



The President's Conference

May 2003

ISRAELI DEMOCRACY EXAMINED

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Measuring Israeli Democracy

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The Guttman Center
of
The Israel Democracy Institute



The Israel Democracy Institute is an independent body that assists the Knesset and its committees, government offices and institutions, local government bodies, and political parties through studies and proposals designed to bring about changes and reforms in their manner of operation.

In addition, The Israel Democracy Institute fulfills its public charge through the presentation of comparative information on legislative topics and the various ways in which democratic regimes function. Likewise, it seeks to enrich public discourse and encourage new ways of thinking through the initiation of discussion on topics of current political, social and economic interest, both by bringing together legislators, administrators and academics and through the publication of research findings.

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Research Description and Objectives

The Israeli Democracy Index Project was established to evaluate the quality and functioning of Israeli democracy by collecting quantified and comparable information that is comprehensive, precise, clear, reliable, and valid. We plan to conduct periodical evaluations of the state of Israeli democracy and to present the findings annually. The Israel Democracy Institute believes that the information presented here can contribute to the promotion of intense and informed public discourse regarding the state of Israeli democracy and lead to its reinforcement.

The 2003 Democracy Index Project was conducted on two levels: first, an examination of the state of Israeli democracy in terms of a series of indicators that attempted to measure the central aspects of the concept of democracy; second, an analysis of the state of democracy in Israel as it is reflected in public opinion. The public opinion survey's explicit goal was to examine the extent that democratic political culture has struck roots in Israel and to check public perception of how Israeli democracy functions. Our intention was to examine the relation between the two; i.e., whether there is a disparity between the evaluation of the state of Israeli democracy according to the various indicators and the way the Israeli public perceives the state of democracy. In both categories—the indicators


and the public opinion survey—Israel's status was examined from a comparative perspective. The analysis of the state of Israeli democracy was thus conducted on two comparative dimensions: Israel's situation compared to that of thirty-five other democracies in the world, and Israel's internal situation, as measured over the previous decade (1992-2003).¹ Where available, data from as far back as 1969 was included in the public opinion category.

This research project is based on the assumption that democracy is a multi-dimensional phenomenon. Accordingly, the Democracy Index encompasses three main aspects: the institutional aspect, the rights aspect, and the aspect of stability and social cohesion. Addressing the formal and substantive sides of democracy respectively, the institutional aspect and the rights aspect are meant to include the content embedded in the concept of democracy. The third aspect, stability, is a characteristic of governments in general, not only of democratic regimes. Nonetheless, it seemed right to include it since its existence or absence influences the quality and functioning of democracy.

Each of these three aspects includes several characteristics that are important to a democratic regime (see Figure 1). The institutional aspect includes five such characteristics: accountability, representativeness, participation, checks and

1. The states participating in the project for which comparative data was gathered are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, England, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Holland, Hungary, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Romania, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, and the United States. Comparisons with public opinion surveys for all of these countries were not always possible.

Figure 1



balances, and governmental integrity (corruption). The rights aspect includes six characteristics: civil rights, political rights, social rights, economic (property) rights, gender equality and equality for minorities. The stability aspect includes three characteristics: stability of the government, the absence of political conflict, and the absence of social rifts. Each characteristic was examined by means of multiple (usually two) indicators, so that the research project includes a total of thirty-one indicators of the state of Israeli democracy. Thus, it can indeed be analyzed as a multi-dimensional phenomenon.

Likewise, in a representative sample of the adult population in Israel (Jews and Arabs), respondents were asked to what extent, in their opinion, each of the aforementioned characteristics is in fact realized in Israel. With regard to the characteristics that comprise the

rights aspect, which express the substantive side of democracy, we examined the degree of support for those values among the general public in an attempt to measure the depth of democratic culture in Israel. The questions posed were included in a survey conducted in April 2003.

The public opinion data for comparison among countries was taken from international studies, mainly from *The World Values Survey* and *The International Social Science Project*. The indicators incorporated in the research were developed by various international research institutions, which also provided most of the data, primarily: Polity, Minorities at Risk, The United Nations Human Development Project, The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, The International Country Risk Guide, Freedom House, Amnesty

International, Transparency International, The Heritage Foundation, and researchers Arthur Banks, Michael Gallagher and Arend Lijphart.

This project surveys existing knowledge in the field of democracy evaluation, with the hope of including as wide a variety of indicators and information sources as possible. Those indicators that best met the following criteria were chosen: validity, reliability, sensitivity, transparency, clarity, specificity, availability of information,

and the currency of the data. Unfortunately, in several cases we had to use indicators that did not fully conform to our criteria.

We present here a summary of the current state of Israeli democracy according to its ranking on various democracy scales, several detailed examples from among the indicators, and the main findings of the public opinion survey. The comprehensive data of the indicators and the democracy survey will be published in the near future.

The Democracy Indicators

The State of Israeli Democracy

Figure 2 presents Israel's ranking according to twenty-four indicators compared to those countries in the survey (thirty-five states) for which data were available.² These indicators embody the three aspects encompassed by the democracy index—the institutional aspect, the rights aspect, and the aspect of stability—and they give expression to all the characteristics contained in these aspects. Each column represents a separate index, and the scale represents Israel's relative ranking. The higher


the ranking on a specific index (i.e., the closer to 1), the better is Israel's situation with regard to being a democratic and stable state. On the other hand, the lower the mark, the worse off is Israel's relative ranking.

It is important to emphasize that not in all instances is Israel's relative place compared with the other states in the survey, and this factor makes it difficult to compare Israel's ranking across the various indicators.³ Nevertheless,

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2. As stated above, there were thirty-one indicators and not just the twenty-four that appear in Figure 2. We did not include in the summary table Israel's ranking in the vertical accountability index, as there was no significant difference among the surveyed states (all received the highest mark). We did not present the comparative position concerning the degree of horizontal accountability and the scope of governmental spending for the realization of social rights since we do not yet have complete data. In addition, we have another four indicators that pertain to Israel alone (voter turnout for municipal elections; the percentage of prisoners in the state, including security prisoners; the Gini co-efficient before taxes and transfer payments; and the length of time served by the incumbent government as a percentage of its full term of office). Data for all thirty-six countries in the survey is available for only thirteen indicators.
 3. The most salient instance that might result in a mistaken impression of Israel is the relative situation of social rights, as measured by the Gini coefficient after taxes and transfer payments. Israel is ranked 20th out of 23 states. The "social rights" column in the chart is situated to the left of the column labelled "economic rights," which ranks Israel 21st out of the 36 surveyed states. As stated, we decided to present Israel's relative place for each of the indicators from left to right in ascending order, with the reservation that this does not always mean that Israel's relative place is necessarily better.

Figure 2

Israel's Relative Rank in 24 Variables*



The height of the bar indicates the number of countries for which data was available.

* These variables are a selection of the total indicators examined. "A", "B", and "C" indicate a measure of one of the variables used in the complete index.

it can be seen that Israel's relative ranking compared with its own past would not have changed substantially in the majority of instances, even if we possessed data for all the states in the survey. Thus, for example, representativeness and checks and balances would have remained the characteristics in which Israel's position fared best in relation to other characteristics, and social rifts the characteristic in which Israel fared worst.

The data in the chart indicates that institutionally,

Israeli democracy is in good condition. Israel's highest rank was for indicators that measure representativeness and checks and balances, institutional aspect characteristics. In both of these, Israel is ranked sixth among the surveyed states (see columns 21 and 22). However, voter turnout, which is one of the indicators characterizing political participation (and is also an element of the institutional aspect) has been in decline since 1996. Today, the turnout rate is 67.8% of all registered voters, ranking Israel in twenty-second place among the surveyed states

(see column 7). On the subject of corruption, Israel ranks more or less in the middle (14-15 out of 35 states according to one index, and 19-28 out of 36 states according to another index [see columns 17 and 11, respectively]).

Israel's situation with regard to the rights aspect is worrisome. Freedom of the press is low in comparison with other democratic states, and on this index Israel ranks 28-31 out of 36 surveyed states (see column 5). With regard to the index measuring infringement of human rights, which indicates how civil rights are safeguarded, Israel occupies the lowest rank (the data also relates to the violation of human rights by Israel in the territories of Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip) along with South Africa and India (see column 12).⁴ In the area of freedom of religion and equality of social rights, too (through employment of the Gini co-efficient for inequality in the distribution of net income), Israel is ranked in a low position (15-22 out of 26 states in the freedom of religion category [see column 16], and 20th place out of 23 states using the Gini co-efficient [see column 9]). The findings regarding equality for minorities further aggravate the picture: the degree of economic discrimination is high (17-28 out of 28 states [see column 13]), as is that of political discrimination (17-25 out of 28 [see column 14]). Only the indicator measuring cultural restrictions on minorities is Israel in a better position (14-19 out of 28 [see column 18]). On the other hand, on the subject of gender equality, Israel is ranked more or less in the middle, ranking 19 out of 34 in the Gender Development Index (see column 10) and

16 out of 30 on the Gender Empowerment Index (see column 15). The single indicator among the rights characteristics in which Israel attains the highest mark, together with the majority of states in the survey (places 1-24 out of 35 states), is political rights. This indicator measures the extent to which political participation is open to competition in a manner that allows for alternatives to government policy and leadership (see column 23).

It is clear from the data that in comparison with the other states in the survey, Israel does not enjoy stability. Political conflict is widespread (Israel is ranked 29 out of 36 [see column 4]). With regard to the stability of the government, measured by the number of changes of government occurring in the last decade, Israel has undergone more frequent turnovers than other states (Israel is ranked 31-32 out of 35 [see column 3]). Above all, in the two indicators of social cleavage, Israel's relative position is revealed as clearly grave: religious tension is very widespread (Israel is ranked 34 out of 35 [see column 2]), as well as tension stemming from national/ethnic/language conflicts (here Israel finds itself at the bottom of the list, along with India [see column 1]).

Finally, in comparison with democracies elsewhere in the world, Israel's situation ought to arouse concern among proponents of democracy. Although its relative position in the institutional aspect is in general good, even this aspect is not without its problems: voter turnout is decreasing, and integrity in government has

4. The data we have, however, relates to only nineteen states in the survey, but there is no data for the rest of the states because they are considered to be states that safeguard human rights satisfactorily.

diminished somewhat. Israel's problematic area is concentrated in the rights aspect: freedom of the press is low, infringement of human rights is high (as mentioned, the evaluation includes the territories of Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip). The percentage of incarcerated criminals is mounting, inequality in distribution of income is rising, and the inequality between the Jewish

majority and the Arab minority remains unchanged. Moreover, it is apparent that comparatively, Israel suffers from instability. In sum, from the relative ranking across all the indicators, Israel may be classified as a formal democracy that has not yet succeeded in incorporating the characteristics of substantive democracy.

The Institutional Aspect: Representativeness


The majority of indicators for representativeness try to gauge the extent to which the elective institutions, in particularly the lower house, accurately express the public's preferences. One of the two indicators chosen to measure the degree of representativeness is Party Dominance, which examines the extent to which the legislature is dominated by a limited number of political parties. This indicator assumes that if parliament is dominated by a single party, or by a very small number of parties, then there are sections of the population who remain without effective representation. The Party Dominance Index has become accepted because of its simplicity:⁵ divide the size of the legislative body (the number of seats) by the number of seats held by the largest party and multiply by 100. The index ranges between 100—which signifies complete control; i.e., all the legislative seats are held by the same party—and the number of seats in a specific legislature multiplied by 100, a figure which varies from country to country. (In Israel, for example, the

given figure is 12,000.) The smaller the number of seats of the largest party, the higher the index score, signifying diminishing dominance and better representation. Undoubtedly, situations may arise in which, despite the existence of a dominant party, all citizen interests will be represented. However, as a general rule, the likelihood of this occurring is relatively slim.

Using the Party Dominance Index, substantial changes can be discerned in Israel over the past decade (see Figure 3). Party dominance has steadily eroded since 1992, a development that indicates greater representativeness. On the other hand, this erosion could be considered to be a significant factor in the instability of political system. Only in the 2003 elections, in which the Likud Party received a large mandate, did the system return to a dominant party model, and the index plummeted accordingly. Moreover, not only did the largest party consistently decline in strength through loss of votes in every election; even during its term of office its power

5. See: Joe Foweraker and Roman Krznaric, "How to Construct a Database of Liberal Democratic Performance," *Democratization* 8 (3), 2001: 12-13; Arthur S. Banks, *Cross-Polity Time Series Data* (New York: State University of New York at Binghamton, 2000).

Figure 3
Representativeness in Israel



was weakened because of the fragmentation of several parties. This pattern was repeated in each of the three elections held during the past decade: 1992, 1996, and 1999. In the 1996 elections, the system of direct election of the prime minister was inaugurated. The new electoral system resulted in a greater degree of representativeness and an erosion of party dominance: the largest party (Labor) held only 34 seats (raising the

index to 353). During the term, a number of MKs left the Labor Party, reducing its parliamentary strength to 29 mandates (this raised the index to 414). After the 1999 elections, the Labor Party's parliamentary strength dwindled to 26 mandates (the index increased further to 462). The Party Dominance Index soared in the special elections for prime minister in 2001, reducing the Labor Party to 25 mandates (the index reached 480).


In this situation, Israel ranks highest in terms of the lack of party domination, substantially ahead of the second-ranking state. As stated above, the picture changed in the 2003 elections with the return of a dominant party—the Likud, which holds one-third of the Knesset seats (40 out of 120; accordingly, the index declined to 300).

Looking at Israel today from the viewpoint of representativeness, the index shows a very high degree of representativeness in comparison with other democratic states in the world (see Figure 4).

In fact, this is one of two indicators in which Israel is ranked highest—sixth place out of thirty-six surveyed states. Two states that stand out in representativeness according to the Party Dominance Index are Finland and Switzerland, which share the first place; following them are Estonia, Holland, Thailand and Israel. The states that fill the bottom of the scale are South Africa, followed by England and Chile. The data on the various states is from 1999 and is taken from *Cross-Polity Time Series Data*, edited by Professor Arthur Banks.

Figure 4
Representativeness Compared Internationally

Party Dominance: 1992-2003




The Institutional Aspect: Political Participation

Political participation is a multi-dimensional characteristic. The majority of participation indicators document the percentage of turnout in national elections, for two principal reasons: first, because voting in elections is very important for political participation from the point of view of both researchers who hold the 'shallow' approach to democracy and those who endorse the 'broad' approach; second, because of methodological difficulties in measuring participation rate by other indicators. Voting is measured in two main ways. One approach is to take the percentage of voters in relation to the adult population in the country. The second approach, which is adopted here, takes the percentage of actual voters in relation to total number of registered voters.⁶ The voting rate

appears in percentages as the number of ballots counted after the voting has taken place (both valid and invalid ballots are counted as the total number of ballots cast for purposes of deriving the voting rate; in those cases in which invalid ballots are distinguished from blank ballots, the blank ballots are also included) divided by the number of eligible voters. Voter registration should be simple so that all eligible citizens of voting age can fulfill their basic civil right. The data on the percentage of turnout in national elections relative to the number of citizens registered as eligible voters is taken from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (henceforth, IDEA). The data for Israel for 2001 and 2003 comes from Knesset publications.⁷

Figure 5
Voter Turnout in Israel 1992-2003



6. Regarding the dispute on how to measure voter turnout, see: Foweraker and Krznaric, 2001, p. 14.

7. See: www.knesset.gov.il/elections16/heb/results/regions.asp; www.knesset.gov.il/elections01/results.htm.


Data on the percentage of voter turnout in Israel over the past decade reveals a worrisome trend (see Figure 5).

Although there was a moderate rise in the turnout rate between the 1992 and 1996 elections, since 1996 (the first elections in which voters cast two ballots, one for prime minister and one for the Knesset) there has been a steady decline in voter turnout. This decline increased in the 2001 election for prime minister and in the January 2003 general elections. If in 2001

the low turnout could be attributed to the fact that the elections were solely for prime minister, in 2003, when the single-ballot electoral system was reinstated (one votes for a political party, and the head of the party with the most mandates is usually the one tapped to be prime minister), this explanation became irrelevant.

Compared with other countries, voter turnout in Israel is not as high as we are used to thinking. Israel is ranked 22 among 36 surveyed states (see Figure 6).⁸

Figure 6
Voter Turnout Compared Internationally



8. Needless to say, Israel's relative position improves when the voter turnout rate among the entire adult population is measured. Israel ranks in eleventh place with 74% turnout for the Sixteenth Knesset elections held in January 2003 (the data concerning the voting rate in Israel based upon the entire adult population does not appear here and will be published in the full Democracy Index).

The highest turnout is in Australia (95.2% of all registered voters in 1998), followed by Cyprus (91.8% in 2001), with South Africa in third place (89.3% in 1999). The high voter turnout in Australia and Cyprus may reasonably be attributed to the institution of compulsory voting, which requires that citizens who do not

vote supply a reasonable explanation for their absence and are liable for a fine for failing to go to the polls. The states with the lowest turnout of eligible voters are Switzerland (43.2% in 1999), Poland (46.2% in 2001), and the United States (48.5% in 2000).

The Rights Aspect: Political Rights

Political rights safeguard the freedoms that guarantee a valid and egalitarian democratic process, the assurance of free and fair elections, and the participation of citizens in the political process. Thus, there is a certain overlap between political rights and the values of accountability and political participation. One of the two indicators by which we measured the state of political rights in Israel focuses on freedom of information. It is the Press Freedom Index, developed by Freedom House. This index relates to both the print press and the electronic media, and it contains three subcategories, each of which is assigned a separate score.⁹ The first category concerns the legal situation; i.e., the presence or absence of laws that limit freedom of the press or protect it, and the extent to which these laws are enforced (30 points). The second category deals with political influences and pressures on the press (40 points); and the last category concerns economic influences and pressures on the press (30 points). The cumulative index ranges from 0 to 100, with 0 indicating the worst position and 100 the best.¹⁰ States that scored 70 to 100 points are considered as having freedom

of the press; states that ranged from 40 to 69 points possess moderate freedom of the press; and states with 39 points or less are defined as states that do not have freedom of the press.

An examination of freedom of the press in Israel during the past decade indicates no improvement. A 1997 report from Freedom House raised Israel's score from 70 (its score from 1994-1996)¹¹ to 72, but in 2000 it reverted to its earlier score of 70 and has remained there. The significance of this is that while Israel is still ranked among the states possessing freedom of the press, it is in danger of slipping into the category of partial press freedom. Among the reasons that Freedom House cites for the deterioration of freedom of the press in Israel is the attitude of governmental authorities and the Israel Defense Forces to the Palestinian and foreign press since the outbreak of the Intifada in September 2000, and the November 2000 decision of the Supreme Court to lower the threshold for publications or public speech to be considered harmful to the public order.¹²


9. For a detailed account of the methodology, see: Leonard R. Sussman and Karin Deutsch Karlekar, *The Annual Survey of Press Freedom 2002* (New York: Freedom House, 2002), pp. 17-18.

10. The index devised by Freedom House goes in the opposite direction, so that 0 means complete freedom of the press. For purposes of data presentation we inverted the order so that a higher score would indicate higher democratic quality.

11. The Freedom of the Press Index began using this methodology only in 1994. Prior to that, states were only ranked as free, partly free, or not free (Israel was ranked as a state having freedom of the press).

12. See: *The Annual Survey of Press Freedom, 2002*, p. 33.

Figure 7
Political Rights Compared Internationally
 Freedom of the Press



A comparison of the state of freedom of the press in Israel with that of the leading democratic states in the world reveals a gloomy picture (see Figure 7).¹³ According to the Freedom House report for 2002, Israel is ranked 28-31 out of 36 states included in this project. South Korea, Thailand and Greece also score only 70 points.

The only states ranked lower are Romania, South Africa, Argentina, Mexico and India, which occupies the bottom of the list. States displaying the highest rankings in the freedom of press category are Switzerland, Sweden, and New Zealand, followed by Norway and Denmark.

13. This data is also taken from *The Annual Survey of Press Freedom, 2002*, and relates to the situation as of December 2001.

The Rights Aspect: Equality for

The category of equality for minorities also includes, in effect, the other characteristics of the rights aspect: political, civil, social and economic rights of the minority as compared with the majority in a state. The Minorities at Risk Project, which was established by researcher Ted Robert Gurr in 1986, is the most comprehensive attempt to date to evaluate the situation with regard to minority rights from an international comparative perspective. Three indicators from Gurr's project are used in this study: political discrimination against minorities, economic discrimination against minorities, and cultural restrictions on minorities. Here, we present findings in relation to the first indicator only—political discrimination against minorities. The Minorities at Risk Index, comprised of a scale containing five categories, examines the role of public policy and social practice in the maintenance of inequality or its correction. A score of zero indicates absence of any discrimination while a score of four points to a policy of repression and exclusion, and to the presence of severe limitations on political participation by minorities. In the majority of cases, the Minorities at Risk Project supplies information on the situation of several minorities in each state. We have chosen to relate to the minority that is subject to the greatest discrimination according to the data of Minorities at Risk, on the assumption that the best way to learn about any political system is to examine the situation of those at the margins of society.¹⁴ In the case of Israel, we report on the treatment of Israel's Arab citizens.


Findings indicate that throughout the entire last decade (1992-2002), there was no improvement in the degree of discrimination against Arab citizens of the State of Israel. Throughout this period, Israel received a score of 3, which ranks next to last. Category 3 indicates the continued existence of social practice that excludes minorities in the political arena, alongside formally neutral policy, or at best affirmative action on the declaratory level only, with no de facto success. The degree of political discrimination in Israel as compared with other states in the survey shows that as of the year 2000, Israel ranks in the bottom third of the scale (see Figure 8).¹⁵

Among the twenty-eight states for which data is available, Israel is ranked 17-25, together with Italy, Bulgaria, India, Taiwan, Greece, Mexico, the Czech Republic and Romania, all of which received a score of three. The worst cases of political discrimination against minorities were found in Japan, France and Switzerland, each of which received a score of four. On the other hand, the only states that have complete political equality between minorities and the majority are Estonia, South Korea, and Cyprus. In the middle, with a score of one, are Australia, England, the United States, Germany, Hungary, New Zealand, Costa Rica and Canada. These states are followed by Argentina, South Africa, Spain, Chile and Thailand, each of which received a score of two.

14. On the justification for selecting this criterion, see: Foweraker and Krznaric, 2001, p. 17.

15. The Minorities at Risk Project has not yet published updated data for the last two years. The data is taken from Ted Robert Gurr, Monty G. Marshall and Christian Davenport, *Minorities at Risk Dataset* (Maryland: University of Maryland, 2002), <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/data.htm>

Figure 8
Minority Rights Compared Internationally
 Political Discrimination



The Stability Aspect: Governmental Stability

In contrast with the institutional and rights aspects, which distinguish democratic regimes from other types of regimes, the stability aspect may be generally examined and compared across regimes. This is why many studies that measure how well democratic states function ignore the question of stability. This study employs indicators that measure the degree of stability in society and in the political system, assuming that the presence or absence of stability has


an impact upon the quality of democracy and its functioning. Two of the stability indicators incorporated in the study concern the character of governmental stability. The first indicator is commonly accepted and widely used and relates to the number of changes of government in a state; i.e., the number of times that actual control of the executive branch changes hands.¹⁶ This is examined by calculating the number of times the executive head of state (the prime

16. Banks, 2000. (See note 5 above.)

minister in Israel) was changed during the period 1992-2002.¹⁷ The assumption is that in stable political systems, the state does not experience frequent changes of leadership.¹⁸ The second indicator—incomplete terms of office—is intended to provide a more detailed picture of governmental instability, in that it also examines developments during the term of office. This index was developed by the Israel Democracy Institute and it relates to the percentage of the

term a government actually manages to fulfill. This is calculated by dividing the time served by the government from its swearing in to the swearing in of the next government, by the time of its swearing in until the next regular elections as stipulated in Basic Law: The Knesset.¹⁹ Comparative data for the first index was gathered from among the surveyed states; the second index draws solely upon data pertaining to Israel.

Figure 9
Stability Compared Internationally
Changes of Government 1992-2002




17. The data for this index was drawn from several sources: Banks, 2000; The Rulers website: <http://www.rulers.org>; CIA—*The World Fact Book 2002*, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook>.
18. Jack C. Plano, Robert Riggs and Helenan S. Robin, *The Dictionary of Political Analysis* (Oxford and Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 1982), p. 149.
19. Data on length of time that governments reigned is taken from the Knesset website. The date set for an election is calculated according to clauses 9 and 36 of Basic Law: The Knesset.

Figure 9 describes the number of changes of government in the surveyed states during the past decade. A very clear conclusion can be drawn from the data: Israel is numbered among the least stable democratic states.²⁰ Among the thirty-five states, Israel is ranked 31-32 along with Argentina, both of which had five changes of government between 1992 and 2002. Three states suffer from even greater instability—Italy, Japan and Thailand—with eight changes of government over this period. In the majority of democratic states included in the study—twenty-six in all—the government changed only once or twice during the ten-year span, indicating governmental stability. The problem of instability in Israel becomes clear when the findings based on the second measure—the incomplete term of

office—are analyzed (see Figure 10).

Israel changed prime ministers five times within the decade, and not one of them completed the full term of office allocated by the electoral law. Thus in every case, elections were called in advance of the time stipulated by the law. Rabin's government (1992-1995) and Sharon's government (2001-2003) completed the greatest percentage of term time—78.4% and 77.4% respectively. The Netanyahu government (1996-1999) completed 69.2% of its officially allotted term time; the Peres government (1995-1996) succeeded in ruling for 54.6% of its official term time; and the Barak government, by far the shortest time in office, only managed to govern for 39.2% of its official term time.

Figure 10
Governmental Stability in Israel 1992-2003
 Completion of Terms



20. It should be pointed out that the index measures governmental stability and not the stability of the democratic regime.

The Democracy Survey

Democratic Culture

The Democracy Survey conducted in April 2003 examined the Israeli public's positions on various democratic norms, in order to ascertain the extent to which a democratic political culture is rooted in Israel.²¹ The survey looked at public opinion regarding three different levels of democratic norms: the first, and most abstract level—general support for the democratic system (for example, the degree of agreement or disagreement with the claim that "a democratic regime is desirable for Israel"); the second level—support for values and specific democratic principles (for example, the degree of agreement or disagreement with the statement, "I support freedom of expression for everyone irrespective of their opinions"); and the third, and most specific level—public opinion on equal rights for the Arab minority in Israel (for example, the degree of support or opposition to Arab parties joining the government, including having Arab ministers).


In every one of the above-mentioned levels, there has been a significant decline over the last few years in the rate of support for democratic norms by the Jewish Israeli public. This can be demonstrated first for the most abstract norm—general support for the democratic system. The survey revealed that the assertion that democracy is the best form of government received the least public support in twenty years. Only 77% of Jewish citizens in Israel

agree with this position, a significant drop from previous rates of support. From the beginning of the 1980s to the year 2000, there was a rising trend in the percentage of Jews who agreed with the statement that "democracy is the best form of government" (see Figure 11)—from 84% in 1981 to 90% in 1999. The only exception is 1988, following the first Intifada, when there was a slight decline in support for this statement. However, in 2003 there has been a substantial retreat in support for this statement: down 13% from the 1999 position.

An examination of support for the second level of democratic norms reveals a similar declining trend during the last years. We asked what was the degree of agreement or disagreement with the three following statements, each of which relates to a separate democratic value: "I support freedom of expression for all persons regardless of their opinions"; "Groups or individuals who belong to a minority should be allowed to try to convince the majority to support their position"; and "Every person should have the same rights before the law regardless of their political views." All three cases reveal the same pattern: in 2003, there was a significant gnawing away of support among the Jewish public for democratic values (and it has dropped by an average of 15% compared to the rate of support at the turn of the century). In some cases, a decline in support was

21. The Survey was conducted among a representative sample of the adult population in Israel, both Jewish and Arab, from 1-7 April 2003. It numbered 1,208 respondents interviewed in Hebrew, Arabic and Russian. The Survey was conducted by the Mahshov Research Institute under the direction of Dr. Rachel Israeli. The percentage of error is ± 3.1 .

Figure 11
Support for Democracy in Israel
 “Democracy is the best form of government.”
 Agree and strongly agree (Jewish samples only)




already apparent in 2001, following the outbreak of the second Intifada, and in other instances the decline was slower. However, in all instances the current study indicates that the decline in the rate of support for democratic values is the lowest in a decade. If the trend over the last two decades is examined, it can be seen that the support for these three values was relatively high at the beginning of the 1980s but began to drop and reached its lowest point in 1988, the year when the first Intifada began. From that date and throughout the 1990s, there was a clear and continuous rise in the degree of support for democratic values among the Jewish population. That trend reached a peak in 1999-2000, when an average of 90% supported each of these values. Today, as was stated, the picture has changed completely.

Figure 12 presents an example of that trend.

Whereas in 1980, 89% of the Jewish population in Israel agreed that everyone should have equal rights before the law regardless of their political views, in 1988 the rate of support for this view plunged to 66%. In 1990, support for this value returned to 83% and continued to rise to 86% in 1991, 94% in 1999, and reached a peak of 96% in April 2000. Nevertheless, as of 2003, only 81% of the Jewish public in Israel (15% less than in April 2000) agree that everyone should have equal rights before the law regardless of their political views, a lower rate of support than in the beginning of the 1980s. Likewise, in the current survey, only 67% of the Jewish population agreed that minority groups or individuals should be allowed to try to garner support for their views from the majority population. This figure is 17% lower than the rate of support registered exactly three years earlier (84% in April 2000). The same trend may be found in the

Figure 12
Support for Democratic Values in Israel
 “Equality before the law regardless of political opinion”
 Agree and strongly agree (Jewish samples only)



degree of support for the principle of freedom of expression—in April 2003, 75% supported freedom of expression for individuals regardless of their views, whereas in March 1999, 90% supported this position (15% less).

The findings arising from an analysis of the third normative level—public opinion on equal rights for the Arab minority in Israel—is particularly worrisome. While the first two levels registered a decline in the degree of support for democratic

norms, a majority of the Jewish public in Israel still supports democratic values and the democratic system. This is not the case where public opinion on equality for the Arab minority is concerned. In 2003, more than half the Jewish citizens (53%) oppose full equal rights for both Jewish and Arab citizens of the State, and 77% maintain that there must be a Jewish majority on all fateful decisions concerning the State. Less than one-third (31%) support Arab parties joining the government (as opposed to a majority for this position in

1999), and more than half the population (57%) maintains that the government ought to encourage Arab emigration (compared to a majority who opposed such a policy in 1999). Not only does the Jewish public not support equality for the Arabs; it does not admit that in actual fact there is no equality for the Arab citizens of the State. Only 51% agreed that Israeli Arabs are discriminated against as compared to Jewish citizens, whereas 49% opposed this claim.

If this trend is examined over time, it again becomes clear that during the last few years the degree of support among the Jewish population for a policy of equality for Arab citizens has crumbled, in contrast to the rise recorded throughout the 1990s. Figure 13 describes the change in the extent of support for the demand for a Jewish majority in any major decisions concerning the fate of the State, such as return of the territories captured in the Six Day War. In the current survey, only 23% of the Jewish public opposed the demand for a Jewish majority and supported the participation of Arabs in fateful decisions. This figure is only slightly higher than that for the previous year, when the Jewish public's readiness to adopt a policy of equality for the Arab minority had reached its lowest ebb—only one-fifth of the Jewish public (20%) opposed the discriminatory avenue that demanded a Jewish majority. This means that one-quarter of the Jewish population changed their opinion since the beginning of 1999, when support for Arab equality reached its peak and almost half the Jewish public (48%) supported Arab participation (a change of 25%-28%).

The frequent and dramatic changes in the rate of support over time for a policy of equality towards the Arab minority, as expressed in the

chart, may also indicate how much the Jewish public's support for democratic values depends upon the political context. For example, during the prime ministerial change from Benjamin Netanyahu to Ehud Barak, in the very same year there was a sharp drop in the readiness to allow Arabs to participate in fateful decisions—from 48% in January 1999, four months before the fall of the Netanyahu government, to 24% in September 1999, four months into the rule of the Barak government. After a few months, support for Arab participation began to improve (36% in January 2000). A possible explanation for this change may be the desire of the public to constrain Barak, as a leftist prime minister, and compel him to mobilize a Jewish majority for the support of any ensuing peace agreement.

Not only does a majority of the Jewish public currently not support equal rights for Arab citizens, it is also prepared to declare this quite openly. In this survey, only 47% of the Jewish population said that it supports full equal rights for Arab citizens, whereas in 1999 a decisive majority (73%) said that it supported full equality of rights. Nonetheless, there is still a huge gap between declared support for the principle of equality as an abstract value and the readiness to actually apply it. While 81% of the Jewish population supports the principle that every individual ought to have the same rights before the law, only 47% supports full equality of rights between Jews and Arabs, and less than half (23%) supports participation of Arabs in decisions affecting the destiny of the State.


While the rate of support for democratic values is especially low concerning everything relating to equality for the Arab minority, let us not err:

Figure 13

Equality for the Arab Minority

“A Jewish majority on critical national decisions
such as returning territories”

Disagree and strongly disagree (Jewish samples only)



The change filters through to the other levels and is expressed in a clear decline in the level of support for abstract and general democratic values and principles. The findings clearly reveal that in recent years there has been a marked deterioration in the degree of support of the Jewish public for democratic norms on all levels. In the majority of instances, the positive change that occurred in the 1990s has been completely eroded, and in specific cases it has even fallen to previously unknown depths.

This portrait is reinforced when support for democracy and for democratic norms in Israel is compared with that in other democratic countries. Among the thirty-two states in the Democracy Index for which there is data, Israel is ranked in last place (along with Poland) in


the degree of support of its citizens (Jews and Arabs) for the claim that a democratic regime is a desirable thing (see Figure 14).²²

Denmark and Greece head the list with 98% supporting the democratic system. They are followed by Italy, Holland and Sweden (all register 97%). Japan, New Zealand and Argentina register in the middle with 90-92% support, and Israel and Poland are at the bottom of the list, both with only 84% of the public opining that democracy is a desirable thing. When the degree of agreement or disagreement is asked regarding the statement that "A number of strong leaders can benefit the state more than all the debates and laws," Israel again appears problematical, to say the least. Israel is ranked 29 out of thirty-one surveyed states for which there was data, in the high rate of support

22. The data is taken from the fourth round of the *World Values Survey* taken during 1999-2001. The data was published in Ronald Inglehart, "How Solid is Mass Support for Democracy—And How Can We Measure It?" *Political Science and World Politics* 36(1), 2003: 51-57.

Figure 14
Support for Democracy Compared Internationally

“Democracy is a desirable form of government.”
 Agree and strongly agree (general population samples)



The results of West Germany and East Germany were both presented in the source material and are replicated here.

for "strong leaders"—56% of the total population (see Figure 15).²³ In fact, Israel is among only four states (along with Mexico, which is one slot above Israel, and Romania and India, which close out the list) in which a majority of the public claim that "strong leaders" are a good or very good idea. Greece again heads the list, with only 9% of its public supporting "strong leaders," followed by Denmark and Norway with 14% each.

Alongside the retreat from democratic values, there was also a decline in the degree of public satisfaction with Israeli democracy. The trend is familiar: in 1999, 79% were satisfied or very satisfied with the way in which democracy functioned in Israel, but in 2001 the number plummeted to a record low, and for the first time less than half of the citizens (47%) expressed satisfaction with the state of democracy.

Today the level of satisfaction still remains at 51%. Yet, when the public is asked whether the State of Israel is currently democratic to the proper extent, too democratic, or not democratic enough, the erosion is much less. Although 36% stated in 1999 that Israel was less than a satisfactory democracy whereas today 29% hold this position, still, in comparison with the beginning of the 1990s, the figures have doubled. At that time, only 14% claimed that Israel was not democratic enough. Among the groups who assert that Israel is a less than satisfactory democracy, the Arabs stand out: 65% of them declare that Israel is not democratic enough. Among Jewish respondents, this group is characterized by a preponderance of Ashkenazi leftists and new immigrants from the Former Soviet Union.


23. Ibid.

Figure 15

Support for “Strong Leaders” Compared Internationally

“A few strong leaders could do more good for the country than all the discussions and laws.”

Agree and strongly agree (general population samples)



Social Cohesion

The 2003 Israeli Democracy Survey examined the state of social cohesion on several levels: first, the degree of trust citizens have in the major institutions of the state; second, the degree of interpersonal trust; third, the character of the relationships between groups in society; and fourth, the sense of belonging. Following are the main findings for each one of these levels.

We start with the measure of trust in institutions. As of April 2003, 83% of the Israeli public

expressed trust in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), 70% in the Supreme Court, 68% in the president of the state, 66% in the police, 58% in the attorney-general’s office, 55% in the government, 53% in the prime minister, and 51% in the Knesset. The only four institutions that are trusted by less than half the adult population are the media (49%), the Rabbinate (43%), the Histadrut (42%), and the political parties, which only a third of the public trusted (32%). These latter institutions have maintained

their positions at the bottom of the list for four consecutive years. The IDF and the Supreme Court have kept their positions as the most trusted institutions, but both have experienced a significant decline in the degree of trust the public is willing to grant them: the IDF is 14% lower than in 2002 and the Supreme Court is 8% lower. In fact, in 2003 these two institutions reached their nadir on the trust index since records were begun in 1994.²⁴ The attorney-general's office and the media also received their lowest scores in 2003 and even lost their relative ranking on the index for trust in institutions, the attorney-general's office dropping two places and the media dropping four to five places. Compared with 2002 figures, the majority of institutions show an erosion in the degree of trust placed in them, with the greatest decline (17%) in that of the prime minister (in both instances, Ariel Sharon was prime minister). Public trust in the Knesset rose by 7% and in the political parties by 4% from the previous year, although this improvement did not change their general ranking among the institutions included in the survey. The Histadrut exhibited the greatest increase, from 31% of trust in 2002 to 42% of trust in April 2003 (11% higher). However, its relative ranking did not improve, and it still garners the lowest trust ranking, with the exception of the political parties.

The current survey also asked respondents which institution best safeguards Israeli democracy—the Knesset, the prime minister, the Supreme Court or the media, (representing the three branches of government and "the fourth estate" in democracies).

Among the general population, the Supreme Court was regarded as the institution which best safeguards Israeli democracy (42%), followed by the media (26%), the prime minister (18%), and the Knesset, which was ranked last (14%). However, when the breakdown between religious and non-religious respondents is compared, the picture changes considerably (see Figure 16).

Among the secular population, the ranking order remains the same, but the Supreme Court attains a higher degree of support at the expense of the prime minister and the Knesset: half of the secular respondents (51%) claim that the Supreme Court safeguards democracy best. On the other hand, among the religious population, the order is reversed: 30% claim that the prime minister is the institution that safeguards Israeli democracy best, followed by the Knesset (29%), the Supreme Court (22%), and finally the media (19%). Each group attributes the ability to safeguard Israeli democracy to the institution in which it has greatest influence and sway.


From the perspective of social trust as expressed between an individual and his fellow man, the current study indicates that only 29% of Israeli citizens—less than a third—believe that people can be trusted, while a decisive majority (71%) believe that one must be very wary in relations with other people. These data have been relatively stable for the last twenty years (in specific instances they have been a little lower, but never have they registered a higher degree of trust in Israeli society). Is the Jewish adage "all Jews are responsible for each other" true then?

24. For data pertaining to 1994-1995 see: Yohanan Peres and Ephraim Yaar-Yuchtman, *Between Consensus and Division: Democracy and Peace in the Israeli Consciousness* (Jerusalem: The Israel Democracy Institute, 1998), pp. 244-249.

Figure 16

The Institution That Best Protects Israeli Democracy

(Jewish sample only, according to religious observance)



In order to measure the degree of trust among citizens and the trust of citizens in governmental institutions, we compared Israel to other democratic states. To this end, we succeeded in gathering data from twenty-one of the states in the survey project on the extent of social trust and the extent of trust in eight major institutions: the armed forces, the judicial system, the police, the parliament, the government, the media, labor unions and the church (in comparison with the Rabbinate in Israel).²⁵

Figure 17 presents the relative ranking of Israel for each of these criteria. From the data it may be seen


that although there has been a decline in the degree of trust in public institutions by Israeli citizens when compared diachronically, the extent of trust is still relatively high when compared to other democratic states. Among the eight public institutions examined in five instances, Israel is ranked in the top third of the list (the state ranked twenty-first exhibits the highest trust in the specified institution): the IDF—19-20 out of twenty-one states, with only the United States ahead of Israel and India sharing Israel's ranking; the Supreme Court (18-19);²⁶ the Knesset (18); and the government (16). The degree of trust that Israelis place in the media, the police, and the Histadrut is more or less on average with

25. All the data is from the third round of the *World Values Survey* taken between 1995-1997.

See: www.worldvaluessurvey.org/services/index.html

26. It should be pointed out that comparisons of the extent of trust in the Supreme Court in Israel with that in judicial systems elsewhere may be slightly biased in favor of Israel. However, in past surveys, the degree of trust in the Israeli Supreme Court compared with courts in general was on average 6% more favorable to the Israeli Supreme Court. Thus, even if this is taken into account, the extent of trust in the judicial system in Israel is still relatively higher compared with other states (Israel drops only three places in ranking).

Figure 17
**Israel's Relative Ranking on Trust in Institutions
 and Trust in People**



other states (the media is ranked 14 out of twenty-one states; the police 12; and the Histadrut 11). The only institution in which Israel ranks in the bottom third of the scale is the Rabbinate which, in comparison to the degree of trust that citizens of other states confer on the church, is low (7 out of twenty-one states).

Nevertheless, in contrast to the relatively high degree of trust that Israelis confer upon most public institutions, is the relatively low degree of social trust (8-9 out of twenty-one, together with Bulgaria). In a majority of the surveyed states, more citizens feel that they can rely upon their fellow man than is the case in Israel. Norway

and Sweden head the list, with two-thirds of the citizens bestowing confidence on their fellow man. Argentina, Poland and South Africa are found at the bottom of the list with only 18% of the citizenry claiming that they can rely upon their neighbor.


Examination of the relations among the various groups that comprise Israeli society provides additional evidence that social cohesion is low in Israel, especially with regard to interpersonal relations. According to the Democracy Survey, none of the relations between groups in society is considered to be good, and a majority of the public rated each of the relations as not so good or not good at all (see Figure 18).

Figure 18

Inter-group Relations in Israel

Not good and not good at all

(The Jewish-Arab and rich-poor responses were from the general population; the rest from the Jewish population only)



- **The ethnic rift:** The worst relations are those between Jews and Arabs, with 89% of the general population claiming that relations are not good. The Jews think those relations are worse than the Arabs think: 72% of the Arabs rate the relations as not good, while 92% of the Jews think the relations are not good.
- **The religious rift:** Among Jews, 76% claim that relations between the religious and the non-religious are not good, with secular respondents regarding the relations in a worse light than religious respondents. With one exception in 1978, this detail has remained constant for the last 30 years. In 1972 as well, 75% felt that the relations between religious and secular Jews were not good; thus, there has been no improvement.
- **The class rift:** This is the third worst cleavage—three-quarters of the state's citizens (75%) claim that relations between the wealthy and the poor are not good.
- **The communal rift:** 57% of the Jews claim that relations between Western and Oriental Jews (Ashkenazim and Mizrahim) are not good. This is the highest percentage since 1972,

except for 1988 when 72% said that relations between the communal groups were not good.

- The new immigrants/old-timer Israelis rift:**
 The best relations in the opinion of the Jewish public are those between new immigrants and veteran Israelis—"only" 51% regard them as not good. It is important to point out that there is no significant difference between the way new immigrants and old-timers perceive these relationships.

The last level of the social cohesion category that the Democracy Survey dealt with was the


sense of community attachment. Of the list of findings on this topic, we present only one here. We asked, "What things are important in order to be a 'real Israeli'?" Figure 19 contrasts the various replies of Jewish and Arab citizens.

Both groups attribute the greatest importance to respect for state institutions and the law: 95% of the Jewish citizens claim that this issue is important in order to be "a real Israel," and 89% of the Arabs hold this position. For Jews, the second most important issue is to feel Israeli and to agree that Israel should be Jewish and

Figure 19

To be a "real Israeli"

Important or very important



democratic (92% for each item), followed by military service (91%). The least important topic for the Jewish respondents was to be born in Israel (only 52%). This is also the only item to which the Arabs attributed greater importance than the Jews: 63% of the Arabs said that it was important to be born in Israel in order to be a "real Israeli." In their opinion, the second most

important issue, after respect for state institutions and the law, was to be an Israeli citizen (80%), and after that, to live in Israel for most of one's life (73%), to be able to speak Hebrew (68%), and to feel Israeli (66%). The item of least importance for the Arabs was Jewishness (36%) and military service (31%).

Public Perceptions of Israeli Democracy

The Democracy Index Project attempts to examine the state of Israeli democracy not only via a battery of indicators and a public opinion survey on various democratic topics, but also through exploration of the connection between them. In other words, how does the Israeli public perceive the functioning of Israeli democracy, and is there a gap between public perception and Israel's situation based on the various indicators? In this report, we present only preliminary and partial findings of this analysis.

A comparison of the findings of the 2003 Democracy Survey with the democracy indices reveals that the number of instances in which there is no connection between the way the public perceives the state of Israeli democracy and the rankings of those same characteristics according to the various indicators is no greater than the number of instances in which there is a correlation between the two. Moreover, in instances where there is a gap, there is a tendency to enhance reality and to evaluate the situation as better than it really is. However, there are also cases of regarding the situation as worse than it really is, so that Israel's situation is in fact relatively better than the public's perception of it.

The survey included, among other things, a string

of questions in which respondents were asked to compare the Israeli situation to other democratic states with regard to a certain characteristic. The findings reveal that the two areas in which Israelis view their situation as the worst, relative to other states, are the stability of the political system and the rifts in society: 62% said that Israel is relatively unstable, and 59% estimated that there is more tension among groups in Israeli society than in other places. On these two levels, it appears that the public's evaluation of the situation is correct. A check of Israel's relative ranking, compared with the thirty-six states in the survey, across the various democratic indicators reveals that the two aspects in which Israel's situation is indeed more problematic are the absence of governmental stability and the existence of great tension in society (see Figure 2). In other words, the situation in Israel is worrisome, but at least the public is aware of this.

Aside from the issues of stability and rifts, there is only one other topic in which a majority of the public thinks that Israel's situation is worse than that of other states—corruption: 52% of the respondents think that in Israel there is more corruption than in other places, 37% that the situation is similar to other places, and only 11% who estimate that there is less corruption. On this

issue there is a great gap between the way the public perceives the situation and Israel's ranking in the corruption index of international research entities. The Israeli public feels that the relative state of the country is much worse than the experts claim. Figure 20 tries to illustrate this. It compares nineteen states in the survey according to two criteria: the first is the score the country received in the corruption index of Transparency International (the score ranges from 0-10, with 10 signifying the absence of corruption).²⁷ The second is the percentage of citizens in that state who replied that there is political corruption to a great extent or to a certain extent.²⁸

The picture that emerges from the figure is quite clear: Israel registers the highest rate of citizens who claim that there is corruption in the state—89% of the general population. That is to say that Israel ranks first in terms of the public's perception of the degree of corruption (19 out of 19). On the other hand, in the Transparency International corruption index, Israel's relative position is much better: among the nineteen states (the state ranked last having the most corruption) Israel ranks 9-10. Moreover, in comparison with other states, Israel registers the greatest gap between the public's perception of the degree of corruption and its ranking on the Transparency International corruption index. In all the other states, the deviation between the two rankings is not more than four slots, and in the majority of cases less than that. In Israel, the gap is enormous—a gap of nine-and-a-half places between the public's perceived ranking

of the scope of corruption and the ranking according to the Transparency International corruption index.

The subject of corruption is the exception that does not prove the rule. In the majority of cases where there is a lack of connection between the public's perception, as expressed in the 2003 Democracy Survey, and the democracy indices, the deviation goes the other way: Israelis judge their position to be better than it actually is. Two examples of this are: a) political participation—about 80% of the population think that Israeli citizens participate in politics more than citizens in other places, or equally, with the same percentage in each of the two categories. Only one-fifth of the population claims that political participation in Israel is lower than in other places. On the other hand, determining the degree of political participation by looking at the rate of voting in Knesset elections indicates that Israel ranks a relatively low: 22 out of thirty-six states in the survey. And b) the protection of human rights—on this topic the public thinks that Israel is located firmly in the middle ranks: nearly half of Israelis claim that the situation is similar to that in other states (46%), and the rest are equally split between those who think that the situation in Israel is less good (27%) and those who think that the situation is better than in other places (27%). Yet, on the index measuring infringement of human rights, Israel is at the bottom of the ranking, together with South Africa and India.²⁹


27. The data is taken from: Transparency International, *The 2002 Corruption Perceptions Index*, <http://www.gwdg.de/uwvw/2002data.html>

28. The data for Israel is taken from *The 2003 Democracy Survey*. The data for the rest of the states is taken from the third round of the *World Values Survey*. See footnote 23.

29. The data was submitted by Mark Gibney, University of North Carolina, Asheville. Gibney bases his statistics on the reports of Amnesty International. On the preference for the Amnesty International index over that of the U.S. Department of State, see: Foweraker and Krznaric, 2001, p. 15.

Figure 20
**Israel's Ranking on the Corruption Index
 Compared to the Perception of Corruption**

(General population samples)



We regard this current document as a preliminary publication of the study, which is in its formative stages, and we welcome suggestions for corrections and improvements.