There are 1.4 million Arabs (18% of Israel's citizens) living in Israel today. They are part of Israeli society, but also of the Palestinian people, who are considered to be Israel's enemy. What do they think of Jews, the Israeli state, and their life as a minority? Do they trust the Jews and the state? Are they willing to be integrated in residential neighborhoods, schools, and government coalitions? Do they fear violence by the authorities? Is their identity Israeli or Palestinian? Do they accept Israel's right to exist or support its replacement by a Palestinian state? Do they have confidence in their leaders? Do they approve of a nondemocratic struggle? And what are they willing to do so that the Jews and the State will treat them with equality, dignity, and trust?

And what do the Jews think of the Arab citizens? Are they ready to have them live in their neighborhoods and be part of the government coalition? Would they agree to work under an Arab supervisor? Are they afraid of an Arab uprising? Do they accept the Arabs as an equal minority? Is their identity Jewish or Israeli? Do they acknowledge the Nakba? Do they favor the cession of the Triangle to a Palestinian state? And what are they willing to do so that the Arabs will feel that Israel is their state, too?

The Index of Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel addresses these and many other questions. It has been conducted annually since 2003, on the basis of representative surveys of the Arab and Jewish sectors in Israel.

The current volume presents the findings of the 2013 Index. They reveal a complex picture of the attitudes of Arab and Jewish citizens towards the state and towards each other. The 2013 Index indicates a halt in the aggravation of Arab attitudes, whereas Jewish attitudes continue to be stable. This finding is at variance with the prevalent view. Only subsequent Indexes will reveal whether the unexpected change is a true turning point.

Prof. Sammy Smooha is Professor Emeritus of Sociology at the University of Haifa and the Israel Prize laureate for Sociology in 2008. He studies society and regime in Israel in a comparative perspective, with particular attention to the Arab-Jewish divide.
Still Playing by the Rules
Index of Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel 2013
Findings and Conclusions

Sammy Smooha
The Israel Democracy Institute (IDI) is a non-partisan “think and do tank” dedicated to strengthening the foundations of Israeli democracy. A 2009 Israel Prize recipient, IDI promotes political reform, democratic values, social cohesion, and solutions in the field of religion and state.

The Guttman Center for Surveys at IDI holds the largest, most comprehensive database on public opinion surveys in Israel. Over a span of sixty years, the Center, based in Jerusalem, has applied rigorous, innovative, and pioneering research methods enhanced by its unique “continuing survey.” It has documented the attitudes of the Israeli public regarding thousands of issues, in all aspects of life, in over 1,200 studies that have been conducted since 1947: from everyday concerns to politics, culture, ideology, religion, education, and national security.

The University of Haifa is dedicated to academic excellence and social responsibility. Its location provides a unique backdrop for novel interdisciplinary programs, cooperative endeavors with academic institutes around the world and a diverse student body primed to address regional challenges and universal social issues. Jews, Arabs, and new immigrants come together to study, research, share knowledge, and socialize in an atmosphere of coexistence, tolerance, and mutual respect. Instruction is offered within six faculties: Humanities, Social Sciences, Law, Natural Sciences, Social Welfare, and Health Sciences and Education; and the Graduate School of Management. The University’s dual mission of first-rate higher education and service to the community at large is manifested in the equal educational opportunities open to all sectors of society and in its many forms of programs for reducing the gaps between population groups.

The Index of Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel was developed at the University of Haifa by Prof. Sammy Smooha, of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology. Since its inception in 2003, the Index measures the attitudes of Arab and Jewish citizens toward each other and toward the state, drawing on representative national surveys conducted annually. It creates a scientific database that monitors trends of change over time in the attitudes of the Arab minority and Jewish majority. In 2012 and 2013, the Index was a joint enterprise of the University of Haifa and the Israel Democracy Institute.

The Index of Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel 2013 was made possible by the generous support of the Fohs Foundation, the Charles H. Revson Foundation, the Marc Rich Foundation for Education, Culture and Welfare, the Alan B. Slifka Foundation, and Chen and Orni Petrushka.
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The Index of Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel was inaugurated in 2003 under the aegis of the University of Haifa. In 2012 and 2013 it was a joint project of the University and the Israel Democracy Institute (IDI). It seeks to contribute to the study of relations between Arab and Jewish citizens of Israel, to Arab-Jewish coexistence, and to a resilient democracy in Israel.

In 2012 and 2013, the surveys on which the Index is based were conducted by the University of Haifa in conjunction with IDI’s Guttman Center for Surveys under the leadership of Prof. Tamar Hermann.

Dr. Nohad Ali of Western Galilee College was responsible for carrying out the fieldwork for the survey in the Arab sector; Dr. Mina Zemach, co-director of the Midgam Institute, was in charge of the fieldwork for the survey in the Jewish sector. Both provided assistance in formulating some of the questions, and I wish to express my thanks for their contribution.

The 2013 Index was supported by the following foundations, to which I wish to express my profound gratitude: the Fohs Foundation, the Charles H. Revson Foundation, the Marc Rich Foundation for Education, Culture and Welfare, the Alan B. Slifka Foundation, and Chen and Orni Petrushka. The publication of the 2013 Index also includes selected findings from the 2003 Index, the 2012 Index, and other indexes that were supported by funds from the office of the president of the University of Haifa, the Alan B. Slifka Foundation, the Fohs Foundation, the Andrea and Charles Bronfman Philanthropies, the Naomi and Nehemiah Cohen Foundation, the Ford Foundation received through Israel Foundations Trustees, Israel Endowment Funds, and the Beracha Foundation.

Thanks are due to the scores of interviewers who did valuable work and to the thousands of respondents who shared with us their views on the sensitive issues on which the research focuses.
The 2013 Index report is based on the text and data-analysis of the 2012 Index with the required changes and updates.

The report does not reflect the opinions of the funding foundations and the institutions under whose auspices this research was conducted. I bear sole and full responsibility for the contents.

Sammy Smooha
June 2014
Chapter 1

About the Index

The Index of Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel, based on an Arab public opinion survey and a Jewish public opinion survey, measures attitudes of Arab and Jewish citizens towards each other and towards the state and serves as a tool to monitor trends of change in these attitudes over the years.

The Arab survey draws on 700 face-to-face interviews with a national representative sample of Arab citizens aged 18 and over (including Druze and Bedouin but excluding Palestinians in East Jerusalem and Druze in the Golan Heights who are by and large not Israeli citizens). The Jewish survey draws on 700 telephone interviews with a national representative sample of Jews aged 18 and over (including recent immigrants, ultra-Orthodox, settlers, and moshav and kibbutz members). Arabs are interviewed by Arab interviewers in Arabic while Jews are interviewed by Jews in Hebrew and Russian, and all are assured full confidentiality. The interviews are conducted on the basis of fixed-choice questionnaires that comprised 195 items for Arabs and 125 items for Jews in 2013. The surveys are carried out every year in the fall. The sampling error in each survey is ±3.7%.

The Index data are weighted according to the Knesset elections returns, ensuring full correspondence between reporting on voting in the interviews and the actual election returns. The Index surveys have been conducted since 2003 according to the same design, allowing for comparisons of the results from 2003 to 2013. The Index questionnaires include some questions that first appeared in the surveys for Arabs in 1976 and in surveys for Jews in 1980. These questions are used as benchmarks to measure long-term trends of changes in Arab and Jewish attitudes.
The Index examines sixteen key issues on which Arabs and Jews are likely to differ. These include (social and cultural) separation, image of the other, alienation, distrust, deprivation, collective memory, threats, legitimacy of coexistence, regional disputes (the Palestinian question and conflicts in the Middle East), regional integration, identity, minority leadership, autonomy, means of struggle, options for change (of policy and regime), and overall evaluation of the state of Arab-Jewish relations. In addition to these constants, the Index focuses every year on a specific issue, whether it is one of the regular issues or another important topical issue that may shed light on the relations in the triangle of Arab citizens, Jews, and the state. In the 2013 Index new questions were asked about the government’s controversial plan to settle all the unsettled Negev Bedouin in official townships and to enact a new nation-state law that would further strengthen Israel’s Jewish character.

In addition to an analysis of the findings concerning each issue, the cumulative Index data allows us to examine short-term trends of change for the Index years from 2003, long-term trends of change since Arabs and Jews were first surveyed in 1976 and 1980 (respectively), and drivers of coexistence (namely, background and other characteristics associated with attitudes towards Arab-Jewish coexistence).

Like other Israeli indexes, mainly the Israeli Democracy Index of the Israel Democracy Institute, the Peace Index of Tel Aviv University and the Israel Democracy Institute, and the National Resilience Index of the National Security Studies Center of the University of Haifa, the Index of Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel has several advantages over incidental public opinion polls. It is a scientific tool for comprehensively and annually investigating a specific issue based on national representative surveys of the adult population, and enables cross-temporal comparisons in order to examine trends of change beyond random fluctuations. It also constitutes a database that provides valuable information to researchers, policy makers, and anyone interested in the topic.

Differences were found in all attitudes not only between Arabs and Jews but also within each group. For the sake of brevity and to avoid repetition, the differences within each group are reported separately and not for each attitude.
CHAPTER 2

MAIN FINDINGS OF THE 2013 INDEX

Israel is a deeply divided society owing to the deep divisions between Arabs and Jews and between the religious and secular. The cultural differences between the Palestinian-Arab and Jewish citizens and the separation of institutions and communities are permanent and appreciable. The two groups are fundamentally divided on principal issues concerning the character of the state, the conflict with the Arab world, and integration into the region.

Yet, since Rabin’s assassination in 1995, Arab-Jewish relations have deteriorated as a result of the shattering of the high hopes that the Rabin government instilled in the Arabs, the failure of the Oslo Accords, the October 2000 Arab unrest, the suppression of the second Intifada in 2000–2005, the acts of belligerency (the Second Lebanon war in 2006, the military operations against the Hamas in Gaza in 2008–2009 and 2012), the legislative steps taken and restrictions imposed in order to contain the national struggle of the Arab public and leadership, and the failure to initiate a grand state program for achieving socioeconomic equality. Despite the exacerbation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the worsening of Arab-Jewish relations, Israel has maintained tranquility and stability to a certain degree; however, there is growing fear of breakdown of coexistence and of violent outbursts.

The opinion surveys for this research were conducted in the last quarter of 2013. During this year, forces pushing Arabs and Jews apart and forces drawing them together continued to operate. The year opened
with the 19th Knesset elections that brought about the formation of a rightist-centrist government instead of the rightwing government that had served until then. The new government negotiated a permanent settlement with the Palestinians and released Palestinian prisoners. Nonetheless, the government demanded that the Palestinians recognize Israel as the homeland of the Jewish people, a demand utterly rejected by the Palestinians with the pressure and blessings of Arab-Israeli citizens. Yisrael Beitenu’s idea of ceding the Triangle to a future Palestinian state was still on the national agenda in 2013. It unexpectedly and paradoxically forced the Arabs to seriously contemplate the meaning of their citizenship and brought them to appreciate it and have a positive view of their life in Israel.

Other developments drawing Arabs closer to Israel were the bitter disenchantment with the Arab Spring in face of the continued bloodshed in Syria, the use of military force to oust the Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt, and the ascendance to power of Islamic regimes in Libya and Tunisia.

In 2013 the government submitted a bill to the Knesset for the settlement of the Negev Bedouin, but retracted it due to Arab resistance and internal disagreement within the coalition. The new government also wisely avoided crossing the red line of imposing a duty of civic service on Arabs; 2013 saw an impressive rise in the number of Arab volunteers to civic service despite the boycott campaign of Arab leaders. Besides, it appears that various initiatives for the economic integration of the Arab population, mainly of the Arab middle class, began coming to fruition in this year.

The intriguing question is if the balance of these unfavorable and favorable events reinforced the continuous trend of the hardening of Arab attitudes since 1996, which intensified since 2000, or if this trend changed in 2013. The historical trend among the Jews was stability in or moderation of attitudes towards the Arab minority; the question is if this has changed recently.
Following are the main findings for each of the sixteen key issues covered in the Index. The attitudes of the Arabs and Jews in 2013 in comparison with 2003 and 2012 are presented in chronological order to monitor the change over the decade and the changes from 2012 to 2013.

1. Separation

The potential for integration between Arabs and Jews, two of the world’s most separated groups, is far from being realized. In 2013, 54.1% of the Arabs (70.5% in 2003 and 45.1% in 2012) agree to Arab children attending Jewish high schools, 62.8% (66.4% and 55.3%, respectively) agree to Arabs living in Jewish neighborhoods, and 79.8% (80.7% and 72.8%) agree to Arab national political parties joining coalition governments. Moreover, the high support of integration is also personal: in 2013, 42.5% (37.1% in 2012) of the Arabs want their own children to attend Jewish high schools and 48.6% (42.4%) themselves would like to live in Jewish neighborhoods. In 2013, 67.2% (60.4% in 2003 and 63.9% in 2012) of the Arabs believe that Arab and Jewish citizens should forge common values and customs in addition to their own values and customs.

In Arab eyes, social and cultural integration would increase their access to resources and to a less traditional way of life without them having to assimilate into the Jewish population. These findings clearly point to a halt in the trend towards separation and to a growing desire for integration, from 2012 to 2013.
The Jews are also open to social and cultural integration with Arabs. In 2012, 45.7% of the Jews (34.5% in 2003) were in favor of Arab citizens living in Jewish neighborhoods, 54.8% (51.5%) were in favor of Arabs attending Jewish high schools, and 52.8% (47.4%) supported Arab political parties’ participation in government coalitions. Furthermore, in 2013, 49.2% of the Jews (42.3% in 2011) are willing for Arabs to live in their own neighborhoods and 54.0% (55.9% in 2011) are willing to allow Arabs to attend their own children’s high schools. With regard to cultural integration, 51.9% of the Jews in 2013 approve of the creation of values and customs common to Arabs and Jews as against 57.6% in 2003 and 54.0% in 2012. Most of these figures indicate appreciable and stable openness of Jews toward integration in a deeply divided society.
2. Image of the Other

There is a genuine improvement in the Arab perception of Jews. In 2013, only 30.5% of the Arabs (42.4% in 2003 and 50.7% in 2012) see Jews as violent, and 35.6% (52.5% in 2009 and 35.6% in 2012) perceive them as swindlers. There is also a drop in attribution of racism to Jews during these years (51.4% in 2013 as against 55.7% in 2003 and 60.5% in 2012).

There is stability in the Jewish perception of Arab citizens. For instance, in 2013, 31.4% of Jews (33.0% in 2003 and 31.3% in 2012) think that the majority of Arab citizens will never reach the Jews’ level of cultural development.
### 3. Alienation

There is also a decrease in the Arab sense of alienation towards Israel and Jews. In 2013, 70.7% of the Arabs, as against 74.5% in 2007 and 58.5% in 2012, say that Israel is a good place to live; 43.7% in 2013, as against 54.3% in 2003 and 55.5% in 2012, assert that as Israeli citizens they feel estranged and rejected in Israel; and 47.8% in 2013, as against 34.8% in 2003 and 56.5% in 2012, are dissatisfied with their life as Arab citizens of Israel.

The Jews also feel alienation towards Arabs but their alienation has not increased over time. In 2013, 65.9% of the Jews, as compared to 69.5% in 2003 and 62.2% in 2012, feel distant from Arab citizens; 38.2%, as
compared to 40.3% and 38.0% respectively, are not willing to have an Arab as a superior at work; and 58.0%, as compared to 73.1% and 57.6%, concede that they avoid entering Arab villages and towns in Israel.

**Figure 4** Unwillingness to have a member of the other group as a neighbor, Arabs and Jews, 2003–2013 (percent)

4. **Deprivation**

There is no intensification of the feeling of deprivation among Arabs from 2012 to 2013. In addition to land confiscations and displacement in the past, the Arabs report the following negative experiences in 2013: 22.7% have suffered humiliations, threats, or blows by Jews; 52.9% have endured discrimination by the Jews or the state; 10.3% underwent harassment by the state authorities; and 9.1% suffered economically due to protest activities in the last three years. There is no rise in these figures from 2012.
In comparison to the hurts Arabs have endured, 18.7% of the Jews in 2013 (18.8% in 2012) report suffering threats, humiliations, or blows by Arab citizens. Since for every Arab there are five Jews, the number of Jews hurt by Arabs is several times greater than the number of Arabs hurt by Jews. This attests to the strong and assertive character of the Arab minority.

The negative experiences of Arabs and Jews are counterbalanced by positive experiences. In 2013, 62.2% of the Arabs (an appreciable increase from 48.5% in 2012) reported receiving help at some point from Jews; 79.3% (up from 68.7% in 2012) had spent leisure time with Jews. In comparison, 12.3% of the Jews in 2013 (a decrease from 20.1% in 2012) reported receiving assistance from Arabs at some point and 26.6% (29.7%) had spent leisure time with Arabs.
5. Distrust

Arab distrust of Jews and institutions rose from 2003 to 2012, but stopped rising in 2013. In 2013, 55.3% of the Arabs (55.6% in 2003 and 62.4% in 2012) feel that it is impossible to trust most Jews. In 2013, the lack of confidence in health services is 18.7% (6.7% in 2003 and 15.0% in 2012); in the courts is 38.7% (27.5% and 41.6% in 2003 and 2012); in the Knesset is 66.3% (58.3% and 64.6%), and in the government is 73.1% (71.5% and 70.4%).

Figure 6  Belief that it is impossible to trust most members of the other group, Arabs and Jews, 2003–2013 (percent)

The percentage of Jews who do not trust Arabs (45.8% in 2013) is smaller than the percentage of Arabs who do not trust Jews (55.3%). Jewish distrust of professional institutions is similar to Arab distrust (for instance, 18.1% of the Jews in 2013 have no confidence in health services) but is lower than Arab
distrust of political institutions (51.8% do not have confidence in the Knesset and 51.8% in the government).

6. Threats

Arabs and Jews feel highly threatened by each other, but Arab fear decreased in 2013. In 2013, 70.7% of Arabs (71.1% in 2003 and 77.8% in 2012) fear grave violations of their basic rights; 58.4% (55.4% and 68.0%) fear population transfer; 67.0% (71.1% and 75.9%) fear state violence; 53.6% (50.6% and 66.5%) fear cession of the Triangle to a Palestinian state, and 78.2% (unchanged—79.2% and 79.5%) fear land expropriations.

Figure 7  Fear of threats from the authorities, Arabs, 2003–2013 (percent)
In the same vein, 59.4% of the Jews in 2013 (71.8% in 2003 and 64.9% in 2012) fear an Arab struggle to change the Jewish character of the state and 60.6% (73.8% and 63.8%, respectively) fear an Arab mass uprising. In addition, in 2013, 67.5% of the Jews (83.1% and 76.0%) fear Israeli Arab support for the struggle of the Palestinian people.

**Figure 8**  Fear of threats from Arab citizens, Jews, 2003–2013 (percent)

![Bar chart showing fear of threats from Arab citizens, Jews, 2003–2013](chart.png)

7. Collective Memory

On both sides, the collective memory is less harsh than it was. In 2013, 75.5% of the Arabs (down from 85.3% in 2012) perceive Zionism as a colonial and racist movement. In addition, only 47.3% of the Arabs in 2013...
(down from 57.0% in 2012 and 62.5% in 2011) perceive Israeli Jews as “Crusaders,” i.e., foreign settlers who do not integrate into the region and are doomed to leave, so that the country will eventually revert to Palestinian control. Similarly, 58.7% of the Jews in 2013 (64.2% in 2012) perceive the Palestinians as Arabs who settled in the Land of Israel, which belongs to the Jewish people; 61.1% (60.5% in 2012) believe that the Palestinians do not have national rights to the land because they are not its original inhabitants.

**Figure 9** Blame of Jews for the conflict with the Palestinians and disbelief that there was a Shoah (Holocaust), Arabs, 2003–2013 (percent)
The mutual blame rates also dropped from 2012 to 2013. In 2013, 64.8% of the Arabs (77.2% in 2012) blame the Jews for the protracted dispute with the Palestinians; 59.6% of the Jews (68.6% in 2012) blame the Palestinians for the dispute. An unchanged third of the Arabs (34.5% in 2013 and 31.0% in 2012) do not believe there was a Shoah (Holocaust) in which millions of Jews were murdered by the Nazis; over half of the Jews (54.5% in 2013 and 52.5% in 2012) do not believe in the Nakba, a disaster in which the Palestinians lost the war with the Jews, saw their towns and villages destroyed, became refugees, and failed to establish a state of their own.

**Figure 10** Blame of the Palestinians for the conflict with Jews and disbelief that there was a Palestinian Nakba, Jews, 2003–2013 (percent)
8. Legitimacy of Coexistence

“Coexistence” in the Index is defined as an outlook that holds that it is good for Arabs and Jews to live together, with equal rights, in the same state, to which they should show loyalty; also the prevalence of voluntary relations beyond the bare minimum between Arabs and Jews and activity to change the relations between them by democratic means only. Arab commitment to this pattern of coexistence is high and has increased from 2012 to 2013. For instance, 69.2% of the Arabs in 2013 (59.0% in 2012) believe that Arab and Jewish citizens in Israel should have equal rights and have a duty of loyalty to the state. In 2013, 79.2% of the Jews (81.1% in 2012) concur.

Figure 11 Recognition of Israel’s right to exist, Arabs, 2003–2013 (percent)
A main aspect of the issue of legitimacy of coexistence is the Arabs’ acceptance of Israel’s right to exist. In 2013, 55.6% of the Arabs (81.0% in 2003 and 58.0% in 2012) recognize Israel’s right to exist as an independent state, 52.8% (65.6% in 2003 and 47.4% in 2012) recognize Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish and democratic state, 43.1% (29.6% in 2012) recognize Israel’s right to exist as a state that maintains its Jewish majority, and 34.5% (29.3%) recognize Israel’s right to exist as a state in Jewish control. These figures point to a diminishing legitimacy of Israel up to 2012.

Since 2003 the trend was a decreasing legitimacy of Israel in the eyes of the Arab minority, but this decline stopped in 2013. This generalization is confirmed by the finding that in 2013, 52.1% of the Arabs (57.7% in 2011 and 55.9% in 2012) are reconciled to contemporary Israel as a state with a Jewish majority, 52.3% (56.6% and 60.6%) as a state whose dominant language is Hebrew, 52.1% (51.1% and 53.2%) as a state whose culture is Israeli-Hebrew, and 55.9% (57.9% and 60.2%) as a state where Saturday is the day of rest. Further confirmation comes from the 53.2% of Arabs in 2013 (70.9% in 2006 and 48.2% in 2012) who, in a referendum, would support a constitution that defines Israel as a Jewish and democratic state and guarantees full civil rights to the Arabs. These and other figures lead to the conclusion that more than half of the Arabs accept Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. Yet their resigned acceptance of its Jewish identity constitutes neither justification nor preference; it is evident that they would like Israel to be a binational state.

The Jews proclaimed Israel as a Jewish and Zionist state and want to keep it as such, while respecting the rights of its Arab minority. In 2013, 73.7% of the Jews (72.6% in 2003 and 75.0% in 2012) recognize the Arabs’ right to live in the state as a minority with full citizenship rights, 67.4% (66.7% and 67.2%) justify the provision of separate education for Arabs, and 41.2% (68.5% in 2006 and 41.9% in 2012) agree that the Arabs, like the Jews, have historical and national rights to the country (figure 12). These findings show that a majority of the Jews accepts Arabs as a minority with equal rights as individuals and recognizes the reality in which ethnic-cultural collective rights are accorded to the Arabs; however, only a small minority is willing to grant Arabs national collective rights, such as Palestinian identity and
veto power in matters of vital interest to the minority. These attitudes have not changed over the years. Around a quarter of the Jews have consistently favored denying the Knesset franchise to Arabs, but the percentage of Jews in favor of limiting these and other rights is larger now. For example, 30.5% of the Jews in 2013 (33.7% in 2003 and 27.9% in 2012) oppose Arabs’ right to vote in Knesset elections and 44.9% (52.0% and 44.6%) are in favor of outlawing the veteran Arab-Jewish political party Hadash.

Figure 12 Recognition of Arab rights, Jews, 2003–2013 (percent)
Most Jews are committed to Israel’s Jewish identity more than to democracy. Some 61.7% of the Jews in 2013 (69.7% in 2003 and 64.5% in 2012) would choose the Jewish character of the state if it stands in contradiction to its democratic character. Responses to two questions about the proposed nation-state bill posed for the first time in the 2013 Index affirms this choice. In 2013, 66.9% of the Jews agree that “Israel is first of all a Jewish state and only then a democratic state”; 64.2% agree that “a law is required to determine that democracy prevails in Israel only if it does not hurt the Jewish state.”

9. Regional Disputes

Arabs and Jews disagree on the Palestinian question and the disputes in the region. Most of them accept the two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict but are divided about the manner of its implementation. Only 51.2% of the Arabs and 40.3% of the Jews endorse the pre-1967 borders with land swaps; the opponents on each side want more territory or reject the two-state solution. Some 26.6% of the Arabs and 40.4% of the Jews consent to the annexation of part of the Triangle to a Palestinian state; the consent of only two-fifths of the Jews most probably stems from their realization of the difficulty of implementing this idea due to the staunch Arab opposition. The Arabs expect that the final-status settlement with the Palestinians will meet their own demands as well. For instance, only 42.3% of the Arabs in 2013 (34.8% in 2012) would embrace a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians that did not include a solution to the question of lands expropriated from Arab citizens and to the problem of the Arab internal refugees.
With regard to other disputes in the region, 28.1% of the Arabs in 2013 support Iran’s acquisition of nuclear arms, whereas 60.0% of the Jews not only dissent but also feel that Israel should resort to force in order to prevent Iran from doing so if other countries fail to act. In 2012, 62.7% of the Arabs (59.4% in 2013), as against only 8.0% of the Jews, supported the ascendance to power of Islamic movements in several Arab states after weighing the pros and cons. In 2013, however, 65.4% of the Arabs do not support Assad’s continued rule in Syria; 54.4% oppose the ouster of the Muslim Brotherhood from power in Egypt. These figures testify to the Arab citizens’ disillusionment with the Arab Spring.
10. Regional Integration

Arabs and Jews are divided on Israel’s integration into the region versus the West. While the Arab leadership takes a clear stand in favor of the incorporation of Israel into the Arab space, the Arab public is divided in this respect. Both the Jewish leadership and the Jewish public evidently prefer integration into the West. In 2013, 48.2% of the Arabs (42.7% in 2009) and 60.1% of the Jews (60.3% in 2009) believe that “Israel should integrate into the West and maintain only necessary relations with Arab countries.” The attitudes of both sides on this issue have not changed over the years.

Figure 14. Belief that Israel should integrate into the West and maintain only necessary ties with Arab states, Arabs and Jews, 2009–2013 (percent)

![Graph showing the belief percentages over the years for Arabs and Jews in green and blue bars respectively.]

Arabs Jews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Arabs</th>
<th>Jews</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>42.7%</td>
<td>60.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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11. Identity

The Arab collective identity in Israel includes four components: Arab, Palestinian, Israeli, and Nakba. Some 42.5% of the Arabs in 2013 (53.0% in 2003 and 32.6% in 2012) prefer an Israeli-Arab identity without a Palestinian component, 39.0% (45.0% and 40.1%, respectively) prefer a Palestinian identity with an Israeli component, and 17.6% (5.6% and 21.5%) prefer a Palestinian identity without an Israeli component. In 2013, 33.9% (18.8% in 2003 and 41.3% in 2012) choose the Palestinian people as their most important affiliation, more than religion and citizenship. These figures point to a rise from 2003 to 2012 in the Palestinian-Arab component of Arab identity and a decline in it in 2013. Some 51.8% of the Arabs in 2013 feel that the memory of the Nakba is important to a great or very great extent in their life.

Figure 15. Belief that Israeli citizenship is their most important affiliation, Arabs and Jews, 2003–2013 (percent)

![Bar chart showing the percentage of Arabs and Jews who believe Israeli citizenship is their most important affiliation from 2003 to 2013.](image)
The Jewish collective identity also has four components: Jewish, Israeli, Zionist, and Shoah (Holocaust). Some 63.5% of the Jews in 2013 describe their identity as equally Jewish and Israeli; 41.0% choose Israeli citizenship and 40.6% choose the Jewish people as their most important affiliation; 83.3% define themselves as Zionist; and 94.8% feel the Shoah is important to a great or very great extent in their life.

The identities of Arabs and Jews pull them apart because the common Israeli component is weaker than the other components of their identity, and because neither side respects the identity of the other. In 2013, 68.1% of the Jews believe that an Arab who defines himself or herself as “a Palestinian-Arab in Israel” cannot be loyal to the state and its laws; 54.5% do not recognize the very occurrence of the Nakba. Similarly, in 2013, 75.5% of the Arabs condemn Zionism as a colonial and racist movement. Most Arabs do not feel at ease with the Shoah because it has been harnessed to legitimize the state’s existence while 34.5% of the Arabs do not even acknowledge that it took place. Hence, the Jews do not honor the Palestinian and Nakba components of Arab identity, and the Arabs do not honor the Zionist and Shoah components of Jewish identity.

12. Minority Leadership

Arabs and Jews disagree about the representative nature of Arab leadership bodies but agree that the Arab leaders themselves are not representative. Some 59.1% of the Arabs in 2013 (53.1% in 2003 and 61.9% in 2012), as compared to 36.6% of the Jews (53.1% and 35.4%), view the Arab political parties as truly representative of the Arabs in Israel. In 2013, 60.7% of the Arabs (55.0% in 2012), as against 39.6% of the Jews (36.0% in 2012), perceive the National Committee of Arab Local Councils as representative. In addition, 59.5% of the Arabs in 2013 (58.9% in 2003 and 62.7% in 2012) accept the Arab Higher Follow-Up Committee as representative (this question was not posed to Jews).

Regarding their priorities, 61.3% of the Arabs in 2013 (62.4% in 2012) express their desire that the Arab public will struggle for civil and socioeconomic equality and less for peace and a change in Israel’s character. These preferences explain why 63.3% of the Arabs in 2013 (58.2% in 2012)
and 84.8% of the Jews (83.2%) do not have confidence in Arab leaders. Their lack of confidence stems from their perception of Arab leaders as engaged in protest over the character of the state and its policies on the Palestinian question instead of tackling the Arabs’ everyday problems. These positions have not changed since this question was posed in 2011.

**Figure 16** Lack of confidence in Arab leaders in Israel, Arabs and Jews, 2011–2013 (percent)

Do not trust Arab leaders in Israel

Arab leaders in Israel do not advance practical solutions to the problems of the Arab population in Israel

Arab leaders in Israel should be engaged more in solving the Arabs’ daily problems than in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict
13. Autonomy

The Jewish establishment denies cultural autonomy to the Arabs, lest it be exploited for incitement and struggle; the Jewish public is less opposed because it does not distinguish between the existing institutional separation and the extension of self-rule by the state. The Arabs obviously support autonomy.

Figure 17 Belief that the state should grant Arab citizens the authority over their own religious, educational, and cultural institutions, Arabs and Jews, 2003–2013 (percent)

Some 80.4% of the Arabs in 2013 (90.9% in 2003 and 86.5% in 2012) and 53.6% of the Jews (61.7% and 58.3%, respectively) think that the state should grant Arab citizens self-management of their religious, educational, and cultural institutions. Arab and Jewish support of autonomy for Arabs dropped to some extent from 2012 to 2013.
14. Means of Struggle

Most Arabs support the use of democratic means of struggle, but there is a significant minority who favor non-democratic steps. Some 54.0% of the Arabs in 2013 (63.1% in 2003 and 54.2% in 2012), compared to 78.4% of the Jews (76.6% and 79.9%), believe that, despite its shortcomings, the regime in Israel is also a democracy for the Arabs. In 2013, 70.3% of the Arabs (62.6% in 2003 and 81.0% in 2012), compared to 30.5% of the Jews (46.1% and 29.3%), support general strikes; 49.0% of the Arabs (49.9% and 70.9%), compared to 30.3% of the Jews (40.8% and 30.3%), support Arab protests abroad.

Figure 18 Belief that Israel is also a democracy for Arabs and support for Arab protest abroad, Arabs and Jews, 2003–2013 (percent)
But Arab support of non-democratic means is no less significant: in 2013, 19.0% of the Arabs (9.9% in 2003 and 25.8% in 2012) are in favor of illegal demonstrations, 16.0% (5.4% and 26.6%) support all acts necessary, including violence, and 29.7% (32.8% and 21.3%) are for boycotting Knesset elections. Moreover, 51.7% of the Arabs in 2013 (down from 58.2% in 2012) believe that it would be justified for the Arabs in Israel to launch an Intifada of their own if their situation does not considerably improve. However, these figures show that the rising trend of support for violent means leveled off in 2013.

**Figure 19** Support for Arabs’ general strikes and illegal demonstrations, Arabs, 2003–2013 (percent)
15. Options for Change

Arabs and Jews have contrasting visions and desires about options for a change in their relations. Some 41.7% of the Arabs in 2013 (18.9% in 2003 and 48.5% in 2012) favor the establishment of a Palestinian state instead of Israel, while 20.2% of the Jews in 2013 (21.4% in 2003 and 17.4% in 2012) espouse the idea that the Jews rule and the Arabs have no democratic rights. The Arabs were offered 16 steps that they could take in order to be trusted
and treated with equality and dignity by the state and the Jews; none of the steps win the support of a majority. The rates of agreement range from 19.1% to 46.9% in 2009, 16.7% to 35.9% in 2012, and 19.8% to 45.0% in 2013. In 2013, 40%–47% of the Arabs agree with only four of the 16 steps. The trend seen in 2009 to 2012 is replaced by some moderation in 2013. For example, in order to be trusted and treated with equality and dignity by the state and Jews, in 2013 41.5% of the Arabs (43.0% in 2009 and 34.4% in 2012) agreed that Arab citizens should fulfill a duty of some kind of service to the state; 23.7% (23.8% and 17.5% in 2009 and 2012) agreed that the Arabs should not commemorate the Nakba in public.

**Figure 21 Support for change of regime and policy, Arabs, 2003–2013 (percent)**

- Support for a Palestinian state in all of Palestine, replacing Israel
- Support for Arab citizens’ fulfillment of a duty of some kind of service to the state
Similarly, Jews were presented with 17 steps they could take to make Arab citizens feel that Israel is their state and that they are citizens with equal rights. The Jewish agreement rates range from 15.5% to 80.1% in 2009, from 12.7% to 65.8% in 2012, and from 12.5% to 57.6% in 2013. These Jewish agreement rates are much higher than are those of their Arab counterparts. The Jews are willing to take steps to accommodate the Arab minority as long as the steps do not compromise Israel’s national security and its Jewish character and do not require affirmative action on behalf of the Arabs. On the one hand, a rate as high as 53.6% of the Jews in 2013 (69.0% in 2009
and 55.9% in 2012) agree that the state should enact a law to ensure that Arab citizens receive their proportional share of the state budget. On the other hand, only 27.7% of the Jews in 2013 (33.2% in 2009 and 26.9% in 2012) agree that there should be no differences in security checks at border crossings between Arabs and Jews; only 26.4% (36.3% and 24.5%) agree to grant Arabs expression in state symbols; and only 24.7% (34.9% and 29.9%) would accept affirmative action for Arab citizens in admission to state institutions, universities, and colleges.

The 2013 Index was the first to address specifically the heated controversy between Arabs and Jews over the plan to settle all the unsettled Bedouin of the Negev in recognized and permanent townships. It was found that 62.6% of the Arabs support the plan proposed by the Regional Council of the Unrecognized Villages to recognize all the unrecognized villages and Bedouin land claims; only 25.8% support the government plan to recognize only some of the villages and demands. On the other hand, 57.5% of the Jews endorse the government plan and only 35.5% accept the Regional Council plan. Some 55.8% of the Arabs justify the launch of a Bedouin Intifada should the government plan be enacted into law and implemented, as against 41.0% of the Jews who fear such a development.

16. Evaluation of the State of Relations

Arabs and Jews have different evaluations of their present and future relations. In 2013 66.7% of the Arabs (62.3% in 2003 and 70.5% in 2012), as against 30.4% of the Jews (37.9% and 31.0%), say that the government today treats Arabs as second-class citizens or as hostile residents who do not deserve equality. Some 53.5% of the Arabs in 2013 (58.3% in 2003 and 61.4% in 2012) and 63.6% of the Jews (85.8% and 69.3%) perceive the relations as not good, while 52.3% of the Arabs (43.0% and 66.2%) and 40.5% of the Jews (54.2% and 49.6%) expect a worsening of the relations in the future. The evaluations of both sides were more moderate in 2012 than in 2013.
Believe that the government treats Arabs as second-class citizens or hostile citizens and expectation that Arab-Jewish relations will worsen, Arabs and Jews, 2003–2013 (percent)

Arabs’ negative assessment of government policy towards them is based on the government’s foreign and security policies as well as special legislation to restrict the Arabs’ freedom of action. Most Arabs respond harshly to the laws that impose financial penalties on state-supported bodies that fund commemoration of Nakba (“the Catastrophe”) Day, which marks the establishment of Israel in 1948 and the displacement of the Palestinians in the aftermath, to laws granting authority to admission committees of communal villages to reject candidates, and to laws criminalizing support...
for the boycott of Jewish settlements in the West Bank, and so on. In 2011, 76.2% of the Arabs felt that these laws weakened their confidence in coexistence with Jews; 75.6% reported that these laws diminished their belief in Israel’s right to exist.

17. Internal Differences and Predictors

In addition to examining the differences in attitudes between Arabs and Jews, the Index systematically scrutinizes the internal differences among subgroups of the Arab and Jewish sectors. Significant differences are found in nearly every attitude. In order to identify the best predictors (drivers) of the overall orientation toward the other group, a coexistence scale was constructed on the basis of the coexistence questions mentioned above (p. 26). The 0–6 scale is skewed toward the upper end (Figure 24). In 2013, the ratio of scores 5–6 to scores 0–1 is 57.8% to 10.6% among the Arabs and 55.6% to 9.7% among the Jews. This asymmetric distribution shows that both sides strongly support Arab-Jewish coexistence. The mean Arab score is 4.47 and the mean Jewish score is 4.26, pointing to a higher Arab commitment to coexistence.

Arabs who take more critical and radical stands are those who are non-Druze, religious, Arabs whose identity is Palestinian-Arab without an Israeli component; those without a positive experience of Jews (friends, home visits, help, leisure time), and those with negative experiences of Jews or state institutions (they have been subjected to humiliations, threats, blows, discrimination, harassment by the authorities, land expropriation, or displacement from their village or town in 1948). The best predictors of the score on the coexistence scale, from this large set of factors, are (in descending order): suffering from humiliations, threats, or blows; personal identity as Israeli-Arab without a Palestinian component; personal identity that is more Israeli-Arab than Palestinian, spending leisure time with Jews, and being Druze. There is no influence of age, gender, and level of education on Arab attitudes.
With regard to the internal differences among Jews, it is found that Jews who have more critical and negative views towards Arab citizens are those who are ultra-Orthodox and National-Religious, those aged 18 to 24, individuals without a full university education, those whose most important affiliation is Judaism or the Jewish people (rather than Israeli citizenship), those politically in the moderate right and the right, those without positive experiences with Arabs (friends, home visits, help, leisure time) and those with negative experiences with Arab citizens (suffering from humiliations, threats, or blows). The best predictors of the score on the coexistence scale, from this set of factors, are (in descending order): political stream (right, center, left), religiosity, receipt of help from Arabs, and level of education. Higher on the coexistence scale are Jews on the center or left, the secular, recipients of Arab help, and Jews with full university education.
Chapter 2: Main Findings of the 2013 Index

18. Trends of Change

The Index shows that Arab-Jewish relations worsened between 2003 and 2012, but that the trend of hardening Arab attitudes towards the Jews and the state was checked in 2013. Above we reviewed the foreign and domestic developments that can account for the deepening of alienation and the harsher Arab attitudes in the years prior to 2013 and the change that took place in 2013 that can explain why this trend was interrupted. At any rate, the moderation of Arab attitudes, evidenced in the 2013 Index findings, does not stem from an increase in fear of the authorities; Arab fears, in fact, decreased in 2013. A scrutiny of the sources of Arab attitude change reveals that the halt in the radicalization of Arab attitudes exists in all Arab population groups. Most Arabs, including non-Bedouin, Muslims and Christians, constituting 70.8% of the Arabs in the sample, do not change their attitudes in 2013; that is, their attitudes became neither more critical nor more moderate. The groups who became more moderate include the Druze, Galilee Bedouin, Negev Bedouin, Arabs who suffered from land expropriations, internal refugees, and those without Jewish friends. It is impossible to know whether this development and the moderation of many Arabs in 2013 are a fleeting episode or a true turning point. Only time will tell.

In contrast to the clear toughening in Arab attitudes from 2003 to 2012, no similar toughening in Jewish attitudes is evident during these years—or even since 1980; rather, there is stability or some moderation (figure 26). This finding contradicts the dominant view that the Jews have moved monotonically towards religion and the political right, and that, consequently, their intolerance of the Arab minority has risen accordingly. The Index affirms the alternative interpretation that, along with the increased power, prominence, and audacity of the radical right, the main trend in Jewish politics is the formation of a large and viable political center and the convergence of the Jewish public from all sides in that center. This shift overall produces stability and moderation of Jewish attitudes (mainly the moderation of right-wingers who have moved to the political center).
Figure 25 Trend of change in militant and rejectionist attitudes, Arabs, 1976–2013 (percent)

- Deny Israel's right to exist as a Jewish-Zionist state
- Deny Israel's right to exist as a state
- Support the use of violence as part of the Arab struggle to improve their situation
Figure 26. Trend of change in rejectionist attitudes, Jews, 1980–2013 (percent)

- Reject the right to exist of an Arab minority with full civil rights
- Deny the right of Arabs to vote the Knesset
- Unwilling to have Arab friends

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CHAPTER 3

CONCLUSIONS

Analysis of the developments since 1996, the 2003 to 2013 Index findings, and the findings of attitude surveys in the years 1976 to 2013 lead to several conclusions regarding Arab-Jewish relations in Israel.

1. A Halt in the Trend of Hardening Arab Attitudes

Between 2003 and 2012, until the 2013 Index, Arab attitudes towards the Jewish character of the state and its Jewish majority became harsher, but there is stability or even a certain moderation in Jewish attitudes towards Israel’s Arab citizens. The 2013 findings indicate continued moderation among Jews and a halt in the trend to harsher attitudes among Arabs. Only in the future will we know if the change among the Arabs is temporary or constitutes a genuine shift.

The toughening of Arab attitudes up to 2013 stems primarily from the wide gap between the high expectations raised by the second Rabin government (1992–1995) and the stark reality of its aftermath, the continued discrimination and exclusion of Arabs, the ongoing occupation, the building of Jewish settlements over the Green Line, violence, feelings of hopelessness, and rising tensions involving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and above all—the growing disaffection with the current formula of the Jewish and democratic state.

A similar trend can be seen over the three-and-a-half decades since the first Land Day strike in 1976, which marked the beginning of the stage of mass protests in the history of Arab-Jewish relations. Since 1996, Arab attitudes have become more critical and have only intensified since 2006. On
the other hand, there has been no hardening of Jewish attitudes regarding the Arab minority since 1980.

The first decade of the current millennium was a lost decade for Arab-Jewish coexistence. During this time not only was there no improvement in the status of the Arab minority and attitudes toward Arab-Jewish coexistence, but there was a regression. Under the pressure of the unfavorable circumstances, relations between Arabs and Jews worsened and Arab attitudes continued to harden. These regressive processes threaten the relative tranquility in Arab-Jewish relations.

If the halt in the deterioration of Arab attitudes in 2013 is indeed a turning point, it can be explained by several developments. The moderating effects in the regional arena were the final-status negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians that brought a gleam of hope for a peace settlement; the dissatisfaction with the Arab Spring following the toppling of the Muslim Brotherhood regime in Egypt and the continued repression and bloodshed in Syria; and the Palestinians’ rejection of Israel’s demand to be recognized as the homeland of the Jewish people. The moderating forces in the domestic arena include the campaign to annex the Triangle to a Palestinian state, which paradoxically reinforced the Arabs’ attachment to their Israeli citizenship and life in Israel; the opening of civic service to Arab volunteers, providing them with a new channel for bettering their lives; and the quiet efforts by the state and nongovernmental organizations to promote the economic integration of the Arab population in the civil service and private sector, especially Arabs with a university degree, and the efforts made to encourage entrepreneurship and small business. It appears that these forces, which were partly in effect earlier, came to fruition and strengthened the Arabs’ attachment to Israel in 2013.

2. Willingness to Make Concessions

A comprehensive look at the attitudes regarding the steps needed to improve Arab-Jewish relations shows that while Jews are open to some change, the Arabs perceive themselves as the absolute victim; they expect the state and
the Jews to make the concessions and refuse to take any steps in order to win
the trust and goodwill of the state and the Jews or to motivate them to affect
change.

Although the Future Vision documents assume that there is already
coexistence in Israel within the Green Line and that the Arab struggle is
conducted democratically, from a Jewish perspective the documents set forth
an extreme goal and place the responsibility for change on the state and the
Jews alone. According to these documents, the changes required from the
Arabs themselves are merely internal social changes that are supposed to
better their lifestyles and propel them to intensify their endeavors of turning
Israel into a binational state.

3. National Struggle

Since 1967, Arab citizens have experienced politicization and empowerment
as a result of the developments in their sector. Israel has undergone a process
of democratization (with a certain regression during the term of the most right-
wing government Israel has ever had, from 2009 to 2012) and has seen the
spread of Jewish protest movements, changes that have created opportunities
for Arabs to organize and fight against discrimination and exclusion. The
Arabs accumulated power and exacted a price for their maltreatment by the
state and the Jews. From the early 1970s, under the leadership of Hadash,
they focused on their fight for civil equality and peace according to the plan
of two states for two peoples.

The Oslo Accords raised Arab hopes that these two goals were about
to be achieved, but Rabin’s assassination shattered their dreams. The
improved treatment by the state came to an end; the eruption of violence also
disillusioned them. They realized that no salvation would be forthcoming
from the Palestinian leadership or from a future Palestinian state, if and when
established. For this reason, they shifted their collective goal from protest to
national struggle. The Arab leadership of Hadash, Balad, and Ra’am-Ta’al
is no longer satisfied with protesting to uproot discrimination, obtain civil
equality, and establish a Palestinian state alongside Israel; instead, it strives
to change the Arabs’ national status, obliterate Israel’s Jewish identity, and set up a binational state in place of the Jewish nation-state. This received formal expression in the Future Vision documents, which challenge both the Jewish state and the Palestinian national movement. The idea of making Israel a binational state requires that the Jews renounce the Zionist project and the state’s Jewish character. It also signals to the Palestinian leaders that the Palestinian state will not offer a sufficient remedy for the Israeli segment of the Palestinian people. The objective of the national struggle that the Arabs are conducting vis-à-vis the State of Israel and the Palestinian national movement is to escape their double marginality—within Israeli society and, even more so, within the Palestinian people—and to gain attention, respect, and support from both sides.

4. The Arab Leadership

The state and the Jewish majority, led by the political right, interpret the Arab national struggle as an existential threat. Voices are heard explicitly proclaiming that the Arabs of Israel pose an even greater threat than do the Palestinians and other enemies in the region. Jewish democracy has embarked on a battle for containment. The anti-Arab legislation in the Knesset was a signal from the state, warning the Arab leadership to cease and desist because its struggle was on the verge of crossing a red line.

The Jewish public and leadership perceive the Arab leadership as untrustworthy, unrepresentative, and ineffective, while the Arab public views it as representative but untrustworthy and ineffective. This situation makes it difficult to advance Arab-Jewish relations because a representative, trustworthy, and effective minority leadership is the key to improving minority-majority relations. In the absence of power-sharing, the ideological Arab leadership engages in protest and national struggle, but the pragmatic Arab minority expects it to share power, change policy, deal with daily problems, and come up with practical solutions. The Jewish leadership does not feel the need or public responsibility to affect a basic change, while the Arab leadership is not willing to modify its strategy in order to change
policy and the attitudes of the Jewish leadership and public. The outcome is a stalemate. Both the Jewish and Arab sides shirk public responsibility and avoid taking real steps for change.

5. Peace-Makers or Spoilers?

For years, many have expressed the view or indulged in the hope that the Arabs of Israel would be “a bridge for peace” with the Palestinians and the Arab world, since they are part of both sides and they have a high stake in peace. However, this expectation is not realistic. The Arabs cannot fulfill the role of peace-makers because they are absolutely on the Arab side and hence cannot serve as a fair mediator. Moreover, they lack the power and resources that are vital for conflict management (like those of the United States, for instance).

Time has shown the contrary to be true: the Arab minority is liable to perform the role of “peace spoiler.” The Arab citizens might impede the attainment and stabilization of a peace treaty with the Palestinians if they conduct a struggle to include their own demands in it, if they launch an Intifada of their own, if they join a Palestinian Intifada, or if in the national referendum they vote against a permanent settlement that ignores their demands from the state. Improvement of the Arab condition in Israel could curb the danger that the Arabs might become peace spoilers.

6. Operative Consensus

Despite the deep rift between Arabs and Jews and the trend of harshening Arab attitudes until 2013, the Index found a solid infrastructure of Arab-Jewish coexistence in Israel. A majority of Arabs and a majority of Jews believe in a shared society, accept the state in its pre-1967 borders as the arena for their relations, feel that Israel is a good place to live, are committed to democracy as a mechanism for managing their mutual relations, and agree that civil equality is the basis for coexistence and is an important state goal.

A majority of Arabs have reconciled themselves to the notion that Israel is a Jewish and democratic state with a Jewish majority, in which Hebrew is the dominant language, Israeli-Hebrew culture is on top, and the Jewish
calendar is in effect. This acquiescence is conditioned on full civil equality and fulfillment of Arab national aspirations by the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It is clear that the acute asymmetry in power between the Jewish state and the Jewish majority, on the one hand, and the Arab minority, on the other, underpins this assent. Yet this is not the main factor behind the continued quiet and stability; the acute power asymmetry between Israel and the Palestinians under occupation has not prevented terrorism, uprisings, a struggle waged by diverse means, and repression.

A functional consensus has crystallized between Arabs and Jews. It bridges the deep divide between them, draws them nearer, and prevents instability and violence. The cornerstone of this fundamental concord is the two-state principle, which implies Arab recognition of Israel’s right to exist within the pre-1967 borders, loyalty to the state, civil equality, democracy as a mechanism of conflict management and a means of change, and integration without assimilation. It is obvious that each side has its own interpretation of these principles, which limits their effectiveness; yet, they still serve to calm relations and stabilize Arab-Jewish coexistence.

7. Conditions of Sustained Calm and Stability

The conditions conducive to sustained tranquility and stability of Arab-Jewish relations are as follows:

a. The Arabs are undergoing “Israelization,” which offsets and reduces the effect of their Palestinization and Islamization. An Arab in Gaza or Nablus experiences Palestinization without Israelization, whereas an Arab in Nazareth or Jaffa experiences Palestinization with Israelization. The process of Israelization experienced by an Arab in Israel moderates his Palestinization, ties him to Israel, and draws him nearer to the Jews in terms of language, culture, lifestyle, and means of struggle. The Arabs’ status as Israeli citizens carves out a destiny different from that of non-citizen Palestinians. In the same vein, Israelization sets limits to Islamization. Members of the Islamic Movement in Israel are not only
linked to life in Israel but are also aware of their status as a Muslim minority that has no chance of becoming a majority and taking over the country. For this reason, they will become more moderate than members of the Islamic Movement in Egypt, Afghanistan, the West Bank, or Gaza, where Islamization not only fails to set limits but also heightens expectations for an Islamic revolution.

b. Israel is a strong democratic state. It allows Arabs to conduct a legal and orderly struggle, provides them with services and benefits, and follows a policy that differentiates its Palestinian citizens from non-citizen Palestinians. The rule of law and procedural democracy in Israel guarantee Arab participation in parliamentary and extra-parliamentary politics, making it unnecessary to turn to extra-legal channels. If Arabs resort to subversion and violence, they will be subdued and fail. Additionally, Israel is a welfare state that especially benefits the Arabs because they are over-represented among the needy, and have large families, lower incomes, and underdeveloped communities. Moreover, Israel does not treat its Arab citizens as it treats the Palestinians over the Green Line. The Arabs in Israel enjoy freedom of movement, access to employment all over the country, the right to vote for the Knesset, welfare services, civil rights, and a future in a democratic state, as opposed to the insecure situation and future of the Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and the Diaspora.

c. The Jewish majority is shifting to the center and adopting the state’s distinction between Palestinians on the two sides of the Green Line. Israeli politics, too, gravitates towards the center, which has become larger and attractive despite its instability. Right-wingers who move to the center moderate their political attitudes and become more tolerant of Arab citizens. This is why Jewish attitudes are not becoming more rigid. Nevertheless, a vocal Jewish radical right has emerged. It leverages its power by means of legislative initiatives that target the Arab minority and create a nationalist and undemocratic atmosphere. This radical right has not managed to take over the state and radicalize the Jewish public,
but it has succeeded in reinforcing the alienation of the Arab minority and in engendering a growing fear of the collapse of democracy among centrist and leftist Jews. The interruption in the trend to harsher Arab attitudes suggests that the campaign by the anti-Arab radical right has begun forcing Arab citizens to understand the danger of disconnecting from Israel, to cherish the advantages of life in Israel, and to draw closer to the Jews and the state.

d. The Palestinian national movement assigns to the Palestinians in Israel the role of a political lobby for the Palestinian people; it does not expect them to join the Palestinian resistance movement and to undermine the existence of the State of Israel. Like Israeli governments, the PLO and the Palestinian Authority distinguish between Palestinians outside Israel (including Arabs in East Jerusalem) and inside Israel (“Arabs of the interior”). They do not see themselves as representative of Arab citizens, do not reject Israel’s policy that Israeli-Arab problems are Israel’s internal affairs, do not recruit Arab citizens for terrorism and war against Israel, and do not call on them to boycott Knesset elections and disrupt public order. They consider them to be an integral part of Israel and urge them to support the peace movement in Israel and to act politically for the Palestinian cause. This stance gives legitimacy to the existence of the State of Israel and to the continued residence of a Palestinian Arab minority within it. Only in special circumstances does the Palestinian Authority take into account the needs of Arabs in Israel. Its rejection of the Netanyahu government’s demand to recognize Israel as the state of the Jewish people, for instance, is influenced by pressure from the Israeli Arab leaders who view this demand as excessive emphasis on the Jewish-Zionist character of the state. Their main concern is that such recognition might put an end to Arab refugees’ right of return to Israel. Yet, even in these exceptional cases, the Palestinian Authority does not intervene directly in relations between the State of Israel and its Arab citizens. As a matter of fact, Arab citizens have a feeling, grounded in reality, that they are just as marginal to the Palestinian people as they are to Israeli
society. The main motivation behind the Future Vision documents was the feeling that the Palestinian national movement does not represent them, that their interests differ from those of the other segments of the Palestinian people, and that they should fight the State of Israel head-on in order to improve their status.

e. The international community does not intervene in Israel’s internal affairs and its policies towards the Arab minority. The United Nations, the European Union, and international non-governmental organizations support Arab civil society organizations, mostly with financial aid, but they do not press Israel to change its Jewish-Zionist character or its policy toward the Arab minority. The UN partition resolution of 1947 recognized Israel as a Jewish state—a recognition accepted by most countries of the world, except for the Arabs. The international criticism of Israel and the mounting pressure on it focus on termination of occupation and the need to establish a Palestinian state alongside Israel.

8. Mutual Red Lines

The toughening of Arab attitudes (halted in 2013) is the result of a certain weakening of these stabilizing conditions. But these cohesive intergroup forces are still strong enough to ensure a modus vivendi between the two sides. Neither Arabs nor Jews, and certainly not the state, want to break the rules of the game. Each side is careful not to cross the red lines drawn by the other side.

The red lines that the state and the Jewish majority drew for the Arabs include infringements of national security, disruptions of public order outside the Arab communities, taking steps that would cause international interference in Israel’s internal affairs, and undermining the state’s Jewish-Zionist character. The test lies in the Arabs’ behavior, not so much in their attitudes. This is why the toughening of Arab attitudes has not alarmed the authorities.

The red lines that the Arabs and their leaders have drawn for the state and the Jewish majority include denial of Arabs’ basic rights, the enactment
of laws that explicitly target Arabs, the confiscation of large tracts of Arab land, the imposition of military rule, the repeal of the Arabs’ exemption from military service and civic service, a blatant and manifest anti-Arab policy in the allocation of services and resources, and the use of terror tactics against Arab citizens.

The mutual respect of these red lines is a common interest. Neither side has an interest in crossing them, because the price to be paid is too high. This is the lesson learned from the Arab unrest in October 2000.

9. A New Formula for a Jewish and Democratic State

In order to better contend with the division, discord, and conflict between Arabs and Jews, it is essential that Israel achieve peace with the Palestinians and the Arab world at large. A peace agreement would eliminate the Palestinian Arab minority’s affinity with an active enemy.

There is also a need to draw up a more balanced formula for a Jewish and democratic state that would be fairer to the Arabs and tolerable to Jews. In the new and reformed Israel, one with a friendly Palestinian state next door, discrimination and exclusion of Arabs will be abolished. The Arabs will be granted full civil equality, official recognition as a Palestinian national minority, cultural autonomy, representation in the national power structure, and a proportional share of the state budget. The government will be obligated to consult with the Arab political parties represented in the Knesset on matters vital to the Arab minority. The Arabs, like the Jews, will also participate in some form of service to the state. In this way, most of the demands set forth in the Future Vision documents will be met, while the Arabs will end their struggle to transform Israel into a binational state and accept it as a Jewish and democratic state.
There are 1.4 million Arabs (18% of Israel’s citizens) living in Israel today. They are part of Israeli society, but also of the Palestinian people, who are considered to be Israel’s enemy. What do they think of Jews, the Israeli state, and their life as a minority? Do they trust the Jews and the state? Are they willing to be integrated in residential neighborhoods, schools, and government coalitions? Do they fear violence by the authorities? Is their identity Israeli or Palestinian? Do they accept Israel’s right to exist or support its replacement by a Palestinian state? Do they have confidence in their leaders? Do they approve of a nondemocratic struggle? And what are they willing to do so that the Jews and the State will treat them with equality, dignity, and trust?

And what do the Jews think of the Arab citizens? Are they ready to have them live in their neighborhoods and be part of the government coalition? Would they agree to work under an Arab supervisor? Are they afraid of an Arab uprising? Do they accept the Arabs as an equal minority? Is their identity Jewish or Israeli? Do they acknowledge the Nakba? Do they favor the cession of the Triangle to a Palestinian state? And what are they willing to do so that the Arabs will feel that Israel is their state, too?

The Index of Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel addresses these and many other questions. It has been conducted annually since 2003, on the basis of representative surveys of the Arab and Jewish sectors in Israel.

The current volume presents the findings of the 2013 Index. They reveal a complex picture of the attitudes of Arab and Jewish citizens towards the state and towards each other. The 2013 Index indicates a halt in the aggravation of Arab attitudes, whereas Jewish attitudes continue to be stable. This finding is at variance with the prevalent view. Only subsequent Indexes will reveal whether the unexpected change is a true turning point.

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