking relates to the country's standing relative to the other countries surveyed. This means that a country's **score** can remain unchanged year after year, but if other countries improve or decline in their democratic performance, then that country's **ranking** will change. And conversely, a score can change, but if the scores of all the other countries in that indicator change in the same direction, then its **ranking** may remain the same. The score is presented as an absolute number between 0 and 100, whereas the ranking is given in two forms: an absolute number and a percentile.

A note on methodology: Each of the research institutes uses its own scale to present its scores, in some cases 0–10, in others 0–40, 0–60, 0–1, and so on. To make it easier to compare Israel's scores across the various indicators, we have standardized the scores on a uniform scale from 0 to 100. The higher the score, the better the quality of democracy in a given country.


Overview of the International Indicators, 2024

Table 7.1 Israel's ranking in the international indicators, 2024

		Global ranking*	Percentile among all countries surveyed	OECD ranking (out of 38 countries)	Percentile among OECD countries	Israel's standardized score (0–100)
Democratic rights and freedoms	Political rights (Freedom House)	57–64/208	69–73	31–33/38	13–18	85.0
	Civil liberties (Freedom House)	87–94/208	55–58	35–36/38	5–8	65.0
	Freedom of the press (Reporters Without Borders)	111–112/180	38	35/38	8	51.1
Democratic process	Political participation (Economist Intelligence Unit)	3/167	98	3/38	92	94.4
	Egalitarian democracy (V-Dem)	34/179	81	28/38	26	80.8
	Participatory democracy (V-Dem)	48/179	73	33/38	13	60.1
	Deliberative democracy (V-Dem)	57/179	68	32/38	16	77.3
	Democratic political culture (Economist Intelligence Unit)	24–42/167	75–86	19–27/38	29–50	68.8
Governance	Functioning of government (Economist Intelligence Unit)	21–29/167	83–87	18–25/38	34–53	75.0
Corruption	Perception of corruption (Transparency International)	30–31/180	83	21–22/38	42–45	64.0
Economic equality	Equal distribution of resources (V-Dem)	52–53/179	70–71	31/38	18	81.0


* The number following the slash denotes the number of countries included in that indicator.

Figure 7.1 Israel's percentile in the international indicators, 2024



Israeli democracy earned its highest scores in 2024 in the political participation indicator (compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit), and the political rights indicator (produced by Freedom House). Its lowest scores this year were in freedom of the press (Reporters Without Borders), and participatory democracy (V-Dem).

Figure 7.2 Israel's scores in the international indicators, 2023



International Indicators: 2024 compared with 2023 and Israel's multi-year average

As summarized in table 7.2 (below), the 2024 findings show an increase over 2023 in three indicators, and a decline in two, while the rest remained largely stable or with very minor changes.

According to the Economist Intelligence Unit's *Democracy Index*,²⁰ Israel has been classified for some time as a “flawed democracy,” meaning that it does not meet the criteria for a “full democracy.” Israel received the same scores in the EIU index this year as in 2023 in all three indicators presented here: political participation (in which it earned its highest score), democratic political culture, and functioning of government.

In the *Freedom in the World* report (produced by Freedom House), which measures two principal categories—political rights and civil liberties—Israel continues to be categorized as “free,”²¹ meaning that its political rights and civil liberties are on a high level. Nonetheless, though its score in the political rights indicator remains the same as in 2023, there was a slight drop in the civil liberties indicator.

In the *World Press Freedom Index* (compiled by Reporters Without Borders), Israel continued its downward trend, while in Transparency International's *Corruption Perceptions Index*, its score this year was actually somewhat improved.

In two of the four indicators produced by the V-Dem Institute (egalitarian democracy and deliberative democracy), Israel's scores rose slightly, and in the remaining two (participatory democracy and equal distribution of resources), they held steady. Despite this, Israel is still classified as an “electoral democracy,” that is, a state that holds free and competitive elections but does not necessarily uphold all democratic principles, such as checks and balances, restriction of government power, and safeguarding of human and civil rights.

20 The Economist Intelligence Unit distinguishes between four types of democratic regime: full democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid regimes, and authoritarian regimes.

21 Freedom House utilizes three categories of regime type: free, partly free, and not free.

Table 7.2 Israel's scores and ranking in the 2024 indicators compared with 2023²²

	Indicator	2024 score	2024 ranking*,**	2024 percentile	2023 score	2023 ranking	2023 percentile	Change in score
Democratic rights and freedoms	Political rights (Freedom House)	85.0	57–64/208	69–73	85.0	57–62/210	70–73	=
	Civil liberties (Freedom House)	65.0	87–94/208	55–58	66.7	85–86/210	59–60	↓
	Freedom of the press (Reporters Without Borders)	51.1	111–112/180	38	53.2	101/180	44	↓
Democratic process	Political participation (Economist Intelligence Unit)	94.4	3/167	98	94.4	3/167	98	=
	Egalitarian democracy (V-Dem)	80.8	34/179	81	77.0	48/179	73	↑
	Participatory democracy (V-Dem)	60.1	48/179	73	60.2	49/179	73	=
	Deliberative democracy (V-Dem)	77.3	57/179	68	75.2	66/179	63	↑
	Democratic political culture (Economist Intelligence Unit)	68.8	24–42/167	75–86	68.8	24–42/167	75–86	=
Governance	Functioning of government (Economist Intelligence Unit)	75.0	21–29/167	83–87	75.0	25–30/167	82–85	=
Corruption	Perception of corruption (Transparency International)	64.0	30–31/180	83	62.0	33/180	82	↑
Economic equality	Equal distribution of resources (V-Dem)	81.0	52–53/179	70–71	79.9	57/179	68	=

* Israel's global ranking.

** The number following the slash denotes the number of countries included in that indicator.

↑ improvement compared with 2023

= no substantial change compared with 2023

↓ decline compared with 2023

22 In certain instances, earlier data in some of the indicators undergo revisions; for example, if new information is received after the fact. Accordingly, there may be differences in the previous year's data appearing in a table from a given year, compared with the data presented in the earlier report.

When comparing Israel's scores in 2024 with its multi-year average for all 11 indicators (table 7.3), the following picture emerges: In three indicators, Israel's score this year is higher than the multi-year average, with the EIU's political participation indicator showing the greatest increase. In six indicators, Israel's score this year is lower than the multi-year average, mainly in ratings related to democratic rights and freedoms, and in particular, freedom of the press, where the difference reaches some 30%. In the remaining indicators, the scores are similar or close to the multi-year average.

Table 7.3 Israel's scores in the 2024 indicators compared with its multi-year average

	Indicator	2024 score	Multi-year average score*	Change (in %)
Democratic rights and freedoms	Political rights (Freedom House)	85.0	89.4	↓ -4.9%
	Civil liberties (Freedom House)	65.0	73.8	↓ -11.9%
	Freedom of the press (Reporters Without Borders)	51.1	72.9	↓ -29.9%
Democratic process	Political participation (Economist Intelligence Unit)	94.4	88.2	↑ 7.0%
	Egalitarian democracy (V-Dem)	80.8	81.1	= -0.4%
	Participatory democracy (V-Dem)	60.1	57.9	↑ 3.8%
	Deliberative democracy (V-Dem)	77.3	80.4	↓ -3.9%
	Democratic political culture (Economist Intelligence Unit)	68.8	73.8	↓ -6.8%
Governance	Functioning of government (Economist Intelligence Unit)	75.0	74.5	= 0.7%
Corruption	Perception of corruption (Transparency International)	64.0	61.4	↑ 4.2%
Economic equality	Equal distribution of resources (V-Dem)	81.0	85.9	↓ -5.7%

* The average does not include data from 2024.

- ↑ improvement in Israel's score compared with the multi-year average (up to and including 2022)
- = no substantial change (above 1%) in Israel's score compared with the multi-year average (up to and including 2022)
- ↓ decline in Israel's score compared with the multi-year average (up to and including 2022)

Democratic Rights and Freedoms

Freedom in the World is a report compiled annually by Freedom House based on expert assessments. It comprises two sets of indicators that reflect countries' performance in the areas of political rights and civil liberties, respectively.

Political rights

Institution: Freedom House


Israel's score: 85.0

No. of countries included in indicator: 208

Israel's ranking among all countries surveyed: 57–64 (69th–73rd percentile)

Israel's ranking among OECD members: 31–33 (13th–18th percentile)

Figure 7.3 Distribution of scores in political rights indicator, 2024




The political rights indicator examines the extent to which a given country meets the following criteria: free and fair elections; unhindered competition between political parties; actual power of elected representatives; and a strong and influential opposition. In addition, it assesses the level of corruption; the safeguarding of minority rights; whether the country is subject to military rule; and whether there is foreign intervention in its affairs.

Israel's score in the political rights indicator has remained stable since 2021 (at 85.0), ranking it in 2024 at 57–64 (69th–73rd percentile) among all countries surveyed. Among OECD countries, it ranks near the bottom of the list, in the

31–33 slot (13th–18th percentile), alongside Poland and the United States, and above South Korea, Colombia, Mexico, Hungary, and Turkey.

Figure 7.4 Israel's score in political rights indicator, 2003–2024



Civil liberties

Institution: Freedom House


Israel's score: 65.0

No. of countries included in indicator: 208

Israel's ranking among all countries surveyed: 87–94 (55th–58th percentile)

Israel's ranking among OECD members: 35–36 (5th–8th percentile)


Figure 7.5 Distribution of scores in civil liberties indicator, 2024



The **civil liberties indicator** reflects the extent to which a country upholds such democratic rights as freedom of expression, the press, movement, religion, and association, along with academic freedom and marital and family rights. Also assessed in this indicator are independence of the judicial system; personal security; equality before the law; extent of political violence; property rights; and gender equality.

Israel's score in the civil liberties indicator for 2024 is 65.0, representing its lowest grade to date. This marks the continuation of a decline that began in 2022. Of the countries included in this indicator, Israel is ranked this year at 87–94 (55th–58th percentile). Its low ranking stands out in particular when compared with the other members of the OECD, where it places near the bottom of the list, at 35–36 (5th–8th percentile), alongside Colombia, and ahead of only Mexico and Turkey.

Figure 7.6 Israel's score in civil liberties indicator, 2003–2024



Freedom of the press

Institution: Reporters Without Borders


Israel's score: 51.1

No. of countries included in indicator: 180

Israel's ranking among all countries surveyed: 111–112 (38th percentile)

Israel's ranking among OECD members: 35 (8th percentile)


Figure 7.7 Distribution of scores in freedom of the press indicator, 2024



The World Press Freedom Index, published by Reporters Without Borders, assesses reporters' freedom of activity in 180 countries around the globe. It is calculated based on an analysis of objective quantitative data—for example, the number of journalists injured over the past year—combined with the opinions of media experts in such areas as media independence, representation of different opinions, censorship, and transparency.

Israel's score in this indicator for 2024 is 51.1. This represents its lowest grade since 2003, continuing a downward trend that began in 2020. In comparison with all the other countries surveyed, Israel shows an ongoing decline in this indicator (from a ranking of 86th in 2021 to 97th in 2022, 101st in 2023, and 111th–112th in 2024). Relative to the other OECD states, its position is extremely low (35), topping only Colombia, Mexico, and Turkey.

Figure 7.8 Israel’s score in freedom of the press indicator, 2003–2024



Democratic Process

Political participation

Institution: Economist Intelligence Unit


Israel’s score: 94.4

No. of countries included in indicator: 167

Israel’s ranking among all countries surveyed: 3 (98th percentile)

Israel’s ranking among OECD members: 3 (92nd percentile)


Figure 7.9 Distribution of scores in political participation indicator, 2024



The **political participation indicator** of the Economist Intelligence Unit is based on a combination of expert assessments, public opinion polls, and official statistics that measure the following parameters: voter turnout; minorities' voting rights and right of association; the proportion of women in parliament; party membership rates; citizens' level of interest in current affairs in general and the political system in particular; level of political engagement; readiness to participate in legal demonstrations; and state encouragement of political participation.

Since 2022, Israel's score in political participation has consistently remained high. This positions Israel in third place relative to all countries surveyed and to the OECD member states, slightly behind Norway and New Zealand.

Figure 7.10 Israel's score in political participation indicator, 2006–2024



Egalitarian democracy

Institution: V-Dem Institute


Israel's score: 80.8

No. of countries included in indicator: 179

Israel's ranking among all countries surveyed: 34 (81st percentile)

Israel's ranking among OECD members: 28 (26th percentile)


Figure 7.11 Distribution of scores in egalitarian democracy indicator, 2024



The **Egalitarian Component Index** (ECI), one of several democracy indicators compiled by the V-Dem (Varieties of Democracy) Institute, is based on a worldwide survey of experts. Its underlying principle is the belief that equal distribution of resources between groups contributes to political equality, and hence to the quality of democracy in a given country. Thus, the indicator examines to what extent all groups in a given society have an equal chance to play a role in the political sphere, run for office, express their opinions, and influence decision-making.

In 2024, Israel showed an increase in this indicator, from 77 in 2023 to 80.8 in 2024—coming close to its levels in 2020–2022. It climbed noticeably in the global ranking, from 48th place in 2023 to 34th place in 2024 (that is, from the 73rd to 81st percentile). Among OECD members as well, it registered an upturn, from 31st place in 2023 to 28th in 2024 (from the 18th to 26th percentile), positioning it ahead of ten states, including Portugal, the United Kingdom, and Slovakia.

Figure 7.12 Israel's score in egalitarian democracy indicator, 2003–2024



Participatory democracy

Institution: V-Dem Institute


Israel's score: 60.1

No. of countries included in indicator: 179

Israel's ranking among all countries surveyed: 48 (73rd percentile)

Israel's ranking among OECD members: 33 (13th percentile)


Figure 7.13 Distribution of scores in participatory democracy indicator, 2024



The V-Dem Institute's **Participatory Component Index (PCI)** is based on the premise that in a substantive democracy, citizens' political involvement should not be confined to voting in elections every few years but must also include active, ongoing participation in the political process. Thus, the PCI measures citizens' participation in civil society organizations as well as in regional and local government.

In 2024, Israel's score in this indicator is 60.1, virtually the same as in 2023 (60.2). In both cases, this represents its highest scores to date. Israel's global and OECD rankings also remain virtually unchanged relative to 2023, in the 48th position among all countries surveyed (compared with 49th last year), and in 33rd place relative to the other OECD states (versus 32nd in 2023).

Figure 7.14 Israel's score in participatory democracy indicator, 2003–2024



Deliberative democracy

Institution: V-Dem Institute


Israel's score: 77.3

No. of countries included in indicator: 179

Israel's ranking among all countries surveyed: 57 (68th percentile)

Israel's ranking among OECD members: 32 (16th percentile)


Figure 7.15 Distribution of scores in deliberative democracy indicator, 2024



The **Deliberative Component Index (DCI)** of the V-Dem Institute centers on the political decision-making process. A deliberative democracy is one in which political decisions are made in a public process focused on the common good, as opposed to being shaped by partisan or narrow political interests, or imposed from the top down. Democratic deliberation is measured by the extent to which political elites share with the public the reasoning behind their positions on key issues under discussion, acknowledge opposing views, and are open to respectful dialogue with those who disagree with them.

Israel's score in the DCI for 2024 is 77.3. Whereas this represents a slight upturn relative to 2023 (from 75.2 last year), looking at the trend over time shows that the present score is lower than those recorded between 2003 and 2022. Among all countries surveyed, Israel's ranking rose from 66 to 57 (63rd to 68th percentile); relative to the other OECD members, it remains in 32nd place (16th percentile), ahead of six states: Canada, Colombia, Mexico, Slovakia, Hungary, and Turkey.

Figure 7.16 Israel’s score in deliberative democracy indicator, 2003–2024



Democratic political culture

Institution: Economist Intelligence Unit


Israel’s score: 68.8

No. of countries included in indicator: 167

Israel’s ranking among all countries surveyed: 24–42 (75th–86th percentile)

Israel’s ranking among OECD members: 19–27 (29th–50th percentile)


Figure 7.17 Distribution of scores in democratic political culture indicator, 2024



The **democratic political culture indicator**, compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit, is based on expert assessments and public opinion polls. It considers the following parameters: citizens' support for a democratic regime, and their opposition to rule by a "strong leader," a military regime, or technocratic leadership; the perception (or lack thereof) that democracy is beneficial to public order and economic prosperity; and the separation of religion and state.

Israel's score in this indicator has held steady since 2021, at 68.8. Among all other countries surveyed as well as among its fellow OECD members, Israel's ranking this year has also remained unchanged.

Figure 7.18 **Israel's score in democratic political culture indicator, 2006–2024**



Governance

Functioning of government

Institution: Economist Intelligence Unit


Israel's score: 75.0

No. of countries included in indicator: 167

Israel's ranking among all countries surveyed: 21–29 (83rd–87th percentile)

Israel's ranking among OECD members: 18–25 (34th–53rd percentile)


Figure 7.19 Distribution of scores in functioning of government indicator, 2024



The Economist Intelligence Unit's **functioning of government indicator** is based on expert assessments, public opinion polls, and official statistics that reflect the level of democratic performance and the effectiveness of government institutions in numerous areas. These include the government's ability to set policy, free of pressure from vested interests; separation of powers, based on a system of checks and balances; parliamentary oversight of government; involvement of the military or other extrapolitical entities in politics; the degree of government transparency and accountability; the extent of government corruption; and the level of public trust in state institutions.

As in 2023, Israel's score this year in this indicator is 75.0. This gives it a global ranking of 21–29 (83rd–87th percentile), and a ranking of 18–25 (34th–53rd percentile) among OECD states, on par with the United Kingdom, Costa Rica, Austria, Spain, France, Slovakia, and South Korea. Compared with last year, Israel's rankings in both cases (globally, and relative to OECD states) do not show substantial change.

Figure 7.20 Israel's score in functioning of government indicator, 2006–2024



Corruption

Perception of corruption

Institution: Transparency International


Israel's score: 64.0

No. of countries included in indicator: 180

Israel's ranking among all countries surveyed: 30–31 (83rd percentile)

Israel's ranking among OECD members: 21–22 (42nd–45th percentile)


Figure 7.21 Distribution of scores in perception of corruption indicator, 2024



The **Corruption Perceptions Index**, produced by Transparency International, is based on an analysis of indicators published by 12 independent research institutes around the world. It presents expert assessments of the extent of corruption in the public sector, with an emphasis on abuse of power for personal gain; bribery; mechanisms to expose corruption and prosecute those suspected of corruption; protection of whistleblowers; and nepotism in the civil service, among other areas.

Israel's score for 2024 in perception of corruption improved slightly, up to 64.0 from 62.0 in 2023. This is reflected in both its rankings: among all countries surveyed, Israel rose from position 33 to 30–31; and among OECD states, from position 23 to 21–22.

Figure 7.22 Israel's score in perception of corruption indicator, 2003–2024



Economic Equality

Equal distribution of resources

Institution: V-Dem Institute


Israel's score: 81.0

No. of countries included in indicator: 179

Israel's ranking among all countries surveyed: 52–53 (70th–71st percentile)

Israel's ranking among OECD members: 31 (18th percentile)


Figure 7.23 Distribution of scores in equal distribution of resources indicator, 2024



The **equal distribution of resources** index is an additional democracy indicator produced by the V-Dem Institute. It examines the extent to which basic resources necessary to exercise democratic rights and freedoms are made available to citizens. This indicator includes, among other factors, levels of poverty and economic disparities; equality of access to food, education, and healthcare; distribution of social/political power between different groups; and the correspondence between these power differentials and economic gaps.

Israel's score in 2024 in the equal distribution of resources index is 81.0, marking an increase from 2023 and upping its global ranking slightly, from 57 to 52–53 (68th percentile to 71st). Likewise, its ranking among OECD states rose from 32 to 31 (16th to 18th percentile), placing it above Finland, Hungary, Chile, the United States, Turkey, Colombia, and Mexico.

Figure 7.24 Israel's score in equal distribution of resources indicator, 2003–2024



Appendices

Appendix 1

Questionnaire and Distribution of Responses

(Jewish sample, Arab sample, total sample; %)

1. How would you characterize Israel's overall situation today?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Very good	Good	So-so	Bad	Very bad	Don't know	Total
Jews	3.5	17.3	33.9	23.2	21.9	0.2	100
Arabs	7.1	9.3	18.9	24.4	39.9	0.4	100
Total sample	4.1	15.9	31.4	23.4	25.0	0.2	100

2. And what about your personal situation?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Very good	Good	So-so	Bad	Very bad	Don't know	Total
Jews	13.8	40.4	37.9	6.1	1.6	0.2	100
Arabs	18.5	36.0	26.5	9.9	8.8	0.3	100
Total sample	14.6	39.7	35.9	6.7	2.8	0.3	100

3. How proud are you to be Israeli?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Very much	Quite a lot	Not so much	Not at all	Don't know	Total
Jews	48.9	33.7	12.3	3.8	1.3	100
Arabs	16.0	27.9	18.9	29.2	8.0	100
Total sample	43.3	32.7	13.4	8.1	2.5	100

4. How would you rate the level of solidarity (sense of "togetherness") of Israeli society (Jews, Arabs, and all other citizens) today, where 1 = no solidarity at all and 10 = a very high level of solidarity?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	1 – No solidarity at all	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 – Very high level of solidarity	Don't know	Total	Mean rating (1–10)
Jews	10.7	7.7	14.5	10.5	16.6	12.2	13.1	8.4	3.2	2.0	1.1	100	4.81
Arabs	24.2	6.0	7.5	7.9	17.3	9.4	6.3	4.4	0.8	15.4	0.8	100	4.78
Total sample	13.0	7.4	13.3	10.1	16.7	11.7	12.0	7.7	2.8	4.3	1	100	4.80

5. Societies throughout the world are divided into stronger and weaker groups.

Which group in Israeli society do you feel you belong to?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Strong group	Quite strong group	Quite weak group	Weak group	Don't know	Total
Jews	14.8	49.9	19.3	5.6	10.4	100
Arabs	22.4	20.6	14.9	38.3	3.8	100
Total sample	16.1	44.9	18.6	11.1	9.3	100

6. To what extent do you feel part of the State of Israel and its problems?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Very much	Quite a lot	Not so much	Not at all	Don't know	Total
Jews	39.6	47.6	9.4	1.9	1.5	100
Arabs	23.1	30.7	25.6	18.7	1.9	100
Total sample	36.8	44.7	12.1	4.8	1.6	100

7. How would you rate Israeli democracy today on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 = very poor and 5 = very good?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	1 – Very poor	2	3	4	5 – Very good	Don't know	Total	Mean rating (1–5)
Jews	24.1	20.9	29.4	16.4	7.7	1.5	100	2.62
Arabs	48.3	13.1	18.7	6.3	12.4	1.2	100	2.21
Total sample	28.3	19.6	27.5	14.7	8.5	1.4	100	2.55

8. In recent years, numerous democracies around the world have grappled with such challenges as a rise in populism, diminished separation of powers in government, and declining public trust in leadership.

Do you think that Israeli democracy is in better or worse shape than other democracies?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Much worse	Slightly worse	The same	Slightly better	Much better	Don't know	Total
Jews	19.4	24.3	25.3	13.4	11.7	5.9	100
Arabs	41.1	9.9	16.6	13.2	16.0	3.2	100
Total sample	23.1	21.9	23.9	13.4	12.4	5.3	100

9. In your opinion, do the challenges facing Israeli democracy stem more from:

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Factors unique to Israel	Factors confronting other democracies as well	Don't know	Total
Jews	68.7	23.0	8.3	100
Arabs	70.0	21.5	8.5	100
Total sample	69.0	22.8	8.2	100

10. Compared with other democracies around the world, is freedom of expression in Israel today:

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Much more extensive	Slightly more extensive	Similar to other democracies	Slightly more limited	Much more limited	Don't know	Total
Jews	21.5	21.9	29.0	17.0	7.0	3.6	100
Arabs	11.3	9.1	6.9	16.4	55.8	0.5	100
Total sample	19.7	19.7	25.3	16.9	15.3	3.1	100

11. "I prefer to keep quiet and not express my political opinions in the presence of people I don't know"

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	13.9	38.9	27.1	18.6	1.5	100
Arabs	54.7	15.4	9.7	19.7	0.5	100
Total sample	20.9	34.9	24.1	18.8	1.3	100

12. Which of the following is the most acute social tension in Israel today?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim	Between religious and secular Jews	Between Right and Left	Between rich and poor	Between Jews and Arabs	Don't know	Total
Jews	1.7	19.7	54.9	1.3	20.0	2.4	100
Arabs	2.5	10.5	21.1	5.2	53.9	6.8	100
Total sample	1.8	18.1	49.1	2.0	25.8	3.2	100

13. Israel is defined as a Jewish and democratic state. Do you feel there is a good balance today between the Jewish and the democratic components?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	There is a good balance between the two components	The Jewish component is too dominant	The democratic component is too dominant	Don't know	Total
Jews	18.8	43.7	23.9	13.6	100
Arabs	12.7	80.0	3.8	3.5	100
Total sample	17.7	49.9	20.5	11.9	100

To what extent do you trust each of the following individuals or institutions?

14. The media

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know	Total
Jews	40.8	30.6	21.6	5.2	1.8	100
Arabs	47.8	25.3	13.8	12.0	1.1	100
Total sample	42.0	29.7	20.3	6.4	1.6	100

15. The Supreme Court

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know	Total
Jews	36.0	18.5	20.4	21.5	3.6	100
Arabs	34.9	18.7	22.6	17.2	6.6	100
Total sample	35.8	18.5	20.7	20.8	4.2	100

16. The police

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know	Total
Jews	16.1	43.0	30.0	9.4	1.5	100
Arabs	50.5	23.0	12.7	12.4	1.4	100
Total sample	21.9	39.6	27.1	9.9	1.5	100

17. The President of Israel

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know	Total
Jews	22.1	30.3	26.8	15.3	5.5	100
Arabs	53.3	15.3	12.1	13.9	5.4	100
Total sample	27.4	27.8	24.3	15.1	5.4	100

18. The Knesset

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know	Total
Jews	41.4	40.3	12.7	4.4	1.2	100
Arabs	54.7	23.1	8.8	8.8	4.6	100
Total sample	43.6	37.4	12.0	5.1	1.9	100

19. The IDF

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know	Total
Jews	3.7	12.1	37.8	45.7	0.7	100
Arabs	42.6	17.1	17.3	15.9	7.1	100
Total sample	10.3	13.0	34.3	40.7	1.7	100

20. The government

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know	Total
Jews	50.6	25.4	16.7	6.5	0.8	100
Arabs	57.7	20.0	8.8	9.7	3.8	100
Total sample	51.8	24.5	15.4	7.0	1.3	100

21. The political parties

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know	Total
Jews	41.0	46.0	7.4	1.5	4.1	100
Arabs	52.5	26.4	11.6	5.7	3.8	100
Total sample	43.0	42.7	8.1	2.3	3.9	100

22. Your municipality or local authority

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know	Total
Jews	11.2	29.2	42.8	14.3	2.5	100
Arabs	42.6	23.0	21.7	11.8	0.9	100
Total sample	16.5	28.2	39.2	13.9	2.2	100

23. The Attorney General

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know	Total
Jews	42.6	13.6	15.1	24.3	4.4	100
Arabs	33.6	19.5	19.2	15.6	12.1	100
Total sample	41.1	14.6	15.8	22.8	5.7	100

24. The Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency)

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know	Total
Jews	15.9	21.4	32.2	27.5	3.0	100
Arabs	44.4	16.8	12.9	12.7	13.2	100
Total sample	20.7	20.7	28.9	25.0	4.7	100

25. To what extent do you agree or disagree that Israel is a good place to live?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	27.9	38.0	25.5	6.8	1.8	100
Arabs	28.7	32.9	17.1	19.7	1.6	100
Total sample	28.1	37.1	24.1	9.0	1.7	100

26. To what extent do you agree or disagree that there are people in Israel who take advantage of freedom of expression to harm the state?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	47.2	32.0	12.9	5.1	2.8	100
Arabs	23.0	33.9	21.6	16.5	5.0	100
Total sample	43.1	32.3	14.4	7.0	3.2	100

27. To what extent do you agree or disagree that Israelis can always count on other Israelis to help them in times of trouble?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	30.6	48.3	15.8	3.7	1.6	100
Arabs	27.5	36.9	20.4	11.3	3.9	100
Total sample	30.1	46.4	16.6	5.0	1.9	100

28. To what extent do you agree or disagree that the use of violence for political ends is never justified?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	68.5	20.9	5.4	3.5	1.7	100
Arabs	49.1	24.2	12.6	13.3	0.8	100
Total sample	65.2	21.5	6.6	5.2	1.5	100

29. To what extent do you agree or disagree that Israeli media portray the situation here as much worse than it really is?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	31.0	24.4	27.1	13.3	4.2	100
Arabs	25.3	29.1	22.8	18.5	4.3	100
Total sample	30.1	25.2	26.4	14.2	4.1	100

30. To what extent do you agree or disagree that human and civil rights organizations, such as the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) and B'Tselem, cause damage to the state?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	43.8	20.6	16.5	11.1	8.0	100
Arabs	9.1	18.8	32.4	33.1	6.6	100
Total sample	37.9	20.3	19.2	14.8	7.8	100

31. To what extent do you agree or disagree that young people are less willing to contribute to the state today than in the past?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	8.3	21.9	38.2	26.1	5.5	100
Arabs	35.9	30.8	14.8	13.6	4.9	100
Total sample	13.0	23.4	34.3	24.0	5.3	100

32. In your opinion, who is more hesitant to express their political opinions in Israel today—people on the Right, or people on the Left?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	No one in Israel is hesitant to express their political opinions	People on the Right are more hesitant	People on the Left are more hesitant	Everyone is equally hesitant to express their political opinions	Don't know	Total
Jews	18.8	29.6	28.0	17.2	6.4	100
Arabs	16.0	12.4	41.6	20.5	9.5	100
Total sample	18.3	26.7	30.3	17.8	6.9	100

33. To what extent do you agree or disagree that citizens of Israel can always rely on the state to come to their aid in times of trouble?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	5.9	23.3	36.1	32.7	2.0	100
Arabs	23.0	39.5	21.7	15.0	0.8	100
Total sample	8.8	26.0	33.7	29.7	1.8	100

34. To what extent do you agree or disagree that the Supreme Court intervenes too much in decisions made by the government?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	36.1	13.9	17.6	25.2	7.2	100
Arabs	22.7	32.7	21.1	12.7	10.8	100
Total sample	33.8	17.1	18.2	23.0	7.9	100

35. To what extent do you agree or disagree that it makes no difference who you vote for, as it doesn't change the situation?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	12.3	26.0	29.6	27.6	4.5	100
Arabs	21.6	26.1	19.5	30.1	2.7	100
Total sample	13.8	26.0	27.9	28.0	4.3	100

36. (Jewish respondents) To what extent do you agree or disagree that the government should encourage Arab citizens to emigrate from Israel?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	31.0	21.7	20.0	18.0	9.3	100

37. To what extent do you agree or disagree that most Jewish citizens of Israel want Arabs to integrate into Israeli society and be part of it?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	5.8	19.7	39.7	29.3	5.5	100
Arabs	15.1	30.9	28.6	23.9	1.5	100
Total sample	7.4	21.6	37.8	28.4	4.8	100

38. In your opinion, should nonprofit groups and civil society organizations be permitted to accept donations from Israeli foundations and private donors?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Certain they should	Think they should	Think they should not	Certain they should not	Don't know	Total
Jews	31.4	41.9	10.1	3.1	13.5	100
Arabs	38.2	29.7	12.1	12.3	7.7	100
Total sample	32.6	39.8	10.4	4.6	12.6	100

39. In your opinion, should nonprofit groups and civil society organizations be permitted to accept donations from foreign foundations and private donors?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Certain they should	Think they should	Think they should not	Certain they should not	Don't know	Total
Jews	23.0	41.7	15.6	7.7	12.0	100
Arabs	34.6	32.2	10.9	13.7	8.6	100
Total sample	25.0	40.1	14.8	8.7	11.4	100

40. In your opinion, should nonprofit groups and civil society organizations be permitted to accept donations from other states/governments?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Certain they should	Think they should	Think they should not	Certain they should not	Don't know	Total
Jews	15.8	25.8	22.0	22.5	13.9	100
Arabs	34.7	30.0	13.7	13.5	8.1	100
Total sample	19.0	26.5	20.6	20.9	13.0	100

41. In your opinion, should nonprofit groups and civil society organizations be permitted to accept donations from international foundations and organizations?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Certain they should	Think they should	Think they should not	Certain they should not	Don't know	Total
Jews	18.2	36.4	15.7	16.0	13.7	100
Arabs	36.0	33.3	11.2	11.6	7.9	100
Total sample	21.3	35.9	14.9	15.3	12.6	100

42. Which of these statements more accurately represents your views?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Decisions made by a government that holds a majority in the Knesset are inherently democratic	Decisions that are opposed to fundamental democratic values such as minority rights and freedom of expression are not democratic, even if they are passed by the government or a Knesset majority	Don't know	Total
Jews	33.1	51.2	15.7	100
Arabs	20.8	74.8	4.4	100
Total sample	31.0	55.2	13.8	100

43. In your opinion, to what extent does the State of Israel ensure the security of its citizens?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Very much	Quite a lot	Not so much	Not at all	Don't know	Total
Jews	6.7	39.0	39.9	13.4	1.0	100
Arabs	11.5	21.3	31.8	35.1	0.3	100
Total sample	7.5	36.0	38.5	17.1	0.9	100

44. And to what extent does it ensure the welfare of its citizens?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Very much	Quite a lot	Not so much	Not at all	Don't know	Total
Jews	2.6	18.6	50.1	27.4	1.3	100
Arabs	12.3	20.6	35.4	31.1	0.6	100
Total sample	4.2	18.9	47.6	28.0	1.3	100

45. To what extent do you agree or disagree that most Arab citizens want to integrate into Israeli society and be part of it?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	7.6	29.3	35.0	21.9	6.2	100
Arabs	32.2	41.3	12.7	12.7	1.1	100
Total sample	11.8	31.4	31.2	20.3	5.3	100

46. To what extent do you agree or disagree that Israel acts democratically toward Arab citizens as well?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	23.7	39.7	21.8	8.9	5.9	100
Arabs	12.1	21.4	29.4	36.6	0.5	100
Total sample	21.7	36.6	23.1	13.6	5.0	100

47a. (Jewish respondents) To what extent do you agree or disagree that to preserve Jewish identity, it is better for Jews and Arabs in Israel to live separately?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	26.0	22.5	26.0	15.2	10.3	100

47b. (Arab respondents) To what extent do you agree or disagree that to preserve Arab identity, it is better for Jews and Arabs in Israel to live separately?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Arabs	8.0	17.0	31.1	42.6	1.3	100

48. Do you support or oppose bringing Arab parties into the government, including the appointment of Arab ministers?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Strongly support	Somewhat support	Somewhat oppose	Strongly oppose	Don't know	Total
Jews	6.5	20.5	18.5	46.2	8.3	100
Arabs	62.6	23.1	7.2	5.2	1.9	100
Total sample	16.0	21.0	16.5	39.2	7.3	100

49. To what extent do you agree or disagree that Arabs citizens of Israel should integrate into Israeli society and be part of it?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	16.2	34.5	19.5	25.3	4.5	100
Arabs	52.2	37.8	5.5	3.9	0.6	100
Total sample	22.3	35.1	17.2	21.7	3.7	100

50. In your opinion, is it possible for an Arab citizen of Israel who feels part of the Palestinian people to also be a loyal citizen of the State of Israel?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Certain it is possible	Think it is possible	Think it is not possible	Certain it is not possible	Don't know	Total
Jews	2.8	13.2	24.6	54.5	4.9	100
Arabs	35.7	34.0	14.9	10.1	5.3	100
Total sample	8.4	16.7	22.9	47.0	5.0	100

51. At present, the state funds various cultural and artistic institutions and activities.

In your opinion, does this give it the right to be involved in determining the cultural and artistic content of these institutions and activities?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Certain it does	Think it does	Think it does not	Certain it does not	Don't know	Total
Jews	9.9	26.1	31.2	22.6	10.2	100
Arabs	20.4	20.0	17.6	39.8	2.2	100
Total sample	11.7	25.1	28.9	25.6	8.7	100

52. Is there a political party in Israel today that closely represents your views?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	There is a party that closely represents my views	There is a party that partly represents my views	There is no party that closely represents my views	Don't know	Total
Jews	26.7	38.8	28.7	5.8	100
Arabs	20.5	17.6	58.6	3.3	100
Total sample	25.7	35.2	33.8	5.3	100

53. Which of the following factors will most strongly influence your decision about which party to vote for in the next elections?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	The party's positions on foreign policy and security	The party's positions on religion and state	The party's positions on the economy and the high cost of living	The party's positions on the climate crisis	The identity of the party leader	In any case, I will vote for the same party I voted for in the last elections	Other	Don't know	Don't intend to vote	Total
Jews	19.9	19.4	18.9	0.8	17.1	10.2	2.9	8.1	2.7	100
Arabs	17.9	7.4	33.0	1.7	6.3	8.7	6.6	4.7	13.7	100
Total sample	19.6	17.3	21.3	0.9	15.3	10.0	3.6	7.5	4.5	100

54. (Arab respondents) To what extent will their platform on the fight against crime (in Arab society) be a major factor in deciding which party to vote for in the next elections?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Very much	Quite a lot	Not so much	Not at all	Don't know	Total
Arabs	41.7	30.7	11.3	13.2	3.1	100

55. In your opinion, will the next Knesset elections be free and fair?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Certain they will	Think they will	Think they will not	Certain they will not	Don't know	Total
Jews	22.4	46.0	18.3	4.6	8.7	100
Arabs	23.0	27.4	28.4	15.9	5.3	100
Total sample	22.5	42.9	20.0	6.5	8.1	100

56. In your opinion, how likely is it that Israeli political individuals or groups will attempt to sway the results of the next elections by improper means?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Very likely	Quite likely	Quite unlikely	Very unlikely/ not at all	Don't know	Total
Jews	16.8	40.8	25.6	8.9	7.9	100
Arabs	19.9	31.3	25.5	16.4	6.9	100
Total sample	17.3	39.2	25.6	10.2	7.7	100

57. In your opinion, how likely is it that foreign political entities (for example, other states) will attempt, in various ways, to sway the results of the next elections in Israel?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Very likely	Quite likely	Quite unlikely	Very unlikely/ not at all	Don't know	Total
Jews	13.9	36.0	28.6	10.4	11.1	100
Arabs	18.4	28.5	26.2	20.0	6.9	100
Total sample	14.7	34.7	28.2	12.1	10.3	100

58. Which of the following will have the greatest impact on your decision about which party to vote for in the next elections?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	The events of October 7	The judicial reform/ overhaul	Anti-government protests	Legislation on Haredi conscription	The Netanyahu trial	The high cost of living	The return of the hostages	Don't know	Total
Jews	16.9	16.4	2.5	16.6	1.5	16.8	18.1	11.2	100
Arabs	7.1	11.2	1.6	1.7	10.7	49.1	6.5	12.1	100
Total sample	15.2	15.5	2.4	14.1	3.1	22.2	16.2	11.3	100

59. At present, the government subsidizes such media outlets as Kan (the Israeli Public Broadcasting Corporation) and Galei Tzahal (Israeli Army Radio). In your opinion, does this give it the right to be involved in determining the content broadcast by these media?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Certain it does	Think it does	Think it does not	Certain it does not	Don't know	Total
Jews	11.8	22.9	27.5	32.0	5.8	100
Arabs	13.7	13.5	20.9	49.7	2.2	100
Total sample	12.2	21.3	26.4	35.0	5.1	100

60. Israel has not had a constitution since its founding. In your view, how important is it that Israel have a constitution?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Very important	Quite important	Not so important	Not at all important	Don't know	Total
Jews	38.7	30.7	10.2	5.5	14.9	100
Arabs	52.9	25.0	9.1	10.8	2.2	100
Total sample	41.1	29.7	10.0	6.4	12.8	100

61. In your opinion, what are the chances that Israel will have a constitution within ten years?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Very high	Quite high	Quite low	Very low	Don't know	Total
Jews	3.6	14.8	35.8	25.6	20.2	100
Arabs	9.3	19.2	30.9	34.3	6.3	100
Total sample	4.6	15.5	35.0	27.1	17.8	100

62a. (Jewish respondents) In your opinion, where is it safer for Jews to live today?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Israel	Abroad	Both are equally safe	Don't know	Total
Jews	72.4	6.2	17.0	4.4	100

62b. (Arab respondents) In your opinion, where is it safer for Arabs to live today?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Israel	Abroad	Both are equally safe	Don't know	Total
Arabs	52.4	23.0	22.7	1.9	100

63. If you could receive American citizenship, or that of another Western country, would you prefer to move there or to remain in Israel?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	I would prefer to move there	I would prefer to remain in Israel	Don't know	Total
Jews	17.6	72.3	10.1	100
Arabs	17.2	81.7	1.1	100
Total sample	17.5	73.9	8.6	100

64. To what extent would it be difficult for you to accept someone with political views that are contrary to yours as a romantic partner/spouse?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Very much	Quite a lot	Not so much	Not at all	Don't know	Total
Jews	20.5	27.7	26.4	23.8	1.6	100
Arabs	3.9	5.2	18.7	71.9	0.3	100
Total sample	17.7	23.9	25.1	32.0	1.3	100

65. To what extent would it be difficult for you to accept someone with political views that are contrary to yours as a close friend?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Very much	Quite a lot	Not so much	Not at all	Don't know	Total
Jews	7.2	18.9	38.4	34.8	0.7	100
Arabs	3.3	6.1	18.4	71.9	0.3	100
Total sample	6.5	16.7	35.0	41.1	0.7	100

66. To what extent would it be difficult for you to accept someone with political views that are contrary to yours as a neighbor in your building? [Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Very much	Quite a lot	Not so much	Not at all	Don't know	Total
Jews	3.1	6.9	31.1	57.9	1.0	100
Arabs	3.3	5.0	18.7	72.7	0.3	100
Total sample	3.1	6.5	29.0	60.4	1.0	100

67. To what extent would it be difficult for you to accept someone with political views that are contrary to yours as a coworker? [Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Very much	Quite a lot	Not so much	Not at all	Don't know	Total
Jews	2.8	7.1	32.5	56.6	1.0	100
Arabs	2.8	5.2	18.1	73.0	0.9	100
Total sample	2.8	6.7	30.1	59.4	1.0	100

68. Do you think that in the next 10–15 years, Israel's religious-Jewish character will become more pronounced? [Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Certain it will	Think it will	Think it will not	Certain it will not	Don't know	Total
Jews	22.4	46.6	18.6	3.4	9.0	100
Arabs	35.2	26.2	18.9	11.2	8.5	100
Total sample	24.6	43.2	18.7	4.7	8.8	100

69. Do you think that in the next 10–15 years, Israel will be able to defend itself rily and in terms of security? [Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Certain it will	Think it will	Think it will not	Certain it will not	Don't know	Total
Jews	31.1	48.4	10.9	3.5	6.1	100
Arabs	40.9	31.1	14.2	9.3	4.5	100
Total sample	32.8	45.5	11.5	4.4	5.8	100

70. Do you think that in the next 10–15 years, peace agreements will be signed with additional Arab states? [Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Certain it will	Think it will	Think it will not	Certain it will not	Don't know	Total
Jews	11.6	52.3	18.3	6.9	10.9	100
Arabs	39.2	40.1	11.6	4.9	4.2	100
Total sample	16.3	50.3	17.2	6.5	9.7	100

71. Do you think that in the next 10–15 years, Israel will be more isolated internationally than it is today?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Certain it will	Think it will	Think it will not	Certain it will not	Don't know	Total
Jews	6.2	27.6	38.7	16.8	10.7	100
Arabs	29.7	29.4	20.3	16.5	4.1	100
Total sample	10.2	27.9	35.6	16.7	9.6	100

72. Do you think that in the next 10–15 years, Israel will preserve its standing as a leading high-tech nation?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Certain it will	Think it will	Think it will not	Certain it will not	Don't know	Total
Jews	28.5	48.2	14.8	2.3	6.2	100
Arabs	43.6	28.4	14.1	7.9	6.0	100
Total sample	31.0	44.9	14.7	3.2	6.2	100

73. To what extent do you agree or disagree that it would be best to dismantle all the country's political institutions and start over from scratch?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Jews	23.5	22.9	23.9	18.0	11.7	100
Arabs	19.8	26.8	25.0	22.4	6.0	100
Total sample	22.9	23.6	24.1	18.8	10.6	100

74. In general, are you optimistic or pessimistic about Israel's future?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

	Very optimistic	Quite optimistic	Quite pessimistic	Very pessimistic	Don't know	Total
Jews	16.3	40.7	30.7	8.0	4.3	100
Arabs	11.2	34.2	31.6	20.5	2.5	100
Total sample	15.4	39.6	30.9	10.2	3.9	100

Appendix 2

Distribution of 2025 Survey Results Compared with Previous Years —Recurring Questions

(total sample; Jewish sample; Arab sample; %)

1. How would you characterize Israel's overall situation today?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

		2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Jun 2023	Dec 2023*	2024	2025
Total sample	Good + very good	41	37	48	53	50	37	31	25	21	22	12	20
	So-so	39	40	33	30	31	40	42	37	34	31.5	28	31.5
	Bad + very bad	18	23	17	16	18	22	26	37	45	45	60	48.5
	Don't know	2	0	2	1	1	1	1	1	0	1.5	0	0
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Good + very good	44	36	49	56	50	39	32	27	21	24	11	21
	So-so	38	41	33	29	33	41	45	39	36	33.5	30	34
	Bad + very bad	16	22	16	14	16	19	22	34	42	41	59	45
	Don't know	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	0	1	1.5	0	0
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Good + very good	29	39	42	39	48	29	24	18	18	9	15	16.5
	So-so	40	32	33	32	22	37	27	30	23	22	18	19
	Bad + very bad	29	28	24	26	29	34	48	52	59	65	67	64.5
	Don't know	2	1	1	3	1	0	1	0	0	4	0	0
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Source: *Israeli Voice Index*.

Note: Due to rounding, percentages shown in the table may not add up precisely to 100.

2. And what about your personal situation?

Discussion on p. 00

		2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2020	2022	2025
Total sample	Good + very good	66	75	75	73	80	61	58	54
	So-so	22	20	20	20	17	30	33	36
	Bad + very bad	9	5	4	5	3	8	9	10
	Don't know	3	0	1	2	0	1	0	0
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Good + very good	69	76	78	77	83	62	62	54
	So-so	21	18	18	18	15	31	32	38
	Bad + very bad	8	5	4	4	2	7	6	8
	Don't know	2	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Good + very good	50	65	61	56	65	54	41	54.5
	So-so	28	29	31	33	29	28	36	26.5
	Bad + very bad	20	6	8	11	6	18	22	19
	Don't know	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

3. How proud are you to be Israeli?

Discussion on p. 00

		2016	2017*	2018	2019**	2021	2022	2025
Total sample	Very much + quite a lot	81	80	82	88	75	77	76
	Not so much + not at all	17	17	16	11	20	21	22
	Don't know	2	3	2	1	5	2	2
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Very much + quite a lot	86	86	88	92	84	85	83
	Not so much + not at all	14	13	11	7	14	14	16
	Don't know	0	1	1	1	2	1	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Very much + quite a lot	55	51	51	65	28	38	44
	Not so much + not at all	37	40	43	32	55	55	48
	Don't know	8	9	6	3	17	7	8
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Source: Israel Democracy Institute, Peace Index, April 2017.

** Source: Tamar Hermann et al., *Jews and Arabs: A Conditional Partnership* 2019.

4. How would you rate the level of solidarity (sense of “togetherness”) of Israeli society (Jews, Arabs, and all other citizens) today, where 1 = no solidarity at all and 10 = a very high level of solidarity?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

		2011	2014	2015	2020	2021	2022	Jun 2023	Oct 2023*	Dec 2023**	2024	2025
Total sample	Mean rating (1–10)	4.78	4.71	5.13	5.35	4.86	4.5	4.26	6.79	6.46	5.43	4.80
Jews	Mean rating (1–10)	4.83	4.83	5.26	5.46	5.01	4.65	4.39	7.18	6.68	5.52	4.81
Arabs	Mean rating (1–10)	4.49	3.99	4.48	4.76	4.09	3.75	3.62	4.77	5.19	5.01	4.78

* Source: *War in Gaza Survey*.

** Source: *Israeli Voice Index*.

5. Societies throughout the world are divided into stronger and weaker groups. Which group in Israeli society do you feel you belong to?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

		2012	2013	2014	2015	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2024	2025
Total sample	Strong group + quite strong group	65	55	58	60	61	73	67	59	68	59	60	61
	Weak group + quite weak group	29	37	31	34	31	22	26	33	23	33	28	30
	Don't know	6	8	11	6	8	5	7	8	9	8	12	9
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Strong group + quite strong group	68	57	61	65	66	75	73	63	72	62	64	65
	Weak group + quite weak group	25	34	29	28	26	20	19	29	19	29	23	25
	Don't know	7	9	10	7	8	5	8	8	9	9	13	10
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Strong group + quite strong group	49	41	45	31	39	60	36	40	52	44	42	43
	Weak group + quite weak group	48	49	46	66	56	36	59	59	45	52	54	53
	Don't know	3	10	9	3	5	4	5	1	3	4	4	4
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

6. To what extent do you feel part of the State of Israel and its problems?*

Discussion on p. 00

		2015	2016	2019	2020	2021	2022	Jun 2023	Nov 2023**	Feb 2024***	2024	2025
Total sample	Very much + quite a lot	79	77	76	79	76	79	79	90	79	83	81.5
	Not so much + not at all	19	22	23	20	22	20	19	8	19	16	17
	Don't know	2	1	1	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	1.5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Very much + quite a lot	88	84	83	85	82	86	85	94	86	86	87
	Not so much + not at all	10	15	16	14	16	12	12	5	12	12	11
	Don't know	2	1	1	1	2	2	3	1	2	2	2
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Very much + quite a lot	32	39	42	43	43	41	48	70	46	66	54
	Not so much + not at all	67	59	58	56	53	58	51	24	50	33	44
	Don't know	1	2	0	1	4	1	1	6	4	1	2
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* From 2003 to 2013, there were five response options: To a very large extent, to a large extent, to some extent, to a small extent, to a very small extent. For the sake of comparison with later years, we portioned out the "to some extent" responses in a proportional manner between "to a large extent" and "to a small extent."

** Source: *War in Gaza Survey*.

*** Source: *Israeli Voice Index*.

7. How would you rate Israeli democracy today on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 = very poor and 5 = very good?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

		2018	2019	2023	2025
Total sample	1 – Very poor	18	17	25	28
	2	13	18	23	20
	3	33	31	24	27.5
	4	23	21	17	15
	5 – Very good	13	13	9	8.5
	Don't know	0	0	2	1
	Total	100	100	100	100
	Mean rating (1–5)	3.01	2.95	2.63	2.55
Jews	1 – Very poor	14	15	18	24
	2	12	19	25	21
	3	33	30	24	29.5
	4	27	23	20	16
	5 – Very good	14	12	10	8
	Don't know	0	1	3	1.5
	Total	100	100	100	100
	Mean rating (1–5)	3.14	2.99	2.77	2.62
Arabs	1 – Very poor	35	27	56	48
	2	16	11	11	13
	3	34	36	23	19
	4	6	12	4	6
	5 – Very good	9	14	6	12.5
	Don't know	0	0	0	1.5
	Total	100	100	100	100
	Mean rating (1–5)	2.36	2.75	1.93	2.21

11. "I prefer to keep quiet and not express my political opinions in the presence of people I don't know"

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

		2016	2017	2025
Total sample	Strongly + somewhat agree	38.5	42	56
	Strongly + somewhat disagree	61	56	43
	Don't know	0.5	2	1
	Total	100	100	100
Jews	Strongly + somewhat agree	37	38	53
	Strongly + somewhat disagree	62	60	46
	Don't know	1	2	1
	Total	100	100	100
Arabs	Strongly + somewhat agree	45	62.5	70
	Strongly + somewhat disagree	53	35	29.5
	Don't know	2	2.5	0.5
	Total	100	100	100

12. Which of the following is the most acute social tension in Israel today?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

		2012	2015	2016	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Jun 2023	Dec 2023*	2024	2025
Total sample	Between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim	3	4	1	5	3	3	2	2	3	2	1.5	2
	Between religious and secular Jews	20	10	11	25	22	17	11	6	18	9	14	18
	Between Right and Left	9	18	24	32	37	39	32	24	39	42	48	49
	Between rich and poor	13	13	8	5	5	8	3	4	6	2	1	2
	Between Jews and Arabs	48	47	53	30	27	28	46	61	31	34	31	26
	Don't know	7	8	3	3	6	5	6	3	3	11	4.5	3
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim	3	4	1	3	3	4	2	2	3	2	1	2
	Between religious and secular Jews	21	10	11	24	24	19	12	6	19	9	15	20
	Between Right and Left	9	20	27	36	40	42	36	26	43	46	53	55
	Between rich and poor	14	14	8	6	4	8	3	4	4	2	1	1
	Between Jews and Arabs	47	44	50	28	23	25	43	60	26	31.5	26	20
	Don't know	6	8	3	3	6	2	4	2	5	9.5	4	2
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim	4	1	1	16	2	2	3	3	3	4	2	2.5
	Between religious and secular Jews	16	12	10	27	13	11	10	6	12	7	9.5	10.5
	Between Right and Left	9	8	6	12	21	22	12	15	14	21	22	21
	Between rich and poor	8	7	8	1	8	12	4	6	14	3	4	5
	Between Jews and Arabs	50	64	68	43	44	48	64	65	53	47.5	55.5	54
	Don't know	13	8	7	1	12	5	7	5	4	17.5	7	7
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Source: *Israeli Voice Index*.

13. Israel is defined as a Jewish and democratic state. Do you feel there is a good balance today between the Jewish and the democratic components?

Discussion on p. 00

		2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Total sample	There is a good balance between the two components	26	27	28	28	20	19	18	22	19	18
	The Jewish component is too dominant	45	47	45	47	47	45	38	44	43	50
	The democratic component is too dominant	23	20	21	18	23	22	25	21	21.5	20.5
	Don't know	6	6	6	7	10	14	19	13	16.5	11.5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	There is a good balance between the two components	29	29	30	31	22	21	20	21	19	19
	The Jewish component is too dominant	39	42	39	41	42	38	29	41	37	44
	The democratic component is too dominant	25	23	24	20	25	24	30	24	25	24
	Don't know	7	6	7	8	11	17	21	14	19	13
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	There is a good balance between the two components	7	16	17	13	9	8	7	27	18	13
	The Jewish component is too dominant	80	74	77	77	76	82	86	60	72	80
	The democratic component is too dominant	9	6	5	8	14	7	3	9	5.5	4
	Don't know	4	4	1	2	1	3	4	4	4.5	3
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

To what extent do you trust each of the following institutions?

14. The media

Discussion on p. 00

		2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Jun 2023	Oct 2023*	Dec 2023**	2024	2025
Total sample	Not so much + not at all	63	75	71	68	62	65	71	76	74	59	66.5	74	72
	Very much + quite a lot	36	24	28	31	36	33	27	22	24	38	31	25	27
	Don't know	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	3	2.5	1	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Not so much + not at all	66	74	69	66	62	65	68	74	72	59	68	72	71
	Very much + quite a lot	33	26	30	33	36	33	30	24	25	39	30	27	27
	Don't know	1	0	1	1	2	2	2	2	3	2	2	1	2
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Not so much + not at all	48	83	82	81	60	65	83	86	82	59	60	83	73
	Very much + quite a lot	51	15	18	18	36	35	16	14	18	34	36	16	26
	Don't know	1	2	0	1	4	0	1	0	0	7	4	1	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Source: *War in Gaza Survey*.** Source: *Israeli Voice Index*.

15. The Supreme Court

Discussion on p. 00

		2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Jun 2023	Dec 2023*	2024	2025
Total sample	Not so much + not at all	32	41	40	45	42	44	49	56	57	51	61	54
	Very much + quite a lot	62	56	56	52	55	54	47	41	39	44	37	41.5
	Don't know	6	3	4	3	3	2	4	3	4	5	2	4.5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Not so much + not at all	32	41	41	42	43	46	49	56	54	54	59	54.5
	Very much + quite a lot	62	57	57	55	55	52	48	41	42	42.5	39	42
	Don't know	6	2	2	3	2	2	3	3	4	3.5	2	3.5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Not so much + not at all	32	42	39	61	37	38	51	57	70	34.5	72	53.5
	Very much + quite a lot	63	52	54	36	56	60	44	40	26	53	26	40
	Don't know	5	6	7	3	7	2	5	3	4	12.5	2	6.5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Source: Israeli Voice Index

16. The police

Discussion on p. 00

		2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2022	2021	2022	Jun 2023	Oct 2023*	Dec 2023**	2024	2025
Total sample	Not so much + not at all	54	59	58	52	55	56	61	66	67	44	41	58	61.5
	Very much + quite a lot	42	40	40	47	43	43	37	32	32	52	55	41	37
	Don't know	4	1	2	1	2	1	2	2	1	4	4	1	1.5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Not so much + not at all	54	57	56	47	54	54	56	62	64	37	38.5	55	59
	Very much + quite a lot	42	42	42	52	44	44	42	36	35	59	58.5	44	39.5
	Don't know	4	1	2	1	2	2	2	2	1	4	3	1	1.5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Not so much + not at all	54	72	69	80	61	66	85	86	82	77	55	77	73.5
	Very much + quite a lot	44	27	29	18	38	33	14	13	17	17	38	22	25
	Don't know	2	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	6	7	1	1.5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Source: *War in Gaza Survey*.** Source: *Israeli Voice Index*.

17. The President of Israel

Discussion on p. 00

		2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Jun 2023	Dec 2023*	2024	2025
Total sample	Not so much + not at all	22	36	29	35	28	39	36	42	47	36	53	55
	Very much + quite a lot	70	61	65	61	66	58	56	51	48	57	43	39.5
	Don't know	8	3	6	4	6	3	8	7	5	7	4	5.5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Not so much + not at all	16	30	24	27	23	34	32	35	40	33	47	52.5
	Very much + quite a lot	76	68	71	68	71	63	60	58	54	61	48	42
	Don't know	8	2	5	5	6	3	8	7	6	6	5	5.5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Not so much + not at all	56	66	56	72	53	68	52	77	77	51.5	82	69
	Very much + quite a lot	39	26	34	26	37	29	35	17	18	38	15	26
	Don't know	5	8	10	2	10	3	13	6	5	10.5	3	5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Source: Israeli Voice Index.

18. The Knesset

Discussion on p. 00

		2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Jun 2023	Dec 2023*	2024	2025
Total sample	Not so much + not at all	61	72	72	71	68	67	68	83	74	75	85.5	81
	Very much + quite a lot	35	27	26	28	29	32	27	14	23	20	13	17
	Don't know	4	1	2	1	3	1	5	3	3	5	1.5	2
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Not so much + not at all	62	71	71	69	68	67	68	82	73	77	85	82
	Very much + quite a lot	34	28	27	30	30	32	29	15	24	19	13	17
	Don't know	4	1	2	1	2	1	3	3	3	4	2	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Not so much + not at all	53	77	76	83	67	67	70	87	79	63	86	78
	Very much + quite a lot	44	18	19	16	24	31	22	11	18	28	12	17.5
	Don't know	3	5	5	1	9	2	8	2	3	9	2	4.5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Source: Israeli Voice Index.

19. The IDF

Discussion on p. 00

		2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Jun 2023	Oct 2023*	Dec 2023**	2024	2025
Total sample	Not so much + not at all	14	17	17	22	16	21	18	25	24	20	16	30	23
	Very much + quite a lot	84	82	81	78	82	75	79	73	75	77	79	69	75
	Don't know	2	1	2	0	2	4	3	2	1	3	5	1	2
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Not so much + not at all	6	9	11	10	9	14	9	14	13	12	10	22	16
	Very much + quite a lot	93	90	88	89	90	82	90	85	86	87	86.5	77	83.5
	Don't know	1	1	1	1	1	4	1	1	1	1	3.5	1	0.5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Not so much + not at all	56	62	49	79	54	60	64	82	76	62	44	67.5	60
	Very much + quite a lot	37	32	41	19	41	35	24	15	21	23	44	30	33
	Don't know	7	6	10	2	5	5	12	3	3	15	12	2.5	7
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Source: *War in Gaza Survey*.** Source: *Israeli Voice Index*.

20. The government

Discussion on p. 00

		2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Jun 2023	Oct 2023*	Dec 2023**	2024	2025
Total sample	Not so much + not at all	61	71	70	68	67	71	66	77	71	79	74	81	76
	Very much + quite a lot	36	27	29	30	30	28	27	21	27	18	22	18	22.5
	Don't know	3	2	1	2	3	1	7	2	2	3	4	1	1.5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Not so much + not at all	60	70	69	65	67	70	65	75	69	78	74	80	76
	Very much + quite a lot	37	29	30	34	30	29	29	23	28	20.5	23	19	23
	Don't know	3	1	1	1	3	1	6	2	3	1.5	3	1	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Not so much + not at all	65	75	75	84	66	75	70	90	80	82	70	84	78
	Very much + quite a lot	30	20	23	15	28	25	18	10	18	7.5	19	15	18.5
	Don't know	5	5	2	1	6	0	12	0	2	10.5	11	1	3.5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Source: *War in Gaza Survey*.** Source: *Israeli Voice Index*.

21. The political parties

Discussion on p. 00

		2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Jun 2023	Dec 2023*	2024	2025
Total sample	Not so much + not at all	71	82	79	80	75	78	79	88	82	75	88	86
	Very much + quite a lot	19	14	15	16	15	19	15	9	13	17	9	10
	Don't know	10	4	6	4	10	3	6	3	5	8	3	4
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Not so much + not at all	73	81	78	79	75	81	80	87	81	78	88	87
	Very much + quite a lot	15	14	15	16	14	17	15	9	13	15	9	9
	Don't know	12	5	7	5	11	2	5	4	6	7	3	4
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Not so much + not at all	58	85	81	84	71	67	77	91	84	58	87	79
	Very much + quite a lot	40	12	16	15	20	30	15	8	15	25	11	17
	Don't know	2	3	3	1	9	3	8	1	1	17	2	4
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Source: Israeli Voice Index

22. Your municipality or local authority

Discussion on p. 00

		2016	2018	2019*	2020	2021	2022	Jun 2023	Dec 2023**	2024	2025
Total sample	Not so much + not at all	47	46	42	38	40	50	48	35	45	45
	Very much + quite a lot	52	53	56	61	57	48	50	60	53	53
	Don't know	1	1	2	1	3	2	2	5	2	2
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Not so much + not at all	44	39	41	35	35	46	43	32	39	40.5
	Very much + quite a lot	55	60	56	63	62	51	55	64	59	57
	Don't know	1	1	3	2	3	3	2	4	2	2.5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Not so much + not at all	66	79	46	52	64	68	71	52	72	66
	Very much + quite a lot	33	19	52	48	32	32	28	39	28	33.5
	Don't know	1	2	2	0	4	0	1	9	0	0.5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Source: Tamar Hermann et al., *Jews and Arabs: A Conditional Partnership 2019*.** Source: *Israeli Voice Index*.

23. The Attorney General

Discussion on p. 00

		2008	2009	2011	2017	2018	2019*	2020	2022	2023	2024	2025
Total sample	Not so much + not at all	58	43	25	48	50	43	53	65	60	64	56
	Very much + quite a lot	34	46	64	42	42	46	42	26	31	31	39
	Don't know	8	11	11	10	8	11	5	9	9	5	5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Not so much + not at all	56	38	22	48	45	41	52	62	56	61	56
	Very much + quite a lot	35	50	67	44	47	49	44	27	34	33	39.5
	Don't know	9	12	11	8	8	10	4	11	10	6	4.5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Not so much + not at all	69	72	43	50	78	52	58	78	81	78	53
	Very much + quite a lot	24	15	50	31	19	28	34	18	16	20	35
	Don't know	7	13	7	19	3	20	8	4	3	2	12
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

** Source: Tamar Hermann et al., *Jews and Arabs: A Conditional Partnership 2019*.

24. The Shin Bet

Discussion on p. 00

		Mar 2022*	Dec 2023*	Mar 2024**	May 2024	2025
Total sample	Not so much + not at all	26	31	31	37	41
	Very much + quite a lot	67	59	61	59	54
	Don't know	7	10	8	4	5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Not so much + not at all	20	27.5	25	31	37
	Very much + quite a lot	75	65	69	65.5	60
	Don't know	5	7.5	6	3.5	3
	Total	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Not so much + not at all	56	46	63	68	61
	Very much + quite a lot	27	30	22	26.5	26
	Don't know	17	24	15	5.5	13
	Total	100	100	100	100	100

* Source: *Israeli Voice Index*.** Source: *War in Gaza Survey*.

25. To what extent do you agree or disagree that Israel is a good place to live?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

		2017	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Total sample	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	84	76	74	62	67	65	65
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	15	23	23	36	32	33	33
	Don't know	1	1	3	2	1	2	2
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	86	76	76	64	67	65	66
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	13	23	22	34	31	34	32
	Don't know	1	1	2	2	2	1	2
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	73	78	66	52	65	67	62
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	27	22	28	47	35	32.5	37
	Don't know	0	0	6	1	0	0.5	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

26. To what extent do you agree or disagree that there are people in Israel who take advantage of freedom of expression to harm the state?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

		2017	2025
Total sample	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	71	75.5
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	26.5	21.5
	Don't know	2.5	3
	Total	100	100
Jews	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	74	79
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	24.5	18
	Don't know	1.5	3
	Total	100	100
Arabs	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	54	57
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	37	38
	Don't know	9	5
	Total	100	100

27. To what extent do you agree or disagree that Israelis can always count on other Israelis to help them in times of trouble?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

		2016	2017	2022	2024	2025
Total sample	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	71	67	63	78	76.5
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	28	30	33	20	21.5
	Don't know	1	3	4	2	2
	Total	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	75	70	68	81	79
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	25	28	29	17	19.5
	Don't know	0	2	3	2	1.5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	52	52	39	62	64.5
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	45	44	53	36	32
	Don't know	3	4	8	2	3.5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100

28. To what extent do you agree or disagree that the use of violence for political ends is never justified?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

		2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2019	2022	2025
Total sample	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	82	77	81	82	71	60	71	67	68	78	90	87
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	18	22	18	17	25	38	26	29	30	20	9	12
	Don't know	0	1	1	1	4	2	3	4	2	2	1	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	80	80	83	83	75	64	73	73	73	77	90	89
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	19	19	16	17	23	35	25	25	26	22	8	9
	Don't know	1	1	1	0	2	1	2	2	1	1	2	2
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	94	61	71	76	51	38	54	36	44	85	88	73
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	6	38	28	22	39	59	28	56	55	11	11	26
	Don't know	0	1	1	2	10	3	18	8	1	4	1	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

29. To what extent do you agree or disagree that the Israeli media portray the situation here as much worse than it really is?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

		2017	2018	2020	2021	2025
Total sample	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	56	54	54.5	55	55
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	40	44	43	39	41
	Don't know	4	2	2.5	6	4
	Total	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	56	58	54	54	55.5
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	40	40	43.5	39.5	40.5
	Don't know	4	2	2.5	6.5	4
	Total	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	54	33	58.5	61	54.5
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	39	65	40	34	41
	Don't know	7	2	1.5	5	4.5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100

30. To what extent do you agree or disagree that human and civil rights organizations, such as the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) and B'Tselem, cause damage to the state?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

		2010	2013	2015	2016	2017	2022	2023	2025
Total sample	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	50	50	50	64	52	61	56	58
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	40	38	40	31	41	32	35	34
	Don't know	10	12	10	5	7	7	9	8
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	50	52	56	71	59	66	60	64
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	40	36	34	25	35	26	30	28
	Don't know	10	12	10	4	6	8	10	8
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	51	42	19	23	12	34	32	28
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	39	45	75	67	77	61	61	65
	Don't know	10	13	6	10	11	5	7	7
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

31. To what extent do you agree or disagree that young people are less willing to contribute to the state today than in the past?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

		2019	2025
Total sample	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	54	36.5
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	40	58
	Don't know	6	5.5
	Total	100	100
Jews	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	52	30
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	43	64.5
	Don't know	5	5.5
	Total	100	100
Arabs	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	65	67
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	22	28
	Don't know	13	5
	Total	100	100

32. In your opinion, who is more hesitant to express their political opinions in Israel today — people on the Right, or people on the Left?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

		2016	2025
Total sample	No one in Israel is hesitant to express their political opinions	35	18
	People on the Right are more hesitant	17	27
	People on the Left are more hesitant	30	30
	Everyone is equally hesitant to express their political opinions	13	18
	Don't know	5	7
	Total	100	100
Jews	No one in Israel is hesitant to express their political opinions	37	19
	People on the Right are more hesitant	19	30
	People on the Left are more hesitant	30	28
	Everyone is equally hesitant to express their political opinions	13	17
	Don't know	1	6
	Total	100	100
Arabs	No one in Israel is hesitant to express their political opinions	27	16
	People on the Right are more hesitant	8	12
	People on the Left are more hesitant	32	42
	Everyone is equally hesitant to express their political opinions	17	20.5
	Don't know	16	9.5
	Total	100	100

33. To what extent do you agree or disagree that citizens of Israel can always rely on the state to come to their aid in times of trouble?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

		2017	2022	2024	2025
Total sample	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	46	39	32	35
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	53	57	67	63
	Don't know	1	4	1	2
	Total	100	100	100	100
Jews	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	43	37	25.5	29
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	56	60	72.5	69
	Don't know	1	3	2	2
	Total	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	61	52	61	62.5
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	37	44	38	37
	Don't know	2	4	1	0.5
	Total	100	100	100	100

34. To what extent do you agree or disagree that the Supreme Court intervenes too much in decisions made by the government?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

		2021	2023	2025
Total sample	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	52	52	51
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	36	41	41
	Don't know	12	7	8
	Total	100	100	100
Jews	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	52	50	50
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	38	42	43
	Don't know	10	8	7
	Total	100	100	100
Arabs	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	56	66	55.5
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	25	32	34
	Don't know	19	2	10.5
	Total	100	100	100

35. To what extent do you agree or disagree that it makes no difference who you vote for, as it doesn't change the situation?*

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

		2003	2004	2006	2009	2010	2012	2013	2014	2015	2017	2020	2022	2025
Total sample	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	39	36	41	49	49	43	37	45	29	35	46	39	40
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	61	63	58	48	48	51	58	52	69	62	53	58	56
	Don't know	0	1	1	3	3	6	5	3	2	3	1	3	4
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	37	36	40	50	51	41	39	47	29	32	45	36	38
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	63	63	60	48	47	53	58	52	69	65	53	62	57
	Don't know	0	1	0	2	2	6	3	1	2	3	2	2	5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	47	40	53	38	36	53	30	42	27	52	47	56	48
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	53	58	45	44	55	44	61	51	71	46	51	42	50
	Don't know	0	2	2	18	9	3	9	7	2	2	2	2	2
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* In 2003, 2004, and 2006, the response options were: Definitely disagree, disagree, not sure, agree, definitely agree. For the sake of comparison with later years, we portioned out the "not sure" responses in a proportional manner between the shares of respondents who agreed and who disagreed.

36. To what extent do you agree or disagree that the government should encourage Arab citizens to emigrate from Israel? (Jewish respondents)

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

		2005*	2006*	2007*	2008*	2009*	2010*	2013	2019	2025
Jews	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	49	60	52.5	54.5	49.5	50.5	44	36	53
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	49	38	43	42.5	41	44	50	60	38
	Don't know	2	2	4.5	3	9.5	5.5	6	4	9
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Between 2005 and 2020, the response options were: Not at all, to a small extent, somewhat, to a large extent.

42. Which of these statements more accurately represents your views?

Discussion on p. 00

		2013*	2017**	2023	2025
Total sample	Decisions made by a government that holds a majority in the Knesset are inherently democratic	45	33	35	31
	Decisions that are opposed to fundamental democratic values such as minority rights and freedom of expression are not democratic, even if they are passed by the government or a Knesset majority	35	54	50	55
	Don't know / declined to respond	20	13	15	14
	Total	100	100	100	100
Jews	Decisions made by a government that holds a majority in the Knesset are inherently democratic	45	36	36	33
	Decisions that are opposed to fundamental democratic values such as minority rights and freedom of expression are not democratic, even if they are passed by the government or a Knesset majority	35	52	47	51
	Don't know / declined to respond	20	13	17	16
	Total	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Decisions made by a government that holds a majority in the Knesset are inherently democratic	41	20	28	21
	Decisions that are opposed to fundamental democratic values such as minority rights and freedom of expression are not democratic, even if they are passed by the government or a Knesset majority	36	67	67	75
	Don't know / declined to respond	23	13	5	4
	Total	100	100	100	100

* In the *Israeli Democracy Index 2013*, the response choices were: (1) "Decisions made by the government and Knesset, elected by the majority in free elections, are by definition democratic"; and (2) "Decisions that conflict with such values as equality before the law, minority rights, or freedom of expression are not democratic, even if made by a government and Knesset elected by the majority in free elections."

** In the *Israeli Democracy Index 2017*, the second response choice was: "Decisions that run counter to such values as minority rights and freedom of expression are non-democratic, even if they are made by a government with a Knesset majority."

43. In your opinion, to what extent does the State of Israel ensure the security of its citizens?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

		2019	2020	2021	2022	2025
Total sample	Very much + quite a lot	64	76	57	38	43.5
	Not so much + not at all	35	23	41	60	56
	Don't know	1	1	2	2	0.5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Very much + quite a lot	63	80	61	40	46
	Not so much + not at all	35	19	36	58	53
	Don't know	2	1	3	2	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Very much + quite a lot	64	56	33	28	33
	Not so much + not at all	35	43	65	70	67
	Don't know	1	1	2	2	0
	Total	100	100	100	100	100

44. And to what extent does it ensure the welfare of its citizens?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

		2019	2020	2021	2022	2025
Total sample	Very much + quite a lot	35	31	33	23	23
	Not so much + not at all	63	67	63	75	76
	Don't know	2	2	4	2	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Very much + quite a lot	30	28	31	21	21
	Not so much + not at all	68	71	65	77	77.5
	Don't know	2	1	4	2	1.5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Very much + quite a lot	61	50	41	32	33
	Not so much + not at all	38	49	56	65	66.5
	Don't know	1	1	3	3	0.5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100

45. To what extent do you agree or disagree that most Arab citizens of Israel want to integrate into Israeli society and be part of it?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

		2018	2020	2022	2024	2025
Total sample	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	67	60	46	48	43
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	31	36	49	48	51.5
	Don't know	2	4	5	4	5.5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	67	57	40	42	37
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	31	39	54	53	57
	Don't know	2	4	6	5	6
	Total	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	66	81	75	77	73.5
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	34	18	24	22	25.5
	Don't know	—	1	1	1	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100

46. To what extent do you agree or disagree that Israel acts democratically toward Arab citizens as well?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

		2018	2020	2022	2025
Total sample	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	69	61	63	58
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	30	35	33	37
	Don't know	1	4	4	5
	Total	100	100	100	100
Jews	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	76	65.5	69	63
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	23	30.5	25	31
	Don't know	1	4	6	6
	Total	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	33	35	31	33.5
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	67	63	69	66
	Don't know	0	2	0	0.5
	Total	100	100	100	100

47a. To what extent do you agree or disagree that to preserve Jewish identity, it is better for Jews and Arabs in Israel to live separately?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

		2017*	2018	2020	2024	2025
Jews	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	52	43	41.5	48	48.5
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	45	53	54	44	41
	Don't know	3	4	4.5	8	10.5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100

* Source: Tamar Hermann et al., *Jews and Arabs: A Conditional Partnership* 2017.

47b. To what extent do you agree or disagree that to preserve Arab identity, it is better for Jews and Arabs in Israel to live separately?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

		2017*	2018	2020	2024	2025
Arabs	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	22	29.5	22	36	25
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	77	70.5	77.5	63	74
	Don't know	1	0	0.5	1	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100

* Source: Tamar Hermann et al., *Jews and Arabs: A Conditional Partnership* 2017.

48. Do you support or oppose bringing Arab parties into the government, including the appointment of Arab ministers?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

		2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2015	2016	2017*	2019**	2021***	2022	2023****	2025
Jews	Strongly + somewhat oppose	69	61	63	67	75	68	67	67	57	59	66	49	53	66	54	65
	Strongly + somewhat support	31	37	36	31	21	29	28	29	35	37	30	37	35	28	36.5	27
	Depends which government / only a left-wing government	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	4	–	–	–	–
	Don't know	0	2	2	1	3	3	5	4	9	4	4	11	12	6	9.5	8
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Strongly + somewhat oppose	9	16	17	9	22	30	23		11	19	15	15	11	18	16	12
	Strongly + somewhat support	91	83	82	90	72	66	74		85	72	81	76	74	79	80.5	86
	Depends which government / only a left-wing government	–	–	–	–	–	–	–		–	–	–	2	–	–	–	–
	Don't know	0	1	2	1	5	4	3		4	9	3	7	15	3	3.5	2
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100		100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

In 2016 and 2017, the version presented to Arab respondents was: "Do you support or oppose Arab parties agreeing to join the government, including the appointment of Arab ministers?"

* Source: Tamar Hermann et al., *Jews and Arabs: A Conditional Partnership* 2017.

** Source: Tamar Hermann et al., *Jews and Arabs: A Conditional Partnership* 2019.

*** Source: *Israeli Voice Index*, February 2021.

**** Source: Tamar Hermann et al., *Jews and Arabs: A Conditional Partnership* 2023.

50. In your opinion, is it possible for an Arab citizen of Israel who feels part of the Palestinian people to also be a loyal citizen of the State of Israel?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

		2015	2017*	2019*	Apr 2021**	Aug 2021**	Mar 2022**	2023*	Oct 2023**	2025
Jews	Think + certain it is	38	29	35	38.5	33	28.5	33	26	16
	Think + certain it is not	56	68	59	54	59	68	62	65.5	79
	Don't know	6	3	6	7.5	8	3.5	5	8.5	5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Think + certain it is	76		70	69	64	63	77	57	70
	Think + certain it is not	19		26	30.5	35	27	20	19	25
	Don't know	5		4	0.5	1	10	3	24	5
	Total	100		100	100	100	100	100	100	100

In previous surveys, the question wording was: "In your opinion, is it possible or not possible for an Arab citizen of Israel who feels part of the Palestinian people to also be a loyal citizen of the State of Israel?" The response options were: Certain it is possible, think it is possible, think it is not possible, certain it is not possible, don't know.

* Source: Tamar Hermann et al., *Jews and Arabs: A Conditional Partnership*.

** Source: *Israeli Voice Index*.

51. At present, the state funds various cultural and artistic institutions and activities. In your opinion, does this give it the right to be involved in determining the cultural and artistic content of these institutions and activities?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

		2018*	2023	2025
Total sample	Think + certain it does	48	42	37
	Think + certain it does not	50	53	54.5
	Don't know	2	5	8.5
	Total	100	100	100
Jews	Think + certain it does	44	40	36
	Think + certain it does not	54	54	54
	Don't know	2	6	10
	Total	100	100	100
Arabs	Think + certain it does	69	51	40.5
	Think + certain it does not	30	49	57.5
	Don't know	1	0	2
	Total	100	100	100

* In 2018, the question wording was: "If the state provides funding for artistic and cultural activities and institutions, should it also have a say in their artistic content?"

52. Is there a political party in Israel today that closely represents your views?

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		2003	2012	2016	2017	2019	2022	2025
Total sample	There is a party that closely represents my views	58	38	51	47	55	30	26
	There is a party that partly represents my views					20	35	35
	There is no party that closely represents my views	41	57	48	50	24	29	34
	Don't know	1	5	1	3	1	6	5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	There is a party that closely represents my views	60	40	53	50	59	33	27
	There is a party that partly represents my views					21	36	39
	There is no party that closely represents my views	40	55	45	47	19	24	29
	Don't know	0	5	2	3	1	7	5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	There is a party that closely represents my views	47	28	34	32	30	14	20.5
	There is a party that partly represents my views					14	32	18
	There is no party that closely represents my views	53	68	63	66	50	51	58.5
	Don't know	0	4	3	2	6	3	3
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

53. Which of the following factors will most strongly influence your decision about which party to vote for in the next elections?

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		Aug 2022*	2025
Total sample	The party's positions on foreign policy and security	12	20
	The party's positions on religion and state	15	17
	The party's positions on the economy and the high cost of living	31	21
	The party's positions on the climate crisis	0.5	1
	The identity of the party leader	17.5	15
	In any case, I will vote for the same party I voted for in the last elections**	11	10
	Other	3	4
	Don't know	6	7.5
	Don't intend to vote	4	4.5
	Total	100	100
Jews	The party's positions on foreign policy and security	12	20
	The party's positions on religion and state	17	19
	The party's positions on the economy and the high cost of living	30	19
	The party's positions on the climate crisis	0.5	1
	The identity of the party leader	19	17
	In any case, I will vote for the same party I voted for in the last elections**	11	10
	Other	4	3
	Don't know	4.5	8
	Don't intend to vote	2	3
	Total	100	100
Arabs	The party's positions on foreign policy and security	10	18
	The party's positions on religion and state	5.5	7
	The party's positions on the economy and the high cost of living	33	33
	The party's positions on the climate crisis	1	2
	The identity of the party leader	9.5	6
	In any case, I will vote for the same party I voted for in the last elections**	12	9
	Other	1	7
	Don't know	14	4
	Don't intend to vote	14	14
	Total	100	100

* Source: *Israeli Voice Index*.

** The question wording was: "The party I voted for previously."

60. Israel has not had a constitution since its founding. In your view, how important is it that Israel have a constitution?

		2010*	2023	2025
Total sample	Very and quite important	75	73	71
	Not so important + not at all important	17	18	16
	Don't know	8	9	13
	Total	100	100	100
Jews	Very and quite important	78	72	69
	Not so important + not at all important	14	17	16
	Don't know	8	11	15
	Total	100	100	100
Arabs	Very and quite important	52	78	78
	Not so important + not at all important	41	20	20
	Don't know	7	2	2
	Total	100	100	100

* In 2010, the question wording was: "How important is it to you that Israel should have a constitution?" The response options were: Extremely important, very important, so-so, not important, not at all important. For the sake of comparison with later years, we portioned out the "so-so" responses in a proportional manner between the shares of respondents who thought it important for Israel to have a constitution and those who thought it not important.

61. In your opinion, what are the chances that Israel will have a constitution within ten years?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

		2023	2025
Total sample	Very high and quite high	22	20
	Very low and quite low	60	62
	Don't know	18	18
	Total	100	100
Jews	Very high and quite high	17	18
	Very low and quite low	62	61.5
	Don't know	21	20.5
	Total	100	100
Arabs	Very high and quite high	45	28.5
	Very low and quite low	50	65
	Don't know	5	6.5
	Total	100	100

62a. In your opinion, where is it safer for Jews to live today?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

		2024	2025
Jews	In Israel	73	72
	Abroad	5.5	6
	Both are equally safe	15.5	17
	Don't know	6	5
	Total	100	100

63. If you could receive American citizenship, or that of another Western country, would you prefer to move there or to remain in Israel?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

		2015	2017	2019	2021	2022	Jun 2023	Nov 2023*	2024	2025
Total sample	I would prefer to move there	12	15	13	17	18	21	11	21	17.5
	I would prefer to remain in Israel	84	81	84	72	69	69	77	67	74
	Don't know	4	4	3	11	13	10	12	12	8.5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	I would prefer to move there	11	15	12	18	18	18	8	20.5	18
	I would prefer to remain in Israel	84	81	84	70	67	70	80.5	64.5	72
	Don't know	5	4	4	12	15	12	11.5	15	10
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	I would prefer to move there	15	18	14	15	17	38	26	22	17
	I would prefer to remain in Israel	83	81	84	81	80	62	59	77	82
	Don't know	2	1	2	4	3	0	15	1	1
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Source: War in Gaza Survey.

68. Do you think that in the next 10–15 years, Israel's religious-Jewish character will become more pronounced?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

		2012*	2022**	2025
Total sample	Think and certain it will	40.5	38	68
	Think and certain it will not	52	49	23
	Don't know	7.5	13	9
	Total	100	100	100
Jews	Think and certain it will	39	38	69
	Think and certain it will not	53.5	49	22
	Don't know	7.5	13	9
	Total	100	100	100
Arabs	Think and certain it will	50	42	61.5
	Think and certain it will not	46	45	30
	Don't know	4.5	13	8.5
	Total	100	100	100

* In 2012, the question wording was: "Do you think Israel will become a much more religious state?" The response options were: Think it will, think it will not, don't know.

** In 2022, the question wording was: "Do you think Israel will become a more religious state?"

69. Do you think that in the next 10–15 years, Israel will be able to defend itself militarily and in terms of security?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

		2012*	2025
Total sample	Think and certain it will	81.5	78
	Think and certain it will not	12	16
	Don't know	6.5	6
	Total	100	100
Jews	Think and certain it will	85.5	79.5
	Think and certain it will not	8	14
	Don't know	6.5	6.5
	Total	100	100
Arabs	Think and certain it will	63	72
	Think and certain it will not	28	23.5
	Don't know	9	4.5
	Total	100	100

* In 2012, the response options were: Think it will, think it will not, don't know.

71. Do you think that in the next 10–15 years, Israel will be more isolated internationally than it is today?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

		2012*	2025
Total sample	Think and certain it will	37	38
	Think and certain it will not	53	52
	Don't know	10	10
	Total	100	100
Jews	Think and certain it will	33	34
	Think and certain it will not	56	55.5
	Don't know	11	10.5
	Total	100	100
Arabs	Think and certain it will	55.5	59
	Think and certain it will not	38	37
	Don't know	6.5	4
	Total	100	100

* In 2012, the response options were: Think it will, think it will not, don't know.

72. Do you think that in the next 10–15 years, Israel will preserve its standing as a leading high-tech nation?

[Discussion on p. 00](#)

		2012*	2025
Total sample	Think and certain it will	83	76
	Think and certain it will not	12	18
	Don't know	5	6
	Total	100	100
Jews	Think and certain it will	85	77
	Think and certain it will not	10	17
	Don't know	5	6
	Total	100	100
Arabs	Think and certain it will	76	72
	Think and certain it will not	18	22
	Don't know	6	6
	Total	100	100

* In 2012, the response options were: Think it will, think it will not, don't know.

73. To what extent do you agree or disagree that it would be best to dismantle all the country's political institutions and start over from scratch?

Discussion on p. 00

		2010*	2022	2023	2025
Total sample	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	37	43	38	46.5
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	59	46	54	43
	Don't know	4	11	8	10.5
	Total	100	100	100	100
Jews	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	40	41	34	46.5
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	57	47	57	42
	Don't know	3	12	9	11.5
	Total	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Strongly agree + somewhat agree	25	55	59	47
	Somewhat disagree + strongly disagree	68	42	38	47
	Don't know	7	3	3	6
	Total	100	100	100	100

* In 2010, the response options were: Definitely disagree, disagree, not sure, agree, definitely agree. For the sake of comparison, we portioned out the "not sure" responses in a proportional manner between the shares of respondents who agreed and who disagreed.

74. In general, are you optimistic or pessimistic about Israel's future?

Discussion on p. 00

		2009*	2011*	2012	2014*	2016	2017	2018*	2021	2022	2023	Oct 2023 (15–17)**	Oct 2023 (18–19)**	Nov 2023**	2024	2025
Total sample	Very and quite optimistic	79	58	76	73	67	68	70	63	49	50	64	61	64	52.5	55
	Very and quite pessimistic	18	38	22	24	30	29	24	30	43	45	26.5	32	27	42	41
	Don't know	3	4	2	3	3	3	6	7	8	5	9.5	7	9	5.5	4
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jews	Very and quite optimistic	81	63	79	73	70	71	75	67	51	52	68	65.5	72	56	57
	Very and quite pessimistic	15	34	18	24	28	26	21	27	41	43	23	27	20	38.5	39
	Don't know	4	3	3	3	2	3	4	6	8	5	9	7.5	8	5.5	4
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Arabs	Very and quite optimistic	65	36	60	72	51	50	44	42	37	40	44	36	27	35	45.5
	Very and quite pessimistic	33	59	39	24	43	46	44	50	56	58	46	54	60	59	52
	Don't know	2	5	1	4	6	4	12	8	7	2	10	10	13	6	2.5
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Source: Israel Democracy Institute, Peace Index, April 2009, January 2011, April 2014, and April 2018.

** Source: War in Gaza Survey.

Appendix 3

Sociodemographic Breakdown and Self-Definitions

(total sample; Jewish sample; Arab sample; %)*

Nationality	Total sample
Jews	83.0
Arabs	17.0
Total	100

Sex	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Men	49.1	48.9	50
Women	50.9	51.1	50
Total	100	100	100

Age	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
18–24	16.0	15.0	20.9
25–34	18.5	17.3	24.6
35–44	18.4	18.4	18.4
45–54	15.0	14.8	15.9
55–64	12.6	12.8	11.4
65 and over	19.5	21.7	8.8
Total	100	100	100

Education	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Partial high school, without matriculation	12.7	9.6	28.1
Full high school with matriculation certificate	21.4	19.7	21.4
Post-secondary	12.1	13.4	5.8
Post-secondary yeshiva	3.3	3.9	–
Partial academic education (no degree)	7.3	7.2	7.7
Full academic degree (B.A. or higher)	42.1	45.0	28.3
Declined to respond	1.1	1.2	0.5
Total	100	100	100

* To ensure that the Jewish and Arab samples accurately represented their proportion of the population in Israel based on Central Bureau of Statistics data, both samples were weighted by nationality, sex, age, religiosity (Jews), and religion (Arabs).

Median monthly household income*	Jews
Far below the median income	13.0
Slightly below the median income	15.4
Similar to the median income	24.1
Slightly above the median income	26.8
Far above the median income	12.2
Declined to respond	8.5
Total	100

* The median gross monthly household income for Jews in Israel (relative to which half the public earns more and half the public earns less) is NIS 16,500 for a family, and NIS 9,000 for a single-person household. Respondents were asked to rate their overall household income (of all household members) based on the above categories.

Median monthly household income*	Arabs
Far below the median income	19.3
Slightly below the median income	12.7
Similar to the median income	32.8
Slightly above the median income	10.2
Far above the median income	9.3
Declined to respond	15.7
Total	100

* The median gross monthly household income for Arabs in Israel (relative to which half the public earns more and half the public earns less) is NIS 10,500 for a family, and NIS 7,000 for a single-person household. Respondents were asked to rate their overall household income (of all household members) based on the above categories.

Religion	Arabs
Muslim*	80.6
Christian	8.8
Druze	8.4
Declined to respond / other	2.2
Total	100

* Includes Bedouin.

Religiosity	Arabs
Very religious	3.3
Religious	24.7
Traditional	59.7
Not at all religious	11.2
Don't know	1.1
Total	100

Religiosity	Jews
Haredi	11.6
National religious / Haredi leumi	12.9
Traditional religious	13.0
Traditional non-religious	18.9
Secular	43.6
Total	100

Ethnicity	Jews
Ashkenazi	39.8
Mizrahi	35.2
Mixed (Ashkenazi and Mizrahi)	15.3
FSU immigrant	5.3
Ethiopian	0.6
Don't know / declined to respond	2.3
Other	1.5
Total	100

Political orientation	Jews
Left	12.5
Center	26.9
Right	58.9
Don't know/ declined to respond	1.7
Total	100

Political orientation, by religiosity (Jewish sample)	Haredi	National religious / Haredi leumi	Traditional religious	Traditional non-religious	Secular
Left	0.7	4.5	2.2	6.3	23.8
Center	12.0	10.0	18.9	28.1	37.7
Right	84.5	84.2	76.8	64.2	37.2
Don't know/ declined to respond	2.8	1.2	2.2	1.4	1.3
Total	100	100	100	100	100

District	Jews
North	8.9
Haifa	10.6
Center	29.2
Tel Aviv	21.7
Jerusalem	10.2
South	14.1
Judea and Samaria	5.3
Total	100

Area of residence ²³	Arabs
Galilee	56.2
"Triangle"*	21.9
Negev	11.3
Mixed cities	10.6
Total	100

* The "Triangle" is an area in central Israel with a largely Arab population, including the major Arab towns of Tayibe, Tira, Baqa al-Gharbiyye, and Umm al-Fahm.

IDF reserve duty during the Iron Swords war (Jews, ages 18–54)

	Haredim	National religious / Haredi leumi	Traditional religious	Traditional non-religious	Secular	Total (Jews)
Performed reserve duty during the war	3.3	16.0	18.3	26.4	18.4	16.9
Did not perform reserve duty during the war	26.4	43.5	48.5	56.8	66.0	52.9
Currently in mandatory military service	0.8	2.3	3.9	2.6	2.1	2.2
Have not served in the IDF at all	69.5	38.2	29.3	14.3	13.5	28.0
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

²³ In the Jewish sample, we refer to six districts, in accordance with the categories of the Central Bureau of Statistics, whereas in the Arab sample, we refer to four areas of residence, since the bulk of the Arab population is concentrated in the Galilee and Triangle areas. The Arab sample does not include Arab residents of east Jerusalem.

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The Israel Democracy Institute (IDI) is an independent center of research and action dedicated to strengthening the foundations of Israeli democracy. IDI works to bolster the values and institutions of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. A non-partisan think-and-do tank, the Institute harnesses rigorous applied research to influence policy, legislation, and public opinion. The Institute partners with political leaders, policymakers, and representatives of civil society to improve the functioning of the government and its institutions, confront security threats while preserving civil liberties, and foster solidarity within Israeli society. The State of Israel recognized the positive impact of IDI's research and recommendations by bestowing upon the Institute its most prestigious award, the Israel Prize for Lifetime Achievement.

The Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research (IDI) conducts rigorous empirical research on the attitudes of the Israeli public regarding the functioning of the country's democratic system and the commitment of Israeli society to core democratic values. Data Israel: The Louis Guttman Social Research Database, maintained by the Center, presents current and historical survey data and other materials collected since 1949 by the Center for Applied Social Research founded by Prof. Guttman, which have been donated to the Israel Democracy Institute. The Viterbi Center strives to enrich the public discourse in Israel on social and policy issues by generating, analyzing, and publicizing authoritative information, and placing it at the disposal of researchers, journalists, and interested members of the public in Israel and around the world.

The Israeli Democracy Index offers an annual assessment of the quality of Israeli democracy. Since 2003, an extensive survey has been conducted on a representative sample of Israel's adult population. The project aims to explore trends in Israeli society on fundamental questions relating to the realization of democratic goals and values, and the performance of government systems and elected officials. Analysis of the survey results is intended to enhance public debate on the status of democracy in Israel, and create a comprehensive source of relevant information.