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THE 2004 ISRAELI DEMOCRACY INDEX

Auditing Israeli Democracy
Attitudes of Youth

Asher Arian, Shlomit Barnea, Pazit Ben-Nun

AUDITING ISRAELI DEMOCRACY – 2004

Attitudes of Youth

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THE 2004
ISRAELI DEMOCRACY INDEX

Auditing Israeli Democracy

Attitudes of Youth

Asher Arian, Shlomit Barnea, Pazit Ben-Nun

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A. Summary of Principal Findings

The picture of Israeli youth in 2004 that emerges from the survey is that of relatively conformist young people who are not all that different from the general population. In certain aspects, Israeli youth reflects feelings and perceptions that are more positive than those of adults regarding the status of Israeli democracy and express greater confidence in traditional formal institutions than adults, such as the Knesset, political parties and the Histadrut Labor Federation. In contrast with this, the level of interest and knowledge among young people, their support for those who refuse to obey orders while in the army and their desire for strong leadership serve as warning signs that cannot be ignored. The two sides of Israeli youth presented suggest they have a different perception of democracy, one which is more formal than it is substantive and ethical. This perception, which focuses on the framework rather than the substance of democracy, leads one to ponder the future of Israeli democracy.

Israeli youth, as seen from the survey, is conformist, devoted to the state, and in some of the categories examined, not essentially different from the adult generation. Nonetheless, we found several tendencies that characterize the youth as a distinct group from the rest of society, including some that divide youth among themselves.

In general, it was found that youth express **greater satisfaction towards democracy** than adults **and are more moderate in their anti-democratic tendencies**. Additionally, with regard to their assessments of Israel's social rifts, young people expressed a more positive feeling regarding the nature of the relationship between different groups and sectors, and like adults, youth also believe that **the present national schisms are quite serious**, although Jewish youth see these rifts as more serious than do Arab youth.

Regarding Israeli youth's satisfaction with their civics classes in preparing them to be good citizens, it was found that **57% of young people expressed satisfaction with their civics classes**, compared with 41% of adults who expressed similar satisfaction. When youth is divided according to type of educational setting, it appears that pupils in the state-religious education system are the most satisfied, followed by those in state schools, and in third place pupils in private or democratic schools.

In examining their connection to the state and the tendency to leave Israel on a permanent basis, the youth's sense of belonging and its connection to the land and the State of Israel are weaker than those of adults and the security situation features as a primary motive for emigration (as opposed to the economic situation, which is the primary motivation among adults).

In connection with the degree of trust in government authorities and institutions, it was found that **the three institutions in which youth express their trust are the IDF, the Supreme Court and police**, although their level of trust in the first two is less strong than that of adults. It is interesting to note that young people place greater trust than adults in the Knesset, political parties, the Histadrut and the Rabbinate; and they have a greater tendency than adults to perceive

the Knesset, rather than the Supreme Court, as the institution that safeguards democracy.

Disturbing findings were seen when examining youth rates of participation and degree of interest in politics, both in relation to adults and in relation to findings from 2000. We also found a gender difference within the youth, with young women being less involved, less knowledgeable and less interested in politics.

The rate of support for refusing an order was higher among the youth than adults – **43% of youth expressed support for refusing**, compared with 25% among adults (and this is in contrast with both the high level of trust youth expressed in the IDF and rates of actual refusal).

A particularly disturbing finding is **the desire of most young people (60%) for strong leaders** (as an alternative to the legal framework) and the feeling of more than half the youth that **politicians do not tend to take citizens' opinions into consideration**.

The picture emerging from the 2004 survey of the general sample of the entire population does not bode well for the current state of Israeli democracy. The degree of public criticism towards democracy rose, a fact reflected in a consistent decline in **public satisfaction with the level of democracy in Israel**. Compared with 14% who felt that Israel was not sufficiently democratic in 1990, 39% of Jews surveyed expressed dissatisfaction in 2004, along with a concomitant **decline in the level of satisfaction with the way Israeli democracy functions.**

A downward trend is also apparent in **public affiliation to the state**, particularly among new immigrants, which is reflected in their sense of identity with the state and their level of pride in their Israeli citizenship.

With regard to whether or not democratic culture is solidly founded in Israel, there was **greater sensitivity among the public regarding the existence or non-existence of democratic values and norms**. There was a significant drop in public satisfaction with the safeguarding of human rights and a heightened sensitivity to the rates of discrimination against the Arab minority in Israel (64% pointed to discrimination, in contrast with 55% in the 2003 survey). **The feeling of socio-economic inequality within the Jewish public was deeper than it had ever been over the past 30 years** and was expressed in the fact that 90% of the Jewish respondents agreed with the statement that "there is not enough socio-economic equality in Israel."

In connection with public faith in government and state institutions, it was found that alongside **a significant drop in people's faith in political institutions** (primarily government ministers), there was **a significant increase in their faith in legal institutions** (especially the Supreme Court).

There was **a certain improvement in the perception of unity and the degree of divisiveness within Israeli society in the 2004 survey**. Improvement was seen in people's assessment of the relationship between Jews and Arabs and Ashkenazim and Sephardim,

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compared with a deterioration in the relationship between immigrants and veteran Israelis. In spite of the improvement, the Jewish-Arab rift is still perceived among most respondents as the primary source of tension in Israeli society.

Israeli democracy, as reflected by comparative quantitative indicators, is primarily a **formal democracy** that features a democratic institutional system, entrusted with the functioning of the regime and performing state democratic functions. From this perspective, Israel's status is relatively good compared with other democracies, especially its high level of representativeness and the high score it receives

regarding the restrictions placed on the executive branch of government.

On the other hand, it appears that Israeli democracy has yet to attain the essential characteristics of a democracy and to inculcate its values, perceptions and democratic culture. The situation with regard to human rights is very troubling.

The most prominent weak points of Israeli democracy are **instability**, which is reflected in frequent regime changes; the short life span of its government; and the **great tension** which results from rifts along nationalist and religious lines.

B. Description of the Research and its Goals

This is the second year in which Israeli democracy has been examined and assessed as part of the Democracy Index Project, the goal of which is to give a reliable and comprehensive picture of the quality and functioning of Israel's democracy and the way it is perceived by the Israeli public.[1] Recognizing the importance of the existence of a substantive and stable democracy in Israel, we used the Index to identify items that need to be improved and enhanced in our democratic culture and regime.

Because we wanted to examine the actual functioning of democracy, as well as the way it is perceived by the public, the study was carried out on two levels: first, examining the central aspects of the functioning of the democratic regime on the basis of quantitative indicators accepted in international research. Second, using surveys to examine public perception of the status of the democracy and an assessment of the degree to which democratic culture has taken root among the public, which is a condition for the existence of a substantive democracy in Israel.

On both levels, the study was conducted from a dual perspective: comparative (Israel's status compared with 35 other democracies around the world) and historic (Israel's status over time).[2] For the purpose of historic comparison, we defined the last decade as our primary reference point, and when investigating public opinion we also included earlier data, when available.

Given the complexity and multifaceted nature of democracy, the Democracy Index focuses on three salient aspects of the phenomenon: the institutional aspect, the rights aspect and the stability aspect. Looking at the institutional aspect and the rights aspect can tell us about democracy's status in terms of its formal and substantive perspectives. The stability aspect was included in our assessment, even though it is not exclusively a characteristic of democratic regimes, because of its impact on the ability to function and on governance.

Each of these three aspects included several characteristics that constitute foundations of democracy (see Figure 1). **The institutional aspect** includes five characteristics: accountability, representativeness, participation, checks and balances, and governmental integrity (corruption). **The rights aspect** includes six characteristics: civil rights, political rights, social rights, economic (property) rights, gender equality and equality for minorities. **The stability aspect** includes three characteristics: stability of the government, the absence of political conflict and the absence of social rifts.

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1. See Arian, Asher, David Nachmias, Doron Navot and Danielle Shani, Auditing Israeli Democracy 2003. Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute, 2003.
2. The nations included in the project sample were: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, England, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Holland, Hungary, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Romania, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland Taiwan, Thailand and the United States. Data on public opinion in these countries does not exist for all aspects examined in the Index survey.

Figure 1

| Democracy Indicators |
| Institutions | Rights | Stability |

| Representativeness | Corruption |
| Participation | Checks and Balances |
| Accountability |

Economic	Political
Gender Equality	Civil
Minority	Social

| Governmental Stability | Political Conflict |
| Social Rifts |

Each of these characteristics was examined using several comparative quantitative indicators (31 indicators in all) and through a public opinion survey that investigated public perception of the degree to which these characteristics were realized in Israel in 2004.[3] With regard to the characteristics included in the rights aspect, which reflects the substantive dimension of democracy, the survey also assessed the level of Israeli public support of democratic values in an effort to study the degree to which democratic culture and values have taken root. The survey was conducted in March 2004 and included a representative sample of the Israeli adult population (Jews and Arabs).

Our choice of characteristics to be included in the Index was guided by criteria of validity, reliability, differentiation, transparency, clarity, specificity, availability of information and currency of data. Due to the complex nature of the phenomenon being studied, we decided to focus our examination on the meaningful and significant components of democracy, while recognizing the limitations of such an attempt to measure democracy, on both a theoretical and practical level.

The Democracy Index Project continues to carry out its mission – to conduct a periodic assessment of the status of democracy in Israel – in an

3. The quantitative indicators incorporated in the study were developed by various international research institutions, such as: Polity, Minorities at Risk, the United National Human Development Project, the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), Freedom House, Transparency International, the Heritage Foundation, and researchers Arthur Banks, Michael Gallagher and Arend Lijphart. Data for comparison of countries on the matter of public opinion was taken from international studies, primarily from the World International Social Science Project.

attempt to formulate a pool of information that can promote research and debate and engender awareness. The 2004 Index includes the most up-to-date data available and presents changes that have occurred over the past year.

This year, in addition to updating the survey, we chose to focus on **youth** in an attempt to understand Israeli youth attitudes towards the functioning of the democratic regime and the inculcation of democratic values in Israel. For this purpose, we conducted a separate survey, which included a representative sample of young people and asked them about their attitudes, thoughts, feelings and perceptions of various aspects of democratic life in Israel and compared these responses with those of the adult

population. The survey, which was conducted in March 2004, included a representative sample of Israeli youth (Jews and Arabs).

This report presents a summary of the state of Israeli democracy in 2004, according to its ranking on various quantitative indexes and public opinion surveys, and paying attention to changes since last year. Also presented are several findings from international rankings and comparative international public opinion polls. Another section is devoted to a discussion of the status of Israeli youth, highlighting specific areas of interest from a comparative perspective. The complete data of the 2004 Democracy Index appear in the appendices at the end of this publication.

C. Democracy Indicators

1. Summary of Findings

The status of Israeli democracy in 2004, as reflected by the Index, is different in certain aspects from the picture presented a year ago. The findings from our examination of actual democratic functioning based on quantitative indicators do not indicate movement in a single direction. Some of the parameters examined the status of the democracy had improved, while others showed no change at all; some had even worsened.[4]

Figure 2 shows Israel's position relative to the 35 countries included in the sample, based on 17 of the 31 indicators we examined, from first place

Figure 2

Israel's Relative Ranking among Democracies in the Sample

Based on 17 indicators

High Ranking																
1																
5																6
10															8	
15														17-18		
20							15-24	17-19	19 (34)	20	19-24	20				
25					18-25	17-25										
30			31-32	29	28											
36	35-36	35									35-36					

| National/ethnic tension | Religious tension | Change of power | Protest and opposition | Freedom of the press | Law and order | Lack of political discrimination | Religious freedom | Human rights | Gender equality | Economic freedom | Involvement of the military | Perceived corruption | Political participation | Corruption indicator | Representativeness | Restrictions on executive branch |

Stability aspect | Rights aspects | Institutional aspect

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4. As stated, updating the indicators depended upon the availability of the data collected by the various international research bodies, and therefore we cannot conclude that for indicators that were not updated, there was no change in either direction.

(1) on the democracy ranking to last place (35).

The clear distinction that emerges from Figure 2 (as was the case in the 2003 Index) is between Israel's relative positions in each of the three aspects we examined. Regarding the institutional aspect, which considers the formal dimension of democracy, Israel's position is relatively good, particularly with regard to checks and balances (the number of restrictions placed on the executive branch of government) and representativeness (because of the proportional method of election and the low electoral threshold). The only characteristic from the institutional aspect for which Israel ranked first on the scale is military involvement (one of two criteria we used to measure accountability), and this, naturally, derives from the security reality in which Israel's democracy presently exists.

In terms of the rights aspect, Israel's position is not as good as it was for the institutional aspect, and the country's place is in the middle third of the scale. Compared with the degree of economic freedom and gender equality, where Israel is

ranked around 20th place (out of 35 democracies), Israel's position in terms of human rights, civil rights and political rights is lower. With regard to rights, the most problematic aspect is that of freedom of the press, which, like the other characteristics in this category, is also influenced by the security reality.[5] Israel's relative position in the rights aspect indicates its weakness as a substantive democracy that safeguards and maintains democratic norms and values within its formal institutional frameworks.

With regard to the stability aspect, Israel's status is the most serious, and in addition to its ranking at the bottom of the scale of tension indicators for nationalistic and religious reasons, Israel suffers from a lack of government stability which is reflected in its frequent regime changes. Stability is not necessarily a characteristic of democratic governments, but frequent changes in regime and a low rate of completion of the government's term of office during the last decade limit the functional ability needed by any effective government and erode public trust in the democratic system in general.

2. Israel Democracy Index 2004 – Changes in the Indicators Compared with the 2003 Index

As part of the 2004 Democracy Index, 14 of the 31 indicators included in the Index were updated, and these changes were not uni-directional. Table 1 presents the updated indicators according to the direction of the change – either improvement, no change, or worsening of the status of Israel's

democracy, as compared with the findings for 2003.

As indicated in Table 1, despite Israel's improvement for the indicator of **religious tension**, it still ranks in 35th place in the sample

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5. Further details concerning the freedom of the press indicator are included in the next section.

Table 1
Israel Democracy Index 2004
Changes in the Indicators Compared with the 2003 Index*

Indicator name	Scale	Israel's score 2004	Relative ranking	Change
Social rifts Religious tension	0-6 (0= great tension)	3	35 (36)	↑
Political corruption Corruption index	0-6 (0= severe corruption)	4	19-24 (36)	↑
Economic freedom Economic freedom index	1-5 (1= great economic freedom)	2.36	20 (36)	↑
Political rights Freedom of the press	0-100 (0= full freedom)	27	28 (36)	↑
Horizontal accountability Involvement by the military in the state	0-6 (0= high military involvement)	3	35-36 (36)	=
Civil rights Law and order index	0-6 (0= low level of maintaining law and order)	5	18-25 (36)	=
Civil rights Freedom of religion	1-7 (1= full freedom)	3	15-24 (27)	=
Social rifts National/ ethnic/ language tensions	0-6 (0= great tension)	2	35-36 (36)	=
Political participation Voter turnout in local elections	0-100 (100%= full voter turnout)	50%	No international comparison	↓
Political corruption Perceived corruption index	0-10 (0= high level of corruption)	7	17-18 (36)	↓
Social rights Gini coefficient for available income	0-1 (0= full equality)	0.3738	-	↓
Social rights Gini coefficient for economic income	0-1 (0= full equality)	0.5320	No international comparison	↓
Civil rights Number of prisoners per 100,000 residents, including security prisoners	0-100,000 (0= few prisoners)	189	No international comparison	↓
Civil rights Number of prisoners per 100,000 residents, not including security prisoners	0-100,000 (0= few prisoners)	143	22 (36)*	↓

* The indicators are arranged according to the direction of change (from "improved" through "no change" to "worse"), and within groups according to the degree of change (from the greatest to the least change).

(with India in last place). This change was not reflected in the survey findings, which did not indicate any change in relations between the nation's religious and secular populations. In the complementary indicator referring to **tension for reasons of nationalism, ethnicity, or language** no change was identified. This is interesting because the survey actually shows an improvement in the perception of nationalist and ethnic relations and a worsening in the perception of the relationship between immigrants and long-term resident Israelis.

Governmental integrity or political corruption was examined using two assessments by different international research bodies. The **Corruption Index** (of the International Country Risk Guide [ICRG]) which focuses on extreme corruption, exposure of which is liable to undermine the political order and in extreme cases even bring about the fall of the government, indicates an improvement in Israel's position since 2003. The **Corruption Perceptions Index** (Transparency International) is based on the opinions of experts (political analysts, academics, journalists, senior-ranking managers and business people) regarding the degree of corruption in their country and in other countries. According to the findings of this index, Israel's status has worsened since 1993 (by 0.3 out of 10). There are several explanations for the seeming contradiction between the findings of the two indicators. First is the difference in their definition of the concept "corruption" – as something that threatens government stability (ICRG) or as a phenomenon that involves different types (economic, leadership and political) and degrees of corruption (TI). Moreover, we should recall that the findings represent, for the most part,

the year prior to their publication, such that the data for 2004 does not reflect what has been happening in Israel in recent months.

Examination of the economic dimension of democracy, both in terms of **economic freedom** and **equality in the distribution of income** illustrates the tension between these two values. While the economic freedom indicator saw an improvement over last year, both indicators encompassing the equality of income distribution in Israel show increasing gaps, and thus equality is in jeopardy.[6]

The indicator for **freedom of the press**, which is measured by Freedom House (as outlined below), not only improved, but marks the highest score Israel has received for this indicator since 1994. The significant improvement in weighting this indicator was for the parameter "political pressure on the media" (one of the three parameters included in this indicator).

With regard to **political participation**, as reflected in voter participation in general elections and local authority elections, there was a constant downward trend. This phenomenon characterizes most Western democracies in recent decades, and this is usually linked to the decline in public levels of trust and satisfaction in the traditional, institutionalized political system. In terms of Israel's relative position, according to the data examined in the previous Index relating to the 2003 elections for the 16th Knesset, Israel's relative position has improved (from 22nd place in the previous Index to 20th place), which reinforces the feeling that this phenomenon, which is serious and problematic for representative democracies in general, is

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6. Further details regarding the economic indicators are included in the next section.

prevalent and becoming worse throughout the democratic world.

The last two figures in the table, relating to the **number of criminal and security prisoners per 100,000 people**, served as a tool to evaluate the status of civil rights, with the assumption that a high rate of prisoners reflects the determination of the law enforcement system in limiting individual freedom when appropriate.[7] Both

in terms of all prisoners – including security prisoners – and in terms of only criminal prisoners, there is an increase in their number relative to the general population. Whether the explanation for this is based on increased crime, toughening of the law enforcement system, or an improvement in its effectiveness, we perceive this as an important indicator for a democratic society regarding the manner in which freedoms are embodied within its formal frameworks.

3. Selected Findings from the Index

Institutional Aspect: Governmental Integrity

Political corruption, which involves the improper use of public office for the purpose of promoting private goals, is in direct contradiction to the various principles underlying the ideals of democracy (including the rule of law, equality

and the government's duty to realize its power on behalf of the public good rather than for private benefit).

As part of the Index, we assessed the degree of corruption in Israeli democracy using two indicators (as explained above), both of which

Figure 3

Israel's Relative Ranking among Democracies in the Sample

Based on 17 indicators

More Integrity

Less Integrity

Integrity

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
7. Data for the purpose of calculating this indicator were provided by the Israel Prison Service in April 2004.

are based on the evaluations of experts and specialists relating to the degree of corruption in various countries. For both of these indicators, Israel's relative place in the countries' rankings was at the lower end of the scale, alongside Japan, Chile and Spain, as can be seen on the previous page. Nations that enjoy lesser degrees of corruption are Finland, Denmark and New Zealand. At the opposite end of the scale are Argentina, India and Romania, where corruption is much more widespread.

In examining Israel's status in recent years on the basis of the Corruption Perceptions Index, there is a significant upward trend, which dropped drastically in 2001 and since then has been gradually moving back upwards (see Figure 4). It should be recalled that the Index refers to corruption at different levels of government, administration and the economy, and not only in the parliamentary sphere.

Given Israel's relative position on the scale, the growth of corruption during the past three years and, particularly, during the last year, we can understand the importance of being aware of this phenomenon, since it jeopardizes fundamental democratic principles and weakens the legitimacy upon which the democratic regime and government is based.

Figure 4

Political Corruption in Israel, 1996 – 2004

Institutional Aspect: Political Participation

Political participation refers to public participation in the country's decision-making process. It is a multi-dimensional characteristic with numerous and varied expressions. Here, we examined voting rates in general and local elections (percentage of voters out of the total number of eligible voters). Although this indicator does not reflect patterns of participation that are less institutional, we found that voting in elections, as the primary channel for expressing public preference for representative democracy, was the basic indicator and represents the characteristic being examined.

The relative status of Israel, as can be seen in Figure 5, is in the middle third of the scale, alongside Spain, Taiwan and Bulgaria (in these three nations there is no legal obligation to vote). It is interesting to see that the high level of representativeness (giving actual expression to voters' preferences), public involvement in political events in Israel, the high level of competition in general within the party system, and the emotionally charged agenda facing elected public officials are not reflected in voting rates. The countries in which voter turnout is highest are Australia (where the obligation to vote is legally fixed), Cyprus, South Africa and Denmark. At the opposite end of the scale, with the lowest voter turnout rates, are Switzerland, Poland and South Korea. It is difficult to find a common denominator, such as geographical region, democratic seniority or constitutional structure to explain the way countries are distributed along this continuum.

Figure 5
International Comparison of Political Participation**

*   Country where voting is required by law, at varying levels of enforcement.
**   Numbers in brackets refer to the election year for which turnout rate is included in index.

The drop in voter turnout is a phenomenon that characterizes most Western democracies It is argued that it reflects public lack of trust in the traditional, party-based, parliamentary political system and its tendency to limit its participation or direct it towards alternative, extra-parliamentary channels.

Maintaining and expanding the legitimate foundation of the democratic regime depends to a large extent on public willingness to participate in the electoral process and to express its preferences through the existing institutional system. Therefore, it is essential that the public again participates in formal democratic activities of participation.

Rights Aspect: Freedom of the Press

Political rights including freedom of movement, freedom of assembly, the freedom to vote and to be elected, and freedom of speech and information protect the liberties that are essential for the existence of the democratic and egalitarian process and enable citizens to participate in the decision-making process. The Freedom of the Press Index, which was developed and implemented by Freedom House, indicates the level of freedom of the written and broadcast media in democracies in dozens of countries around the world.

The index consists of three sub-categories, and the weighted score given for each one of them constitutes a country's final score on the index, from a scale of 0 – 100 (where 0 = **greater** journalistic freedom).[8] The first category refers to the legal situation in the country (the existence or lack of laws restricting freedom of the press in that country). For this category there was a general deterioration in Israel's status since the mid-1990s, when its score went from 4 (in 1996) to 14 (in 2004) out of 20.[9] The second category relates to the political pressures and influence on the press from political parties and leaders: whether there is government ownership of the media, whether there is censorship and on what types of coverage, whether journalists are prohibited from entering certain geographical areas, etc. In this category, too, there has been a decline since 1997, and Israel's score has gone from 4 (in 1996) to 16 out of 20. This category is very sensitive due to security-related incidents and the resulting restrictions on movement and media coverage, and of the three categories, this has been the most problematic for Israel over time.[10] The third category has to do with economic pressures and influence on the press in the form of control and ownership of the media, national broadcasting costs, the media's economic dependence on special interest groups, etc. In this category Israel's score is best of the three.

As can be seen from Figure 6, Israel's improvement reached its peak in the 2003 Index.

In spite of the improvement, Israel's status compared with other countries in the sample is problematic, ranking 28th alongside Italy, Greece and South Africa. The most liberal countries are New Zealand, Switzerland and Norway. India and Argentina conclude the group of five nations defined by Freedom House as being "semi-free."

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8. In the past, the index included a fourth sub-category that examined actual violations of journalistic freedom. This category was cancelled and has not been included in the Freedom House index since 2002.
9. As stated, a higher score indicates that freedom of the press is being compromised in that nation.
10. We must remember that the Index data represents, for the most part, the year prior to its publication, thus the figures for 1996 reflect the situation in 1995, and so on.

Figure 6
Freedom of the Press in Israel, 1994 – 2003*

* For illustration purposes, scores are presented in inverse values, so that a **higher** score represents greater
    freedom of the press.

Figure 7
International Comparison of Freedom of the Press*

* For illustration purposes, scores are presented in inverse values, so that a **higher** score represents greater
   freedom of the press.

Rights Aspect: The Economic Dimension – Economic Freedom Versus Equality of Income

The distribution of resources, economic perceptions and the policy lines derived from them stand at the core of political action and controversy in a democracy. Due to the potential tension between the value of "freedom" and the value of "economic equality," we chose to assess the level of economic freedom as well as the degree to which income is distributed equally.

In measuring economic freedom, we used the Economic Freedom Index of the Heritage Foundation, which looks at 50 economic variables that include various institutional factors that impact on the degree of a country's economic freedom. In attributing a score, the Institution's researchers base themselves on databases, hard economic data and interviews with government officials dealing with the relevant issues. Then, after deciding a final score on a scale of 1 – 5 (where 1 = maximum economic freedom), the countries are divided into three categories: free, nearly free and not free. As can be seen in Figure 8, Israel is located in the middle of the scale, beside Norway, the Czech Republic, Spain and Taiwan. Countries that have the most freedom are New Zealand and Ireland, with Canada capping off the group of nations defined as free. The countries that have the least economic freedom are Romania, India, Argentina and Bulgaria, which are defined as not very free.

In assessing Israel's position throughout the years, it appears that, generally speaking, there has been an increase in the level of economic freedom up to the peak at which we presently find ourselves (see Figure 9).

Figure 8
International Comparison of Economic Freedom

The situation with regard to the second side of a democracy's economic dimension, that is, the degree of **equal distribution** of income, is almost the opposite. In order to evaluate the degree of inequality we used two Gini indexes: inequality in the distribution of economic income and inequality in the distribution of available income.[11] As can be seen in Figure 10, the picture with regard to both these indexes shows an upward trend in the level of inequality, from 2001 to this point in time.

Stability Aspect: Social Rifts

The pattern of relationships between social groups and sectors, the level of tension between them, the scope and depth of the rifts and their prominence has a tremendous impact on a democratic government's ability to function and its stability. In order to safeguard its legitimacy and quality of functioning, the democratic political system must reflect on and respond to social rifts and mitigate the level of tension they produce. Given the diversity that characterizes democratic societies, the study found it difficult to quantify the situation regarding social rifts in various countries. Of all the comparative international databases we looked at that measure the functioning and stability of democracies, only the ICRG deals with the question of social rifts and the tension between different groups in a particular country. The two indicators we used from this database relate to the level of **religious tension** and the level of **nationalist/ethnic/language-based tension**. For both of these indicators,

Figure 9
Economic Freedom in Israel, 1995-2004*

* For illustration purposes, scores are presented in inverse values, so that a **higher** score represents greater economic freedom.

11. The updated data for the purpose of the 2004 Index were taken from the Report on Poverty and Inequality in Income Distribution in 2002, prepared by the National Insurance Institute.

Figure 10
Inequality of Income Distribution in Israel, 1993 – 2003

evaluation was based on the opinion of experts, newspaper articles and reports prepared by various international organizations. The first indicator measures the degree of tension within a society on the basis of a **religious** schism, which is reflected as religious oppression, religious coercion, or an attempt to establish a ruling religious hegemony. The second indicator assesses the level of social tension because of schisms relating to **nationalism/ethnicity/ language**, which, in the case of Israel, refers to the ethnic rift between Ashkenazi and Mizrachi Jews and the nationalist rift between Jews and Arab citizens of the state.

In both cases, Israel is located at the bottom of the scale, in **last** place (together with India) for religious rifts, and in **next-to-last** place for nationalist/ethnic rifts (just ahead of India). In connection with the religious rift, there has been a certain improvement since last year, but no change in its relative ranking in the world.

As can be seen from Figure 11, over time, the tension resulting from the nationalist/ethnic rift has been more serious than the religious rift, and both have undergone parallel changes such that the nationalist/ethnic rift moderated in 2001 while the decline in tension resulting from the religious rift came only in the past year. Despite the fact that including the nationalist/ ethnic rift in the same index makes it more difficult to determine what led to the change in this indicator, it is certainly possible to see the reflection of security-related tensions at the level of social tension, which explains the sharp rise in 1996.

In order to continue maintaining the stability and quality of democracy in Israel, we must continue to examine ourselves in an attempt to find the best way to allow expression for the different groups and sectors in our society in order to reduce the rifts that separate them and mitigate tensions between them.

Figure 11
## **Social Rifts in Israel, 1992 – 2004***

* For illustration purposes, scores are presented in inverse values, so that a **higher** score represents greater tension resulting from the rifts.

D. Democracy Survey

1. Israeli Public Opinion According to the 2004 Democracy Survey, Compared with the 2003 Survey

The Democracy Survey conducted in March 2004[12] examined various aspects of democratic life of the Israeli public. In this report, the key differences obtained when comparing the situation as seen through the 2004 Survey with that of the Democracy Survey conducted in April 2003 will be presented. The full comparison between the two surveys can be found in Appendix B.

Satisfaction with Israeli Democracy

Israelis' sense of satisfaction with democracy declined from 2003 to 2004. This finding is supported from two angles: in 2004, 55% of the Israeli public expressed dissatisfaction ("very unhappy" or "unhappy") with the way Israel's democracy functioned, as opposed to 49% in 2003. Furthermore, 33% of the Israeli public in general expressed the opinion in 2003 that Israel was "not democratic enough" or "strongly not democratic," in contrast with 44% in 2004. In addition, the number of citizens who expressed a certain degree of satisfaction with the level of Israeli democracy and reported that Israel was democratic "to a proper degree" dropped from 47% in 2003 to 30% in 2004.

Figure 12

Satisfaction with Democracy

"In your opinion, is the State of Israel currently democratic to a suitable degree, too democratic or not democratic enough"

Not democratic enough or strongly not democratic (Jewish sample only)

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
12. The survey was conducted among a representative sample of the Israeli adult population, both Jewish and Arab. The sample included 1,200 respondents who were interviewed over the phone in Hebrew, Arabic and Russian, by the Dahaf Research Institute. Sampling error is ±2.9.

When we look at satisfaction with Israeli democracy among the Jewish population, we can see an increase over time in the level of dissatisfaction of the people (see Figure 12). From 14% in 1990 who felt that Israel was "not democratic enough", the level of dissatisfaction rose gradually. Today the figure stands at the lowest level for the past 15 years: 39% of the Jewish population believes that Israel is not democratic enough. One exception to this gradual climb in dissatisfaction was seen in July 1999, immediately following the election of Ehud Barak as prime minister and about a year before the outbreak of the second intifada.

Sense of Affinity with the State (Patriotism and Identification)

The level of identification by the Israeli public with the State of Israel and the degree of pride they feel in being Israeli dropped in 2004. The feeling of identification with the state was examined by asking the question, "To what degree do you feel part of the state of Israel and its problems?" and the sense of pride in belonging to Israel was examined by the question, "To what extent are you proud or not proud to be an Israeli?" In both cases the same pattern emerged: 79% of the entire population felt a sense of identification with the state in 2003, compared with 73% in 2004; and 84% of the Israeli public exhibited a feeling of pride in being an Israeli in 2003, compared with 79% in 2004.

Figure 13 looks at the decrease in level of pride in belonging to the state over time among three different groups in Israeli society: Israeli Arabs, new immigrants and veteran Israelis. Israeli Arabs feel less pride in belonging to Israel over time. Nevertheless, this year there was a marked rise in their feeling of pride, and it remained at a level similar to that observed in April 2000, prior to the second intifada and the events of October 2001: 55% of Israeli Arabs were proud to be associated with the state, as opposed to 56% this year. In 2001 there was a significant decline in the feeling of pride among Israeli Arabs, to 21%, and since that time, there has been a recovery to the present stable level. The feeling of pride among new immigrants hovered at a level of 85% over the years, except for 2001 and 2004. The present rate marks the lowest level of pride among new immigrants for the last five years. The Jewish public also exhibited a certain decline in levels of pride since 2003, but this is less significant than the other two groups described and it would appear that, in general, in spite of the decline, the level of pride in belonging to Israel among the veteran Jewish population has remained quite stable during the past five years.

When we examine the degree of identification with Israel based on the three groups described above, we find a similar pattern: 84% felt identification in 2003, in comparison with 83% in 2004. However, among new immigrants there was a sharp drop in the rate of identification: in 2003, 80% of new immigrants reported feeling identification with the state, as opposed to only 51% in 2004. In addition, the pattern observed previously among the Arabs repeated itself in terms of identification: there was a slight increase in the level of Israeli Arab identification with the state, from 42% who identified with the state in 2003 to 50% in 2004. The connection felt by new immigrants to the state is in a state of flux, while that of Israeli Arabs is rising slightly.

Figure 13
Pride in Belonging to the Country
"How proud or not proud are you to be an Israeli"
Very proud and fairly proud

| | Veteran Jews | New Immigrants | Arabs |

Support for Equality

In the past year there has been a decline in the degree of satisfaction with the level of socio-economic equality in Israel. In 2003, 82% of the public agreed with the statement, "There is not enough socio-economic equality in Israel." This year, on the other hand, 88% of the population feels a lack of socio-economic equality. When we look at the Jewish population only, we see that this year 90% of Jews feel there is inequality in this sphere, in contrast with 80% of Jews who felt this way last year. When we look at this trend over time, we find that the feeling among the Jewish public that there is no socio-economic equality is presently at its highest level for the past 30 years.[13] In May 1973, a turbulent period in social terms, particularly for ethnic reasons, 86% of Jews felt there was insufficient socio-economic equality in Israel. Some 20 years later the figure was far lower: only about 60% of Jews felt there was inequality. This figure rose in 1996 to approximately 77% of all Jews and dropped once again in April 1999, to 62%. The feeling of inequality rose sharply once again between 1999 and 2003: at that time, 80% of Jews were dissatisfied with the level of socio-economic equality. This upward trend continued this year as well, and 90% of the Jewish population reported feeling a lack of socio-economic equality.

Concomitant with the growing feeling of discrepancy in the equality of socio-economic rights in Israel, there was an increase over time in support for a left-wing economic policy that was

13. See, Arian, Asher, David Nachmias, Doron Navot and Danielle Shani, Israeli Democracy: Follow-up Report on the 2003 Israeli Democracy Index Project. Jerusalem: The Israel Democracy Institute, 2003, p. 161, Figure 5.7.

more socialist than capitalist. In 2003, 54% of the Israeli public voiced its support for socialism compared with capitalism while in 2004, 60% of the Israeli public expressed its support for socialism rather than capitalism. However, when we look at this increased support for socialism over time among the Jewish public, we find it to be part of a general trend of increased support for socialism (see Figure 14).

Support for Rights of Arabs

In 2003, when we examined the perceptions of the Israeli public regarding the realization of religious freedom, 74% of all Israelis expressed their feeling that there was religious freedom in Israel to a large or certain extent. This was compared with 80% who felt this way in 2004.

A similar increase can be seen in Israelis' perception in relation to the realization of freedom of speech: 81% feel that this freedom existed in 2003, in contrast with 86% to date. In addition, regarding the perception that the rule of law and equality before the law exists in Israel to a large extent or to a certain extent, similar increases are observed: in 2003, 75% of Israelis expressed the opinion that the rule of law is realized in Israel to a large or certain extent, and 68% felt that there was equality before the law, compared with 80% and 72%, respectively, in 2004.

And yet, in spite of these slight increases for the aspects of "religious freedom," "freedom of speech" and "equality before the law," the Israeli public exhibited a sharp decline in

Figure 14
Support for Socialism
"With regard to the structure of economic life in Israel,
are you more in favor of a socialist or a capitalist approach"
More socialist than capitalist and fully socialist (Jewish sample only)

satisfaction with the safeguarding of human rights in general, in contrast with the previous year. The considerable change in this sphere can be seen when we compare the perception of the realization of human rights in Israel in various years. When we asked in the 2003 survey, "Do you think the state of Israel does more or less to safeguard human rights than other countries," 27% of Israelis responded that Israel does "much less" or "somewhat less" to safeguard human rights. And now, in 2004, 40% of Israelis perceive the safeguarding of human rights in Israel to be inferior in quality compared with other countries.

This drop in satisfaction in Israel coincides with Israelis' assessments concerning actual equality between Jews and Arab Israelis, and with public attitudes regarding the realization of the rights of the Arab minority. Last year, 55% of the Israeli public felt that Israeli Arabs were discriminated against compared with Jewish citizens. In comparison, 64% of the public feels this way this year.

The growing feeling regarding the discrepancy in equality for nationalist reasons, that is, the rift between Jews and Arabs – to the extent that some two-thirds of the citizens believe that Israeli Arabs are discriminated against compared with Jewish citizens – is also reflected in increased willingness to embrace equal rights for Jews and Arabs. Last year, 53% of the Israeli public supported the institution of full equal rights for Jews and Arabs, in contrast with 64% who support such a notion this year. This trend also emerges in connection with Arab parties joining the government: in 2003, 38% of the Israeli public supported Arab parties joining the government, while 45% support such an idea this year.

In Figure 15, we examine support among the Israeli public regarding the issue of equal rights for Jewish and Arab Israeli citizens over time, beginning in April 2001. For both questions, a similar pattern emerges: a drop in support for equal rights for Israeli Arabs beginning in 2001 and a renewed increase in 2004. Thus, about one-third of the Jewish public supported a willingness to give Arabs political rights in April 2001. In the two subsequent years there was a slight decrease, and this year support rose again. The pattern is more discernible when we look at the perception of the actual existence of equality, based on the respondents' agreement with the statement, "Israeli Arabs are discriminated against compared with Jewish citizens." In 2001, 60% of the Israeli public agreed with the statement that the Arab public suffered from discrimination. This feeling moderated somewhat during the next two years and rebounded this year to 60% agreement. It would appear, therefore, that support for the idea of equal rights for Arabs stabilized this year at the level seen prior to the intifada following the events of October 2001.

Trust in Government Institutions

When we look at the changes from last year to this year in the level of people's trust in state institutions, we see an increase in trust in legal institutions – the State Attorney's office and the Supreme Court, as well as in the institution of the office of the president. This is in comparison with decreased trust in political institutions – the prime minister, the Knesset, and government ministers.

Figure 15
Support for Equal Rights for Arabs
"Adding Arab parties to the government, including Arab ministers";
"Israeli Arabs are discriminated against in comparison with Jewish citizens"
Strongly support, support to a large degree and support to a certain degree (Jewish sample only)

As can be seen in Figure 16, the level of trust in the legislative branch and the executive branch of the government dropped since 2003. At that time, more than half of the public expressed its trust in these branches of government "to a great extent" or "to a certain extent": 55% of the Israeli public expressed trust in government ministers, 53% in the prime minister, and 52% in the Knesset. To date, the level of trust has declined significantly: only 41% expressed trust in government ministers, 45% in the prime minister, and 46% in the Knesset. This trend, that is, the weakening trust in our political institutions, parallels a growing trust in legal institutions, compared with last year: in 2003, 70% of the Israeli public expressed its trust in the Supreme Court and 58% in the State Attorney. This is compared with 79% and 66%, respectively, in 2004. Trust in the president also improved this year: 73% of the entire Israeli public expressed their trust in

the office of the president, compared with 68% last year. In addition, trust in the judicial branch of the government was higher last year than in the legislative and executive branches, although the discrepancy was lower.

The trend of increased trust in legal institutions as opposed to political institutions was also reflected in people's assessment of the institution that best preserves Israeli democracy. In 2003, 18% of the public felt that the prime minister was the best safeguard of democracy, and 42% felt the Supreme Court was the best keeper of democracy. In 2004, there was a stronger belief that the Supreme Court was the best safeguard of democracy, and this feeling regarding the prime minister decreased: 47% of the Israeli public feel the Supreme Court is currently the best protector of democracy, compared with only 9% who believe the prime minister primarily assumes this role.

Figure 16
Trust in Institutions
"To what degree do you trust each of the following persons or
institutions" To a large degree and to a certain degree

| | 2003 | 2004 |

One more expression of the increased trust in the judicial establishment among the Israeli public is seen in the desire for checks and balances to be employed by the judicial branch against the legislative branch of government. In 2003, approximately one-half of the Israeli public disagreed with the statement: "the Supreme Court's authority to revoke a law passed by the Knesset should be withdrawn." Today, objections to reining in legal activism have risen: 59% of the public in Israel disagrees with this statement.

Notwithstanding the drop in Israeli public trust in the political establishment, it would appear that the assessment of integrity regarding persons in the political establishment has increased, and the perception of the scope of corruption in Israel

compared with other countries has decreased, although no change is observed regarding other aspects that express corruption in the Israeli political system and bureaucracy. Thus, in 2003, 36% of the Israeli public disagreed with the statement: "In order to reach the top political echelons today, you must be corrupt," and 36% agreed with the statement. In contrast with this, in 2004, 41% of the Israeli public disagreed with this statement and 43% agreed with it. In other words, there was a slight drop in the feeling among the Israeli population that reaching the top of the political ladder required one to be corrupt. An even more significant change was observed regarding the perception of the scope of corruption in Israel: in 2003, 52% of the Israeli public felt that the state of Israel was "much more corrupt" or "slightly more corrupt"

than other countries. This compares with 37% of the public that feels this way in 2004.

Social Rifts

In examining the relationships between different groups that comprise Israeli society, we can see several changes that have taken place since 2003 that point to a certain increase in social unity in Israel and particularly with regard to relations between Ashkenazi and Mizrachi Jews and between Jews and Arabs.

First of all, we can say that to date, the public believes that the level of tension between Israel's social groups has lessened, from a comparative point of view. Regarding the question: "Do you think there is more or less tension between social groups in the state of Israel than in other countries" there was a decrease in the belief that Israel has greater social tension: in 2003, 59% of the Israeli public felt that Israel had more social tension than other countries, while 7% felt that the tensions in Israel were less than in other countries. In 2004, 60% feel that there is greater tension in Israel than in other countries, without any change from the previous year, but 15% feel there was less tension comparatively speaking, that is, there was a greater feeling that the situation in Israel is not as bad as in other societies around the world.

Furthermore, when examining the relationships between different sectors of society, we can see

three major changes compared with last year, and these are presented in Figure 17. Regarding the worst social rift in the opinion of Israelis, which was and remains the nationalist rift between Arabs and Jews, there was a slight increase in the feeling of the Israeli public that relations between Jews and Arabs were good: 11% felt last year that relations between Jews and Arabs were "very good" or "good," compared with 16% this year. A similar picture emerges regarding the ethnic rift. Last year, 43% of the general Jewish public felt that relations between Ashkenazi and Mizrachi Jews in Israel were "good" or "very good," as opposed to 53% who feel this way in 2004. It would seem, therefore, that the public feels there has been an improvement in social unity with regard to these two flash points.

A different picture is obtained when we look at the rift between new immigrants and veteran Israelis. In 2003, approximately 50% of Jews felt that relations between new immigrants and Israelis were good, but today only 40% of the Jewish public holds this view. This figure corresponds with the previous finding regarding the connection to Israel felt by new immigrants: the connection between new immigrants and Israel is in a state of flux, both in terms of their pride in belonging to Israel and their identification with the state. This contrasts with the connection felt by Israeli Arabs, which is slightly on the rise.

Figure 17
Inter-group Relations in Israel
"In your opinion, are the relations between Ashkenazim and Mizrachim in Israel good or poor";
"and between Israeli Arabs and Jews"; "and between new immigrants and veteran Israelis"
Very good and good*

2003　　2004

*　The sample for the questions on immigrants-veteran Israelis and Ashkenazim-Mizrachim was asked of Jews only; the sample for the question on Jews-Arabs was asked of the general population.

2. Opinions of Israeli Youth according to the 2004
Youth and Democracy Survey – General Characterization of the Youth Population

The youth survey was conducted in March 2004[14] and included 585 Jewish and Arab young people between the ages 15-18. The survey presents and characterizes youth as a separate group. Comparative results between the youth survey and the adult survey are cited in their entirety in Appendix C.

Satisfaction with democracy in Israel and support for the characteristics of a democratic regime

In comparing the youth survey and the adult survey, it was found that 53% of young people

are satisfied with the way Israel's democracy functions, compared with 45% of adults. The fact that the youth express greater satisfaction with Israel's democratic functioning than adults corresponds with the findings presented in Figure 24, which illustrate the youth's tendency to support characteristics of the democratic regime more than adults. Young people show a high level of support for the method of elections, confidence in politicians, a high level of support for freedom of speech and a moderate perception of corruption. All of these are greater than the corresponding findings for adults.

14. The survey used a representative sample of the Israeli population, Jewish and Arab. It consisted of two samples: a sample of adults aged 18 and older, which entailed 1,200 respondents; and a sample of youth aged 15-17, which included 585 respondents. In both of the samples interviewees were questioned in Hebrew, Arabic and Russian. The survey was conducted by the Dahaf Research Institute. Sampling error for the youth survey is ±4.1.

Nonetheless, undemocratic statements are still quite prevalent among the youth. More than half the young people think that politicians do not consider the opinions of ordinary citizens (compared with 62% of adults); 43% of young people support restrictions on freedom of speech for those criticizing the country (compared with 51% of adults); more than one-third of young people feel that corruption is necessary in order to climb the political ladder (in contrast with 43% of adults); and some 25% express a lack of confidence in the electoral

method (as opposed to 32% of adults). Along with this, youth desire for strong leadership stands out, a desire that is not so different from the desire expressed by adults and coincides with the anti-democratic tendencies they demonstrated.

In looking at the findings from previous surveys conducted among Jewish youth, we find that their desire for strong leadership is not a stable characteristic. In 1984 we found that 28% of Jewish young people expressed a preference

Figure 18
Agreement with Non-Democratic Statements
Desire for strong leaders, lack of trust in politicians, desire to restrict freedom of speech, perception of political corruption and lack of trust in electoral system*

* "A few strong leaders could do more good for the country than all the discussions and laws" ("agree," "strongly agree" – out of 4 categories), "Politicians do not tend to consider the opinion of ordinary citizens" ("agree," "strongly agree" – out of 4 categories), "Speakers should be prohibited from expressing harsh criticism of the State of Israel" ("agree," "strongly agree" – out of 4 categories), "Knesset members do not care what the public thinks" ("agree," "strongly agree" – out of 5 categories), "In order to reach a top political position in Israel today, you have to be corrupt" ("completely disagree," "fairly disagree" – out of 5 categories), "It doesn't matter who you vote for, it doesn't change the situation" ("agree," "strongly agree" – out of 5 categories).

for strong leaders in Israel, compared with a parliamentary system.[15] Five years later, in 1989, we found that 74% of Jewish youth supported the idea of strong leadership.[16] In 1995, some six years later, 37% of young people supported this concept,[17] while in 2004, in the survey conducted for this study, 65% of all Jewish youth supports strong leaders.[18]

A comparison of young people from the different groups shows that **Arab youth perceive the political system as being less corrupt** (23% of Arab youth agreed that in order to reach the top of the political ladder one needs to be corrupt, compared with 40% of Israeli-born Jewish youth and 37% of immigrant youth). **Arab youth are less interested in strong leadership** (43% of Arab youth, in contrast with 65% of Israeli-born Jewish youth and 66% of immigrant youth). In comparison with this, young immigrants believe less than other youth groups in politicians' integrity (61% of immigrant youth agree that politicians do not tend to consider the opinions of the man in the street, compared with 52% of Israeli-born youth and 55% of Arab youth), but among the young people they are the ones who demonstrate the greatest support for freedom of speech (only 28% of immigrant youth

agree that people should be prohibited from sharply criticizing the country, compared with 48% of Israeli-born Jewish youth and 39% of Arab youth). Thus, it would appear that there is no clear and uniform pattern regarding the impact of socio-demographic characteristics and cultural background on anti-democratic tendencies among Israeli youth.

We can see that youth are less tolerant than adults when it comes to undemocratic statements and more satisfied with the way Israel's democracy functions. However, when we break down the concept of "democracy" into more narrow aspects than have already been discussed, we find that young people express attitudes that have serious implications from a democratic point of view: they support the concept of "transfer," demonstrate a low level of political participation, feel a weak connection with Israel, etc. It could be that youth's perception of the concept of "democracy" is narrower than that of adults and focuses on formal and narrow ideas of the political system and method. This may also be the reason that young people express greater satisfaction with Israeli democracy.

15. Van Leer Institute Survey, 1984, M. Tzemach: "There is an opinion that in order to overcome the country's serious problems, we must totally change the political system in Israel and establish a strong regime of leaders who will not be dependent on any party. Others think that we need to leave things the way they are. What do you think?" (1-2; categories of agreement). Tzemach, M and R. Tzin, **Attitudes of Young People Regarding Democratic Values**, Van Leer, Jerusalem, 1984.

16. Guttman Institute Survey, 1989, Z. Ben Sira: "What the country needs now are strong leaders that the people can trust, and what we don't need today are discussions and arguments in the Knesset and the parties." (1-6; 3 categories of agreement). Ben-Sira, Z. **Zionism versus Democracy**, Magnes, Jerusalem, 1995.

17. Carmel Institute Survey, 1995, R. Gal and Y. Ezrachi: "There is an opinion that in order to overcome the country's serious problems we need to change the political system and set up a government of strong leaders who are not dependent upon political parties and coalitions. Others think we should leave things the way they are. What do you think?" (1-2; categories of agreement). Gal, R., and Y. Ezrachi, **World views and attitudes of high school pupils on the subjects of society, security and peace**. Carmel Institute, Zichron Ya'akov, 1995.

18. Democracy Survey 2004: "Several strong leaders would be better for the country than discussions and laws." ("Agree", "Strongly agree" – out of four categories).

Feeling a Connection with Israel

The issue of youth's connection to the state and sense of belonging to the community was examined from three angles: the degree to which youth feel a sense of belonging to the country, how proud they are to be Israeli, and how certain they are they will remain in Israel. As can be seen from Table 2, **the connection between the young people and the state is, indeed, weaker than that of the adults**, but it is not lower in absolute terms: as opposed to 87% of adults, **only 73% of young people see their future in Israel**. The situation is worse with regard to their sense of belonging to the country: only 52% of young people feel part of Israel and its problems, compared with 73% of adults. With regard to their level of pride at being Israeli, we found no difference between youth and adults (79%

of young people, and the same percentage of adults, feel tremendous pride or a certain pride in being Israeli).

A comparison with previous studies shows that the percentage of Jewish youth who intend to **remain** in Israel has stayed quite stable over the past several decades: 74% intend to remain in Israel according to the 1989 survey,[19] 72% indicated their intention of remaining in Israel according to the 1995 survey,[20] and 73% according to the 2004 youth survey.

On the issue of patriotism and connection to the state, a comparison was made among the youth according to their native country and nationality (see Figure 19). It was found that the feelings of Jewish youth who were born in Israel are, for the most part, similar to those of adults.

Table 2

Belonging to a Community and Connection to the State, among Israeli Youth and Adults

Survey question	Adults 2004	Youth 2004	Youth compared with adults
Do you or do you not want to remain in Israel long term? (certain that I want to, want to but not certain)	87	75	-12
To what extent are you sure that you will remain in Israel? (absolutely sure I will remain, pretty sure I will remain)	87	73	-14
To what extent are you proud to be an Israeli? (very proud, quite proud)	79	79	0
To what extent do you feel yourself part of the state of Israel and its problems? (to a very great extent, to a great extent)	73	52	-21

19. From the survey conducted by the Guttman Institute presented by Ben-Sira in 1989 in the Guttman Institute Survey, the question was, "Are you certain you will remain in Israel?" (1-5).

20. In another survey conducted by the Carmel Institute, Gal and Ezrachi used the following wording: "Are you certain you will remain in Israel, in other words, that you will not move permanently to another country?" (1-5).

Thus, Israeli-born youth exhibit the highest level of belonging to the community of all the youth groups: 61% feel part of the country, 78% are convinced or quite convinced that they will remain in Israel, and 89% are proud to be Israelis. Nevertheless, these figures are still lower than those for the adult population.

Among the populations of immigrant youth and Arab youth, the picture is slightly different. Immigrant youth feel proud to belong to Israel to the same degree as Israeli-born Jewish youth, but their sense of identity with the country is weaker: less than half of the immigrant youth feel that they are part of the state of Israel and its problems. Similarly, the tendency of immigrant youth to leave Israel is the highest among all

the groups of youth questioned: only 51% are convinced that they will remain in Israel in the future.

Arab youth present an opposing picture, in other words, their sense of pride in being Israeli is the lowest: only 46% of Arab youth feels a sense of pride in belonging to the country, and less than one-third feels any sense of identification with the state and its problems. Alongside this, they feel a strong connection to the country, and the percentages of those who intend to leave or remain here are similar to those of Jewish youth (70% intend to stay).

In studying the same variables according to **political** attitude (left vs. right), we found that

Figure 19

**Feeling a Connection to State Patriotism,
Identifying with the State and a Desire to Remain in Israel among Israeli Youth,
by a Breakdown of Native-born Jews, Immigrant Jews and Arab Youth***

*   "How proud are you of being Israeli," "How certain are you that you will remain in Israel," "To what degree do you feel part of the State of Israel and its problems" (Very proud / fairly proud; I am completely certain I will remain / I am fairly certain I will remain; To a great degree and to a large degree).

youth from the political center and the political left feel less pride in belonging to Israel, less identification with the country, and a weaker desire to remain in the country than young people from the political right and less than adults who hold the same political positions (center and left). Thus, for example, only 35% of young people from the center and 48% of youth from the left feel part of the country, in contrast with 61% of youth from the right. In addition, only 62% of youth from the center of the political map and 63% of young people who identify with the political left are convinced they will remain in Israel, compared with 80% from the political right.

Figure 20 presents some of the possible reasons why Israeli youth and adults leave the country. As can be seen from the figure, about 50% of young people cite the security situation as the primary reason for emigration. In contrast, adults are more concerned with the economic situation.

Confidence in National Institutions

Figure 21 presents the degree of confidence experienced by youth in the country's various institutions in contrast with adults. The three institutions that attracted the greatest expression of confidence among the youth were the IDF (80%), the Supreme Court (77%) and the Israeli

Figure 20
Main Reasons for Emigration from Israel among Youth and Adults*

* "In your opinion, which of the following is the main factor that arouses doubts as to the desire to live in Israel, among people who have such doubts" ("the security situation, the economic situation, the social situation, rise in anti-democratic tendencies, status of religion in the state, other").

police (76%). The institutions that attracted the least confidence among young people were political institutions: the parties (38%), government ministers (43%), and the prime minister (42%). This contrasts with adults who expressed greatest trust in the IDF (86%), followed by the Supreme Court (79%) and the president (73%), while least confidence was expressed in the Histadrut Labor Federation (38%) and political parties (27%).

Surprisingly enough, it was found that young people choose to believe more in bureaucratic executive institutions than adults: they believe in the Histadrut more than adults (53% of the young have confidence in the Histadrut, compared with 38% of adults), in the police (76% of young people compared with 66% of the adults), and in the Chief Rabbinate (56% of youth in contrast with 45% of adults).

As stated, we found an increase in the public sense of confidence in legal institutions, compared with a drop in faith in political institutions. On the other hand, youth place their trust in the Knesset and in political parties more than adults and less in the State Attorney's office: 38% of young people have confidence in the parties and 56% in the Knesset, compared with 27% and 46% respectively among adults; and 58% of young people have confidence in the State Attorney's office, in contrast with 66% of adults.

Figure 21

Trust in Institutions

"To what degree do you trust each of the following persons or institutions"
To a large degree and to a certain degree

Table 3

The Institution that Best Safeguards Democracy, among Israeli Youth and Adults

Survey question	Adults 2004	Youth 2004	Youth compared with adults
Which safeguards Israeli democracy better – the Prime Minister, the Supreme Court, the Knesset or the media			
Supreme Court	47	35	**-12**
The Media	30	31	**+1**
Knesset	14	21	**+7**
Prime Minister	9	13	**+4**

The attitude of youth regarding confidence in legal institutions rather than the legislative branch of government can also be seen from their assessment of the contribution made by different institutions towards safeguarding democracy. As can be seen in Table 3, young people tend more than adults to attribute protection of democracy to the Knesset. This trend is the opposite of that among the adults, who tend to place greater value on the legal institutions and less on the political institutions.

Confidence in national institutions was also examined by nationality. We found that Arab youth exhibits much lower levels of confidence than Jewish youth in the prime minister, the IDF and the president. Thus, for example, only 20% of Arab youth place their trust in the prime minister, only 33% of Arab youth have confidence in the IDF, and only 38% have faith in the president.

Nonetheless, Arab youth have more confidence in the Knesset, the media and the Histadrut than Jewish youth. 67% of Arab young people expressed confidence in the media, which they perceive as quite balanced. Another institution that enjoys much more confidence among Arab than Jewish youth is the Knesset. This institution is trusted by 61% of Arab young people; presumably, the existence of Arab political parties and their involvement in the state influences their level of confidence in this institution. The Histadrut is also perceived by Arab youth as reliable: 63% of Arab young people expressed their confidence in it.

As a follow-up to the issue of confidence in national institutions, the following open-ended question was asked:[21] "What, in your opinion, is the agency (person, institution, organization) that best safeguards Israeli democracy?" Interviewers were asked to record the precise responses of the interviewees. 80% of the

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21. Dr. Rafael Ventura coded and analyzed the responses to this question.

interviewees from the general sample, and 72% of the youth responded to this question. Various types of answer were obtained, indicating an authority or government institution; referring to an organization, society or association; citing the name of a political party (or group of political parties); indicating the name of a specific person (names of ministers, past and present Knesset members, public figures and rabbis); referring to something related to the respondent's immediate social environment; an approach that ordinary citizens best safeguarded democracy; and the claim that in Israel there is no institution that safeguards democracy.

Table 4 compares the distribution of the various responses in the general sample with the sample of young people. The most common

Table 4
The Agency that Best Safeguards Democracy, among Israeli Youth and Adults

	General sample N = 961	Youth N = 423
The judicial branch (courts, Supreme Court, High Court of Justice)	31%	17%
The media / press	11%	6%
The legislative branch (Knesset, Knesset members, the Opposition)	9%	17%
The average citizen / general public / the people	8%	10%
The executive branch (the government, Prime Minister, local government)	7%	14%
Security institutions (security forces, IDF, police)	6%	7%
A political party or group of parties	5%	5%
Name of a public figure	4%	3%
Voluntary organizations (such as the Movement for Quality Government)	4%	5%
Social-economic organizations (such as the Histadrut)	3%	2%
Other state institutions (President, State Comptroller, State Attorney, Chief Rabbinate)	2%	4%
The social environment (parents, school, friends, youth movement)	2%	6%
No agency accomplishes this	8%	4%

type of response was that of an authority or government institution, and this was stated by about half the respondents, both adults and youth. Nevertheless, the internal division was different: in the general sample, most people chose the judicial branch (22% specifically cited the Supreme Court), while young people preferred the legislative and the executive branch (6% specifically mentioned the prime minister). This phenomenon coincides with the assessment we get from the previous examinations, according to which youth tend to have greater confidence in political institutions while adults tend to have more confidence in judicial institutions. It should be noted that both among adults and youth, there was no small number of respondents who decided that it was actually the defense system that best safeguarded democracy (most references in this context were to the IDF and the police).

The rate of response to this question among immigrants from the CIS was low (only 66%). The distribution among the respondents was quite different from among the general public. The most significant difference was the particularly high rate of immigrants (21%) who mentioned a specific person, and most of the names mentioned were those of political figures from the CIS (Avigdor Lieberman, Natan Sharansky, Marina Solodkin, Roman Bronfman). Furthermore, 15% of immigrants believe that the prime minister best safeguards Israeli democracy.

Not surprisingly, the responses of Arab Israelis differed from those of the Jewish population. Only 33% of the Arab interviewees referred to one of the state authorities (only 10% chose the judicial system), and very few of them cited the media. On the other hand, 23% of the Arab respondents chose an organization or association, and the most common responses were the Histadrut, the Association for Civil Rights in Israel and Al-Massawa Association for Equality between Jews and Arabs. Additionally, 11% of Arab interviewees mentioned the left-wing political parties, Arab parties and the peace movements, while 8% chose ordinary citizens.

Political Participation: interest, involvement and political knowledge

Political participation was examined in the survey in terms of political interest, expressing interest in current political events, the tendency to use the media to stay updated with what is happening, and the tendency to discuss political matters with friends and family members. The survey also looked at youth levels of political knowledge.

In general, it was found that **the level of interest and involvement of young people was significantly lower than that of the adults in all three areas we examined**, and they demonstrate a lower level of political knowledge than adults. Thus, for example, 61% of Israeli adults proved to have a reasonable level of expertise with regard to the political world, answering the questions that were posed. This compares with only 29% of Israeli youth.

As can be seen from Table 5, only about half of the young people interviewed expressed an interest in politics and reported frequently updating their knowledge through the media and discussing political matters with their

Table 5
Political Participation, among Israeli Youth and Adults

Survey question	Adults 2004	Youth 2004	Youth compared with adults
How often do you keep yourself updated regarding political matters using television, radio or the press? (Everyday, or several times a week)	79	56	-23
To what extent are you interested in politics? (To a great extent / to a certain extent)	67	50	-17
To what extent to you discuss political matters with your friends and with your family? (To a great extent / to a certain extent)	64	55	-9

friends. This compares with 67% of adults who expressed interest, 79% of whom tend to keep updated, and 64% who tend to discuss political matters. There is evidence, therefore, of a troubling phenomenon: **a low level of political interest among youth**.

Nevertheless, we can see interesting differences in the level of interest that characterizes young people from various groups. As is evident from Figure 22, Jewish young people born in Israel have the highest level of political involvement, as well as the broadest political knowledge relative to the other youth groups. In contrast with this, Arab young people display greater interest in politics than immigrant Jewish youth, but their level of political knowledge is lower than Jewish youth. And they tend to stay updated and discuss political matters to the same extent as immigrant youth.

When looking at the level of involvement of youth by gender, **we find tremendous differences between boys and girls: the boys are involved in politics, interested and stay updated, and demonstrate political knowledge to a greater extent than the girls**. 43% of the boys exhibited moderate or good political knowledge, compared with only 18% of the girls; 57% of the boys expressed an interest in politics in contrast with 45% of the girls; 59% of the boys use the media to update themselves frequently regarding politics, as opposed to only 49% of the girls; and 62% of the boys discuss political matters with family members, compared with only 49% of the girls. This difference indicates a low level of political interest among girls compared to boys among Israeli youth. The question asked was: "How does the level of interest in politics among Israeli youth compare with the level of interest expressed by young people around the world?"

Figure 22

**Level of Involvement in Politics, Interest and Political Knowledge
Among Israeli Adults in Comparison with Youth, by a Breakdown of Native-born Jews,
Immigrant Jews and Arab Youth***

* "To what degree are you interested in politics," "How often do you keep up with current affairs on television, radio or newspapers," To what degree do you discuss political matters with your friends and family" (to a large degree / to a certain degree; every day / several times a week; to a large degree / to a certain degree). The political knowledge scale was composed of a simple addition of responses to 3 questions ("Which party gained strength in the past elections," "What portion of the total government budget does the defense budget currently occupy," "Who is the current Knesset speaker"). Each correct response received a ranking of 1, while an incorrect response or the response "I don't know" received a ranking of 0. Respondents were considered to possess political knowledge if they answered two or three questions correctly, giving them a ranking of 2-3.

Figure 23 compares the results of an international comparative study on the subject of citizenship from the years 1999-2000, conducted by the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA), a survey that also included the State of Israel.[22]

First of all, we can see a certain decline in the level of interest exhibited by young people in 2004 compared with 2000. In addition, we see that Israel dropped in its relative ranking compared with the other countries participating in the study, in terms of the level of young people's involvement in politics. It is noteworthy that 2000 was not an election year, nor was 2004, and therefore we cannot attribute the difference to elections. Nevertheless, we can surmise that in 2000 the level of tension in the Israeli political

22. The survey was conducted as part of an international comparative study on the subject of citizenship, in which 24 countries participated. The study was conducted by the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA). Chief researcher for the study in Israel was Prof. Orit Ichilov. The research population in Israel comprised a representative sample of Israeli youth in Grade 11: 2,103 pupils from the Arab sector and 4,423 pupils from Jewish schools. The survey was conducted in the various countries between 1999-2000. The question asked was identical to the wording used by the Democracy Index Survey: "To what extent are you interested in politics?" (To a large extent / to a certain extent).

Figure 23

Current Level of Interest in Politics among Youth In Comparison with the Level of Interest among Youth in Various Democracies, and in Comparison with Israeli Youth in 2000*

* The information is taken from the report: Civic Knowledge and Engagement, Amadeo, J., Torney-Purta, J., Lehmann, R., Husfeldt, V. Nikolova, R., IEA, 2002, p. 108, http://www.wam.umd.edu/~iea/UpperSecondary_files/Civics%20Booklet%20J A.pdf

system was higher than it was this year. In the 2003 elections the Likud party, headed by Ariel Sharon, gained power for the second time and with a sweeping majority, and a certain degree of political stability was foreseen in the political system – stability that was not yet felt when the IEA survey was conducted in 2000.

Patterns of Protest and Opposition: "Refusal" and Willingness to Stage Illegal Protest

In recent years, discussions have raged throughout Israel on the issue of "refusal." This phenomenon is usually divided into two types: refusal to evacuate settlers when such

orders are issued and refusal to serve in the IDF due to Israel's policy towards the Palestinians. With regard to this sub-category, we looked at youth attitudes towards both aspects of this phenomenon. Another issue related to patterns of protest and opposition among young people is their willingness to take illegal steps, and even engage in violence, for the sake of protest – this was also examined by the survey.

As can be seen in Table 6, we found significant differences between youth and adults on the issue of protest and particularly with regard to their attitudes about refusal. On the issue of refusal, we found that **young people in the**

survey were more supportive of both types of refusal compared with the adult population in Israel. Nearly half the youth feel that refusing to evacuate settlers is permissible and that it is permissible to refuse to serve in the Territories for reasons of conscience. This compares with about 25% of the adults.

Each type of refusal is usually associated with a different political outlook, and therefore, we examined whether youth with different ideological tendencies support both types of refusal to a different degree. This issue was examined among Jewish respondents only because of the impact that nationality would have on their attitude in connection with this question. The results of this survey are shown in Figure 24.

Surprisingly enough, we found that in general youth from the entire gamut of political attitudes displays a similar level of tolerance towards refusal to evacuate settlers: approximately 40% of young people from the entire range of political outlooks were tolerant of such refusal. Nevertheless, right-wing youth were less supportive of refusal to serve because of Israel's policy in the Territories, while around half of the youth from the center of the political map and the left supported this type of refusal (49% of youth from the center and 51% of youth from the left). This demonstrates that the attitude of young people on the left and in the center towards refusal is generalized and sweeping, while the attitude of young people on the right depends on the situation: when the issue at hand is refusal to carry out orders that do not correspond with their political outlook, they are likely to justify refusal, but when refusal does

Table 6

Patterns of Protest and Opposition, among Israeli Youth and Adults

Survey question	Adults 2004	Youth 2004	Youth compared with adults
If the government or the Knesset were to make a decision that contradicts your opinion on the matter of the Territories and security, which of the following actions would you take? (Obey or demonstrate legally)	92	87	-5
You know that a soldier must refuse to follow an order that is blatantly illegal. But what about a soldier who refuses to follow orders because of his personal morals or ideology; for example, can a soldier refuse to follow an order to evacuate settlers? (Forbidden)	75	57	-18
What about a soldier who refuses to serve in the Territories because of Israel's policy towards the Palestinians; can a soldier refuse to serve in the Territories? (Forbidden)	71	57	-14

not correspond with their views, they tend to be less tolerant.

These statistics are liable to give rise to the claim that young people from the left and the center support patterns of illegal protest more than youth from the right. And yet, this is not seen in our examination of the additional parameter of a willingness to undertake illegal or violent action if a decision is made on matters of security or the Territories that contradicts the respondent's own opinions. Our examination of this category shows that Jewish young people on the right tended to state, somewhat more than others, their willingness to engage in illegal action in such a case.

Social Rifts: solidarity and tensions between groups

Young people have a more positive feeling than adults towards the relationship between new immigrants and veteran Israelis and between people from different socio-economic strata in Israel. Some 40% of all Jewish adults feel that the relationship between immigrants and veteran Israelis is good or very good, compared with about 55% of all young people. Additionally, only about 25% of all adults feel that relations between rich and poor in this country are good, compared with 39% of the youth. Perhaps this is because immigrant youth in Israel have a smoother absorption process than immigrant

Figure 24

Support for Refusal to Evacuate Settlers and Refusal due to Israel's Policy towards the Palestinians, and Willingness to Stage Illegal Protest, in a Cross-section of Political Attitudes among Jewish Youth*

*   "For example, can a soldier refuse an order to evacuate settlers," "And what of a soldier who refuses to serve in the Territories due to Israel's policy towards the Palestinians" ("permitted"); "If a decision were made by the government and Knesset that is opposed to your opinion on the topic of territory and security, which of the following actions would you take" (protest fiercely against the decision even beyond what is permitted by law, but without use of physical force / take all measures, even those beyond what is permitted by law, including the use of physical force).

Table 7

Social Rifts among Israeli Youth and Adults

Survey question	Adults 2004	Youth 2004	Youth compared with adults
Relations between Ashkenazi and Mizrachi populations? (Very good, good) [Jews only]	53	53	0
Relations between new immigrants and veteran Israelis (Very good, good) [Jews only]	40	55	+15
Do you think relations between Israel's religious and non-religious populations are good or not good? (Very good, good) [Jews only]	28	28	0
Relations between rich and poor? (Very good, good)	24	39	+15
Relations between Israel Arabs and Jews? (Very good, good)	16	14	-2

adults on account of the fact that they encounter fewer language problems, worry less about finding work, are better at social integration, etc. The most prominent area of tension as seen by the youth is that between Israeli Arabs and Jews, followed by tensions due to religious differences. The economic rift is ranked third. In final place are ethnic tensions and those between immigrants and veteran Israelis.

Figure 25 presents the attitudes of young people towards the five types of social rift, divided according to religious affiliation (religious-secular), ethnic origin, nationality (Arabs-Jews), seniority in Israel (immigrants-veteran Israelis), and social status.[23]

With regard to the religious rift, we noticed that religious youth are more likely than their secular counterparts to assess the relationship between religious and secular populations in the country as good: 41% of religious youth feel that relations between the religious and secular are good, compared with only 25% of secular youth. Regarding the national rift, minority youth – that is, Arabs – feel that relations with the majority group – with Jewish youth – are quite good (47% versus only 5% of Jewish youth).

Differences were also found regarding the ethnic rift. Here we questioned only Israeli-born Jewish youth and found that 65% of Ashkenazi youth born in Israel feel that relations between Ashkenazi and Mizrachi Jews in Israel are good. About 53% of native-born Israeli youth, that is, at least third generation in Israel, consider such relationships good, and only 46% of Israeli-born Mizrachi young people think that relationships

23. Only Jewish youth were asked questions concerning ethnic and social rifts.

Figure 25

The Five Rifts in Israel, by a Breakdown of Youth from Various Sides of the Divided Sectors: The religious rift among religious and secular; the ethnic rift among Ashkenazim, Mizrachim and native-born Israelis; the national rift among Jews and Arabs; the immigration rift among immigrant youth and Israeli-born youth; the economic rift between youth of high, medium and low economic status*

* The division into religious and secular was done using the question: "To what degree do you observe religious tradition." 284 religious young people and 288 secular young people were found. The division into Ashkenazim, Mizrachim and third-generation native-born Israelis was done using the question: "Where were you born, and where was your father born." 65 Ashkenazi young people, 77 Mizrachi young people and 53 third-generation native-born young people were found – all among respondents born in Israel only. The division into Jews and Arabs was done according to the language of the interview. 453 Jewish young people and 129 Arab young people were found. The division into immigrants and veteran residents were done by the question regarding the year of immigration to Israel, among Jews only. 360 native-born Israelis and 86 immigrants were found. The division into economic status was done using the question: "The monthly income for an average family of four came to about NIS 9,300 last month. Considering your family's expenses, do you spend…" 182 young people of high economic status, 151 of medium economic status and 132 of low economic status were found.

between Ashkenazi and Mizrachi Jews are good. With regard to relationships between immigrants and veteran Israelis and the economic rift, no significant differences were found between the different groups.

It would appear that not only do youth assess the relationship between immigrants and veteran Israelis and between rich and poor as being better than adults but that there is agreement between young people from different sectors of the population with regard to the level of tension.

This reinforces the feeling that the rifts among young people are less significant compared with the general population.

Support for Equality and Rights for Minorities

Our examination of the differences between youth and adults regarding the rights aspect in general, as can be seen in Appendix C, gives rise to an interesting issue concerning freedom of speech. It appears that **young people are less**

appreciative than adults of the principle of realizing freedom of speech and that they are less satisfied than adult citizens regarding this issue: about 20% of youth think that Israel does not have freedom of speech. Similarly, around 25% feel that Israel has more limited freedom of speech than other countries. Many more of the young people, relative to the adults, are also willing to condone public criticism of the state, that is, they demonstrate more tolerance to those whose opinions differ from theirs, than adults. Thus, for example, 57% of the youth do not feel that people should be prohibited from strongly criticizing Israel, as opposed to 49% of adults. A possible explanation for this phenomenon is the fact that young people have frequent encounters with hierarchical institutions and restricting situations, such as family, school and conscription into the IDF. All of these, plus their natural need to express their opinion, a need that characterizes their age group, are likely to support their feeling that freedom of speech is restricted in Israel.

From a socio-economic perspective, many more young people demonstrate support for a socialist policy, despite the fact that the socio-economic rift is perceived by youth as being more limited than adults consider it. And yet, some 80% of young people feel that there is not enough social and economic equality in Israel.

With regard to actually giving equal rights to Israeli Arabs, the picture is more complex. Only about one-third of Jewish youth oppose a policy of encouraging Arabs to emigrate from the country, and this is in contrast with about 40% of adults. In other words, Jewish youth are a greater

supporter of the concept of "transfer" than Jewish adults. Nevertheless, young people understand the need for the agreement of the Jewish majority regarding critical decisions, such as evacuation of territory: 71% of the Jewish youth feels there must be agreement among the Jewish majority regarding such decisions, compared with 77% of Jewish adults.

The feeling of discrimination among Arab young people is quite strong: 84% of Arab youth feel that Israeli Arabs are discriminated against. Thus, it would seem that the feeling concerning the realization of actual equality is lower among Arab youth.

Some 60% of Israeli-born Jewish youth agree that Israeli Arabs are, indeed, discriminated against compared to Jews. And yet, only 46% supports full equal rights for Arab citizens. When it comes to political equality, **only 28% of Jewish young people support the idea of including Arab political parties in the government, including Arab ministers**. This picture corresponds with the fact that the attitude that won most support among youth and adults alike was the need for a consensus among the Jewish minority regarding critical issues for the state.

Support by Jewish immigrant youth for the idea of equality for Arabs was greater than that by Jewish youth in general: 64% of immigrant youth support full equal rights and 59% agree that Israel's Arab citizens are discriminated against in comparison with its Jewish citizens. All the same, less than one-third support the actual realization of political rights for Arabs

as a group, by including Arab parties in the government. This compares with the attitude of Israeli-born Jewish youth. The tolerance of immigrant youth relative to that of Israeli-born Jewish youth is also reflected in their greater opposition to transfer: 41% of immigrant youth do not agree that the government should encourage Arabs to emigrate from Israel, compared with only about one-third of Israeli-born Jewish youth.

Teaching Democracy: satisfaction with civics lessons and informal educational sources for teaching democracy

Up to now we have presented perceptions, attitudes and feelings regarding various aspects and elements of the democratic regime in general, and Israel's democracy in particular, among Israeli youth. Another question looks at the sources of the various attitudes exhibited by these people. There are various sources that can be used to educate youth regarding the concept of democracy: political involvement and participation, support for the system, confidence in the country's institutions, etc. The primary formal source is school, and the civics classes taught there. Other, less formal frameworks that can impart democratic principles are the family, youth movements, the media and rabbis. In this section we look at the level of satisfaction among young people and adults with the formal teaching of democracy that young people receive as part of their civics classes and the degree to which the various informal settings contribute to this important educational process.

Satisfaction with the degree to which civics classes prepare our youth to be good citizens of the state are moderate, both among adults and youth, although adults exhibit greater skepticism in this regard: 57% of Israeli youth feel that their civics classes fulfill this important goal "to a large extent" or "to a certain extent," compared with only 41% of Israeli adults.

There are significant differences in the level of satisfaction based on nationality: 76% of Arab youth feels that civics classes provide them with the foundation they need to be citizens, as do 63% of Arab adults. This compares with 51% of Jewish youth and 36% of Jewish adults. Thus, the Arab public finds the formal teaching of democracy more effective than the Jewish population.

Other differences were obtained from the comparison between different educational streams, as described in Figure 26. This question was asked only of Jewish youth. The greatest satisfaction with the formal teaching of democracy is youth from state-religious schools: 64% are satisfied "to a great degree" or "to a certain degree" with the civics curriculum. They are followed by young people attending state schools, where 53% express a certain degree of satisfaction. Satisfaction in the different special frameworks is somewhat lower: only 46% of those in private and democratic schools feel that their civics classes prepare them to be good citizens. And satisfaction is expressed by only 37% of those attending ultra-Orthodox schools. Nonetheless, it is important to remember that there are liable to be differences between pupils of different schools that impinge upon their responses to this question. Thus, for example, pupils attending private and democratic schools are likely to be more critical and skeptical

Figure 26

Satisfaction with Formal Education for Democracy, by Type of School

"In your opinion, to what degree do civics classes
prepare youth to be good citizens of the state?"
To a large degree and to a certain degree (Jewish sample only)

than other pupils in this regard, and thus they probably receive their democratic training at the school from sources that are not part of the formal civics curriculum. Additionally, pupils from ultra-Orthodox schools are likely to find less interest and value in the civics curriculum relative to other subjects and thus have a low assessment. For this reason we should avoid making sweeping conclusions.

Young people are likely to be taught democratic principles and values from other sources as well. When we examined the main sources that contributed to teaching democratic values to youth, we found that Jewish youth born in Israel obtain their democratic values primarily from their parents: 56% of Israeli-born Jewish youth pointed to their parents as making a major

contribution towards their democratic education, and 28% mentioned school. Among immigrant youth the figures were 38% and 43% respectively, and for Arab youth, 26% and 43% respectively. The third most important agent according to young people for teaching democracy was the media: this was mentioned by 11% of immigrant youth, 7% of Arab youth, and 3% of Israeli-born Jewish youth.

We can understand this phenomenon if we look at how close families of the different young people are to the streams of primary educational agent. We can assume that parents of immigrant youth and Arab youth are less involved with what goes on in Israel than their Israeli-born Jewish counterparts, among other things, because Hebrew is their second language and

because they are less familiar with the principles underlying the Israeli form of government. Therefore, sources that are external to the home – school and the media – play a more pivotal role in teaching democratic values in this group than among Israeli-born Jewish youth. This also explains the greater degree of faith in the civics curriculum expressed by Arab youth and Arab adults, relative to Jewish youth and adults. In any event, the two most critical sources for teaching democratic values among Israeli youth are the school and parents.

How the Characteristics of Youth are Perceived: the generation gap

We often hear claims of ethical indifference among the youth and that the connection between young people and the state have weakened. How do the young people themselves perceive this? Do they attribute such indifference to themselves the way adults do? And what are the feelings of the adults regarding the younger generation? The Democracy Survey examined these important questions.

Figure 27

Perceptions of Youth and Adults Regarding Different Aspects of Democracy,*
And the Assessment of Adults Regarding the Strengthening
of these Characteristics among Youth in Israel**

* "In your opinion, to what degree is each of the following true or untrue with regard to young people in Israel today: Will continue to live in Israel, violent, respect their parents, believe in equality between Jews and Arabs, law-abiding, loyal to the state, believe in democratic principles, respect the religious tradition, take an interest in what happens in the country" [1-4]. (For each question, the frequencies are provided for the responses "to a large degree" and "to a certain degree," with the exception of the question "violent," where the responses "to a small degree" or "not at all" were included). The question was presented to adults and youth using the same wording.
** Among adults only – "In your opinion, is each of the following traits becoming stronger or weaker among youth in Israel along the years: Belief in democratic principles, respect for religious tradition, take an interest in what happens in the country, will continue to live in Israel, belief in equality between Jews and Arabs, law-abiding, violent, respect their parents, loyal to the state" [1-5], (becoming much stronger or becoming slightly stronger).

In Figure 27 we can see the perceived characteristics of youth regarding various elements of democratic values, as they are perceived by adults and by the youth themselves, as well as the adults' assessment of the degree to which these democratic characteristics are present among Israeli youth.

Young people assess their **tendency to remain in Israel** to a much greater degree than do adults. 76% of young people and a similar percentage of adults believe that the youth will remain in Israel. We should note that about 25% of youth and adults feel that youth have a tendency to emigrate, and this statistic is very similar to the number we saw previously regarding the degree of certainty young people feel regarding their intention to remain in Israel.

In connection with **a belief in democratic principles**, 78% of adults consider that Israeli youth believe in democratic principles, as compared with 72% of the youth. An even greater discrepancy was found regarding the level of young people's loyalty to the state: adults attribute to youth a much higher level of loyalty to the state than the youth attribute to themselves – 81% of adults see young people as loyal to the state, compared with only 69% of the young people themselves. And yet, most adults also believe that the connection between the youth and the state and the democratic regime is weakening (this assessment is supported somewhat by the survey's findings).

Regarding the level of interest demonstrated by Israeli youth in what is going on in the country, there is a consensus between the youth and the adults: more than two-thirds of young people

and adults agree that young people are interested in what goes on in the country. The picture is completed with the assessment of 41% of adults that as time goes on, the youth's tendency to know what is happening in the country is becoming stronger. These observations are quite optimistic, both among youth and adults, and are weakened by the survey's findings.

In assessing **the respect young people feel towards various values** – law, tradition and the family – the outcomes are more moderate. Adults agree that the degree of youth respect for these values is becoming weaker. This phenomenon, that is, that adults assess the young people better than the young assess themselves, is repeated in relation to the assessment of youth to uphold the law: 66% of adults believe that the young uphold the law, compared with only 56% of youth themselves. This also holds true for the belief in equality between Arabs and Jews in Israel: 38% of adults perceive youth as believing in equality between Jews and Arabs in Israel, higher than the figure that youth give themselves.

We can see that for some of the democratic characteristics there are no significant differences between the way youth perceive themselves and the way adults perceive the youth, except for the four aspects relating to connection to the state and faith in democracy. It would seem that adults attribute to the young a much higher degree of loyalty than the youth attribute to themselves: 81% of adults perceive Israeli youth as loyal to the state, compared with only 69% of the youth themselves.

The most disturbing assessment regarding the characteristics of contemporary Israeli youth

relates to **its tendency towards violence**. Only 20% of youth and adults believe that youth today do not tend towards violence, that is, about 80% perceive tendencies towards violence among Israeli youth. Some 74% of adults see the tendency to violence becoming stronger among Israeli youth.

In response to the question: "There is discussion of whether today's youth are willing to do what is necessary in order to ensure the country's security. What is your opinion – are young people today less willing than in the past, more willing, or equally as willing," it was found that 54% of Jewish youth believe that youth's commitment to the country's security is lower than in the past, and this is contrasted with 62% of Jewish adults. 12% of Jewish adults think that today's youth is willing to do more for the country's security than youth in the past. This compares with 31% of Jewish young people themselves. Although many young people perceive youth commitment to the nation's security as being weaker than in the past, about one-third see youth's commitment to the nation's security as stronger today. Youth's assessment of themselves is more positive in this aspect than the adults' assessment. Youth's assessment regarding their commitment to the nation's security represents a ray of light given their pessimistic assessments regarding their connection to Israel and their commitment to democratic values.

E. Appendices

Appendix A
Democracy Index 2004

Institutional Aspect					
Characteristic	Indicator	Scale	Israel's score	Relative ranking	Change
Accountability	Vertical accountability	1-3 (1=improper elections)	3*	1-35 (36)	-
	Horizontal accountability	0-6 (0=high involvement by the military)	3	35-36 (36)	-
Representativeness	Deviation from the principle of proportionality	0-100 (0=absolute proportionality)	1.98*	8 (35)	-
	Party dominance	0-100 (100=high dominance, less representativeness)	315	8 (35)	-
Checks and balances	Level of restriction placed on the executive branch	1-7 (1=unlimited authority)	7*	1-30 (36)	-
	Scope of restrictions on the ability of the executive branch to change policy	0-1 (0=lack of restrictions)	0.7864*	6 (36)	-
Political participation	Rate of voter turnout in national elections of all citizens registered in the voter registry	0-100 (100=full voter turnout)	67.8%*	20 (36)	- (Rise in relative position)
	Rate of voter turnout in national elections of all citizens of voting age	0-100 (100=full voter turnout)	74.4%*	12 (36)	-
	Rate of voter turnout in local elections	0-100 (100=full voter turnout)	50%	No international comparison	↓
Governmental integrity	Perceived corruption index	0-10 (0=high level of corruption)	7	17-18 (36)	↓
	Corruption index	0-6 (0=high level of corruption)	4	19-24 (36)	↑

Democracy Index 2004 (Continued)

Rights Aspect					
Characteristic	Indicator	Scale	Israel's score	Relative ranking	Change
Political rights	Level of competition in participation	1-5 (1=repression of opposition activity)	5*	1-24 (35)	-
	Freedom of the press	0-100 (0=complete freedom)	27	28 (36)	⬆
Civil rights	Index of damage to human rights	1-5 (1=maintenance of human rights)	4*	17-19 (19)	-
	Rate of prisoners per 100,000 residents	0-100,000 (0=very few prisoners)	143	22 (36)*	⬇
	Rate of prisoners per 100,000 residents, including security prisoners	0-100,000 (0=very few prisoners)	189	No international comparison	⬇
	Law and order index	0-6 (0=low level of maintaining law and order)	5	18-25 (36)	-
	Religious freedom	1-7 (1=full freedom)	3	15-24 (27)	-
Social rights	Gini coefficient for available income	0-1 (0=full equality)	0.3738	-	⬇
	Gini coefficient for economic income	0-1 (0=full equality)	0.5320	No international comparison	⬇
Economic rights	Economic freedom index	1-5 (1=great economic freedom)	2.36	20 (36)	⬆
Gender equality	Gender development index	0-1 (0=lack of equality)	0.891*	19 (34)	-
	Gender empowerment index	0-1 (0=lack of equality)	0.596*	16 (30)	-
Minority rights	Political discrimination	0-4 (0=lack of discrimination)	3*	25-17 (28)	-
	Economic discrimination	0-4 (0=lack of discrimination)	3*	28-17 (28)	-
	Cultural discrimination	0-12 (0=lack of discrimination)	1*	19-14 (28)	-

Democracy Index 2004 (Continued)

Stability Aspect					
Government stability	Changes in government	Number of regime changes between 1992-2002	5*	32-31 (35)	-
	Incompletion of term of office indicator	0-100 (100=full term of office)	24.57%**	No international comparison	-
Protest and opposition	Weighted index of political conflict	0-infinity (0=lack of conflict)	3,100*	29 (36)	-
Social rifts	Religious tension	0-6 (0=high level of tension)	3	35 (36)	
	National/ethnic/language tension	0-6 (0=high level of tension)	2	35-36 (36)	-

*   Statistics taken from the 2003 Democracy Index

**   Percentage of term of office completed as of April 2004

Appendix B
The 2004 Democracy Survey Compared with the 2003 Democracy Survey

1. Institutional Aspect				
Index characteristics	Survey question	General 2003	General 2004	Difference*
A. Perception of the principle of accountability				
In the election process	"Doesn't matter who you vote for, it won't change things (disagree)	54	57	(+3)
Actions of elected officials in connection with the people's preferences	"To what extent do you agree or disagree that politicians do not consider the opinions of ordinary citizens" (disagree)	38	38	(-)
	"Knesset members don't care about what the general public thinks" (disagree)	31	36	(+5)
	"The politicians we elect try to keep their campaign promises" (agree)	22	21	-1
B. Checks and balances				
	"We need to revoke the Supreme Court's authority to rescind laws passed by the Knesset" (disagree)	50	59	+9
C. Political participation				
1. Level of political participation				
Interest in politics	"To what extent are you interested in politics?" (interested)	76	67	-9
Keeping up-to-date about politics	How often do you keep up with what is going on in politics, via television, radio or the press? (daily or several times a week)	87	79	-8
Discuss politics	To what extent do you discuss political matters with family and friends (discuss)	69	64	-5
Engage in formal activity	Are you a supporter of or active in any political party (party member and above)	7	7	-
2. Perception of the level to which political participation is realized				
Assessment of the level of participation	In your opinion, are Israeli citizens more or less involved in politics than in other countries? (more)	40	49	+9
Feeling of impact	To what extent can you and your friends have an impact on government policy? (can)	20	18	-2
D. Governmental integrity				
Attitudes regarding corruption of government officials	Think about the following actions: are they justified or are they not justified? – An official taking a bribe while carrying out his job (not justified)	96	95	(-1)
	In general, do you think the people running the country are looking out for their own private interests, or are they acting for the general good? (general good)	15	15	-
	In order to reach the top of the political ladder in Israel, you need to be corrupt (disagree)	36	41	(+5)
Perception of the level of corruption in Israel	In your opinion, is Israel more corrupt than other countries, or less corrupt? (less)	11	15	+4

The 2004 Democracy Survey Compared with the 2003 Democracy Survey (continued)

2. Rights Aspect				
Index characteristics	Survey question	General 2003	General 2004	Difference*
A. Political rights and citizenship				
Attitudes towards political and civil rights				
Freedom of speech	I support freedom of speech for all people, regardless of their position (agree)	76	75	(-1)
	Speakers should be prohibited from expressing harsh criticism against Israel in public (disagree)	52	49	-3
Religious freedom	Every couple in Israel should be permitted to marry in any manner they choose (agree)	63	60	(-3)
Perception of the degree to which rights are realized	In your opinion, to what degree are there equal rights in Israel? (doesn't exist)	37	37	-
	Rule of law? (doesn't exist)	25	20	-5
	Equality before the law? (doesn't exist)	32	28	-4
	Freedom of speech (doesn't exist)	19	14	-5
	Religious freedom (doesn't exist)	26	20	-6
Perception of the degree to which rights are realized – comparatively	In your opinion, to what degree does Israel respect or not respect human rights? (doesn't respect)	30	31	(+1)
	In your opinion, are human rights safeguarded in Israel more or less than in other countries? (less)	27	40	+13
	And freedom of speech? (less)	15	17	+2
B. Social and economic rights				
Support for social-economic policy	Regarding the structure of economic life in Israel, do you support a more socialist approach or a more capitalist approach (socialist)	54	60	+6
Assessment of the degree to which socio-economic rights are realized	There isn't enough socio-economic equality in Israel (agree)	82	88	+6
C. Support for gender equality				
	Men are more successful political leaders than women (disagree)	65	70	+5

The 2004 Democracy Survey Compared with the 2003 Democracy Survey (continued)

Index characteristics	Survey question	General 2003	General 2004	Difference*
D. Equality for minorities				
Willingness for equal rights for Jews and Arabs	To what extent do you support or oppose each of the following? Including Arab parties in the government, including Arab ministers. (support)	38	45	+7
	Introduction of full equal rights between Jews and Israeli Arabs (support)	53	64	+11
	There must be a consensus of a majority of Jews regarding critical decisions for the country, such as giving up territory (oppose)	26	23	-3
	The government must encourage the emigration of Arabs from Israel (oppose) [Jews only]	43	41	-2
Perception of the actual existence of equality	Israeli Arabs are discriminated against compared with Jewish citizens (agree)	55	64	+9

The 2004 Democracy Survey Compared with the 2003 Democracy Survey (continued)

3. Stability and Unity Aspect				
Index characteristics	Survey question	General 2003	General 2004	Difference*
A. Satisfaction with the government				
	What do you think is Israel's position in general? (not good)	63	54	(-9)
	What do you think about the way in which the government deals with Israel's current problems? (not good)	78	78	(-)
B. Protest and opposition				
Opposition to violence	Under no circumstances can violence be justified in order to achieve a political aim (agree)	82	78	(-4)
	If the government and the Knesset were to make a decision that contradicted with your opinion regarding security and the Territories, which of the following actions would you take? (obey or protest legally)	93	92	(-1)
Opposition to refusers	You know that a soldier must refuse to obey an order that is blatantly illegal. But what about a soldier who refuses to obey an order due to his personal morals or ideology? For example, can a soldier refuse to obey an order to evacuate settlers? (prohibited)	73	75	(+2)
	And what about a soldier who refuses to serve in the Territories due to Israel's policy towards the Palestinians? Can such a soldier refuse to serve in the Territories? (prohibited)	72	71	(-1)
C. Trust in institutions				
Degree of trust in various institutions	To what degree do you have trust in the following people or institutions?			
	Political parties (have trust)	32	27	-5
	Prime Minister (have trust)	53	45	-8
	The media (have trust)	49	51	+2
	State Attorney (have trust)	58	66	+8
	Supreme Court (have trust)	70	79	+9
	The police (have trust)	66	66	(-)
	President of Israel (have trust)	68	73	+5
	Chief Rabbinate (have trust)	43	45	(+2)
	The Knesset (have trust)	52	46	-6
	The IDF (have trust)	84	86	(+2)
	Government ministers (have trust)	55	41	-14
	The Histadrut (have trust)	42	38	-4

The 2004 Democracy Survey Compared with the 2003 Democracy Survey (continued)

Index characteristics	Survey question	General 2003	General 2004	Difference*
The institution that best safeguards Israel's democracy	Who best safeguards Israel's democracy: The Prime Minister, the Supreme Court, the Knesset or the media?			
	Prime Minister	18	9	-9
	Supreme Court	42	47	(+5)
	The Knesset	14	14	(-)
	The media	26	30	(+4)
D. Social faith				
	In general, do you think it's possible to rely on people, or must one be careful when it comes to relationships with people? (rely)	29	33	(+4)
E. Social rifts				
	In your opinion, are the relations between religious and secular populations in Israel good or not good? (good) [Jews only]	24	28	(+4)
	And relations between Ashkenazim and Mizrachim? (good) [Jews only]	43	53	+10
	And between Israeli Arabs and Jews? (good)	11	16	+5
	And between new immigrants and veteran Israelis? (good) [Jews only]	49	40	-9
	And between rich and poor? (good)	25	24	(-1)
Assessment of the level of tension between different groups in Israel compared with other countries	In your opinion, does Israel have more or less tension between social groups than in other countries? (less)	7	15	(+8)
F. Belonging to the community				
Pride in being connected with Israel	To what degree are you proud to be an Israeli? (proud)	84	79	-5
Desire to remain in Israel	Do you want to remain in Israel for the long term, or not? (want to remain)	88	87	(-1)
	To what degree are you certain you will remain in Israel? (certain)	84	87	(+3)
Feels part of Israel and its problems	To what extent do you feel yourself to be part of the state of Israel and its problems? (feel)	79	73	-6

The 2004 Democracy Survey Compared with the 2003 Democracy Survey (continued)

Index characteristics	Survey question	General 2003	General 2004	Difference*
Components of Israeli identity	To be born in Israel (important)	53	48	-5
	To be an Israeli citizen (important)	86	86	(-)
	To agree that Israel remain a Jewish and democratic state (important)	88	84	(-4)
	To live in Israel most of your life (important)	81	82	+1
	To know how to speak Hebrew (important)	85	91	+6
	To be Jewish (for Arabs: To be Palestinian) (important)	79	77	(-2)
	To respect the state's institutions and laws (important)	95	95	-
	To feel Israeli (important)	89	87	(-2)
	To serve in the IDF (important)	84	82	(-2)

The 2004 Democracy Survey Compared with the 2003 Democracy Survey (continued)

4. Democracy – Support and Satisfaction				
Index characteristics	Survey question	General 2003	General 2004	Difference*
A. Support for democracy				
	A democratic regime is a good thing for Israel (agree)	84	85	+1
	Several strong leaders would be better for the state than all the discussions and laws (disagree)	44	42	(-2)
	Democracy is the best type of government (agree)	78	80	+2
B. Democracy versus competing values				
	There are cases where democracy contradicts Jewish law. In the event of such a contradiction, should we give preference to preserving democratic principles or should we give preference to observing the commandments of Jewish law? (preference to democracy)	48	45	-3
	There are cases where safeguarding the principle of "rule of law" contradicts with the need to safeguard security interests. In the event of such a contradiction, should we give preference to security interests or should we give preference to maintaining the "rule of law?" (preference to the law).	21	19	-2
	If we think about the possible directions in which the State of Israel can develop, there are four important values that contradict with one another to a certain extent, and are important to different people in different degrees: a state with a Jewish majority, Greater Land of Israel, democratic state (with equal political rights for all) and a situation of peace (low probability of war). Of these four values, which is most important to you? (Democracy first) [Jews only]	17	14	(-3)
C. Satisfaction with Israeli democracy				
	In your opinion, is the State of Israel presently democratic to a suitable degree, too democratic or not democratic enough? (not democratic enough)	33	44	(+11)
	In general, to what extent are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way in which Israel's democracy functions? (dissatisfied)	49	55	+6

* Statistical significance between the means was tested using the independent samples T test procedure assuming random assignment of subjects (the actual differences between the samples were slight). Differences that appear in parentheses were not statistically significant. All other differences were statistically significant at least at the 0.05 level.

Remarks:

1. All findings are quoted in percentages; 0.5 percent has been rounded up to the nearest percent.

2. In general, the questions have been arranged so that the high end of the scale is "positive" for democracy, that is, the findings should point to support for various democratic principles. When examining various aspects of dissatisfaction with democracy, the questions are arranged so that the high end of the scale is critical of democracy. In any event, the direction of the scale is indicated beside each question.

3. The data present the two "high end" categories relating to democracy for questions in which there are between four-five categories (i.e., 1-2 or 3-4 or 4-5), and the high-end category for questions that have two-three categories (i.e., 1 or 2 in dichotomous questions, and 1 or 3 for questions with three categories).

4. Only questions that were asked in both years appear.

5. When a question was asked only among Jews, this is noted in brackets after the question. When the question was asked only among Jews for only one of the years, the frequency without Arabs was examined for the other year and the question is labeled "[Jews only]".

6. The size of the sample in 2004 was 1,200 with a sampling error of ±2.9. The size of the sample in 2003 was 1,208, with a sampling error of ±3.1.

Appendix C
2004 Youth Survey Compared with the 2004 Democracy Survey

1. Institutional Aspect				
Index characteristics	Survey question	General 2004	Youth 2004	Difference*
A. Perception of the principle of accountability				
In the election process	"Doesn't matter who you vote for, it won't change things (disagree)	57	58	(+1)
Actions of elected officials in connection with the people's preferences	"To what extent do you agree or disagree that politicians do not consider the opinions of ordinary citizens" (disagree)	38	46	+8
	"Knesset members don't care about what the general public thinks" (disagree)	36	40	+4
	"The politicians we elect try to keep their campaign promises" (agree)	21	27	+6
B. Checks and balances				
	"We need to revoke the Supreme Court's authority to rescind laws passed by the Knesset" (disagree)	59	54	(-5)
C. Political participation				
1. Level of political participation				
Interest in politics	"To what extent are you interested in politics?" (interested)	67	50	-17
Keeping up-to-date about politics	How often do you keep up with what is going on in politics, via television, radio or the press? (daily or several times a week)	79	56	-23
Discuss politics	To what extent do you discuss political matters with family and friends (discuss)	64	55	-9
Engage in formal activity	Are you a supporter of or active in any political party (party member and above)	7	4	-3
2. Perception of the level to which political participation is realized				
Assessment of the level of participation	In your opinion, are Israeli citizens more or less involved in politics than in other countries? (more)	49	42	-7
Feeling of impact	To what extent can you and your friends have an impact on government policy? (can)	18	21	(+3)
D. Governmental integrity				
Attitudes regarding corruption of government officials	Think about the following actions: Are they justified or are they not justified? – An official taking a bribe while carrying out his job (not justified)	95	90	-5
	In general, do you think the people running the country are looking out for their own private interests, or are they acting for the general good? (general good)	15	15	(-)
	In order to reach the top of the political ladder in Israel, you need to be corrupt (disagree)	41	50	+9
Perception of the level of corruption in Israel	In your opinion, is Israel more corrupt than other countries, or less corrupt? (less)	15	23	+8

2004 Youth Survey compared with the 2004 Democracy Index Survey (continued)

2. Rights Aspect				
Index characteristics	Survey question	General 2004	Youth 2004	Difference*
A. Political rights and citizenship				
Attitudes towards political and civil rights				
Freedom of speech	I support freedom of speech for all people, regardless of their position (agree)	75	73	(-2)
	Speakers should be prohibited from expressing harsh criticism against Israel in public (disagree)	49	57	+8
Religious freedom	Every couple in Israel should be permitted to marry in any manner they choose. (agree)	60	61	(+1)
Perception of the degree to which rights are realized	In your opinion, to what degree are there equal rights in Israel? (doesn't exist)	37	36	(-1)
	Rule of law? (doesn't exist)	20	21	(+1)
	Equality before the law? (doesn't exist)	28	31	(+3)
	Freedom of speech (doesn't exist)	14	21	+7
	Religious freedom (doesn't exist)	20	22	+2
Perception of the degree to which rights are realized – comparatively	In your opinion, to what degree does Israel respect or not respect human rights? (doesn't respect)	31	30	(-1)
	In your opinion, are human rights safeguarded in Israel more or less than in other countries? (less)	40	38	-2
	And freedom of speech? (less)	17	24	(+7)
B. Social and economic rights				
Support for social-economic policy	Regarding the structure of economic life in Israel, do you support a more socialist approach or a more capitalist approach (socialist)	60	67	(+7)
Assessment of the degree to which socio-economic rights are realized	There isn't enough socio-economic equality in Israel. (agree)	88	81	-7
C. Support for gender equality				
	Men are more successful political leaders than women (disagree)	70	72	(+2)
D. Equality for minorities				
Willingness for equal rights for Jews and Arabs	To what extent do you support or oppose each of the following? Having Arab parties join the government, including Arab ministers (support)	45	42	(-3)
	Introduction of full equal rights between Jews and Israeli Arabs (support)	64	60	(-4)
	There must be a consensus of a majority of Jews regarding critical decisions for the country, such as giving up territory. (oppose)	23	29	+6
	The government must encourage the emigration of Arabs from Israel (oppose) [Jews only]	41	34	-7
Perception of the actual existence of equality	Israeli Arabs are discriminated against compared with Jewish citizens (agree)	64	66	(+2)

2004 Youth Survey Compared with the 2004 Democracy Index Survey (continued)

3. Stability and Unity Aspect				
Index characteristics	Survey question	General 2004	Youth 2004	Difference*
A. Satisfaction with the government				
	What do you think is Israel's position in general? (not good)	53	48	(-5)
	What do you think about the way in which the government deals with Israel's current problems? (not good)	78	73	-5
B. Protest and opposition				
Opposition to violence	Under no circumstances can violence be justified in order to achieve a political aim (agree)	78	77	(-1)
	If the government and the Knesset were to make a decision that contradicted with your opinion regarding security and the Territories, which of the following actions would you take? (obey or protest legally)	92	87	-5
Opposition to refusers	You know that a soldier must refuse to obey an order that is blatantly illegal. But what about a soldier who refuses to obey an order due to his personal morals or ideology? For example, can a soldier refuse to obey an order to evacuate settlers? (prohibited)	75	57	-18
	And what about a soldier who refuses to serve in the Territories due to Israel's policy towards the Palestinians? Can such a soldier refuse to serve in the Territories? (prohibited)	71	57	-14
C. Trust in institutions				
Degree of trust in various institutions	To what degree do you have trust in the following people or institutions?			
	Political parties (have trust)	27	38	+11
	Prime Minister (have trust)	45	42	(-3)
	The media (have trust)	51	50	(-1)
	State Attorney (have trust)	66	58	-8
	Supreme Court (have trust)	79	77	(-2)
	The police ((have trust)	66	76	+10
	President of Israel (have trust)	73	64	-9
	Chief Rabbinate (have trust)	45	56	+11
	The Knesset (have trust)	46	56	+10
	The IDF (have trust)	86	80	-6
	Government ministers (have trust)	41	43	(+2)
	The Histadrut (have trust)	38	53	+15

2004 Youth Survey compared with the 2004 Democracy Index Survey (continued)

Index characteristics	Survey question	General 2004	Youth 2004	Difference*
The institution that best safeguards Israel's democracy	Who best safeguards Israel's democracy: The Prime Minister, the Supreme Court, the Knesset or the media?			
	Prime Minister	9	13	(+4)
	Supreme Court	47	35	-12
	The Knesset	14	21	+7
	The media	30	31	+1
D. Social faith				
	In general, do you think it's possible to rely on people, or must one be careful when it comes to relationships with people? (rely)	33	30	-3
E. Social rifts				
	In your opinion, are the relations between religious and secular populations in Israel good or not good? (good) [Jews only]	28	28	(-)
	And the relations between Ashkenazim and Mizrachim? (good) [Jews only]	53	53	(-)
	And between Israeli Arabs and Jews? (good)	16	14	-2
	And between new immigrants and veteran Israelis? (good) [Jews only]	40	55	+15
	And between rich and poor? (good)	24	39	+15
Assessment of the level of tension between different groups in Israel compared with other countries	In your opinion, does Israel have more or less tension between social groups than other countries? (less)	15	19	(+4)
F. Belonging to the community				
Pride in being connected with Israel	To what degree are you proud to be an Israeli? (proud)	79	79	(-)
Desire to remain in Israel	Do you want do remain in Israel for the long term, or not? (want to remain)	87	75	-12
	To what degree are you certain you will remain in Israel? (certain)	87	73	-14
Feels part of Israel and its problems	To what extent do you feel yourself to be part of the state of Israel and its problems? (feel)	73	52	-21

2004 Youth Survey compared with the 2004 Democracy Index Survey (continued)

Index characteristics	Survey question	General 2004	Youth 2004	Difference*
Components of Israeli identity	To be born in Israel (important)	48	53	(+5)
	To be an Israeli citizen (important)	86	80	-6
	To agree that Israel remain a Jewish and democratic state. (important)	84	78	-6
	To live in Israel most of your life (important)	82	71	-11
	To know how to speak Hebrew (important)	91	88	-3
	To be Jewish (for Arabs: To be Palestinian) (important)	77	84	+7
	To respect the state's institutions and laws (important)	95	89	-6
	To feel Israeli (important)	87	78	-9
	To serve in the IDF (important)	82	73	-9

2004 Youth Survey Compared with the 2004 Democracy Index Survey (continued)

4. Democracy – Support and Satisfaction				
Index characteristics	Survey question	General 2004	Youth 2004	Difference*
A. Support for democracy				
	A democratic regime is a good thing for Israel (agree)	85	84	(-1)
	Several strong leaders would be better for the state than all the discussions and laws (disagree)	42	40	(-2)
	Democracy is the best type of government (agree)	80	77	(-3)
B. Democracy versus competing values				
	There are cases where democracy contradicts Jewish law. In the event of such a contradiction, should we give preference to preserving democratic principles or should we give preference to observing the commandments of Jewish law? (preference to democracy)	45	34	-11
	There are cases where safeguarding the principle of "rule of law" contradicts the need to safeguard security interests. In the event of such a contradiction, should we give preference to security interests or should we give preference to maintaining the "rule of law?" (preference to the law).	19	17	(-2)
	If we think about the possible directions in which the State of Israel can develop, there are four important values that contradict one another to a certain extent, and are important to different people in different degrees: a state with a Jewish majority, Greater Land of Israel, democratic state (with equal political rights for all) and a situation of peace (low probability of war). Of these four values, which is most important to you? (Democracy first) [Jews only]	14	14	(-)
C. Satisfaction with Israeli democracy				
	In your opinion, is the State of Israel presently democratic to a suitable degree, too democratic or not democratic enough? (not democratic enough)	44	48	+4
	In general, to what extent are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way in which Israel's democracy functions? (dissatisfied)	55	47	-8

* Statistical significance between the means was tested using the independent samples T test procedure assuming random assignment of subjects (the actual differences between the samples were slight). Differences that appear in parentheses were not statistically significant. All other differences were statistically significant at least at the 0.05 level.

Remarks:

1. All findings are quoted in percentages; 0.5 percent has been rounded up to the nearest percent.
2. In general, the questions have been arranged so that the high end of the scale is "positive" for democracy, that is, the findings should point to support for various democratic principles. When examining various aspects of dissatisfaction with democracy, the questions are arranged so that the high end of the scale is critical of democracy. In any event, the direction of the scale is indicated beside each question.
3. The data present the two "high end" categories relating to democracy for questions in which there are between four-five categories (i.e., 1-2 or 3-4 or 4-5), and the high-end category for questions that have two-three categories (i.e., 1 or 2 in dichotomous questions, and 1 or 3 for questions with three categories).
4. Only questions that were asked in both surveys appear.
5. When a question was asked only among Jews, this is noted in brackets after the question. When the question was asked only among Jews for only one of the years, the frequency without Arabs was examined for the other year and the question is labeled "[Jews only]".
6. The size of the youth sample was 585 with a sampling error of ±4.1. The size of the adult sample was 1,200, with a sampling error of ±2.9.