



The Israel Democracy Institute
International Workshop on "Citizens, Politics and the Political Profession"
19 December 2008
Session 7

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Prof. Tamar Hermann: I am very very pleased and honored to have with us this morning member of Knesset Professor Menachem Ben Sasson who is the Chairman of the Constitutional Law and Justice Committee of the Knesset and we asked him to come here this morning in order to share with us his view of the present situation and state of affairs in the Israeli democratic system. We have been discussing democratic systems in the last two days so we focus on the relations between the electorate and the representatives, the trust crisis, the anti political sentiment that is quite prevalent among the grass roots and so on and we wanted to hear from how does it look like from up there, personal and formal.

Prof. Menachem Ben Sasson: I will dedicate 5 minutes to the personal because it is very fresh what I can report to you about the status of the Israeli politics from a very personal point of view and then the last 25 minutes or 20 minutes I shall dedicate to some, I cannot say insights, neither insights nor an overview because nothing before after the 13th century I can teach you. The usual thing is that I come to you in order to learn from you. That is what I have been doing a few times both in Europe and the United States. I was promoted yesterday from the 18th seat in the Kadima list to the 35th seat and it was an end of three years of a very productive, interesting, challenging and satisfying years that I served in the Judiciary Committee. We have also had the task to write the Israeli constitution in addition to what we do in the Judiciary Committee. The annals of the Israeli legislation are a little bit higher than of yours. The Knesset put on its desk and it is part of the decisions 5000 bills through the last

three years and few months. It is unheard of. It is an illness. It is part of symptoms that create a syndrome the disease that you have been discussing through the last days and maybe we will come to it at the end of this meeting.

How was I so successful in the primaries that is the question. It is not only my achievement, there is another professor. He is a real serious professor who deals with administration and foreseeing the future and he is the head of Strategic Planning Committee. He won a prize for his innovative initiative and nobody knows what is behind this. He was a little bit less successful than me. He moved to 31st seat and he called me up yesterday night and he told me, Menachem you are going to be promoted to 34th seat. As you know professors are not always fit to serve in the parliament. You do your research. It says nothing about your skills as a political leader, as one who can conduct legislation, as one who can run a plenary, and so and so forth, but still that is the end of the process. It is the end of a process of a very successful primary sessions. I was personally involved in changing the Israeli primary law which made us very transparent. Hopefully we can detect majority of primitive corruptions, not sophisticated ones because those who know how to hide know how to hide and they will be caught maybe in the future when they will become prime ministers or ministers of Finance and so on and so forth. But as a whole the system that combines both an achievement to get as many as parts in the parties that you can muster through unions and at the same time the mustering of this participation ends up with a great success to those who know how to maneuver sophisticatedly in this field. So democracy was very successful both among ourselves and in the Likud. If you want to find out who was the most successful members of the House, these are the members who were connected to the mass enrolment, namely to the Unions. The phenomenon as a whole tells you what are the results at the end of the day. I can tell you that I was offered in the last few months, if you get us this sum of money we can insure you that you can get as many as 10 thousand voters in the bucket and you can have a back to back deal and since I was foolish enough not to collect a penny by principle I had a very polite answer that I do not have this substantial amount of money and it is O.K. we have nothing against you but then priorities will be different. I asked them since I made the law I wanted to know how much front corruption there is there and then what is the hidden investment. And the answer was we need it for gas for those who go from one house to another to convince people. We have to rent buses to bring people to vote. We have to make phone calls, we have to put up a network. But at the end of the day you have 22 who contributed because 22 was the number who contributed. So I multiplied it and they said yes. They even apologized. They did not say it in a very specific way. They said, these people who do it they have vote once in 4 years. It is a lie. It is one in 2 years. You were informed that we have elections once in 2 years, once in 2 years and a half. So people have to make a living and those who can make a living can make it on the shoulders of 22 or 20 participants. At the end you may be lucky that 2 are left for those who do not pay. That is the process. I did not go into details because I did not want to start an investigation. Now it is in the hands of the State Controller and he is not only entitled, he is asked to do it by the new law. The new law asks him to go at the end of the elections and to get into the details into each of the invoices to make sure that money was invested in the proper way. In a half a year we will get sort of a report. It was a good report even before the law. Nowadays we gave the details how such an examination will be made and we expect to do it properly. I also collect new materials from our experience from

the Likud and the Labor in order to make the law more elaborate for seeing in the next election. But let us forget this and move to the major subject.

Prof. Yossi Shain: You said everybody in Israel could have donated for the election more or less on a personal level up to 10 thousand shekels. 25 hundred dollars. Now you refused to receive any donations?

Prof. Menachem Ben Sasson: Yes.

Prof. Yossi Shain: But it is legal and of course you need to run a campaign but what you say is you selected to be without any campaign.

Prof. Menachem Ben Sasson: Yes. I wanted to use my good name, the reputation of some 350 Israeli Bills that I made, some of them were not bad at all. And some fights that I had and I thought they were successful and there was some exposure to them and I thought to myself this will do.

Prof. Yossi Shain: So you did not have any banner, you did not have anything.

Prof. Menachem Ben Sasson: Nothing. I went for a month, I visited settlements of Druse in the North to the Beduins in the South and in between neighborhoods in the center. I was in nobody's killing list. I was heavily involved in fund raising when I was at the Hebrew University so I am not completely foreign to this language of donations and money making. It is a personal obstacle. I am not a politician. I came on a mission for four years. I thought that at the end of this I will not continue. In the middle I realized that there are things that need to be completed specially the constitution. I thought to myself that I can make it. And I have even a way, not necessarily agreed upon with my colleagues. I thought that I have a date. February 9th was the day that I was about to present a draft. That is the day that the Knesset was going to celebrate its 60th anniversary and I held it as a target. And I thought to myself that in one way or another 95% of the constitution is ready I can bring a draft and then continue in process of implementing the idea of constitution in the mind of the Israeli public. And I failed because elections came. And I tried very hard to invest in this venue as a legacy. And I found that I want to continue at least this mission.

Israeli democracy is doing very badly and it going in the wrong way, astray, completely astray and I do not know if we have a chance to change it and that is the problem. The only way to change it. I will tell you the happy end of the beginning of a very dark and not an optimistic description is only if we have a leader who knows that is the first priority. Let me talk about priorities. In no time Israeli politicians are will have priorities and this will happen after the elections. The making of a coalition is the making of priorities. Anybody who aspires to be a prime minister and to compose the agenda of the Israeli life if he or she has a chance automatically first and foremost become a prime minister for the purpose of becoming a prime minister. And do not fool yourselves that Tzipi is different from the others. We failed with Shas because we made all the mistakes a few months ago. Otherwise she would have made it. Since the agenda of the elections is going to be in a few days the security issue or the international issue than we come back to square one, the regular issue in the Middle East that you can do nothing and at the same time you can convince that that is the most important topic. Hence you make the coalition with the least damaging element

bringing you to achieve your goals in this security and international political agenda. It is a mistake because we can do almost nothing because the conditions are dictated by the super powers of the world and other partners and you can invest all of your efforts in order to achieve peace now or later, whatever you want. But it will not yield anything. Or almost nothing. The most logical issue is to make a coalition with the Likud and with the Labor and with Kadima and let us have it. Since the agenda is almost the same and the security is the same and we want to negotiate and we do not want to give everything but we know that we will have to give a lot, let us have this coalition/ We think that we can make a difference. The very marginal issue of threshold is to be elected to the Knesset. The Likud wanted to invest in Shas and Shas was threatened by the fragmentary parties of the ultra orthodox. It was a brains storming to see the process because Shas has promised me reforms recommended by institutions and I will tell you what are the five reforms. First of all the biggest party makes the coalition. Secondly the threshold will be at least up to 3%. Thirdly, there is the revolving door process that effect 120 members of the House. A partial regional reform. Cutting the number of members of cabinet to 18. Now it is 26. And some reforms in the House enabling the members of the House to put on the table of the Knesset only 10% of what we do nowadays, adding to it reduced numbers in the committees, and members in each of the committee. It was a process that made no resolution but at the same time was supposed to create a sober life around the table of the Knesset. The small parties fought against it. One Arabic party wanted it very much. And Shas did not participate so we did not have a coalition. Since Likud already knew that maybe they are going to have a government. It was supposed to be after the second stage of the Vinograd Committee the Investigation Committee after the Second Lebanese War, so they fooled themselves to have then a new coalition without having an election but agreements were made already. I am going to the first point, What was the first point? The question is what are the priorities. The priorities were, number one to create a coalition for the sake of the coalition, for no other reason. What would like to achieve? The system is broken. It is not corrupted. It does not exist.

What are the problems? After talking about the priorities. The problem is that each of the factions of the administration, the Legislative part, the Executive and Judiciary each thinks that the other is works for us. For sure, they know, they have the proofs. The future of the state is in our hands says the Judiciary Branch. All know if we leave to their hands we are going to disappear. The future of the country is in our hands. Are we going to fool ourselves that it is going to save the law makers. The future of the state is in our hands, says the law maker. So it ends up that everybody tries to grab from the grey area that has not been defined for the last 60 years a share that becomes maybe later on or making it having the lion's share of Israeli life. It had to do with the public arena. It had to do with the defense policy. It had to do with the educational system. It does not matter what. Everything is under the eyes of the Judiciary, under the eyes of the law maker and under the eyes of the Executive.

Now let us take the example I started with, 4000 Bills. It is a result of the will of any law maker to teach the government a lesson how to run the state. I want to run the state from the Floor. Instead of letting them run the state and we make the inspection and the examination and investigate them. 10% of the time I dedicated to monitor the work of the government. So members of the House did not come to these meetings. I was the only one and from time to time somebody else who monitored the work of the

Courts, of the police which is of utmost importance. It yields the day after also involvement in policy because if the government did not allocate the money in order to put more Justices or to put more policemen. You can monitor them because it is the law. And then you can ask why the implementation is so poor and you can force them to allocate more money and then create a solution to the problem even though a Bill was written. Nothing is executed. 70% of the Executive's decisions are not implemented. I make a coalition with a mute element. Shas is a mute element. So if you ask yourself what is wrong, everything is wrong but priorities are the most important issue. I have not been preaching . Now I do it in election panels. If we do not force our leaders or the leaders that are going to be elected to put it as their first priority we are not going to have any chance. Maybe by improvisation as we used to do and a lot of luck and some help. So I could have gone into details but I wanted to make it very clear that I do not know of any other way but preaching to public in order to expose the problems and it is a mission. It is complicated more than using the slogan of constitution. Constitution does not solve the problems in full. And it needs to be done first and foremost from a different point of view of the State's priorities. So this is the situation in my very primitive eye. And I can then go to the elections system and tell you that it is not a very healthy one. I can go to the coalition making system. I can tell you that we need a smaller Cabinet and a more effective Knesset. We need a budget. The priorities are in making a coalition and mending the broken parts. If we had a descent barrel then we could start to put the liquid into it.

John Lloyd: You do not say that the system lacks priorities. It does not share your priorities.

Prof. Menachem Ben Sasson: I say that it is mistaken by making the administrative priority as their priority. The administrative priority is not to mend the administration. They want to rule. And it has nothing to do with the goal. Likud, Labor and Kadima have very limited options in Foreign Affairs or in the Defense Policy. Again we have here strategic people and it will be very interesting to hear that I am fully mistaken and what I describe is not the case but my claim is that putting these issues in the fore front you make a declaration that you want to be very social. You make a declaration that you want to invest in education. At the end of the day, now we have two months to the election, the last issue and the most important one will remain the security.

John Lloyd: The parties' goal is to make a coalition. The details do not matter. Is that a legitimate value for you?

Prof. Menachem Ben Sasson: Sure. Everything is legitimate. I was a member in such a party that was very successful when education was its goal and the goal was let us use this power in order to invest in education and not in the settlements in the West Bank. So you may say I want to use this tool. They want to have the harness and they want to have the power in order to make a defense policy. Fine. I am not interested in the defense policy.

Prof. Asher Arian: You say you are not interested. You say you would go along with the defense policy. Ben Gurion, he had the largest party by far and we will concentrate on other things. You have other parties in the coalition.

Prof. Menachem Ben Sasson: You can have whatever you want. For me as a ruling party it is very promising to have such a partner. You are going to have your corrupted Rabbinical Court. We wanted to defend our educational system. And for that you can have whatever you want in the national relations.

Dr. Danny Filc: I would like to challenge your analysis on two levels. The first one is the way in which electoral reform really modifies the malaise of democracy. One of the points that stems from our discussion in the past two days is that different electoral systems do not really affect the problems of lack of coincidence between man and the possibility of the system to answer and Gerry told us of the problems of the constitutional system. You are more familiar with the weaknesses and the decisions of the system you are accustomed to but the belief changing this will modify the quality of Israel democracy I do not think that the experience both of research and of other democracies with different electoral system can support this claim. This is one level in which I would challenge your analysis. I have more particular challenges to the specific forms that the idea supports. Historically when the limit to get elected was 1% we had a more stable party system than we have today with 2%. The problem of the Israeli political system is not too many small parties but too many middle range parties or too few big parties. The problem is not that we have a party with two members but that we have no party with 40 members or 45 members and you do not solve this by modifying the threshold.

The second point for a very cleavage society in Israel the variety of representation is also a way of getting people involved and believing in the system. Limiting the number of political parties could even enhance the degree of disaffection of people because they will not find parties that really represent their views which are very sectorial and that cannot be. It is not extreme Left. This is a kind of identity parties that can be bridged into a bigger party.

And my last point is concerning constitution. I am not sure whether in a cleavage society passing a constitution, it is not a real liberal constitution but it would be a kind of semi liberal constitution that fixes the relation of forces for many years. I am not sure that that will be a guarantee for Israeli democracy.

Prof. Yossi Shain: Thank you very much for the comments. I appreciate them. I have been thinking like others here about what needs to be done. You put your finger on two issues. One was of course second priorities prior to leadership and that was based on your observations which are political observations. But here we are three large parties at very little discrepancies or divergence in terms of their positions and here is the condition that basically can make such a coalition that will allow to treat domestic issues prior to the other issues which are untreatable at this junction. This is a political observation. If I follow your logic. The second argument of course that politics is driven first and foremost by the desire to build a coalition and from then on let us see how we treat what. Now the question was to what extent the first vision that you prescribed has been compromised by the second. Because you said once the coalition has been built immediately we are going to treat the other issues which are not treatable at this junction. Now is that a disease of leadership or that is a disease of mechanism? Because I was impervious to that. I was appointed with the secretary of government. All those questions of how many legislations to put a quota of 10 perhaps, to look at all those incredible numbers. And I asked myself what is the

disease? Is the disease in implementing? Is the disease in allowing this to be open ended? Or is the disease in leadership and setting the priorities as you said because of coalition or because of personality? Because we know when Sharon wanted to do something he did against his party, against the entire system and he did something to the chagrin of many but he did it. The system allowed him to do it.

Prof. Menachem Ben Sasson: What I see in terms of a solution is not one. It is a supermarket. You just have to be very careful with their balance. I had an opportunity to vote for some of the reforms. I did want to because I thought that if I voted for some and not the others then I am ending up with an unbalanced result as we had 1992 and we still pay the toll for that mistake. So that was one issue and I do not want to argue about it. I just want to make it clear that I refer to a cocktail or to a supermarket, a balanced one that tries to make a change and a change itself changed the spirit and then it blocks some of the problems. You are right, we can change the people but it is very costly. So we have to remain with what we have. And therefore knowing what is the constituency, Italy we studied very thoroughly the reforms that you did after the elections.

Prof. Pierangelo Isernia: We went through all this electoral reforms and none worked.

Prof. Menchaem Ben Sasson: I come from a small institute of education and there we learnt that whenever you make some reform with a change in mind and openness to other changes that is what we want to change. We want to tell people look we changed the rules of the game. We had to be very careful. It has nothing to do with the topic but politicians try very carefully not to be caught. So they use tactics. Can I answer stability nowadays vis a vis the others. May I contribute my education as a historian, maybe times will change also. And that is one issue that has to be counted. Maybe our trust in democracy and it is a danger to the future, I did not count it. We are different people. We used to be obedient element. People told us that is the truth and we agreed. The system was different. So it is not only the threshold. I am not going to disappear without saying that there is an answer but it is more thorough. What you asked me Yossi, I think that the morning after is that you stay with the coalition agreement and then you are stuck, but really stuck. You say that you are not going to change the threshold or you are not going to change any basic law or you are not going to change any judiciary law without a full consent of certain parties. The real life is with the law makers, with the legislative element. We could not make many reforms that we wanted to and there was a majority in the House to make them. Some of them was bound to coalition agreement with the Labor.

Prof. Tamar Hermann: Thank you. Coming from a Polish family in which you never share things with the outside I feel a bit embarrassed with the impression that was created here with having people from the outside, experiencing this sort of discourse which is difficult, the Israeli discourse about politics. Daniel Ben Simon and Menchem show us that things are not very rosy. What I wanted to do in this session is to start by pushing our guests from the outside to share with us their impressions of what they have heard and what they know about the Israeli democracy. Because we have a saying in Hebrew that a guest for a minute usually sees everything better than someone who is stuck in the local mud. I will really appreciate it if we will go around the table with our foreign guests and if they are ready to share with us. We do not expect you to be very polite. You should not feel embarrassed because we brought

you here. What are your feelings about what you have just heard about the Israeli democracy. There are more questions to follow but I would like to get some first impressions of what you have heard so far and what do you think.

Prof. Pierangelo Isernia: I arrive here as a, how to say, when you have a clean slate, tabula rasa. I was very curious. What we study of the Israeli politics comes most from Lipseheart's book about democracy. So that is all we know. As I told you I felt very much at home. The list of things that he mentions could be mentioned by any descent Italian politician of course and this poses two questions to me. The first one is what happens when you have already tried all. Because if we put together all the experiences we had in Israel, Italy, France, Germany on making democracy we can honestly say some of these countries have tried all. We tried electoral systems. Countries have tried constitutional reforms. We have tried to create new parties. Maybe to give voice to new demands, or change the way the demands translating into output. And apparently this is not in many ways affected the malaise. In fact it is going exactly in the opposite direction. It seems that the more you start to change things the more the malaise increases. So my first point is that if there something in the way we look at the problem that is wrong and my impression is that the way political science is affecting this debate a lot, at least in Italy. This debate is dominated by constitutional lawyers and political scientists so it is affected basically by us so we have to be careful. My impression is that the debate very much influenced by an institutional view of politics. That politics is mostly about institutions, democracy is about institutions that have to preserve this inner core from let us say the threat of the public or the threat of the external side or whatever. So my first question is that maybe we have to change something .

The second question is more related to Israel I think and that is to do with the fact that probably in a different way than many European countries you have your ranking priorities already set by the outside. There is no match you can do to manipulate the agenda. From what I understand your agenda is heavily dominated by external forces and this in a way stifles the political debate. I do not think there is much you can do about that at least alone and in a way this is quite similar to the situation we have in Europe of economic problems. We have big economic problems but our ability to shape the course of the events drifting in one direction or the other is very much linked, we are not able to shape the forces that are around us. So we are talking about economy here, we are talking about security but basically we have the fact that our nation state has a size that is not out of reach. For you it is much more difficult. There is some suggestions that we should try to bring Israel into NATO but I do not think this is the right solution at least with democratic problems of your country. And in a way this is what is new to me because I never have thought about this but I think the implications of our external events affect the functioning of democracy. It is something that we probably do not pay too much attention in political science. So I am sorry if my thoughts were a bit too... And I pass the torch to my enlightened colleague.

Prof. Wolfgang Merkel: Tami a little attack if you would have told me last night of course I would have got up much earlier and thing about this. But listening to the discussions and what I have learnt during the last few days not only on the table but on bilateral conversations as well, from a democratic theoretical point of view the fundamental problem is the extreme heterogeneity of the society. But there are

solutions to it. But it is not easy. We know from John Stuart Mill through Robert Doyle up to Bob Patnem that heterogeneous society needs very specific institutions to work. Pierangelo mentioned Lipeheart; Lipeheart's conceptual democracy. Of course we know the more homogeneous a society is the more it can afford majority political institutions. And from the first side we could argue they are more affective to make clear decisions whether they are good or bad and they will implement them. So the Westminster model was considered as the more efficient one. By the way Lipeheart is challenging and he is arguing consentaneous democracies are more gentle and more affective even in the international comparison if it comes to economic policy. So we have an extreme heterogeneity and you have to some extent an institutional system which is more consentaneous of course than authoritarian. But if you have a consentaneous institutional system you need what one could call an elite settlement so that the elite agrees on the basic rules of the game. This is always the beginning of each democracy and you need these institutions but the elite must play within these institutions and what we sometimes compare situations with democracies in Scandinavia, what they have as an advantage compared to other democracies, they have a strong elite consensus. Therefore minority governments can survive in these countries. So it is not that easy to fix a political system and to create a convergence of the strategic guidelines of the political elite in extreme heterogeneous society. However, looking to all the papers we have seen there is no true Israeli exception I would argue. The opinion poles show us you have more or less the same phenomenon in most of the advanced Western democracies as well. You have a decline in support for the political elite. We were discussing whether we should call them a political class and the more they are at the core of conflictual democratic decision making parties and parliament the more they are disliked. So there is a hidden desire of the population of the citizens for political harmony. But political harmony is not the essence of democracy. So one could even, I was playing sometimes the role of the advocatos diaboli here but one could even argue that the citizens have distrust in politics and the very essence of democracy. Those who govern have to be controlled. And if you have a critical public opinion this is quite a good control. If you have affirmative population which agrees on everything this is not what a real critical review vis a vis the government. So I would argue no real exception if it comes to the public distrust. This is something you know much better than I do but observed from the outside I started with the concept of embedded democracies and defective democracies and I also said as a German of course I cannot teach any lesson in terms of democracy to any country and especially not to Israel but the way the political system does not really comply to civil rights and violates civil rights by actually and factually excluding quite a significant part of the population is one of the serious problems. According to our data we would not call the Israeli democracy clear consolidated rule of law based democracy. Seen from the perspective of those who are excluded from the political rights, I am not talking about the economic rights. This is according to my point of view much too overburdened concept of democracy. And if you have such overburdened concept of democracy then we very often end up in disillusionment as in Latin America say. Tokville would argue there is a tyranny of the majority. This is a kind of paradox. You have a consent system but the Arab citizens are second order citizens. There are many reasons for it. One can explain it historically, one can explain it by disloyalty and so forth. So this is according to my point of view one of the crucial problems and defects of your system. Having said this there is an exception meaning democracy circumvented by this kind of hostile bad neighborhood and having such an heterogeneous society each theory of democracy

would predict the collapse of such a system. So this is the true exception from theoretical point of view and probably the founding myth of the first two or three decades played an important role that this democracy survived. So this is an exception and probably you should not talk too much about crisis. There is a self dynamic. The talk on crisis creates crisis. You can learn to some extent from the Italians. The Italians survive without governing so to speak. There is a poetic vitality of the social system which help them to survive. There are some problems. You have more problems than Finland, there is no doubt about it and there are no model discussion. If you speak about constitutional reforms I completely agree these electoral reforms if you try to reduce the number of parties you will normally increase the number of intra party factions. And Italy is probably one of the best cases. They let the government collapse all the time. Therefore we should not have that much trust in engineering. We should think about how far these constitutional reforms really can travel and if they really can fit the system. Last point, therefore I think such an analytical concept where you have more clear detailed view of the democracy and how these different parts are dependent and interdependent to each other help you to see where to intervene and how to intervene. Not very ordered presentation.

Prof. Tamar Hermann: Thank you for your illuminating comments because my next question do you think that an electoral form will help us or do you think that the constitution will help us. Perhaps we should be more creative because we always go back to the same panacea which is no panacea with the complexity of the situation.

Prof. Gerry Stoker: The first thing to say as I made clear in my own presentation I find it hard to explain what is happening in the UK. First of all the positive. What I have certainly seen is a free press with a staggering capacity. This is an essential ingredient for affective democratic society. At the very least you could claim that you are half way there. The other thing that we do not probably recognize fully is how almost all societies that are trying to practice democracy are actually trying to learn it in relatively new circumstances. The full franchise extending to all adults over the age of 21 only came into place in Great Britain in 1939 and even then as John's talk about the practice of mass democracy, a democracy which is very widely shared probably only really emerged in the 1950's and 1960's and that changed again with the impact of the mass media on the way that polls exist and how they are conducted. This is a new thing. Almost every citizen of Europe thinks that democracy is trapped but it is the best thing we have invented so far and that is what citizens around the world think. There is a sense in which if was not a mess it would have been quite surprising really. I identify with some of the difficulties that we face in the United Kingdom. It is a homogeneous society with a very different set of institutional devices in terms of both the construction of government and the construction of elections. That sort of tells you that maybe the issues are not necessarily about institutions or formal structures. It is something to do with the culture and practice of politics. The one thing I am really pleased about in the book that I wrote, the chapter which I like most is the chapter where I try to explain to people why politics is bound to disappoint you. What I say is that we need constant lectures that remind people that politics is going to disappoint them. There are three reasons why it does disappoint. First of all because in democratic politics the deal is you are allowed to have a say but you cannot turn the decision and the decision in the end is imposed on you. That is the rule. Secondly to actually really affect something in politics is usually down hard work. You have to organize, you have to mobilize, you have to work with others and worst of all you

have to listen to the opinions of others because all politics involve some kind of compromise. These are not pleasant activities. They are a pain in the neck as far as most people are concerned. And then thirdly, anyone who looks at any processes of political implementation know there is a gap between what was in the minds of the legislators when they originally put something on the status than actually what appears on the ground. I asked countless of number of times in the last 10 to 12 years as I have been advising the Labor Government on local government and other matters where I talked to them as to what they are trying to achieve and I understood it is something positive and then you talk two years later to the people on the ground and what emerges that seems to be completely incompatible with what it was that we originally have discussion about, that seemed to be very worthwhile. So is a sense in which we need to keep on explaining to people the whole essence of politics why it is a noble art because we all disagree with one another and we are living in an independent society and part of the real art of politics is simply to muddle through to the next stage without killing each other, and in Israel that would be quite thoughtful. So in terms of then research because I am after all an academic I have to think about two things. One is I think we need to know more about what people think about politics. It is a strange discipline spending a lot of time asking people what they actually think about politics, the way it work, the way it operates, how they imagine it works, what they imagine that it actually does. One of the few studies that does this in depth is a very interesting study called Stealth Democracy and it is the study of American political attitudes. If you have never read it I recommend it as a political science text that will actually make laugh out loud while reading which is a very unusual thing, I think you will have to admit. Simply because they use a combinations of surveys and some of the things that people say about how politics is supposed to work are so naïve, so spectacularly stupid you cannot help laughing when you hear the descriptions of how it is suppose to work. So I am planning to do more work in the UK exactly in real depth about how people actually understand the way that politics works. And then the second thing we need to do is really unpack a lot more the whole issue of trust. Because actually trust is a wonderfully ambiguous term and I do not think we fully captured its importance because in any democracy one thing you do not want is the people to trust the government. You want a certain element of not trusting. You can argue that the whole principle of democracy is based on the idea of not trusting. At the same time we all know that to a degree an element of trust is actually quite important to making the system work and unpacking these two sense and what we mean by trust would be quite important, would help to illuminate the debate a little bit more. And then finally I do actually think that less on the empirical side and more on the side of political theory we need to really rejoin the debate between elite democratic theory and more participatory democratic theory. We all know that in political theory the big trend in the last 20 or 30 years has been to arbitrate more and more theory forms of participatory of deliberate elements of democracy. That is pretty much what democratic theory has concentrated on after the previous 30 years concentrating on the elite theory of democracy. But it does seem to me that past and the future have got to be defined some way of actually reconciling those two concepts of a democracy because it is quite difficult to imagine a viable system of governance let alone a viable system of governance at the European level unless we find a way of actually bringing those two together. At the moment my political theorists colleagues simply bang on about more and more utopian forms of deliberative democracy. This could never be achieved and could never be obtained. I would like them to take more seriously a constraint. This is an odd thing to ask a

modern political theory to do to take reality into account. But I would like them to take reality into account and actually chew their theoretical assumptions into helping things thought how we can actually create a meaningful engagement of the people but also accountability and also our leadership within a system of democratic government. So my main reflections on what I heard is that I am convinced that it does set out quite an important shared research.

Prof. John Lloyd: I am struck how different the discourse is and of how naturally for example Pierangelo began. One of the differences which journalists state their observations from academics and how academic differ from journalists is that they talk first through theory and then perhaps get to the practical. My profession is hopelessly mired in the assumption of pragmatism which actually sometimes is not justified. And one of the examples of that is the way in which journalists regard Israel and the Middle East. What I said yesterday that newspapers and T.V have cut back a great deal on Foreign Affairs, one of the places they had not cut out or at least not nearly as much as other places is the Middle East and Israel. Nearly every newspaper of any kind of pretentious keeps a correspondent in Jerusalem or Tel Aviv, and the heat of the Israeli-Arab confrontation is one of the most reliable proofs of journalism. We always return to that. It is one of the most contested areas too in Britain and I am sure elsewhere. Certainly in America and in continental Europe there are pressure groups who are broadly defined as pro Israeli or pro Arab who watch coverage of the Middle East especially of the Israeli Palestinian conflict like a hawk, and the constant complaints state that the Board of the BBC or the editor of a particular newspaper is biased and it is a constant theme of journalists' conversation who deal with that is how difficult it is to write or to broadcast about the Israeli Palestinian conflict especially if you are at the BBC which has a potential to be a national voice rather than national channel without having call down upon complaints. So it is extremely fought area for journalism and bundled with nevertheless research constantly. The contest is the blame game. Who is most to blame? Is it the Israeli oppressor. Are they the Palestinian or Arab terrorists? Can you draw a line between them? A balance between them? To quite a considerable extent part of the journalistic conversation about that is not so much about the facts although that is a part of it but about how the frame the facts, how you achieve balance or indeed you do not care about the balance and ascribe blame to one side or the other.

Israel itself, I have been here half a dozen times throughout the last two decades. This time has been the most consistently enlightening. I have agreed to do an interview with Willy Seagal because I wanted to write about political satire and I wanted to find out how political satire worked in Israel at least to some extent. And I was struck by how degraded he thought the Israeli political system was and how he thought. What he said was satire in Israel in some ways it is very difficult because you cannot be adequately satirical of something that satirizes itself continually. But the best jokes, again I quote him, are on the conventional political shows, the talk shows. That is where you get your biggest laughs and we have to struggle to make it funnier, to make it more satirical, to produce caricatures which are more caricatures than the real people are. It was differently phrased but it ties in with what Daniel Ben Simon was saying yesterday. So what you have and it has a relationship to stop talking about the crisis because you make a crisis or at least you make it worse. Journalists and satirists by definition always make things worse. Always and everywhere. In America and the UK and so on depends upon an assumption that politicians are if not evil authoritarian

or weak. But here what strikes you is the depth of the contempt with which the future MP's regard politics and the depth and the contempt with which a satirist or a journalist regards Israeli politics. It is much more pronounced in my view, I was listening to Ben Simon, he is the journalist and the future legislator. It seems to me to be excessive. It seemed to me that he was going beyond what was observably mocking democracy with its many faults but nevertheless it did work. The narrative, the journalistic creative political scientist possibly narrative seems to be one of contempt for the legislator and that cannot be good.

Final observations. There are two. One again referring to the exclusion which Professor Merkel mentioned. I began in journalism in Northern Ireland in the seventies. There it seemed to be part of the problem that the Catholic population of Northern Ireland which then 40% of the population of half a million was regarded as excluded. They regarded themselves as excluded. Not formally but they have been to some extent excluded from democratic process after the creation of the Irish Republic in the early twenties and the separation between North Ireland and the Republic but certainly functionally and it has taken 30 years actually 40 years to bring in the Catholic population or the nationalist population into the British politics. And even now it is incomplete and it has meant huge terrorist campaign. It has meant an enormous concession to terrorism to the IRA whose leading members who plotted and murdered are now indeed ministers in the Northern Ireland government. It meant an enormous change and observation simply that to bring in people in this case the Israeli Arabs who seem to be disloyal who are seen to be not good citizens who do not wish to be or are seen to be full citizens of the state, it is enormous problem and it is much easier in a country which does not have contested borders, Britain did not. It a much larger problem in Israel than it was in Britain. And in Britain is a very large problem.

The last observation is about journalism itself. There are many parallels obviously what is not hampered by not understanding what Israeli journalism is about, there are many parallels between what happening in Israeli journalism and what is happening in journalism in all democratic countries and that includes the proliferation of channels, a much harsher view of politics and of the establishment by journalists. That has been the case a view which was epitomized by the questions which an American editor told his reporters to ask themselves through the interview of a politician, why is this bastard lying to me. In other words you assume lying. That seems to me a wrong way of doing journalism but it is a popular one and it is certainly seems to be adopted by many Israeli journalists. The old assumption, the assumption especially here in Israel and Yoram Peri writes about that, that you have a state in which journalists and politicians knew each other often quite intimately, in a small state in which almost everybody in any kind of establishment knew each other and shared the common assumption, the assumption we build the state, the assumption of liberal Zionism perhaps, all kinds of assumptions were shared and therefore many of the kind of questions which are now assumed that journalists should ask were not asked. They were part of a shared culture which was not deeply questioned probably wrongly but that is no longer the case. It is no longer the case here, it is no longer the case in Britain, it is no longer the case in Western Europe or in America and elsewhere. So journalism has become much more aggressive, much more concerned with personality and scandal. Much about what we know about Israel is about scandal. It is about Olmert. And that is the way not just as it is transmitted here but the way it is transmitted abroad. And because journalism is now much more concerned with, I

mean what has Olmert been doing, he has been talking to Syrians, what he will be known for, he will be known for leaving office with corruption charges against him. The substance of his politics has become less important. Blair's legacy in Britain and elsewhere is that he agreed with Bush to launch an invasion on Iraq. The domestic reforms seem to get fully lost. Journalism takes hot issues, scandalous issues often revolving around a personality and make them into the whole of the politician. And that certainly is happening in Israel.

Prof. Astrid von Busekist: I am biased. I am in love with Israel. From what I understand I would share with what Wolfgang said and with what John said it true, This country is over determined by the conflict but not only country, the international agenda this is the sole conflict that has lasted for so long and has determined so much of the politics except maybe the Indian-Pakistani conflict is comparable. It also determines our view from the outside of Israel. In France it is particularly strong where we have a minority of 5 million Moslems with a huge amount of third generation Moslems but who re Arabized themselves to the conflict and that weighs on domestic politics in France. The real issues in France are not about domestic policies. Sarkozy, Segolan Royal they of course do not propose the same policy but I think there is a high degree of distrust in difference between the two policies which are led by one and by the other. One of the real cleavages is about international politics and this and the Arab Israeli conflict is one of the things that produces a real debate. Those demonstrations in Paris, you would see pictures of Sharon next to pictures of Hitler which is very shocking by democratic standards and you can do that in France. Other cleavage that really mobilized people in France is nothing to do with Israel but it has to do with our minorities. The caricatures that has mobilized the French press and the French youth for weeks.

The second thing. We pronounced ethnic democracy one time here. This also has to do the over determination by international conflict because ethnic democracy works fine in Latvia, in Estonia. They still call it democracy. Here it is a democracy too but it works less well probably because of the conflict. As I am hopelessly in love with Israel one thing that is really remarkable and that exists nowhere else; if you come to Israel Israel is a state at war, right. There is a free press, people talk, you can go almost everywhere and this is remarkable. I know no other country at war where at the press you can say anything you want, where democracy functions, it may not function as well as you would like it to function but it functions. I think this is very important and we should say that too. That you have access to everything. You have access to news and you have access to free speech.

Prof. Riva Katoryano: It is difficult for me also to be objective but I will try to comment on what we have heard here during the two days. Astrid, there was a movie done by French media how the French media sees Israel. And all the Israeli professors and political figures the way France sees Israel. France is in a biased view but it is possible to come to Israel with another view biased or not biased. You come with feelings. I have a subjective view. We heard subjectivity with Ben Simon and Ben Sasson and I think we do not witness this in many conferences and round tables when politicians or representatives come to talk about their own experiences. Usually when I go to conferences when we have politicians they talk about their politics and not about their subjectivity even though the concern is collective. This is a very important element for us the way they bring their subjectivity in this collective concern, talking

about corruption, talking about the functioning of their party, talking about their expectations. They talked about mobilization and about reforms being done and asking where is the consensus to be found. And this is the question that comes to my mind. And when we talk about institutional reforms I agree with what was said by Mencahem Ben Sasson that constitutional reform needs a consensus. Where is the consensus to be found in this society?

The second issue that we did not talk much, I agree with Yishai on political rights and we did not talk much about human rights in this conference. We did not talk of non citizens and their participation in society. What about their action and their mobilization? I just had an experience before coming here. I had not seen the Occupied Territories before. I agree with John, the two kinds of citizenships or non citizens. Here again we are torn between history and reality and politics. So what will be the right balance? What would be fair? But what would be the most democratic approach to negotiations to bring in citizenship? And also the papers on participation are notable. Who participate? In what kind of movements? Which are the associations? Exit from politics or escape from politics etc. Why did issues did not come in the discussion about participation in politics, the human rights movement and transnational aspects and this will make an effect on decision making. So these are my concerns. The topic of the conference was citizenship. I wanted to share more about citizens' participation and the question of citizenship with regard to the two nations and one state.

Prof. Tamar Hermann: Now we will go the other way around with our Israeli colleagues and the same question to you, what do you think about the state of affairs in the Israeli democracy.

Dr. Danny Filc: The first thing while it is not the topic of the conference the Israeli democracy is the prolonged occupation. It is 41 years of occupation and it affects and profoundly disturbs the quality of Israeli democracy mostly from the point of view of human rights approach. The prolonged violation of human rights does not stop at the green line, does not stop at the 67 borders and it creates a kind of predisposition of the police towards the violations of human rights. For sure it influences in a very bad form the relations between the national majority and the national minority. Bi national state even in the best of situation like Belgium or Canada are very problematic. We are not a bi national state but we are a state with two national groups, one of them is in a prolonged conflict with the other and this is very threatening for democracy. I do not agree with Menchem Ben Sasson, with that kind of fatalistic view vis a vis the conflict. The history of Israel shows that political will and political leadership did make a change in certain moments, 48. after 67, Camp David. This kind of fatalistic view says there is nothing that the political system can do about the most important thing affecting Israel so let us deal with electoral reforms, I think that is an escapism of reality and not dealing with what democracy should do.

My second point, in the Israeli case the malaise vis a vis democracy is related to the fact that the Labor party dominated until the late seventies and that was what a national popular will, and this national popular will which was shared by relative majority groups including the national religious party which through the historical pact was part of the national popular will, this national popular will created a kind of situation for most Israelis for a period of 30 years or 40 years they identified with. In

77 what consolidated that kind of national popular will was consented. This generated distrust vis a vis democracy, the feeling that those up there do not represent us. One thing that political scientists should do is to be more modest in our feeling that dealing with electoral reforms only in constitutional reforms in a very consented situation will have. We had a very bad experience with reform the elections for prime minister. The possibility of toying and playing with things is much more complicated. Democracy is based on self restraint and I would call also political scientists and constitutional lawyers to self restraint and maybe to be more confident. There lies the possibility of changing democracy.

Dr. Kalman Neuman: I would say the problem of the occupation regarding the status of plural democracy is not only the length of the occupation but the fact that there is no consensus within Israel about what is the status of the occupation. If this is a temporary situation that can be changed at any moment that is only pending peace that would create less of a problem. The problem that the Israeli body politic is that the Israeli system never determined what is the status of the territories. It acted in conflicting ways about it. That creates first of all a lack of priority about how Israel sees its borders, it paralyses the political system because of the stalemate between the different groups and it also raises the question about it will be conceivably possible especially given the heterogeneity of Israel's population how these issues could be resolved. If we just multiply the events of the disengagement from Gaza, again I find it difficult to imagine the way it will be resolved. Peres recently said when he was in Britain that it is a very fickle business to avoid a civil war to evacuate 250 thousand people. Another thing is lack of clear understanding about what the relations Jewish majority and the non Jewish minority is. The whole question of the self definition of the Jewish state. Question that has been dealt with in different ways over different periods but again perhaps comes to the fore. In many years Israeli democracy has become inclusive over the years. For instance the way the ultra orthodox should be included in the body politic.

Prof. Benjamin Gidron: I would like to discuss the issue of democracy without touching at all at the Arab Israeli problem. The reason mainly is that I have participated with so many conferences and seminars in which they discussed the Arab Israeli conflict that I came here this morning with the good feeling that for once I am going to participate in a seminar that is going to discuss democracy in Israel which is a viable issue as it is in all other countries without discussing the occupation and the Arab Israeli conflict. I do not want even to go into the question which is an important one of course of Jewish Arab relations within Israel and Arab citizens. I just want to discuss the system which I thought is really the topic of the conference.

First of all I think Israel has a robust democracy and definitely a rule of law as I think Astrid pointed out very well. Freedom of speech, free press, free and fair elections, etc. It was pointed out that given Israel's conditions this is really exceptional to a certain degree. So we should have things in proper proportions. But to a certain degree it is dysfunctional because there are certain malfunctions in the system. We have serious problems with the stability of the system which results in government change every two or three years. Ministries change every 8 or 9 years 12 ministries of education. How can they run the educational system, things which were not characteristic of Israel 40 or 50 years ago. And this is a very serious problem which leads to an inability to take decisions. Or basically inability to implement decisions.

The main point I wanted to make was that all the attempts to fix this situations have all failed. You mentioned Italy. I am not sure the constitutional reforms help and I am not sure the changing of the threshold will do any good. Small parties do not have an effect, it is the middle size parties. The lack of one or two big parties. The problem is a cultural one and not a political one. This is a cultural system that is very deep down of the DNA over thousands of years of Jewish culture being fractious, being broken down into groups. So a small party like Shas that 1992 had 6 members in 1999 had 17 members. When Arik Sharon changed the system they went down again. It is part of the culture. Each has its own opinion, he is opinionated. The important thing today is tribe, family and religion. These are the factors in the Middle East and that why you see today the weakening of the entire Arab states as such as been influential in the regional area and the rise of religious influence. And to a certain degree we have it in Israel also. How do you change this, how do you get people ready to go a larger thing and try to reach systems where stability is a major factor as in Great Britain and as in the United States are two predominant examples of that, I do not have the answer. It is not easy to change by a constitutional change. It really goes more down to cultural values and cultural norms.

Dr. Ishai Menuchin: This is very interesting political era. We see three different huge changes. First of all something has happened to the nation because of globalization, and it seems that the nation state model is trying to modify itself in problematic political times. The second thing that has changed is that society became more heterogeneous. And the third thing is the decline of representation models of democracy. It is clear more and more in the public sphere. The mix of these three big changes change every society and certainly changes the Israeli public sphere. We hear more voices for more representation for women. More representation for minorities, more representations for sexual minorities. The classical representation model is not working for us. Now we are at the age of democratic transformation. And this is not a small matter. Italy is a very good example why just to change the representation mechanism is not working and we have heard about it. It is not happening in Israel.

Prof. Asher Arian: I am reminded of the question asked of a Rabbi if 5 schizophrenics can make a Minayan, the ten men needed for a ritual prayer. So the Rabbi thinks and thinks and says yes and no. Something of that element I want to convey. If I was giving this talk in San Antonio I would stress the positive features of Israeli democracy and they are many and they are miraculous. Having said that it is certainly not a perfect system. It is true that we do not have the formula for reform but the instinct for reform is sometimes important even it is imperfect. To simply say it is bad but it works is not sufficient. We can be critical, we can be prophetic and we can know that now formula is the panacea for all reforms. I was one of those who worked down the Israeli Democracy Institute constitution. Many compromises were made. I am not happy with each compromise but the idea of putting forth a comprehensive constitution overtakes the deficiencies that were there. This is a Jewish state and Jewish religious sentiment is an important political reality whether I agree with it or not. So my option is either to say I will continue the fight for my absolute value or I will preview the kind of political compromise that will take place and work on something else and that is how a reform takes place. The Israeli democracy constitution by consensus ideal was that we will try to foresee the kind of compromises that might acceptable to the system as a whole. Our failure is that we realize that the parliamentary initiative that will be needed in order to realize this

thought. Professor Ben Sasson was very instrumental in this. What will be the future we do not know of course. I do not think it is enough for us to be clinical and cynical. There is some kind of input that we can make and it is the educational one. I want to make one last comment and that has to do with demography. In sixty years has turned this country from 600 thousands Jews to 6 millions. Almost all Jews agree on one thing that Israel should have a Jewish character, should be a Jewish state.

Prof. Yossi Shain: First of all this morning is very important and has some excellent elaborations. Our guests picked on a lot of important issues here. I met this British philosopher who told me I always thought that I know what is the cogito ergo sum; I think therefore I am and I always thought it is a universal concept. He said I had some encounters with the Israelis and now I understand there is an Israeli cogito and a universal cogito. Universal cogito is I think therefore I am. The Israeli cogito is completely different. I think therefore you are wrong. This notion of a debating society, this notion of constantly debunking, debating, hammering, dissatisfaction notwithstanding what you described, this sort of falling in love with the place is something very interesting and you referred to it yesterday about this notion of total devotion on the one hand and a deep understanding on all segments of the Israeli society that this is something exceptional although no exception in democracy. Exceptional in the sense of the Jewish people that had been created here. A powerful experience with tremendous challenges and with lots of love-hate relationships and conflicts etc. which is very much also characterized with lack of order, respect to order, an attempt almost to debunk every aspect of society from school to teachers to parents, something has gone wrong in the sense that we lost respect. And the respect is very much an issue here and is almost of essence to the understanding of the political system. And this lack of respect, there are no categories of honor, there is no categories of boundaries, and that goes in many dimensions is very much needed in the society and we are calling into order things that are very much disorderly in the society and that is one of the very big issues and that is a cultural issue. We have an amalgamation of conceptual understanding of the community. But regardless of the patriotic sense. And that is why I also think that the debate about procedures. We tend to think that things of essence can be somehow arranged via procedures. Procedures are important but they are coming together with other issues. That is also the problem of the decline of the Supreme Court. They see it as something to constantly intervene with. And this is connected to what extent there is a perception of mistrust of all of these issues that you were dealing with here.

You Gerry have mentioned a very important point that is related to political theory here. We have dealt with elaborating and opening and expanding the participatory democracy, making it almost a creed on its own. Everybody should have a voice and the voice becomes multiplied and at the same time it always comes at the expense of the elite, you are very close to the elite, you dislike the elite but you do not think well of the elite. And indeed we in Israel have lost in some respect this idea that democracy is very much an elite arrangement. It is not that the public is completely detached. The public is involved. We had cases in the War of Lebanon which were unbelievable that soldiers were recording their officers and immediately you saw it on channel 10 in the evening. We had things that you cannot imagine. I was involved a little bit in an investigation. We had put El Gazira and El Arabia reporters to go with the forces. It is a totally open society amidst of a war. I would say that sometimes it

comes to anarchic behavior of the society that deals with some very serious issues that needs leadership.

You see in Israel this notion of the primaries that many people complain about and I agree with you completely John and Ben Simon will agree with you as well, there is a tremendous exaggeration also in his own description. There is no price with the language of corruption. Everybody can say whatever they want with no consequences especially those who are not politicians. And this a language bankruptcy especially among politicians. You see a tendency in Israel on the one hand to enshrine these primaries but you can see also a kind of almost nostalgic for what the is called Vaada Mesadert. We do not want this culture that is completely imbued with what we call the lowest culture that we see on television in Israel on racial issues, on ethnic issues opening all the wounds in a certain fashion. Those who were advocating democracy, human rights, everybody should be participating hold on for a second. It that what we are yearning for? Is that kind of anarchy that we are looking for? Maybe we want some people who sit and really choose. There are more and more parties which are doing that and people are respecting that. This should be recommended by the scholars. Not in the sense of closing the doors to the public. And Professor Ben Sasson inability to enter the fray and to be a purist, not to get even donations for his own campaign. How can be elected. You cannot get both ways. You cannot be purist as a scholar writing a constitution and not understanding the subtleties of the same electorate that is supposed to elect you that you do not want to cater to.

Now one thing that everybody understand here that this highly volatile society. And at the midst of all this you have to deal with the external dimensions. It is not the occupation. But it is the external dimension. It is the environment in which we live. And this is the question that I am asking, to what extent we really start to empower our leaders rather than debunk them? Give power not to the state, to the leaders, to the political echelon. And of course it begins with the elite. There is in Israel a core that understand that something in the Israeli Palestinian conflict is not doable in a second. Can we get a certain degree of time out that we respect each other, talking about the settlements with the view of transition. And this is the key to empower leaders thinking about how we bring cultural order and working with heterogeneous society that we are so in love with and so trying to make better.

Prof. David Ohana: Two or three insights. Haim Guri maybe the most important poet in Israel told me once that there are two kinds of men; a man that has many problems and a man that has one problem. So Israel has one major problem, and that is the correlation between the conflict issue and the democratic issue. This is our main problem because of our unique definition as a Jewish democratic state. And this is why I talk about the Radical Right, they are not the main problem now but who knows. Now it is o.k. with the demographics, now we can manage the Jewish democratic state because we are the majority. When you have three demands, one to be a Jewish state, two to be a democratic state and three, to have the big Israel so you cannot manage the three factors, you can manage only two. You have to exclude one factor and that one factor is the demographics. One day transfer will accommodate the three factors and we will be a Jewish democratic and a great Israel. Tokeville spoke about the tyranny of the majority but he did not speak about a war. The Israeli democracy is impressive despite all the problems and a specially a state during 60 years of war that manages a democracy. It is always a problem to speak outside Israel

about our problems. I participate in many Mediterranean conferences. There is so much criticism about the Israeli democracy from my Arab colleagues. They come from dictatorships. I would like to speak in some academic imagined community with values. The second issue is what Daniel Ben Simon talked about when he referred to the Beduins. I lived for 9 years in the Negev and I saw the a priori the problems. It is so complicated with the Beduins. During the occupation of Gaza strip they married into the Palestinian women. One man married ten women. So now the do not have a legitimacy. From a human point of view is a terrible situation.

End of Session 7