The National-Religious Sector in Israel 2014

Main Findings

Tamar Hermann

Gilad Be'ery | Ella Heller | Chanan Cohen |
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Figure 1 Extent of affiliation with the National-Religious camp (percent; total Israeli Jewish population)



Figure 2: Religious self-definition (percent; sample population)



Figure 3: Degree of affiliation with National-Religious camp (percent; by place of residence)



Figure 4: Self-defined location on political/security left-right spectrum (percent; sample group compared to all Jews)



Source: (All Jews) Peace Index, October 2013.

1. What did we look for, and why?

In recent decades, Jewish Israeli society has experienced a shift of elites and ideologies, including the systematic movement of the National-Religious camp from the margins to the socio-political center stage.[1] Most of the adherents and even the opponents of the National-Religious worldview would presumably agree with the appraisal that the community is gradually taking root in formal and informal positions of power, and entrenching itself at the very heart of public discourse in Israel. This seems to be happening despite the lack (as shown in the annual figures of Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics [CBS]) of a substantial increase in the number of those who self-identify in surveys as "religious." In other words, this increasing prominence cannot be chalked up to demographic change. The massive electoral support for the Bayit Yehudi (Jewish Home) party, even by a sizeable number of secular voters, is only one of the many signs of this trend. As a consequence, interest in the National-Religious camp is on the rise in the political, social, economic, cultural, and media spheres, not to mention in academia.

The transformation of Israeli society has strategic implications for the country's character, the balance of power within the ruling institutional system, the national agenda, and even the foreign and defense policies of the state. This process can be understood from several perspectives: from a broader global viewpoint, there is a massive emergence and/or resurgence of religious ideas and actors in the public arena in many countries around the world;[2] from a regional Middle-Eastern outlook, recent decades have seen a meteoric rise in the socio-political status of religion, coupled with a gradual decline in secularity. This has been expressed in the growing prominence of religion in the public, political, and social arena. It is a frequent topic of discussion both in circles that are pleased with these developments and those troubled by them. Either

1 For the purposes of this study, we will be referring to the *dati-leumi* community in Israel as the "National-Religious" camp (as opposed to the other commonly used term, "religious Zionist").

2 See for example, John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, *God is Back: How the Global Rise of Faith is Changing the World* (London: Penguin Books, 2009).

way, the growing interest in this trend and its players is generating a spate of public opinion polls (most of which do not rely on a representative sample) to characterize the National-Religious ideology in political, sociological, economic, or cultural terms.

The present survey and accompanying report are largely the result of this same fascination. Our study is groundbreaking in several respects: the scope of the topics discussed, the selection of the relevant population (sampling method), the size of the sample, the systematic analysis, and the combination of quantitative data collection (a survey) with a qualitative research method (focus groups).

Our primary goals were as follows:

- to examine whether the National-Religious camp is a discrete sociological category with distinct opinions;
- to explore the degree of ideological homogeneity of this camp, identify its subgroups, and assess their relative importance;
- to systematically investigate the prevalence, distribution, and relative strength of political, social, and cultural perceptions on the core subjects of socio-political discourse in this camp.

2. Methodology

Our study is based on a survey conducted in the fall of 2013 and on focus groups that met with us in the spring of 2014.

The topics for testing and the resulting questionnaire were formulated in May–August 2013 in a series of discussions by the research team, in consultation with Rabbi Dr. Benny Lau and Prof. Yedidia Stern, who served as an informal advisory committee.

The study

The survey was conducted by Midgam SI Research & Consulting[3] from August 18 to September 2, 2013 (before Rosh Hashanah), and from October 1 to November 7, 2013 (after Sukkot).

The questionnaire consisted of 56 content questions and 13 questions on socio-demographic background and self-identification. Most of the items were formulated specifically for this study, but some were recurring questions from past Israeli Democracy Indexes and Guttman–AVI CHAI surveys. All but two questions were multiple choice.

Interview method: Data were collected via 897 telephone interviews (landline phones) and 82 Internet questionnaires.

The sample: Assembling the sample was not a straightforward process, because there is no agreed-upon definition of the National-Religious camp or its affiliation criteria. For this reason, we were uncertain how to define the sample population, that is, what to use as our "rule of thumb" for determining who is and is not included in the National-Religious group, whose characteristics and opinions were the subject of our study.

Following careful deliberation and preliminary testing, we decided on the following screening question: "To what extent would you say that you belong to the National-Religious sector, in terms of both your lifestyle and outlook?" The possible responses were: "not at all," "to a slight extent," "to a large extent," "to a very large extent," and "don't know." Those who responded "to a large extent" or "to a very large extent" were included in the study. Our sample group consisted of

3 See www.midgam.co.il

978 men and women who identified themselves as belonging to the National-Religious camp (hereafter: the sample population), out of a representative nationwide sample of 4,597 adults residing in Israel.

The maximum error for a sample of this size is ±3.2%. The survey data were weighted for gender and age relative to the general Jewish population.

Focus groups

During February and March 2014, we conducted two focus groups, with the assistance of New Wave Research:[4]

- A mixed group of eight men and women who defined themselves as "traditional-religious" yet stated that they see themselves as belonging to the National-Religious camp "to a large extent" or "to a very large extent."
- A group of seven men who defined themselves as Haredim (ultra-Orthodox) yet reported that they see themselves as part of the National-Religious camp "to a large extent" or "to a very large extent."

Each group met for one-and-a-half hours and was led by professional facilitators, based on an outline prepared in advance.

4 See http://nwr.co.il

3. Who's who in the National-Religious camp?

Socio-demographic characteristics

By its very designation, the National-Religious camp is clearly more religious than the general Israeli population; but as shown below, this statement is not self-evident, because religiosity is only one of several components (though a major one) of National-Religious identity, which emerged as multifaceted. We also found that, on average, the National-Religious camp is younger than the general Israeli-Jewish population. The difference is particularly noticeable in the two youngest cohorts (18–24 and 25–34), which are larger in the National-Religious group than in the overall Israeli-Jewish population. Likewise, we found that members of the National-Religious camp are more likely than the general Israeli-Jewish public to live in Judea, Samaria, or Jerusalem and its suburbs, and less so in the Greater Tel Aviv area; that being said, only a small proportion (7%) of the National-Religious population resides over the Green Line. In other words, the vast majority of this group live within pre-1967 Israel, despite the fact that they are commonly identified with the settler population. Nonetheless, in terms of ideology, there is a close affinity, though less than total congruence, between the two groups.

As for earning power, the average income in the National-Religious camp as a whole is lower than that of the general Israeli-Jewish population, though what we will be referring to as the "core group" within the sample is very close to the general average. By contrast, the Haredi, Torani,[5] and traditional-religious groups have lower incomes than the national average.

Based on our findings, the National-Religious camp is slightly better educated on the whole than the general Israeli-Jewish public; moreover,

5 The term "Torani" is used in this study to refer to members of the National-Religious community who have moved closer to the Haredi world, primarily in terms of religious observance. In the survey question on level of religiosity, this category appears as *Torani/Haredi-Leumi*. *Torani* can be loosely translated as Torah-based, while the literal meaning of *Haredi-Leumi* is "national ultra-Orthodox" ("national" is used here in the sense of being loyal to the state and serving in the IDF).

its proportion of religiously educated individuals is obviously higher than that of the general Jewish population. However, within the camp, and even in its "natural" subgroups (the National-Religious core group, the Torani, and the liberal/Modern Orthodox), most of the men—and even more so, the women—do not have a post-secondary Torah education. This is in stark contrast to Haredi society, where most of the men reach this level of religious studies.

In terms of ethnicity, members of the National-Religious camp come from every ethnic group, with a higher proportion of Mizrahim (Sephardim) than is widely assumed or than one might conclude from the makeup of its political and rabbinic leadership. The representation of FSU immigrants in the National-Religious camp, however, is clearly lower than their share of the general Israeli-Jewish population.

Are all welcome here?

Our starting assumption was that the National-Religious camp would be more or less identical in scope to the "religious" category in the CBS surveys (roughly 9%–10% of the total Jewish population in Israel); in other words, we assumed that only religious individuals would identify themselves with the National-Religious camp. But when we screened the interviewees by self-affiliation with the National-Religious sector, and not by level of religiosity, we were surprised to discover—in both the preliminary testing and the survey itself—that there is a sizeable Israeli-Jewish population that identifies itself as belonging to the National-Religious camp despite the fact that it does not display the usual markers of this group and does not necessarily define itself as "religious." This category encompasses individuals who identify themselves as "traditional-religious" or "traditional non-religious," and even secular and Haredi Jews who answered in the affirmative when asked if they belonged to the National-Religious camp. In fact, the figures indicate that self-identification with the Right on the political/security spectrum is no less a predictor of affiliation with the National-Religious camp than is religiosity alone—a finding on which we will be elaborating below. This affinity is bolstered by the consensus that we found among groups who identify themselves with the National-

Religious camp, particularly on issues related to security and settlements, attitude towards democracy, and opinions on religion and state.

Based on self-declared affiliation, as opposed to level of religiosity alone, the findings indicate that the National-Religious camp now constitutes roughly one-fifth (22%) of the adult Jewish population in Israel. According to our definition (which is also based on additional variables, such as voting patterns), today's National-Religious camp encompasses (in various proportions) the full spectrum of religious definitions employed by the CBS: Haredi (11%); Torani (6%); National-Religious (31%); liberal/Modern Orthodox (12%); traditional religious (24%); traditional non-religious (9%); and even a small group of secular Jews (3%). The remainder did not fall into any clear category. If we remove the Haredi, secular, and traditional non-religious groups from the equation, and factor in only those groups that are naturally identified with the National-Religious camp, the relative proportions correspond with what we know from other surveys based strictly on religiosity: Torani (12%); National-Religious (63%); liberal/Modern Orthodox (24%).

The large numbers that we found who identify with, but are not generally considered an integral part of, the National-Religious camp underscore the complexity and fluidity of patterns of identification and belonging in Israeli-Jewish society today. This is consistent with post-modern definitions of affiliation and identity as consciously constructed, rather than essentialist. Moreover, despite the noticeable fragmentation of public discourse—often magnified by interested parties—our findings show that many Israelis manage to combine several identities (for example secular and Haredi) with a sense of belonging to the National-Religious camp. Because we asked about belonging in terms of both "lifestyle" and "outlook," it seems that the Israeli public today does not see before it one obligatory "National-Religious" model. This flexibility leaves room for the emergence of large hybrid groups whose members have a foot in more than one camp, yet feel fully identified with the National-Religious camp even if they do not take on the entire "package" associated with it. This opens up

space for tactical and strategic collaborations that were once politically, socially, economically, and culturally unworkable.

If, as we believe, the definition we have chosen for identification with the National-Religious camp is valid, then our findings have political, social, cultural, demographic, and other implications for Israeli society—already, and certainly in the future—that are much more far-reaching than they would be were affiliation with this camp based solely on religiosity. In our opinion, the latter is too narrow a definition to embrace the full significance of belonging to the camp we aimed to examine here. What is more, there are individuals who refer to themselves as "religious" but who are not interested in belonging to the National-Religious camp and who certainly do not feel part of it; for example, because they do not share its nationalist/right-wing agenda.

Extent of affiliation

Within the group that reported belonging to the National-Religious camp, we found differences in the degree of affiliation: Roughly one-third of the sample population[6] stated that they associate themselves with this camp "to a very large extent," which we classified as "definite affiliation"; two-thirds stated that they associate themselves with the National-Religious camp "to a large extent," which we labeled "soft affiliation."

Those who identify as National-Religious represent the majority of the "definite affiliation" category; but not all National-Religious respondents (by religiosity) placed themselves in this group. This validates our argument that level of religiosity is not the sole criterion for belonging to the National-Religious camp. In the category of "soft affiliation," the traditional groups constitute the majority. The share of Judea and Samaria residents in the "definite affiliation" category is twice that in the "soft affiliation" group. Likewise, the share of hesder-yeshiva[7] graduates in the "definite" category is much greater than that

6 Those who reported a lesser degree of belonging ("to a slight extent" or "not at all") were not included in our sample.

7 The hesder yeshivot combine religious studies with army service over a fixed time frame.

in the "soft" group, attesting to the major success of these institutions in socializing their students. Those who identify with the political Right make up a much greater proportion of the "definite" category than do those who situate themselves on the moderate Right, the Center, or the Left of the political spectrum.

If we examine the figures from the opposite direction, that is, breaking down the subgroups by level of affiliation, we find that only two of the groups "naturally" identified with the National-Religious camp (based on self-defined religiosity)—the National-Religious and the Torani—appear in greater numbers in the definite category, as opposed to soft affiliation. By contrast, among the liberal/Modern Orthodox, the soft affiliation level is more prevalent.

To summarize, we are proposing a conceptual shift whereby the determining factor in the extent of affiliation with the National-Religious camp—though not necessarily full acceptance into it—is not one-dimensional. Stated otherwise, we conclude on the basis of our findings that self-definition as "religious" and affiliation with the National-Religious camp are not one and the same. From a sociological unit with common features, its own inner language, and a shared lifestyle (reinforced by the halakhic, or Jewish religious, way of life), Israel's National-Religious camp is evolving into a societal-political identity entity that acts in accordance with values conceptualized such that they are understood and accepted even by those ostensibly outside the group based on the parameter of religiosity alone.

Further study is needed to clarify to what degree the National-Religious sector and its leaders are aware and in favor of this shift, because internal diversity makes it harder to create an obligatory, all-encompassing model and to control the relevant ideological, social, and political space. But in practice, the National-Religious camp has strong appeal for the groups associated with its "natural" constituents; in the words of a member of the traditional-religious focus group, "we are all National-Religious." Whereas in the past, the National-Religious group constituted the entire camp, its position today can perhaps be compared to the canonic status of the kibbutzim in the pioneering labor movement of the Mandate period and the early years after independence. The

kibbutz members were few in number, yet they were a model to be emulated and admired, and strongly influenced the shaping of the relevant ideological and practical space, far beyond their demographic weight. Similarly, the National-Religious camp today serves as an expansive ideological/political/social umbrella, which in the not-too-distant future may well supplant the secular Right as the driving force of the Israeli right wing.

Characteristic values and behavior patterns

What, then, are the ideological and practical qualities that unite the "natural" members of the National-Religious camp and are so attractive to other large groups that they associate themselves with it?

a. **Political/security stance:** This topic was examined in our survey from several perspectives, ranging from self-reported location on the political-religious spectrum (Left-Right) to specific questions on foreign affairs and defense. Virtually without exception, the findings show that the camp as a whole, including all its subgroups, is a "Right-wing indicator" in terms of both political affiliation and prevailing opinions. Members of the National-Religious camp who align themselves with the classic Right clearly exceed those who identify with the moderate Right, not to mention the Center and the Left. In fact, the Rightist political/security stance lies at the heart of the camp's consensus in all its groups, both "natural" and otherwise.

A major portion of the National-Religious camp not only locates itself on the Right with respect to political/security issues, but also votes mainly for Right-wing parties and refrains almost entirely from voting for Left-wing and even Centrist parties. Yet, forced to choose between the pivotal goals of a Jewish majority in the State of Israel and Israeli sovereignty from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea, a majority in all subgroups of the National-Religious camp (as in the general Jewish-Israeli public) would opt for the former. In other words, even in the National-Religious camp, the primary political standard-bearer of the "Greater Israel" movement, control of territory is less important than ensuring a Jewish majority. It should be noted in this context that

"foreign affairs and defense" was cited by the greatest proportion of the sample population as the primary factor in deciding which party to vote for.

b. **Identity and religiosity:** When respondents were asked to cite the central feature of those who identify with the National-Religious camp, the most frequent reply was Jewish religious belief, followed by Zionism and love of Israel. Based on the 2009 Guttman–AVI CHAI survey, which found that an overwhelming majority of Jewish Israelis believe in God,[8] as well as the consensus in the Israeli-Jewish public regarding Zionism as the hegemonic ideology of the State of Israel, it is not surprising that the National-Religious camp is considered open to everyone. This does not necessarily mean, however, that all will be accepted; as we saw in the focus groups, certain communities—particularly the Mizrahi traditional-religious—feel that the welcome mat is out, but not for them. Our findings indicate that there is a "hard core" within the camp who see themselves as close, or drawing closer to, religious observance in the Orthodox halakhic-rabbinic sense of the term, with a sizeable percentage reporting that they have become more religious in recent years. In their perception, this is not just an individual process but one that Jewish society is undergoing as a whole—a parallel that presumably generates a sense of belonging and lessens alienation. This stands in contrast to other segments of Israeli-Jewish society, who feel that the state has been "stolen" from them and are becoming estranged from it as their ideological and political-social dominance erodes.

The data further show that, for the most part, those who report becoming more religious are taking a segregationist approach and not rushing to compromise with the non-religious public, not to mention non-Jews. True, there are elements within the National-Religious camp who are more in favor of openness and compromise with other parts of Israeli society; yet the latter constitute a more heterogeneous group than the former and, as such, are harder to draw into internal struggles.

8 Asher Arian and Ayala Keissar-Sugarmen, *A Portrait of Israeli Jews: Beliefs, Observance, and Values of Israeli Jews, 2009* (Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute and the AVI CHAI-Israel Foundation, 2012), pp. 15, 49–50.

Moreover, despite differences in their level of openness, it should be recalled that they nonetheless share several underlying values with those who are close or drawing closer to Judaism; these probably make it harder or even impossible for them to come out against the trends towards greater religious stringency and segregation from "others." It is noteworthy that the camp is split more or less down the middle over whether religious Jews are more moral than their secular peers. This pattern deviates from surveys focused solely on those who defined themselves as "religious" (rather than "National-Religious," as in our survey), which showed a clear majority who hold that secular Jews are less moral than religious ones.

Although we identified more diversity in the National-Religious camp on the subject of identity and religiosity than on political/security issues (on which there is a high degree of consensus), we can nonetheless generalize, based on our data, that the National-Religious camp emphasizes a Jewish-particularist identity and rejects universalist values. It is frequently also marked by a high level of nationalism or even hypernationalism. The examples are numerous: widespread acceptance of collective punishment by the IDF based on the assumption that in times of war there are no "innocents" on the other side; strong support for excluding non-Jewish Israelis from strategic national decisions, for example, ratifying a peace treaty through a referendum of Jews alone; the high percentage who hold that citizenship should not be granted to immigrants who are not considered Jewish according to halakhah; and the sizeable proportion who are willing to donate organs, but not to non-Jews.

In terms of ideology and identity, it appears that the National-Religious camp, despite its heterogeneity, is "closing ranks" on certain issues: For example, we found widespread opposition to changing the halakhic status of women. Moreover, a large majority across all subgroups notes that they personally attach great importance to rabbinic authority on political issues, though only a small minority feel that decisions in this area—for instance, with regard to a peace treaty—should be left to rabbis.

More religious and nationalistic positions are common virtually across the board in the younger age groups and are prevalent to the

same extent or more in groups that we would not "normally" expect to identify with the National-Religious camp. These views may be grounded in the belief that this camp is the authentic embodiment of the national Jewish identity to which they aspire, though not necessarily in the classical religious sense.

c. **Religion and state:** Alongside the prevailing desire in the National-Religious camp to consolidate the Jewish identity of the State (even at the cost of abandoning the idea of Greater Israel), and the readiness to exclude non-Jews from strategic decisions and even from citizenship, there are signs of a desire for integration when it comes to the character and authority of the state. In our opinion, this stems from a combination of patriotism and a fear of "going too far" towards the religious and nationalist perspective. Thus, for example, only a minority agreed with the statement that the State had lost its moral standing as a result of the evacuation of Gush Katif and that its laws should therefore not be obeyed. At the same time, many respondents felt that soldiers should refuse to follow orders if told to evacuate settlements. A majority feel that religious members of Knesset (MKs) should bow to rabbinic authority, but are unwilling to entrust rabbis with the power to decide on a peace treaty. There is almost total consensus regarding the importance of religious parties in maintaining the Jewish character of the State, suggesting that other political actors cannot be relied upon to do the job properly. An interesting finding emerged regarding Israeli Independence Day: a majority of the sample population consider it an Israeli civil holiday, although a substantial minority do see it as a Jewish religious holiday.

The State, according to our findings, is expected to serve the Orthodox stream; hence, only a minority support funding for Reform or Conservative congregations and rabbis. Along the same lines, a majority of the respondents feel that the state should fund schools in the Haredi school system even if they do not teach Israel's core curriculum. Roughly one-third of the sample population (and a majority in the Haredi and Torani subgroups) agreed with the statement that religious MKs should be concerned with the welfare of their constituents, even if this comes at the expense of other sectors.

d. **Democracy:** Much like the findings in the 2011 Israeli Democracy Index (which surveyed the entire Israeli-Jewish public), the defining feature of democracy for survey respondents who affiliate with the National-Religious camp is the freedoms it confers.[9] In second place are government mechanisms and institutions. The key difference between the two surveys is the higher proportion who expressed a negative opinion of democracy and saw it as in direct contradiction with Judaism. In this sense, the National-Religious camp as a whole can be said to have a more ambivalent view of democracy than does the general Israeli-Jewish public.

As for the extent to which Israel upholds basic democratic freedoms—freedom of assembly, freedom of expression, the right to a decent standard of living, and freedom of religion—we found noticeable similarities between the present survey and the 2013 Israeli Democracy Index; however, the current study shows a higher share who believe that freedom of religion in Israel is not maintained to a suitable degree.

An interesting finding is the National-Religious camp's greater satisfaction with the functioning of Israeli democracy than is evinced by the Israeli-Jewish public as a whole—an outcome consistent with the 2013 Israeli Democracy Index. Nonetheless, as part of the same ambivalence cited above, the National-Religious Camp's relatively high degree of satisfaction is coupled with a lower level of trust in all three branches of government: the Knesset, the Government, and especially the Supreme Court.

On the other hand, there is support for the republican idea that the source of sovereignty and the government's legitimacy lies with the people as a collective entity with a coherent religious, linguistic-cultural, and historical identity. On issues such as a referendum about a peace treaty, there was strong agreement with the notion that the Jewish identity is the source of authority of the State of Israel.

Do the findings presented above point to an internalization of the basic principles of democracy by the National-Religious camp in

9 Tamar Hermann et al., *The Israeli Democracy Index 2011* (Jerusalem: The Israel Democracy Institute, 2011), pp. 45–50.

Israel? It is difficult to offer an unequivocal response. It seems that these concepts have not yet been fully integrated—an assessment that is also valid, to some extent, with regard to the Israeli-Jewish public as a whole. Thus, a majority of respondents agreed with the statement that Jews and Arabs should receive equal state funding for social services; that is, they have assimilated the principle of a need-based universal allocation of resources as a basic civil right. At the same time, however, we found a clear majority in all subgroups who favor cutting back on civics and democracy studies in favor of courses on Jewish culture and love of the land. We also found a substantial minority who support legal sanctions for speaking out against Zionism.

Two other findings are also highly problematic, casting doubt on the depth of democratic values in the National-Religious camp: the sizeable percentage who hold that soldiers should refuse orders to evacuate Jewish settlements, and the many respondents who feel that a peace treaty involving territorial concessions and evacuation of settlements should be approved by a referendum of Jews only—this in contrast to the views of the Israeli-Jewish public at large.

e. **Attitude to modernity:** On this issue, the bulk of the National-Religious camp as a whole takes a middle-of-the-road approach, somewhere between the secular and Haredi positions. This is chiefly expressed by the survey's behavioral indicator (on media consumption), which shows a desire to keep the "outside world" at arm's length and allow only moderate and guarded exposure to it. We found openness to new trends and to what the larger world has to offer in the majority's attitude regarding the division of labor within the family; willingness to include secular studies in the curriculum of religious schools; a preference for schools that are scholastically strong over those that are more religious; and a willingness to vacation outside of Israel. On the other hand, we encountered a general reluctance to abandon conservative positions about the halakhic status of women: a majority favored full gender separation in schools from an early age and showed only limited flexibility about allowing women to study the Talmud or to serve on rabbinic courts.

4. Homogeneity/heterogeneity of the National-Religious camp

In this section, we will attempt to offer a concise response to the intriguing question of the homogeneity (or lack thereof) of the National-Religious camp in Israel in relation to its various subgroups. The question has been raised recently, in various contexts, as to whether the National-Religious will continue as one body, or whether it is in danger of breaking up due to profound internal differences on a number of topics. The discussion below will be divided into two parts: first, we will relate to the various scales that we assembled throughout the report, after which we will focus on the three "natural" components of the National-Religious camp: the National-Religious core, the Torani (nationalist ultra-Orthodox), and the liberal/Modern Orthodox.

Let us begin by looking at the results as broken down by religious self-definition, age, and position on the political/security spectrum—the three variables that, in our opinion, stood out for their predictive value throughout the analysis. A note of caution: The boundaries between these groups are quite diffuse, because the members of the National-Religious camp, like most people, are multifaceted. Their complex identities are expressed in different ways, depending on the circumstances; but on the whole, these are not soldiers in uniforms of different colors who nonetheless line up in perfect formation. As much as we might wish to place everything in neatly labeled compartments, the categories and lines of separation are in practice much less precise and more dynamic, often shifting in accordance with the question at hand. Nonetheless, there is a some logic here and the positions expressed do break down into a certain pattern.

Table 1: Average scores of subgroups (self-defined religiosity), on seven scales

Self-defined religiosity	Exposure to general media	Status of women	Trust in democratic institutions	Upholding of democratic freedoms	Willingness to compromise on religious issues	Attitude towards the State	Religious openness
Haredi	.27	.21	.26	.57	.12	.44	.2
Torani	.41	.29	.35	.6	.19	.49	.29
National-Religious	.64	.57	.53	.51	.36	.53	.46
Liberal/ Modern Orthodox	.71	.64	.52	.52	.47	.58	.56
Traditional-religious	.72	.6	.53	.5	.43	.56	.52
Traditional non-religious	.79	.68	.5	.51	.51	.59	.64
Secular	.8	.65	.61	.51	.66	.66	.64
Total	**.63**	**.54**	**.49**	**.52**	**.38**	**.54**	**.47**

Table 1 presents the average scores of the several self-defined religiosity subgroups on each of seven scales that we constructed: exposure to general media; status of women; trust in democratic institutions; upholding of democratic freedoms; willingness to compromise on religious issues; attitude towards the State; and religious openness. Each scale consisted of several questions, whose answers should reflect the overall attitude on this issue.[10] We are speaking here of spectrums with systematic, though varying, differences between the groups. We see that the National-Religious camp tends to one mind on certain subjects and less so on others. For example, on the scale of democratic freedoms,

10 A score of 0 reflects conservative/nondemocratic/closed-minded positions; a score of 1 indicates liberal/democratic/open-minded views. A score of 0.5 represents the mid-point (with the exception of the scale of democratic freedoms, where 1 indicates that these freedoms are upheld "too little" in Israel; 0.5, "the right amount"; and 0, "too much").

there is almost no difference between the subgroups. In large part, this also holds true for attitudes towards government and state, though here the distribution is broader; that is, the differences between the group averages are somewhat greater. By contrast, there is a very large spread on the scales of media exposure and women's status, indicating much greater differences between groups. As we remarked earlier, the extent to which the camp is split varies from issue to issue. Even so, we can offer several generalizations:

a. A comparison of the various subgroups of the National-Religious camp in each of the seven key areas shows consistently lower scores among the Haredi respondents, with the exception of the scale on democratic freedoms in Israel (reflecting the extent to which certain democratic principles are upheld in Israel, ranging from "far too much" to "far too little"). The Haredi group's scores on all the scales clearly express conservative values and a refusal to entertain criticism of Israel's democracy, coupled with a lack of trust in State institutions.

b. The scores of the Torani group were also lower than the average for our sample (again, with the exception of the scale on democratic freedoms in Israel), though they were consistently higher than those of the Haredi group.

c. Although the core National-Religious group constituted only one-third of our sample population in numerical terms, its average scores in every case were either very similar or identical to the overall averages of the entire sample (that is, the National-Religious camp). This finding reflects the position of the National-Religious subgroup as the nucleus of the entire camp.

d. The scores of the liberal/Modern Orthodox group were in most cases higher than the overall average and the averages of the National-Religious and, of course, the Torani and Haredi groups; however, they were lower than those of the secular and traditional non-religious group. In certain cases, the scores for the liberal/Modern Orthodox group were higher than those of the group defining itself as traditional-religious.

e. In many areas—for example, openness to religious compromise—the traditional-religious group was closer to the core National-Religious

group and the liberal/Modern Orthodox than to the traditional non-religious and secular groups. On the other hand, the traditional-religious are similar to the latter two groups in terms of leisure-time activities and exposure to media. On the subject of women's status, the traditional-religious group falls exactly in the center, between the core National-Religious and liberal/Modern Orthodox groups. This is actually a prime example of a hybrid group, with one foot planted firmly inside and the other outside the National-Religious camp as a whole.

f. On all the topics surveyed, the traditional non-religious and secular groups displayed more open-minded, liberal-democratic positions, even when compared with the liberal/Modern Orthodox group. At the same time, a comparison with other surveys of the general Jewish public in Israel shows that on national issues, for example, those included in our sample (who defined themselves as belonging to the National-Religious camp) are more close-minded and nationalistic than are their peers by self-defined religiosity who did not identify themselves with this camp. On the scale of openness to religious compromise, the average score of the traditional non-religious respondents was considerably lower than that of the secular group.

We learned, then, that self-defined religiosity has a major impact on positions in the key areas examined in our survey. This is reflected in the wide distribution of average scores of the groups across the various scales. Does self-defined location on the political/security spectrum exert a similar influence? Table 2 summarizes the average scores of the subgroups on the seven scales in terms of this variable.

Table 2: Average scores of subgroups (self-defined location on political/security spectrum), on seven scales

Self-defined religiosity	Exposure to general media	Status of women	Trust in democratic institutions	Upholding of democratic freedoms	Willingness to compromise on religious issues	Attitude towards the State	Religious openness
Right	.58	.49	.44	.51	.32	.46	.41
Moderate Right	.67	.56	.52	.52	.43	.59	.51
Center	.71	.61	.54	.51	.46	.64	.55
Left*	.70	.73	.54	.48	.63	.77	.61
Total	**.63**	**.54**	**.48**	**.51**	**.38**	**.54**	**.47**

* The number who self-identified as "Left" or "moderate Left" was so small that these two categories were combined in the findings.

Political identification also proved to be a salient variable, especially given the fact that the number of interviewees who identified with the Center or Left was very small. Those who located themselves at the right end of the spectrum are less exposed to the general media and had lower scores on religious openness, attitude towards the State, willingness to compromise on religious issues, trust in democratic institutions, and women's status. On the scale of democratic freedoms, they were more likely to feel that these freedoms are upheld "too little" in Israel than were the other subgroups. Those on the opposite side of the map (only a small proportion of our sample, as stated) showed the greatest media exposure, religious openness, willingness to compromise on religious issues, engagement with the State, trust in its democratic institutions, and desire to improve the status of women. The average score of this group on the democratic freedoms scale indicates that, in their view, democratic principles are upheld "too much" in Israel. It should be noted that there is a fixed relationship between the moderate Right and the Center on virtually all of the scales, with the moderate Right falling between the Right and the Center (though not always at equal intervals) while the Center is situated between the Left and the moderate Right (again, the intervals vary in accordance with the specific scale).

Let us now move on to a comparison between the various age subgroups with regard to the same seven scales.

Table 3: Average scores of subgroups (age), on seven scales

Self-defined religiosity	Exposure to general media	Status of women	Trust in democratic institutions	Upholding of democratic freedoms	Willingness to compromise on religious issues	Attitude towards the State	Religious openness
18–24	.66	.5	.47	.53	.32	.49	.44
25–34	.58	.49	.4	.53	.38	.48	.47
35–54	.6	.55	.49	.51	.41	.57	.47
55+	.65	.58	.54	.5	.42	.61	.49
Total	**.62**	**.53**	**.48**	**.51**	**.38**	**.54**	**.47**

As shown in Table 3, age has a lesser effect on the distribution of scores than do self-defined religiosity and location on the political/security spectrum. Stated otherwise, the differences between the group averages for this variable are smaller and less pervasive. What else can we learn here?

While the youngest age group has the greatest exposure to general media, this does not modulate its positions on the issues under discussion, as demonstrated by its low average scores in the following areas: willingness to compromise on religious issues; religious openness; attitude towards the State; and the status of women. Like the Haredi and Torani groups and those who identify with the Right, this cohort scores higher than other age groups on the scale of democratic freedoms, indicating that it considers these principles to be insufficiently upheld. As we see from the table, the issue of trust in democratic institutions does not follow a consistent pattern with regard to age; that is, it does not rise or fall in accordance with the age of the respondent. The above also holds true for the most part, with slight deviations, for the second-youngest age group, with the exception of exposure to the general media, where this cohort scores lower than the other age groups (perhaps because this is roughly the age when people start a family, leaving less leisure time for media consumption). In general, the older

age groups exhibit a greater willingness to compromise on religious issues, greater religious openness, and a more positive attitude towards the State.

If we accept the theory that young people typically adopt more radical positions, which later "soften" with maturity, there is no reason to assume that this pattern will not repeat itself here. But if we take the alternative approach, namely, that individuals undergo social/political socialization at a given age and retain its effects throughout their lives, with only slight variation, Israel should expect a different future, primarily because the demographic share of the two youngest age groups in the Israeli population is greater than that of the older cohorts of the National-Religious camp. We would therefore expect that its socio-political impact will also be greater. What this means is that the democratic component of the "Jewish and democratic" equation will be weakened, nationalism will take a particularistic form, and the National-Religious mainstream will become less religiously open and willing to compromise.

We now proceed to the findings regarding the three "natural" constituents of the National-Religious camp: the National-Religious core group,[11] the Torani group, and the liberal/Modern Orthodox.[12]

National-Religious core group

In terms of its opinions and behavior, the National-Religious core group emerges in our study as intermediate between the Torani and liberal/Modern Orthodox, but slightly closer to the latter than to the former, especially on questions of religious openness, trust in democratic institutions, and attitudes towards non-Jews. On political/security issues, the responses of the core group tend to fall close to the midpoint. It should be noted, however, that theirs is a centrist position only within the camp studied here; in relation to Israeli society as a whole, the core group is characterized by religious conservatism and hawkish political/security views. An additional feature of the core group is the tendency

11 This section is based on the work of Gilad Be'ery and Chanan Cohen.
12 Both these sections are based on the work of Kalman Neuman.

to respond to certain questions with some version of "both equally" (for example, Greater Israel versus a Jewish majority in the State; key electoral considerations; and the perception of Israeli Independence Day as a religious-Jewish holiday or a civil-Israeli one). This may point to a classic National-Religious pattern, as an ideological stance, of refraining from a choice among values.

a. **Socio-demographic and socio-political characteristics:** The National-Religious core group constitutes 31% of our total sample population. Most of the respondents who identified themselves as National-Religious (in terms of religiosity) also stated that they see saw themselves as belonging "to a very large extent" to the National-Religious sector. This subgroup is similar in income distribution to the general Jewish public in Israel, better educated and somewhat younger. The group is ethnically diverse and is not typically Ashkenazi, as is often assumed. It has a relatively low proportion of FSU immigrants.

b. **Political/security stance:** This group tends to be more hawkish than the Israeli-Jewish public as a whole: the vast majority (83%) locate themselves on the Right or moderate Right. Bayit Yehudi is unquestionably their political "home base," garnering 60% of the respondents' votes. The Likud–Yisrael Beitenu bloc received a much smaller share of its vote in the last Knesset elections (20%), followed by Shas (7%), Otzmah Leyisrael (5%), and parties on the Center and Left (a total of 8%).

Political/security issues rank high on the group's agenda, with foreign affairs and defense heading the list of electoral concerns—especially when combined with the issue of settlements. At the same time, there is a tendency to favor a Jewish majority over Greater Israel, though "both equally" was a prevalent response. A sizeable majority of the core group (75%) do not agree with the proposition that the State lost its moral legitimacy as a result of the disengagement from Gush Katif in 2005. As for the authority to decide on future territorial concessions, a majority of the group favor a referendum limited to Jewish voters. Regarding the right to refuse orders in the case of evacuation of settlements, opinions are more or less evenly divided. The findings, then, indicate that the

National-Religious core group is an gauge of the moderate Right, displaying Right-leaning *mamlakhtiyut* (i.e., placing the country above all partisan, ideological, sectoral, and tribal considerations) based on nationalistic and security considerations.

c. **Identity and religiosity:** When we examined the core group's attitude towards religious politics, we found that an overwhelming majority (93%) consider religious parties to be important for maintaining the Jewish character of the State of Israel. With regard to strengthening Jewish identity and bringing Jews closer to religious observance, this group is part of the overall trend in the National-Religious camp towards strengthening the Jewish identity of Jews in Israel. As for the method of doing so (classical Orthodox outreach versus an all-inclusive Jewish renaissance), the core group favors strengthening Jewish identity using a range of approaches, in addition to bringing Jews closer to the Orthodox lifestyle specifically. Yet when members of the group were asked to assess the change in religiosity in Israel, a higher share (42%) felt that Israeli-Jewish society had become more religious as compared with those who held that it had stayed the same or become more secular (26% and 24%, respectively). Regarding their personal religious observance, a substantial majority (71%) reported no change.

On the issue of women's status in the halakhic and social spheres, we found a tendency to distinguish between resistance to fundamental halakhic change in the status of women and support for equality between the sexes in everyday life. A majority of respondents (58%) felt that the halakhic status of women should not be altered. Nonetheless, almost half of those surveyed (47%) supported allowing women to serve as religious court judges. Further, a sizeable majority (71%) stated that women should be permitted to study Talmud, while an equal share (71%) disagreed with the statement that it is the husband's job to earn a living and the wife's job to take care of the home and family.

d. **Religion and state:** As for who should have the final authority on political matters, a majority (58%) of the National-Religious core group attach importance to the halakhic rulings of rabbis on controversial political issues. In a similar context, there is a very slight preference

for the view that religious MKs should bow to rabbinic authority when making political decisions (48% in favor versus 46% opposed).

When it comes to religious legislation, a majority favor maintaining the status quo; specifically, they are opposed to civil marriage (57%); automatic citizenship for those who are not Jewish according to halakhah (86%); public transportation on the Sabbath (67%); and State funding for non-Orthodox institutions (60%). There is a willingness, however, to make the conversion process as lenient as possible within the bounds of halakhah (53%); one-third of respondents support State funding for non-Orthodox streams of Judaism.

In terms of the religious significance of the state, the National-Religious core group stands out for its view of Independence Day as a holiday that is either religious or both civil and religious.

e. **Attitude towards democracy:** A sizeable proportion of the National-Religious core group (64%) stated that they were satisfied with the functioning of Israeli democracy, a figure higher than the comparable share of the general Israeli-Jewish public (as reflected in the 2013 Israeli Democracy Index). As for the meaning attached to the term "democracy," the most frequent responses were democratic freedoms (37%); system of government (31%); and human dignity (16%). A small proportion (5%) expressed negative opinions of the concept of democracy.

On the extent to which freedom of religion is upheld in Israel, a majority (58%) felt that it is maintained to a suitable degree, while a sizeable minority (27%) held that there is too little religious freedom. When asked about the right to a decent standard of living, almost one-half of those who identified with the National-Religious core group felt that this principle is upheld too little. Slightly more than half felt that it is maintained to a suitable degree. With respect to freedom of expression, again, slightly more than one-third of respondents felt that this right is upheld to the appropriate extent, while a similar share held that there is too much freedom of expression in Israel today. As for freedom of assembly, a majority of the National-Religious core group were of the opinion that this right is being upheld properly.

On the question of trust in Israel's democratic institutions, we identified somewhat different trends in the National-Religious core group than in the general Jewish public. There is a moderate degree of trust in the Knesset and Government (50%), as compared with 58% in the Israel-Jewish population as a whole. Trust in the Supreme Court is even lower (40%)—very low relative to the level of trust in this institution among the Israeli-Jewish public (63%, according to the 2013 Israeli Democracy Index). By contrast, the National-Religious respondents expressed a relatively strong sense of trust in the Chief Rabbinate (58%)—much greater than the share of the general Israeli public (43%, again based on the 2013 Israeli Democracy Index).

A substantive democracy is characterized, inter alia, by equal treatment of "the other," and the right of minorities to express their opinions. The National-Religious core group did not excel in this area. A sizeable minority (36%) expressed opposition to donating organs to non-Jews, while a similar proportion (31%) opposed equal State funding for social services for Jews and Arabs. Regarding treatment of enemy civilians in time of war, almost half (47%) justified collective punishment. A similar proportion (45%) agreed that anti-Zionist speech should be punishable under law. Thus, even though many in the National-Religious core group expressed support for substantive democracy, there is also a considerable majority who oppose various democratic practices with regard to minorities. Consistent with these findings, the bulk of the respondents in the National-Religious core group (62%) agreed with the statement that classes in civics and democracy should be cut back in favor of devoting more time to Jewish history and love of the land; only 27% disagreed.

f. **Attitude towards modernity:** The National-Religious core group is exposed to secular-Western media and leisure culture to a moderate extent. An important pattern in this regard is the careful filtering of general media. Looking at this topic from a different perspective—attitudes towards secular studies—we found very strong support in principle (90%) for broad general studies such as art, philosophy, and literature, and virtually unanimous support (98%) for studying

the subjects needed to pursue a profession, for example, computers, mathematics, and English.

When asked to decide between sending their children to a school with a high religious level and low academic level, versus one with a good religious level and poor scholastic level, the core group showed a slight preference (36%) for the former over the latter (32%). The remaining respondents indicated that they had no preference or declined to answer.

In general, the National-Religious core group demonstrated a relatively moderate religious stance in the private domain, in contrast to a more conservative approach on issues involving the public space.

The Torani group

a. **Socio-demographic and socio-political characteristics:** A total of 6% of the sample population identified themselves as Torani (see note 5). The Hebrew term is prevalent within the National-Religious camp, and in recent years has even spilled over into the general media. The reference is mainly to a conservative (small "c") subgroup influenced by the religious-Zionist yeshivot (originating with the Merkaz Harav yeshiva and its rabbis) that combines a messianic, faith-based approach with a belief system that, as we have shown, is similar in many respects to that of the Haredi population.

But those who define themselves as Torani in our survey do not seem to fit the accepted image of this group in the public mind. Though further research is needed to pinpoint the reasons, two possible explanations are as follows: The relatively small number of interviewees from this group in our sample population may not represent the entire Torani public; alternatively, the prevailing image of this group was not empirically substantiated because it is inaccurate. This seeming anomaly is reflected in both the higher-than-expected number of graduates of Haredi yeshivot (almost 30% of those who define themselves as Torani reported that they had attended such yeshivot) and in the voting patterns among this group. In the run-up to the most recent Knesset elections, virtually all the leading rabbis of the Torani stream expressed support for the Bayit Yehudi party. Because this is a group that, at least ostensibly, follows

the guidance of their rabbis, there is a need to explain the finding that close to 30% of those who identify themselves as Torani reported voting for either United Torah Judaism (12%) or Shas (17%). It is possible that a sizeable proportion of those who identify themselves as Torani in our survey do not fit this definition in the commonly accepted sense of the term, but in fact belong to the Haredi public and prefer to define themselves as Torani because they are undergoing Israelification and modernization. If this is in fact the case, it would also explain the large proportion of residents of central Israel among those who define themselves as Torani, in comparison to those who live in its familiar strongholds Jerusalem and Judea/Samaria.

On the whole, the group that participated in the survey was multifaceted. Its members expressed a range of opinions on many subjects, in contrast to the prevailing view of the Torani public as homogeneous and stringent. For example, "only" two-thirds of those who define themselves as Torani do not have a television set in their homes. This stands in contrast to the widespread assumption that owning a TV is inconsistent with belonging to this group. In other words, although there are characteristics that would seem to justify this definition, according to our findings (and in keeping with our argument regarding the flexibility and complexity of identities), this is not a completely discrete group. As expected, those who define themselves as Torani expressed opinions that fell somewhere between the National-Religious and Haredi groups in our sample (presumably in contrast to the views of the Haredi sector as a whole). At times, however, the results were closer to those of the Haredi group.

b. **Political/security stance:** The self-defined Torani respondents locate themselves at a point on the left-right political/security spectrum similar to that of the National-Religious core group; however, they show more support for the ideological position that favors Greater Israel over a Jewish majority (37% of the Torani group and only 23% of the National-Religious). This figure is even more striking given that only 9% of the Haredim in the sample population supported this position. Stated otherwise, on this issue we are not speaking of an intermediate position between National-Religious respondents and

Haredim, but a unique right-wing/nationalist ideological stance based on religious belief. This is also reflected in the attitude towards enemy civilians in wartime: Agreement with the statement justifying collective punishment is greater in the Torani group than among the Haredim or the National-Religious.

c. **Identity and religiosity:** The Torani group unquestionably shares a strong affinity with the National-Religious camp, with a very high proportion in the "definite affiliation" category. While their political/security views are frequently more right-wing than those of the Haredim and the National-Religious core, the members of this group truly represent an intermediate position between those two with regard to identity and religiosity. For example, 60% of the Haredim surveyed characterized the statement that religious Jews are more principled than secular ones as "very accurate," as opposed to 27% of the Torani group and only 19% of the National-Religious. Like the Haredim, this group votes overwhelmingly for religious parties (90%). Yet unlike the Haredim surveyed, who reported voting primarily for Shas and United Torah Judaism (UTJ), the Torani group indicated that they voted for Bayit Yehudi or the Haredi parties. In the National-Religious group, by contrast, some 20% voted for mainstream parties (mainly Likud). It is worth noting that the deciding electoral factor among the Torani respondents, as among the Haredim, is first and foremost religion and state; this contrasts with the National-Religious, who rank foreign affairs and defense as their primary consideration when choosing which party to vote for.

d. **Religion and state:** The Torani group, who are generally assumed to favor greater enforcement of religious practice and the vision of a state based on halakhah (Jewish religious law), in fact displays less willingness than their National-Religious counterparts to compromise on matters of religion and state in such areas as public transportation on the Sabbath and civil marriage. On the subject of conversion, the share of those who favor a more stringent process (58%) falls squarely between the National-Religious (40%) and the Haredim (80%). An issue that clearly divides the Torani group from the overall National-Religious camp is

the weight that should be accorded to rabbinic rulings on controversial political issues. Here there is a noticeable correspondence between the Torani respondents and the Haredim: a very large proportion of both groups attaches great importance to rabbinic opinion on these matters (65% and 74%, respectively), as compared with 21% in the National-Religious core group. The gap on whether religious MKs should bow to rabbinic authority is also striking: 45% of the Torani group answered "definitely," as opposed to 72% of Haredim and 16% of the National-Religious core.

e. **Attitude towards democracy:** When defining democracy, the Torani group ascribes greater importance to its formal governmental aspect and less to the rights—primarily freedoms—that are part of substantive democracy. As for the level of satisfaction with the functioning of Israeli democracy and the trust in Israel's democratic institutions, the average scores of the Torani respondents are closer to those of the Haredim in our sample than to the National-Religious core group. Likewise, there are clear differences between the Torani and National-Religious groups in the level of trust in the Government, Knesset, and Supreme Court. This difference is especially salient with regard to the Supreme Court: Among National-Religious respondents, over 40% trust the institution "to a large extent" or "to some extent," while the corresponding share in the Torani group is only 15%. On the other hand, the latter group reports greater trust in the Chief Rabbinate (75%) as compared with both the Haredim (68%) and the National-Religious core group (58%). This is so despite the claim in recent years that the rabbinate is controlled by Haredi forces and not by the National-Religious camp, so that we might expect that the Torani group to distance itself from the Chief Rabbinate. Additional evidence of a unique attitude towards democracy is the Torani position on who should decide on territorial concessions. A total of 23% of the Torani respondents shifted this responsibility away from political institutions and held that rabbis should decide on this matter (with 8% saying that no one has the authority to make such a decision). This response falls between that of the Haredim (59% of whom see rabbis as the supreme authority in this area) and the National-Religious (of whom a total of 10% chose either rabbis or "no one"). On this question,

only 8% of the Torani group embraced both democratic options—the Knesset, or a referendum of all Israeli citizens—as opposed to 29% of the National-Religious respondents. This devaluation of democracy is also seen in the notable willingness to cut back on civics studies in favor of more hours for teaching Jewish history and love of the land.

f. **Attitude towards modernity:** In keeping with the prevailing image of the Torani group, the findings show a stance ranging from reserved to hostile with regard to modernity. This attitude is reflected in the minimal exposure to any secular culture, placing this group in between the Haredim and the National-Religious core (but slightly closer to the former). The position of most of the Torani group with regard to secular studies is pragmatic: 91% support studying the subjects necessary for a profession, but only 51% favor studying literature and philosophy simply for the sake of knowledge. The disparity between the Torani and National-Religious groups on the question of choosing a school stands out: Of the National-Religious core group, only one-third would give preference to an educational institution with a high religious level but low scholastic level, as compared with two-thirds of the Torani respondents. With regard to the status of women, the position of the Torani group again falls between that of the Haredim and the National-Religious core group. The scale on this subject indicates that the Torani group (with a score of 0.20) is closer to the former (0.10) than to the latter (0.37).

Liberal/Modern Orthodox

a. **Socio-demographic and socio-political characteristics:** A total of 12% of our sample identified themselves as liberal/Modern Orthodox. This is a much less distinct subgroup, whose members do not have a clear image in the internal discourse of the National-Religious camp, as does the Torani group. Further, it is difficult to point to practices that would define an individual as belonging to this group. In general, we would assume that those who define themselves as such feel that they accept the liberal values and behavior typical of the modern world and integrate these into their religious outlook. One example of this synthesis is religious feminism.

When we embarked on this study, we assumed that those who identified themselves as liberal/Modern Orthodox would adopt less stringent halakhic norms than the National-Religious core group; but when we examined the criteria by which respondents defined themselves as "modern" or "liberal," the data did not offer a clear-cut answer. Another area considered to be an indicator of membership in the liberal/Modern Orthodox group is deep support for secular studies, in contrast to the more circumspect approach of Torani circles on this issue. Yet we found that the minority of liberal/Modern Orthodox respondents who expressed opposition to the study of philosophy and literature is almost equal in size to that of the National-Religious group, meaning that the liberals are not all that liberal relative to the core group of the camp as a whole.

Another area in which we would have expected greater consensus and openness among those who define themselves as liberal/Modern Orthodox is coeducation, at least in the lower grades. It turns out, however, that nearly 10% of this group support separate classes for boys and girls "at every age" or "starting from preschool." In other words, on certain issues it is hard to discern the reasoning behind the liberal/Modern Orthodox label. It is possible that, contrary to popular opinion, the boundaries between the liberal/Modern Orthodox and traditional-religious groups are blurred and that those who define themselves as "liberal" or "modern" are referring primarily to a level of leniency in religious practice and less to a fundamental ideological stance in the generally accepted sense. This premise is validated by the finding that a sizeable majority of this subgroup associate themselves with the National-Religious camp "to a large extent" (placing them in the category of "soft" as opposed to definite affiliation).

What, then, are the common denominators that we did discover among those who define themselves as liberal/Modern Orthodox? We found a relatively large number of individuals who reside in the center of the country and are in the over-55 age group (in fact, the liberal/modern Orthodox were the "oldest" of the various subgroups). Contrary to our expectations, we did not find a greater share of college-educated individuals or those with European-American family origins among the

self-defined liberal/Modern Orthodox as compared with the National-Religious core group.

b. **Political/security stance:** The findings indicate that this is not a "Leftist" group, although the liberal/Modern Orthodox are less right-wing than the other subgroups of the National-Religious camp (with the exception of the small secular minority). Some 70% of this group place themselves on the Right (36%) or the moderate Right (36%) with respect to political/security issues, with roughly 20% even favoring Greater Israel over a Jewish majority in Israel. As we saw in the other groups (except for the Haredim and secular Jews), here too the greatest share feel that a peace treaty involving major territorial concessions should be approved by Jewish citizens only, through a referendum. At the same time, this group contains the greatest proportion of respondents who feel that soldiers should in no circumstances refuse orders to evacuate settlements.

c. **Identity and religiosity:** As we noted, this group shows a "softer" affiliation with the National-Religious camp in comparison with the other two "natural" subgroups, with an attitude that is less bound by sector. This is reflected in their opinions concerning the necessity for religious parties, the role of religious representatives in the Knesset, and the degree to which they should be subject to rabbinic authority. The Likud was the most popular choice among the liberal/Modern Orthodox in the 2013 Knesset elections. Roughly 44% of this group consider Israeli society to be more religious than in the past (a figure closely mirroring the National-Religious core group); but on the personal level, they are less inclined than the latter to describe themselves as "the same" in their own religious observance (58% versus 71%, respectively), or as more secular (10% as opposed to only 4% in the National-Religious group and 5% in the Torani group). We also found a substantial difference between the share of liberal/Modern Orthodox respondents who attach "great" or "very great" importance to the halakhic rulings of rabbis on controversial political issues and that of the National-Religious core group and of course the Torani group (43.5%, as opposed to 58% and 87%, respectively).

d. **Religion and state:** As we might expect, members of the liberal/Modern Orthodox group showed a greater tendency towards compromise on matters of religion and state. For example, only 29% were "strongly opposed" to public transportation on the Sabbath in areas with few religious Jews, as opposed to 44% of the National-Religious core group. Roughly one-third of the liberal/Modern Orthodox support civil marriage for anyone who wants it, in contrast with 13% of the National-Religious group. On the other hand (somewhat surprisingly), 45% expressed their opposition to making the conversion process more lenient. The liberal/Modern Orthodox attach only slightly less importance than the National-Religious to the existence of religious parties, despite the fact that they voted for them in smaller numbers in the last election (18% for the Bayit Yehudi party; 8% for Shas; and 2% for UTJ). A majority (55%) of the liberal/Modern Orthodox group see Independence Day as an Israeli civil holiday, whereas the responses of the National-Religious core group were split evenly between "Israeli civil" and "Jewish religious." Unlike the other two "natural" National-Religious groups, a majority of the liberal/Modern Orthodox respondents do not support the notion that religious MKs should bow to rabbinic authority. Moreover, the members of this group who favor State funding for non-Orthodox congregations and rabbis exceed those who are opposed to it. Similarly, a greater proportion of liberal/Modern Orthodox respondents (67.5%) support equal funding for social services for Jews and Arabs, as compared with 64% of the National-Religious and 55% of the Torani group.

e. **Attitude towards democracy:** On the question of the final authority in decisions on territorial concessions, there is greater support in the liberal/Modern Orthodox group than in the other two "natural" National-Religious groups for the options of the Knesset (16%) and all Israeli citizens (19%), despite the fact that the majority favor a referendum open to Jews only. The liberal/Modern Orthodox are satisfied with the functioning of Israeli democracy to an extent similar to that of the National-Religious and traditional (religious and non-religious) groups, and to a greater degree than the Torani group. They show a greater tendency than the National-Religious core group (but less than the

traditional-religious) to define democracy in terms of "freedoms." On the subject of criminal sanctions for anti-Zionist speech, the liberal/Modern Orthodox are very similar to the National-Religious group. As for faith in institutions, they report less trust in the Chief Rabbinate and more in the Supreme Court, as compared with the National-Religious core. In this area, they are more similar to the traditional-religious.

f. **Attitude towards modernity:** Compared with the National-Religious core group, the liberal/Modern Orthodox are more in favor of changing the status of women and more opposed to maintaining traditional gender roles; however, they do not show greater support for Talmud study by women. On the scale of women's status, they emerge as more open to change than even the traditional-religious, who were found to hold conservative opinions on many issues. The liberal/Modern Orthodox group report moderate exposure to secular media, with their score on this scale slightly higher than that of the National-Religious and much higher than that of the Torani group. On the subject of attitudes towards others, as well as the scale of religious openness, there is a noticeable difference between the liberal/Modern Orthodox and the National-Religious. Unlike the latter, who are more or less evenly split on the preference for a school with a high religious level over one with strong academic performance, only one-third of the liberal/Modern Orthodox would favor a school with a higher religious level.

5. The National-Religious camp: Where is it headed?

To conclude, we move on to the third research question, which relates to the role of the National-Religious camp within Israel's marketplace of ideas. The primary revelation here is the size of the camp, which was found to be almost twice as large as expected based on the presumed congruence between those who defined themselves as religious and those who affiliated with the National-Religious camp. According to repeated statistical tests we conducted, one-fifth (20%) of the Jewish population in Israel associates itself to a "large extent" or a "very large extent" with the National-Religious camp. At least half of those who identify as such are not part of what we referred to in this study as the camp's "natural groups," that is, the National-Religious core group and the Torani and liberal/Modern Orthodox groups. In political terms, this is extremely important as an indicator of the political direction in which Israeli Jews are headed—particularly in light of the finding that the proportion of young people who identify with the National-Religious camp is higher than their share of the Israeli-Jewish population. Based on an analysis of the data from multiple perspectives, this trend includes a strong rightward shift on political/security issues, a low level of trust in democratic institutions, limited flexibility and willingness to compromise on religious issues, and a strong emphasis on the Jewish-national aspect of identity.

As a central member of Israeli society as a whole and Jewish-Israeli society in particular, the National-Religious camp is expected to relate to the full range of core issues in Israeli discourse—and is in fact doing so. In the past, as a small, homogeneous group, it could allow itself to focus on preserving and promoting particularist ideological and practical interests. But the group's transformation into a large, multifaceted sector (though with clearly discernible characteristics, as enumerated above), and the entry of its representatives into key positions in the political, economic, and cultural spheres, demand that the National-Religious camp formulate opinions on an array of questions on the national agenda, not just in its own backyard.

Does this study corroborate the thesis that the National-Religious sector is disintegrating, or bolster the argument that it is united enough

to remain intact? To answer this question, we must first examine the four factors that affect the cohesiveness of a camp with the ideological and practical diversity described above: (a) overlapping cleavages (mutually reinforcing ideological and socio-demographic divisions), which increase the potential for distinct groups to split off from the camp due to differences of opinion in several areas, or alternatively, cross-cutting cleavages, which encourage the formation of coalitions and reduce the likelihood of disintegration of the group; (b) the presence or absence of consensus on key issues; (c) the presence or absence of a core group that unites the extremes; (d) sufficient size for groups to break off from the sector.

Our data do not provide solid evidence of the existence of cross-cutting cleavages. In fact, our analysis actually indicates an overlapping between scales (for example, between religious openness and national values), meaning that the scores on one scale almost always correspond to those in another. Thus, the figures tend to support the hypothesis of reinforcing cleavages, which predicts potential disintegration in the future.

On the other hand, the study offers strong evidence of consensus or commonality in the following areas: fundamental issues in the political/security realm; low level of trust in democratic institutions; limited willingness to show flexibility and compromise on religious issues; and emphasis on the Jewish-national component. In addition, there would appear to be consensus in the area of religion and state regarding the importance of the Jewish dimension in the public sphere and a very slight willingness to change the status quo in this context—an assessment that actually supports the prospect of continued unity in the sector in the foreseeable future. This thesis is bolstered by our findings about the existence of a sizeable core group that stakes an intermediate position on many of the issues studied, creating a continuum and connection between the camp's extremes. If there is potential for disintegration, it lies with the Torani group, despite its small numerical size even by the most generous estimates. While the liberal/Modern Orthodox group is much larger, it does not present a coherent worldview, and its members are pulled in opposing directions—sometimes conservative, sometimes

liberal. This leads us to conclude that there is little risk of it breaking away from the National-Religious camp as a body. By contrast, the Torani group, which demonstrates internal consistency and unique leadership values, is drawing closer to the Haredi position—and not to the National-Religious core group—on many of the questions that we touched upon.

In many areas, there is a clear dividing line between the Haredi and Torani groups, on the one hand, and the other subgroups of the National-Religious camp, on the other. From here, the situation can evolve in three different directions: one, preservation of the status quo, in which the Torani group represents the furthest extreme while remaining within the fold; two, strengthening of Torani influence within the National-Religious camp, and transformation of this element into the focal point of the sector, at the expense of the present core group (the National-Religious); and three, the secession of the Torani group and its merger with those Haredim who have undergone Israelification and modernization. This would lead to a split—presumably an asymmetrical one—in the National-Religious camp, with the largest remaining portion (after the departure of the Torani group) more open and flexible on the issues discussed above. Such a process could boost the relative influence of the liberal/Modern Orthodox group within both the National-Religious camp and Israeli society as a whole. As for which of these directions Israel's National-Religious camp will take, far be it from us to predict the future.

Appendix 1
Questionnaire and findings

1. To what extent would you say that you belong to the National-Religious sector, in terms of both your lifestyle and outlook?[13]

	Total sample
Not at all	53.1
To a slight extent	23.4
To a large extent	13.7
To a very large extent	7.6
Don't know / refuse*	2.2
Total	100

* Throughout the survey, this option was never proposed by the pollsters.

2. When you think of someone who belongs to the National-Religious sector, what do you see as his or her primary characteristic? (Open question)

Respondent-generated categories	Total sample
A dimension of religion or faith	25.8
An ethical person, values, general values	14.4
Zionism and the land of Israel	15.2
Israel Defense Forces, military service	1.8
A knitted skullcap and/or another visible marker	10.5
Combination of Jewish law and modernity	7.4
Combination of religion and nationalism	10.3
No special characteristic, they are like everyone else, don't know	12.8
Military service combined with Torah or the land of Israel	1.3
Negative associations: exploitation, coercion, fanaticism, despair	0.5
Total	100

13 This was a filter question. Only those who replied "to a great extent" or "to a very great extent" were asked the rest of the questions (i.e., included in the sample).

3. Israel is defined as a democratic state. People attach different meanings to the term "democracy." In your opinion, what is the most important and essential feature of a democracy? (Open question)

Respondent-generated categories	Total sample
Freedom (freedom of speech, religion, "live and let live")	42.3
Human dignity, human and civil rights, equality, pluralism, concern for minorities	16.6
Formal aspects: majority rule, sovereignty of the people, government responsiveness	22.3
A preference for "Jewish" over "democratic"	2.3
Other negative perceptions of democracy, as well as anti-democratic perceptions	4.7
Other positive associations	3.7
Other	0.2
Don't know	7.9
Total	100

4. In general, how satisfied are you with the functioning of Israeli democracy?

	Total sample
Very dissatisfied	13.4
Dissatisfied	24.9
Satisfied	50.6
Very satisfied	9.1
Don't know / refuse	2.0
Total	100

5. To what extent do you feel that these principles are being upheld in Israel today?

	Far too much	Too much	The right amount	Too little	Far too little	Don't know / refuse	Total
5.1. Freedom of religion	9.1	7.2	48.7	21.9	10.3	2.8	100
5.2. Right to a decent standard of living	5.3	6.7	33.9	35.9	15.5	2.7	100
5.3. Freedom of expression	24.2	11.6	40.2	14.2	7.2	2.6	100
5.4. Freedom of assembly	8.7	9.5	50.5	16.1	5.7	9.5	100

6. Do you feel that in recent years Israeli society has become more secular, more religious, or stayed the same?

	Total sample
Much more secular	10.5
Slightly more secular	13.3
The same	25.2
Slightly more religious	31.2
Much more religious	13.7
Don't know / refuse	6.1
Total	100

7. In recent years, have you personally become more secular, more religious, or stayed the same?

	Total sample
Much more secular	2.3
Slightly more secular	5.6
The same	59.3
Slightly more religious	18.5
Much more religious	13.6
Don't know / refuse	0.6
Total	100

8. To what extent do you trust each of these institutions?

	To a large extent	To some extent	To a small extent	Not at all	Don't know / refuse	Total
8.1. Knesset	18.1	20.7	36.5	22.3	2.3	100
8.2. Supreme Court	22.4	20.7	26.6	23.3	7.0	100
8.3. Government	17.8	23.6	34.3	21.4	2.9	100
8.4. Chief Rabbinate	25.4	26.2	27.3	12.8	8.2	100

9. Which is more important in your eyes: that the State of Israel have a Jewish majority, or that the entire Land of Israel from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea be under Israeli sovereignty?

	Total sample
That the State of Israel have a Jewish majority	61.7
That the entire Land of Israel from the Jordan to the Mediterranean be under Israeli sovereignty	22.1
Both are equally important (volunteered)	10.1
Neither is important (volunteered)	1.2
Other (volunteered)	0.3
Don't know / refuse	4.6
Total	100

10. Who should have the final authority to approve a peace treaty that would include Israel's withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and the evacuation of settlements?

	Total sample
The Knesset	13.2
Only Jewish citizens of Israel, by referendum	50.3
All citizens of Israel (Jews and non-Jews), by referendum	16.3
Rabbis/halakhic scholars	13.7
No one has the authority to make such a decision (volunteered)	2.3
Other	0.2
Don't know / refuse	4.0
Total	100

11. In your opinion, should a soldier who is opposed to a government decision to evacuate Jewish settlements in the West Bank refuse to follow orders?

	Total sample
Definitely should refuse	22.7
Think he should refuse	16.9
Think he should not refuse	16.0
Definitely should not refuse	29.3
Don't know / refuse to answer	15.1
Total	100

12. Do you feel that the following statement is accurate: Religious Jews are more principled than secular Jews.

	Total sample
Very accurate	23.9
Accurate	24.9
Not so accurate	26.9
Not at all accurate	20.4
Don't know / refuse	3.9
Total	100

13. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: In the unilateral disengagement and expulsion of Jews from Gush Katif, the State of Israel lost its moral standing, and one should therefore not obey its laws.

	Total sample
Disagree strongly	45.3
Disagree somewhat	23.6
Agree somewhat	13.2
Agree strongly	12.2
Don't know / refuse	5.8
Total	100

14. Do you agree or disagree with the following:

		Agree strongly	Agree somewhat	Disagree somewhat	Disagree strongly	Don't know / refuse	Total
14.1.	I would accept same-sex couples in my synagogue	22.6	22.2	14.9	32.7	7.6	100
14.2.	If a loved one died, I would donate their organs to a non-Jewish patient	24.3	20.3	9.7	29.4	12.6 (An additional 3.8 object to organ donation to anyone.)	100
14.3.	There should be equal state funding for Jews and Arabs for social services such as clinics and schools	34.9	25.5	11.6	21.5	6.5	100
14.4.	Automatic Israeli citizenship should be granted only to immigrants who are Jewish according to halakha (Jewish law)	63.1	19.7	7.0	6.3	3.9	100
14.5.	There should be legal penalties for speaking out against Zionism	23.7	16.4	21.1	31.8	6.9	100

15. In your opinion, should religious members of Knesset be subject to rabbinic authority in making political decisions?

	Total sample
Definitely should	23.0
Think they should	27.6
Think they should not	21.6
Definitely should not	21.8
Don't know / refuse	6.0
Total	100

16. How much importance do you personally attach to the halakhic rulings of rabbis on controversial political issues?

	Total sample
A lot	26.9
Quite a lot	30.6
Quite a little	21.5
None at all	15.1
Don't know / refuse	5.9
Total	100

17. Do you support or oppose granting state funding to Reform and Conservative congregations and rabbis?

	Total sample
Support strongly	9.5
Support somewhat	25.1
Oppose somewhat	19.5
Oppose strongly	38.7
Don't know / refuse	7.2
Total	100

18. Do you support or oppose instituting civil marriage in Israel?

	Total sample
Support, for all who prefer it	20.6
Support, but only for those not entitled to marry through the Chief Rabbinate	24.1
Oppose instituting civil marriage in Israel	51.7
Don't know / refuse	3.6
Total	100

19. Do you support or oppose public transportation on the Sabbath in areas where there are not many religious Jews?

	Total sample
Strongly support	13.6
Somewhat support	21.9
Somewhat oppose	19.2
Strongly oppose	40.8
Don't know / refuse	4.6
Total	100

20. In your opinion, should the conversion process be made as lenient as possible within the boundaries of halakhah (Jewish religious law) to enable more converts to join the Jewish people, or should the process be very stringent, even if that means fewer converts?

	Total sample
Conversion process should be lenient	46.4
Conversion process should be stringent	47.2
Don't know / refuse	6.3
Total	100

21. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements:

		Agree strongly	Agree somewhat	Disagree somewhat	Disagree strongly	Don't know / refuse	Total
21.1.	It is important that we have religious parties to preserve the Jewish character of the State of Israel.	66.2	25.0	3.1	2.9	2.7	100
21.2.	The halakhic status of women should remain unchanged.	33.6	22.1	17.1	16.4	10.8	100
21.3.	A religious member of Knesset should be concerned with the welfare of the religious population, even if this comes at the expense of other sectors.	15.0	19.0	27.7	30.5	7.7	100
21.4.	It is the husband's job to earn a living, and the wife's job to take care of the home and family.	10.9	15.6	23.4	44.0	6.1	100

22. Do you consider the following statement on the behavior of the IDF toward enemy civilians in time of war to be true: "We are surrounded by rioters and murderers...According to the Torah, there is a basis here for collective punishment, and the IDF should act accordingly...There are no innocents in war."

	Total sample
Very true	26.6
Quite true	20.4
Not so true	22.9
Not at all true	19.1
Don't know / refuse	11.1
Total	100

23. Which type of religious school would you choose for your child?

	Total sample
School with a high religious level, even if the general academic level is weak	33.2
School with a high academic level, even if the religious level is weak	43.5
No preference (volunteered)	13.0
Would prefer a non-religious school (volunteered)	1.0
Don't know / refuse	9.3
Total	100

24. Given that the number of school hours is limited, would you want the curriculum in the religious school system to include the following (in addition to religious studies):

	Yes	No	Don't know / refuse	Total
24.1. Broad general education, including art, philosophy and/or literature	80.5	16.8	2.7	100
24.2. Essential subjects for learning a profession such as computers, math, and English	94.3	4.2	1.5	100

25. From what age, if at all, should religious boys and girls be educated separately?

	Total sample
Should be separated at all ages	5.7
Starting at kindergarten	12.6
Starting from elementary school	25.6
Starting from junior high school	17.4
Starting from high school	6.4
Starting from the army or civilian national service	1.0
They should not be separated at any age (religious boys and girls should be in a coed framework at every stage)	26.2
Don't know / refuse	5.2
Total	100

26. Do you support or oppose the following statements?

	Support strongly	Support somewhat	Oppose somewhat	Oppose strongly	Don't know / refuse	Total
26.1. Classes in civics and democracy should be cut back, and more hours should be devoted to Jewish history and love of the Land.	33.5	32.3	17.0	9.0	8.3	100
26.2. Every Jew should be encouraged to study Judaism, even in ways that depart from tradition.	37.5	28.3	13.5	13.6	7.0	100
26.3. Women should be allowed to study Talmud.	25.3	31.1	12.8	20.0	10.8	100
26.4. Activities to bring secular Jews closer to religious observance should be encouraged.	26.8	29.8	19.6	17.4	6.4	100
26.5. Women should be allowed to serve as judges on religious courts.	26.4	21.8	12.0	29.9	9.9	100

27. Should the state provide funding to schools in the Haredi school system that do not teach core curriculum subjects such as civics, math, and English?

	Total sample
Definitely should provide funding	33.3
Think it should	24.5
Think it should not	17.0
Definitely should not	21.6
Don't know / refuse	3.6
Total	100

28. Do you have Internet at home? If so, what level of filtering, if any, do you have on your home Internet?

	Total sample
We don't have Internet at home	18.7
High level of filtering	17.2
Intermediate level	17.0
Low level	9.2
No filtering	30.0
Don't know / refuse	7.8
Total	100

29. During the past year, have you...

	Not at all	Once	Several times	Don't know / refuse	Total
29.1. Seen a movie at a theater	51.5	12.7	34.9	0.9	100
29.2. Read a book other than religious texts	24.7	8.3	66.2	0.9	100

30. Do you see Israeli Independence Day as mainly:

	Total sample
An Israeli civic holiday	57.3
A Jewish religious holiday	22.5
Both equally (volunteered)	17.5
Don't know / refuse	2.7
Total	100

31. If you had the ability (e.g., free time and enough money), would you leave Israel for a vacation?

	Total sample
Definitely	53.7
Think so	18.6
Think not	9.0
Definitely not	16.9
Don't know / refuse	1.9
Total	100

32. Which issue do you consider most important in deciding which party to vote for?

	Total sample
Foreign affairs and defense	23.2
Settlements	7.6
Religion and state	19.3
Social issues	12.8
Economic issues	11.5
All of them equally / no main one / none of the above (volunteered)	14.7
Don't know / refuse / other	11.0
Total	100

33. Which radio station(s) do you listen to most often?

	Total sample
Don't listen to radio	16.1
Galei Yisrael	4.0
Galei Tzahal	15.6
Galgalatz	22.8
Radio Kol Chai	8.2
Kol Baramah	9.6
Reshet Aleph	2.6
Reshet Bet	15.4
Reshet Gimmel	12.9
Kol Hamusica	1.5
Local stations (e.g., Kol Hadarom, Radio Haifa, etc.)	6.4
Other	12.9
Don't know / refuse	3.2
Total	131.2

* Multiple answers were possible, and therefore the total is over 100%.

34. Which newspaper(s) do you usually read on weekends?

	Total sample
Don't read weekend papers	18.5
Besheva	4.7
Makor Rishon	9.0
Yated Ne'eman	4.0
Mishpacha	2.9
Hamevaser	1.3
HaPeles	0.5
Yisrael Hayom	24.8
Maariv	6.0
Yediot	40.2
Haaretz	1.8
Other (specify):	9.3
Don't know / refuse	3.3
Total	126.4

* Multiple answers were possible, and therefore the total is over 100%.

35. Do you have a television in your home? If so, which shows do you usually watch?

	Total sample
We don't have a TV at home	30.7
Entertainment	18.9
News	42.6
Current affairs	17.2
Reality	20.6
Drama	10.1
Movies	19.3
Documentaries	11.0
Music	10.3
Children's shows	9.0
Series	11.5
Other (specify):	12.4
Total	213.7

* Multiple answers were possible, and therefore the total is over 100%.

Appendix2

Social-demographic and political profile of the sample

36. Sex

	Sample	Total Jewish Population
Male	45.3	46.9
Female	54.7	53.1

37. Age

	Sample	Total Jewish Population*
18–24	20.3	12.9
25–34	21.2	19.9
35–44	18.3	18.9
45–54	14.7	15.2
55–64	13.0	15.0
65+	12.5	18.1

37. Place of Residence

	Sample	Total Jewish Population*
South	18.7	14.7
Haifa	8.5	11.7
Judea and Samaria	7.4	3.9
Jerusalem	14.3	9.9
Center	26.8	27.7
North	9.0	9.8
Tel Aviv	15.3	22.2
Total	100	100

* **Source (Total Jewish Population):** The representative sample of the adult Jewish population (N=4597), from which the sample of people who identify themselves as National-Religious was taken.

38. Which of the following best describes you?

	Total Sample
Haredi (ultra-Orthodox)	11.1
Torani/ Haredi Leumi (Hardal)	6.1
National-Religious	31.2
Liberal or Modern Orthodox	12.0
Traditional-religious	23.7
Traditional non-religious	8.8
Formerly religious	0.6
Secular	2.9
None of the above (volunteered)	1.2
Other	2.4
Total	100

39. Did you study in an advanced Jewish religious studies framework after age 18? If so, in what kind of framework?

	Sample: Men
No	59.6
Pre-army preparatory program (mixed religious/ non-religious)	2.5
Pre-army preparatory program (religious)	3.6
Hesder yeshiva	14.2
Religious-Zionist post-secondary yeshiva	6.5
Haredi post-secondary yeshiva	9.2
Don’t know / refuse	4.4
Total	100

40. Did you study in an advanced Jewish religious studies framework after age 18? If so, in what kind of framework?

	Sample: Women
No	73.4
Pre-army preparatory program (mixed religious/non-religious)	0.7
Seminary or women's college	22.5
Don't know / refuse	3.4
Total	100

41. How would you define yourself, from a political/security standpoint?

	Total Sample
Right-wing	46.7
Moderate right-wing	31.4
Center	10.2
Moderate left-wing	1.8
Left-wing	1.3
Don't know/ refuse	8.6
Total	100

42. Which party did you vote for in the last Knesset elections (January 2013)?

	Total Sample
Likud Beitenu, chaired by Binyamin Netanyahu (a merger of Likud and Yisrael Beitenu)	23.3
Bayit Yehudi–National Union–Tekuma, chaired by Naftali Bennett	24.1
Otzma LeYisrael, chaired by Aryeh Eldad and Michael Ben-Ari	2.4
United Torah Judaism: Yahadut Hatorah–Agudat Yisrael–Degel Hatorah, Chaired by Yaakov Litzman	4.9
Labor Party, chaired by Shelly Yachimovich	2.6
Hatnua, chaired by Tzipi Livni	1.5
Yesh Atid, chaired by Yair Lapid	3.2
Shas, chaired by Aryeh Deri and Eli Yishai	8.7
Kadima, chaired by Shaul Mofaz	0.7

43–44: Ethnic Origins

Israeli

	Total Sample
Born in Israel, father born in Israel	29.3
Born in Israel, father born in Europe–America (including the former Soviet Union)	16.4
Born in Israel, father born in Asia–Africa	25.6
Born in Europe–America (including the former Soviet Union)	15.8
Born in Asia–Africa	9.8
Don’t know / refuse	3.1

45. When did you immigrate to Israel?

	Total Sample
Veteran Israeli: Immigrated in 1989 or earlier	91.4
New Immigrant: Immigrated in 1990–2013	8.6

46. The average monthly household income in Israel is currently NIS 13,000 (after taxes). Is your total family income (from both spouses combined):

	Total Sample
Far below average	22.0
Slightly below average	16.8
Average	18.3
Slightly above average	18.3
Far above average	8.4
Not relevant: Kibbutz member	1.4
Don't know/ refuse	14.7
Total	100

47. What is your level of education?

	Total Sample
Elementary school or less	3.7
Partial high school	7.5
Full high school	29.1
Post-secondary (teachers' college, nursing school, vocational school)	13.7
Post-secondary yeshiva	3.9
Partial academic (no degree)	9.3
Full academic (B.A. or higher)	30.1
Refuse to answer	2.7
Total	100

The Research Team

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