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Session 5

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Prof. Gerry Stoker: Britain had a culture that was almost an ideal in being a stable democracy. So there is an interesting element in which both evidence and theory are mixed together here. We have to ask ourselves did anything change? To some extent the first issue is how is our understanding of the issue changed because Ulman and Weber had a particular sense about the way British politics worked and indeed when their book was published it was largely greeted with why the Americans are bothering to tell us this because we knew it already. There was a large assumption amongst British academia that this portrayal of incredibly benign affective system pragmatic tolerance was indeed exactly what it was and that Ulaman and Weber had done just a lot of statistics to show what we already knew. Fairly soon after the book was published in 1963 we began to see much more significant both their practical challenges and also academic challenges and of course the great debate, in a way Ulman and Weber's book was the last statement of that particular kind of an elitist understanding of democracy and a lot of the discussion that then followed was really how bizarre it was that a book that almost celebrated apathy and disinterest saw this is a whole mark of a stable democracy. So we have changed the terms of the academic debate from seeing apathy and disinterest as good for democracy and instead now we see them as bad for democracy. So to some extent the reason why we have these discussions is because our theoretical understanding and our view about what is good or bad democratic practice has changed and this is interesting and worth talking about. It is also worth trying drawing a comparison between the data that the civic culture produced and where we are now in Great Britain. And that is exactly what I am planning to do with a colleague of mine whose work was quoted in the brochures and the material associated with this conference. His name is Colin Hay. He works at Sheffield University and he wrote a book called Why We Hate Politics which covers

very similar territory in many ways to the book that I wrote Why Politics Matters. And we have been working together ever since we published the two books without knowing as it were. We decided to have a conversation once we saw that the books were about similar things and we have done several pieces of work together but most particularly what we are planning to do in 2009, we have not quite yet got all the funding but we are hopeful we are going to do it and in effect to repeat the civic culture survey. It is worth doing because civic culture survey was actually the first significant nation wide academic survey of the attitudes of British citizens to politics and so to repeat it 50 years later in 2009 is quite a good idea. And it is possible to do it not only because the material is available through the book but also the material in general is more available too. It will be great to do it. It would have been nice to do it about other countries.

Anyway I thought what I should do both for this presentation and for the paper for the publication that will follow is a comparison between the civic culture data of 1959 and what we can currently gain from the existing knowledge. Basically you can argue that the relationship of British citizens to their political system has changed in very important respects. In a way it will disappoint Ulman and Weber and theorists with less of an elitist approach to democracy. There is a lot of evidence to say that anti politics is strong in Greater Britain and presents a significant challenge along several dimensions. And I am going to quickly look at some shifts in political attitudes, some changes in political behavior and some impacts and changes in political institutions to establish this sense that there has been a big shift over 50 years. Ulman and Weber found that in 1959 there were quite high levels of civic competence expressed by British citizens. 78% said they could do something about an unjust local regulation. A comparable question in 2007 citizenship survey said that only two fifths felt that they could influence decisions in their local area. That suggests to me that people are not so quite confident about their capacity to influence the system. They are more alienated about the system. It is amazing to read Ulman and Weber. It is like almost entering another world. And the most shocking of the other worlds that I saw was that when asked what they were most proud of apparently nearly half of the British citizens said spontaneously that they were proud of the system of government of political institutions in 1959. I do not think you get them saying that in 2009 and this is a comparable that comes 2008 citizens' audit that simply says that 62% say that the system can be improved quite a lot or a great deal and only 2% feel that the system works extremely well and could not be improved.

I would say that the evidence is that it is not the issue of trusting politicians or trusting the standards of politicians because hidden away in Ulman and Weber are actually quite a lot of survey questions that show that 1959 people thought that politicians are crap and did not trust them and did not believe their promises. If you ask people whether they trust strangers which is most politicians are then inevitably they are likely to say no unless they are pathologically stupid. So if you ask slightly more subtle question which is to what extent you may trust them then you can find that 44% say that they would trust government ministers a lot to tell the truth. The figure with MPs are 45%. Local councilors 57% and you ask them not about MPs in general but about your local MP then 63% say that they trust them to tell the truth in some broad way most of the time. Not so quite as good as doctors. Apparently 95% of British people think doctors tell the truth which just says how stupid British people are. 91% trust head teachers. The point is that it may be not so much that people do not trust

people but it is so that they lost faith in the system because they do not feel that they could influence the system in the way that they could in the past.

Obviously attitudes only tell you so much. You need to understand changes in political behavior and here some of the changes have been quite significant as well. So if you compare 1959 to 2009 we are much less likely to see the pattern of decline from about 80% turned out to the 1950's to 60% at the 21st century. What is really significant is that if you group together some series of 3 general elections you are allow for the fact that some general elections are a bit more competitive and therefore there is a bit more of a turn out because they are closer and people think is worth voting for. What you actually still see is a substantial step down from 1945 onwards in the number of people prepared to vote. And what is significant about this is that there may be an increasing number of people who basically lost the habit of voting. And you see that going through a generation after generation. Much less likely to be a member of a political party. In the 1950's a staggering of British citizens were actually members of political parties. That figure would be considerably lower now. Most of the political parties have very low membership indeed. The Conservatives officially claim that they have about 300 thousands members. The Labor Party is almost so embarrassed about its loss of membership that it stopped releasing membership figures. But maybe it has about 150 thousands members. But you can see the scale of the decline. And also people are much less partisans. In 1940's or 1950's the two main parties Conservative and Labor swallowed up maybe about 90% of the overall share of the vote. But that is not so now. One of the figures where we are virtually the same as the picture of 1959 is the number of members of organizations. What Ulman and Weber focused on was activism as engaging with light minded individuals and in group but what more recent studies of what people do when they engage in non voting political activity it has become more individualistic so people engage in political activity by boycotting certain goods or by signing a petition or by going to engage in some individualistic action rather than simply joining a group.

These changes in attitude of behavior are reflected in new social divisions. So hidden away in Ulman and Weber actually what it shows is that there were quite significant gender paths in British politics in 1959 with significant differences in engagement and views about politics which have been largely by 2009 washed out of the system. That is gender differences have become much less noticeable but what is noticeable is much greater social class differentials. So age remains a major predictor of disengagement and of course another factor that comes into play is the increasing affective ethnic minorities where the picture is quite complex in terms of the degree of engagement and disengagement with political system. But just to concentrate on the social divisions that are emerging in British politics and the scale of disengagement let us look at these figures. This shows that people are not that keen yet on returning to voting. This is a question which was asked in 2008 audit about how likely are you to vote in the next general elections and these are people who are very likely to vote. 53% of men, 52% of women but look at the difference. If you go to younger age groups 18 to 24 only 23% actually say they are likely to vote. Although in the professional and managerial classes you get 66% saying they are likely to vote. In the DE classes we find 34% only saying they are likely to vote.

So I think this is an important dimension to disengagement which is disengagement is affecting some groups much more than it is affecting other groups. And to finish off

the portrait of where we are then if you compare 1959 to 2009 what I argue is that one is seeing is that political institutions are more regulated and less politically autonomous. Everyone is constrained by relationships much more within the system. The rise of the European Union is clearly an important part of understanding the changing parameters of what you can decide and how you can decide. The decline of local government which is being very significant in terms of the loss of both financial capacity and powers changing media practice, something that John already has spoken about so I will not dwell on that greatly. And then the rise of both nationalism and evolved government have all created a rather different context for the way politics works and operates.

So to sum up the section on dimensions you can say is that there is quite a complex change as ever but voters decline does seem to be quite serious and sustained if you belief the propensity to vote figures anyway. There are increasingly significant social divisions in terms of that levels of disengagement. The argument I put is that we never really trusted politicians but now we are much less confident of the system and much less confident about our capacity to influence that system. And in some ways one explanation might be Ulman and Weber assumed that as the population got better educated so people would engage in politics more but in some way perhaps is cut the other way in that perhaps people were naïve in their assumptions about how they could influence the system in the past and now people are better educated they realize how bloody difficult it is to influence the political system and at the same time perhaps they are more demanding of their political system. So we have formal landscape of politics which is very thin and undernourished and provides an incredibly strong basis for anti political climate. So these are the dimensions on the descriptive part of it. Let me just quickly move on and then summarize what I think might be some of the causes and therefore what might be some of the solutions.

In the realm of the causes I put the collapse of formal politics which is left a massive gap for anti politics to grow into. John in his presentation mentioned how Attley did not need to think about working through the media because they could work through the party machine. The party machine no longer exists or is such a pathetic thing that you could not possibly work through it. We have become more alienated and more divorced from politics and at the same time more demanding of politics. That is the double killer blow that politics finds it very difficult to respond to. And the political class helped create this situation by their own lack of belief in politics and in collective action.

Let me just explore a little bit more of these. In my book I go into this quite a lot but basically citizens have been left on the sidelines by professionalization of politics and politics in all its forms has become incredibly professional and specialized. You get people who went to university, became part of the student politics, then went on and became members of think tanks and advisors to various ministers etc. and then eventually they get a seat and then eventually they go into Parliament. But it is almost like a kind of a business rather than somebody who has got some connection with their community or some connection with their society more generally. The reality is that partly because of our electoral system in 2005 almost of all the affective campaigning was concentrated on 30 or 40 constituencies that were in some way considered to be marginal that if you could win them you could potentially win the votes overall with the result that there virtually no campaign experienced by vast

numbers of citizens. So it used to be the complaint that politicians only ever approach us at the time of elections but now in Britain politicians do not even bother to approach you at the time of elections unless you live in a marginal constituency and then they will. And the parties themselves are incredibly small, limited and driven by very small members. And this would be fine in some ways if as people try when they try to portray a kind of a positive thing about what is happening that people have moved away from engagement in parties to engagement in single issue pressure groups. But actually when you look at the reality of most single issue pressure groups they are check book organizations. They do not have actually active engagement with their members. What they ask for is money from their members in order to run highly professional campaigns for themselves.

I had given several talks on this throughout the United Kingdom and several times to members of Parliament. One of them told me the story about the way in which the exchange between interest groups and politicians occurs in modern Britain. Many of the interest groups now have a system where if you are a member you get and email and on the email it says to you please write to your member of Parliament about this and they actually provide a kind of formats of a letter a kind of a general wording etc and effectively what you need to do is click a button in order to send the letter off to your member of Parliament. And members of Parliament were receiving these letters by email and after a while they decided to get together and actually think instead of replying individually why don't we develop collective responses ourselves. So then they developed a collective response which they could click a button too to the collective emails they were receiving from the interest groups. It was a spectacular example of a kind of electronic dialogue of the deaf. So there is a kind of thinness in the way in which a lot of politics is conducted and even many so called protests are actually almost organized events in the same kind of way. If public relations is vital for the practice of formal politics then there is a kind of events groups that organizes a lot of protest as well. So the professionalization of politics had left a lot of people on the sidelines. As several people have argued politics because it is about collective decision making, because it does involve sustained dialogue, because it does involve compromise actually does not fit very comfortably with the commitment to self actualization, being the best you can be for yourself and all those kind of other features of more individualistic society so to some extent politics cuts against the grain and then politicians themselves are being experts at practicing the art of anti politics because they attack each other all the time on the basis of sleaze funding trust and making claims about the mendacity of their opponents. And indeed worse than that the government at the moment, the Labor government is always boasting about it- and we have taken another set of decisions out of politics because politics is so unsustainable, unreliable etc. So whether it is planning decisions or environmental decisions they like to boast how they have taken out of politics.

You would have thought that the opposition might be more pro politics but in many ways they are simply replicating a lot of the same kinds of ideas and views as well. So politicians themselves promote quite a strong anti politics culture. You can see some of the cause there but I am still more hazy about the causes than I am about the dimensions of the problem. I am hazy still about solutions but one solution I am convinced is not right which is that the British people are crying out for more and more opportunities to participate. This is very much the solution that was offered by a third sector non governmental organization called The Power Inquiry which basically

said the solution to the malaise in British politics is to offer people more and more a chance to engage and participate.

When Gordon Brown came to power he took some of the arguments of The Power Inquiry and published a paper on the governance of Britain and one of ministers published another paper called Communities in Control which sort of takes forward this line of argument which is somehow or other what we are going to do is give you more opportunity to be consulted about everything. I do not think simply being consulted about everything is the solution to the problem. In some sense we need to have a discussion between the advocates of more participating and engaging democracy and the advocates of a more elitist position. We need to think what would be the right balance between levels of engagement and levels of allowing representative politics to do its job. So I am not convinced by the need to consult people more line of argument. But I do think that we need to find ways of giving people chance to enter politics as amateurs as I have said politics have become incredibly professionalized. We need to find ways in which people can engage without giving up their lives. That is the other terrible thing that happens to you if you are a politician in the UK. Basically you have to abandon hope of any semblance of a normal life. You just become a politician. You cannot do anything else. We need to find ways in which people can engage but we need to do it in a way that forces them not just to be consulted but actually get involved in making political choices. To push me is to say well which particular mechanism of any that I recommend it will be something like participatory budgeting because that at least forces people into the real heart and soul of politics which is that horrible moment of trying to make choices between different things that you actually desire. A lot of politics is about choosing between things that you actually want and realizing you cannot have them all. We could do a lot about restructuring formal politics and representative politics. We could do more about tackling social divisions.

Let me just quickly cover the issue of representative politics. One of the things that I have not done but I keep saying to members of Parliament that I want to do is I want to cunduct an entire study of what they actually do. And I think they spend a massive amount of time away from constituents. Not actually doing what representation involves if it is a verb rather than a noun which is active engagement with their own constituents. There is a lot more that could be done to make much more of a dialogue between representatives and their constituents. Also we need to think about making a representative more socially representative because that is important for encouraging people levels of engagements and if we are going to have elections we need to make sure that they are competitive elections so that implies broader changes. We need to give people a real answer to the question of how to develop more local decision making which is more straight forward because we simply can copy models elsewhere. What is a lot harder is to think about how you can convince anyone that you can actually influence a decision within the European Union. But if you are a European citizen that is a good question to ask.

Finally, I would like to bring politics back in so any politician who says that they want to take the decision out of politics I want him to be moved from politics immediately. There is enormous amount of quasi governmental organizations that sit around making all kinds of collective allocations, decisions particularly. I actually do think that information technology could provide a real option for a representative

particularly to talk in much more particular way to a much more variety of sets of their own constituents. And above all I would like a politics that did give some sense of real choices to citizens. For me it would be some of the solutions. I am all confident in my depiction of where we are than necessarily my idea of where we might go in order to get to a better place. Thanks very much for listening.

Prof. Tamar Hermann: I really find a similarity between what you have been describing and what we are experiencing here. We ask a question in the 2008 Democracy Indext: if a member of your family or a close friend would ask your advice should or shouldn't he or she go into politics. We had the result of zero of people who said that they will give the advice to go into politics. Politics is something that is undesirable in the eyes of so many people. No mother wants her child to be a prime minister anymore. Any comments?

Dr. Kalman Neuman: I just want to know on the comparative level. One of the issues always raised in Israel about the election process is the suggestion that changing the constituency system would create more accountability, more responsibility but in the UK this is not so affective. That big advantage is perhaps not really to be gained.

Prof. Wolfgang Merkel: Gerry I can buy many of your arguments and I also liked the fact that there was no alarmist subtext in your analysis which we hear very often these days. Three remarks. The first one, you are using the term political class. I would argue that this is a term of anti politics itself. There is no theoretical justification to put the regional councilors, the local government, the Parliamentarians, and the executives, the minister of the national government in one class. You cannot find it in elitist theory so is it a journalists' invention? And it migrated to some extent in the terminology of social scientists as well, I see no justification. This is a preliminary remark. If I would be cynical and I am not, and would have read, and I have, Anthony Down very carefully I would say so what? These people are very rational. They know exactly if me Woflgang go to the elections. One simple vote does not change anything. Why should I go? So if you are a rational choice theorist you would say it does make sense to go. One could argue these people are more self interested and if you use this term of rationality in this regard you would say these people became more rational and why bother. The third remark is related to the causes and one of your main arguments is a very sound one. At least in the OECD people are more critical and more demanding at the same time. If you read Ulman and Weber and you look at the social structure at the end of the 1950's these people did not have more knowledge about politics. But you had at this time a complete different social structure and you had huge collective organizations. Now these collective organizations explain the variety of those figures you got from Ulman and Weber and especially with regard to Trade Unions. And this is one reason why you would not find these figures in the same way in Scandinavia.

Prof. Gerry Stoker: If I can reply very quickly, In the book that I wrote Why Politics Matters I was trying to be more comparative and at the end I decided that I could not say anything about the electoral system since they seem to have adverse effects or positive effects in almost every society that I looked at so for me the electoral system cannot necessarily be the solution but on the other hand as a trigger to why the set of changes are might argue for it in particular circumstances and in a particular country but not because for all times that electoral system will deliver those benefits but the

change of that time might deliver those benefits. I very much take the point about using the phrase political class and I will think hard and I will try not to use it but I still want to try and capture the sense in which the range of variety of people attracted into politics is becoming increasingly narrow and increasingly small and that is an issue. Because of the impact that particularly the Labor Party has in attracting wider range of social classes to politics itself.

Prof. Yossi Shain: Mosta does use this term a political class and employs it in this fashion. It does exactly that the way he uses the term encapsulating politicians in all levels. That is how he looked at them, that is how he defined them when he looked at the political class. It might be a good term for those who are preoccupied with politics in the business of government. The term was used mainly to politicians in the way he envisioned it.

 Prof. Gerry Stoker: The only other thing I was going to comment on is it rational to vote. Voting does make a big difference. You can state it formally by showing that actually British parties if they are elected tend to carry out 98% of their manifesto commitments. Of course no one red the manifesto commitment but they really do carry out most of those manifesto commitments. If you were trying to describe British politics you could say that the arrival of new labor actually made a big difference in lots of areas most particularly in public spending on health and education which from my point of view alone was well worth of having 10 or 11 years of power in terms of the scale of new investments that they put in. It does make sense. The thing that worries me is that if we are finding that increasingly particular social groups, maybe the young but more particularly the manual working class and other lower social groups are actually completely turning off bothering to vote then actually the politicians will react rationally and stop bothering to focus on issues concerns and matters which are relevant to those constituents. That is an issue. Voting does make a difference.

Dr. Danny Filc: Two questions. The first one. You said that there is a relationship between age and degree of disengagement. But those who are disengaged at the a young age remain disengaged or age also produces engagement? The second question is do you think that political parties can still play a role in the politicization of politics and if your answer is positive I would like if you can elaborate which kinds of intra party modifications could bring back politics in the way you want.

Prof. Yael Yisahi: I would like to be an advocate and contrary to what I said in my own presentation to ask a question, why do we need people to be in politics? If there are no serious social deviations, if there is no widespread violence, if the system can function following Huntington and others, the system can function without interruption, without too much public pressure so perhaps we live in a new era where there are things more important to do than being engaged in politics. Perhaps people socialize more. There is no vacuum and we keep saying that the purpose of this workshop is politics and I said it myself yesterday morning so let us ask the difficult questions. I would really appreciate your feelings about this. Perhaps it is a tide of anti politics that we cannot cope with. That is right we are in the 21st century.

Dr. Yishai Menuchin: An anecdote and an observation. The anecdote is that in Israel the Parliament has just passed a new anti-spam law. There is only one group that this

law is not going to cover, the political parties. It covers everybody else but not the politicians and the political parties. The second thing it became clear to me in the last few lectures that we have to separate between anti politics and anti politicians. It is clear cut that all the voices we have heard that we are going to bring a change to Washington because we are not from Washington. We are totally different kind of politicians. In Israel a small party in Tel Aviv says that we are going to bring you a different politics and this is the reason why all the parties have journalists as candidates because they are clean. People are using their wallet to make political decisions. They are buying first rate products. I looked at the numbers of people giving donations for development. There are huge sums of money from the public. It is politics too.

Prof. Yossi Shain: You said something about the systems themselves. I have been witnessing in the last several months traveling and witnessing the most incredible awakening I have seen in American politics. Incredible registration. Keep in mind that in the Democratic party alone we had 40 million people registering as members of party only for the Democratic party. Only for Hilary Clinton you had 19 million voters. 40 million registered to vote for the primaries. Just in the Democratic party. Youngsters all around the country from every campus driven to vote. Incredible activity across the board. Unprecedented phenomenon. Of course the Obama phenomenon has generated it but it is across the board. More discussions in the blogs and the internet newspapers. All the student newspapers in America becoming completely politicized. You see more internships on Capitol Hill where youngsters want to go to Political Science Department and National Affairs Department. There is an increase of 460%. They do not know what to do with them. What it teaches me, it is anecdotal perhaps that politics brings itself into a position of mobilization when mobilization is needed. We have remembered the anti politics of the sixties which was anti leaders politics. Both for the Civil Rights Movement and of course it brought Kennedy etc. So the terms here have to be discussed in a certain fashion. I want to ask you what do you think about parliamentary democracy which is different than the American system of course. Something does not work well for me if you have an incredible excitement. And in Israel as well. I remember the 1999 elections tremendous mobilization and you have the data there also. Or the elections in 1996 where there huge mobilization after the assassination of Rabin. Even in Italy. Sometimes you have ups and downs there as well. We have to do something with that because I do not see this as anti politics. It is something else that is happening here. What you say is important. It is the politicians, they are less and less involved and people demand more of them. They look to politicians in parliamentary and presidential systems. You see the excitement also in France with Royal and Sarkozy. It struck me when you spoke maybe I see something different here and maybe there is a distinction between different political systems. Maybe each society lends itself to awakening and dormant politics and explosive politics according to the issues that are presenting themselves to each society. Sometimes it a global phenomenon and sometimes it is a local phenomenon.

Prof. Riva Kastoryano: My question is factual. When you had the race relations act in England and there was a big mobilization then together with the Unions and I remember when I was doing my research on the European level they were the most active on the European level fighting against exclusion and xenophobia they were most active in promoting the idea of fight against racism on the European level which

created a lot of difficulty because other groups did not identify themselves as blacks. You talked also about the ethnic groups with the decline in mobilization, is there anything that mobilizes today and this blackness is there and it is not unifying any more. Is there anything that replaced it? Is there a way to mobilize ethnic issues and European issues?

Prof. Asher Arian: I think Yossi is correct. There is a problem of precision in our use of words. He also has a problem with some of the data that you presented. First of all the participation. The Obama effect is fascinating but it is very one sided, Yossi. The Republican youth did not come out and volunteered. The excitement was for one candidate on one side. And maybe it was anti Bush. It reminded me of the Candles Generation after Rabin's assassination. There was a feeling that the youth would come and they would restore politics. It was the youth and half of the country. And clearly in the elections after the assassination youth participation was not higher than it had been. So it is very selective and very sporadic. When I talk this afternoon I want to talk about the precision issue and we have to be very careful in generalizing from what the media made into a super-high participation but the rates show some increase.

Prof. Yossi Shain: But on campuses Asher when you asked students and people joining the army there is a massive movement.

Prof. Asher Arian: There are two different populations. People who go into the American army are not from the universities.

Prof. Gerry Stoker: Some answers. Is the age disengagement in one way reengage when they are older? That used to be the argument although the evidence is only tentative at the moment. I quoted one piece of evidence about the step scale downwards of voting turnout which suggest that there is lack of turnout among young people is turning into a serial not turning out. But there is actually been a couple of studies that suggest that that is exactly what is happening. In the past people used to not vote when they were young and then came back to it. But now they are not coming back to it.

The political parties and the role that they could play. Strange enough the question is asked often in the UK itself. It is a bit like asking a dead body to get off and start moving around and doing things because there are so few active people in many political parties. I equally accept that in a way they are actually the only formal institution we have got in the game. It would require considerable efforts of leadership on the part of somebody to make that kind of a scale difference in a party and the trouble is that all the effort in leadership goes into creating the electoral advantage and then in the practice of the government itself if you are able to get there and so much into re-cementing the constituents. Both the Conservative party and the Labor party there are perpetually having conversations about how they can get people to join in. There are all sorts of things. Like people who are not really members but like affiliated members. I do not know. Maybe there are some lessons from the Obama campaign in terms of the use of social networks. One of the most interesting features of the Obama campaign was the bit on the website that said My Obama. That tells you everything about the campaign. You could make up your own Obama. And that what I suspect has happened. Some people did not have the foggiest idea what Obama thinks about something one way or the other and one imagines they are going to be

massively disappointed. You could imagine that a party could use some of these kinds of social networking tools to replace the mass meeting, their boring committees etc. It is possible that that might provide some focus of energy. The truth is I. like everyone else pretty much in British Political Science, think that we cannot do without parties, but we cannot think how the hell to make them work. I do not think I have an easy answer to that.

In terms of the question about should we expect people to participate I have got two answers. The first is like a lot of people in Political Science I had to think hard when I was writing a book about engagement, how much engagement do I want and I also had to reflect on honestly the levels of engagement that I am interested in. And I suppose what I feel is, I got both philosophical and a practical answer. The philosophical answer is the democratic ideal has got to be more about the occasional opportunity to choose your leaders. In the end why do people believe in democracy, why it is a value I have? It is a fundamental human right to have a say in matters that influence you and that is why I want people to be able to participate because it is a fundamental human right. That is why I do care about the opportunities of participation that are there. The practical issue is that I accept the fact as several people have argued, if the economy is growing and things are moving along swimmingly etc. maybe there is nothing much to argue about, although actually there are a lot of things to argue about and indeed there lots of things that politics is a lot better in sorting out, small things, politics can sort out major ethnic conflicts. What I fear in particularly with the turn off of young people is a turn to the more fascist form of politics rather than non democratic politics and indeed there is a constant evidence that in British politics there are bursts of a Right Wing populism which I think are worrying and which is why I would want to constantly be vigilant. I am sufficiently pessimistic to think that things will not go swimmingly well for the future and I am rather hoping that therefore we have a political system that can cope with rather more challenging times which we may well be moving into. I agree with the value of thinking about distinction between anti politics and anti politicians and I agree that many people still have the same expressed level of interest in politics. So yes it is partly because they think about doing politics in other ways. That is what I meant about people being more engaged in individualistic activity. The problem is that for me that is not good enough in terms of their political engagement because it is more of a life style statement to say look at me, I bought fair trade coffee and my word people who buy fair trade coffee tend to shove it in your face. I have bought fair trade coffee. Do you want some fair trade coffee? So there is a sense in which it is a life style statement rather than an engagement with the whole range of issues that Oxfam will want people to engage in about why it is that coffee is growing like that, why it is our markets work like that, why it is that there is a massive North-South divide in our world.

An answer to the last question which was about race relations and black identity. Very good and valuable question. I want to say two things. One is that the complexity of the range of ethnic minorities in the UK has made the establishment of that sense of blackness actually a difficult identity. Because the Afro-Arabian immigrants are happy to share that identity and also some of the other immigrants from other parts of Africa are, but the Kenyans and Ugandans are not, and many of the immigrants from Pakistan and India are not either. It has actually always been a tension. Actually there is an amazing difference in the scale of political organizations. The Afro-Arabian

organizations except in some parts of London are politically very weak. Asian organizations in some of the major cities in the North, in Bradford and in Leicester are amazingly strong. They turn out more in elections than anyone else and they actually in many ways in most of our big cities now have almost a social representative balance in terms of the candidates that they can get elected as well. One of the problems of the project was that there was not and is not a shared identity between different ethnic groups. It is still an issue where people keep on returning to and certainly there is a campaigning organization called Black Voice Get the Vote Out which is trying to more specifically organize within the Afro-Caribbean community and actually make it more influential than it is. Thank you very much for the comments.

Prof. Pierangelo Isernia: I thank the Israel Democracy Institute for the invitation. This is the first time for me in Israel. I know almost nothing about the country but I realize that there many similarities with Italy in terms of politics at least. We also use sex for alluring voters but we do not think it's illegal. And we had Ravioli for dinner yesterday night. So when I asked Tamar what she wanted me to talk about I listed what I am presently working on and she picked up this project. We in Siena are coordinating a comparative European project under the six countries program to study the change and the nature and scope of citizenship in Europe. Basically running two ways of surveys of the mass and political and economical elite in 15 European countries and what I am reporting are some of the initial results of the first way of this study. Of course this study is too wide to be compressed in 30 minutes. What I would tackle is one problem that in a way can be defined or framed as an anti politics problem but is related to European integration. In fact you might say that European integration process is in itself an embodiment of anti politics institutional process because basically what European Union is about is to screen and separate some issue areas from the day by day hot politics debate and bring them into the functional areas of technical representation. So in a way the European Union is in itself a manifestation of anti politics. But I do not want to tackle this specific thing but with more general paradoxes that are related to the image of the European integration process in public opinion. Over time there is an increasingly sense among the public that Europe is becoming a sort of manifestation of the globalization threat. While in fact most of the elite, at least of the founding fathers European Union was perceived as an attempt to cope with some of the challenges that after the Second World War, the shrinking of the European balance of power system was posed to the European countries. So again as a way to shield, as a way to cope with globalization problem. So there is a sort of paradox here. The European Union was born out of a project to address some of the leanings of the European nation states is now perceived more and more as a globalizing effect. I want to look a bit more into the details of this image.

Let me first show you what the problem could be about. There has been a decline in support for European integration and this decline occurred at the very moment which European integration process was reaching its zenith. The 1992 with the decision to go along with the European monitory union much stronger steps towards integration in the economic market, labor market. So at this very moment in which many of the dreams of the founding fathers were going to be realized we have a decline in support of several indicators in the European process itself. To what extent this is related to what I am talking about you will see in a minute but surely part of it was related to the European Union, rather than helping and strengthening the domestic political leads

was in fact working against that. As this might be the case is also seen in this graph in 2005 that was asking whether the European Union could be perceived as an instrument to protect us against globalization. And you can see from there that not many Europeans with the exception of Cyprus Island perceive Europe as a shield, as a way to cope with the globalization processes. Some of the first members of the European Union, Germany in particular are among the smallest that think that this is true. So there is some interest in looking at this relationship between Europeanization the process of growing intermingling of the European sphere into the domestic life of citizens with globalization. No matter what globalization means and I will tell you more about this in a second.

So what I want to do is to look at these relationships with a very simple unidirectional hypothesis. The idea is that there is a factor out there that is called globalization in several dimensions. Globalization is like beauty sometimes, it is in the eyes of the beholder. Globalization is an exogenous factor that can be perceived either as threat or an opportunity or both and we shall see that there is a lot of ambivalence of what globalization is in Europe and that in a way European integration could be strengthening to the European institutions, could be a response to globalization. A threat if it is a threat. Of course these very simple linear relationships can be affected by many intervening variables and the ones I am more interested in are those which are related to national and European identity, to trusting institutions and things like that.

Let me first say a thing or two about what we are talking about when we talk about globalization. Globalization is something very vague and difficult to grasp and this can be gathered also from looking at the available data that has been collected over time about globalization as an issue. The clearest thing that comes out that there is a huge variety of reactions you can get depending how the question is worded, what kind of values are included in the question, whether definitions are offered or not, whether good or bad elements or aspects of globalization are stressed. So in a way this something on which people has no clear cut idea. And in fact one third of the population in some countries, the UK among them simply do not know what globalization is. You would say that UK was the father of globalization, so this means we are working with a tricky issue and we have to be clear and careful on what we are measuring when we want to measure it.

So what we basically did, we ran an experiment in our survey. This survey has been conducted in 2007 in 15 European countries and we ran an experiment that means we submitted to the samples of European population a question that was slightly different from randomly assigned sub groups of the respondents. This question was about globalization and we offered a definition of globalization that is very general but not far from the one you can find in any book about globalization like the one by Elt or McGrew. So sticking to a definition of what globalization is about we then introduced an element of threat into it and the nature of this threat was randomly changed in the sub groups of the population. For some the threat was described as a national security threat, for others it was described as economic threat and for others was described as threat to the cultural values and way of life of the society. And then after we got answers to the question we then asked whether they thought that in view of this, the power of European Union should be increased even at the cost infringing or shrinking the power of domestic institutions. We asked similar questions, we did not run this

experiment for the elite. The political elite are basically the national parliamentarians in these 15 European countries; the economical elite are the top 10% firms in each country. We tried to interview a senior or their immediate partners and we succeeded in most of the cases. Since the numbers are not as big we ran 120 interviews in each country. We asked the elite slightly different questions. One of those questions was mentioning globalization as a threat to welfare of the country.

What are the reactions? Asked about globalization as perceived as a threat, again not surprisingly given what I have said about the variety of answers we got to the questions we have a wide distribution from countries like UK and Portugal where the majority of the population thinks that globalization is a threat. To countries like Denmark and Slovenia and Austria where minorities are on this side. This combines together all questions about all the different threats, and we can see that there are differences between the mass and the elite. In one of the bars the third starting from the left is about globalization and you can see that minorities in all countries among the elite think that globalization is a threat to the welfare of the state. And with the difference between economic and political elite and it is interesting that economic elite is much less than for the political elites. We also saw a gap between the public and the elite in terms of the perception of threat. This question is not strictly comparable I know, it is not exactly the same but you can see that there are huge differences between the public and the elites in almost all countries with some exception like Serbia that by the way is not part of the European Union yet. The conclusion is that there is no much relationship between public and elites on how globalization is perceived as a threat. This is not surprising in a sense if we consider that the elites have been looking at the Europeanization of the domestic politics has a way to promote in a way globalizing values within their own societies as a way to modernize the country in directions that can be perceived as positive towards globalization. So in a sense this is not very surprising but there is a gap anyway. And this gap is even more interesting if we look at more data and we compare perception of globalization as a threat with the degree of globalization of the economies of these various countries. And we can see here that there is a negative relationship between these two variables. The more you are mobilized as a country and I use two simple indicators for investment of the JDP and the foreign policy magazine globalization index standardized from a zero to a hundred and on both cases one is Estonia and the other one is Denmark in our sample there is a clear cut negative relationship between the degree of globalization of the economy and the perception of globalization as a threat. And this is interesting and positive if you like.

Now let us look at the relationship as I outlined in the beginning. I will go in two steps. I will first do variant relationship one by one and then I will present you a regression analysis and I will explain it. I do not want to scare anyone. I am mindless empiricist as somebody told me. Perception of threat by types of threat. Is there any difference in public's mind about the nature of globalization in making them more or less likely to perceive it as a threat? There are some differences. Apparently it is more likely to see globalization as a threat when it is declined or defined as in economic threat than when is defined as a national security or a cultural threat. Differences are not staggering, and as you will see in the analysis, they tend to disappear in some cases, but is a difference. There are also of course differences across countries. The most remarkable one here is that in UK, economic well being is less powerful as a predictor than national security and these may be related to the experiences UK has

gone through in the last few years about the terrorist attacks. Is perceptional threat somehow related to the willingness to increase new powers at the cost of national powers? There is again a relationship here, the more you perceive the threat as serious the more you want powers to be increased, but again the differences are not that dramatic. And this in itself points to the fact that there might be some truth in the argument that for some sections of the population, Europeanization the growing intermingling of the European and the domestic in many policy areas, is really perceived as something coming from this globalizing process that is not perceived as benign. And we also tried to see whether there is an interaction between the increase of new powers and the nature and seriousness of the threat and again there are some differences. And here what is interesting is that apparently there is an interaction effort between the nature of the threat and whether you perceive it as economic, political, security or cultural in a sense that when you perceive the threat as a national security threat you are more likely to see European Union as a possible instrument to cope with that. That is in line with most of the data we have about the Eurobarometer on the willingness of the European public to go along with much greater role for European defense for the foreign affairs security policies in Europe. You cannot see much about that.

By the way I have a paper available. It is with me and I can give it to you upon request. No money is involved. The most appropriate in dealing with this kind of data is using multi level analysis but what I am presenting here in fact is not a multi level analysis even though we included some facts in it. We found the following interesting things. Of course there is a relationship between threat perception and the desire to increase new powers. The relationship is in the right direction and it is strong and it holds across all the issue areas. This means that in a way Europeanization can be sold, can be framed, can be seen as a way to increase to deepen European connection.

Second interesting thing is that there is also a relationship between the kind of attachments of identity and the desire to see this increase happening. The more you are attached to Europe the more you feel that Europe is going in the right direction the more you want the powers to be increased. On the other hand, and this is quite interesting, some of the literature argues that national identity and European identity do not work at cross purposes in many countries. In fact, they argue that those who are attached to national identity are also strongly attached to European identity. But this does not work the same way in our model. First, when you keep everything under control, attachment to country seems to work against Europe when you perceive a globalizing threat. But this overall picture is made complicated depending on the issues, in the sense in these relationships the more you are attached to national identity the less you see Europe as answer to your problems. This relationship is stronger in some dimensions than in others. Not surprisingly it is stronger in a national security dimension than it is in the economy or culture.

Third element, the standard ideological variables typically the Left-Right ideological differences is not significant across the board. This means that not only is ideology not at all driving the public's minds on this issue, but that parties might have a problem in using globalizing threats as a way to increase new powers because the impact of globalizing threats on Left and Right voters are so ambiguous that this is not working on both the parties and the voters. In a sense this means that the standard that coordinates politics does not seem to work in this specific case. And last but not

least, I also have to say that most of the economy's self interest indicators relating to the benefits from the European Union and the perceptions of the economic situation do not work in this direction, they are either not significant or slightly significant.

However, it must be said that these results were given in 2007. We are running a new wave in 2009. It would be very interesting to see what it is happening in the meanwhile because we have here a quasi experimental situation in which globalizing threat in a way is working at full steam. You can see here how European identity and national identity are related to the desire for increasing new powers depending on the nature of the threat. The first thing that is clear is that there is no interaction effort between the factual factors: security, culture or economy and the likelihood of willingness to increase new powers. And the second thing that you can see is that there is strong relationship between identity and the desire to have new powers to be increased and this is true across the board. Confirming that most of what we see and discuss about European intervention has more to do with identity issues, political issues than with utilitarian considerations. Thank you.

Prof. Tamar Hermann: Questions, comments. The front row looked a bit upset.

Prof. Astrid von Busekist: I am not upset but I wonder about the cultural threats. I understand this very well from a French perspective. This is the average that you gave us that a cultural threat goes on. But in America and Germany the loss of national culture, national classics.

Dr. Kalman Neuman: Muslim immigration.

Prof. Astrid von Busekist: Oh, that is the cultural threat.
 Prof. Pierangelo Isernia: No, no.

Prof. Riva Kastoryano: One methodological question. How did you do this research? Where does the data come from?

Prof. Peirangelo Isernia: We ran our own survey.

Prof. Riva Kastoryano: The other question is about organizations and globalization. I think it is a very good idea to dissociate this research and to see how things are connected or not connected. When you say that the Europeanization in Europe is the manifestation of anti politics and that it is a reaction to globalization, much is manifestation of anti politics. But of course we do not take the political mobilization against organizations. You do not take any groups that are acting against globalization etc. but what makes you think, I see the opposite that Europe has become more the manifestation of politics in the way it has been defined in this conference since yesterday, grass roots organizations, networking, NGO, all these webs that are covering immigrants etc. So why Europe exhibits the manifestation of anti politics? And in this kind of politization and mobilization in the European Union there are also things that you find on the global level. When you take for example the Human Rights Movement it is also the European globalization. And to what extent they can be so separate? I understand that from the point of view of methodology you need to do this because you take the European Union and how in the state form. And how states are reacting against globalization and how the European Union is a total

political unity that can react against globalization as the state reacts. And within the European Union each state reacts in a different way. So there is no European unity in this way against anything, not only globalization. I was intrigued by the methodology.

Prof. Pierangelo Isernia: This survey was run by TNS in 17 European counties actually. The samples are 1000 people and we asked these two questions, the ones I used as dependent variables. As you can see what kind of threat to cultural values and ways of life is in the people's mind can be inferred from other questions. My impression having looked also at these other questions- there were also questions on immigration, on Turkey enlargement and on other issues, were that these kind of issues were much more on people's mind then they were reacting to cultural threats and other kind of considerations. The relationship between these questions and globalization issue is of course built by us as an experiment to try and see what the reactions are. This does not mean that in fact Europeanization and globalization are one and the same thing. The reason why I said European intervention can be seen as a gigantic experiment of anti politics was half way joke way of saying that basically for male scholars to quote two that are different assessment of the situation Fritz Sharp and Mayone, they both argued that the European intervention process has been a way to shield some sectors from political debates delivering them to technical elites to be dealt with in a way that could avoid any political conflict. That is good. That is what makes Europe work and that should continue. There are people that argue that this is not enough. That we need more democracy at the European Union level and we need to have multilevel governments with different levels of accountability. Now to what extent it is possible to realize these things is another matter. And whether it is going to work is also another matter. If only you consider the fact that basically people reside at the European Union. We should do more of what we do at the national level when we have just said that at the national level things are not going very well either. So in a way whether we should bring this analogy so easily form one level to another is not obvious because since it is not working at the domestic level why should it the European level? But this is very complex issue and I have also something to say about it because we are running another project that is pressing exactly these kinds of issues. This is an empirical question and that should be assessed. What is going to happen if we realize the conditions that some people experience should be realized at the European level for the democratic life in Europe.

Prof. Wolfgang Merkel: One remark. You addressed the question of the cultural threat. What exactly is the cultural threat?

Prof. Pierangelo Insernia: Again that is the question we asked. Now what is in people's mind when you think of cultural values and a way of life can be inferred by other questions. But we did not specify what is cultural and way of life- is it either immigration or Muslims or McDonalds, or Americanization or whatever. You could get that thought other questions but we did not define it in a specific way.

Prof. Wolfgang Merkel: Because it would be quite relevant if you would ask in the Nederland, in Austria and in Germany about a cultural threat, the overall majority of the people would think about Muslim immigration, not about McDonalds or not about pop music or something else. It is the Muslim immigration and if they want to have more protection by the European Union this is not very positive news in terms of European identity, they only think that the European nation states are not restrictive

enough against immigration so this is a closing of the mind. It is a closing against immigration. This is just a remark. 90% if you have discourse in the Nederland, in Austria. It is not about Vietnamese immigration. It is Muslim immigration. If you ask people they are afraid of it. And this is just an empirical observation of course not a value judgment. The other thing is you could become a shield against economic globalization and if the people respond, the Austrians, the Germans at the bottom 28% know, they are completely right. This is what we are discussing. The European immigration is a neoliberal project. Some called it a negative immigration meaning dismantling the economic restrictions against economic freedom. They are completely right, they are well informed. They just say what the effect is. And we have to know that the economic exchange within the European countries 70% is not the outside world. It is within the European community. Why these 30% are so relevant for shielding the people against so to say the neoliberal economic threat. The very last point is the input and output dimension of democracy. The argument by Sharp and John Domenico Mayone and others- their view is very weak on the input dimension of democracy, it is not very transparent and not very accountable. And therefore it is quite strong on the output dimension because they increase economic welfare and this is clearly something that they do. Therefore this would be a little criticism on the empiricists. Something quite different in the perception of the people and the reality of social welfare. So the economic welfare, if you ask the people and you separate the questions, they would say the economic welfare yes, but social welfare it is a threat. Therefore you get all these negative or low figures for the European Union among Scandinavian for example, because they consider it as a threat against the welfare state.

Prof. Gerry Stoker: What I wanted to say first of all very impressive piece of work and I wanted to say in public that I would like a copy of the paper. This split, was that split equally in each national sample? So you actually have quite small samples in relation to individual questions.

Prof. Pierangelo Isernia: 300 to 350 each.

Prof. Tamar Hermann: O.K Kalman the floor is yours.

Dr. Kalman Neuman: Thank you. I will try to be brief. I am working here at the Institute on the project on religion and state. I have done work on religious Zionism and the attitude towards the state and presently I am working on the question of The Territories in the context of religion and state relations. Tamar asked me therefore to speak today about the religious rights in Israel and anti politics. I am not going to talk about the Likud so I am not stepping on any toes. I hope both Israelis and the guests will find this interesting and just the story about a marginal and perhaps esoteric group. At least I can feel more confident in describing a community I am somewhat familiar with. I apologize if I find myself relating things that are well known to the Israelis or if I am unable to make myself intelligible for our guests. So I am asking the guests to please interrupt me if I take something for granted that should be articulated. I must admit that I have some differences with Professor Ohana about part of his presentation this morning. But especially since he dealt basically with the pathology and very very extreme phenomenon, so I am not sure that everything would have to be seen as contradicting to what he said. Yesterday different speakers spoke of different types and different reasons for the escape from politics in general or about

involvement with formal political activities specifically. As mentioned by Naomi Hazan, the escape from politics may derive from an aversion or disinterest in the political sphere altogether. Our code word is Yoga. Yoga, that is the people who do not care anything about politics at all. It can also result from rejection of present political parties or present political leadership as hopelessly corrupt. Perhaps referring to engagement of political activity outside the formal political system such as civil societies or it can also result in the belief that there is no real difference between political parties or political leaders. It does not really matter if they are all good or all bad, but if it does not matter why bother. An interesting question to examine on this issue is how this tendency influences politics itself among political groups that are clearly different. For example the head of the political party named Meretz, there is such a political party, Haim Oron has recently mentioned that his party which is clearly very ideological party want to attract voters from the party of the despairing and the party of the indifferent. The reservoir of votes that this party will try to attract is not to compete with existing parties but to attract those who are anti politics. And thus the party of course wishes to attract new faces, candidates, untainted with a stain and the name of being politicians. What does the anti political person knows about? He knows about the people he meets in the media. So we have to settle for journalists in the meantime. So basically we are talking about utilizing anti politics for political activity. One of the reasons to the escape from politics is the perception that there are all the same and Danny Ben Simon said that he encountered these feelings in his travels around the country, so will not be the case for those who support a party that offers a voice not an echo. Will it to be assumed that a party with a clear ideology with support associated to this ideology, be less vulnerable to desertions and escapists?. Could such a party be able to utilize the atmosphere of anti politics in order to promote its goals? Obviously lower voter turnout would allow over representation of groups who are not turned off and can be mobilized to vote. In addition, the atmosphere of anti politics and especially the corruption eruption mentioned yesterday may help such group position itself such an ideological group position itself as a non political party and thus help promote its agenda. I would study the fortunes of a specific political ideology in an environment of anti politics. Specifically, I would examine the different options open to the religious Right in the present situation in Israel.

The group that I am talking about, the religious Right is rather small but due to the proportional nature of Israeli elections and the great visibility of this group and of course the fact that much of the settlers population is a sub set of what I call the religious Right and I am emphasizing it to sub set of the larger community. And that is why this group is significant and important perhaps beyond its numbers. Israeli social scientists often speak of a four-fold division of Israeli Jews into secular, traditional, religious and ultra orthodox. There has been a more sophisticated way of defining these groups but this is the most common way in order to examine data. The third group which defines itself as religious is more or less identical to that which we call Religious Zionist or National Religious. One of the major things that distinguish them from the ultra orthodox is the fact that they are a Zionist, and the ultra orthodox are anti Zionist. They have also a different approach to modernity but in our context this is what we are talking about. When we talk about religious Jews in Israel in effect we are talking about orthodox Jews, non orthodox religious Jews they do not appear separate in the surveys. In the 2008 Gutman's figures the religious people who defined themselves as religious are 10% of the Jewish population.

As has been shown in numerous studies in Israel the continuum of self definition of Left or Right is determined by one issue and one issue alone- by the question of the attitude towards the resolution of Israeli Palestinian conflict. Seldom does one problem claimed the center of a public stage for decades. However such predominance is evident in Israeli national agenda. Individual leaders and entire political camps engage and disengage, rise and fall, and ultimately leave their imprint in the collective memory in accordance with their stations and the continuum between partitioning greater Israel between two peoples who inhabit it and keeping all or most of it under Jewish Israeli control. Those are the two groups, Left and Right, doves and hawks. Those are the birds of a feather of Israeli political typography.

And going from that on to our question I am quoting from an article by Tamar, "The polls of Steinmetz Peace Project shows consistently that the religious-secular dimension is the most important factor in determining the positions of the public regarding the peace process. This element is more influential with factors such as education, land of origin, age, gender, income etc." While there has been a convergence into the center in Israeli society as a whole, such as acceptance of some version of the two states solution while remaining skeptical about the chances of reaching a final status agreement with the Palestinians that is the general situation. Again data that I saw in April said that 70% of Israeli Jews support the two states solution while only about 20% believe that negotiations with the Palestinians will lead to peace in the coming years.

The religious community identifies itself overwhelmingly over 80% as Right Wing. For example a survey I saw quoted that 82% of people who defined themselves as religious are against the establishment of a Palestinian state. And of course they vote for parties that are right to the center. The Israeli Right in general is not of one color. There is a pragmatic Right which includes those who are willing to hold on to the territories as long as they do not jeopardize Israel's alliance with United States and they do not jeopardize economic benefits for the moneyed classes. They support occupation deluxe but they are not always willing to pay the price for it and if the price is too high maybe things will change. Here I am talking about the ideological religious Right. Within this group I want to focus on those who are Right in politics and in opposition to withdrawal and in opposition to any evacuation of settlements which is directly connected with their religious commitment. This ideological hardcore is not necessarily a majority within the religious community, but the most important leadership figures, the educators, the dominant Rabbis, the people who have control of discourse within that community have this more hardcore ideological position. Like the religious Right in the United States which focused its attention very often on the question of abortion, the Israeli Religious Right is in many respects a one issue group that is concerned with the issue of what they call the land of Israel, the sacred land of Israel, the opposition to any concession. Just to give an example. This is from Haaretz. We had municipal elections and people got an email which gave them a list who is the right person to vote for, based on their positions on the issues above.

I want to point out something we spoken about media. Within the religious community there is very spirited ideological discourse which is not visible to the mass media. It is almost an exception to the rule that John has been talking about. Some of

the Israeli media has already realized that this happens. There is a huge area of internal media which is distributed in synagogues on every Saturday. This is an ideal media. First of all, of course it is targeted to an exact population. It is given out in the synagogues and it is given out for free. Occasionally when you spend two hours in a synagogue you might find yourself for 5 or 10 minutes willing to consider not focusing on your prayers but maybe reading something interesting. It is a captive audience. And not only that there is no competition from anything because orthodox Jews do not even use the internet, they do not have access to television or radio on Shabbat. So it is a very successful project and of course who publishes them? The NGO's. Many different ideological steams have their own thing. They contain of course religious teachings and advice about family. And this is one of the ways to gain perspective on what is the ideological discourse within this closed community that does not have always access, so its debates are not carried out in the public media.

A very crucial moment in the ideological development of this group is the trauma of disengagement in 2005. This event generated doubts among many people in the community about the very utility of political activity. Ariel Sharon's decision to initiate and carry out this plan pitted the ideological Right against a leader who they idolized for decades. Ariel Sharon was considered the general and he actually initiated many of the settlements. So it was a terrific disappointment. When the time came for the implementation of the plan most of the Likud members of parliament did not oppose the plan and the parliamentary representative of the religious Right were unable to stop Sharon. There was an attempt to mass march to Gaza that was stopped in Kefar Mimon. There was a conflict of thousands of demonstrators with the army and then at the point of conflict, the leadership of the settler movement sided away from a violent confrontation. That left them open to subsequent criticism they have stabbed the movement at the back. In addition there was a terrific disappointment with the leadership of the secular Right. And the idea that was developed by many of the religious Right as a result of this was that this weakness, this willingness to withdraw, this is to be attributed either to a lack of identification with Jewish values, these people are secular Jews they are not really committed to the land of Israel like religious Jews are, or they are doing it as a result of corruption. This is certainly a source of anti politics, the idea of such a grave decision was taken for non legitimate considerations. What is the response of this community to this event? As far as voters participation in the elections that were held shortly after the disengagement we have no evidence in a drop of voter participation in this community. This group is certainly not post ideological. There is no indifference towards politics but there is dissatisfaction with the leadership. What happened as a result? This event accelerated the appearance of ideological tendency that was submerged in pervious years. This is the call that the religious Zionist community should no longer just see itself as participants in the Israeli politics and not just strive to act as lobby but should strive to influence the system as a whole.

I will briefly present just 5 different options that stand before this community. Three are within the political system which I call new politics but more of the same and two which are no politics. New politics option one is the creation of a broad religious Zionist party containing all religious Zionists regardless of political inclination and focused on education and this supposedly would also be able to mobilize traditional people, people who are concerned about Jewish values, the Jewish cultural nature of

the state of Israel, people who feel that the state of Israel is threatened by globalization and there is such a threat among certain parts of the community and therefore a party that would express Jewish values that party is now being created. In this party there are those who see the party as a cover for extreme Right Wing positions and those who really believe that religious idols have to change a face.

Strategy number two is to have a partnership with the ultra orthodox. That would conceivably create a larger block. The orthodox are even right to the religious. They are anti peace and anti withdrawal but they usually do not make a point of willingness to join any government. In this case such a block of all the religious parties together would be a trade of which the religious Zionists would make concessions on religious issues to the ultra orthodox where they would gain support on the political issues.

The third strategy is the most interesting one, is that of Moshe Feiglin. He has a Leninist strategy. Why start a new party if there already a party in power that could achieve power. Let us take over the Likud and the Likud will now become that party which will achieve this ideological position. I call this anti anti politics. He utilizes the rhetoric of anti politics in order to say let us take over the Likud and make it and clean it from all the negative things that have contaminated politics. He is been doing this for years. It is fascinating as a political experiment. Those are the three options within the political system to forge alliances one way or another in order to gain larger control of the political system.

And there are two groups I would say who are going all the way and who are anti politics to the extreme. There is a group that ideologically has almost joined the ultra orthodox traditional position of not participating in any way in the political system. There is a Rabbi named Yitzhak Ginzburg who is notorious for other reasons who should be taken very seriously. He is a challenging person. He has a great attraction for many people and he basically talks about the husk that precedes the fruit. It is a Kabalistic metaphor that there is fruit that is surrounded by husks. In order to get to the fruit you have to break through the husks. So the fruit is the ideal state of Israel and the husks are the establishments, the legal establishment, the army that does not respond in a violent enough way to the Arabs, and the media. These are the husks that have to be broken through in order to achieve the perfect state. And of course there are anarchists and there people who have given up and live on the hilltops and have no interest in these issues. We all know it is difficult to make predictions. It is hard to determine where this is leading and like many other issues in this country much will depend on the future of the conflict as to how these different groups interact. Thank you.

Prof. Tamar Hermann: Thank you Kalman. I will try to be creative. We can have coffee now and we can ask Kalman questions when we will be touring the neighborhoods of Jerusalem. Probably his remarks will have to do with the subject of his presentation.

End of session 5.