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The Israel Democracy Institute
18 December 2008, Session 6



The Israel Democracy Institute
International Workshop on "Citizens, Politics and the Political Profession"
18 December 2008
Session 6

Participants:

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Prof. Astrid von Busekist
Mr. John Lloyd
Dr. Danny Filc
Dr. Kalman Neuman
Prof. Pierangelo Isernia
Prof. Asher Arian
Prof. Gerry Stoker
Prof. Wolfgang Merkel
Dr. Yishai Menuchin
Prof. Yossi Shain
Prof. David Ohana

Prof. Tamar Hermann: Prof. Astrid von Busekist will lead the first presentation. Astrid please.

Prof. Astrid von Busekist: I am going to talk about a slightly different topic which actually matches that of Prof. Pierangelo. It is also about democracy. It is about democracy and language. I started my research when I found out that there is huge gap on language issues as linked to democracy. Not on deliberative democracy, the deliberative turn in democracy, but on language technically as such. How does language matters in democracy? I have a couple of assumptions. Maybe I will give those first before I am starting.

One, I assume that Europe unlike maybe Pierangelo, is a large scale democracy. It is something like the fourth wave of democracy, so it is something new. I also assume that colloquial democratic deficit in Europe is not due to withdrawal as Naomi said, neither to withdrawal nor to escape as Yael put it, nor to any evidence of anti politics in my sense but rather to a lack of communication, what Wolfgang called overlapping membership by language, which makes overlapping consensus possible through communication. My main assumption is to say that linguistically divided state organizations including the EU are more vulnerable democracies. So if we had a common language we would probably just technically as a matter of a tool, be able to communicate better with each other. There are different solutions, symbolically and technically, to this dilemma of common language: either one common language, one lingua franca for the whole of Europe or a better coordinated language diversity. The year 2001 is the European Year of Languages when the European Commission said that language diversity is more relevant and that we need language diversity. The result of this was that the more languages we had, the more English we actually spoke

g ads on the European official buildings were all in
for the Year of Languages 2001.

So there are two teams in Europe actually. Maybe three but the third one is not really important. The one says that democracy needs a lingua franca, we need a common language to communicate with each other and we can only achieve justice, at least on regional European level, if we had a common language. And the others argue that democracy is about diversity and that we need so many different languages because so many different languages are so many different cultures and that language has an intrinsic value and that we should value the culture that languages stage. Democracy notes the European Commission 2001 Year of Languages. Democracy has equal respect for all languages, so we have official texts in all the 21 languages of the European Union, which costs a huge amount of money. So it is equal respect for our languages and free choice, that is the individual aspect, every individual in Europe should be able to choose his or her language, the language in which he or she wants to be understood. And this is also about cultural values Pierangelo and the threat of cultural invasion because in this subject the cultural threat is of course the threat by English and by American culture which will wipe out, of course not British culture the American culture, which would wipe out especially French culture first. Team A says why don't we consider language as a tool. Language is probably something else also, cultural and so forth, but what we know, let us consider language as a tool. We need a common tool to communicate. And the healthy talks of deliberative democracy works with one language. Maybe more. But if we came up with one language that would be perfect. Plus if we had one common language mobility would be much easier, we would have more equality of chances because we would all function in the same language. There would be no drain from Europe to Anglophone countries the US, Canada and Australia. It is a huge budget of course to translate into all languages for all norms and rules.

Just very fast two technical things. There are two socio-linguistic truths. That is in the literature. Learning a language is rewarded only by language learning. Now we have so many native English speakers from the UK and we have so many others that had to learn English. So it is unfair to all those who had to learn English but how and why people learn languages? If you look at the data we have, they learn languages if they are rewarded by a sufficient number of other people engaging in learning the same language because only that way they can speak that language and make it profitable for them to have learned that language. That is one socio-linguistic truth. And the other truth is that language is spread above a certain tipping point. Esperanto for instance has never reached that tipping point. So its spread was not self sufficient. So people also learn, that is a sociological truth, people learn languages upwards. From small languages to bigger languages and they learn languages because it is useful to learn languages and less so because they love languages. So the choice of one specific language that we learn depends upon the expectations and the perceptions concerning others speakers who acquire that language. So if I think everybody in France is going to learn Hebrew tomorrow I would probably also engage in learning Hebrew because it is practical and useful for me to learn Hebrew. Now if we want to be fair, instead of everybody needing to learn English because of the mother tongue blessed thing, we can say let us pick an artificial language that would be the fairest way obviously to get everybody to speak the same language. But Esperanto has never reached the point when it was self spreading. And in fact the people who speak Esperanto are the chess



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. So there is lack of motivation for other people
o. There is lack of anticipated profit. And of course
there is no institution to educate in Esperanto. All
national wide spread languages are of course institutional written archive languages
fostered by states.

I said amo lingua, love of languages. Just one thing about usefulness. Hungary is one
of the countries in Europe where you have the best data on language practice,
language training since the twenties, so that allows us to make time comparisons. So
in the 1920's because of the German minority in Hungary German was widely spoken.
Russian is of course the official first foreign language that had to be learned from the
twenties on also. And then you have here the huge take off of English. German goes
up also because the Hungarians anticipated that German would be the central and
Eastern European lingua franca but that was not so, so German dropped pretty rapidly
after 1989 -1990 and English continued steadily to rise. So what we did in fact in
Hungary is that we went to Budapest to a whole set of Grammar Schools and we
showed the kids aged 11 to 13 this picture. And we asked them which in their sense
would be the red language. And they all 95% to 96% said English because they knew
that English would be the language they would have to learn. We said this is a flower.
The petals are different languages and which would be the most important language in
the center for you, and they all said English. And we did not even say it had to be a
foreign language. We said a language. And it was English. And three quarters of the
interviewed Hungarians said that they would love to learn Italian and French and
learning Italian and French accounts for less than 5% of the actual learning of a
foreign language. They do learn a little bit of French and they do learn a little bit of
Italian but they understood that the useful language they should know also because
of peer pressure group is English.

Let us go back to Europe. The most useful language to Europeans, according to
Eurobarometer 2006 specific one on languages, over 60% said it is English and the
best spoken languages to participate in a conversation is English by 37% which is a
lot actually. And this is the comparison 2001 Euro languages also especially
Eurobarometer and 2006. Russian. It is two things. It is the legacy of the ex
Communist countries and it is because in many Western European countries Chinese
and Russian are the languages to get into the good high schools as a distinction
instead of learning English, Spanish and French which would be the regular thing.
Two foreign languages people now learn are Russian and Chinese because that would
put them into the good high schools. This is the frequency of use- the highest one is
Spanish, but on a daily basis it is English. So, on a daily basis 30% all Europeans use
English. We talked about that over lunch with Pierangelo. This is not a specified
question. This is a non comparable question but it could be open the internet. This
is the known languages by age. So as you can see English is known by more than 50%
of the 25 years old in Europe. German is higher than French because the Turks in
Germany and Austria are accounted for speaking German as a second language
whereas the migrants in France are third generation and they are considered first
language French speaking. That is why German is a little higher. And Polish is
because of the demography. So the level of English in the EU 15% unsurprisingly is
very high in the Scandinavian countries and in the Netherland. This is Austria. I put
this here because it is pretty high. Very good level of English EU 15 is more than
30%. This is really interesting. In Belgium as you know we have two official and

Flemish. French and Flemish are not compulsory first languages. English has changed in the eighties. In other words, people can speak a second or foreign language. But most of the times, at least in the French speaking part of the country, the other official or national language, Flemish in other words. So there are more people in Belgium who speak English than there are people speaking Flemish or French. And when academics get together for instance and in order not to have disputes on which language to carry out conferences they do it in English although almost everybody in the generation of 40 and above still speak the language of the other community. This is Brussels. This is interesting too. Brussels is French speaking city. French is there very high of course. English is almost as high as French in the 25-45 age group because of Europe. This is Europe. These are the Europeans living in Brussels and working in English of course. And Arabic comes on the third position after English and French. Immigration of course. But Arabic as a mother tongue of almost 15% of people living in Brussels which is really huge.

Let us forget about all these graphs and let us take a look at the language constellation as a whole. This is a colleague of mine from Amsterdam who did this. I think he is right. We had the flower and the petals, and this would be a planetary system of languages. He says there are super peripheral languages, dialects or oral languages. Then you have peripheral languages 90% of all languages spoken by less than 10% of mankind. Serbian, Flemish, stuff like that. Hebrew is central because Hebrew is a written language and it is national language so it would go into the central languages. So that is more or less 100 languages, national written languages spoken by 90% of mankind. And then you have the super central languages – Arabic, Chinese, French, English, Spanish, Swahili. Swahili by the way is a partially artificial language. So why hypo central English? because English is the language that permits all the connections, that holds the whole solar system together. Intuitively we all know that English is the lingua franca, not only in Europe but also here and when people get together. So why is it that English is spreading so fast and so easily? Because languages are networks and languages are collective goods. Languages are tools and languages are networks because languages are open networks. Every newcomer adds value to the network as a whole. On the contrary of other types of networks. And they are collective goods because they are non-excludable. Every joiner is welcome and adds value to the good.

In Europe you can use two types of measures to measure language penetration to the speakers. So you have either prevalence, which would be the proportion of native speakers in one particular language who also speak other languages, multilingual, so this is individual linking of speakers to others. And then you have centrality, which is the proportion connecting languages as such meaning that if we took 'red' as a language, 'red' would be a non-native language of x Europeans, a red network which would connect all the languages the ones with the others. So English for instance has a poor prevalence because there are less British people than Polish or French. But it has a very high centrality because as a non-native language English connects everyone.

So let me get back to the beginning: My question here which has to do with democracy, is what will be the less expensive and the fairest way of coordinating language policies, which would lead to, if we accept this idea, to a healthier

could communicate with each other. So given the
or should rather be in association of two or three
to be a combination. Let us go back to democracy.

Let me show you just two graphs. This is a question that comes up also in Eurobarometer. Let us take only question two and three. So the surveyor asked if everybody should be able to speak a common language. 70% of the Europeans said yes. And even almost 50% said yes when asked if the European institutions should adopt one single language to communicate with European citizens. Then there is of course 75% who say that all languages should be treated equally. 70% is a lot to agree on a common language. But if you do it the other way around and if ask yourself how many Europeans would be excluded if we did actually adopt English as a lingua franca you come up with this. If you adopt only English as a lingua franca you would exclude 50% of the European citizens which is a lot. Half of the European citizens EU 25. If it were only French you would exclude 70%. If it were English and German almost 40% and if it was English and French little less than 40%. So a combination of two is better than only English and only French. If you then take averages by member states the numbers are very high for some countries.

Now my idea is that you have to do something about the 63 millions Euros per year and per member state that we spend on translating the whole European stuff. In Malta for instance, the translation cost 980 Euros per citizen per year which is just horrendous. Plus there are tons of problems with interpretation and translation because it is ex financial, plus you cannot do direct translation anymore because you do not have enough translators so most of the time in the European Parliament there are people going around the interpreters and say, please no jokes because we have no time to translate them because we have to translate via sometimes two interpreters when you go from Hungarian to Swedish to Danish for instance you have to go via English or via French or via Italian so the chain is too long so do not make any jokes. So the solutions to a just equity democracy and reasonable budget would be, I think there are two solutions. One is the free use of the budget but that would demand member states to be very reasonable. Say we give you the 63 millions, use them for language training. That would be one solution. And then there is the Indian solution. In India you have both Hindi and English as official languages, plus the language of the state of the federation, plus sometimes a protected minority language within the state. If we did that for Europe what would that do? The cheapest languages of communication are English, French and German. If all the other member states said language is just a tool and it is not about identity we would have almost everything in these 3 languages and the translation cost would be almost zero. So solution one would be that native speakers other than English, French and German learn English, French and German. They would be in one their mother tongue plus 3 solutions. And native English, French and German learn the two other ones. Three minus one because they do not have to learn their mother tongue. So solution one is unfair because it does not treat equally those who are not English, French and German speakers. Solution two, native speakers other than English learn two out of the classical languages. And native English, French and German speakers learn the two other classical languages. So this seems to be fair but it is not because native speakers of English, French and German would know the three classical languages and the others would lack one. I think this is unfair. It is not only unfair but it would not insure extra European connections. Who would learn Hebrew, Russian, Chinese, Hindi? So my solution is native speakers other than English, French and German learn

European language to insure that connection in extra one or two classical or one classical and one extra one probably the fairest solution. It would enable us to translate correctly, it would insure connections, the constellation would stay dynamic because people choose the language they want to learn so there is a free market of languages and a free choice of languages we want to learn. This could also fit into EU coordination of languages policies. But the thing is the same as for the interpreters I talked about. Languages are killed because when we get together we always speak the language of the one who speaks it less well. We always adopt the one that everybody speaks and in which even the level of the one who speaks it is not sufficient and that is how we kill languages because most of the time this language that everybody speaks even poorly is English. And in Europe when you put together a guy from Poland and someone from Denmark they will probably still speak English although they learn all these other languages. So it is only half a solution but it is a solution. And it would be so much cheaper.

Mr. John Lloyd: There is another option which is another artificial language.

Dr. Danny Filc: Your solution is still a little bit unfair because the one plus one plus one still means that a person fluent in one of the three classical languages still would have more fluency in one of the classical languages. There is no real solution to that unfairness because their mother tongue is another one so maybe you should think about fairness not in terms of language fluency but in terms of compensating those countries in other ways, not counting how many languages they speak.

Dr. Kalman Neuman: You mentioned the question of language outside of Europe. Would it not be probable that Chinese would monopolize the market for extra European languages? And what would be the significance of that?

Prof. Astrid von Busekist: It could be Chinese, it could be Arabic, it could be Hindi. We do not know that. It is more likely that it is going to be Hindi than Chinese because of the difficulty in learning Chinese. And you have to take the market into account. You have to leave the choice to people to choose the language they want to learn. If you also intervene in that, the dynamic of the constellations shifts. A colleague of mine says that the Brits should pay for our language training which is highly unlikely. The only thing you can do is you can try to compensate the social access to language training. As we all know people from wealthy families send their children to learn languages.

Prof. Pierangelo Isernia: To me this is a way to kill all the other languages softly by English. So my question to you is which of these would be politically more welcomed by the French, who apparently are the ones who do not want to kill themselves so softly. Because I assume the Germans and the Italians have already given up.

Prof. Astrid von Busekist: The Germans gave up the French because they have an alliance, French and German against English. And in fact the Germans gave up the French. If you look at other data you would see that for instance employment is enhanced if you are bilingual or trilingual. That should count. The French are of course against English but because the cultural factor not because of the language. They would love to speak English. They do not, but they would love to do so. In my

only in English, which is against the law of the
France. You cannot write a PhD in English and that
phone. If you look at that, that is a good argument. If
you are bilingual or trilingual you almost double your salary.

Prof. Pierangelo Isernia: Is the French government ready to give up on this using one of this alternative formula?

Prof. Astrid von Busekist: Oh yes. Because French is in. So they probably would. You see the EU functions like that there in fact also functions like that.

Prof. Tamar Hermann: Thank you Astrid. Asher.

Prof. Asher Arian: Thank you very much. Language is a rich topic and in connection to that topic we move to my topic. My topic has to do with leadership and trust and I am going to use mostly Israeli data. I want to start with this notion of anti politics and I am sure we are going to keep the term because I know here at the Institute it is a very popular topic and it has always been quoted. It lacks a certain precision and clarity that we as a group ought to think about. We as political scientists have to remind ourselves that politics is a natural part of the environment. It is like the circulatory system of the body. We might have a pathology, we might be upset about it, there might be problems. It is participation, maybe it is democracy and maybe it is leadership or leaders but it is not politics. Politics, it seems to me, is something natural, it is something dear. So that is one issue.

The next issue is that we have nice conferences using the term anti politics, but we have to critically ask the question is it really out there? Does it really exist? Is it worse than it ever was? Is it better? Are we reacting to some kind of change that is distressing, despairing to all of us because we do not know what it is. I know that we as elections analysts we are very good when the elections results are static, but when they are dynamic, when there is a change, we are much less good with dynamism. I at least want to raise those issues for us because it too easy to set up a straw man and make democracy the ideal or democratic participation the ideal and then make every deviation from that somehow not good. Democratic behavior is a learnt behavior. It is not natural behavior. It is not something that the body politic automatically generates. I want to talk about that notion. Learned behavior in a sense that most citizens do not have democracy in their DNA. It is not a natural. It something that we have to teach, learn, certainly in the case of Israel where most of the immigrants, 80% or 90% of them came from non democratic countries. And even the native born Israelis I would hardly give high grades to the education in democracy that children receive at school. So in that sense the persistence of democracy in Israel it is a real achievement.

I think the phrase 'make us a king' both in English and in Hebrew has a fascinating use. It is not appoint us a king. It is not select us a king. It is make us a king. There is something very symbolic there. And the notion brings us to a status where we have a king, where there is a hierarchy, where we are subordinates, when we are led, I think it is an important notion. It goes on. He will do terrible things to you this king. Be careful, we are told. And yet we persist, and in Samuel it says "there shall be a king over us" so we would be like everybody else. That is the real goal, and also that we will not have to make decisions. He will go to war and he will fight for us and he will

natural of wanting to be in hierarchical situation is
mily in a relationship where someone else takes
rt from that point and I want to bring some data on
the Israeli case.

Here I have a quiz for you. I found this quote and I am telling you it is post biblical. It says: 'shall ask for the one remaining instrument to meet the crisis, to wage a war against the emergencies, as a great a power that was given to me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign power'. Who said it and when?

Speaker: Roosevelt.

Prof. Asher Arian: Very good. And it was said in the first inaugural speech in 1933 and it exactly the speech that Obama is going to give in 5 weeks. And maybe the crisis is as bad as it was then. But it seems to me that it is the same kind of reaction by a politician to a crisis situation speaking to a democratic audience and asking for the authority to act in anti democratic way. Why? Because the crisis is so bad. It seems to me a pattern that we should at least think about.

So we asked over the years the question that is in the world value survey, we asked it, 'strong leaders benefit the state more than discussion' and 60% agree. This is a 2008 survey of all Israelis. And if I look over time and it is 1969 the figure is 60%. 60% of Israelis agree with this awful wording "strong leaders benefit the state more than discussion". That is one element that is a basic characteristic of the political culture of the last 30 years. That is a statement that is safe and fair. It is a basic element in the understanding. The next on what we did was we took those and we correlated it with the human development and it is very high correlation. Level of democracy. The electoral system has very little effect. This is just to give you an idea of where this notion of leadership is, it would seem to me that its characteristic may be of developing, emergent democracies. About 15% of the electorate are Soviet immigrants and we analyzed the same question over the last 5 yeas using the same question and we see that year after year immigrants support this notion even more. In the picture you see Liberman, he is in a right wing non religious Russian immigrant of 20 years ago who was Bibi Netanyahu's close political associate, formed its own party and he is very attractive candidate for the Russian immigration because of his strong non religious nationalist anti socialist policies. This combination would appeal to Soviet immigrants who have no Jewish background but a Jewish identification. He is a strong nationalist and wants to run away from Communism as quickly as possible. That is an important element in the electorate. My suggestion is that they represent an important strand in Israeli political culture and they really fit in very nicely with the political culture developed by their cousins who came a hundred years ago who formed the Israeli political system. It is much easier for a Russian immigrant to deal with the Israeli bureaucracy than it is for a Moroccan immigrant or an American immigrant. Their cousins made the rules and these people just fit in.

These are three of the classic questions used. Social trust of others: if you think people can be trusted, and what is more important to the Israeli citizens: personal interest or interest in the country a whole, and what is more important to the leaders. On the right we have the Soviet immigrants. So interestingly the Arabs show pretty much the same pattern as the Jewish samples. The immigrants again have the pattern that is most

figure here is very interesting. And this is the social interest of the country as whole. And here there is an anti politics. It comes out here when we look from 1981 when the country's goals are far more important than personal goals, to 1992 when there are about the same in importance, and 1996 to 2007 the country's goals are the lowest. So here there is a developmental sense of what is going on in the country. It is clear something is going on. One, is the loss of values of state centered values, the 'Me'ism, the individualism is certainly evident here. Personal social trust. Can we trust one another? And interestingly when we look here we see a rise. Now I want to look at the trust in political parties. 22%. Very low as in other countries, many other countries. Trust in the House of Representatives -40%. Personal social trust – here Israel is not at the high level, not at the lowest. Here are the key institutions in the last survey. I want to show here the decline. We heard about the IDF. Yehuda Ben Meir talked about these figures. The Supreme Court goes way down. It became a political issue of course. The Minister of Justice and his attack on the Court obviously propelled some of that. The police has taken a beating. The President low point is one of the sexual scandals we have talked about and if you want all the details over dinner we can talk about that. The Prime Minister again. This is Ariel Sharon who did not have fewer criminal investigations but whose trust was higher than Ehud Olmert. The Knesset. Every time we hit a low point I say it cannot get lower and then the next year it is lower and the political parties are so low that I cannot even say that.

This is what is fascinating to me. If I look at these two over time I see that strong leadership seems on the rise. Trusting people is different. And the down shift in trust of institutions maybe a temporary thing. It might be a reflection of bad times. I want to add by underscoring something that I think Kalman said. That in addition to all this statistical analysis and the theoretical analysis it seems to me that Israel faces difficult problems and until it solves the one problem that it faces I do not think that things will get a lot better. That is not a political statement. But it is such a deep problem it saps all energies, it attracts all violence. Everything is affected by the problem of the territories and in a sense we can think of Israeli politics, there is a solution, there is not a solution. And if there is no solution I frankly see no easy exit from the anti politics dilemma. Because the anti politics dilemma says we are stuck in this situation. There is no out and we just going to have to muddle through. That leads to not very inspired call for participation and for decisions. Thank you very much.

Prof. Tamar Hermann: I would like to challenge your last statement. I think once and if the conflict is resolved we will see a terrible situation in terms of people's relations with the government. Because we do know that when we ask people to which extent the government is successful in dealing with a series of issues we know that the highest scores are given to security policies. So once the security issue is resolved I suppose you will see all other problems rising to the surface. And indeed we know that in the early days of the Oslo process when it seemed as if we are done with this problem we had lots of new social and political problems that divided the country in much stronger way than it did before and after. So in a sense I would argue that the conflict undermines the basic political problems of the country because there is in a way a rallying around the flag phenomenon which actually prevents people from expressing their real dissatisfaction with the government because they fear that too strong protest would pull the rug from under the feet of the government's ability to deal with the situation.

g two things. I agree that there other problems down the road but I do not think that the indication of how the government is dealing with the security is the same as what I was talking about. The government could be dealing well with security and yet we could have a real debate over the future of the territories or a Palestinian state. What you need is a situation in which the population would say this is the solution for security and this is the good way for the government to deal with it. And that is what we lack. We lack a consensus.

Prof. Gerry Stoker: I wanted to just ask, at the beginning of your talk you quite rightly queried the notion of the term anti politics. I suppose if somebody would ask me what did I think I was doing when I was coming to a conference entitled anti politics I would have said it is about a group of people that are interested in the way which people are to some extent being turned off or turning away from formal political institutions and processes and beginning to look for alternatives in some way. That is the desperate definition I might have offered. If I offered that definition actually your evidence does speak to the fact that there does not appear to be an anti politics according to that definition because there is a lot of evidence about the declining trust in political institutions and also evidence which you are hinting at that people might actually look for other ways of constructing politics in the future.

Prof. Asher Arian: Well sure. Your description of the British situation we could duplicate and show measures for each of those things. For sure. There is that pulling away. My question is what is the deeper meaning of the loss of the trust? Is it really endemic, is it institutional, how deep is it, how widespread is it. When we do the socio-economical analysis we do not find generational or class divisions that would indicate long standing institutional crisis.

Prof. Gerry Stoker: There might be a difference between Israel and the United Kingdom. It might be a difference between the United States as well where there is some evidence to suggest that it is more comparable to the UK. Another debate is what people imagine democratic practice actually is. We have some kind of idea but we did not have a discussion of what we mean. As I have shown in my presentation the very data which we could have looked at on my first slide from Ulman and Weber we could say that oh my God that sounds as a political system going down the tube. It was exactly the data that Ulman and Weber then pronounced this is the healthiest democratic system in the world. So there is an issue to be discussed about what do you expect from democracy as well.

Prof. Asher Arian: The point I want to stress again is the stability of this desire. I do not know if it is anti political, but there is an element obviously of searching for something other than the democracy.

Prof. Wolfgang Merkel If I look to your figures Israel is no exception. It is more or less reflected in Eurobarometer- the democratic parties especially are always at the bottom of the ranking. This is something we could be afraid of because these are the core institutions. And what one could call the repressive apparatus of the state, they get always good scores. And this is true for Europe. I looked to East European

Even in the Afro barometer. So it is something which
country. What is exceptional is the question of police
European countries is normally always in high esteem and
in yours I saw it is one of the lowest esteemed by the citizens. But again I have a
systematic question. We have a decreasing trust in core democratic institutions in
Israel and in most of the Western democracies. But if you look to objective indicators,
going from the subjective dimension of surveys to the objective dimensions of
democracy and if we measure it by Kaufman's good government indicators of what
we did with the University of Zurich, what you did in your democracy index there is
no deterioration of the quality of democracy. We have two different developments.
One does the subjective dimension and it suggests that there is a lower trust in
democracy and in the experts' objective judgment on democracy there is no
deterioration in the quality of democracy. So what should we do with this double
thing? What do these surveys really tell us? So who is wrong?

Prof. Asher Arian: I do not think someone has to be wrong. Both things can be right
and in fact they are. There is a lag in the experts' opinion in publications. By the time
freedom house comes about.

Prof. Wolfgang Merkel: I am not talking about freedom house because freedom house
is insignificant. It does not tell us everything but if you look to your indicators and we
have collected 80 indicators and there is no deterioration of democracy. But citizens
obviously think there is one.

Dr. Danny Filc: There were two parts to your presentation. The first part is classing
the strong leader. And in the second part you discussed the figures about the
descending confidence in the political institutions. I am not sure there is a correlation
between the two parts. As you stated wishing for a strong leader is somehow stable
for 30 years. And the deterioration of confidence in political institutions accelerated
in the last 5 years. Even when people have more confidence they still want a strong
leader. A strong leader does not come instead of the political system. Still when
people thought that the political system functions relatively good they wanted a strong
leader. So how the theme of 'make us a king' helps us to understand the question of
anti politics?

Prof. Asher Arian: I see the strong leader question as if I were a social psychologist.
I would say that the basic value and the trust questions attitudes are more fleeting,
more temporal. The basic psychological predisposition is for someone to put order.
Then I can react to each stimulus on a different level, which reinforces my first point
that democracy is not the natural state. It is not the assumed form of government that
people look at.

Prof. Tamar Hermann: Last presentation of today, Yishai.

Dr. Yishai Menuchin: My point of view is a point of view of an activist. As an activist
I was wondering for many years how come there so very few of us. How come the
rest did not see the things that they should do or take part in? So this is one of the
answers, I hope. A few words about the social dimension of values. Individuals are
part of a community that gives meaning to the values and rules or standards of
practice. The common shared meaning of each value is derived from its role in the

from the mode in which it used by the community without members who hold or reject them or in other society when and only when their meanings are known to the society members that hold or reject them. However, often different people analyze the reality in different and even contradictory ways and vary in their social points of view and their values and the way they morally evaluate the activity and personal and social decisions. These factors are significant in establishing spheres of personal and social priorities. When an open and free deliberation is taking place in the public sphere the differences in attitudes and individual assessments inspire exchange of views among the participants. A provides B with a new information, B might show C some weaknesses in her argument, C could fix some of these mistakes and D will reveal some new facts to A. Knowledge in the public sphere moves and evolves in circles. Although it was defined by A as proper, it will seem to him not appropriate after learning new facts during the deliberation. An activity that was seen as unworthy by C can be perceived by her as the right thing to do after open deliberations that lead to a different evaluation of the benefits that that activity can bring. Everyone should determine, using knowledge they had acquired in the past and the new information they received from the other participants of the public discourse, their attitudes to their own actions, to the actions of other members of society, their society decisions and actions. More so beyond the need for a personal evaluation of every action, every decision, every social act the public's deliberation assists each member of the society to find out how others evaluate the situation and how they choose to act.

In general, examining the essence of the relationship between individuals and their society reveals that partnership in society, in sharing a specific world view which includes a shared moral basis and commitments. Michael Waltzer for example claimed that commitments to principles are usually also commitments to other men from whom or with whom their principles have been learnt and by whom they are enforced. A sort of commitment to a collective view, loyalty to its values and an obligation to be involved. Membership in a society and the sense of belonging, solidarity and loyalty to the society, to its members and its values. Beyond that partnership, membership has a moral meaning and includes commitment and responsibility. One of the modes in which an individual implements her partnership in society is by expressing her commitment to the shared societal values. In democratic societies this commitment to a collective world view, to democratic values and to involvements implies the commitment to direct individual conduct and the conduct of the society at large not only according to a particular list of national or religious values but basically according to basic universal democratic values. Conan West argues that the rules of democracy are fundamentally grounded in mutual respect, personal responsibility and social accountability. An individual evaluating a certain law or societal activity identifies a disparity between the law or activity and the specific democratic value and subsequently acts in accordance with this evaluation, is fulfilling a basic societal duty. Taking part only in a democratic activities and resisting undemocratic ones is an expression of this individual commitment to a shared system of basic societal democratic values. Democratic societies should be based on libration, on personal commitment, on social accountability and on basic democratic values all of which should function within society as a social and moral compass.

ent which the individual comes to accept through
ved or deliberately presented as a commitment to the
d body of commonly accepted social resolutions. The
question of commitment to democratic values always arises when there is a
discrepancy between the initial commitment to basic democratic values and actual
conduct as is perceived as deriving from a commitment to society and its national
institutions. Consequently individual resolutions and conduct mistakenly perceived as
deriving from a commitment to social values derived in fact from a commitment to
societal or national institutions. It is important to remember that the initial
commitment of every member of a democratic society should be to democratic values
and only a secondary commitment to its institutions derived from this initial
commitment. A good example for the confusion between the commitment to national
institutions and the commitment to democracy is the common attitude towards
individuals refusing to take part in a war which they perceive as unjustified.

So I will say a few words about democratic partnership. In societies at large, and in
democracies in particular, we presume that members are responsible not only for their
individual actions but also for other members' actions and for the collective conduct
of their community or society. On the one hand this responsibility is perceived to be
derived from the internalization of the democratic values, values that give weight and
value to other society members' actions as individuals and as a collective. On the
other hand this responsibility is perceived as deriving from the collective at large,
from the relationship developed among the individuals, from the sensation of
belonging to society and from identifying with it. Individual commitment to
democratic values and collective responsibility cannot be reduced to accepting the
majority decisions, voting or obeying the law. Membership in a democratic society
requires taking responsibility at both the personal and the collective levels.
Democratic commitment should include the day-to-day partnership with and the
sharing of responsibility with the other members and their actions and the decisions
and activities of the society at large. Democratic responsibility means that the
legislator, the government or the commanders share a responsibility with everyone
who directly or indirectly obeys or stand on the side. Even when there are others who
act against, or in accordance, or in contradiction with one of the democratic values
every individual should oppose those acts based on his partnership in a democratic
society and his commitment to the values that should guide the society. The
commitment and willingness to take part in actions that were agreed upon in an
acceptable societal decision process and the willingness to avoid acts that oppose
democratic values are derived from a primary commitment to those values. A
commitment that entails the responsibility of each individual to his society. In general,
this responsibility is imposed on each member because of her membership. This is the
individual responsibility to her democratic collective.

So let us talk about what is personal responsibility. Agnes Heller argued that there are
many different characterizations in quasi definitions of the decent person but all of
them indicate the same essence – responsibility. But responsibility in the public
sphere is vague and politically biased. It is customary to demand that these obedient
individuals be held accountable for their activities and be required to answer for what
is considered a lack of responsibility. It is similarly common to ignore the
responsibility of the obedient. David Miller analyzed responsibility by 4 categories,
casual, moral, remedial, and communitarian. When we discuss casual responsibility

able for their actions. For instance an individual who
the broken window. An individual refusing to take
nsible for his bad health and a careless driver is
responsible for an accident. Moral responsibility rests with those who could have
prevented or corrected the faulty situations. For instance, the moral responsibility of
one who could have prevented a stone throwing or could convince the one who did
not take proper care of himself to take medical care and did not do so. An individual
does not bear causal responsibility for his society deeds in which he did not take part
but he is morally responsible for the societal conduct. Miller also looked at remedial
responsibility. The main problem with this as he sees it, is that such an inquiry
focuses on the past. The question it asks is always who is responsible for bringing this
bad situation about and never for instance who is best to put it right. For example
when a person liable for an environmental disaster or for car accident is anon then
ministry in the first case and the national interest in the second case has to rehabilitate
the environment and the crush victim. Contrary to causal and moral responsibility,
remedial responsibility sets responsibility according to the capacity to repair and not
pass relationships or causality. Miller also presented a communitarian principle. When
people are linked together by such ties whether arising for shared activities or
commitments, common identities, common histories, or other such sources they also
see themselves as having special responsibility to one another. Responsibilities that
are greater than those they have towards humanity at large and this is in particular
imposes special responsibility towards any member of the relevant community who is
harmd or in need. The possibility to take part in a social decision process reflects on
the individual's ability to repair wrongs. This ability together with the individual's
moral commitment to democratic values threatens remedial responsibility to the
society's conduct. Moreover, if the individual takes part in wrong activities, direct
causal and moral responsibilities are added. Sometimes this responsibility is reduced
because of special circumstances that prevent for moral responsibility from attaching
such as lack of knowledge, lack of ability to act. The same is true regarding the moral
responsibility of a citizen that witness racial behavior or policy in her society. Her
moral responsibility to intervene and a failure to impinge in the implementation of
such behavior are absolute. She has remedial and communitarian responsibility the
same as that of the other citizen bearing witness to this conduct. She is responsible of
this immoral conduct even when she has no causal responsibility.

As I mentioned before responsibility is a fuzzy and political biased concept. The
public is quick to demand accountability, to discuss lack of responsibility, and to
accuse those who disobey the political establishment decisions of misconduct. But the
public usually ignores the responsibility of the obedient ones, those who obey,
collaborate, stand on the side, hesitate full of sorrow, publish petitions, shout and cry,
and those who wait for the others to fix the mess. All citizens, obedient and
disobedient, should be accountable for their decisions and conduct. They are
individually responsible for their own judgments and acts. They are morally,
remedially, and communitarian responsible even when another legislator, another
commander, or anther obedient citizen did the wrong things and they just stood by.
The murder of Kitty Genovese in 1964 was an event that changed the face of social
psychology. She was murder at night in New York. During the time around 40
neighbors heard her screams but no one came to help her and no one even bothered to
call the police. The homicide and the fact that so many people witnessed it and did
nothing brought about a wide discussion on what brought the witnesses not to take

circumstances of the situation were not clear or if the events were witnessed by the witnesses and even those multiple neighbors to anticipate the other neighbors' response to the screams, the diffusion of responsibility, and this is the main issue that social psychologists started to speak about after this case, remains astonishing. It seems that when an individual assesses that others are witnessing the same act he feels that the responsibility involved is not his and that it is actually distributed between all those involved either as witnesses or perpetrators. Even when action is needed, too many individuals assume that the others will react and do the necessary thing and therefore there is according to the perception of the witness, no real need to act.

Helen Carter wrote about a case when a person sees a drowning child and discusses the responsibility to rescue him. When an individual witnesses evil he or she is responsible for ending it. If another witness such as evil, Carter argues the responsibility is not proportionately distributed between them. For example, one third of the responsibility per witness if there are three of them and so forth. But rather, that each of them bears the full moral responsibility to rescue the child. Taking into account the number of witnesses or participants is an absurdity. For instance, the moral responsibility of an uninvolved witness to a murder would be reduced, as the number of witnesses grows. Likewise is the causal responsibility of a soldier who took part in a massacre of civilians would be reduced as the number of soldiers grows. As citizens in a democratic society our moral, remedial, communitarian responsibility for our society's conduct should be identical to that of other members of our society. Each individual should be causally, morally, remedially and commonly responsible for her conduct and morality. Remedially and communally responsible for the conduct of society as a whole even if she does not take part in the wrong deed. When an individual is not willing to take moral responsibility for societal decisions because of diffusion of responsibility that derives from the vast number of partners or witnesses to the decision, he ignores his primal commitment to those democratic values. He pays no attention to his democratic obligation to evaluate, judge, make a decision and act that is he ignores his responsibility for his society's conduct. This neglect of individual responsibility makes the slippery moral slope all the more sleek and disturbs the social moral compass that should help every individual find his way in a complex moral environment.

Now I want to say a few words about simple solutions and their complex personal and societal weight. As I said before, every individual should act to reduce the inconsistencies between deed and values or moral intuitions. Moral responsibility should push a democratic citizen to take a stand when incompatible activities, laws and orders and democratic values are evident. Beyond the diffusion of responsibility there are common roots that help individuals ignore their responsibilities. The simplest and most common response to the tension between some laws and democratic values is that of obedience based on conformity. The obedience is based on conformity as a social attitude that exempts the obedient person from being disturbed by moral dilemmas and from the need to make a moral decision. It assists him to ignore responsibility to his society's conduct. The individual releases himself from necessity to evaluate the true meaning of the law, command or activity in specific circumstances and from need to deal with moral dilemmas and societal commitments. When new legislation distributed a public good, for example for us Israelis giving control over the national land reserve to a certain ethnic minority, when

to take part in target killings, when one witness an abused children based on ethnic diversity for example. If immorality does not wave prominently above the social, the common solution is obedience. Another popular solution is addressing external authorities such as the parliament, courts, religious leaders, commanders and such, which assists the individual to avoid making personal moral decisions. Individuals that choose this solution seemingly avoid personal decision actually make a clear cut decision to support the conduct that was decided upon by the leader, the commander and the priest. The avoidance of making a personal moral decision is an evasion of the obligation to make moral decision. In many cases it gives the political system the power to make a decision that the individual should make himself.

Hanna Arendt wrote that we have become very much accustomed by modern psychology and sociology not to speak of modern bureaucracy to explain away the responsibility of the doer for his deed in terms of this or that kind determinism. Israeli law in theory and in practice, like the jurisdiction of other countries, cannot but admit that the fact of superior orders, even when their unlawfulness is manifested, can severely disturb the normal working of a man's consciousness.

Yigal Elam an Israeli author argued that the people who get things done and those who obey orders are never merrily blind tools in their leaders' hands. It is convenient for them to believe or to present it so, in order to avoid responsibility for conduct or failings that they were involved in. Leadership is rewarded not for actual responsible words which are fulfilled but for its willingness to exempt the people from this responsibility.

A third popular solution is the inner exile. This is not immigration, moving to another country but personal exile of the individual from her society. The meaning of that exile is escape from moral, remedial and communitarian responsibility to the other partners and to the society at large. A declaration of departure from society keeping her hands clean from all the immoral deed that hers society and its members are taking part in. It is actually escaping from commitment to the democratic values that call for resistance. This inner exile has many different degrees of disassociation from society, from a purely psychological mood to an actual disassociation.

The forth simple solution is ongoing introspect responsibility, taking part in immoral deeds, feeling remorse, asking for forgiveness and vise versa. The notorious Israeli shouting and crying for one another. Itamar Pitowsky described this mood of participating in morally wrong conduct and receiving moral credit for feeling remorse the shouting crier praises himself and even uses his remorse for personal benefit. He supposes that the remorseful pain itself is a moral virtue that gives him moral credit.

Many times despite the diffusion of responsibility, individuals do have knowledge or clear moral intuition as to the immorality of certain laws as well as society conduct. Nevertheless, due to the weakness of the will they take part in this conduct and obey these laws and orders. And I am coming back to Agnes Heller. Agnes Heller wrote that Dostoyevsky once said that every person is responsible for every other. If everyone acted accordingly there would be paradise on earth at once. To assume absolute responsibility is to promise salvation itself. The opposite of absolute responsibility is to assume no responsibility at all, to make no promises. Both and

absence of responsibility are extreme cases beyond
dition.

So where does responsibility end? Does personal responsibility have limits? Moshe Greenberg looked at these questions in the light of the origin of Jewish thought. Talmudic scholars discuss the issue of the punishment of Avner, King Shaul prominent commander who refused to obey the king's order and did not take part in the murder of the priest of Nov that assisted David in his escape. The scholars' answer was that he was punished by God because he only disobeyed the king but did not prevent the priest's murder by others. Keeping the hands clean of the priest's blood was not enough Avner. He should have taken a stand and prevent the murder. The same with Kitty's neighbors who avoided acting. They did not kill her with their own hands. They just did not help her. This is the reason for the moral and communitarian and maybe their remedial responsibility for her death. The morally responsible democratic citizen that is not taking a refuge in obedience diffusion of responsibility, interpretation of external authorities is not in inner exile and is not suffering from weakness of the will, should take a stand when he witnesses a clear and inconsistencies between deeds and values or moral intuitions. Everyone should act to reduce the incompatibility between activities, laws and orders and democratic values. Also the discussion of simple solutions demonstrated theoretically the transition from moral knowledge to activity taking a stand seems clear. Many times it is not enough to push the individual to do the right thing.

Yeshayahu Leibovitz wrote that the meaning of heroism is being dedicated to a value which does not contribute anything to the person but claims and even demands something from me. It seems that in order to be responsible democratic citizen in Israel now one must sometimes be a hero.

Prof. Tamar Hermann: Questions, comments.

Dr. Danny Filc: From a personal and even a political point of view I almost always agree with you. I have a problem with the underlying assumption of your claims because you assume that there is always a single moral correct stand and you divide people between those who are courageous, responsible, moral enough to stand for their beliefs and those who do not. That kind of thinking is not helpful for two reasons. It does not help in answering your first question why there are so few activists. Because if the answer is that there are a few heroes then there is no possibility for more activists to operate. And my second point, maybe people are not standing because they have different moral considerations than yours. You are assuming a single moral scale which is in terms of this round table a little bit undemocratic.

Dr. Yishai Menuchin: First of all I based it on democratic values. And secondly I am not expecting that everyone will take every value and will check everything but I look into undemocratic activities that are very blunt and I see no participation in resisting them. For example, Jews are the only ones who can have land in Israel. It is not democratic because it opposed equality and equity.

Prof. Astrid von Busekist: Just a conceptual question. I agree with everything you say but if you look at politics as working in exceptional situations the answer is complex.

ing the citizens of Coventry that the Germans were
you do with these kinds of cases which are either
s and which do not fit in the routine democratic that
enhances diversity.

Prof. Gerry Stoker: I am not sure I did entirely agree with what you are arguing. Partly because if I was going to have a discussion about what would be a virtuous citizen I would not want to talk about their individualism but instead talk about their willingness to commit to something that is collective because that seems to me the heart of democracy. There are numerous ways in which you could make decisions. Most people fail because they do not know which decisions to spend time on in terms of engaging. It is a problem of cognition. I did not hear you saying any of that.

Dr. Yishai Menuchin: Of course I spoke about it when I spoke about the social dimension of values, about the liberation.

Prof. Gerry Stoker: Everyone engages but they tend to engage only on those issues which they regard as actually central or important themselves. I find it quite difficult to imagine that you can create one category of moral behavior. I think there are multiple categories.

Prof. Yossi Shain: The big question is in the expose is of course the notion of the democratic. You can say and we have enshrined in the world all sorts of values. They have to be applied and have to be executed notwithstanding the democratic character of states. Democracies however function in a different fashion with different set of values to begin with, not all of them liberal democracies. They have different constraints on who is included and who is excluded, they have different constraints because what is coming first in most democracies is the not the liberal creed but rather first of all the community itself, which is part of the citizenship body and that is part and parcel of debate about democracy. To what extent universal values which are absolutely the Hobbsian notion, regardless of community versus those who are upholding community. Nationalism also comes into play and these are serious debates. As a result of that, once you make a broad distinction you are losing the sight of any kind of decision making on whose behalf. Because then of course you could say in all conditions there are no kinship relations. Who would you say is first? These are serious questions I do not want to get into. Politics and democracy is about the demos. Who is part of the demos? In many countries in the world you cannot buy property. It breaks down that you are talking about universal values and how much there is individual responsibility. Then there are democratic responsibilities and that is completely story. Sometimes they combine.

Prof. David Ohana: I think in Israel there is a question of nationalism and not of democracy. When you mentioned Dostoevsky- that everyone should be responsible for anyone else this is danger for totalitarianism as well. Democracy, and I say it as a paradox, needs some anti democratic enemies always as a permanent test. I am impressed by the Israeli democracy because this is the only democracy in the world that for 60 years confronts a war.

Dr. Yishai Menuchin: I totally agree that there are so many vague cases. But there cases that are clear cut. And occupation of 41 years is anti democratic action no



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problematic. A war that is not a defense war is anti
en should resist it.

End of session 6.