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Session 2

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Prof. Tamar Hermann: Professor Pierangelo got stuck in Paris. So this session will be changed a little. The first speaker will be Professor Naomi Hazan, then Dr. Danny Filc and then Riva who was kind enough to replace Pierangelo on this session. He will replace her on her original session tomorrow. Naomi the floor is yours.

Prof. Naomi Hazan: Thank you. Good afternoon. I want to start with a few introductory comments which are of rather personal nature. I am coming to the table with two halves. One half is the academic. I did most of my work on civil society in the States in the African context. And I have written on this subject. I am also coming with an activist half in two respects. Number one, I was a member of parliament and I am very involved with a political party. This is the reason I have to apologize that I will have to leave because we are in the middle of negotiations of establishing a new Left Alliance. And I have to be in Tel Aviv to see if that is possible. For the past two years I have chaired Shatil which is the umbrella organization for social change and social justice organizations in Israel. I am now the president of the New Israel Front that in for last 30 years has jump started over 800 organizations in civil society. So I am coming from both directions and probably as a result of that I will create a mishmash. Nevertheless I want to present a proposal and I will do a lot of characterization in order to deal with some of the issues that we discussed this morning and maybe even further complicate the question.

If we talk about civil society that is in a political engagement in Israel, on the one hand is very clear now that on all the key formal indicators there is a reduction in participation in Israel. If there is an election there is involvement of various sorts quite systematically now. I think that in the past decade all the surveys show that there is a reduction. People are less engaged in the formal political arena. On the other hand, and I find it most interesting finding in the latest democracy, is that the democratic norms that had not been adversely affected. I am at the beginning of construction of an interesting paradox which I would supplement with a statement that there is a tremendous amount of activity outside the formal political arena. How is it possible to reconcile these contradictions. In order to do so we need to do three things. The first issue is something that Professor Merkel raised right at the end and there is a tremendous conceptual confusion. I will attempt to make some conceptual order. The thing is to try and look at the empirical manifestation of anti politics and challenging politics however you want to describe it, and not only do I want to look at the

manifestations but I would like to attempt to clarify the empirical differences. The conceptual differences are not good enough. We are seeing things that look the same but they are really quite different in terms of the political implications. And the last thing, are there strategies to overcome some of the problematic phenomena that appear.

I would contend that there is an expansion of the sphere of politics in Israel. An expansion and diversification. There is shrinking of the state. And without linking the two we cannot begin to understand what we are talking about. I will try by making some conceptual order. I found a great deal of confusion this morning in the definition of the political sphere. Some have talked about the political sphere in terms of institutionalized state related terms. Essentially the political sphere is formal politics with the normative justification. It is possible to conceive of the political arena in much broader terms. There is a lot of activity outside the formal arena which is heavily political and heavily engaged but not necessarily interactive at this stage. We have different political arenas operating and not just one very formalistic. The second differentiation is what is democracy? Is democracy very regularized way in the political parties participation, civil rights, law and order, operation of institutions. Democracy can occur in other places as well. It does not have to occur only in the formal setting. There is a linkage here between what is the political sphere and what is democratic activity. Democratic activity depends to a large extent on the arena in which it takes place. The third conceptual clarification is tied with the state. There is a very clear distinction between democratic regimes and the state. The state arching with organs of power. In Israel state structures are no longer strong and their reach is becoming more and more limited. The capacity to implement and control policy outcome is shrinking. Israel is a much weaker state than it was 15 or 20 years ago. And to ignore the state as an instrument of power is a terrible mistake. The fourth and final clarification I want to make is related to civil society, the activity of associations, organizational activity etc.

We actually have 4 categories of activity here. I am talking about organizations, various networks, movements actually. People do not meet each other face to face but they are acting together as a group. There are 4 types of groups out there and they are very different. The first type of groups are the groups that withdraw entirely. They are escape groups. They basically deal with the here and now with no linkage horizontally or vertically to anything. The example for me is the soup kitchens. That is really an exit withdraw phenomena, very much self help, self enclosed and self sustained to a large extent. The second kind of groups are holistic groups. They are groups that are outside of the political arena that have the ambition and the drive to take over the formal arena and to control it. Roughly speaking they are challengers but they are holistic in a sense that they want controlled power and they have all the answers to all the questions. They are firmly fundamentalist in outlook. These are certain ideological very right wing settlers groups, these are very strongly organized religious groups who also want to take over the state and impose their ideology on the state. The third kind of groups are groups that emanate from the state, they are linked to political parties and the state, they are dependent on government funding. In many respects the heavily organized Trade Unions in Israel are of that order. Their way of interaction is very often formal. The fourth group is civil society organizations. They are very minor percentage in this landscape. Civil society organizations by definition are autonomous of the state but relate to the state. In terms of the space they occupy the

middle space between state and society. Civil society organizations deal with a part not with the whole. They will deal with human rights or civil rights or media rights or social justice. They do not come with a complete agenda. They are about parts. They have both horizontal and vertical outreach.

Now this leads us to the empirical question of what is going on here? There are two major things and we are lumping it together as one and a half thing. A growing number of residents of this country are completely tuned out of politics in the formal sense and in the informal sense. They are not there. They either physically escape from the country. You will find most of our 20 to 22 years old in Goa, India, in Nepal, in Peru. So they are either physically absent or the vast majority of those who are absent are mentally absent. You can live in this country and be totally mentally absent. The greatest thing that happens to you during the course of the day is the Yoga lesson or your Pilatus lesson and your cup of coffee with your friend. You will not see them in the newspapers. They will be on the internet. They are planning their next trip. There is nothing beyond Tel Aviv. This is the culture of Goa and the Tel Aviv pub and it exists everywhere in this country. These are the absentees. That is in my mind non-politics. Totally indifferent and apathetic. And if you raise the subject the answer that you will get is- it does not interest me. This is not being studied or examined anywhere in the poles. People are really turned off of formal politics in a visceral physical sense. They are disgusted. If you say politics they shudder. They begin to break out in a deep sweat. These are the people that complain on Friday nights, make cynical jokes about every politician and then channel all their energies into helping Ethiopian youngsters to pass matriculation exams. In defending the rights of Beduins in the South against the destruction of their homes. In fighting Israeli violations on human rights in the Occupied Territories, in building a co-up. There is a tremendous amount of activity and engagement in the informal political sector. How do you differentiate between the two? The only way is through using the definition of civil society. Anti-politics of this sort is politically engaged in the most profound sense of the term. On the other hand the Yoga is the antithesis of political engagement. And Israelis as they do well on almost everything have developed it into a high form.

In this space there is a third phenomena and these are the challengers who are trying to simply take over. They are prompted by world views that are antithetical to diversity, to pluralism, and definitely to equality. They are really profoundly truly fundamentalists of the Right and of the Left. They seem to blossom when everything else is very confused and when people like us do not make the order in this confusion.

Which leads me to the last section, what do you do about it? I have the activist part of me and the academic part of me. This is a great puzzle. The direction of reversing or redressing the various form of withdrawing from the political arena has focus and very formal, very institutional and very boring and very unconvincing approach of governmental reform. If we reduce corruption, if we strengthen the efficiency of the institutions people will begin to believe again that the formal arena is worthwhile. A lot of our colleagues developed strategies which require one form or another of governmental reform in order to deal with the question of accountability. Because if there is a disconnection between citizens and the government then by creating some kind of closer connection between the two, people suggest that strategically this is a way of embracing or redirecting the political activity that is outside the political arena

back into the formal political arena. I do not discount this structural approach. It has great limitations. It does not effect what is underlying a lot of the processes and that is very strong sense of political inefficiency, that people can control their destiny. And unless they have a feeling that what they say makes a difference they are not going to engage in the formal political setting. In order to redress the question of efficacy you need totally different strategy. The most important relates to policy and not to structural reform. And among the policies that I would suggest is increasing the interaction by reinforcing the remnants of the welfare state. Israel never had a policy concerning how to deal with civil society and how to interact with civil society. In a constructive kind of way if part of state budget automatically goes to civil society organizations and as they become the founders of this society that can be very interesting. The third strategic approach relates directly to the state and the definition of the state in Israel. Israel is the only state I know that has no defined geographic boundaries. How can they actually conduct and control the population if we do not know what the regions are supposed to be. It is absolutely essential to resolve the Israeli conflicts. Without the resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Israel is doomed to a reduction in government ability and then the relative autonomy of the state. This is not a political statement, it is an analytical one. There are three approaches. One are the various forms of institutional and governmental reform. The second relates to policy issues and the third relates to resolving the conflict in order to define the reach of the state in order to fortify its capacity. Non-politics and anti-politics are becoming more embracing in Israel but these are not irreversible. They require much more concerted action and that is actually the form of political action. Thank you.

Dr. Danny Filc: I am glad to hear Naomi because I think that she put forward a very clear concept of framework and I completely identify with her definition of the formal political area but I want to look at this formal political area and at the state, at the relations. Parties and the parliament in Israel can be characterized as a crisis of representation. There are several explanations in the political literature to this crisis of representation which is not exclusive of Israeli society. The crisis of representation stems from a feeling that actual politics betrayed the democratic promise. The democratic promise is based on two central assumptions. The first is that there is an essential equality among the members of the political community and the second one is the idea of sovereignty. There is no real meaning to the idea of democracy without the idea of popular sovereignty. I am speaking not about liberal democracy but the democratic part of the liberal democratic combination. The global neo-liberal state is unable to meet the challenge of popular sovereignty. There is no meaning to the term popular sovereignty without a clear territorial definition. This idea of popular sovereignty involves certain paradoxes. The most central one is the contradiction between the idea of sovereignty of the rule of the one or the necessary unity of the act of governing and idea of the many. The many do not have a common will because it is constantly changing. One of the claims of the monarchies against democrats was how can you claim that there is something like popular sovereignty if people are always changing. People are dying, people are born so there is no such thing as the people. Representation is one of the ways of solving this contradiction. Representation is not a second best option for direct democracy but the process of representation is a way to make present something that is not present literally. Also Hobbs defined it a multitude of men are made one person when they are represented. Representation contributes to creating the very political fiction of the people as the sovereign. But when the

mechanism of political representation are not able to represent the people's unity, when the process of representation does not represent popular sovereignty, when political equality is betrayed, when there a significant gap between the actual ways of the political system and the democratic promise we face a crisis of representation. There is no such thing as biological or natural division of humanity into national entities. The people are always already political. So the process of representation is part of the creation of the people as subjects. Thus representation is much more than responsive authorization legitimacy of accountability. I propose to understand representation as the translation and reconstruction of popular sovereignty into acts of legislation. If the people do not exist as a pre political unity then identity and representation are not two opposite concepts. Because identity as such does not exist. There is not a self evident perception of the people as such which is the preferred way of democracy and representation as second best. Representation is inherent to the political. The unity is never final. Representatives are never truly external or independent from the people they are representing. There is a double moment of mediation.

There are three main forms of political representation. There is the Berkian form of representation and I quote, "parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests but an assembly of one nation with one interest with no local purposes, no local prejudices, ought to guide the general good starting from the reason of the whole" and as Burke makes clear he wants the voice that represents the interest of the whole. Schmidt accepted this kind of representation and for Schmidt and for Burke the representatives are able to represent and unify the whole. For Burke because they are the best, they are the ones who have no particular interest. For Schmidt because the whole is a unified whole that exists previous to the political processes of representation.

The second form of representation is the instructed delegates. This is an approach to democracy in which elected officials follow the expressed wishes of their constituents. And the third form of representation which is the form that is in crisis in Israel today is the responsible party of representation. The responsible parties mode of representation see political parties as collectives. Political parties are not individual legislators are the primary vehicles that articulate citizens' policy beliefs and convert them into public policies. Now Professor Merkel said that parties are not particular democratic institutions but the democratic role is not only related to internal democracy but the extent into which they are able to translate the claims of the citizens into policies, into state governmental actions. What we see now is a crisis of this process of representation in Israel, particularly of the parties responsible for over representation. A crisis of representation can stem from transformations on three different levels of the process of representation. It can be a modification in the characteristics of the represented. For example immigration, for example inclusion into the political community that previously excluded. It can be a crisis in the mediating institutions like political parties and it can be a crisis in the capacity of the represented to really represent their electors. The second level, the level of mediation is always secondary to transformation at the level of the represented or at the level of the state under representatives. And that is the reason that I am less optimistic about Naomi's conclusion that structural reforms in the ways of representation will be able to solve this crisis of representation. Maybe that in the same way that the political party was an answer to the inclusion of the masses into the political community the

transformation of the state in a global world means that we must look to other institutions of representation. That trying to save the traditional political party is like searching for the coin under the light but not where the coin really is.

Now crisis of representation may lead and has led in the past to a violence in the legal order. Today the crisis of representation at least in Israel but not only in Israel, takes the form of affection. This affection stems from the dissatisfaction with quality and maintenance of democratic representation. It is a situation where patterns of representation are unstable. This is expressed in a low voting turn out, in electoral volatility, in low membership and this is a phenomenon which is now pervasive in almost every democracy. Putnam and collaborators published a paper a few years ago and they said that the collapse in citizens' engagement with political parties is as close where universal generalizations are present. In Israel we use data from the Israel Democratic Institute. Some of the data was quoted before by Yael. The fact that this is a crisis of representation and not a problem of engagement in policy is very clear from the fact that Israel is first among 35 nations concerning interest in politics. It is a country where people discuss politics with their friends and relatives. And still, this is a country where only 6% are members in political parties, where electoral voting went down to 60% and if we take into account anti-party politics like the elder citizens' party or Avigdor Liberman Israel Our Home because radical Right political parties are usually considered as anti party politics we can arrive at figures like 50% of the electorate who express disbelief in the political party system. This situation is not a problem of non-politics but a problem of the political community within the state and its political representatives. The neoliberal form of globalization and the way that Israel entered the neoliberal global world is one of the reasons for this crisis. Globalization creates growing incongruity between the scope of territorial units and the issues raised by interdependence reducing the output effectiveness of democratic national state and this Naomi related to efficiency and the ability of government to be effective. But even more than that, the neoliberal globalization transfers part of the state powers to national organizations like the market. The ranking of government policies by private market like organizations, the establishing of risks for investors is the main variable in economic policies that could or maybe adopted by different countries. This is one part of the equation. The other part of the equation is that the neoliberal transformation of the state empties or restrains the fears that are under democratic control. For example the autonomy of the central Bank takes from the democratic control by the state several areas of monetary policies. The modifications in the relationship between the Ministry of Finance and the Ministries in charge of social policies that subordinates all social policies to the Ministry of Finance. In Israel this is especially strong process but it is not exclusive of the Israeli situation. Under that kind of transformation the possibility of the citizens to feel that their claims are taken into account by the representatives are almost nil. But this is not a side effect of neoliberal policies. It is one of its aims. The World Bank for example, the need to reform the state as they put it in one of their reports, with a few critical enclaves that typically include the Ministry of Finance, the Central Bank and the Tax Collection Agency organs cannot be achieved through executive orders and should establish affective management by insolated technocratic elite. What are the means of insolated technocratic elite? It is an elite that is insolated from the claims of the people, from the democratic activity, from the supervision or the guidance by the people's representatives. So there is a clear attempt to bypass the formal channels of

government and other social institutions which are subject to popular influence. This kind of transformation empties the very idea of popular sovereignty.

Now this is one level. The other level by which the neoliberalization of the state influences the idea of sovereignty is by what Margert Tacher called there is no alternative. When Netanyahu was a Minister of Finance he said economics is like the theatre. The law of economics has the same kind of hard epistemological and ontological true value. If this is so there is no meaning to popular sovereignty within the area of economic policies. Nobody would contend the gravity law. If economics is like physics, democracy is very constraint especially if any social policy is subjected to those laws of economics which are not political at all. So neoliberalization is not only the weakening of the state. It is the raising of the idea that there is any value to political alternatives. Now in Israel we should add that also in the area of the conflict the idea that there are alternatives after Oslo. Most political agents in Israel are speaking about conflict management not about different visions of conflict resolution. So if there is no real alternative in the political sphere, not in the political area, not in the socio-economical policy area then one of the main prerequisite of the responsible party mode of representation, the fact that there are parties which propose a different agenda and different policies that prerequisite does not exist and we face a crisis of representation.

Among the modifications that characterize the neoliberal terms in Israeli policies that diminish the ability of the state to issue any kind of policy at all is the liberalization of finance. Once in Israel the state was the main guarantor of credit and of developmental economic policy. The liberalization of trade, the liberalization on pension funds. I have already mentioned the autonomy of the central government, the modification in exchange rate policies. Once in Israel the government had a day-to-day control on the exchange rate market. Now it is completely left to market forces. The government has no voice on issues of monetary policy. The only area of mass economic policies that are still under governmental control is taxes. And this is also relative because the government for example passed legislation a few years ago that the deficit is constrained and the government can decide year by year which budget deficit it will choose. So the neoliberal transformation of the government leaves the state with almost no instrument to pressure any social policy or any economical policy. The right of citizens is the meaning of representation. There is no difference whom you choose, the policy options are almost nil. So it is quite rational not to participate. Civil society is about the parts and not about the whole. Civil society is not an answer to the democratic promise. It can help but without state policies which can be at least partially controlled by the political community there is no real democracy.

I would like to finish by claiming that the conception of democracy leads obligatory to a crisis of representation. There is no possibility to avoid crisis of representation. Today it is not even about choosing which elite will be in charge but in a way the formal political process is about ratification of policies decided by a transnational elite and not about choosing one of several competing elites. This conception of neoliberal democracy has unavoidable link with permanent crisis of representation and the question we should ask ourselves is when the crisis of representation become a crisis of legitimacy and the crisis of legitimacy is much more of a trying for the democratic

process. The crisis of legitimacy in a way involves the promise of a real change. Thank you.

Prof. Tamar Hermann: We are moving to Europe.

Prof. Riva Kastoryano: I going to talk about civil society because I am talking about the immigrants and post colonial immigrants in the countries of Europe and the question of citizenship and participation. The question of citizenship has been a real issue in Europe since eighties and the focus is on judicial, political, social and cultural debate. In Europe citizenship has taken different shapes and definitions with the rhetoric, ideology and practice with regard to immigrant incorporations in different European societies. It has also been related to the political participation beyond boundaries relating home and host countries and to a broader European state. Citizenship has been an issue for the European self construction when we started to define what the union could be and what does this mean and what does it imply. So within nation states citizenship has been expressed in different domains, expressing its scope from the national community to the civil society through volunteer associations and ethno-cultural religious communities. The question of citizenship therefore opens the way to negotiations of identities between states and immigrants. Within nation states the call for equality that citizens claim extends to different domains often turning negotiation of interest in negotiation of identity. For the state it is a question of negotiating the means of inclusion of immigrants through the political community on a basis of a new equilibrium between community structures and national institutions. For individuals citizenship becomes a principle of equality and a way to struggle against political, social and cultural exclusion. It becomes a way to claim recognition as citizens through which the attachment and loyalty to form national community and ethnic community are expressed. Such an understanding of citizenship raises the question of the relevance of the link between citizenship, nationality and identity, the link between political community and cultural community the former as a source of right and the latter as a source of identity. At the European level the concession of a new political state has created an opportunity for action leading to a transnational structures of representation and new negotiations with state and introduces the question of territoriality with regard to practice of citizenship and its relations to nationhood. Here we have a complex articulation between citizenship, national identity that I will try to relate to cultural and political belonging between the identity and the relevance of territoriality in relations to nations and the new expression of identity by forms of national participation.

So to start with the link between citizenship, nationality and identity, we know that in the understanding of a nation-state there are through citizenship and nationhood or nationality two interdependent concepts and interchangeable concepts and are defined above all as a membership to political community. Its implementation by a law implies the integration or the incorporation of the foreigners into the national community with which he or she is supposed to share the same moral and political values. Moreover she or he is supposed to adopt or even appropriate historical references as a proof of belonging and loyalty to the founding principles of the nation. Fiction, representation, imagination but a nation. Here we have all the tests for citizenship through naturalization when you have all the facts.

But reality is more complex. Obviously such representations of the nation have expanded and to some extent have justified restrictions. This is where fiction meets law. The reality seems to have effected the course of history. The experience of immigration and settlement along with the claim of equality and recognition as citizens has both changed the understanding and the citizenship with a collective perspective and changed the understanding of the laws of citizenship. As we know in all European countries there more liberal laws of citizenship. The best example here is Germany who has now the most liberal citizenship laws. Politics and the right of citizenship have obviously an influence on the strategies of the participation of immigrants. Voting directly or through civil societies, or just as spectators. But the practice of citizenship goes beyond its legal definition. It stems from the political engagement of individuals and it applies to different domains and in different terms. It is expressed in terms of participation in the public state. Citizenship can therefore be practiced within a cultural or ethnic framework as well as within the national community. Such multiple identifications raises the question of belonging and loyalty of individuals to the national community. It has even become a social suspicion for a nation-state, a feeling that comes out in every discussion of public debate on citizenship and nationhood. As a matter of fact, since the 1980's the scope of the debate of citizenship related to immigration translates the apprehensions of the political classes and the public opinion to see citizenship be de-secularized based on the argument that immigrants or foreigners express their attachment to the country of origin and therefore to primordial ties with a transposed cultural community instead of the national community of the country of settlement. Based on such fears immigration has been perceived as second to nation-state. But what is truly at stake is the limit of law and their relations to social reality. To what extent citizenship can be a solution to exclusion and inequality? The citizenship in practice and its discourse is linked to phenomenon of exclusion. On the other hand citizenship and the civic participation do not always normatively preclude the expression of collective identity. All the more so with immigrants who arrived at different European countries in the 1960's and publicly expressed their attachment to the country of origin in linguistic, ethnic or religious communities or local communities as well as to a transnational community in the European Union. Their participation and claims combined both interest and ethno-religious or social community and the political community. The principle of a new ethnic identification defined in religious or national terms becomes one of citizenship. Such an evolution leads to multiplicity of allegiances. This has been crystallized about debate on dual citizenship mainly in Germany. But dual citizenship is founded on the logic that has two consequences: It transforms nationality into identity and makes citizenship an entitlement within the country of residence. Identity versus right. In such a case new citizenship becomes illegal settlement and nationality is merely defined along the religious, ethnic, cultural lines and constitutes the identity of the home country. This has been a big debate in Germany in 1998. Citizenship linked to the nation of the home country is thereby de-territorialized. A citizenship relating to an ethnic community seeking recognition not only within the national community but on a European and international level is therefore also denationalized. Such a question would suggest that ethnic communities become part of the nation derived from the relation between home and host countries and with a broader space of transnational participation.

This point brings me to my second equation- dissociation that is citizenship and territory. This has led immigrants to develop transnational networks linking the

country of origin to the country of residence and to participate actively in both states. In this perspective, dual citizenship stems from the political participation in both political communities which lies in multiple allegiances. Transnationalism relates to integration. Within the European Union you have many voluntary associations which are looking to find a justification and legitimacy within national societies and try to reach national institutions for recognition beyond state boundaries. So the national institutions are used in order to have an effect on representation, recognition and legitimacy on a national state level. Just to give an example when I was doing my research in 1992 when I was interviewing leaders on what is Europe, they were saying that they consider themselves, at the time there were 12 states in the union, they called themselves the 13th state or the 13th nation or the 13th population. So what does this mean? It was the beginning of my thoughts on transnational identity. The other idea I wanted to point is the emergence of transnational community on a European level. That is a community structured by individuals or groups different from national society defining common interests and identities beyond boundaries. What can be a common identity on such a broad scale and with so many different fragmentations is expressed through the fight for equality and human rights seeking at the same time a unified identity in search of legitimacy before institutions. So their claim is denationalize with regard to the home country and host country. They point to the existence of a new type of nationalism. This brings forth a new understanding of nation that is denationalized and creates new expressions of belonging and political engagement. This reflects the nationalization of communitarian feelings such as religion guided by an imagined community leading to a non territorial community. Thus transnationalism in Europe raises the question of territoriality with regard to participation and citizenship.

First of all, transnational organizations create a space for political organizations that goes beyond national territory. In the European Union transnationalism from this perspective territory becomes broader, unbounded space when nation states and institutions interact and when transnational networks build bridges between national societies and Europe. As for citizenship it implies the view of the activists involved in such networks as part of its construction. But paradoxically enough European citizenship as a global concept of membership of nation states introduces the allegiance of immigrants to their home country in the process of gaining in the same way they express allegiance to the state of residence, or to the European institutions.

We know also that the law that gives citizenship of the union, citizenship of the union means of a member state but it means in practice that to vote for local European institution in your state based on municipality and residence. So this also brings an extra territoriality through its practice. Beyond territorial limited nation-states brings therefore de territorial form of the national community.

A little bit more on transnationalism and extra territoriality. This extra territoriality gives strength to transnationalism. It institutionalizes multiple allegiances and dissociates citizenship from nationhood and territory. Within the European Union this multiplicity of allegiances and status for political participation include the home country. In fact European citizenship includes membership in the European Union. Such a transnational community is characterized by its internal diversity, national, ethnic, religious and linguistic of course. This diversity can be centered about values that are diffused by the European institutions and through the process by which the

same institutions give diversity and legitimacy. Especially inclusive discourse developed by transnational acts. But the same diversity finds itself re-centered around common identity elements such as religion, particularly Islam. In many countries it is primarily the case with Islam that is a minority religion that communities are formed around and they build their networks independently from European institutions not subsidized by any state to create a platform for action and claim recognition before European institutions. In this perspective it is rather the countries of origin or international organizations which reactivate religious loyalty of Muslim populations residing in different European countries. Their strategies are contradictory and at times even completely in conflict. But international organizations seek to rise above the national cleavages of Muslims in Europe in order to create a single identification that of being Muslims in Europe and therefore the recognition of Islam by European institutions.

This brings me to my third point and that is that we cannot think of citizenship without recognition and without representation. The demands of recognition of formal groups that claim a specific identity to emerge from political sidelines and fully integrate into the structure of the state, in this perspective being recognized is emancipation for the group. But contrary to the emancipation of the enlightenment which separates religion from the public life and individual from the community we find the demand for recognition is born from a desire to be a part of the community with equal rights within the framework of the state. The recognition of collective identity specifically is concerned with Islam. It is so in many countries. Even though the recognition was citizenship in Germany, much more religious recognition in France now we can find it in every European country in Germany, in Britain, in the Netherlands, in Belgium, the claim for recognition for a collective identity concerned with Islam and representation concerned with Islam. Religion becomes the only identity. They can find legitimacy before the state institutions. Why? Because all secular states, which have a special arrangement with religion in the European countries, have their own institutional representation of religion. And to include Islam into this representation is a matter of equality among religions. So in this perspective let us bring the state back in. Each state has its own understanding of religion, institutional setting for religion. For example in France we have constituency for the Jews that goes back to Napoleon times and then federation for the Protestants and the idea was to extend this representation to Islam. We have now the French Council of Muslims that was created in 2003. In Germany the question is the language of instruction in the public schools. In England it is the same kind of institutional representation as in France. So we come to this perspective on a state level to institutions' assimilation that will be the next step of multicultural reality.

Thus the paradox, even if transnational logic tries to cope with national politics and weaken the state, the state remains the driving force of the process of Europeanization and of globalization. This fight is limited autonomy to normative pressures of super national institutions. Despite an increasing interdependence between the internal and external in political decisions, the state remains the main actor for negotiations because of its sovereignty within and outside of its borders. It remains the legal source of citizenship despite dual citizenship. But transnational community and nationalization has become an important source of identification resistance and mobilization, a source of power stemming from the mobility of individuals and groups in opposition to the immobility of state. Therefore the de-territorialization of

citizens generate new tensions between state and communities and more generally new tensions in the international system.

But transnationalism as an extra territorial citizenship generates negotiations between transnationalism and state which brings the state to another level. For transnational actors, national action becomes a political tool for leading them to act from outside. For state, transnationalism is a way to include identity issues that are in minority situations into the political strategy. It becomes for the state a way to incubate the process of globalization. Thank you.

Prof. Tamar Hermann: I thank Riva for the issues she put on the table and thoughts in terms of our perceptions about identity. Nationality, territoriality, religion, all these super-national non-territorial identities. The floor is open to questions, remarks.

Speaker: I am just wondering Danny, in the Israeli example you would have to claim that economic policy is a significant factor in Israeli representative democracy. Are you claiming that?

Dr. Danny Filc: That is the point. When Euhud Barak was elected prime minister his first choice for Chair of the Central Bank was Yaacov Neamn who was Binyamin Netanyahu's Minister of Finance. If you want to choose for the second most important economic role the guy who was the first most important economic officer in the previous administration, which is not the same party administration this is a very powerful message. Rhetoric notwithstanding there is no real difference in concrete policies.

Speaker: In 1995 it was like that.

Dr. Danny Filc: That is what I am claiming. That since 1985 there is an ongoing process by which the state and the political parties are not able to translate the claims. In the poles you can see that at least 60% of the population considers that education should be under state responsibility. And still we witness, with the exception of the National Health Insurance Law, a process of slow but steady privatization of both education and health. So there is a real break between claims expressed by people, in poles for example, about what they expect from the government and what they expect the government to do and between real governmental policies. The fact that this is a continuous process and the fact that neoliberalism also dismantles the instruments that the government has to do politics in my opinion deepens the crisis of representation. It is not the only reason; the fact that since 1993 the parties have no real difference concerning the vision for the resolution of the Palestinian Israeli conflict is for sure part of the equation. I was only pointing to one factor.

Prof. Wolfgang Merkel: Just a brief remark. We may think about the mode of our discussion. Maybe it is better to have a brief discussion right after each presentation. I find myself now in the position of having many interesting questions to all three of you. It is rather complex having to come back to the first and so forth.

Prof. Tamar Hermann: The problem is that there are an unlimited number of questions to each presentation.

Prof. Wolfgang Merkel: But then you can be the Socratic authoritarian. I have question to you Riva. I do not buy your point at the political theory, it is very analytical and I do not buy your point that the state was the main drive of Europeanization. I put this aside. We will have time to talk about this. But Danny I would challenge your point of view. It is something that is very often referred to in Social Science. There was a crisis. There is a slippery slope and there was sometimes a golden age. Now we are living in a kind of crisis and slippery slope. The returning argument was based on the neoliberal globalization as you put it. I do agree it solves to some extent the so called the congruity of those who are the authors of political decisions and who are affected by political decision. I have my doubts that globalization really changed that much as we really do think. I am not so sure that the democratic politics in governing the economy was so much better in the fifties and sixties as it is now but this is a matter of dispute. I listening to you and I am thinking this speech could have been done two years ago. If you arguing with the 81 or 82 argument of Margaret Thatcher there is no alternative. There are so many alternatives around as you see after the collapse of Capitalism. If you look to the policies of the European States there is a massive return of the state. And this is interesting to discuss because I do not buy Collin Crauche's point of view that we are living in a post democracy. Of course if you read Collins you see that at the end the democratic moment in the United States was in the 1940's and in Europe in the 1950's. I think this is empirically utterly wrong. And there could be a democratic moment now that the state recovers grounds in governing the economy. And your example of the Central Bank is quite an interesting one. I would say it is a democratic decision and it is reversible democratic decision. It is done by the parliament and can be reverted by the parliament by simple majorities. Of course if you would ask the population, the population would give a strong majority that the Central Bank is not controlled by the political parties and the government. They have much more trust in the Central Bank than in politics. So who is the sovereign? It relates to your question of sovereignty. So we have to be very clear about it and I think the globalization is something we should view from a different point of view and from a new point of view. If we look to Latin America neoliberalism is over. It is over now almost for a decade. There is massive return of social democratic or even socialist thinking of governing. We should take this into account and not by simply saying that there is slippery slope globalization that diminishes it. The very last point if we think about representation I would argue now there is also an increase in the quality of representation. I take Europe now as a case. If you think about how many minorities are entitled to have a representation, from sexual minorities, ethnic minorities and so forth, this is much stronger democratic discourse than we ever could have, I take my country now, in the fifties, and the sixties and in the Adenauer era for example. So we should be more precise and therefore I want to bring this argument, maybe globalization, there is an alternative to globalization.

Dr. Danny Filc: I did not make myself clear because when I spoke about the crisis of representation I did think in terms of past era and an avoidable degeneration of the democracy, not in post democratic terms. I was thinking about a certain moment when there is a crisis of representation which does not mean that that cannot be solved or that the only solution is a non democratic solution. So from that point of view I completely agree with you. I am less optimistic than you about the period of this crisis. I am not sure that the current crisis would bring the state back in. Concerning South America there is a lot of anti neoliberal rhetoric but if I take for example the

case of Argentina the real modification of neoliberal policies have been marginal. May be not in Ecuador but it is still recent. Even in Brazil there has not been redistribution of resources. There has not been progressive taxation policy. In Argentina for sure not. In Chile even there have been certain modifications within the rules of the game. Concerning specifically the Israeli case when Barak for example wanted to assign the Chair of the Central Bank, one of the main newspapers in Israel raised claims concerning one of the candidates and the market gave their veto. If we take the last 20 or 30 years and I accept that globalization is not a uniform process, it is modified by the specific characteristic of each state. But still there are some transnational processes and traits that influence the quality of democracy in each state and even changes in government. For example if I take the health care service in the United Kingdom, the Labor party modified the budget and the policies of Thatcher but adopted a policy of its own by developing and building new services. Maybe you are right and what I said today in a couple of years will be ancient history because we will be in a completely new era where the financial crisis opens the possibility of a new kind of modification of society and of the state. I am a little bit skeptical about the scope of these changes.

Prof. Riva Katolyano: I am not a driving force of Europeanization but of the European construction. The transnationalism and transnational networks and transnational representation, the representation at the Commission, at the Parliament, the institutions are at the process of Europeanization. But the claims remain national, the claims remain with regard to state. But the process of Europeanization is not the state. The process of Europeanization is all this web of representations that are meeting in this European state, call it what you want but the state as a driving force is the European construction. What each state brings to the Europe institutionally not necessarily by societies; not necessarily by citizens. The mobilization, the organization, the action is Europeanization. That goes beyond the state, beyond boundaries, beyond national interests. The entity of Europe we get to political Europe remains with the state, even the politicization of Europe being of actors, of interest groups of any kind of mobilization becomes transnational. Europeanization is a phenomenon. It is not a fiction. It is something that goes on in the society. We cannot think of the European Union without the states.

Prof. Yael Yishai: Danny you claim that the people would like the nationalization of the health service and the educational service. But when they go to the ballots, if they go to the ballots, they elect parties which are against nationalization. Nor did I ever see a civil society organization promoting these goals. So there is no real pressure from the bottom. They answer questions when you present them with a public opinion survey. That is the easiest thing to do. They do not really mean it because they keep electing the same parties and they are not serious about it. Essentially it is a guided democracy. We are used for the past 60 years to accommodate with the government. We still look at the government as a culmination of hopes of the Jewish people. We have a state and we have a government and that is the problem. The government is very free to make its own decisions without internal control.

Naomi, I really appreciate your attempt to define politics. What is politics? It is very difficult to define. I could not come with a real conclusion. I wonder what you mean by that because it has serious implications on the definition of civil society. Civil society is in between individuals and the state. According to one definition civil

society is only this association which has claims on state which wants something from the state and its agencies. I practice yoga. I would like the society to allocate a state. You mentioned the corporations in your neighborhood. Where are we located? We need these definitions. I agree with you there are more than 4 or 5 civil society associations but do you mean the grass root activity that has no relation to the state or its agencies or do you mean only those associations which are linked to the state. So I am confused.

And a brief question to Riva. You spoke about citizenship, the state and the super state organizations. What about the community arena? I have a student who is writing a dissertation about the perceptions of citizenship among the individuals and how do they see the Russian immigrants, the Arabs, the foreign workers and the ultra religious. Their identity is defined by the concepts of the majority.

Prof. Benjamin Gidron: A short comment. First of all I want to thank Danny for bringing in the question of globalization into the discussion. Globalization came about mostly because of technological development and communications development and some spheres of activities in life have used it better than others. So we see the economy that moved into a neoliberal system that uses the globalization in such a way, we see terror and I can also tell you that philanthropy has used globalization to its advantage. Some systems do not use it. Eventually one day we will have world citizenship and all people will be equal and all people will vote for the institutions. But this is of course a slow process and this kind of issues are not there. This major crisis that we are experiencing now shows us, not that globalization should be totally erased but there should be major modifications because it causes what it causes. So I think we will see in the next 20 or 30 years the need to adapt to the fact that we are a global system and different spheres of life will have to adapt to the new conditions.

I think Naomi that what you described so eloquently in the way associations are working and the types of activities that they are engaged in what we see here is the replacement of the activity and involvement of individuals that used to do it in the party system in the 1950's and 1960's. So we are seeing a decrease in party involvement and an increase in involvement with associations. From the point of view of participatory democracy this is definitely an improvement. We remember the 1950's and the 1960's as very repressive years in terms of what we have to think about and whoever did not think along certain lines we remember what people thought of him. So it is definitely an improvement and another form of participation.

Dr. Danny Filc: Riva, did you claim that people belong to more than one political community? Because in traditional political thinking you belong to one political community not to more than one. And if I understood you correctly you claim that they belong to territorial political community but also to a transnational community. I would like you to elaborate on this belonging to two different communities.

Dr. Yishai Menuchin: You talked about 1985. In 1985 we had Peres that did something that was very influential. The welfare state worked. So for most of us nowadays we are looking at this period of time and wish the state to come back. For most of us in the Left it was something, not a golden age but something that we think the state should go back there to 1985. Because of different political issues the main parties broke the alliance with the middle classes and moved to build new alliances

with the rich layers of society. From the end of the eighties till now we see a shrinkage of the middle classes and on the other hand there is the blooming of civil societies that actually were built by the middle class.

Prof. Naomi Hazan: Just to comment on the latest exchange to make it very clear, Israel does not follow European voting patterns. Otherwise it will be impossible to understand what is going on. Essentially civil societies take over where political parties stop. You were born with the red card of the labor party at the time. It used to be so and that decided your education, your youth movement. I do not think that civil organizations necessarily sprang up as replacement for services provided by parties. I think there is something else there primarily because of the structural characteristics and that is the political parties were extraordinarily monolithic and exclusive in the way they control social services. This does not exist. Quite the contrary, there is a plurality and duplication of a lot of the things that are going on in associational life. Yael, there is no associational world out there. Only certain elements I would dare call civil societies and one of the features of civil society and I hope I am not making an empirical reduction is that civil society organizations address the state. They may parallel the state, they may oppose the state or they may make demands on the state but by definition they act vertically as well as horizontally. Otherwise it is impossible to understand.

Prof. Yael Yishai: What about the corporations?

Prof. Naomi Hazan: What they do, they negotiate the space with the municipality, they negotiate a reduction in the VAP with the authorities. In other words they are in constant interaction. They are highly political in any sense of the term. I insist there is a difference between the formal and the informal. There are also linkages but you have to define the linkages. When we get networks of cooperatives they have a capacity for mobilization. We are examining now how these coalitions are more effective coalitions for social change not only on a small basis but on a political scale as well but that is through the formal political parties. These are fascinating questions that need answers also from scholars. Because the activists know what they need but they are limited in the conceptualization of the kinds of activity. And just one final comment- We are in era now where all of a sudden, for a variety of different reasons some by the way related to anti-politics and to civil society activism, there is a requirement to bring the state back in in different forms. Also the transnationality and globalization. There is a new era here that requires more serious study.

Prof. Yossi Shain: We discuss for example civil society and associations. We discuss them within different theories. If you look at the theory of association which was built into the Republicanism and Jean Jacques Rousseau the idea was association which was all geared towards enhancing the Republic and therefore the sphere was of an association that is detached from the state. Therefore Catholicism with the ideal represented government and money. This was the issue. Later on there was a transformation. There was a talk about America. In America the concern was different. Then there was a discussion and the discussion went throughout the late 18th century and the 19th century with Hegel and others and of course John Locke about civil society within the liberal state and within the liberal contrast is the market place and the marketplace is a totally different story. It is separated from the realm of the state. To what extent this marketplace is related to the state? Hegel thought that the

state is not a civil society. It is an ethical entity. You have to bring it up. Do not act as a civil society. We confuse matters. There was a resentment of civil society. For good reason there was resentment because they knew the confusion. Political society is distinguished from civil society and distinguished from the state. And that is where the seminar began. With the idea of disenchantment with the political realm, not with the civil society or with the state. Now to what extent the three interact. The issue is defining who are we and who are they. When Naomi wants to solve the Israeli Palestinian problem it will not be determined by the civil society. It will be determined by politicians. And when you are disenchanted with the political realm then you have to understand what happened to the devaluation of leadership. Why is it that you depend so much on the state and we constantly undermine the leadership that has to govern it.

Prof. Riva Kastoryano: The community has a political meaning. It is a Republican community defined by individual citizenship. What do we mean by communities? How are they constructed? Who constructs them? How do they build themselves into a community? What makes this community a minority? The whole process, rights, representation. We can talk about conceptual and then empirical sides. Danny how did you hear that there is a belonging to another community. I wanted to avoid the transnational nation. Because all the transnational studies will tell you that for the immigrants there is the home country, the host country. When you build this kind of network it is organized network. This transnational community is in the process of recentralizing all the diversity into one and recentralizing any identity will be the core of this transnational whatever you call it, and what will be the political contents of this community and the way they will create power relationship or competition with a political community. I am trying to think about this phenomenon by calling it transnational. There, there is no understanding of territoriality. I see that something is emerging as a political community but we can discuss all kinds of aspects of what we mean by this political community. That is why I talk about imagined geography, re mapping.

Prof. Tamar Hermann: You have done a good job, you deserve your coffee.

End of Session 2