THE ISRAELI DEMOCRACY INDEX

2016

Tamar Hermann

Ella Heller / Chanan Cohen / Dana Bublil / Fadi Omar

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The views expressed in this book do not necessarily reflect those of the Israel Democracy Institute.

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Introduction

The past year has been one of the stormiest in the history of Israeli democracy, with intense public discourse on such fundamental questions as: What constitutes a democratic regime? What is democratic citizenship? Should there be limitations on the speech and actions of human rights organizations, and on oversight of government? Is there one optimal democratic model, or several? And what are—or should be—the obligations of elected representatives to their voters and to the principles of sound government? These and similar questions are being raised repeatedly of late, generating profound divisions in Israeli society. Perhaps it is unreasonable to expect that answers will ever be found that will satisfy everyone, as these are a result of deep-rooted political and ideological differences.

Fanning the flames of the public debate is the fact that the right-wing camp currently holds the reins of power, a situation compounded by the expansion of the coalition, thereby lowering the chances—at least as of this writing—of early elections. The institutional-political strength of the Right and its supporters, and the strong grip of this camp over public opinion, coupled with the weakening of the Left, have created a new power equation between the political and ideological forces in the field, deepening the rift between the competing groups and redrawing the boundaries of discourse and its legitimate participants. The unwanted consequence (in terms of democracy) is that this is often a dialogue of the deaf, a point that is also reflected in the findings of this year's *Democracy Index* survey. On the one side are people who feel that the moral/ethical core of Israeli democracy is being eroded with alarming speed; and on the other, those who believe that groups with vested interests are attempting—under the guise of an ideological struggle—to salvage the last vestiges of their ideological, political, and socioeconomic influence, which is gradually disintegrating in a historical "changing of the guard" that has been taking place in recent years in Israel. To this can be added the relationship between the citizenry and government, and between the government and certain elites—for example, assorted artists and those entrusted with state support of the arts—where tensions reached unprecedented heights this past year. No less turbulent were the rifts between secondary groups in society and politics, based on dissatisfaction with decisions on such issues as anti-terrorism policies, corruption at the top, the natural gas agreement, the soaring cost of living, and a rising real-estate market with no end in sight. And as if this were not enough, relations between the three branches of government—especially between the government and the judicial system in general, and the Supreme Court in particular—have foundered this year on more than one occasion, leaving behind deep scars that will not fade any time soon. No less disturbing was last years's wave of stabbing attacks, perpetrated by Palestinians, with the resulting dilemma between maintaining limitations on the use of preventive measures due to democratic concerns, and the need to protect Israeli citizens to the fullest extent possible.

The 2016 *Israeli Democracy Index* survey, whose findings form the basis of the following report, touched on several of the fundamental questions underlying the splits that have rocked Israeli democracy over the past year. Also, we have changed the order of the chapters from that of previous years, with the international comparison chapter moved to the beginning of the book to provide a broader framework for our discussions of the Israeli case. The topics that we chose to exapand on in this year's survey are: trust in state institutions; and the relationship between democracy and the war against terror.

The report is divided into two sections:

In Part I, findings are presented about the relative position of Israeli democracy in an international context. The claim has been made repeatedly that Israel is rapidly losing its democratic character and transforming into a non democratic regime. As a result, Israel is being cast out of the family of democratic nations, causing it to become increasingly isolated internationally. Is this also the way things look to authoritative sources outside of Israel? The discussion in this section therefore centers on the scores Israel received this year in international indicators, published by major research institutes, concerning various aspects of governmental performance. The goal is to examine the extent to which domestic concerns about the quality of Israeli democracy are well-founded, according to the accepted global parameters of assessment. Perhaps things indeed appear different from the outside looking in.

To convey the significance of Israel's scores, we ranked them in comparison with 27 countries selected by us according to various criteria—some because they are known as respected democracies, others because they are similar to Israel in terms of age, others because they are world powers, and stil others because they are in close geographic proximity to Israel, that is, in the Middle East.

Following the international assessments of the quality of Israeli democracy, we then examine it from the perspective of Israelis of various sectors, in Part II of the report. In this year's survey, special emphasis was placed on the question of trust in state institutions and politicians, given the sense that citizens' faith in them hit all-time lows. We also highlighted the escalating tension between the commitment to democratic values and the need to formulate an effective policy in the fight against terror, which has dealt a serious blow to Israelis' sense of personal security. In addition, we focused, for the first time, specifically on what Haredi Israelis think of the country's democracy.

Methodology

In Part I of the report, we refer to data from external sources, namely, scores in democracy indicators compiled by international institutes, among them the World Bank, Freedom House, the UN Development Programme, and the Economist Intelligence Unit. Part II is based on a public opinion survey that we designed and analyzed.

The field work was carried out by two survey institutes: in Hebrew, by **Smith Consulting and Research, Inc.** (Ramat Gan); and in Arabic, by the **StatNet Research Institute** (Daliyat el Karmel).

The questionnaire

The questionnaire for this year's *Democracy Index* survey was compiled between February and April 2016. It consists of 49 content questions, several of them with multiple subsections, yielding 82 content questions in total. Roughly half of these are recurring questions from previous years. Due to their emotionally-charged nature or specific relevance, certain questions were posed to Jewish respondents or Arab respondents only. For example, question 26 (whether Arab citizens are seen as a security risk) was presented only to Jews, and question 19 (the Arab view of the balance, or lack thereof, between their leaders' concern with the problems of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza and their attention to the needs of Arab Israelis) was posed to Arab respondents only. In Appendices 2 and 4, such questions are specifically indicated. Certain questions were presented to both Jewish and Arabs respondents with necessary adjustments to their wording; for example, in question 30 (on potential conflicts between the law of the land and religious dictates), Arabs were asked about a contradiction between secular court rulings and religious precepts (each according to his or her religion), while Jews were asked about a contradiction between state courts and Jewish religious law. In addition, 12 sociodemographic questions were included in the survey. In every instance, the response "don't know/refuse to answer" was not offered as a choice, but was recorded if the interviewee answered "I don't know," or was unwilling to select one of the options provided.

The questionnaire was translated beforehand into Russian and Arabic, and the interviewers who administered these versions were native speakers of those languages.

Data collection

The data were collected by telephone between May 1 and May 24, 2016, as follows: 41% via landlines, and 59% via cellphones. The breakdown of interviewees in each sample by type of telephone is presented below (in percent):

	Cellphone	Landline	Total
Jewish and "others" sample	61.2	38.8	100
Haredi sample	26.4	73.6	100
Arab sample	62.0	38.0	100
Total sample	59.0	41.0	100

The sample

A total of 1,531 interviews were conducted for purposes of this survey, as follows:

- 891 interviews, constituting a representative sample of the Jewish public (as well the category of "others[1]," that is, non-Arab Christians and those listed as having "no religion")

- 278 interviews, forming a representative sample of the Haredi Jewish public

- 362 interviews, constituting a representative sample of the Arab public (Muslims, Christians, and Druze)

All interviewees in the survey were aged 18 and over.

This year, we increased the number of Arab and Haredi interviewees to allow us to break down these samples into subgroups by assorted variables such as age, voting pattern, or level of religiosity. We devoted a separate chapter to the Haredi public in Israel. The principal findings from the parallel analysis of the enlarged sample and the Arab population will be published separately.

In order to analyze the total sample of the Israeli population (which combines the three above samples), the survey data were twice weighted by self-defined religiosity of the Jewish population (due to the expansion of the Haredi sample) and by nationality (due to the expansion of the Arab sample), based on figures from the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). In other words, we weighted the responses of the Jews and the Arabs based on their relative proportions of the adult population in Israel. The maximum sampling error for the total weighted sample is ±2.7%; for the Jewish sample, ±2.94%; and for the Arab sample, ±6.6%.

To enable us to better analyze the responses of the Haredi interviewees (Chapter 7 and Appendices 5 and 6), we also included in the Haredi representative sample those respondents from the representative sample of Jews and others who defined themselves as Haredim, such that the total number of Haredim whose responses we analyzed came to 357. The maximum sampling error for a sample of this size is ±5.3%.

How did we analyze this year's responses?

Based on what we know about the major variables affecting Israeli public opinion, we decide which ones to use in analyzing the findings based on the topics that are the focus of that year's survey. This year, the preliminary tests (prior to the writing of the report) showed that the variables whose influence was the strongest and most statistically significant among the Jewish public were identification with one of the three political camps (Right, Center, and Left) and self-

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1   These are mainly immigrants from the former Soviet Union who are eligible to immigrate to Israel under the Law of Return but are not considered halakhically Jewish.

defined religiosity (Haredi, National Religious, Traditional Religious, Traditional Non-Religious, and Secular). It should be noted that there is some overlap between these two variables, though (as we will see below) it is not absolute. In certain cases, we also employed the variables of age (18–34, 35–54, 55+) and income (below average, average, above average). This year, we also created a new variable: level of individual trust in state institutions (low, average, or high), analyzing some of the questions on this basis. The variables of sex and education, which we relied on quite frequently in the past, were not found this year to exert substantial influence in most of the questions; thus, to avoid "overloading" our readers, we did not take them into account in this Index, with the exception of the chapter on Haredim.

Navigating the Report

To make it easier to navigate the report, two references have been included in the margins of the text. The first type, located next to each question, leads to the page where that question appears in Appendix 2 (which contains the questionnaire and the distribution of responses for each content question in a three-part format: total sample, Jews, Arabs). The second type of reference is relevant only for the recurring questions, and points to the page where that question appears in Appendix 4 (a multi-year comparison of data). The three appear in the text as follows:

Israel's overall situation

question 1

Appendix 2
p. 206

Appendix 4
p. 248

Next to each question in Appendices 2, 4, and 5, there is a reference to the page in the text where that question is discussed.

And one final comment: To make for easier reading, we rounded off the data to whole numbers in the text and figures; in the Appendices, however, the data are presented in more precise form, to one decimal place. As a result, there are occasionally very slight differences between the data in the text and those in the Appendices.

We hope that the wealth of data presented in this report, which can of course be analyzed in different ways and from multiple perspectives, will help readers gain a better understanding of Israeli public opinion on issues related, directly or indirectly, to Israel's democratic character. It is also our wish that the data assist scholars in their writing and research. For this reason, we are making the raw data used in the Index available to the public (in SPSS format) **via the Guttman Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research webpage on the Israel Democracy Institute website** (en.idi.org.il).

Principal Findings (by Chapter)

Part I—Israeli Democracy: An International Comparison

Chapters 1 and 2: International Democracy Indicators

This year, we examined 12 indicators of democratic quality and government functioning compiled by international research institutes. According to these indicators, the overall state of democracy in Israel is not terrible, but there is still much room for improvement. In six indicators, Israel places in the top quartile of the rankings: political participation (with a score of 8.89 on a scale of 10), functioning of government (7.14 out of 10), rule of law (1.11 on a scale of [−2.5]–2.5), perception of corruption (61 out of 100), regulatory quality (1.21 on a scale of [−2.5]–2.5), and human development (0.894 out of 1.000). In four indicators, it is ranked in the second quartile, that is, still in the top half of the rankings for the global indicators that we examined: political rights and civil liberties (6.5 out of 7), freedom of the press (68 out of 100), voice and accountability (0.73 on a scale of [−2.5]–2.5), and political risk (66.5 out of 100). In two other areas, Israel's situation is less encouraging, and the country lies in the lower half of the rankings: in the civil liberties indicator, it ranks in the third quartile (with a score of 6.18 out of 10), and in political stability and absence of violence or terrorism it is located in the fourth and lowest quartile (−0.99 on a scale of [−2.5]–2.5).

Part II—Israeli Democracy as Seen by Its Citizens

Chapter 3: How is Israel Doing?

In 2016, as in previous years, the most frequent assessment of Israel's overall situation by the total sample is "so-so" (40%), followed closely by "good" or "very good" (36.5%). Less than one quarter (23%) of those surveyed view the overall situation as "bad" or "very bad." In a repeat of past years, respondents see their personal situation as better than that of the country. Much like 2015, a majority of the total sample (75%), as well as the Jews (78%) and Arabs (61%) separately, categorize their personal situation as "good" or "very good."

Some 70% of Jews, and slightly over half of Arabs, are optimistic concerning Israel's future. Breaking down these figures by political camp (Jews) shows that only on the Left do the pessimists outweigh the optimists. Analysis by religion (Arabs) reveals a sizeable majority of optimists among Christians and Druze; and a large minority of optimists among Muslims, with the majority pessimistic about the country's future.

The majority of Jews across the political spectrum are proud to be Israeli (Right—92%; Center—90%; Left—65.5%), and most Arab respondents share this view (Muslims—49%; Christians—64%; Druze—83%). By contrast, when it comes to feeling part of the state and its problems, we found a majority among Jews (84%) but not among Arabs (only 39.5%) who indicated they felt this way.

On the question of their primary identity, a majority of Haredi and National Religious respondents chose Jewish identity (56% and 62%, respectively) as the most important to them. The traditional respondents (religious and non-religious alike) also defined their Jewish identity as primary, but in similar proportions to their Israeli identity. The secular respondents unequivocally placed their Israeli identity at the top of the list (76%). Ethnic identity emerged as only marginally important for all subgroups of the Jewish public. Among Arab respondents, the primary identity selected in this survey was religious (29%). Only 12% chose Palestinian as their major identity. The remainder gave preference to their Israeli or Arab identities.

On the balance between the democratic and Jewish components of Israel's character as a state, the prevailing view among religious Jewish groups is that the democratic component is too dominant (Haredim—69%; National Religious—45.5%). The traditional religious respondents are divided between satisfaction with the balance, and the feeling that the democratic component is too pronounced. Among the non-religious traditional and secular groups, the sense is that the Jewish element is too dominant (40.5% and 59%, respectively). Meanwhile, some 80% of Arab respondents feel that the Jewish component is too strong.

One very important finding is that more than three quarters of Arab respondents did not agree with the statement that Israel has the right to be defined as a Jewish state. On the other hand, a majority of Jews (52.5%) hold that individuals who are unwilling to affirm that Israel is the nation-state of the Jewish people should lose their right to vote. This contrast is liable to fan the flames of a future confrontation over the character of the state.

On the question of which to follow in the event of a clash between Jewish religious law/Arab religious strictures and secular court rulings, two-thirds of Jewish respondents answered that they would comply with the state courts. However, Haredim responded almost unanimously that they would follow the dictates of halakha (Jewish religious law). Arab respondents were divided on this issue, with a slightly higher share stating that they would obey religious directives as opposed to a court ruling (48% and 44%, respectively).

Chapter 4: State and Governance

There is a general consensus at present that Israel's democratic regime should be maintained, if only to deal with the major challenges confronting the country. This holds true for all sections of the Jewish and Arab publics. Nonetheless, if we look more closely at the respondents who do not share this view (in all cases, this is a minority position), this sentiment is particularly strong among the Haredi public (38%, as opposed to 25% of the national religious group, 23% of the traditional religious, 13% of the traditional non-religious, and 7% of the secular respondents). It is indeed possible that the strong support among Arabs for preserving Israel's democratic character (87%) reflects the fear that a shift to a different system of government would mean minority rights would no longer be protected, as they ostensibly are in a democratic regime.

As for the electoral system, a majority of non-Haredi Jews feel that it does not allow the government to function properly, whereas 54% of Arab respondents and 61% of Haredi Jews hold that the present system is satisfactory, perhaps out of concerns that changing it would reduce their political influence.

When questioned about the option of a strong leader who would not be swayed by the Knesset, the media, or public opinion, a majority of non-Haredi Jews public indicated this would not be desirable for Israel. Among Haredi and traditional religious Jews as well as Arab respondents, we found a majority (60%, 53%, and 63%, respectively) who would support such a system of government.

Once again this year, only a very small share of the Israeli public (both Jews and Arabs) feel that they have the ability to influence government policy. The majority (82%) consider their power as citizens to be negligible. From a democratic perspective, this is an extremely worrisome finding, particularly since this has been recurring for several years.

A negative image of politicians emerged once again in this year's survey: Roughly two thirds of the total sample (Jews and Arabs) disagree with the statement that most Knesset members work hard and are doing a good job. An even bigger majority, three-quarters or more, feel that politicians are detached from the needs and problems of their voters. Moreover, some 80% agree with the statement that politicians look out more for their own interests than for those of the public who elected them.

Regarding corruption, as previously mentioned, Israel does not earn outstanding marks in the Corruption Perceptions Index, but neither is it included among the countries considered truly corrupt. Israel's citizens, however, might beg to differ. Among both Jews and Arabs, the prevailing opinion is that Israel's leadership is closer to the corrupt end of the spectrum (the average for the total sample is 2.32 on a scale of 1 to 5). Furthermore, over three-quarters agreed with the statement that the only way to get things done in Israel is to have connections and know the right people.

On the subject of how well the system functions, only in the military-security realm did we find a majority of the total sample (including those on the Left) who consider the state's performance satisfactory. In the area of public order, the assessment (of the Jewish sample) was that the state's performance is "average," but in the economic, social, and especially, political-diplomatic realms, the system earned poor marks. The Arab public offered low assessments with regard to public order, the economy, and the political-diplomatic area, and an average score for performance in the social realm.

As regards the respondents' unflattering assessment of the state's political-diplomatic functioning, a different question should also be noted. Of the several reasons that we proposed for the harsh criticism of Israel in the international arena, the highest proportion of Jews opted equally for Israel's behavior and policies in the conflict with the Palestinians and for the prevalence of antisemitism around the world. Among Arabs, a clear majority placed the responsibility on Israel's policies and behavior in the context of the conflict.

We found a high level of anxiety in the total sample population concerning a number of internal threats to Israel. Among respondents from the Right and Center, the strong disagreements of Israeli society are seen as the primary threat, whereas on the Left, Israel's continued control of the West Bank/Judea and Samaria is considered the major danger, followed by demands to make Israel more Jewish. In the eyes of the Arab respondents, the strongest threats center around demands to make Israel more Jewish and control of the West Bank/Judea and Samaria .

In keeping with the sense of inability to exert civic influence, the negative image of politicians, and the poor assessment of the state's performance in many areas—not to mention the perception that the political system is corrupt—we found a drop this year in the degree of trust in all the state institutions, among both Jews and Arabs. The sense of trust among Arabs is always lower than that among Jews, and in fact the Supreme Court was the only institution in which a majority of Arab respondents said they could place their faith. A breakdown of the findings by level of trust (low, average, and high) in both populations shows that among Jews the largest share express an average level of trust, while among Arabs a plurality express a low level of trust. For the Jewish respondents, the IDF is at the top of the trust scale, with 90% expressing faith in the army (IDF), while the political parties are at the bottom (14%). Among Arab respondents, the Supreme Court leads the list of state institutions (with a 52% trust rating); here too, the political parties garnered the smallest degree of trust (12%). Among both Jews and Arabs, the three democratic institutions—the government, Knesset, and political parties—enjoy the trust of only a small minority.

Chapter 5: Democracy and Security

As stated, we found that a majority of the Israeli public wish to preserve Israel's democratic character, so that it can contend with the challenges it faces. Yet it appears that the largest share of the Jewish public (with the exception of those who identify with the Left) believe that it is actually non-democratic countries that are the most successful in the fight against terror. In other words, there is a contradiction here between the preference for a democratic system and the perception that this may impede the struggle with one of Israel's greatest challenges—the war on terror. Among the Arab public, a majority hold that democratic countries are in fact those that are able to fight terror most effectively.

Another sizeable gap between Jews and Arabs relates to the place of ethical concerns in the fight against terror. We found that a clear majority of the Jewish public (62%) feel there is no room for ethical considerations in this struggle. By contrast, in the Arab public a small majority (54.5%) believe that such considerations have their place, perhaps out of fear of what would happen if Israel were to shed all moral constraints in the fight against Palestinian terror. Breaking down the results of the Jewish public by political camp shows that on the Right, there is a solid majority who hold that ethical considerations are not relevant in the war on terror. In the Center and Left, the tendency is toward the opposite view.

Further, the Jewish public is divided over whether security forces should be given full powers to investigate terrorism suspects without any legal constraints (on the Right, a majority would give them a free hand, while in the Center, half would be prepared to do so, and on the Left, only a quarter). In the Arab public, a majority are opposed to the position that security forces can act as they see fit when investigating individuals suspected of terrorist activity.

Putting aside ethics and law, what of imposing constraints that reflect the norms of the international community? A very large majority of the Jewish public (81%), along with a small majority of the Arab public (54%), feel that Israel should fight terror any way it sees fit, without taking into consideration the views of other countries about how it conducts this battle.

A majority of Jews (57%), and an even larger majority of Arabs (78%), agree with the statement that freedom of expression should be protected, even for people who speak out against the state. At the same time, 58% of Jews and 53% of Arabs agree that for security purposes, the state should be permitted to monitor what citizens write on the Internet.

This year, there was a steep rise in the share of Jews (primarily on the Right and in the Center) who hold that human- and civil-rights organizations cause harm to the state, climbing to 71%. In the Arab public, less than one-quarter define such organizations as harmful.

Chapter 6: The Social Realm

Some three quarters of Jews agree that "Israelis can always rely on other Israelis to help them out in times of trouble." We found almost no differences between subgroups of the Jewish public (by age, political orientation, religiosity, and the like) on this question. Among Arab respondents, a noticeably smaller majority (52%) support this statement. The reason for this may be that Arabs feel, to a lesser extent than Jews, that other Israelis will come to their aid in time of need.

But despite the seemingly strong sense of solidarity among Israelis, there are severe social tensions in the country. Asked about the level of tension between religious and secular Jews, between Right and Left (on foreign policy and national security), between rich and poor, and between Jews and Arabs, a majority of Jews rated it as high in these cases. Only ethnic tensions (between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim) were rated as average once again this year. Among Arabs, the pattern is similar, except for the fact that the proportion of those who define the level of tension as high in all areas is slightly less than the corresponding figure among Jews. When asked to rank the tensions in terms of their relative severity, both Jews (50%) and Arabs (68%) pointed to the conflict between them as the primary source of tension in Israeli society at present. This year, as in 2015, the second greatest focal point of tension in the eyes of the Jewish respondents was that between Right and Left; among Arab respondents, by contrast, it was the tension between religious and secular Jews.

We examined whether there are people in Israel today who are hesitant to publicly express their political opinions. A majority of Jews who identify with the Right responded that no one in Israel is hesitant to do so, whereas those in the Center were divided between "no one is hesitant" and "people on the Left are more hesitant"; on the Left, three-quarters stated that people in their camp are more hesitant to express their political views. Among Arabs, the picture that emerges is not entirely clear; however it can be stated that the highest share of respondents (32%) likewise pointed to the Left as the camp whose members feel the most threatened. But when we shifted to the personal level, asking the interviewees if they are hesitant to express their political opinions to people they don't know and therefore keep silent, a majority of the Jews (62%) and of the Arabs (53%) responded in the negative; in fact, surprisingly, this was actually the most prevalent response (69%) among Jews who identified with the Left.

This year, we examined the degree of social contact between Jews and Arabs, using the well-known Bogardus Social Distance Scale. Our findings show that both Arabs and Jews (with the exception of the Left) are opposed to intermarriage with the other group. In all the other areas (contact as friends, neighbors, coworkers, fellow citizens, and the like), a majority of Jews of all political orientations and almost all religious groups (apart from the Haredim), and an even larger majority of Arabs, expressed their willingness to engage in close social contact with "the other." This finding would seem to contradict the claims that Jewish Israeli society is becoming racist, for if such were the case there would be no openness to personal contact across group boundaries.

On the question of collective discrimination against Arabs in Israel, there is widespread agreement on the Left and in the Center that such discrimination exists (93% and 67%, respectively) whereas on the Right only a minority (34%) share this view. Arab respondents agreed, virtually across the board, with the statement that Arab citizens are discriminated against compared with Jewish citizens of the state. At the same time, the Jewish public (with the exception of the Haredim) is largely opposed (70%) to the notion that Jewish citizens of Israel should have greater rights than non-Jewish citizens. A small majority (54%) of Jews are also opposed to allocating more funding to Jewish localities than to Arab ones.

As in 2015, a majority of the Jewish public (52%) disagree with the statement that Arab citizens of Israel have not reconciled themselves to the state's existence and support its destruction. A slightly greater majority (56%) are also opposed to the claim that Arab citizens of Israel pose a security risk to the state. Once again, on the Right and among Haredim, the national religious, and traditional religious, a majority see Arab citizens as a security risk and feel that most of them support the state's destruction.

It is impossible to ignore the clear unwillingness of the Jewish public to devote greater funding to fostering the culture and heritage of Arab citizens of Israel (52%). Even more troubling is the longstanding opposition within this group to including Arab parties in the government and appointing Arab ministers (59% this year). This finding stands in stark contrast to the willingness of 72% of Arabs to have Arab parties join the government and serve in the Cabinet.

On a similar note, the unwillingness of the Jewish public to include Arabs in the running of the state is reflected in the repeated demand that crucial decisions be made solely by a Jewish majority, not only on issues of peace and security (72%) but also on matters of governance, economy, and society (57%). This indicates that at the collective national level the position of Jewish Israelis regarding a political partnership with the Arab public is, at the very least, questionable from a democratic standpoint, if not genuinely anti-democratic.

Chapter 7: The Haredi Community and Israeli Democracy

A greater proportion of Haredi than non-Haredi Jews consider Israel's overall situation (as well as their own personal circumstances) to be good. While the most frequent assessment of Israel's situation by the non-Haredi Jewish public was "so-so," 45% of Haredim described it as "good" or "very good."

In the three main subgroups of Haredim that we examined (Hassidic, Lita'im, and Sephardi), we found a clear majority of respondents who attest that they are proud to be Israeli (68%, 59%, and 79.5%, respectively). Moreover, almost two-thirds of Haredi interviewees state that they see themselves as part of the state and its problems. Here too, the Sephardi Haredim report feeling this way to a greater extent than do the Hassidim and the Lita'im. In other words, unlike the prevailing impression in the general public, at present the Haredi community is not an isolated enclave, alienated from the "Israeli endeavor."

Against this backdrop, another finding of interest (which may nonetheless indicate a sense of isolation from Israeli society on the part of Haredim, even as they wish to see themselves as part of the state and its problems) is the very high share of Haredi Jews, as opposed to non-Haredi Jews, who prefer to remain silent and not express their political opinions in the presence of people they don't know (50% versus 36%).

Among Haredim, the share who self-identify with the Right is the second largest in the Jewish public (75%). This is reflected in their attitudes toward Arab citizens of Israel, inasmuch as the Haredim are the most extreme in their desire to close Arabs out of decision-making circles and keep them far removed from their personal lives. On a number of questions, the Haredim stand out from the rest of Jewish society for their estrangement and lack of empathy toward the Arab public, on both the personal and collective levels. Thus, the Haredim are the only group in which a majority are not only unwilling to marry Arabs but are also unwilling to have them as neighbors, friends, or coworkers. In the political realm too, a sizeable majority of Haredim (68%) disagree with the statement that Arab citizens of Israel are discriminated against. Furthermore, a majority of Haredim, as opposed to only a minority of non-Haredi Jews, hold that Jewish Israelis should receive greater rights than non-Jews. Opposition among Haredim to including Arab parties in a coalition government is much greater than that among other segments of the Jewish public.

A majority of Haredim feel that the democratic component of Israel's character is too dominant (69%). There is also virtually unanimous agreement (96%) that in cases where Jewish religious law clashes with secular court rulings, halakha should be the determining factor.

In the Haredi community, the primary identity is Jewish followed by Haredi, in contrast with the national religious public, whose main identity is also Jewish but whose second is Israeli. Among Haredim, the share who assign the greatest importance to their Israeli and ethnic identities is negligible.

On the question of confidence in institutions, the level of trust among the Haredi community is lower than that of the other Jewish subgroups, though with regard to the government, Knesset, and political parties they are not far from the others, who also have little faith in these bodies. The greatest gap in trust between Haredi and non-Haredi Jews is in relation to the Supreme Court: 61.5% of the non-Haredi Jewish public place their trust in it, as opposed to only 6% of Haredim.

The Haredi population believes, in similar proportions to the non-Haredi Jewish public (roughly three-quarters), that politicians in Israel are detached from their constituents; however, they are somewhat less critical than non-Haredi Jews regarding the effort that Knesset members invest in their work (51% compared with 67%, respectively).

And finally, a greater share of Haredi than non-Haredi Jews report being optimistic about the future of the state (75% versus 69%, respectively).

General Insights

The insights offered here represent an interpretive reading of the 2016 *Democracy Index* survey data by the research team. As such, they differ from the report on the principal findings in the previous section and from the full review of the data in the chapters below and the Appendices, where the data are presented with minimal interpretation. Readers are invited to arrive at their own conclusions after studying the data.

Before turning to the insights themselves, it is important to state that from a multi-year perspective, the data indicate that the perceptions of Israel's political system and society held by the public are dynamic but not erratic. In other words, the views of the Israeli public on most of the survey questions do not display the huge pendulum swings of a capricious population, but rather reflect clear trends that can be identified and explained in light of changes in political circumstances and social developments in the country and region. Among these are the rising tide of global and local terror; massive migration from impoverished, war-torn regions to economically established and relatively tranquil countries; the rise of identity politics, which also serves to strengthen nationalist parties and organizations around the world; the growing

gaps between rich and poor; and the debate, unresolved as yet, between proponents of globalization and advocates of a more inward focus on local societies and nation-states.

In recent years, two major camps can be identified in Israeli public discourse, each of which has taken upon itself the role of guardian of democracy, and each of them convinced of its "truth." One side is mostly made up of people who identify with the political Center, and even more so, the Left. For purposes of this discussion, we will call them "the liberal camp." Its members believe that a dangerous, accelerated process of abandoning liberal democratic principles is taking place in Israel. Concepts such as "universal rights" and "human dignity" reign supreme in this camp. According to this interpretation, Israel's military control over the West Bank has left a deep imprint within the Green Line as well, leading to the adoption of authoritarian and chauvinistic values by the Jewish Israeli public, increased discrimination against non-Jewish minorities in the state, and a severe loss of faith in democratic values. On the other side is the "republican camp," most of whose members are located on the Right. They view the state as an organic entity that is the embodiment of national identity, and not simply as a means of managing the affairs of the collective, as in the liberal approach. The basic premise of the republican camp is that the democratic paradigm that is appropriate and sustainable at this time emphasizes the Jewish national good. The core principles of the republican model are the "public good" and an "ethnic nation-state." This, opposed to the liberal model which places the individual citizen at the center, and favors a neutral state in which all citizens not only have equal standing, but also have equal rights in determining the character of the public space.

According to the republican view, the arguments of the liberal camp are much ado about nothing; not only is the state of democracy in Israel not deteriorating, it is even improving. Supporters of the republican model see the troubling "price tag" incidents (attacks carried out against Palestinians and their property by extremist settler and nationalist groups) and other instances of vigilanteism and nationalist incitement as being marginal occurrences that attract undue public attention. In their view, Israeli democracy is robust, and its institutions safeguard, to a reasonable degree (and beyond), the human and civil rights of Israel's citizens and those under its control, despite the unavoidable need to cope effectively with internal and external threats to security. In a Middle Eastern and global reality of frequent economic crises, terror, unprecedented waves of migration, and states that have lost their ability to function, proponents of the republican approach see Israel as an island of social, economic, and regime stability—a state that is managing to preserve both freedom of expression and debate, and the everyday fabric of life for its residents. Both camps will likely be pleased to discover support for their basic position in some of the findings, and will presumably prefer to ignore other results that contradict it. The international comparison also bolsters the views of both camps. On the one hand, international indicators classify Israel as a free country with high political participation and civic engagement. In areas related to functioning and governance, it also earns high scores: Based on external assessments by prestigious research institutes that compiled the indicators we cited, Israel performs well in the spheres of law and order,

government functioning, financial and economic balance, and human welfare (specifically, health, education, and life expectancy). Obviously, there is room for improvement in these areas as well—for example, with respect to the fight against corruption, or the functioning of bureaucracy—but the international comparison shows that Israel's standing is certainly sound.

However, the indicators also show continuing weaknesses on Israel's part in maintaining the rights and liberties of its citizens. In the indicators dealing with democratic rights and liberties, Israel received average, even low, scores. The international indicators also show regression in the areas of freedom of the press and freedom of expression, and problematic handling of freedom of religion, equality before the law, and minority rights. Finally, the indicators that examine political stability show that the terror and violence within Israel, the high level of inter-group tension in Israeli society, and external conflicts, all make it difficult for Israeli democracy to function on a reasonable level.

As stated, the data drawn from our survey point to mixed findings:

Citizens and government: In our opinion, proponents of liberal and republican approaches alike have reason to be very concerned by the results of this year's survey, which show a further decline in public trust in most state institutions (as part of an ongoing process that we have reported on in the past), and in particular, a low degree of confidence in the principal democratic institutions: the government, parliament (Knesset), and political parties. The strong public trust measured this year and last in other bodies (last year, Israel's HMOs and National Insurance Institute, and this year, the interviewee's bank and local government) proves that we are not dealing with a society that has no faith in any institutions whatsoever. The relatively high continuing level of trust in the Supreme Court (despite the fact that this is definitely a controversial body in various circles)—in contrast to the low degree of trust in Israel's political parties, the Knesset, and the government—leads us to conclude that the Israeli public is not lacking in trust in general, but simply does not extend it to these specific political institutions. This finding of minimal faith in most democratic institutions (vertical trust) is particularly interesting in light of the finding concerning the high level of trust that most Israelis place in their fellow citizens (horizontal trust). In this sense, as in previous years, the claims that Israeli society is disintegrating are not backed by our findings.

The ongoing lack of trust in the country's democratic institutions (with the exception, as stated, of the Supreme Court) is also accompanied by an embarrassingly low perceived ability to influence government policy, and a very high level of support for such statements as "Politicians in Israel are detached from the Israeli public's real needs and problems," not to mention the majority each year who do not agree with the statement that most Knesset members work hard and do a good job. This is compounded by the consistently low assessment of the integrity of Israel's leaders, and the sense that those without connections in the right places pay a heavy price. In a similar vein, apart from the area of security and the army, where the country is seen as operating effectively, the overall assessment of the public is that the state's performance is middling to poor, certainly in the political-diplomatic arena, where citizens rank it at the

bottom of the scale. This last assessment is apparently connected to the sense, reflected in other surveys by the Israel Democracy Institute, that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has reached an impasse, and that Israel's international standing is at a low ebb. Still, the present survey shows that a majority of the Jewish public think that international criticism of Israel stems primarily from antisemitism, with only those on the Left attributing it to Israel's policies and actions regarding the conflict with the Palestinians.

Israelis and the state: Despite the low level of trust in the political system, and the unflattering assessment of its performance in most areas, we did not find this year, nor in previous years, evidence of a dissolution of the bond between the Israeli public and the state. Granted, there are differences between subgroups in this area, in particular between Jews and Arabs, but for the most part the assessment of the country's situation continues to be reasonable to good, and the majority report a good personal situation as well. A majority of respondents also proclaim their pride in being Israeli. In general, a majority of the public are optimistic regarding Israel's future (though the optimism is less marked among those who locate themselves on the Left). We likewise found that the Jewish public is certain that Israeli society is more capable than Palestinian society of withstanding a prolonged confrontation, while Arab Israelis are split as to which of the two societies is more steadfast. We found further that a large majority of Jews and a small majority of Arabs support the statement that Israelis will always come to the aid of fellow Israelis in times of trouble, which indicates a strong sense of civic solidarity.

On the question of whether interviewees feel part of the country and its problems, this year too we found a majority of Jews and a lesser share of Arabs who shared this sentiment. Since a majority of Arabs reported pride in being Israeli, our assumption is that the low proportion of Arabs who feel part of the state is a result of their sense of being rejected and discriminated against, and not of their essentially turning their backs on their Israeli identity (following their religious identity as Muslims, Christians or Druze). For Jewish respondents in general, their Israeli identity takes precedence, though among Haredi, national religious, and traditional religious Jews, their Jewish identity is clearly paramount.

A very important finding, in our opinion, is that in all areas related to the state and the political system, the national religious camp (though not a large group in terms of numbers, at 11% of the Jewish public) is once again the most satisfied, optimistic, and complimentary group. We would suggest that this is a by-product of the feeling that the state is being run in a manner more in keeping with this group's perception of the good of the whole.

The data also indicate that that a considerable proportion of Israeli citizens do not share the same perception of the good of the whole—a key concept of the republican democratic approach. Thus a majority of Israel's Arab citizens (including the Druze) do not support Israel's right to define itself as a Jewish state, apparently because this definition discriminates against non-Jewish minorities in general and Muslim Arabs in particular. Moreover, Arabs see the demands to make Israel more Jewish as the most serious internal threat to Israeli society. But

the battle over the common good is not being waged only between Arabs and Jews. Within the Jewish public as well are two competing groups: on the Left, we found a majority who feel that the Jewish component in Israel is overly dominant compared with the democratic element; by contrast, on the Right, the Jewish character of the state is a basic tenet, to the point that a majority of this camp calls for denying the right to vote to those unwilling to define Israel as a "Jewish state." This is consistent with the desire of a majority of Jews to distance Arabs from the centers of power by not including them in the coalition, not appointing Arab ministers, and not involving Arab citizens in decisions crucial to the state (on this point, there is support for making such decisions only on the basis of a Jewish majority). The Center lives up to its name: on certain issues, it leans more towards the liberal camp, and on others, it is closer to the republican group.

In the spirit of republican democracy, the preference of the Jewish public—particularly on the Right but also, to a certain extent, in the Center and the more religious groups—is to enshrine the collective Jewish stewardship of the country institutionally and procedurally. This should be done while upholding the liberal principle of granting equal individual civil rights to Arab citizens, whom most Jews—it should be emphasized—do not view as a security threat or as a group that wishes to see Israel destroyed.

Dilemma of security versus democracy: This year's survey findings highlight the dilemma of maintaining democratic values in the face of security threats. First, we found a sharp increase in those who define the level of tension between Right and Left (on political and security issues) as high; this tension had seemed to be abating somewhat at the beginning of the decade, since neither of the camps had a clear strategic plan of how to cope with the threat posed by the continuation of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute or with the ramifications of repeated waves of violence on the democratic functioning of the government.

A further upswing, overlapping somewhat with the preceding finding, was recorded this year in the share of Jews who hold that human- and civil-rights organizations in Israel are damaging to the state. In fact, these organizations, which may be the purest representation of the liberal democratic ethos, are seen on the Right as the second most important reason (after antisemitism) for international criticism of Israel today. Stated otherwise, large portions of the Jewish public see the actions of these organizations, and especially their appeals to communities outside of Israel, as a betrayal of sorts of the national collective which, from the republican perspective, transcends all other loyalties, particularly in times of external threat.

Further weakening the Jewish public's embrace of liberal views is the confrontation with the current wave of terror. A majority of Jews believe that non-democratic countries hold an advantage in the war on terror. Consequently, it is not difficult to understand why the majority support the right of the state to monitor what citizens write on the Internet, in the name of security, and why roughly one-half favor granting full powers to the security forces to investigate terror suspects, free of any legal constraints.

To summarize, on the abstract level there is widespread support today among the Israeli public for liberal democratic principles. For example, an overwhelming majority express clear and unequivocal support for democracy—and not, for example, a "strong leader"—as the system of government best suited to handle Israel's challenges. The support for maintaining freedom of expression of individuals who are severely critical of the state is also indicative of this. At the same time, however, there are growing signs that when it comes to practical questions, including the tension between democracy and security or the desired character of the state, a majority of the Jewish public is closer in its views to the republican interpretation of democracy. The Arab and secular Jewish populations, particularly those who identify with the Left, are on the opposite, liberal side of the divide, each for their own reasons.

In our opinion, Israeli democracy today is not on the edge of an abyss; however, there are indications of a gradual shift from a liberal-democratic ethos that stresses human and civil rights to a republican-democratic ethos, which places great emphasis on strengthening the ethnic-Jewish character of the state's institutions and political culture. This shift is connected to the balance of political power in the state, which has tilted to the right in recent years; and to the increasing influence of religious groups, and the parallel loss of power experienced by secular groups and those on the Left. This move toward republicanism is not complete, and it is not known whether it will be concluded in the foreseeable future or whether the pendulum will swing back toward the liberal approach, although sociodemographic trends do not predict such a shift any time soon. A fundamental debate such as this is in itself legitimate; yet the stronger side at any given time must not let its advantage, which can be temporary, go to its head; and should of course not cross any lines that would infringe on liberties or harm the basic principles of democracy, which the republican approach also presumably espouses.

Part One

Israeli Democracy: An International Comparison

This part was written by Chanan Cohen

Each year, a number of research institutes around the world publish indicators that examine and compare the quality of democracy in various countries across a range of aspects, including democratic structure, functioning, and values. These assessments are derived from a combination of official statistics, public opinion polls, in-depth academic studies, and the opinions of professional experts. This section of the *Democracy Index* will look at Israel from a global perspective, based on the scores assigned to it by international research bodies in comparison with those of other countries. In this chapter, we examine this year's scores and the resulting rankings on the various scales.

We review 12 indicators, relating to four areas: democratic rights and freedoms; governance; society and economy; and political stability. The comparison was made along two axes: the first, Israel's ranking vis-à-vis other countries; and the second, Israel's situation in 2016 compared to 2015, as reflected in its scores in the various indicators.

For every indicator, we present two figures: (1) Israel's **score** according to the original scale used in compiling that indicator; and (2) Israel's **ranking** in relation to the other countries included in the indicator.[1] To facilitate the comparison between Israel's rankings in the various indicators, we standardized the results, converting the original rankings to percentiles (that is, Israel's placement on a scale of 0–100). A high percentile indicates a favorable democratic ranking, whereas a low percentile points to a poor one. The decision to use percentiles stems from the fact that each of the international indicators is compiled from a different list of countries (containing between 140 and 209 countries) so that only in this way can there be a clear comparison between Israel's rankings in the various indicators. A detailed description of Israel's scores, the original rankings in the indicators, and a full explanation of the sources can be found in Appendix 1 at the end of this book.

Since the research institutes also examined many countries that are not democratic, and since we believe that Israel must strive to reach the top of the ratings, we had to set a criterion by which to determine whether Israel's ranking in a given indicator was adequate or in need of improvement. In our estimation, an acceptable situation is a slot in the upper quartile of the scale, that is, within the 25% of countries that received the highest scores. At the same time,

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1   It is important to note both the score and the ranking in order to provide a broad picture of the quality of Israel's democracy using various parameters. The **score** tells us to what extent Israel is meeting (or not meeting) the expectations of the particular research institute in terms of its democratic performance. By contrast, the **ranking** signifies the quality of democracy in Israel in relation to other countries. Thus it can be that Israel received a relatively high score in a particular area but only an intermediate ranking, since many other countries outperformed it. (This can be likened to a student who receives a grade of 95 on a mathematics exam but whose ranking in relation to the other students in the class is low, since most of them earned a grade of 100.) Likewise, there are indicators where Israel's score is low but its ranking is relatively high since, in this area, most of the countries surveyed received an even lower score.

in order to view Israel's standing relative to certain nations in particular, we chose 27 countries for illustrative purposes—some of them mature, long-established democracies; some that are younger, less-established democratic regimes; and some that are in geographic proximity to Israel, or are world powers, but do not necessarily meet the criteria of a democratic regime. In the detailed figures provided later in this chapter, Israel's position is presented relative to these 27 countries.

Figure 1 \ Israel's ranking in international indicators (percentiles)

Democratic rights and freedoms

71–75	Political Rights and Civil Liberties (Freedom House)
67	Freedom of the press (Freedom House)
97–99	Political participation (Economist Intelligence Unit)
46–47	Civil liberties (Economist Intelligence Unit)
70	Voice and accountability (World Bank)

Governance

75–81	Functioning of government (Economist Intelligence Unit)
83	Rule of law (World Bank)
80–81	Perception of corruption (Transparency International)

Economy and society

87	Regulatory quality (World Bank)
90	Human development (UN Human Development Report)

Stability

13	Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (World Bank)
57–59	Political risk (International Country Risk Guide)

0
Lowest
ranking

100
Highest
ranking

The figure above presents Israel's rankings in 2016 as determined by the leading international institutes. As shown, once again this year Israel is ranked above the mid-point of the scale in most of the indicators. Especially noteworthy are its very high rankings in those indicators dealing with economy and society (regulatory quality and human development), and its high ranking in indicators of governance (functioning of government, rule of law, and perception of corruption). In most indicators of democratic rights and freedoms (political rights and civil liberties, freedom of the press, voice and accountability), Israel is positioned below the top quartile, with the exception of political participation, where its ranking is truly commendable. With regard to civil liberties, its low placement is cause for concern. In the political stability indicators (political stability and absence of violence or terrorism; political risk), Israel's ranking is low.

Chapter 1 \ International Indicators

Democratic rights and freedoms

Indicator of Political rights and civil liberties

Institution: Freedom House

Scale: 1 (no rights) – 7 (full rights)

Israel's score: 6.5

No. of countries included in indicator: 195

Israel's ranking by percentile: 71–75

Israel's quartile: 2

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |

The political rights and civil liberties indicator *Freedom in the World*, published each year by Freedom House, is based on the assessments of experts, who assign scores to countries based on criteria that reflect the level of political freedom and civil liberties, including: electoral process, extent of political participation, functioning of government, freedom of expression, freedom of association, rule of law, and personal autonomy. The indicator uses a scale from 1 (lack of political rights and civil liberties) to 7 (full political rights and civil liberties). This indicator is considered stable, that is, changes in countries' scores from year to year are relatively minor.

As in the previous 11 years, Israel received a high score here (6.5). Of the 195 countries surveyed, it ranks in the second quartile, just outside the highest quartile, with a percentile of 71–75. Thus while Israel's score is good, it needs to improve further in order to be among the leading countries in the world on this issue.

Figure 1.1 \ Political rights and civil liberties indicator

7.0	Italy
7.0	United States
7.0	Belgium
7.0	United Kingdom
7.0	Germany
7.0	Japan
7.0	Norway
7.0	New Zealand
7.0	Spain
7.0	Czech Republic
7.0	France
7.0	Canada
7.0	Switzerland
6.5	Israel
6.0	Hungary
6.0	Argentina
6.0	Brazil
6.0	Greece
5.5	India
4.5	Turkey
3.5	Lebanon
3.0	Venezuela
2.5	Jordan
2.5	Egypt
2.0	Russia
1.5	China
1.0	Syria
1.0	Saudi Arabia

1.0   2.0   3.0   4.0   5.0   6.0   7.0

No political rights and civil liberties

Full political rights and civil liberties

Freedom of the press

Indicator of freedom of the press

Institution: Freedom House

Scale: 0 (no freedom) – 100 (full freedom)

Israel's score: 68

No. of countries included in indicator: 199

Israel's ranking by percentile: 67

Israel's quartile: 2

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |

The freedom of the press indicator, published by Freedom House, is also based on the opinions of expert analysts and advisers, who assign scores in accordance with three criteria: laws and regulations that influence media content; political pressures and controls on media content (including limitations on journalistic autonomy); and economic factors affecting media content.

This indicator is presented here in the form of a scale from 0 (lack of press freedom) to 100 (full press freedom). The 0–39 range denotes a country where the press is Not Free; 40–69 indicates that the press is Partly Free; and 70–100 means the press is classified as Free. Israel's score (68) is two points lower than last year's; the report attributes this to concerns about the economic viability of newspapers and other media outlets in light of the growth in market share of the free daily *Israel Today (Israel Hayom)*, and the proliferation of covert marketing messages on news sites and television channels. This decline in Israel's score takes it onto the list of countries whose press is defined as only Partly Free. Of the 199 countries surveyed, Israel is located in the 67th percentile—slightly beneath last year's ranking, and also lower than most of the Western democracies. This decline in freedom of the press is certainly worrisome in terms of the quality of Israel's democracy.

Figure 1.2 \ Freedom of the press indicator

Country	Value
Norway	91
Belgium	89
Switzerland	87
Canada	82
Germany	80
New Zealand	80
Czech Republic	79
United States	79
United Kingdom	75
Japan	74
France	72
Spain	72
Italy	69
Israel	68
Hungary	60
India	59
Brazil	54
Greece	52
Argentina	50
Lebanon	44
Jordan	34
Turkey	29
Egypt	23
Venezuela	20
Russia	17
Saudi Arabia	14
China	13
Syria	10

No press freedom — Full press freedom

Political participation

Indicator of political participation

Institution: The Economist

Scale: 0 (low participation) – 10 (high participation)

Israel's score: 8.89

No. of countries included in indicator: 167

Israel's ranking by percentile: 97–99

Israel's quartile: 1

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |

The Economist Intelligence Unit's political participation indicator is based on a combination of expert assessments, public opinion polls, and official statistics that examine the following parameters: voter turnout; minority voting rights and right of association; proportion of women in parliament; party membership rates; political engagement and interest in current affairs; readiness to participate in legal demonstrations; and government encouragement of political participation.

This indicator is presented on a scale of 0 (low participation rate) to 10 (high participation rate). Once again, Israel received a very high score in political participation this year (8.89). Of the 167 countries surveyed for this indicator, it ranks in the 97–99th percentile, alongside New Zealand, surpassing the participation rate of most of the established democracies. In this indicator, Israel is in the top quartile of the scale, where we would obviously like to be; in other words, the conventional wisdom in Israel that Israelis are highly involved politically is more than just an unfounded gut feeling.

Figure 1.3 \ Political participation indicator

Country	Value
Norway	10
Israel	8.89
New Zealand	8.89
Switzerland	7.78
Canada	7.78
Germany	7.78
France	7.78
Lebanon	7.78
United States	7.22
Italy	7.22
India	7.22
Spain	7.22
United Kingdom	6.67
Czech Republic	6.67
Greece	6.67
Japan	6.11
Argentina	6.11
Belgium	5.56
Brazil	5.56
Venezuela	5.0
Russia	5.0
Turkey	5.0
Hungary	4.44
Jordan	3.89
Egypt	3.33
China	3.33
Syria	2.78
Saudi Arabia	2.22

0   2   4   6   8   10

Low political participation

High political participation

Civil liberties

Indicator of civil liberties

Institution: The Economist

Scale: 0 (civil liberties not respected) –
10 (civil liberties fully respected)

Israel's score: 6.18

No. of countries included in indicator: 167

Israel's ranking by percentile: 46–47

Israel's quartile: 3

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |

The civil liberties indicator, also produced by the Economist Intelligence Unit, is based on a combination of expert assessments, surveys of public opinion, and official government statistics. It measures 17 parameters, including freedoms of the press, expression, protest, religion, and association; equality before the law; and level of personal security. This indicator is presented on a scale of 0 to 10, with 10 representing full regard for civil liberties, and 0 a complete lack of respect for them. Israel's score this year was 6.18, placing it in the 46–47th percentile among the 167 countries surveyed, a slight rise over last year's ranking. Nonetheless, this year's score was again low, placing Israel in the third quartile of the scale, where it rubs shoulders with such undemocratic countries as Venezuela and Lebanon (and far removed from Central and Western Europe, and North America, and even Japan and India)—not at all where it should be in our view.

Figure 1.4 \ Civil liberties indicator

Country	Value
Norway	10.0
New Zealand	10.0
Canada	10.0
Belgium	9.41
United Kingdom	9.41
Greece	9.41
Japan	9.41
Spain	9.41
Czech Republic	9.41
Switzerland	9.41
India	9.12
Brazil	9.12
Germany	9.12
France	8.82
Italy	8.53
United States	8.24
Argentina	7.94
Hungary	7.65
Israel	6.18
Venezuela	5.59
Lebanon	5.59
Russia	3.53
Jordan	3.53
Turkey	2.94
Egypt	2.94
China	1.47
Saudi Arabia	1.47
Syria	0

Civil liberties not respected   Civil liberties fully respected

Voice and accountability

Indicator of voice and accountability

Institution: World Bank

Scale: −2.5 (low level of representation) −
　　　　+2.5 (high level of representation)

Israel's score: 0.73

No. of countries included in indicator: 204

Israel's ranking by percentile: 70

Israel's quartile: 2

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |

The voice and accountability indicator of the World Bank is based on expert assessments, public opinion polls, and official statistics. It examines the extent to which citizens can participate in national elections as well as freedoms of expression, association, and the press, which are known to be basic prerequisites for the free election of a government. The scale ranges from −2.5 to 2.5.

Israel's score is 0.73, higher than last year's 0.63. Likewise, Israel rose slightly this year in the ranking, reaching the 70th percentile among the 204 countries included in the indicator, compared with the 66th last year; however, it is still outside the top quartile, where the strong democracies are located.

Figure 1.5 \ Voice and accountability indicator

Governance

Functioning of government

Indicator of functioning of government

Institution: The Economist

Scale: 0 (lack of democratic functioning) –
10 (full democratic functioning)

Israel's score: 7.14

No. of countries included in indicator: 167

Israel's ranking by percentile: 75–81

Israel's quartile: 1

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |

The functioning of government indicator of the Economist Intelligence Unit is based on expert analysis, public surveys, and official statistics. It reflects the level of democratic functioning and the effectiveness of government institutions, for example: the government's ability to set policy; the existence (or non-existence) of a system of checks and balances among the three branches of government; the capacity of parliament to oversee the government; the involvement of the army or other extra-political entities in politics; the degree of government transparency and accountability; the lack of corruption; and the level of public trust in government institutions. A score of 10 on the scale indicates full democratic functioning of the government and its institutions, while 0 denotes a total lack of functioning in this area. Israel's score for 2016 in this indicator is moderate-to-high (7.14), the same as last year's. Among the 167 countries included in this indicator, Israel places in the 75th–81st percentile, similar to its ranking last year. Here Israel is located in the upper quartile, though there is still room to improve.

Figure 1.6 \ Functioning of government indicator

Country	Value
Norway	9.64
Switzerland	9.29
Canada	9.29
New Zealand	9.29
Germany	8.57
Belgium	8.21
Japan	8.21
United States	7.5
Israel	7.14
Spain	7.14
United Kingdom	7.14
Czech Republic	7.14
India	7.14
France	7.14
Brazil	6.79
Italy	6.43
Hungary	6.07
Turkey	5.36
Greece	5.36
Argentina	5.0
China	4.64
Venezuela	3.93
Jordan	3.93
Saudi Arabia	2.86
Russia	2.86
Egypt	2.86
Lebanon	2.14
Syria	0

Lack of democratic functioning — Full democratic functioning

Rule of law

Indicator of rule of law

Institution: World Bank

Scale: −2.5 (weak rule of law) −
        +2.5 (strong rule of law)

Israel's score: 1.11

No. of countries included in indicator: 209

Israel's ranking by percentile: 83

Israel's quartile: 1

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |

The rule of law indicator of the World Bank, which is based on expert assessments, public opinion polls, and statistical data, examines the extent to which citizens and government bodies have faith in the laws of the country and society, and how well they comply with them. Among the parameters included in this indicator are the enforcement of contracts and agreements, upholding of property rights, functioning of the police force and legal system, and prevention of crime and violence. The score ranges from −2.5 to 2.5. Israel's score this year (1.11) is quite high, reflecting an improvement over last year's grade of 0.95. The country ranked in the 83rd percentile compared with the 80th in 2015, which also placed it in the top quartile.

Figure 1.7 \ Rule of law indicator

Country	Value
Norway	2.05
New Zealand	2.02
Switzerland	2.02
Canada	1.89
United Kingdom	1.89
Germany	1.85
United States	1.62
Japan	1.60
Belgium	1.51
France	1.47
Czech Republic	1.14
Israel	1.11
Spain	0.94
Hungary	0.50
Jordan	0.48
Greece	0.34
Italy	0.34
Saudi Arabia	0.27
Turkey	0.04
Brazil	−0.08
India	−0.09
China	−0.33
Egypt	−0.60
Russia	−0.71
Lebanon	−0.76
Argentina	−0.91
Syria	−1.34
Venezuela	−1.89

Weak rule of law — Strong rule of law

Perception of corruption

Indicator of corruption perceptions

Institution: Transparency International

Scale: 0 (high degree of corruption) –
100 (absence of corruption)

Israel's score: 61

No. of countries included in indicator: 167

Israel's ranking by percentile: 80–81

Israel's quartile: 1

1	2	3	4

The Corruption Perceptions Index produced by Transparency International reflects the opinion of experts on the abuse of power in the public sector for personal gain in each of the countries surveyed. The score in this indicator ranges from 0 to 100; the higher the score, the less corruption is perceived. Israel received a score of 61 this year, a slight increase over last year's grade (60). It should be noted that this score has remained stable in recent years, without sizeable differences. Israel is ranked in the 80th–81st percentile in this indicator out of the 167 countries included here, that is, in the upper quartile of the scale. Thus, while Israel's absolute score is not high, and it clearly must step up its fight against corruption, in comparison with other countries—many of which are far from the democratic ideal—Israel is not considered corrupt.

Figure 1.8 \ Perception of corruption indicator

Country	Value
New Zealand	88
Norway	87
Switzerland	86
Canada	83
Germany	81
United Kingdom	81
Belgium	77
United States	76
Japan	75
France	70
Israel	61
Spain	58
Czech Republic	56
Jordan	53
Saudi Arabia	52
Hungary	51
Greece	46
Italy	44
Turkey	42
Brazil	38
India	38
China	37
Egypt	36
Argentina	32
Russia	29
Lebanon	28
Syria	18
Venezuela	17

High level of corruption

Absence of corruption

Economy and society

Regulatory quality

Indicator of regulatory quality

Institution: World Bank

Scale: −2.5 (low regulatory quality) −
        +2.5 (high regulatory quality)

Israel's score: 1.21

No. of countries included in indicator: 209

Israel's ranking by percentile: 87

Israel's quartile: 1

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |

The regulatory quality indicator of the World Bank, based on expert analyses, public surveys, and statistical data, examines the extent to which government is able to shape policy and enforce it in a way that promotes the development of the private-business sector. This indicator measures whether the following yardsticks, among others, are met: promotion of competition, fair taxation, financial freedom and freedom of investment, fair oversight and regulation policies, and a climate that encourages business and start-ups. The scale ranges from −2.5 (denoting poor regulation) to 2.5 (effective regulation). Israel's score this year was quite high (1.21), slightly above last year's grade of 1.15. Israel also rose somewhat in the rankings, placing it in the upper quartile of the 209 countries surveyed, with a very favorable 87th percentile (slightly better than last year's 85th).

Figure 1.9 \ Regulatory quality indicator

1.94	New Zealand
1.83	Canada
1.83	United Kingdom
1.82	Switzerland
1.70	Germany
1.64	Norway
1.27	United States
1.21	Israel
1.17	Belgium
1.14	Japan
1.09	France
1.02	Czech Republic
0.78	Spain
0.77	Hungary
0.66	Italy
0.41	Turkey
0.34	Greece
0.08	Jordan
−0.01	Saudi Arabia
−0.07	Brazil
−0.22	Lebanon
−0.27	China
−0.40	Russia
−0.44	India
−0.75	Egypt
−1.08	Argentina
−1.67	Syria
−1.81	Venezuela

−2.5 −2.0 −1.5 −1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5

Low regulatory quality   High regulatory quality

Human development

Indicator of human development

Institution: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

Scale: 0 (low level of development) – 1 (high level of development)

Israel's score: 0.894

No. of countries included in indicator: 188

Israel's ranking by percentile: 90

Israel's quartile: 1

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |

The Human Development Index of the United Nations Development Programme is based on official statistics of the countries surveyed, and reflects the degree to which certain basic aspects of human development are maintained: life expectancy, quality of health, level of education and knowledge, and a decent standard of living. The scale ranges from 0 (low level of development) to 1 (high level of development). Israel scored very high in this indicator (0.894), even somewhat better than in 2015 (0.888). Of the 188 countries included in this indicator, Israel is ranked in the 90th percentile, a very high slot, and similar to last year's. In this area, we are in an excellent position.

Figure 1.10 \ Human development indicator

Country	Value
Norway	0.944
Switzerland	0.930
Germany	0.916
United States	0.915
New Zealand	0.913
Canada	0.913
United Kingdom	0.907
Israel	0.894
Japan	0.891
Belgium	0.890
France	0.888
Spain	0.876
Italy	0.873
Czech Republic	0.870
Greece	0.867
Saudi Arabia	0.837
Argentina	0.836
Hungary	0.828
Russia	0.798
Lebanon	0.769
Venezuela	0.762
Turkey	0.761
Brazil	0.755
Jordan	0.748
China	0.727
Egypt	0.690
India	0.609
Syria	0.594

0.000 0.100 0.200 0.300 0.400 0.500 0.600 0.700 0.800 0.900 1.000

Low level of
human development

High level of
human development

Political stability

Political stability and absence of violence or terrorism

**Indicator of political stability
and absence of violence/terrorism**

Institution: World Bank

Scale: −2.5 (low stability) − +2.5 (high stability)

Israel's score: -0.99

No. of countries included in indicator: 207

Israel's ranking by percentile: 13

Israel's quartile: 4

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |

The World Bank's political stability and absence of violence or terrorism indicator is based on expert analyses, public surveys, and statistical data. It examines the level of political stability and extent of political violence and terror in the countries surveyed, on a scale from −2.5 (low stability and a high incidence of violence) to 2.5 (high stability and a low level of violence).[1] Israel's score this year is poor (−0.99), though it shows a slight improvement over last year (−1.09). Israel dropped in the rankings this year, placing near the bottom of the scale in the 13th percentile of the 207 countries surveyed, as opposed to the 16th percentile in 2015, which was itself very low. Indeed, problems of security and terror are a major challenge confronting Israel, and stand out for their severity in comparison with other countries.

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1   In exceptional cases, the statistical method by which the data were organized allows for scores to deviate slightly upward or downward from the scale, as reflected in the extremely low score (−2.76) received by Syria this year (see Figure 1.11)

Figure 1.11 \ Political stability and absence of violence or terrorism indicator

	Value	Country
	1.49	New Zealand
	1.24	Switzerland
	1.18	Canada
	1.13	Norway
	1.02	Japan
	0.97	Czech Republic
	0.93	Germany
	0.71	Belgium
	0.70	Hungary
	0.62	United States
	0.50	Italy
	0.44	United Kingdom
	0.36	France
	0.32	Spain
	0.08	Argentina
	0.02	Greece
	−0.01	Brazil
	−0.24	Saudi Arabia
	−0.46	China
	−0.56	Jordan
	−0.83	Venezuela
	−0.84	Russia
	−0.96	India
	−0.99	Israel
	−1.06	Turkey
	−1.58	Egypt
	−1.72	Lebanon
	−2.78	Syria

−2.50   −1.50   −0.50   0.50   1.50   2.50

Low political stability   High political stability

Political risk

Indicator of political risk

Institution: Political Risk Services Group (PRS)

Scale: 0 (high risk) – 100 (low risk)

Israel's score: 66.5

No. of countries included in indicator: 140

Israel's ranking by percentile: 57–59

Israel's quartile: 2

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |

The political risk ranking compiled by the Political Risk Services Group provides an expert assessment of various countries around the world. Its primary goal is to aid international business owners in understanding the level of political stability in various countries. The assessment of political risk includes the following parameters: government stability, socioeconomic conditions, investment profile, macroeconomic conditions, presence of internal or external conflicts, corruption, military involvement in politics, religious or ethnic tensions, law and order, democratic accountability, and quality of bureaucracy. The ranking ranges from 0 to 100, with 100 denoting minimum risk and 0 indicating maximum risk.

Israel received a middling score this year (66.5), representing a very slight increase over last year's score of 66. Israel ranked in the 57–59th percentile, below the highest quartile of the 140 countries surveyed for this indicator. It is noteworthy that when the PRS Group examined Israel's financial and economic stability in the same report, the scores were much higher. It appears that, in PRS's assessment, the parameters relating to political stability—including internal conflict and social tensions between various sectors—form the greatest challenge facing Israel today as a democratic state.

Figure 1.12 \ Political risk indicator

89.0	Norway
88.0	Switzerland
87.5	New Zealand
85.0	Canada
84.5	Germany
84.0	United Kingdom
82.5	United States
82.5	Japan
77.5	Belgium
77.0	Czech Republic
75.5	Hungary
73.0	Italy
70.5	Spain
70.0	Greece
67.5	France
66.5	Israel
65.5	Brazil
64.5	Saudi Arabia
64.0	Argentina
61.0	India
61.0	Jordan
56.5	China
56.5	Russia
53.5	Lebanon
53.0	Turkey
50.0	Egypt
44.5	Venezuela
40.5	Syria

0 20 40 60 80 100

High political risk   Low political risk

Chapter 2 \ Overview of International Indicators

An overview of the state of democracy in Israel based on the international indicators yields a complex and multifaceted picture. As shown in the following table, Israel's ranking in 5 of the indicators remains unchanged this year, while it rose in 5 indicators and declined in another 2.

Table 2.1 \ Israel's ranking in the 2016 indicators compared with 2015

	Indicator	2016 Quartile	2016 Percentile	2015 Percentile	Change
Democratic Rights and Freedoms	Political rights and civil liberties	2	71–75	70–75	=
	Freedom of the press	2	67	68–69	⌄
	Political participation	1	97–99	96–98	=
	Civil liberties	3	46–47	43–46	⌃
	Voice and accountability	2	70	66	⌃
Governance	Functioning of government	1	75–81	74–81	=
	Rule of law	1	83	80	⌃
	Perception of corruption	1	80–81	78–79	⌃
Economy and society	Regulatory quality	1	87	85	⌃
	Human development	1	90	90	=
Political stability	Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism	4	13	16	⌄
	Political risk	2	57–59	57–58	=

⌃   improvement in Israel's ranking compared with previous year

=   no change in Israel's ranking compared with previous year

⌄   decline in Israel's ranking compared with previous year

Overall, the comparison shows that Israel meets the basic requirements of a democracy, but is also facing difficult and substantial problems. In the area of **rights and freedoms**, which are the very bedrock of a democratic regime, the situation calls for improvement. In recent years, freedom of the press is on the decline—a worrisome statistic due to the vital role of the press in mediating between different groups and making the political and social situation accessible to the public. The level of civil liberties—which include freedom of expression and association, religious freedom, equality before the law, and personal security—is low in comparison with established democracies. We would do well to improve in these areas so as to meet the accepted standards in Western liberal democracies. The voice and accountability indicator, which for the most part measures the freedoms that enable democratic expression and political representation, is also a warning that improvement is needed.

A further area in which Israel's performance is less than stellar is **political stability**. Israel's position in the political risk ranking is unsatisfactory, due primarily to internal and regional conflicts. In the indicator of political stability and absence of violence or terrorism, Israel's scores are poor, placing it near the very bottom of the scale. It would appear that the continuing security problems pose a significant ongoing challenge to Israeli democracy.

An area where Israel enjoys a more favorable assessment is **economy and society**. Despite repeated claims of excessive bureaucracy on the part of government bodies in Israel, the international comparison shows that in general Israel's regulatory policy is—at the very least—reasonably encouraging for the private sector and entrepreneurial activity. The level of human development, as reflected in the basic parameters of life expectancy, health, and education, is also very high compared with other countries. At the same time, we should note that this year we did not look at indicators relating to social conditions, such as inequality and social gaps, an area where Israel's rankings in previous years were not complimentary.

Finally, in the realm of **governance**, Israel's scores are not bad, and even quite respectable. The level of government functioning is acceptable when it comes to policy-setting and implementation, checks and balances between branches of government, and trust in government institutions. The extent of corruption is not very high, though there is definitely work to be done. The rule of law, in terms of police and the legal system, and the internalization of the laws of the state by citizens and government entities, is quite high.

Thus, despite the many problems that characterize the Israeli polity, the international indicators show Israel to be a democratically stable country, and demonstrate that the periodic warnings of the imminent collapse of Israeli democracy are exaggerated, given a comparative perspective of the situation over time. The areas in need of repair relate primarily to democratic rights and freedoms and political stability.

Part Two

Israeli Democracy as Seen by Its Citizens

Chapter 3 \ How is Israel Doing?

In this chapter, we will be discussing the following topics based on our analysis of this year's survey findings:

- Israel's overall situation
- The personal situation of the interviewees
- Perception of the country's future
- Attitude toward the state and being Israeli
- Primary identity
- Israel as a Jewish and democratic state

For several years now, studies conducted by Israeli research institutes have shown that the dismal picture of Israel's situation that dominates the media and characterizes Israelis' everyday griping is not mirrored in public opinion polls. This naturally raises questions about the validity of these surveys; or alternatively, about the credibility of articles in the media and informal "coffee klatches," since the gloominess they project may be less a reflection of personal opinion and more a desire on the part of the speakers or writers to conform with the conventional wisdom. It appears there is a need for more intensive study of this disparity, which is also evident in our survey. For example, while the sorry situation of the state is a common topic of public discourse, in the present survey, like others published over the past year, the greatest share of interviewees (in the total sample) define Israel's overall situation as "so-so." The second most common response (roughly one third) is "good," while only a minority (less than one quarter) see the country's situation as "bad." At the same time, there is a slight drop from last year in the share of those who view the situation as favorable (total sample), and some increase in those who define it as poor, though they are still a minority.

Israel's overall situation

Question 1

Appendix 2
p. 206

Appendix 4
p. 248

Table 3.1 (%)

Israel's overall situation (total sample)	2015	2016
Good	41	36.5
So-so	39	40
Bad	18	23
Don't know	2	0.5
Total	100	100

As in past years, the category selected most frequently by Jewish respondents is the intermediate one, "so-so" (for this reason, it is also the most common response in the total sample), followed by the favorable option ("good"). Only about one-fifth define Israel's overall situation as "bad." Somewhat surprisingly, the most common response in the Arab public is actually positive, though it is given by only slightly more than one-third of respondents; at the same time, a greater share of Arabs than Jews define Israel's overall situation as "bad."

Table 3.2 (%)

Israel's overall situation	Good	So-so	Bad	Don't know	Total
Jews	36	41	22	1	100
Arabs	39	32	28	1	100

We broke down the responses of the Jewish sample using four variables: political camp, income, age, and religiosity. Needless to say, though we have separated the categories here for purposes of analysis and clarity, there is a high degree of overlap between some of them, for example, between political camp and religiosity. The results of this breakdown are summarized in the following table:

Table 3.3 (%)

	Israel's overall situation (Jews)	Good	So-so	Bad	Don't know	Total
Political camp	Right	47	37	15	1	100
	Center	30.5	49	20	0.5	100
	Left	13	47	40	--	100
Income	Below average	29	45.5	25	0.5	100
	Average	42.5	37	20	0.5	100
	Above average	42	38.5	19.5	--	100

	Israel's overall situation (Jews)	Good	So-so	Bad	Don't know	Total
Age	18–34	35	44	20	1	100
	35–54	37	45	17	1	100
	55+	36	35	28	1	100
Religiosity	Haredi	44	41	14	1	100
	National religious	77	21	1	1	100
	Traditional religious	40	40	20	--	100
	Traditional non-religious	32	43	25	--	100
	Secular	26	46	28	--	100

Political camp emerges here as the most distinguishing variable in assessments of Israel's situation. A breakdown of responses on this basis shows dramatic differences between the camps: On the Right, the highest share of respondents define the situation as "good," with only a small minority classifying it as "bad." The Center tends to define the situation as "so-so," with a tendency towards the positive. On the Left as well, the most frequent response is also "so-so," but the share who view Israel's overall situation as "bad" is very high (almost three times the corresponding figure on the Right, and twice that of the Center). Only a small minority in this camp see the situation as "good." This distribution is certainly understandable, since it is reasonable to assume that those whose representatives hold the reins of power will be more satisfied with the situation, and take a more positive view, than those whose representatives are far from the formal decision-making frameworks and are opposed to the government's political course.

A breakdown of responses by age shows that, compared with the younger cohorts, the oldest age group has the highest share who define the situation as "bad"—perhaps because there are more voters for the opposition parties in their ranks, and perhaps because as an age group, they do not feel well treated by the state and its institutions- and are thus more critical of the system.

Breaking down the responses by income reveals a divide between below-average earners and average and above-average earners. While those whose income is below average tend most often to define the situation as "so-so," the most common response of those whose income is average or above average is "good."

A breakdown of responses by religiosity indicates that, as in past years, the national religious are the most satisfied with Israel's overall situation. As a rule, the secular group is less satisfied with the "state of the state," though in this case as well only a minority classify it as "bad." However, there is also a divide within this variable: The three most religious groups (Haredim, national religious, and traditional religious) are more positive regarding Israel's situation than the other two groups (traditional non-religious and secular).

Among Arab respondents, we examined two variables that in our opinion are likely to influence the assessment of the country's situation: religion; and political affiliation, based on votes for either the Joint (Arab) List or certain Zionist parties (in the absence of an additional Arab party, this term is used to refer to all Jewish and/or Zionist lists). As shown in the following table, Muslim respondents are split more or less evenly in their perception of Israel's situation, with a slight preference for the positive option. Among Christians, and even more so among Druze, the favorable view is the most prevalent. A breakdown by voting patterns in the 2015 election shows that among those who voted for the Joint List, the most common response is that Israel's situation is bad, whereas among voters for the Zionist parties, a clear majority hold that its situation is good.

Table 3.4 (%)

	Israel's overall situation (Arabs)	Good	So-so	Bad	Don't know	Total
Religion	Muslim	35	33	31	1	100
	Christian	40	34	24	2	100
	Druze	66	19	15	--	100
Vote in 2015 election	Joint List	29	34	36	1	100
	Zionist parties	65	21	14	--	100

Again this year, respondents tended to assess their personal situation as favorable; in fact, the results remained exactly the same as in 2015, with three-quarters of the total sample defining their situation as "good."

Figure 3.1 \ Personal situation (total sample; %)

Nonetheless, as the table below indicates, Jews tended to a greater extent than Arabs to categorize their personal situation as good, though the most frequent response in the Arab public too was positive.

Table 3.5 (%)

Personal situation	Good	So-so	Bad	Don't know	Total
Jews	78	18	4	--	100
Arabs	61	31	8	--	100

As in past years, respondents offered a much more favorable assessment of their personal situation than that of the country as a whole.

Figure 3.2 \ State situation and personal situation (total sample; %)

As indicated in the figure below, cross-tabulating the responses for personal situation with those for the country as a whole yields a strong association between these two assessments. As in 2015, we found that people tend to judge the state's situation in keeping with their personal one (or perhaps the other way around, that is, judge their personal situation in light of the state's; in this context there is no way of knowing the direction of the relation). In other words, most of those who state that their personal situation is good also tend to assess the state's situation as good; most of those who assess their personal situation as "so-so" tend to offer the same assessment regarding the state; and most of those who say their personal situation as bad tend to say the same about the country as a whole.

Figure 3.3 \ State situation by personal situation (by nationality; %)

As with our analysis of the country's situation, here too we attempted to establish which factors are likely to influence respondents' assessments of their personal situation.

Table 3.6 (%)

	Personal situation (Jews)	Good	So-so	Bad	Don't know	Total
Political camp	Right	77	18	4	1	100
	Center	81	16	2	1	100
	Left	78	19.5	2	0.5	100
Income	Below average	68	24	7	1	100
	Average	81	18	0.5	0.5	100
	Above average	89	10	1	--	100

Personal situation (Jews)		Good	So-so	Bad	Don't know	Total
Age	18–34	80	16	4	--	100
	35–54	76	20	3	1	100
	55+	78	18	3	1	100
Religiosity	Haredi	88	10	2	--	100
	National religious	86	13	1	--	100
	Traditional religious	72	23	4	1	100
	Traditional non-religious	77	18	4.5	0.5	100
	Secular	77	19	4	--	100

As indicated in the above table, of all the factors we examined, the strongest distinguishing variable in the perception of personal situation is income. (Here too, the dividing line is between individuals with a below-average income and those with an average or above-average one.) Such is not the case with political orientation, which was the most distinguishing variable in assessing the situation of the state but had only a negligible effect with regard to personal situation. The remaining variables proved to be secondary and not particularly useful in explaining the inter-group differences on this issue.

Among Arab respondents, we also examined two variables that, in our opinion, were likely to affect respondents' perception of their personal situation: religion; and political affiliation, as reflected in votes for the Joint (Arab) List or Zionist parties.

Table 3.7 (%)

Personal situation (Arabs)		Good	So-so	Bad	Don't know	Total
Religion	Muslim	60	31	9	--	100
	Christian	62	28	6	4	100
	Druze	71	22	7	--	100
Vote in 2015 election	Joint List	58	33	8	1	100
	Zionist parties	74.5	17.5	8	--	100

The table above shows that across all subgroups of the Arab public, the majority assess their personal situation as good; however, the Druze and those who voted for Zionist parties were the most inclined to offer a favorable assessment.

In contrast once more to the prevailing tone in Israeli public discourse, the survey demonstrates that the share of optimists about Israel's future is far greater than that of the pessimists. Nonetheless, the proportion of optimists was lower this year than the last time we asked this question (in 2014).

Table 3.8 (%)

Total sample	2014	2016
Optimistic about Israel's future	76	67

Further, as shown in the following figure, while a majority of both groups have a positive take on the future, the Jews are more optimistic than the Arabs.

Figure 3.4 \ Are you optimistic or pessimistic about Israel's future? (by nationality; %)

We broke down the positions in the Jewish sample into four variables: As shown in the preceding table, a majority in each group is optimistic about Israel's future, with the exception being those who position themselves on the Left, where the majority are pessimistic in their expectations. Because of the (partial) overlap between self-identification with the Left and secular affiliation, the secular respondents also display a relatively low proportion, though still a majority, who are optimistic about Israel's future.

Table 3.9 (%)

	Jews	Optimistic	Pessimistic	Don't Know	Total
Political camp	Right	82	17	1	100
	Center	64	34	2	100
	Left	44	54	2	100
Income	Below average	70	27	3	100
	Average	76	23.5	0.5	100
	Above average	68	31	1	100
Age	18–34	70.5	27	2.5	100
	35–54	71	27	2	100
	55+	68	31	1	100
Religiosity	Haredi	75	21	4	100
	National religious	93	5	2	100
	Traditional religious	82	15	3	100
	Traditional non-religious	75	24	1	100
	Secular	56	42	2	100

Breaking down the responses of the Arab sample by voting patterns in the 2015 election (Joint List or Zionist parties) reveals that a sizeable minority (40%) of Joint List voters are optimistic about the future of the state, as are a large majority of those who voted for the Zionist parties (78%).

A breakdown of the Arab sample by religion indicates that a majority of Christians and Druze are optimistic; this does not hold true, however, for the Muslims, where only a minority—though a sizeable one—have a positive view of Israel's future.

Table 3.10 (%)

Arabs	Muslims	Christians	Druze
Optimistic about Israel's future	45	62	85

Next, we moved on to examining the interviewees' connection with Israel, asking two questions in this context: the first, on pride in being Israeli; and the second, on the feeling of being part of the state and its problems.

In both the Jewish and Arab samples, we found majorities (of different sizes) who report feeling proud to be Israeli, with a very large majority among the Jews and a small one among the Arabs (some 10 percentage points less than the 65% majority we found the last time this was measured, in 2014). Nonetheless, given the fact that we are speaking of a national minority whose level of connection with the central Zionist ethos is low, and who, even in the eyes of a majority of the Jewish public, also suffer from ongoing discrimination (more on that below), this figure suggests a positive, if imperfect, relationship, between Israel and its Arab citizens.

Figure 3.5 \ How proud are you to be an Israeli? (by nationality; %)

We broke down the findings from the Jewish sample using four variables: political camp, income, age, and religiosity. As indicated in the following table, in each of the subgroups there was a clear majority who expressed pride in being Israeli. In this question as well, however, the strongest distinguishing variable was political orientation: The majority on the Left who are proud to be Israeli is noticeably smaller than that in the two other camps. Still, contrary to claims that members of the left-wing camp disown their Israeli identity, the survey data demonstrate that the majority are "proud Israelis." The greatest degree of pride in being Israeli was found among the members of the national religious camp who, as we saw, are also the most satisfied with the situation of the state and the most optimistic regarding its future. Another finding of interest was the majority of Haredi respondents who reported pride in being Israeli, proving once again that despite their difference from the mainstream, the Haredim feel a part of the "Israeli endeavor." Income and age were not found to have significant explanatory value.

Table 3.11 (%)

Jews		Proud to be Israeli
Political camp	Right	92
	Center	90
	Left	65.5
Income	Below average	84
	Average	91
	Above average	85
Age	18–34	85
	35–54	84
	55+	88
Religiosity	Haredi	69
	National religious	96.5
	Traditional religious	93
	Traditional non-religious	90
	Secular	82

Cross-tabulation between assessment of Israel's situation and pride in being Israeli (Jewish respondents) reveals a strong association between the two: while a majority in all of the groups are proud to be Israeli, the size of the majority differs in keeping with the perception of Israel's situation. Thus, of the respondents who consider Israel's situation to be good, 95% are proud to be Israeli; of those who perceive the situation as "so-so," 87%; and of those who characterize the situation as bad, only 69%.

Breaking down the responses of the Arab sample by religion shows that among Christians and Druze a majority are proud to be Israeli (64% and 83%, respectively), while a very large minority of Muslims (49%) feel this way. A breakdown of the responses by voting patterns in the 2015 election (Joint List or Zionist parties) shows that pride in being Israeli among those who voted for Zionist parties is almost double that of voters for the Joint List (80% versus 44%).

From here, we moved on to a question on the sense of being part of the state and its problems:

This year as well, we asked interviewees to what extent they feel part of the state and its problems. The difference here between the Jewish and Arab populations is profound: A sizeable majority of Jews feel a sense of connection with the state and its problems, whereas only a minority of Arab citizens share this sentiment.

Feeling part of the state and its problems

Question 5

Appendix 2
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Figure 3.6 \ To what extent do you feel part of the State of Israel and its problems? (by nationality; %)

On this question, there is no great difference between this year's findings and those of last year, notwithstanding a slight decline in the positive responses of the Jewish population, and a slight increase in those of the Arab population.

Table 3.12 (%)

	2015	2016
Feel part of the state and its problems (Jews)	88	84
Feel part of the state and its problems (Arabs)	32	39.5

Breaking down the responses of the Jewish sample in accordance with the same variables used to analyze the question of pride in being Israeli, we found that not only is there a majority in each of the groups who feel connected, but the differences between the groups are small (though the majority among Haredi respondents is noticeably smaller than it is among the other groups).

Table 3.13 (%)

	Jews	Feel part of the state and its problems
Political camp	Right	86
	Center	84
	Left	81
Income	Below average	80
	Average	86
	Above average	87.5
Age	18–34	79
	35–54	84.5
	55+	88
Religiosity	Haredi	63.5
	National religious	92
	Traditional religious	83.5
	Traditional non-religious	85
	Secular	85

The table below, which analyzes the sense of pride and connectedness of Arabs by religion and voting patterns from the 2015 election, shows that in all the religious groups in the Arab public the sense of connection with the state is weaker than the feeling of pride in being Israeli. How can this gap be explained? Further research is needed on this question, but we can already speculate that the reason lies in the pervasive sense of discrimination among the Arab public (see below), and the fact that they are not included in important state processes—a marginalization that is widely supported by the Jewish population (this too will be discussed below).

On the subject of feeling connected with the state and its problems, like that of pride in being Israeli, there is a clear difference between Druze and Christians, on the one hand, most of whom report that they feel part of the state, and Muslims, only one-third of whom feel this way. We also found a substantial difference between Arabs who reported voting for the Joint List, only a minority of whom feel part of the state and its difficulties, and those who voted for Zionist parties, a majority of whom share this feeling.

Table 3.14 (%)

	Arabs	Proud to be Israeli	Feel part of the state and its problems
Religion	Muslim	49	34
	Christian	64	52
	Druze	83	61
Vote in 2015 election	Joint List	44	29
	Zionist parties	80	59

We then moved on to a crucial question, that of identity. As we know, every person has multiple identities, some of them fundamental and others secondary. Moreover, people simultaneously maintain several personal and collective identities (for instance, parent, professional, citizen). In this report, we focused solely on the identities that have political implications, and only the primary ones.

We wanted to know the primary collective identity of all participants in the survey. The reason we were so insistent, in effect "forcing" them to choose just one identity, despite the fact that they presumably live comfortably with several principal identities, was our desire to find an in-depth explanation for the main points of tension in Israel society, which we will be discussing in the next chapter.

The list of identities presented to the Jewish interviewees consisted of four choices: Israeli, Jewish, ethnic (Mizrahi, Ashkenazi, mixed), and religious (secular/religious, according to level of religiosity).

Figure 3.7 \ Which identity is the most important to you?
(Jewish respondents; %)

As shown in the figure, there is still a small majority of Jews who consider their Israeli identity to be primary, although this majority has been eroded in comparison to past measurements. Second in importance, based on the present survey, is Jewish identity, with the other two identities (ethnic and religious) only minor in scope. Of particular interest is the minimal importance attributed to ethnicity as an identity, which is in keeping with the extremely small share of respondents who hold that ethnic tensions are the strongest source of friction in Israel today (to be discussed below).

A breakdown of identities by religiosity produces the following portrait: Among Haredim, Jewish identity is of prime importance, followed by Haredi identity. For the national religious, their Jewish identity also comes first, but in second place is Israeli identity, followed closely by national-religious identity. Among the traditional religious, Jewish identity is considered the

most important, though not by a majority, with Israeli identity not far below. The traditional non-religious group is split more or less evenly between its Jewish and Israeli identities. Among secular Jews the Israeli identity paramount, and to a statistically significant degree, with Jewish identity trailing far behind. An interesting and noteworthy finding, in light of the fierce debate today in the press and social media over injustices committed against Mizrahi Jews, is that ethnic identity is not at the top of the list of any religious group. As we will see in Chapter 7, this includes the Haredim—Ashkenazim and Mizrahim alike—where ethnic tensions have erupted on more than one occasion in recent years due to claims of blatant discrimination against Mizrahim, for instance, in admission to "Ashkenazi" schools and kindergartens.

Table 3.15 (%)

Primary identity (Jews)	Israeli	Jewish	Ethnic	Religious	Other/equal/ none	Total
Haredi	1	56	1	42	--	100
National religious	16	62	1	13	8	100
Traditional religious	40	48	1	4	7	100
Traditional non-religious	47	47	1	1	4	100
Secular	76	14	2	3	5	100

A breakdown by political identificatiaon reveals that whereas for the Left and Center, Israeli identity is dominant to a statistically significant degree, on the Right, Jewish identity is primary. The share of respondents on the Right who attach the highest importance to their religious identity is more than twice that of the Center or Left. In this breakdown as well, ethnic identity emerges as a marginal variable.

Table 3.16 (%)

Primary identity (Jews)	Israeli	Jewish	Ethnic	Religious	Other/equal/ none	Total
Right	35	49	1	10	5	100
Center	65	24	3	4	4	100
Left	79	10	0.5	4	6.5	100

It would appear, then, that in Jewish Israeli society today there are two "competing" primary identities, Israeli and Jewish, that generally dovetail with religious and political affiliation. This is a classic example of overlapping cleavages, which according to the professional literature threaten democratic stability in the long term, since they do not compensate for one another but rather reinforce one another.

Arab respondents were given the following options to choose from as their primary identity: Israeli, Palestinian, Arab, and religious (Muslim/Christian/Druze). As the figure below indicates, the strongest identity among Arab respondents is religious, followed by Israeli and Arab. Palestinian identity was selected as primary by the smallest share of respondents, bolstering the argument that the Arab population is undergoing a process of Israelization and, at least seemingly, countering the widespread claim that a major process of Palestinization has taken place, or is taking place, in Arab Israeli society.

Figure 3.8 \ Which identity is the most important to you?
(Arab respondents; %)

A breakdown of the Arab sample by religion yielded interesting results. The responses of Muslim interviewees when asked about their primary identity can be summarized as follows: religious identity, as chosen by the largest share, followed by Arab and Israeli identity, with Palestinian identity trailing far behind. The differences between the first three identities in the ranking are relatively minor, meaning that the distribution of identities among the the Muslim Arab population is greater than in the Jewish population as a whole. We learned further that among Christian Arabs, Arab identity takes precedence, followed after a sizeable gap by Israeli and religious identities. Here too, Palestinian identity is at the bottom of the list. Among the Druze, religious identity is dominant, followed by Israeli identity, while Arab identity is weak and Palestinian identity is negligible.

A breakdown of the Arab sample by voting patterns in the 2015 election (Joint List or Zionist parties) highlights considerable differences between the two groups: Among voters for the Joint List, the greatest share of interviewees state that their Arab identity is the most important. In second place, in terms of the proportion who select it as their primary identity, is religious identity. By contrast, among voters for Zionist parties, the highest share of respondents report that their Israeli identity is paramount, followed by religious identity. In both cases, Palestinian identity is fourth on the list of primary identities.

The fact that a considerable portion of the Arab public define their Israeli identity as primary, coupled with the low share of respondents who claim Palestinian identity as their primary one, raises interesting questions about primary and secondary identities, both real and imagined.

Table 3.17 (%)

	Primary identity (Arabs)	Israeli	Palestinian	Arab	Religious	Other/ equal/ none	Total
Religion	Muslim	23	13	25	28	11	100
	Christian	22	14	32	18	14	100
	Druze	37	--	5	54	4	100
Vote in 2015 election	Joint List	16	16	32	26	10	100
	Zionist parties	48	4	14	32	2	100

The remaining questions in this chapter deal with Israel's definition as a Jewish state:

The question that we asked this year to examine the relationship between the two components of the definition of Israel as a state was slightly different from past versions. This year, we asked: "Israel is defined as a Jewish and democratic state. Do you feel there is a good balance today between the Jewish and the democratic components?" Although the most frequent response among Jews was that the Jewish component is too dominant, there is a relatively equal spread between the various answers, as shown in the figure below. Among the Arab respondents, the clear consensus is that the Jewish component is too dominant, which may explain the lack of connection to the state expressed by many in this group.

Figure 3.9 \ Is there a good balance today between the Jewish and democratic components of the state? (by nationality; %)

As shown below, in none of the religious groups is there a majority who feel that the balance between the two components is satisfactory (with the exception of the traditional religious, where we found equal propotions of those who hold that the balance is good and those who feel that the democratic component is too dominant). In the opinion of the Haredi and national religious respondents, the democratic component is overly dominant, whereas the traditional non-religious and secular feel that the Jewish element is too strong.

Breaking down the results by political orientation yields the following results: On the Right, the greatest share of respondents feel that there is a good balance between the Jewish and democratic components. This group also contains the highest share (of the three political camps) who hold that the democratic element is too dominant. In the Center and Left camps, a majority in each group believe that the Jewish component is too strong (slightly above 50% and roughly 75%, respectively). As with the subject of primary identities, this finding too supports the impression that overlapping cleavages exist in Israeli society, threatening the country's internal cohesion.

Table 3.18 (%)

	Jews	There is a good balance between the two components	Jewish component is too dominant	Democratic component is too dominant	Other / Don't know	Total
Religiosity	Haredi	17	4	69	10	100
	National religious	38	9	45.5	7.5	100
	Traditional religious	36	17	36	11	100
	Traditional non-religious	37.5	40.5	18	4	100
	Secular	23	59	12	6	100
Political camp	Right	38	21	35	6	100
	Center	26	51.5	17	5.5	100
	Left	11.5	75.5	8	5	100

The next question that we will discuss in this context relates to recognition of the Jewishness of the State of Israel. The question was worded differently for Arabs and for Jews.

The wording presented to the Arab respondents was as follows: "Israel has the right to be defined as the state of the Jewish people." Three quarters of Arab interviewees did not agree with this statement, while less than one fifth agreed with it. This, then, is a major bone of contention between the Jewish Israeli and Arab Israeli populations (including the Druze, who generally serve in the army and who vote for Zionist parties), and as such, it must be taken into account when discussing the present and future definition of the state.

Figure 3.10 \ "Israel has the right to be defined as the state of the Jewish people" (Arab respondents; %)

We broke down the responses of the Arab interviewees by religion and by voting patterns in the 2015 election. A majority in all the groups do not agree that Israel has the right to be defined as the state of the Jewish people. This majority is particularly substantial among Muslims, and even more so among voters for the Joint List. Even among Druze respondents and voters for Zionist lists, who expressed pride in being Israeli and a comparatively strong sense of connectedness with the state and its problems, we found a majority who deny Israel's right to self-definition as a Jewish state.

Table 3.19 (%)

	Israel has the right to be defined as the state of the Jewish people	Agree	Disagree	Don't know	Total
Religion	Muslim	14	79	7	100
	Christian	18	76	6	100
	Druze	34	63	3	100
Vote in 2015 election	Joint List	11	84	5	100
	Zionist parties	36	62	2	100

The question concerning the Jewish character of the state was worded differently for the Jewish respondents, who were asked to express agreement or disagreement with the following sentence: "People who are unwilling to affirm that Israel is the nation-state of the Jewish people should lose their right to vote." A majority of respondents agree with this statement— an extremely worrisome finding in terms of respect for basic democratic rights, among them freedom of conscience and thought.

Figure 3.11 \ "People who are unwilling to affirm that Israel is the nation-state of the Jewish people should lose their right to vote" (Jewish respondents; %)

As expected, a breakdown of responses by political camp yields vast differences: on the Right, a majority agree with the statement; in the Center, a majority disagree, but a sizeable minority agree; and on the Left, by contrast, there is only a very small minority who agree.

Table 3.20 (%)

Jews	Right	Center	Left
Agree that those who are unwilling to affirm that Israel is the state of the Jewish people should lose the right to vote	71	43	15

The final question that we posed, on the relationship between religion and state, touched on whether secular law or religious law is the supreme authority in Israel.

This question too was formulated slightly differently for Jewish and Arab respondents. Jewish interviewees were asked: "If a contradiction arose between Jewish religious law (halakha) and a (state) court ruling, which would you follow?" while Arabs were asked: "If a contradiction arose between your religious dictates and a (state) court ruling, which would you follow?" As the table below indicates, a majority of Jewish respondents report that they would act in accordance with court rulings while the Arabs are split more or less evenly, with a slightly greater share stating that they would follow the dictates of their religion.

Table 3.21 (%)

	Would act in accordance with dictates of religion/halakha	Would act in accordance with (secular) court rulings
Jews	28	64
Arabs	48	44

Breaking down the responses of the Jews by religiosity produces the expected results: Among the Haredim and national religious, the majority would act in accordance with halakha; among the traditional religious, the distribution is quite even, with a slight preference for complying with a court ruling; and among the traditional non-religious and secular, the majority would obey a secular court ruling.

Table 3.22 (%)

	Would act in accordance with halakha	Would act in accordance with court rulings
Haredi	97	2
National religious	71	20
Traditional religious	40	44
Traditional non-religious	16	72
Secular	6	89

The responses of the Arab interviewees were broken down by religion and level of religiosity.

Table 3.23 (%)

		Would act in accordance with religious dictates	Would act in accordance with court rulings
Religion	Muslim	56	38
	Christian	24	62
	Druze	32	56
Religiosity	Very religious	61.5	38.5
	Religious	73	24.5
	Traditional	50	39
	Not at all religious	10	84

As the table indicates, a majority of Muslims, as opposed to only a minority of Christians and Druze, report that they would act in accordance with religious dictates. With regard to level of religiosity, only among those who defined themselves as "not religious as all" was there a majority who would comply with a secular court ruling.

In this question we encountered a difference in the Arab public between men and women: Among men, a majority (52%) stated that they would follow a secular court ruling, while among women the greater share (56.5%) said that they would act in accordance with religious dictates.

Chapter 4 \ State and Governance

In this chapter, we will examine what the Israeli public thinks about Israel's system of government, government performance, and politicians. We will be discussing:

- The system of government
- Relations between citizens and government
- Politicians
- Corruption
- Government performance
- Public trust in institutions

System of Government

In the wake of recent statements that support for the democratic model of government is steadily being eroded among broad swathes of the Israeli public, not only in practice but also in theory, we wanted to know to what extent democracy is perceived today as a desirable system of government.

Given the widespread understanding in the Israeli public that the country still faces unique challenges, we asked if Israel should maintain its democratic character or shift to a different form of government that would perhaps be better suited to its problems. This is not a trivial question, since the Jewish public holds, for example, that democracies are less effective than non-democratic states in the fight against terror (as discussed in the next chapter). In this case, when security is at the top of Israel's national priorities, it wouldn't be unfathomable for the preference to be for an undemocratic regime that better serves the country's security interests. However, we found that a majority of the Israeli public—Jews and Arabs alike—believe that Israel must preserve its democratic character in order to cope effectively with the challenges confronting it.

Figure 4.1 \ "To deal successfully with the challenges confronting it, Israel must maintain its democratic character" (total sample; %)

We wanted to know more about those who do not agree with the above statement. A breakdown of responses by religiosity (Jews) showed that there are higher concentrations of respondents in the more religious groups who do not agree that democracy is the preferred system. In all cases, they are in the minority; still, these respondents form sizeable proportions of each of these groups, ranging from roughly one-quarter to a third who do not agree with the statement that a democratic regime is preferable in order to successfully cope with challenges faced by a nation.

Table 4.1 (%)

	Do not agree that Israel must maintain its democratic character in order to cope with challenges
Haredim	38
National religious	25
Traditional religious	23
Traditional non-religious	13
Secular	7

A breakdown of results in the Jewish sample by political orientation shows a clear preference for democracy in all three of the camps, with only minorities who disagree; on the Left, this minority is particularly low (disagree: Right, 21%; Center, 11.5%; Left, 3%).

Breaking down the responses in the Arab sample by voting patterns in the 2015 election, we found only a minority among both sets of voters—Joint List and Zionist parties—who disagree with the statement that Israel must maintain a democratic regime to cope effectively with its challenges; however, the share who feel this way in the former group is double the size of that in the latter group (13% versus 6%, respectively).

In other words, at least on the declarative level, the overwhelming majority of the Israeli public as a whole sees democracy as an effective tool for addressing the problems confronting the state.

From here, we moved on to examining whether the public believes that the present electoral system contributes to the proper functioning of government.

We asked: "In your opinion, does Israel's current electoral system allow the government to function properly?" The general public is divided over this question, tipping slightly in favor of those who feel that the present system hampers government functioning. But this is not the entire story. In contrast to the preceding question about preserving democracy, here there is a noticeable difference between Jews, most of whom responded that the present electoral system does not allow the government to function well, and Arabs, where an almost identical majority gave the opposite response, namely, that the existing electoral system does allow the government to function properly. (It should be noted that among Arab respondents, we found a high share—11%—who answered "don't know.") It is quite possible that Arab Israelis fear changes to the present electoral system, since they may enhance effectiveness and simultaneously weaken Arab Israeli political representation. Such a scenario is possible if, for example, the electoral threshold were to be raised again.

Table 4.2 (%)

Electoral system allows government to function properly	Agree	Disagree	Don't know	Total
Total sample	44	51	5	100
Jews	42	54	4	100
Arabs	53	36	11	100

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation indicates that in all camps the share who feel that the electoral system hobbles the functioning of government exceeds the share who feel the opposite way; but a greater proportion of those who align themselves with the Left or Center take a negative view of the present electoral system compared with those on the Right (Left, 59%; Center, 60%; Right, 50%).

Breaking down the responses by religiosity shows that among Haredim a majority (61%) feel that the existing electoral system does in fact allow the government to function properly. The traditional religious are split almost down the middle (with 49% believing that the present system allows for adequate functioning, and 44% that it does not). By contrast, a majority of the national religious (52%), the traditional non-religious (61%), and the secular (57%) camps responded that the present system does not enable proper functioning.

As in several previous years, we asked interviewees to express their agreement or disagreement with the following statement: "To handle Israel's unique problems, we need a strong leader who is not swayed by the Knesset, the media or public opinion." The findings, which are summarized in the following figure, reveal a clear division between the preferences of the Jewish public, most of whom are opposed to the notion of a strong leader with virtually no limitations, and the Arab public, most of whom support the idea. (This finding would seem to contradict the support of a majority of the Arab sector for the democratic model.)

Figure 4.2 \ "To handle Israel's unique problems, we need a strong leader who is not swayed by the Knesset, the media or public opinion" (by nationality; %)

Breaking down the responses of the Jewish interviewees by religiosity, we found that a majority of Haredim and traditional religious support the idea of a strong leader who is not bound by the legislature, the media, or public opinion. In the remaining three groups (national religious, traditional non-religious, and secular), a clear majority are opposed to this notion.

Table 4.3 (%)

Israel needs a strong leader	Agree	Disagree	Don't know	Total
Haredim	60	37	3	100
National religious	35	64	1	100
Traditional religious	53	42	5	100
Traditional non-religious	33	66	1	100
Secular	33	65	2	100

As stated, among the Arab public we found a majority who support the idea of a strong leader. When we broke down the responses of the Arab interviewees by religion, a similar majority favored the idea in all three groups: Muslims (65%), Christians (64%), and Druze (61%). Similarly, a breakdown of results by voting patterns in the 2015 election did not yield great differences in the size of the majority who preferred a strong leader (66% among Joint List voters, and 59% among those who voted for Zionist parties).

Relations between Citizens and Government

One of the hallmarks of a sound democracy is a high proportion of citizens who feel that their voice is being heard. As shown below, Israel's standing in this area continues to be poor—a curious finding in light of the international indicator of political participation, where Israel earned a good score and placed very high in the international rankings. Thus, we find ourselves caught in a paradox: Israelis participate politically on a very large scale, yet—as shown in the past and below—their sense of being able to influence government policy is extremely low.

Therefore, we posed the question again this year: "To what extent are you and your friends able to influence government policy?" And again, only a negligible share of respondents in the total sample (17%) said that they feel able to affect policy while a large majority (82%) reported feeling powerless. The similarity between the Jewish and Arab populations on this question calls for consideration: Among Jewish respondents, the majority who feel that they have little

to no influence on policy is smaller, though only slightly, than the corresponding figure in the Arab public (81% versus 87%). In other words, the country's majority and minority populations find themselves in a similar situation: A very large proportion of Israel's citizens feel that the government does not listen to them.

Figure 4.3 \ To what extent are you and your friends able to influence government policy? (total sample; %)

As shown in Appendix 4, we saw a very similar distribution of responses in past years, suggesting that this inattentiveness is a prevailing feature of Israeli politics: feelings of helplessness vis-a-vis state institutions.

We broke down the responses of the Jewish sample for this question using four variables—political orientation, income, age, and religiosity—and found a majority in each of the subgroups who feel that they have no real influence on government policy. At the same time, there are differences: Those who identify themselves with the Right feel more able to influence policy, as do those whose incomes are average or below average, the youngest age group, and the national religious. This last group, a minority, has the highest share of respondents who feel able to influence policy (29%), which is corroborated by the finding that voters for the Jewish Home (Bayit Yehudi) party are the most likely to see themselves as having influence (27%). Interestingly enough, our analysis of the responses to this question by voting patterns in the 2015 election did not raise noticeable differences between voters for the parties now in the coalition and voters for the parties in the opposition. In both these groups, the majority feel that they lack influence on policy.

Table 4.4 (%)

		Feel able to influence government policy
Political camp	Right	21
	Center	13.5
	Left	15
Income	Below average	20
	Average	20.5
	Above average	14
Age	18–34	21
	35–54	18
	55+	15
Religiosity	Haredi	15
	National religious	29
	Traditional religious	25
	Traditional non-religious	16
	Secular	14

Various breakdowns of the Arab sample did not yield statistically significant differences between the various subgroups: in all cases, we found a similar and very large majority who feel unable to influence government policy.

Much has been said of late about the decline of Israel's political parties. Membership has been dropping for years, and the level of public trust in the parties is negligible (more on this below). Some see this as catastrophic for democracy, and others accept it as part of a process of global change reflected in the waning importance of political parties. We therefore wanted to know how Israelis relate to the parties as representative of their political opinions.

We asked the interviewees if there is a party today that genuinely reflects their views. While we found a small majority in the Jewish sample who feel that there is such a party, in the Arab sample the majority assert that there is no party currently that represents their views in a satisfactory manner, which should set off warning bells especially among the leadership of the Joint List, which supposedly represents the entire Arab public in Israel.

Figure 4.4 \ Is there a political party in Israel today that truly represents your views? (by nationality, %)

Breaking down the responses of the Jewish sample shows that on the Left and Right, we found that a majority feel that there are parties that aptly reflect their views, but in the Center, only a minority (though a sizeable one) can say the same. This finding is somewhat surprising given the fact that two centrist parties ran in the last election (Yesh Atid and Kulanu), garnering together no fewer than 21 seats.

Table 4.5 (%)

	Right	Center	Left
There is a party that represents my views	57.5	44	60

A breakdown of responses from Jews by religiosity shows that the higher the level of religiosity, the greater the sense of being well represented by the existing parties. The highest share who feels that there is a party that represents their opinions was found among the Haredim (70%). In the other groups, the proportion of satisfied voters gradually declines from 57% (national religious) to 50% (secular).

Among Arab interviewees, we found a sizeable difference between voters for the Joint List—only 42% of whom feel that there is a party that truly represents them (perhaps because this is a list comprising three parties with profound differences between them)—and voters for Zionist parties, where a majority of 53% state that there is such a party. (It should be recalled, however, that the share of those who reported voting for the Zionist parties is low, certainly in comparison with those who reported voting for the Joint List.)

Breaking down the responses of the Jewish sample by age shows that roughly one-half of the youngest and intermediate age groups answered this question in the affirmative, compared with almost 60% of the oldest age group. Stated otherwise, a greater proportion of older adults feel that there is a party that truly represents them. Among Arab respondents, only a minority in all age groups shared this feeling; the lowest share was recorded in the youngest age group, which would seem to be the most alienated from the party system.

When respondents who replied that there was a party that represented them were then asked if this was the party they voted for in the last election, a large majority in both populations (81% of Jews, and 87% of Arabs) answered that this was indeed the case, which suggests that party loyalty is not entirely a thing of the past.

Politicians

Politicians are professionals who are tasked with implementing democratic principles, whether through legislation or by translating democracy into the language of policy. But year after year, the *Democracy Index* survey finds that the Israeli public has a negative opinion of politicians, their motives, their integrity, and their performance. This year as well, the picture that we offer is a bleak one.

The first question that we posed in this context touched on the way that Knesset members carry out their jobs. In 2016, we found that some two-thirds of the total sample disagree with the sentence: "Most Knesset members work hard and are doing a good job." In both the Jewish and Arab samples, a majority take a negative view of their parliamentarians' performance, though among Jews the majority is larger than it is among Arabs (66% versus 58%, respectively). Only about one-third of interviewees agreed with the statement. In other words, a majority of the Israeli public hold that most of their elected representatives do not meet their expectations in terms of effort and achievement.

Figure 4.5 \ "Most Knesset members work hard and are doing a good job" (total sample; %)

On each of the five occasions that we have studied this topic over the years, a majority of those sampled answered in the negative. However, during the last two election years (2013 and 2015) the share who disagreed with the statement that most Knesset members work hard and are doing a good job was lower than in other years. This may be because in an election year the public has more exposure to Knesset members, or because of the hopes aroused for improvement—a feeling that quickly dissipates in the post-election years.

Table 4.6 (%)

	2011	2012	2013	2015	2016
Do not agree that most Knesset members work hard and are doing a good job	63	62	48	54	64.5

Breaking down the responses of the Jewish interviewees by religiosity, we find a majority of some kind in each of the groups who disagree with the statement, apart from the national religious, where a majority (52.5%) feel that most Knesset members in fact work hard and perform their jobs satisfactorily. A breakdown by political orientation shows that individuals on the Right are more inclined than those from the Center or Left to agree that Knesset members are doing their jobs as they should; but these are still only a minority. Breaking down the Arab sample by votes for the Joint List or Zionist parties yields a similar share from both groups who are prepared to be complimentary toward Knesset members.

As we saw earlier, a majority of the public feel unable to influence government policy. This feeling is most probably connected with the prevailing view that politicians in Israel are not in touch with their public's real needs and problems. As shown in the figure below, this feeling is widespread in all sectors of the population, but is slightly more prevalent among Arabs (83%) than among Jews (74%).

Figure 4.6 \ "Politicians in Israel are detached from the Israeli public's real needs and problems" (agree; by nationality; %)

Is there a difference in this assessment when broken down by political orientation? Among Jewish respondents, we found that in all three of the camps more than two-thirds feel this way, yet the size of the majority differs in each camp: on the Right, the share who think of politicians as detached is noticeably less than the corresponding figure on the Center or the Left (67%, 80.5%, and 82%, respectively). In the Arab public, as stated, a sizeable majority believe that politicians are disconnected from the public, but there is a slight difference between voters for the Joint List and for Zionist parties: among the former, 82% feel that politicians are detached from the needs of their constituents, and among the latter, a slightly higher share (88%) share this view.

In light of the high share of Arab respondents who assert that their elected representatives are detached from the people, as well as recent expressions of displeasure with the priorities of the sector's political leadership, we asked Arab interviewees whether or not Arab leaders are in fact concerned mainly with the problems of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, and not sufficiently concerned with the problems of Israeli Arabs. A total of 61% of interviewees responded that the leaders devote too much attention to the problems of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, which may explain the fact that so many of them report feeling that Israeli politicians are detached from the public who elected them.

Figure 4.7 \ "Arab leaders are mainly concerned with the problems of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, and not sufficiently concerned with the problems of Israeli Arabs" (Arab respondents; %)

Strongly agree
Somewhat agree
Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree
Don't know

A breakdown of responses by religion shows a majority in all three groups who feel that the Arab leadership is too involved with the affairs of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, and not concerned enough with Israeli Arabs; however, the share who feel this way is slightly larger among Christians (72%) than among Druze (68%) and Muslims (60%). Breaking down the findings by voters for the Joint List or Zionist parties, we find that in both cases a majority take issue with the priorities of the Arab leadership, but to a lesser extent among voters for the Joint List (59%) than among voters for Zionist parties (76%).

If we still had any doubt about what Israelis think of their elected representatives, it vanished completely with the unequivocal responses to the statement: "Politicians look out more for their own interests than for those of the public who elected them." A clear majority of the total sample (79%) agreed with this "accusatory" statement.

Figure 4.8 \ "Politicians look out more for their own interests than for those of the public who elected them" (total sample; %)

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation yields a substantial majority who agree in all three camps, though to differing degrees (Right, 77%; Center, 80.5%; Left, 86%). Breaking down the responses by religiosity shows a majority in each of the groups, but in keeping with the generally more positive view of Israel's situation and political system among the national religious, here too their majority is the smallest (56%), while in the other groups it hovers around 80%.

A breakdown of responses in the Arab sample by voting patterns in the 2015 election shows a majority in both groups who agree with the statement that politicians look out first and foremost for themselves. Among voters for Zionist parties, this majority is greater (88%) than it is among voters for the Joint List (77%).

Since it is only a short leap from self-interest to corruption, we moved on to examining this aspect of the public's assessment of government performance.

Corruption

Lately, a great deal has been said and written about personal and party corruption at various levels of government in Israel, with a considerable number of cases coming to light, some even reaching the courts and resulting in prison terms. While according to the *Corruption Perceptions Index* (an international indicator of corruption) Israel is not defined as a corrupt country, it seems that the Israeli public beg to differ: a clear majority believe that Israel's leadership is very, or at least somewhat, corrupt. On a scale of 1 to 5 (where 1 = very corrupt and 5 = not at all corrupt), the corruption mean scores granted to Israeli leadership by the total sample and its subgroups are as follows (the lower the score, the greater the perceived degree of corruption):

Table 4.7 (%)

	Corruption rating (1– 5)
Total sample	**2.32**
Jews	**2.33**
Arabs	**2.25**

Breaking the results down by political orientation (among Jews) yields the following scores: Right, 2.5; Center, 2.2; and Left, 2.0. In other words, in none of the camps is the leadership seen as free of corruption, but the Left ascribes a lower degree of integrity to it than do the other two. Looking at the trend in this area over time, we find that a slight drop was recorded in the mean corruption score this year compared with the previous two years, indicating a further rise in the public's perception that the country's political leaders are corrupt.

Table 4.8 (%)

	2014	2015	2016
Average yearly score	**2.5**	**2.4**	**2.3**

Where there is corruption, cronyism is usually not far behind. We wanted to hear the opinion of the interviewees on the statement: "The only way to get things done in Israel is if you have connections and know the right people." Over three-quarters (78%) of the total sample agreed with this distressing statement about how the country is run. The difference between Jews and Arabs who agree with this judgment is slight (79% and 74%, respectively).

Figure 4.9 \ "The only way to get things done in Israel is if you have connections and know the right people" (total sample; %)

An analysis by subgroups did not yield substantial differences among Jews or Arabs.

Government performance

We have found, then, that the Israeli public takes a dim view of its politicians. What about the functioning of the system as a whole? We wanted to know what the public thinks of the way the state is fulfilling its role in various areas.

The areas of interest to us were: military-security, economic, social, political-diplomatic, and maintaining public order. The two-part figure below shows several differences between the Jewish and Arab populations, though both offer positive assessments in the military-security sphere.

Figure 4.10 \ How would you rate the state's performance in the following areas? (by nationality; %)

The table below summarizes the most frequent assessments of the Jewish respondents in the various areas. As shown, there is only one sphere—military-security—where the state's performance is rated as good by a majority of the Jewish sample. Preservation of public order is the sole area where the three levels are more or less evenly distributed, though a slightly higher share of respondents rate the state's performance as average. In the economic, social, and political-diplomatic areas, the most frequent opinion of the state's performance is poor, with the latter category "enjoying" a particularly low rating, 50% of Jewish respondents classifying it as poor.

Table 4.9 (%)

Most frequent assessment (Jews)	Good	Average	Poor
Military-security	75		
Economic			41.5
Social			44
Political-diplomatic			50
Maintaining public order		35	

As stated, among Arabs as well the military-security area is the only one in which the most frequent assessment of the state's performance is good, though it is lower than the corresponding figure among the Jews. Here, in contrast to the Jewish public, the most common rating in the social realm is average, while in the economic, political-diplomatic, and public order spheres the most frequent response is poor, fairly similar to the Jewish sample.

Table 4.10 (%)

Most frequent assessment (Arabs)	Good	Average	Poor
Military-security	52		
Economic			36
Social		42	
Political-diplomatic			40
Maintaining public order			40

How do things look from the vantage point of the three political camps in the Jewish sample? The following table summarizes the share of respondents from the Right, Center, and Left who assess the state's performance in the various areas as good. As we can see from the table, a majority in all three camps confer this rating only in the military-security sphere (with the Center offering the most positive assessment). In all other areas, only a minority in all three camps judge the state's performance to be good. Not surprisingly, the largest gap between Right and Left relates to the state's functioning in the political-diplomatic sphere: roughly one-quarter of the Right rate the state's performance in this area as good, as opposed to a negligible minority on the Left (25% versus 6%, respectively). Also unremarkably, in all five areas, including military-security, the lowest share who assess the state's performance as good is found among respondents on the Left, who are the most removed ideologically from the present government.

Table 4.11 (%)

Rate state's performance as good (Jews)	Right	Center	Left
Military-security	76	80	65
Economic	35	18	12
Social	21	12	7
Political-diplomatic	25	14.5	6
Maintaining public order	35	35	22

A breakdown of Arab interviewees' responses by voting patterns in the 2015 election shows sizeable gaps in the military-security and public order spheres. In the former area, a majority of those who voted for Zionist parties, and a minority of Joint List voters, assess the state's performance as good. With regard to maintaining public order the criticism among voters for Zionist parties is more muted.

Table 4.12 (%)

Rate state's performance as good (Arabs)	Voted for Joint List	Voted for Zionist parties
Military-security	42	73
Economic	32	37
Social	18	27
Political-diplomatic	22	20
Maintaining public order	24.5	55

The poor assessment of the state's performance by the public is also reflected in responses to the question regarding the international community's harsh criticism of Israel.

We presented the interviewees with five factors that may be feeding international criticism of Israel: Israel's behavior and political positions in the conflict with the Palestinians; global antisemitism; shortcomings in Israeli public diplomacy; activities of Israeli peace and human-rights organizations; and inequality in Israel between Jewish and Arab citizens. The Jewish public, in equal proportions (29%), pointed to two factors that it believes are fueling the criticism: Israel's behavior and political positions in the context of the conflict, and global antisemitism. In the Arab public, one factor stood out as responsible for the situation in the eyes of a majority of the respondents: Israel's behavior and positions in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (58%).

A breakdown of Jewish responses by political orientation shows that on the Right, the primary reason is considered to be antisemitism, whereas in the Center the most frequent response is Israel's behavior and policies in the context of the conflict; the Left shares this view, but at twice the rate of the Center.

Table 4.13 (%)

	Right	Center	Left
Main reason for harsh international criticism of Israel	Antisemitism (40%)	Behavior and policies of Israel in conflict with Palestinians (34%)	Behavior and policies of Israel in conflict with Palestinians (69%)

A breakdown by religiosity shows that in all groups, with the exception of secular Jews, the primary reason given for international criticism of Israel is antisemitism: Haredim, 48%; national religious, 41%; traditional religious, 31%; and traditional non-religious, 32%. In the view of the secular respondents, the main reason is Israel's behavior and policies concerning the conflict with the Palestinians (41%).

In light of this unflattering opinion of the government's performance in various areas, we wanted to examine the internal issues that pose the greatest threat to Israel today, from the public's perspective.

We presented the interviewees with a series of internal issues that have been widely discussed in Israeli public discourse in general and the media in particular over the past year, and that have been identified by various sources as posing a danger to the state: Israel's control over the West Bank/Judea and Samaria, social/economic gaps, demands to make Israel more democratic, demands to make Israel more Jewish, diminution of the country's Jewish majority, and strong disagreements between various segments of Israeli society. First, we asked interviewees to

assess the extent to which each of these factors represents an existential threat to the State of Israel. The figure below illustrates the percentages of Jews and Arabs who defined each of these factors as such to a large or very large extent.

Figure 4.11 \ To what extent does each of the following internal factors constitute an existential threat to the State of Israel? ("very much" and "quite a lot"; by nationality; %)

As shown in the above figure, Jewish respondents rank splits within Israeli society in first place as the most serious existential threat (67%), followed immediately by social/economic gaps (66%) and diminution of the Jewish majority (65%). The Arab interviewees, by contrast, place demands to make Israel more Jewish as the most serious existential threat (73%); in second place is Israeli control of the West Bank (57.5%); and in third, strong disagreements in Israeli society (55%). As for the other factors, it is interesting to note that the Jewish public is less

concerned by the demands to make Israel more democratic than by the demands to make it more Jewish. Continued control of Judea and Samaria is apparently not seen by the Jewish public as a serious threat (as opposed to its perception as a grave existential threat in the eyes of the Arab public): the only factor that generated less of a response is the call to make Israel more democratic.

Overall, our findings indicate that Israeli society is functioning in a state of existential anxiety.

A breakdown of responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation and religiosity does show some differences, though we can make the generalization that all of the subgroups (each for its own reasons) view most of the factors cited here as existential threats, to a large or very large extent. Also noteworthy is the finding that all of the political camps and levels of religiosity see the real or perceived contraction of Israel's Jewish majority as a potent threat.

Table 4.14 (%)

Consider factor to be an existential threat to Israel "quite a lot" or "very much" (Jews)		Continued control of West Bank/Judea and Samaria	Diminution of the country's Jewish majority	Social/ economic gaps
Political camp	Right	27	69	61
	Center	53.5	65	71
	Left	76	57	75
Religiosity	Haredi	27	74	55
	National religious	20	68.5	48
	Traditional religious	33	58	57
	Traditional non-religious	42	67	73
	Secular	54	63	70

	Consider factor to be an existential threat to Israel "quite a lot" or "very much" (Jews)	Demands to make Israel more Jewish	Demands to make Israel more democratic	Strong disagreements between segments of Israeli society
Political camp	Right	35	39	63
	Center	53	28	71
	Left	77	17	72.5
Religiosity	Haredi	20	45.5	64
	National religious	20	43	52
	Traditional religious	40	39	66
	Traditional non-religious	45.5	34	73
	Secular	64	23	67

Breaking down the Arab sample by religion and by voting patterns in the 2015 election, we find that in all the subgroups, the demands to make Israel more Jewish are seen by the largest share of respondents as a serious existential threat. Among Muslims and voters for the Joint List, this is followed in importance by Israel's continued control of the West Bank/Judea and Samaria. By contrast, among Christians and Druze, strong disagreements within Israeli society are next in line, while among voters for Zionist parties, social/economic gaps and differences of opinion are tied in second place.

Table 4.15 (%)

	Consider factor to be an existential threat to Israel "quite a lot" or "very much" (Arabs)	Continued control of West Bank/Judea and Samaria	Diminution of the country's Jewish majority	Social/ economic gaps
Religion	Muslim	63	38.5	52
	Christian	42	26	44
	Druze	46	41.5	37
Vote in 2015 election	Joint List	65	38	57
	Zionist parties	43	41	45

	Consider factor to be an existential threat to Israel "quite a lot" or "very much" (Arabs)	Demands to make Israel more Jewish	Demands to make Israel more democratic	Strong disagreements between segments of Israeli society
Religion	Muslim	77	24.5	58
	Christian	60	14	48
	Druze	66	34	51
Vote in 2015 election	Joint List	72	26	61
	Zionist parties	65	37	45

From here, we moved on to examining which of the above factors is seen by the public as posing the most serious threat. As the following table shows, the greatest share of Jews pointed to strong disagreements in Israeli society as the gravest danger (26%), while the highest proportion of Arabs selected Israel's continued control of the West Bank (26%). In second place, not far behind, the Jewish respondents chose social/economic gaps (23%), and the Arabs, demands to make Israel more Jewish (23%). Here too, there is no clear-cut cluster around one topic, but it is obvious that the Jewish and Arab populations have different fears. The Jews are more concerned about social disintegration, and the Arabs, about the continued occupation and their status in Israel, which is seeking to become more Jewish.

Table 4.16 (%)

Most serious internal threat	Jews	Arabs
Israel's control of West Bank/Judea and Samaria	14	26
Social/economic gaps	23	8
Demands to make Israel more democratic	6	3
Demands to make Israel more Jewish	7	23
Diminution of Jewish majority	19.5	11
Strong disagreements between segments of society	26	19

A breakdown of Jewish respondents by political orientation reveals that on the Right, the two threats that are considered to be the most serious (27% in both cases) are diminution of the country's Jewish majority and strong disagreements within Israel society. In the Center, the gravest threat is seen as social/economic gaps, followed immediately by strong disagreements within society (28% and 27%, respectively). On the Left, there is a cluster around one clear threat: Israel's continued control of the West Bank/Judea and Samaria (37%).

Breaking down the results by religiosity shows that the Haredim are the only group whose primary concern is the shrinking of the country's Jewish majority (36%). In all the other religious groups, the most serious threat is seen as strong disagreements in society or social/ economic gaps, in this order: the national religious fear strong disagreements most of all (31%) followed by a decrease in the country's Jewish majority (29%); the traditional religious are most concerned about the strong disagreements within Israeli society (23%), followed closely by social/economic gaps (22%); the traditional non-religious see the greatest threat as being social/economic gaps (27%), after which come the strong disagreements within society (26%); and secular Jews, like their traditional religious counterparts, perceive strong disagreements as the most serious threat (26%), followed closely by social/economic gaps (24%).

A breakdown of responses in the Arab sample indicates that among Muslims, Israeli control of the West Bank/Judea and Samaria is considered the gravest threat. The same holds true for Christians (28%) and voters for the Joint List (27%). Among the Druze and voters for Zionist parties, the primary threat is seen as the strong disagreements within Israel society (27% and 20%, respectively).

Public trust in institutions

In our opinion, trust in government depends on a combination of the public's assessment of the challenges facing the country, how well the mandated institutions handled these challenges in the past, and the perceived integrity of those who represent each of these institutions. In democratic regimes, trust is of the utmost importance, as a key factor in the formulation of citizens' political preferences on a wide range of subjects. A state whose citizens are not confident in its institutions finds it hard to mobilize them for collective undertakings, causing the regime to gradually lose legitimacy in the eyes of the public.

Each year, we reexamine the extent of public trust in eight major institutions: the army (IDF), the police, the President of Israel, the media, the Supreme Court, the government, the Knesset, and the political parties. In certain years, we add to this list other institutions that citizens interact with on a regular basis, primarily to see how the central democratic institutions rank in

relation to the others. For example, in 2015 we added the health fund where the respondent is insured, and the National Insurance Institute, whose services are needed by all citizens at one time or another.[1] This year, we added to the list the local authority in which respondents reside, and the bank that they use.

The following figure shows the levels of trust in the various institutions among Jews and Arabs in 2016, ranking the institutions accordingly.

Figure 4.12 \ To what extent do you trust each of the following individuals or institutions? ("very much" and "quite a lot"; by nationality; %)

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
1   Israel's health funds earned very high trust ratings from Jews and Arabs alike, while the National Insurance Institute enjoyed a high level of trust among the Arab population and an average-to-low ranking in the Jewish public.

As in past years, out of the eight state institutions assessed, the IDF is at the top of the ranking among the Jewish public, with the political parties at the bottom of the list. In the Arab population, the Supreme Court is at the head of the scale of trust in state institutions, and the parties at the bottom, with an even lower rating than in the Jewish public.

The survey findings presented in the figure indicate further that the trust placed by Jews in each of the individuals and institutions listed is greater than that among Arab respondents, with the exception of the local authority (the lack of trust in this institution is understandable in light of the fact that the local authorities where most Arab citizens of Israel reside are run by Arab elected representatives). The greatest gap in trust between the Jewish and Arab populations is found, as expected, in relation to the IDF, which enjoys the trust of the vast majority of Jewish respondents, compared with only a minority of Arabs.

To summarize the differences between the Jewish and Arab samples, we calculated the mean, the median[2] and standard deviation for each of the populations for all eight of the recurring institutions. We assigned a value of 1 to those who have no trust whatsoever in the institutions surveyed, and a value of 4 to those who express a very high level of trust. The minimal mean score possible is 1, if no one had expressed trust in an institution; the mid-point mean score is 2.5, and the maximum possible mean score is 4, which would have been assigned if everyone had placed the highest level of trust in all institutions. As can be seen in the following table,[3] while the mean score of the Jewish respondents is higher than that of the Arabs, it is not high in and of itself but closer to the mid-point of the scale. The distribution of Jewish responses (as reflected in the lower standard deviation) is smaller than that among the Arabs (0.47 compared to 0.56).

Table 4.17 (%)

Trust in institutions	Jews	Arabs
Mean score	2.46	2.04
Median	2.50	2.00
Standard deviation	0.47	0.56

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2   The median is the mid-point of the distribution, such that half of the respondents fall above it and half fall below it.

3   When an interviewee did not offer a response regarding one of the institutions, it was recorded as if he/she awarded the median score to that institution (among both Jews and Arabs).

As shown in Figure 4.12 above, the two institutions that we added this year—local authorities and banks—enjoy a high level of trust on the part of both Jews and Arabs. This suggests that the levels of trust expressed in key institutions such as the Knesset, government, and political parties are constantly low not because Israelis are untrusting by nature, but because several of the state recurring institutions, in particular these three, are consistently unable to win the trust of the Israeli public for reasons too complex to go into here.

The situation can also be presented from a different perspective. We divided the interviewees into categories based on the extent of their trust in the institutions studied (high, moderate, or low), and attempted to draw conclusions from the relative size of each of these groups in the two samples.

Table 4.18 (%)

Trust in institutions	Jews	Arabs
Low (average personal score 1–2)	22.1	56.2
Moderate (average personal score 2.1–3)	70.4	38.6
High (average personal score 3.1–4)	7.5	5.2

We see from this table that the majority of Jewish interviewees cluster around the moderate trust level, and that the low-trust group is second in size for this population. Only a small minority are found in the high-trust group. In the Arab sample, most of the interviewees are in the group that shows a low level of trust, followed by those in the moderate-level group; again, only a small minority—even less than the share in the Jewish population—are found in the group with the highest level of trust.

As for long-term trends, the following table presents the trust findings this year compared with the multi-year average of trust ratings in a given institution. (Comparison with the multi-year average for 2003–2015, as opposed to only the previous year, is intended to counter the influence of deviations from the norm or of sampling errors, if there were any, in a specific year's results.) This year, the level of trust in all institutions among the Jewish public is lower than the multi-year average (with the exception of the IDF, where the degree of trust is greater, and the President of Israel, whose trust rating this year is similar to the multi-year average). The trust of the Arab respondents in all institutions is low this year in comparison with the multi-year average.

Table 4.19 (%)

Trust in institutions	2016 (Jews)	Multi-year average (Jews)	2016 (Arabs)	Multi-year average (Arabs)
IDF	90.4	88.3	32.2	36.2
President of Israel	67.6	67.6	26.1	40.0
Supreme Court	56.5	63.5	51.8	59.7
The police	41.9	50.6	27.2	44.4
The government	28.5	42.3	19.8	32.1
The Knesset	28.0	40.9	18.4	38.9
The media	25.7	41.1	15.1	50.3
The political parties	14.3	25.8	11.6	27.9

Let us now move on to a separate examination of each of the recurring institutions among the Jewish population followed by the Arab one. To broaden the discussion, we compared this year's data to the multi-year average as well as to the findings from the 2015 survey.

Jews

The IDF, as usual, heads the list, earning the trust of 90% of respondents. This represents a slight drop of some 3% from last year (but a rise in comparison with the multi-year average). A breakdown by political orientation indicates only miniscule differences between camps in levels of confidence in the IDF (Right, 91%; Center, 92%; Left, 89%).

The **President of Israel**, Reuven (Ruvi) Rivlin, is in second place with a 68% trust rating, a drop of 8 percentage points compared with last year (but in line with the multi-year average). Breaking down the result by political orientation shows that a small majority on the Right, and large majorities from both the Center and Left, express confidence in him (54.5%, 81%, and 90%, respectively).

In third place among the recurring institutions is the **Supreme Court**, with a 56.5% share of respondents who expressed confidence in it. Here too, this represents a decline of 6–7 percentage points from last year (and from the multi-year average). A breakdown of responses by political orientation shows sizeable differences: On the Right, only 41% place their trust in this institution, as opposed to 68% in the Center and 87% on the Left. In other words, the Israeli Right lacks a majority who express confidence in the highest court of the land.

Until now, we have looked at the recurring institutions in which a majority of the Jewish public places its trust. All of the following institutions earned the confidence of only a minority of the population.

The police are in fourth place, with the trust of 42% of respondents. While this represents a minority, the police are the only body that did not register a drop this year in the confidence of the Jewish public compared with 2015 (though there was a decrease of 9 percentage points in comparison with the multi-year average). A breakdown by political orientation indicates a higher share of respondents with confidence in the police on the Right (46.5%) than in the Center or Left (roughly 37% in both camps).

The government ranks fifth, with a 28.5% trust rating. This represents a drop of 9 percentage points from last year (and some 14 percentage points from the multi-year average). Breaking down the results by political orientation, we find very sizeable differences, but it should be noted that even on the Right there is not a majority who express confidence in the government (Right, 42%, Center, 18%, Left, 8%).

This year, **the Knesset** places sixth, with 28% expressing confidence in it, a 6-percentage-point drop from 2015 (and some 13 percentage points below the multi-year average). A breakdown by political orientation reveals that there are 33% on the Right who have faith today in the Knesset, as opposed to 24% in the Center and only 22% on the Left.

The media rank in seventh place this year, with 26% placing their trust in it. This reflects a decline of 7 percentage points from last year (and 15 percentage points from the multi-year average). Breaking down this finding by political orientation shows only a small minority from the Right and Center (12% and 34%, respectively) who feel confidence in this institution, compared with a majority (52%) on the Left.

In eighth and last place among the Jewish public, we find **the political parties**, with a confidence level of only 14%. This low, and worrisome, finding represents a drop of only 1 percentage point compared with last year (but roughly 11.5 percentage points in comparison with the multi-year average), as there is a "rock-bottom effect" at play here, meaning that it is difficult for this score to drop much lower. A breakdown by political camp points to 19% on the Right who place their faith in the political parties, 10% in the Center, and only 8% on the Left. As we noted earlier, a majority of Jews stated that there is a party that represents their views, and that this is the party they voted for in the last election (2015). That is, the lack of trust in Israel's political parties does not necessarily relate to the interviewee's "own" party but to this democratic institution in general.

The following figure presents the rises and falls in the level of trust expressed by the public in all institutions since the first *Democracy Index* (in 2003). Figures 4.13 (Jews) and 4.14 (Arabs) highlight the relatively stable order in the ranking of the various institutions in terms of trust simultaneously with wide fluctuations in the confidence level within each institution, as expressed in the *Democracy Index* surveys over the years.

Figure 4.13 \ Overview of trust in institutions (trust "very much" and "quite a lot"; Jews; by year; %)

Legend:
- Political parties
- Government
- IDF
- Knesset
- President of Israel
- Police
- Supreme Court
- Media

* The tables highlight the relatively stable arrangement between the various levels of trust in state institutions alongside strong fluctuations in confidence levels, as reflected in previous Israel Democracy Index surveys conducted over the years.

** The question about trust in the political parties was not asked in 2014.

Arabs

Before citing the data on the Arab public's level of trust in each of the recurring institutions, we will present three entities that only Arab interviewees were questioned about in this year's survey: the Supreme Arab Monitoring Committee, the Hebrew-language media, and the Arabic-language media (within Israel):[4]

Table 4.20 (%)

	Supreme Arab Monitoring Committee	Arabic-language media (within Israel)	Hebrew-language media
Trust "quite a lot" or "very much"	29	21	21

The data indicate a surprisingly low level of trust in the Supreme Arab Monitoring Committee among Arab citizens of Israel.[5] While a breakdown by voting patterns in the 2015 election (Joint List or Zionist parties) shows some difference in the share of respondents who expressed trust in this body (32% versus 20%, respectively), in both cases these were only a minority. As for the media, the distinction between Hebrew and Arabic-language media yielded slightly higher trust ratings among Arab respondents than our usual wording, which does not specify language (21% when Arabic is mentioned, as opposed to 15% when it is not); but here too, there is still a low share of interviewees who feel confident in the media, whether in Hebrew or Arabic.

Let us now move on to a review of the Arab public's level of trust this year in all the recurring institutions. A decline was recorded in the confidence of this population in all institutions compared with last year, which was exceptional for its high levels of trust. As the data below indicate with regard to each institution, the trust ratings of Arabs who voted in 2015 for Zionist parties greatly exceed those of voters for the Joint List.

Earning the highest level of trust among Arab citizens of Israel (52%) is the **Supreme Court**. This is the sole state institution that won the confidence of a majority, albeit a slim one, of the Arab public. This figure marks a fall of 11 percentage points from last year (and 8 percentage points from the multi-year average). A breakdown by voting patterns in the 2015 election

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4   To enable comparison with previous years, we also asked Arab respondents about the media in general (using the standard phrasing for this question).

5   A further interesting finding is the high share of Arab interviewees (18.5%) who responded "don't know / refuse to answer" to this question, a sign of the tenuous status of the Monitoring Committee in the Arab community's consciousness.

shows a considerable difference between voters for the Joint List (45% trust rating) and voters for Zionist parties (71%).

In second place is the **IDF**, with 32% of the Arab public expressing trust in this institution. Here too, this represents a decline—though a relatively small one—of 5 percentage points relative to last year (and 4 percentage points compared with the multi-year average). Though only 19% of Joint List voters expressed confidence in the army, among voters for Zionist parties the level of trust climbs to 65%.

Third place in level of trust among the Arab public are **the police**, earning a confidence rating of 27%. This marks a 17-percentage-point decline in comparison with both the 2015 figures and the multi-year average. A breakdown by voting patterns shows a sizeable gap between the two groups of voters studied: only 19% of voters for the Joint List expressed faith in the police, as opposed to 41% of those who voted for Zionist parties.

The **President of Israel**, Reuven (Ruvi) Rivlin, ranks in fourth place, with a trust rating of 26%. This represents a 13-percentage-point drop over last year (and 14 percentage points in comparison with the multi-year average). Breaking down these findings by voting patterns in the 2015 election, we find that President Rivlin earns a confidence level of only 21.5% among voters for the Joint List while reaching 45% among voters for Zionist parties.

In fifth place is **the government**, with 20% of Arab interviewees expressing their trust in this institution. This marks a drop of 10 percentage points as opposed to last year (and 12 percentage points in comparison with the multi-year average). A breakdown by voting patterns in the 2015 election indicates that only 11% of voters for the Joint List expressed confidence in the government, as opposed to 41% among voters for Zionist parties.

The Knesset stands in sixth place, earning the trust of 18% of the Arab public. Here we encountered a steep decline of 26 percentage points over last year and 21 percentage points compared with the multi-year average. Breaking down the results by voting patterns in the 2015 elections reveals that 14% of Joint List voters report feeling confidence in the Knesset, compared with 29% of voters for Zionist parties.

In seventh place are **the media**, with 15% of the Arab public expressing trust in this institution. This is as opposed to 51% who expressed confidence in the media in 2015, close to the multi-year average of 50%. It appears that in the Arab sector, much like in the Jewish one, trust in the media has plummeted. A breakdown by votes in the 2015 election shows that among voters for the Joint List only 13% express trust in the media, compared with 23.5% of voters for Zionist parties.

As with the Jewish public, the **political parties** are at the very bottom of the rankings. Only 12% expressed confidence in the parties, as opposed to roughly 40% last year (a decline of 16 percentage points from the multi-year average). Breaking down the results by votes in the 2015 election shows that just 10% of voters for the Joint List, and 22% of voters for Zionist parties, have faith in the political parties.

Figure 4.14 \ Overview of trust in institutions (trust "very much" and "quite a lot"; Arabs; by year; %)

Political parties

Government

IDF

Knesset

President of Israel

Police

Supreme Court

Media

*   The question about trust in the political parties was not asked in 2014.

We wanted to know whether the level of trust in state institutions is related to positions on completely different questions relating to state and government. As stated, we divided the interviewees into different categories of trust. We will now revisit several questions that we presented previously, breaking down the responses in accordance with these categories. It should be recalled that among Jewish respondents, the most frequent response category was a moderate level of trust (70%), and among Arabs, a low level of trust (56%).

The first question that we will reexamine here is the sense of optimism or pessimism regarding Israel's future. In the Jewish sample, optimism wins the day across all categories of trust, though the share of optimists is greater in the high-trust group than in the two groups with a lower level of trust. In the Arab sample, those who express a low level of confidence in the institutions studied are largely pessimistic about the future of the country, and (in keeping with the findings for the Jewish public) those with a moderate or high level of trust tend to be more optimistic.

Table 4.21 (%)

		Optimistic about Israel's future	Pessimistic about Israel's future
Jews	Low level of trust	62	33
	Moderate level of trust	70	29
	High level of trust	90	10
Arabs	Low level of trust	34	59
	Moderate level of trust	71	24
	High level of trust	77	15

The second question that we revisited, based on categories of trust, is the sense of belonging to the state. Among Jews, a majority in all levels of trust feel part of the state and its problems, but their proportion rises in tandem with a higher level of trust. As in the previous question, members of the Arab sample with a low level of confidence in Israel's state institutions, who are pessimistic about the country's future, also do not feel a part of the state and its problems. A majority of those who expressed moderate or high levels of trust do feel part of the state.

Table 4.22 (%)

		Feel part of the state and its problems	Don't feel part of the state and its problems
Jews	Low level of trust	70	29
	Moderate level of trust	87	12
	High level of trust	92	6
Arabs	Low level of trust	24	73
	Moderate level of trust	56	43
	High level of trust	83	17

An additional question that we examined relates to agreement with the need for a strong leader to handle the country's problems. Among Jewish respondents at all levels of trust, there was disagreement with the notion of a strong leader, but the opposition was greater among those who expressed moderate or high confidence in state institutions than it was among those with a lower level of trust. Among Arab interviewees, no clear correlation was found between level of trust and support for a strong leader (in all categories of trust, a majority supported the idea of a strong leader).

Table 4.23 (%)

		Agree with the need for a strong leader	Disagree with the need for a strong leader
Jews	Low level of trust	46	51
	Moderate level of trust	36	62
	High level of trust	34	62.5
Arabs	Low level of trust	61	35
	Moderate level of trust	67	29.5
	High level of trust	62	31

The fourth question that we examined in this context was the statement that politicians look out more for their own interests than for those of their constituents. Among Jews, the higher the level of trust, the lower the percentage who agree with the claim that politicians are looking out mainly for themselves. Among Arabs, the correlation is not linear, but, as with the Jewish sample, the findings show that those with a lower level of trust in the state's institutions are the most likely to agree with the statement that politicians are motivated, first and foremost, by self-interest.

Table 4.24 (%)

		Agree that politicians look out more for their own interests than for those of the public who elected them	Disagree that politicians look out more for their own interests than for those of the public who elected them
Jews	Low level of trust	90	9
	Moderate level of trust	78	20
	High level of trust	64	37
Arabs	Low level of trust	83	14
	Moderate level of trust	70	26
	High level of trust	75	17

Analyzing the question of whether a party exists that represents the views of the respondents, again based on categories of trust, shows that among Jews a rise in the level of trust goes hand in hand with a greater share who assert that there is such a party (low level of trust, 41%; moderate level, 56%; high level, 70%). Among Arab respondents, there is not a significant correlation between level of confidence in state institutions and the existence of a party that represents their views.

To summarize the topic of trust in state institutions: The situation in Israel in 2016 is highly troubling. The fact that in a democratic state, the army emerges year after year in the sample findings as the most trusted body is worrisome enough in itself; but the fact that levels of trust in key democratic institutions—the government, the Knesset, and the political parties—are strikingly low, is cause for even greater alarm. The erosion of trust in the Supreme Court should also be a major concern to those who are contributing to this decline, at a time when they should be defending this important institution in their official capacity or on the basis of their stated adherence to democratic values. The data indicate a correlation between citizens' lack of trust in state institutions and their desire for a strong leader, their rising sense of alienation, and their increasing pessimism about the way the country is being run.

Chapter 5 \ Democracy and Security

In this chapter, we will be addressing the following topics:

- The ability of democracies to deal with terror
- Ethical considerations and the fight against terror
- Legal constraints on investigating terrorist activity
- Human and civil rights organizations
- Monitoring of citizens' Internet use

The spate of terrorist attacks over the past year has brought the debate over the unresolved—and perhaps unresolvable—tension between upholding democratic freedoms and combating terror back to center stage. Even from the standpoint of sworn defenders of the democratic system, this struggle necessitates infringing on these freedoms under certain circumstances. The question that interested us is how aware the Israeli public is of this potential clash and to what extent it is prepared to sanction such infringements, even temporarily. This year's survey included several questions dealing directly or indirectly with this tension.

Before analyzing the data, a note of warning about methodology: While we presented these questions to both Jewish and Arab interviewees, the reader should bear in mind the much more sensitive position of the Arabs as a minority group suspected by the majority of supporting terror. In other words, the responses of the Arab interviewees should be treated with a certain degree of caution as they may not be of equal validity to those of the Jewish ones. It is highly possible that the Jewish and Arab answers were influenced by different factors, and that the Arabs, more than the Jews, responded as they did in order to appear more favorable in the eyes of the interviewers or compilers of the survey.

The data we have presented up until now indicate that on the ideological level, a majority of the Israeli public support maintaining the democratic character of Israel. They also show that in various groups, the translation of this commitment into action is less constrained by the basic principles of liberal democracy.

A common argument in public discourse is that democratic countries that insist on respecting democratic freedoms consequently fail in the struggle against terror, and that non-democratic countries, which are not hampered by these freedoms, can act as they see fit against terror and thus defeat—or at least curb—it more easily. A counter-argument is that countries that uphold democratic freedoms from the outset are less likely to be subjected to terrorist attacks; and if they find themselves in such a situation, as democracies they are better able than non-democratic regimes to mobilize public, legal, and international support for a determined battle against terror.

We therefore asked: "Which countries are able to fight terror most effectively: democratic ones or non-democratic ones?" While there is not a real majority among the Jewish public on either side, the highest share of respondents (38%) hold that non-democratic countries are able to fight terror more successfully, as opposed to 34% who feel that democratic countries are better at combating terror. In the Arab public, by contrast, a majority take the position that democratic countries are better equipped for such a battle, perhaps out of fear that full or partial adoption of a non-democratic model in Israel would harm them as a minority; true, our findings show that they are not perceived as a fifth column, but they are undoubtedly close emotionally, nationally, and religiously to the Palestinians and the Muslim Arab world, from which most terrorists have emanated from in recent years.

Figure 5.1 \ Which countries are able to fight terror most effectively: democratic or non-democratic ones? (by nationality; %)

An analysis of the Jewish sample by political orientation shows a strong association between the respondents' political camp and their position on this question. On the Right, the feeling is that non-democratic countries can do a better job of battling terror; in the Center, opinions are more or less split; and on the Left, contrary to the Right, the respondents feel that democratic countries are more successful at fighting terror.

Table 5.1 (%)

Jews	Democratic countries can fight terror more effectively	Non-democratic countries can fight terror more effectively	All of them can fight terror equally effectively / none of them can	Don't know	Total
Right	29	44	24	3	100
Center	38	34	25	3	100
Left	42	27	26	5	100

A breakdown of the Arab responses by voting patterns in the 2015 election shows that among voters for both the Joint List and the Zionist parties there is a small majority (54% and 51%, respectively) who see democratic countries as having an advantage in the war against terror. Analyzing the responses of the Arab sample by religion, we found that slightly more than half of the Muslim and Christian respondents believe that democracies are better able to combat terror. There is a similar trend among the Druze, although here this is the most frequent response rather than a clear-cut majority.

Table 5.2 (%)

Arabs	Democratic countries can fight terror more effectively	Non-democratic countries can fight terror more effectively	All of them can fight terror equally effectively / none of them can	Don't know	Total
Muslim	51	9	27	13	100
Christian	50	16	26	8	100
Druze	41.5	24	29	5.5	100

We looked at whether there was a connection between respondents' opinions on which type of country can fight terror better—democratic or non-democratic—and their thoughts on whether Israel should or should not maintain its democratic character to cope with the challenges confronting it. On both sides of the coin (those who felt that democracies can combat terror more effectively, and those who felt the opposite), we found a majority who believe that Israel should preserve its democratic character whatever the situation; however, the majority was

significantly greater in the former group than in the latter. Among Arab respondents, we did not find a correlation between the two variables, as there is a general consensus in both groups that Israel should maintain its democratic character in any case.

Table 5.3 (%)

		Agree that Israel must maintain its democratic character	Do not agree that Israel must maintain its democratic character	Total
Jews	Democratic countries can fight terror more effectively	91	9	100
	Non-democratic countries can fight terror more effectively	80	20	100
Arabs	Democratic countries can fight terror more effectively	91	9	100
	Non-democratic countries can fight terror more effectively	93	7	100

In a similarly general vein, we examined respondents' opinions on the place of ethical considerations when fighting against terror.

Asked whether ethical considerations should be taken into account in the fight against terror, a majority of the Jewish public chose to respond in the negative. That is, a majority agreed with the statement that there is no room for ethical considerations in the battle against terror, and it is permissible to use any means to prevent terrorist attacks. Among the Arab public, by contrast, the majority did not agree with this statement, though here too a sizeable majority were willing to remove ethical considerations from the equation in the context of the war on terror.

Table 5.4 (%)

There is no room for ethical considerations in the fight against terror	Jews	Arabs
Agree	62	42
Disagree	37	54.5
Don't know	1	3.5
Total	100	100

We broke down the responses of the Jewish sample by political orientation. As the figure below indicates, there are vast differences between the camps. On the Right, a solid majority agree with the statement that ethical considerations should not play a role in the fight against terror; in the Center, a small majority share this view; and on the Left, a majority hold the opposite opinion.

Figure 5.2 \ "In the fight against terror, there is no room for ethical considerations, and it is permissible to use any means to prevent terrorist attacks" (agree; Jewish respondents; by political orientation; %)

Chapter 5 \ Democracy and Security

We looked at whether religiosity affects the importance attached to ethical considerations. Among Jewish respondents in all the religious subgroups, there were majorities of various sizes who agreed that the fight against terror leaves no room for ethical considerations. Indeed, a much greater proportion agreed with this statement among the Haredim and traditional religious than among secular Jews. The national religious and traditional non-religious fall somewhere between the two.

Figure 5.3 \ "In the fight against terror, there is no room for ethical considerations, and it is permissible to use any means to prevent terrorist attacks" (agree; Jewish respondents; by religiosity; %)

A breakdown of the Arab sample by religion and voting patterns in the 2015 elections produced the following results:

Table 5.5 (%)

		Agree that there is no room for ethical considerations in the fight against terror	Do not agree that there is no room for ethical considerations in the fight against terror	Don't know	Total
Religion	Muslim	39	57	4	100
	Christian	38	60	2	100
	Druze	66	29	5	100
Vote in 2015 election	Joint List	38	59	3	100
	Zionist parties	61	39	--	100

As the table indicates, on this question the Druze and voters for the Zionist parties are closer to the Jewish position; that is, a majority agree that the fight against terror does not allow for ethical considerations. The same does not hold true for Muslims, Christians, and voters for the Joint List, most of whom disagree with the notion that ethical considerations should not be taken into account in the fight against terror.

From here we moved on to the Israeli case specifically, and the fight against terror here in Israel. Since recent criticism of Israel by the international community over its handling of the wave of terrorist attacks over the past year has been quite harsh, we wanted to hear the views of the public on whether these criticisms should constrain Israel in its struggle against terror. Given the fact that in the war on terror (and obviously in other contexts as well), Israel needs the cooperation of other countries, it is important to know what the Israeli public thinks about the extent to which the international community's views should be considered in this regard.

We asked the interviewees if they agreed or disagreed with the statement that Israel should fight terror any way it sees fit, without taking into consideration the views of other countries. In the Jewish public, there is widespread agreement that Israel should act as it deems necessary in this context. In the Arab public as well, a majority—though a much smaller one—share this view.

Table 5.6 (%)

	Jews	Arabs
Agree that Israel should fight terror any way it sees fit, without taking into consideration the views of other countries	**81**	**54**

On this question too, we found substantial differences between the political camps in the Jewish sample: On the Right, there is almost total consensus that Israel should act as it sees fit, while a very sizeable segment of the Center shares this view. A bare majority of respondents on the Left also support with this position, meaning that the proportion who agree with the statement in this camp is only slightly higher than the share of those who disagree.

Table 5.7 (%)

Jews	Agree that Israel should fight terror any way it sees fit, without taking into consideration the views of other countries
Right	**92**
Center	**80.5**
Left	**53**

We broke down the responses of the Arab interviewees by voting patterns in the 2015 election, and found that whereas the majority of Joint List voters (51%) disagree with the above statement, the overwhelming majority of Arabs who voted for the Zionist parties (82%) agree with it—in fact to the same extent as the Jewish public (81%).

In an additional question on the same topic, we examined how much latitude the security forces should be given in investigating those suspected of terrorist activity. We asked respondents if they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: "If the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet), the police, or the IDF suspects an individual of being involved in terrorist activity, they should be given full powers to investigate as they see fit, without any legal constraints." As shown in the figure below, opinions in the Israeli public are divided on this question, with a slight preference for those who agree that the security forces should be given a free hand. By contrast, and as expected, a clear-cut majority of the Arab public are opposed to this position.

Powers of security forces in investigating terror suspects

Question 36

Figure 5.4 \ "If the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet), the police, or the IDF suspects an individual of being involved in terrorist activity, they should be given full powers to investigate as they see fit" (by nationality; %)

A breakdown by political orientation shows a clear majority on the Right, a small majority in the Center, and only a minority on the Left who agree with the idea of granting free rein to the security forces when investigating terror suspects.

Table 5.8 (%)

	Right	Center	Left
Agree to allow security forces to investigate terror suspects as they see fit	61	50	26

One of the most fragile democratic freedoms in times of tension around security issues is freedom of expression, in particular the liberty to criticize the state. We wanted to know how deeply entrenched this freedom is in the Israeli public today. This question is of great interest, in light of blatant examples of intolerance in recent months toward those expressing opinions critical of the country's leadership.

We asked interviewees if they supported or opposed the following statement: "Freedom of expression should be protected, even for people who speak out against the state." In both the Jewish and Arab samples, we found a majority who agreed with this statement, though the share among Arab respondents was much greater.

Table 5.9 (%)

	Jews	Arabs
Agree that freedom of expression should be protected, even for people who speak out against the state	**57**	**78**

We broke down the responses of the Jewish sample by political orientation. As shown in the following figure, a sizeable majority on the Left support the position that freedom of expression must be preserved, even in the case of people who criticize the state. In the Center, a majority, though a smaller one, share this view, while on the Right the majority disagree and only a minority—albeit a large one—agree with this statement. In 2015, we posed a similar question, asking for respondents' opinions on **legally prohibiting** public criticism of the state. In that version, the extent of opposition was even greater: some 70% of Jews and a similar proportion of Arabs disagreed with the statement: "Israeli citizens should be legally prohibited from harshly criticizing the state in public." Apparently, the reference to a legal prohibition increased the opposition to infringing on freedom of expression.

Figure 5.5 \ "Freedom of expression should be protected even for people who speak out against the state" (agree; Jewish respondents; by political orientation; %)

Still in this context, we revisited the public's view of human and civil-rights organizations.

Given the repeated attempts by the authorities of late to limit the activities of human and civil-rights organizations in Israel in various ways (including the passage of the NGO Transparency Law), we examined whether these organizations are perceived by the public as problematic for Israel, that is, as causing harm to the state. The data indicate that the government's message of opposition to these organizations has made deep inroads into public opinion: In the Jewish sample, there has been a gradual but steady increase over the years in the size of the majority who believe that these organizations are damaging to the state. Among Arab respondents, a minority have consistently taken this position throughout the years surveyed, but here we cannot point to a systematic upward or downward trend.

Figure 5.6 \ "Human- and civil-rights organizations cause damage to the state" (agree; by nationality; by year; %)

A breakdown of responses by political orientation (Jews) shows an upswing on the Right and Center in the size of the majority who hold that these organizations cause damage to the state. On the Left, the minority who share this view is virtually unchanged since last year.

Table 5.10 (%)

Agree that human-rights organizations cause damage to the state	2015	2016
Right	70.5	86
Center	55	76
Left	26	28

A great deal of political activity, including in the context of terror, takes place on the Internet. We wanted to examine to what extent the public sees the Internet as a "safe space" protected from government intervention, and how much of a state presence it is willing to accept in cyberspace.

As in previous years, interviewees were asked to express their opinion on whether the state should be permitted, on security grounds, to monitor what citizens write on the Internet. In both the Jewish and Arab samples, we found a majority who would allow the state to monitor citizens in cyberspace. Comparing with past results, the majority in the Jewish public who would agree to Internet surveillance has remained unchanged; but in the Arab public, there was a considerable increase this year in the share who would support such surveillance, causing a reversal of the distribution of responses for this population (in 2015, the share in favor was 43%; this year, over one-half, or 53%, agree). This shift may be due to a fear of saying otherwise; but it is also possible that it represents a real change as a result of the rise in terrorist attacks throughout the world over the past year, and the apparent use made of the Internet for this purpose.

Figure 5.7 \ "To safeguard Israel's security, it is permissible for the state to monitor what citizens write on the Internet" (agree; by nationality; %)

Since young people spend more time in virtual space than older adults, we broke down the responses by age to examine whether this year as well there were intergenerational differences in attitude toward the state's presence on the Internet. Perhaps unexpectedly, but in keeping with last year's results, we found that the share of both Jews and Arabs who would agree to state monitoring of Internet use was higher among the younger age group than the older demographic.

Table 5.11 (%)

Agree that the state should be permitted, for security purposes, to monitor what citizens write on the Internet	18–34	35–54	55+
Jews	64	63	48.5
Arabs	56	51	49

A breakdown of the findings by political orientation (Jews) shows that a majority of respondents who align themselves with the Right or Center would agree to monitoring what citizens write on the Internet when it is for security purposes, whereas only a minority of the Left would be in favor.

Table 5.12 (%)

Jews	Right	Center	Left
Agree to let state monitor what citizens write on the Internet, for security purposes	68	55	38

The distribution of responses cited in this chapter—in particular, the fact that a majority feel that Israel should act as it sees fit in the fight against terror, the majority position that anti-terrorism activity should not be constrained by ethical considerations, and the prevailing opinion that democratic countries are less effective in fighting terror than non-democratic ones—should be seen as warning signs. Security concerns are known to be a key factor in shaping the moral and ethical choices of the Jewish public. If terror becomes a strategic-existential problem, it is entirely possible that there will be sweeping support among the Jewish population for waiving certain democratic features of Israel's system of government.

Chapter 6 \ The Social Realm

In this chapter, we will be addressing the following topics:

- Social solidarity in Israel
- Tensions in Israeli society
- Actual Freedom of speech
- Openness to personal relationships between groups
- Civil status of Arabs in Israel
- Civil status of Jews in Israel
- Who has the right to take part in crucial national decisions?

Until now, we have mainly focused on the political-governmental sphere, and on relations between citizens and the formal political system. We will now move on to several topics related to the popular view of Israel's functioning as a society.

The first subject that we examined in this context—though in a different format than in previous years, when we asked about social solidarity—is that of horizontal trust, that is, the sense of fellowship between members of Israeli society (as opposed to vertical trust, which reflects the degree of "partnership" between citizens and the authorities).

One of the more common complaints in public discourse today is that Israeli society, which was supposedly more cohesive in the past, is falling apart, and that nowadays it's a case of "everyone (or every group) for themselves." This feeling has resulted in medium-to-low scores in recent surveys when respondents were asked to assess the level of solidarity in Israeli society. On the other hand, it is often said that "all Jews are responsible for one another," not only in theory but in practice, and that this sense of shared destiny comes to the fore primarily in times of trouble.

We therefore wondered if interviewees agreed or disagreed with the statement: "Israelis can always rely on other Israelis to help them out in times of trouble." We found a sizeable difference between the Jewish and Arab samples on this question, apparently because the meaning of the term "Israelis" is not the same for both groups; the Jews understand the term "Israelis" as "Jews," or at least as the dominant group in Israeli society, of which they are members. Among Arabs, however, the term is probably vaguer; it would seem to include them, but as we saw in chapter 3 ("How is Israel Doing?"), they do not feel Israeli in the same way that Jews do. Nonetheless, in both the Jewish and Arab samples the majority feel that Israelis can indeed always count on other Israelis. This assessment may explain, at least partially, the general feeling, which we have already cited, that Israel's overall situation is satisfactory, even good, and that the personal situation of Israelis is also favorable.

Figure 6.1 \ "Israelis can always rely on other Israelis to help them out in times of trouble" (agree; by nationality; %)

This leads us to the question of which of the two assessments—overall situation or personal situation—correlates more strongly with the opinion that Israelis will help each other out in times of trouble. As shown in the table below, we found a higher correlation with respondents' description of their personal situation than with their perception of Israel's overall situation; specifically, among those who hold that Israelis can rely on one another, a clear majority classify their personal situation as good, whereas there is no majority either way regarding the "state of the state."

Table 6.1 (%)

	Total sample	Agree that Israelis can always rely on other Israelis
State situation	Good	42
	So-so	39
	Bad	18.5
Personal situation	Good	78.5
	So-so	18
	Bad	3

We broke down the responses of the Jewish sample on mutual responsibility in times of trouble by several variables, and the results are assembled in the following table:

Table 6.2 (%)

	Jews	Agree that Israelis can always rely on other Israelis
Political camp	Right	78.5
	Center	73
	Left	68.5
Income	Below average	71
	Average	76
	Above average	78
Age	18–34	71
	35–54	75
	55+	78

➤

Jews		Agree that Israelis can always rely on other Israelis
Religiosity	Haredim	84
	National religious	89
	Traditional religious	65
	Traditional non-religious	77
	Secular	71

As the table indicates, there is a substantial majority in all groups of Jewish respondents who hold that Israelis will come to the aid of their compatriots in times of trouble. Differences in the size of this majority do exist, but they are not dramatic: On the Right, there are slightly more who agree than in the Center or on the Left; older adults agree more than young people; and those with higher incomes are more inclined to agree than are those with lower incomes. The national religious and Haredim stand out in particular for their support of the notion that Israelis look out for one another.

We broke down the responses in the Arab sample by religion, religiosity, voting patterns in the 2015 election, income, and age, which were found in the preceding chapters to affect opinions. As shown below, here too the differences are small and the trends similar to those among the Jews. Once again, the most religious and the oldest feel a greater sense of solidarity between people; nonetheless, as we will explain below, the overall situation in the Arab public is different from that in the Jewish one.

Table 6.3 (%)

Arabs		Agree that Israelis can always rely on other Israelis
Religion	Muslim	50.5
	Christian	60
	Druze	56

	Arabs	Agree that Israelis can always rely on other Israelis
Religiosity	Very religious	69
	Religious	51
	Traditional	55
	Not at all religious	47.5
Income	Below average	53
	Average	57
	Above average	48
Age	18–34	45
	35–54	55
	55+	62.5
Vote in 2015 election	Joint List	47
	Zionist parties	65

As the table shows, not only is the sense of Israeli fellowship weaker in the Arab population, but there is greater variance within the Arab public than within the Jewish one. Among the Arab respondents, we did not find a majority who feel that Israelis can rely on one another among several subgroups: the younger age group, those who define themselves as not at all religious, high income earners, and voters for the Joint List. By contrast, in the other subgroups, there is a majority who feel that Israelis are marked by a strong sense of mutual responsibility, though it is smaller than that among the Jewish respondents.

From here, we moved on to examining the primary sources of tension in Israeli society.

The prevailing feeling is that social tensions in Israel are running high. As shown in the table below, and in keeping with last year's findings, the greatest share of the Israeli public (among Jews, the majority) classify the level of tension in most of the areas presented as high, with the exception of ethnic tensions, which once again were defined as moderate by the highest proportion of both Jews and Arabs. None of the points of tension that we presented were designated as low by the greatest share of respondents, not to mention a majority. Moreover, the proportion of Jews this year who defined the levels of tension as high is greater than the corresponding figure in 2015 in all areas.

Among the Arab respondents, the trend is not consistent: the level of tension in certain areas is seen as higher than last year, while in others it is considered lower. Interestingly enough, in all cases a lower proportion of Arabs than of Jews classify the level of social tensions in Israel as high; in other words, the Jews, more than the Arabs, see a society where tension is rampant. This finding is surprising in light of the fact that the Jews are the majority in Israel, and would be expected to experience less tension than the minority group. As in past years, the tension between Jews and Arabs is seen as high by the largest majority in both groups. The share of Jews who define it as such exceeds that of Arabs, and is substantially greater this year than last.

Table 6.4 (%)*

		High level of tension	Moderate level of tension
Jews	Mizrahim and Ashkenazim		43 (41)
	Religious and secular Jews	51 (47)	
	Right and Left	71 (60)	
	Rich and poor	58 (51)	
	Jews and Arabs	79.5 (67)	
Arabs	Mizrahim and Ashkenazim		37.5 (46)
	Religious and secular Jews	45 (51)	
	Right and Left	44 (58)	
	Rich and poor	42 (46)	
	Jews and Arabs	72 (67.5)	

* The 2015 findings are presented in parentheses.

We examined to what extent the ethnic self-identification of Jewish respondents affects their perception of the level of tension between Ashkenazim and Mizrahim, and found that the interethnic differences were small. In all cases, the greatest share of respondents rated tension in this area as moderate; however, the second largest share of Mizrahim and Sephardim[1]

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1 This year, we added the category of "Sephardim" to the list of ethnic affiliations, since we have found in the past that a considerable proportion of respondents prefer to define themselves this way and not as Mizrahim.

considered the level of tension in this area to be high, whereas among Ashkenazim and those who classified themselves as mixed, the second most frequent response in this category was low.

Table 6.5 (%)

	Ethnic tensions are high	Ethnic tensions are moderate	Ethnic tensions are low	Don't know	Total
Ashkenazim	21	43	36	---	100
Mizrahim	29	45	25.5	0.5	100
Sephardim	30	43	25	2	100
Mixed	27	42	30	1	100

We also considered to what extent income level among Jewish respondents influenced their perception of tensions between rich and poor, and found that this year there was once again no positive or negative correlation between income and assessment of the level of economic tension.

We then explored the correlation between Jewish respondents' religiosity and their assessment of the tension between religious and secular Jews. Here we found that Haredim, and even more so, national religious respondents tend less than the traditional or secular to classify the level of tension in this area as high.

Table 6.6 (%)

	Define level of religious-secular tensions as high
Haredim	40
National religious	31
Traditional religious	54
Traditional non-religious	54
Secular	56.5

An examination of the correlation between Jewish respondents' political orientation and their perception of the tensions between Right and Left found that the Left is more inclined than the Right, and even more so than the Center, to classify these tensions as high.

Table 6.7 (%)

	Define level of Right-Left tensions as high
Right	71
Center	67
Left	78.5

From here, we moved on to exploring which groups have the highest level of tension between them.

Once again this year, the tension between Jews and Arabs is unquestionably the most serious point of friction in Israeli society in the eyes of both Jewish and Arab respondents, though the consensus on this point is broader in the Arab sample than in the Jewish one (68% as opposed to 50%). Moreover, the share who consider it the strongest source of tension has increased since last year among both Jews and Arabs.

As the following figure shows, the tension between Right and Left ranks second in severity among Jewish interviewees. The same was true in 2015, but the share who define it as the greatest source of tension is higher this year than last (27% versus 20%). The preponderance of interviewees this year who classified the tensions between Jews and Arabs and between Right and Left as the most serious, in effect "detracted from" the assessment of the other points of tension, leaving only small proportions who defined the level of tension in the remaining groups as the most severe. In the Arab sample, the tension between Arabs and Jews dominated the rankings, far ahead of the other areas.

Figure 6.2 \ Which groups in Israeli society have the highest level of tension between them? (by nationality; %)

Comparing the assessment of tensions in the total sample by year reveals certain changes, apparently in keeping with the issues that were the focus of public discourse in Israel in a given year, though the tension between Jews and Arabs, as always, leads the list.

Table 6.8 (%)

Total sample	2012	2015	2016
Highest level of tension	Between Jews and Arabs **(48%)**	Between Jews and Arabs **(47%)**	Between Jews and Arabs **(53%)**
Second highest level of tension	Between religious and secular Jews **(20%)**	Between Right and Left **(18%)**	Between Right and Left **(24%)**

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by religiosity shows that while the greatest share in all of the groups point to Jewish-Arab tensions as the most severe, the differences in proportion are large. Thus, in the secular group this is the most frequent response, but it does not constitute a majority. Breaking down the results by political orientation, we find that on the Right, the proportion who classify the Jewish-Arab tension as the most serious is much higher than in the Center or on the Left.

Table 6.9 (%)

		Define Jewish-Arab tension as the most serious
Religiosity	Haredim	73
	National religious	63
	Traditional religious	52
	Traditional non-religious	51
	Secular	42
Political camp	Right	58
	Center	45
	Left	32

A breakdown of the Arab sample by religion and by voting patterns in the 2015 election reveals that a majority in all the groups see Jewish-Arab tensions as the most serious, though this majority is the smallest among the Christians.

Table 6.10 (%)

		Define Jewish-Arab tension as the most serious
Religion	Muslim	70
	Christian	56
	Druze	76
Vote in 2015 election	Joint List	73
	Zionist parties	61

Since Israeli society is in the throes of an ongoing conflict with Palestinian society, we wanted to know whether the strong sense of social solidarity that we found earlier is also reflected in assessments of the resilience of Israeli society compared with that of Palestinian society, should the violence between them persist.

A clear majority of Jewish respondents feel that if the violence between the two societies continues, Israeli society will be able to hold out longer than Palestinian society. Among Arabs, the most frequent response, though by a small proportion, is that Palestinian society will be better able to stand its ground in the face of continued violence. As shown in the figure below, the confidence of the Jewish public in the resilience of Israeli society far outstrips that of the Arabs. Interestingly, the Arab interviewees tend slightly more than the Jews to believe that neither society will be able to hold out for long in a situation of ongoing violence.

Figure 6.3 \ If the present state of violence continues for a prolonged period, which society—Israeli or Palestinian—do you think can hold out longer? (by nationality; %)

A breakdown of Jewish responses by religiosity and political orientation shows that in all the groups a majority hold that Israeli society is more resilient than Palestinian society. At the top of the list are the national religious (74%), and at the bottom are those who define themselves as secular (54%). Breaking down the results by political orientation reveals that a majority on the Right (70%) and in the Center (59%) hold that Israeli society can stand firm. On the Left, this is the most frequent response, though not by a majority (40%).

Breaking down the responses to this question in the Arab sample, we found sizeable differences on the basis of religion and voting patterns. Among Druze and voters for the Zionist parties, a majority believe that Israeli society is more resilient, while among Muslims and voters for the Joint List, the largest share (though not a majority) point to Palestinian society as the most steadfast.

Table 6.11 (%)

		Israeli society is more resilient	Palestinian society is more resilient
Religion	Muslim	23	37
	Christian	34	24
	Druze	51	7
Vote in 2015 election	Joint List	21	39
	Zionist parties	51	14

Much electronic ink has been spilled of late on the question of whether political expression is stifled in Israel, and not necessarily by the authorities. In light of this year's ranking of tensions between Right and Left as one of the primary points of friction, and the opposition—at least in theory—of a majority of Israelis to silencing those who speak out against the state (as stated in the previous chapter, some 60% agree that freedom of expression should be protected), we felt the need to pursue this topic in somewhat greater depth in this year's survey.

We asked: "Who is more hesitant to express their political opinions in Israel today—people on the Right, or people on the Left?" The greatest share of Jewish respondents hold that neither group is hesitant to air their political opinions, and a slightly smaller proportion point to the Left as the political camp whose members are more reluctant to share their views. Among Arabs, the most frequent response is that the Left is more fearful of speaking out.

Figure 6.4 \ Who is more hesitant to express their political opinions in Israel today—people on the Right, or people on the Left? (by nationality; %)

Breaking down the responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation, we found that on the Right, the greatest share feel that no one in Israel today is afraid to express an opinion. In the Center, opinions are evenly divided between those who feel that no one is hesitant to speak out and those who believe that people on the Left are more cautious; while on the Left, only a small minority hold that everyone feels free to speak out, and nearly three-quarters believe that the members of their camp are more afraid than others to express their opinions.

Figure 6.5 \ Who is more hesitant to express their political opinions in Israel today—people on the Right, or people on the Left? (Jewish respondents; by political orientation; %)

Legend:
- No one is hesitant
- People on the left
- People on the right
- Everyone equally/don't know

Does this assessment affect people's personal behavior? Since the answer to this question was unclear to us—justifiably, as the results below will show—we posed a personal question on the fear of expressing an opinion.

We asked the interviewees to tell us if they agreed or disagreed with the statement: "I prefer to keep silent and not express my political opinions in the presence of people I don't know." Among both Jews and Arabs, the majority disagreed, though the proportion was smaller among the Arab respondents. This result testifies favorably to the level of freedom of expression in Israel.

Table 6.12 (%)

	Disagree with the statement that they prefer to keep silent and not express political opinions in the presence of strangers
Jews	**62**
Arabs	**53**

Nonetheless, a considerable portion of respondents prefer to keep silent and not to express their political views before people they don't know. We therefore broke down the responses of the Jewish sample by political orientation, and of the Arab sample by voting patterns in the 2015 election.

Table 6.13 (%)

		Agree with the statement that they prefer to keep silent and not express political opinions in the presence of strangers
Jews	Right	**37**
	Center	**39**
	Left	**31**
Arabs	Voted for Joint List in 2015 election	**46**
	Voted for Zionist parties in 2015 election	**29**

As the table shows, only a minority of Jews of all political stripes (quite similar in size in all three cases) feel uncomfortable expressing political opinions in unfamiliar company. And though a very high share (72%) of respondents on the Left in the previous question answered that members of their camp are hesitant to express their opinions, they report that on a personal level they are reluctant to express their political views in front of strangers to a lesser extent than do those on the Right, and less than those in the Center (31% versus 37% and 39%, respectively).

In the Arab public, a much greater share of those who voted for the Joint List in 2015 report that they are uncomfortable expressing their political opinions before strangers, compared with those who feel this way among voters for the Zionist parties (46% as opposed to 29%).

Social and Civil Status of Arabs in Israel

As we will see in this section, there are considerable disparities between the willingness of the Jewish majority to accept Arab citizens on a personal level—a very high degree of openness that dispels, at least to a certain extent, the claims of widespread racism in Israel today—and the marked unwillingness to allow Arab Israelis entry into decision-making circles at the national level and to share "ownership" of the state with them. This political preference is perceived by many on the Left and Center in Israel as undermining country's democratic character, though it does not necessarily reflect hatred or ethnic discrimination.

In last year's survey, we found evidence (at the individual level) of openness to close interpersonal ties between the two populations, as attested to by the high proportions of Jewish respondents who were willing to accept treatment by Arab physicians and placement of Arab teachers in Jewish schools, and vice versa. This year, we took this topic a step further, using the Bogardus Social Distance Scale, a well-known indicator from the field of sociology. The scale posits several degrees of closeness, on the assumption that those who agree to a more intimate social relationship will presumably agree to more distant relationships as well.

Our findings support the underlying assumption of the Bogardus Scale on gradations of closeness: The more distant the relationship, the greater the share of respondents who are willing to accept it. The data that we collected show clearly that a large majority of Jews, and a similar proportion of Arabs, do not wish to marry (or have their family members marry) into the other group. As for other possible relationships (friends, neighbors, coworkers, citizens, etc.), a majority of at least two-thirds showed openness to all of them. A greater share of Arabs than of Jews are willing to engage in such relationships—a well-known situation among minorities vis-à-vis majority groups in a given society. This is an extremely encouraging finding, particularly in light of the serious accusations—supported primarily by isolated incidents but not necessarily corroborated by non-anecdotal empirical studies—that Israeli society, in particular Jewish society, is plagued by high levels of racism.

Would you be willing to accept as...?

Questions 47.1–47.6

Appendix 2
p. 239

Figure 6.6 \ Would you be willing to accept a Jew/Arab as a spouse, friend, neighbor...? (yes; by nationality; %)

We broke down the responses of the Jewish sample by political orientation and religiosity, with the results summarized in the following table:

Table 6.14 (%)

	Prepared to accept an Arab as a:	spouse	friend	neighbor	coworker	citizen	tourist
Political camp	Right	6.5	55	55	74	76	81
	Center	26	77	79	90	91	90
	Left	55	91	89	95	99	96

Prepared to accept an Arab as a:	spouse	friend	neighbor	coworker	citizen	tourist
Haredim	1	16	14	37	61	68
National religious	3.5	61	54.5	73	78.5	89
Traditional religious	7	53	59	77	76	75
Traditional non-religious	15.5	66	71	86	84.5	84.5
Secular	36	84	82	93	93	93.5

(**Religiosity** label spans the left side of the rows)

The table shows profound differences between the Right, on the one hand, and the Center and Left, on the other, with the exception of the subject of marriage. Although to different degrees, the Right and Center are on the same side in their opposition to marriage with Arabs. More precisely, on the question of intermarriage only a scant minority on the Right, and a small one in the Center, are open to marriage across religious or national lines. By contrast, on the Left a clear majority are willing to accept marriage to Arabs. In all the categories apart from this area, a majority in all three political camps agree to interpersonal relationships with Arabs, with the extent of agreement rising as the level of intimacy decreases.

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by religiosity shows that in all the groups, including secular Jews, only a minority are willing to accept marriage to Arabs (though the minority who agree is much larger in this group than in the others). This figure makes it clear that, despite the considerable overlap between secular and left-wing positions, the congruence is far from full (given that a majority on the Left agree to marriage with Arabs). Further, the Haredim are the exception on this question; they are the most strongly opposed to interpersonal relationships with Arabs, showing a majority in favor only when it comes to being fellow citizens or accepting Arabs as tourists. In all other degrees of intimacy, only a minority of Haredim agree to ties with Arabs. In the other religious groups, including the national religious, only intermarriage is an obstacle, and a majority would agree to relationships at all the other levels of closeness.

We broke down the responses of the Arab sample by religion, religiosity, voting patterns in the 2015 election, sex, and age (Arabs were not asked about citizenship or tourism with regard to Jews, since neither of these topics is relevant to them as a minority group). The analysis shows that, apart from the subject of marriage, in all subgroups and all levels of intimacy a majority of over 75% agree to interpersonal relationships with Jews. With respect to marriage, the

Druze are the group who object the most strongly to entering into marriage with Jews: just 2% would agree to it, compared with 24% of the Muslim respondents and 30% of the Christians. Another interesting finding is the sizeable difference between men and women on the subject of marriage (and only in this area): Of the Arab women surveyed, only 8% would be willing to accept a Jew as a spouse for themselves or their children, as opposed to 36% of the men.

We then shifted from the personal plane, where we found openness to contact (apart from the subject of mixed marriages, where both sides showed wide-ranging opposition), to the collective one. Firstly, we investigated whether the public feels that Arab citizens of Israel are discriminated against.

The survey findings show that a small majority of the Jewish public, and a very large majority of the Arab public, feel that the claim of discrimination is true. Compared with last year's results, the Jewish position is stable, meaning it barely rose or fell; but as the table below indicates, this marks the reversal of a trend since, prior to 2015, the majority did not agree that Arabs are discriminated against. This turnaround apparently reflects a substantial change in attitude among the Jewish public.

Table 6.15 (%)

Jews	2011	2012	2014	2015	2016
Agree that Arabs are discriminated against compared with Jews	45	38	36.5	54	53

As for the Arab public, since we began our surveys a majority in this group have held that Arabs are discriminated against; however this year, perhaps in response to the stormy public debate over minority rights, the share who feel this way is the highest it has been to date.

Figure 6.7 \ "Arab citizens of Israel are discriminated against, compared with Jewish citizens of the state" (agree; Arab respondents; by year; %)

Breaking down the responses of the Jewish sample by political orientation and religiosity, we found that on the Right only a minority agree with the assertion of discrimination. By contrast, among respondents from the Center and the Left an unequivocal majority believe that Arab citizens are discriminated against compared with Jewish ones; in fact, on the Left there is a real consensus on this question. The breakdown by religiosity shows that among the Haredi, national religious, and traditional religious respondents, only a minority agree with the claim of discrimination, whereas among the traditional non-religious and the secular, a clear majority hold that Arab citizens are discriminated against.

Table 6.16 (%)

		Agree that Arabs are discriminated against compared with Jews
Political camp	Right	34
	Center	67
	Left	92
Religiosity	Haredim	27
	National religious	31
	Traditional religious	38
	Traditional non-religious	54.5
	Secular	67

Since a consensus was recorded among the Arabs with regard to discrimination, there was no reason to analyze the responses to this question by other variables.

The findings with respect to discrimination are consistent with the widespread agreement in the Jewish public on the need for equal rights, which is the next topic we will be addressing.

In the Jewish public today, a clear majority (70%) are opposed to the statement that Jews should have greater rights than non-Jewish citizens. As a rule, there has been a rise in the size of this majority over the years.

Should Jews have greater rights?

Figure 6.8 \ "Jewish citizens of Israel should have greater rights than non-Jewish citizens" (disagree; Jewish respondents; by year; %)

A breakdown of responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation and religiosity yielded a (different) majority in each of the three camps—including the Right—who are opposed to granting greater rights to Jews. This result is not self-evident, given previous findings on the position of this camp regarding Arab citizens of Israel, and the findings that we will be presenting later in this chapter. By contrast, when we analyzed the results by religiosity, we found that a majority of Haredim agree with the notion of granting greater rights to Jews in Israel, unlike the remainder of the groups, where a majority are opposed.

Table 6.17 (%)

		Disagree that Jewish citizens of Israel should have greater rights than non-Jewish citizens
Political camp	Right	59
	Center	79
	Left	91
Religiosity	Haredim	40
	National religious	61
	Traditional religious	50
	Traditional non-religious	72
	Secular	84

To explore in greater depth the sincerity of the responses to the somewhat abstract question of equal rights, we gave it a more practical form by asking a related budgetary question.

We asked Jewish respondents if they agreed or disagreed with this statement: "It is acceptable for Israel, as a Jewish state, to allocate more funding to Jewish localities than to Arab ones." Here too, we found a majority (54%), as in 2015, who are opposed to budgetary discrimination. Unlike the previous question, however, a breakdown by political orientation shows substantial differences: On the Right, only a minority (roughly one-third) disagree with preferential treatment for Jewish localities, while in the Center and on the Left, there is a clear-cut majority who are opposed to such discrimination. Sizeable differences also arise in the breakdown by religiosity: Among Haredi, national religious, and traditional religious respondents, a majority support greater funding for Jewish localities, in contrast to the traditional non-religious and secular, where only a minority are in favor.

Figure 6.9 \ "It is acceptable for Israel, as a Jewish state, to allocate more funding to Jewish localities than to Arab ones" (disagree; Jewish respondents; by political orientation and religiosity; %)

Until now, we have seen that in the realm of interpersonal relations and internalization of the principle of equality, Jewish Israeli society (with some consistent exceptions) largely meets the accepted standards of a pluralistic democratic society. From here, we will move on to areas where the responses of the interviewees are somewhat-to-very problematic with regard to basic democratic values.

There has been much talk lately of the need to invest state funds in nurturing Jewish heritage. We wanted to know whether there is a willingness on the part of the Jewish public to also invest in fostering Arab heritage and culture. It emerges that the Jewish population is split nearly down the middle on this question, with a slight preference for those who do not agree with increasing the budget for this purpose (46% agree; 52% disagree). Needless to say, among Arab respondents there is virtually unanimous agreement with the need to increase state funding in this area (95%, representing a slight increase over last year).

Table 6.18 (%)

	Agree that more resources should be allocated for fostering Arab heritage and culture	Disagree that more resources should be allocated for fostering Arab heritage and culture	Don't know	Total
Jews	46	52	2	100

Breaking down the responses of the Jewish sample by political orientation and religiosity, we found that only among those who align themselves with the Left and secular camps is there a sizeable majority who support increasing the resources allocated for fostering Arab heritage and culture (in the Center, a bare majority agree with this position). On the Right, and in all the religious groups (with the exception of secular Jews), a majority are opposed to greater funding. Parenthetically, here we see again that the overlap between secular and left-wing identification is only partial: among secular respondents 39% are opposed to increased funding, while on the Left, less than half this share (15%) take a similar stance.

Figure 6.10 \ "The state should allocate more funds to foster the culture and heritage of Arab citizens of Israel" (disagree; Jewish respondents; by political orientation and religiosity; %)

Opposition to increased state funding for the fostering of Arab heritage and culture is only the first sign that we found of the unwillingness to advance the Arab public and enable it to integrate into Israeli society.

We posed the same question, but in slightly different versions, to Jewish and Arab interviewees. The Jewish respondents were asked: "Do you support or oppose having Arab parties in the government, including the appointment of Arab ministers?", while the Arab respondents were asked: "Do you support or oppose Arab parties' agreeing to join the government, including the appointment of Arab ministers?" This year as well, a majority (59%) of the Jewish sample are opposed to such a move, while a large majority (72%) of the Arab sample are in favor.

The share of Jews who are opposed in this year's survey to including Arab parties in the government and appointing Arab ministers is similar in size to that in past years, with some 60% coming out against it. Among those who identify with the Left or Center, and those who define themselves as secular, only a minority oppose it.

Figure 6.11 \ Do you support or oppose having Arab parties in the government, including the appointment of Arab ministers? (oppose; Jewish respondents; by year; %)

The unwillingness to include Arabs as a group in the government is also reflected in the consistent demand over the years to base decisions crucial to the state on a Jewish majority—a move that is unfeasible in democratic countries if, for example, the majority is polled via a referendum, since it is not possible to exclude a portion of the citizenry from such processes without violating the law.

We presented the following statements to Jewish respondents only, and asked them to express their agreement or disagreement: "Decisions crucial to the state on issues of peace and security should be made by a Jewish majority" and "Decisions crucial to the state regarding governance, economy or society should be made by a Jewish majority." This year, we again found a majority who support each of these statements.

Table 6.19 (%)

Jews	Decisions crucial to the state on peace and security should be made by a Jewish majority	Decisions crucial to the state on governance, economy or society should be made by a Jewish majority
Agree	72	57

In both areas—peace and security as well as governance, economy, and society—the share who support reliance on a Jewish majority is virtually unchanged from 2015 and earlier surveys; thus we are speaking of a very stable percentage that reflects a clear and consistent preference. Moreover, the gap between the share who favor a Jewish majority in matters of peace and security and the corresponding figure in matters of governance, economy, and society is also quite steady over the years that we have posed both these questions, with the former always larger than the latter.

When broken down by political orientation, this year's results are also similar to the past: On the Right and in the Center, a majority favor relying on a Jewish majority for crucial decisions, while on the Left only a minority support this approach.

Table 6.20 (%)

Agree	Decisions crucial to the state on peace and security should be made by a Jewish majority	Decisions crucial to the state on governance, economy or society should be made by a Jewish majority
Right	86.5	72
Center	70	51
Left	38	25

A breakdown of responses in the Jewish sample by religiosity shows that in all the groups, a majority are in favor of basing crucial decisions on matters of peace and security on a Jewish majority.

Figure 6.12 \ "Decisions crucial to the state on issues of peace and security should be made by a Jewish majority" (agree; Jewish respondents; by religiosity; %)

What causes the Jewish majority to be opposed to including the Arab minority in decisions at the national level? Does the answer lie in a perception that the Arabs constitute a security risk or that they do not have Israel's best interests at heart? The answer, it turns out, is not straightforward. In contrast to the prevailing assumption, it seems that the view that the Arabs pose a danger to Israel, or that they have not reconciled themselves to its existence, is not the primary factor in the desire to exclude them; rather, it may be resistance to sharing political power with a national minority.

We asked the Jewish interviewees to express their opinion on the following sentence: "Arab citizens pose a security risk to Israel." As shown in the following figure, a majority (56%) do not agree with this statement, mirroring last year's findings. In other words, despite the harsh feelings in certain sectors of the public, there has not been a decline in this assessment over the past year.

Figure 6.13 \ "Arab citizens pose a security risk to Israel" (Jewish respondents; %)

A breakdown of the results by political orientation shows a divide between the Right, where the majority agree with defining Israel's Arab citizens as a security risk, and the Center and Left, where a sizeable majority are opposed to this label. When the findings are broken down by religiosity, we find a majority among the Haredim, national religious, and traditional religious who see the Arabs as a security risk, as opposed to a minority among the traditional non-religious and secular groups.

Table 6.21 (%)

		Agree that Arab citizens pose a security risk
Political camp	Right	63
	Center	26
	Left	13.5

		Agree that Arab citizens pose a security risk
Religiosity	Haredim	**80.5**
	National religious	**64**
	Traditional religious	**54**
	Traditional non-religious	**44**
	Secular	**27**

Thus, whether for reasons of principle or practice, Arab citizens of Israel are not viewed as a security risk in the eyes of most of the Jewish public; but do Jewish citizens feel that the Arabs have not reconciled themselves to the state's existence?

Here too, it seems that a majority (52%) of the Jewish public disagree at present with the statement that Arab citizens of Israel have not reconciled themselves to Israel's existence, and support its destruction. This is similar to the majority that we found last year, meaning that the assessment of the objectives of the Arab "other" has not worsened over the course of the year. Nonetheless, in this case as well, there is a division between the Right, where we found a majority (64.5%) who believe that Israel's Arab citizens have in fact not "made peace with" the state's existence and wish to see its destruction, and the Center and Left, where a majority do not support this assessment (63% and 84%, respectively).

Figure 6.14 \ "Most Arab citizens of Israel have not reconciled themselves to the state's existence, and support its destruction" (Jewish respondents; %)

- Strongly agree — 23
- Somewhat agree — 23
- Somewhat disagree — 31
- Strongly disagree — 22
- Don't know — 1

Based on these last two questions, and on the data cited in the previous chapters, it therefore emerges that the Jewish majority in Israel does not see the Arab minority as enemies of the state in the security sense, and does not rule out personal relationships with Arabs (apart from marriage). However, as we have seen, the Jewish majority is against allowing the Arab public access to political decision-making. This rejection is apparently based on the understanding—in fact corroborated empirically—that Arab citizens of Israel do not approve of the Jewish character of the state, suggesting that if they were given the chance to wield greater influence, they would take steps to change the situation, perhaps in favor of a "state of all its citizens." Such a shift would certainly clash with the collective aspirations of the Jewish majority.

Chapter 7 \ The Haredi Community and Israeli Democracy

In this chapter, we will engage in a systematic comparison between the opinions of Haredi and non-Haredi Jews on the following topics:

- Overall situation of the state, and personal situation
- Sense of belonging to the state, and pride in being Israeli
- Primary identity
- Democratic and religious components of Israel's character
- Status of the Arab and Jewish populations
- The political system and politicians
- State performance
- Social tensions, and threats to the state

In recent years, the integration of Haredim into broader Israeli society has become a major focus of public debate in Israel. While there may be no consensus on how to accomplish this and what price should be paid, only a minority disagree with the economic and social importance of bringing this growing population into the Israeli experience. Doing so will necessitate a deep understanding of the positions of all segments of the Haredi public regarding the State of Israel and its system of government, as well as regarding the basic questions preoccupying Israeli society as a whole. If in fact the Haredim are on the road to integration, it is extremely important to know their opinions on several key topics that are addressed in this report on democracy in Israel.

Before we turn to the subject matter itself, three brief comments on the methodology of this chapter:

(a) In the past, it was commonly thought that the Haredi population did not participate in public opinion polls, and that even if they did take part, their input would not be of much value since the prevailing view was that all Haredim "echo" the opinions of their venerated religious leaders. In recent years, the situation has changed: first, Haredim are agreeing, in growing numbers, to cooperate with pollsters; and second, perhaps as a result of the weakening of rabbinic authority,[1] and because Haredi society is in the throes of an education and employment revolution, one can see a wide range of responses on

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1   See Benjamin Brown, *Toward Democratization in the Haredi Leadership? The Doctrine of Da'at Torah at the Turn of the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries*, Policy Paper No. 89 (Jerusalem: The Israel Democracy Institute, 2011) [Hebrew].

certain questions— even if the level of conformity in the opinions of the Haredi sample is still undeniably greater than that of the Jewish Israeli public as a whole. Accordingly, we increased the number of Haredim interviewed this year (to a total of 357 respondents) above their proportion of the population to achieve a better, if not necessarily optimal, representation of the diversity of opinions in this group.[2] Since the sample is still quite small, the data in the various subgroups (by age, subgroup, voting, etc.) is not always statistically significant.

(b) To avoid misunderstandings, it should be stated that whereas in the previous chapters (for example, when we compared the responses of Jews and of Arabs), we used a Jewish sample **that included Haredim in accordance with their relative proportion of the population**, in this chapter we will be comparing only the responses of Haredi and non-Haredi Jews.

(c) When discussing the differences between the various communities within the Haredi sector, we related only to those Haredim who affiliate themselves with one of the three major groups: Hassidic, Lita'im[3] and Sephardi.

And now to the analysis itself.

How is Israel Doing in the Eyes of Haredim?

In Chapter 3, we looked at how the public characterizes Israel's overall situation and their own personal situation, including a comparison between Haredim and other groups in the Jewish sample. Here we will examine whether there are differences within the subgroups of the Haredi public on these two questions.

The greatest share of Haredi respondents (45%) classified Israel's situation as "good," with 41% labeling it "so-so," and only a small minority (14%) defining it as "bad." Breaking down the responses by sex, we found that while the majority of Haredi men have a favorable view of Israel's situation, the most common response among Haredi women is "so-so." This is noteworthy since, in the general public, we did not find a difference between the sexes on most questions, including the present one. Regarding their personal situation, a breakdown of Haredi responses by sex did not yield any differences.

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2   As explained in the Introduction, when compiling the total sample and the Jewish sample, the weight of the Haredi respondents was decreased in accordance with their relative proportion of the population.

3   The Hebrew term "Lita'im" (literally, "Lithuanians") is used to refer to non-Hassidic Ashkenazi Haredim. These largely belong to the Lithuanian ultra-Orthodox tradition dating back to the 18th-century, which, historically, was ideologically opposed to Hassidism, and whose followers were thus referred to as "misnagdim," "opponents." Today, however, the group known in Israel as Lita'im is somewhat diverse, and of course has no direct geographic, cultural, or linguistic connection with modern-day Lithuania.

Table 7.1 (%)

Israel's overall situation	Good	So-so	Bad	Don't know	Total
Haredi women	38	45	16	1	100
Haredi men	53	35	11	1	100

At the same time, as in the general population, we found a more positive rating by Haredim of their personal situation than of the state's; however here, the gap between the two was much larger (45% of Haredim classified Israel's situation as good versus 88% who rated their personal situation as such). A breakdown of the Haredi public by subgroups did not yield significant findings.

The fact that the Haredi public openly states that it does not subscribe to the founding Zionist ethos, and the frequent claims that Haredim can be likened to an "enclave" whose ties with the surrounding society are limited to practical matters, led us to examine the extent of their ties to the State of Israel. The first question in this context relates to pride in being Israeli, and the second, the sense of being part of the state and its problems.

Although at the declarative level, Haredim tend to define themselves as non-Zionist, or in certain cases even anti-Zionist, in all three subgroups we found a majority who are proud to be Israeli. This feeling is especially pronounced among the Sephardim.

Table 7.2 (%)

	Hassidim	Lita'im	Sephardim
Proud to be Israeli	68	59	79.5

A breakdown by age showed that the older age groups are more proud to be Israeli, though in all age groups there is a majority who express this sentiment.

Table 7.3 (%)

	18–34	35–54	55+
Proud to be Israeli	66	71	76

As we did with all participants in the survey, we asked the Haredi interviewees: "To what extent do you feel part of the State of Israel and its problems?" As indicated in the following figure, though the state is secular and Zionist, a majority of Haredi interviewees (almost two-thirds), stated that they feel part of the state and its problems; only one-third reported either a weak sense of connection, or none at all, with the state. Nonetheless, whereas in the non-Haredi Jewish public the share who feel very much a part of the state is almost half, among Haredim the corresponding share is less than one-third.

Figure 7.1 \ To what extent do you feel part of the State of Israel and its problems? ("very much" and "quite a lot"; Haredi and non-Haredi Jews; %)

A breakdown of Haredi responses to this question by voting patterns in the 2015 Knesset elections reveals a very strong sense of belonging among those who voted for non-Haredi parties. Among voters for Haredi parties, those who gave their vote to Shas or to the Yachad party headed by Eli Yishai (which broke away from Shas shortly before the elections, ran independently, and did not cross the electoral threshold), the sense of belonging exceeds that of voters for United Torah Judaism (UTJ) by a considerable margin, though in both cases a majority feel part of the state and its problems.

Table 7.4 (%)

Vote in 2015 elections	Shas or Yachad	United Torah Judaism	Other parties
Feel part of the state and its problems	74	60	94

A breakdown by age shows that in the Haredi population, like the non-Haredi one, the older age groups feel more connected with the state and its troubles. Since we do not have valid data from the past, we cannot determine whether the sense of belonging increases gradually with age or whether these differences are constant and stem from political socialization in other times and circumstances, in which case the differences between the age groups will not disappear as today's younger cohorts grow older.

Table 7.5 (%)

Age	18–34	35–54	55+
Feel part of the state and its problems	56	65	83

Breaking down the results by community affiliation, we found that—like the question on pride in being Israeli—here too the Sephardi respondents feel part of the state and its problems to a much greater extent than do the Hassidim and Lita'im; however, in both these groups, the majority do report that they feel part of the state.

Table 7.6 (%)

	Hassidim	Lita'im	Sephardim
Feel part of the state and its problems	56	57	72

The responses of the Haredi sample to the two previous questions demonstrate that, despite the gap between them and the non-Haredi Jewish public, Haredim today are not a group unto themselves, estranged from the state. A majority in fact feel part of the "Israeli endeavor," despite their different lifestyle and their tendency to maintain a limited degree of interaction with the surrounding (non-Haredi) society.

In keeping with the overall sense of optimism that various studies have discerned in Haredi society, and due perhaps to the sense of belonging described above, the data show that Haredim are somewhat more optimistic about Israel's future than the non-Haredi Jewish public, though the latter are also largely optimistic in this regard.

Table 7.7 (%)

	Haredi Jews	Non-Haredi Jews
Optimistic about Israel's future	75	69

A breakdown by age shows that the oldest Haredim are more optimistic about Israel's future than their younger counterparts, though in all cases there is a sizeable majority of optimists.

Table 7.8 (%)

Age	18–34	35–54	55+
Optimistic about Israel's future	73	73	82.5

Breaking down the findings by community affiliation, we find that the Sephardim are the most optimistic regarding the future of the state (Hassidim, 70%; Lita'im, 72%; Sephardim, 79.5%). In other words, despite the periodic fire-and-brimstone rhetoric of the Haredi leadership toward non-Haredi Israel, and the predictions of ruin if it does not mend its ways, the Haredi public sees the future of the state in a positive light.

A Question of Identity

As the data below indicate, the matter of personal, group, and national identity is one of the major bones of contention between the Haredi community as a whole and the rest of the Israeli public. Whereas on the previous questions, despite certain gaps between Haredi and non-Haredi Jewish respondents, the overall pattern was similar, on the question of primary identity we found a substantial difference between the two groups. Among Haredim in general, the primary identity selected was Jewish followed by Haredi, with Israeli and ethnic identities ranked far below in importance. By contrast, among non-Haredi Jews, the primary identity was Israeli followed by Jewish.

Figure 7.2 \ Which identity is the most important to you? (Haredi and non-Haredi Jews; %)

In all three communities of the Haredi sample, the two identities reported as being most important were Jewish and religious (Haredi); however, we still found several interesting differences: among the Lita'im, Haredi identity ranked slightly higher than Jewish identity, while among Hassidim and Sephardim, this was reversed.

Table 7.9 (%)

Most important identity is:	Jewish	Religious (Haredi)
Hassidim	59	37
Lita'im	48	50
Sephardim	53	43

Here again we found a difference between men and women: The share of Haredi women who define their Jewish identity as the most important (59%) is significantly higher than the corresponding figure among Haredi men (52%), while the proportion who define their religious-Haredi identity as the most important is lower than that of the men (37% and 47%, respectively). Though we have no way of corroborating our hypothesis, it is certainly possible that the fact that Haredi women are working in settings that are not necessarily Haredi makes them more open to a more inclusive Jewish identity than the men, who are commonly studying in yeshiva.

And what about the identity of the state? As we did with the general public, we asked the Haredi interviewees about the balance between the Jewish and democratic components of the state. Once again, we encountered a tremendous gap between the Haredi respondents, the vast majority of whom feel that the democratic component is overly dominant, and the non-Haredi Jewish sample, where the distribution is more even and only a minority hold that the democratic element is too strong.

Figure 7.3 \ Do you feel there is a good balance today between the Jewish and democratic components of the state? (Haredi and non-Haredi Jews; %)

- There is a good balance between the two components
- The Jewish component is too dominant
- The democratic component is too dominant
- Don't know

A breakdown of Haredi responses by voting patterns in the 2015 elections reveals a consensus on the balance between the two components, with all groups largely feeling that the democratic aspect is too pronounced. Notably, the share of voters for Shas or Yachad and UTJ who expressed this opinion (73% and 68%, respectively) is greater than that of the Haredim who voted for the other, non-Haredi parties (47%).

Table 7.10 (%)

Vote in 2015 elections	Shas or Yachad	United Torah Judaism	Other parties
Democratic component is too dominant	73	68	47

Similarly, a breakdown of responses by age indicates that only a minority of young Haredim (though a larger one than in the older Haredi age groups) believe there is a good balance between the democratic and Jewish components of Israel's character. Simultaneously, fewer younger and older Haredim, as opposed to the intermediate age group, hold that the democratic aspect is overly emphasized.

Table 7.11 (%)

Age	18–34	35–54	55+
There is a good balance between the Jewish and democratic components	24	10	16
The democratic component is too dominant	62	79	65

The answer to this question was obvious to us from the start, but nonetheless we decided to ask the Haredi respondents what they consider to be the ultimate authority: halakha (Jewish religious law) or secular court rulings. And indeed, the responses indicate that the members of this group are almost unanimous in their belief that halakhic dictates are more binding than the verdict of a court. Among non-Haredi Jews the picture is, as expected, reversed.

Halakhic or legal authority?

Question 30.1

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Figure 7.4 \ If a contradiction arose between Jewish religious law and a (state) court ruling, which would you follow? (Haredi and non-Haredi Jews; %)

A breakdown by voting patterns in the 2015 Knesset elections shows that almost all groups of Haredi voters express a preference for halakhic authority over that of secular law; but the share who stated that they would follow halakhic dictates is greater among those who voted for the Haredi parties (UTJ, Shas, and Yachad) than among those who voted for the non-Haredi parties.

Table 7.12 (%)

Vote in 2015 elections	United Torah Judaism	Shas or Yachad	Other parties
In the event of a contradiction, would follow halakha	99.5	95	71

In the previous chapters, we saw that one of the primary points of tension in Jewish Israeli society is that between Left and Right, and that each of the political camps has its own distinctive worldview. We therefore wished to examine where the Haredim are situated within this space, particularly in light of the argument (which has lost some of its validity in recent years) that foreign affairs and security are not a top priority for the Haredi community.

The majority of the Haredi public seems to have a very clear idea of its position on political-security matters—primarily, and conspicuously, on the Right of the political spectrum. In fact, the Left is virtually non-existent in the Haredi community, and the Center is also negligible in size. The share who state that they do not know where to place themselves (10%) is high, perhaps signifying that the politicization of the Haredi public is not yet complete.

Figure 7.5 \ How would you define yourself (from a political-security perspective)? (Haredi and non-Haredi Jews; %)

A breakdown of the responses by community affiliation shows that, of the three groups, the Sephardim identify with the Right to the greatest extent.

Table 7.13 (%)

	Hassidim	Lita'im	Sephardim
Right	71	70	86
Center	13	17	5
Left	3	3	2
Don't know	13	10	7
Total	100	100	100

Haredim and Israel's Arab Population

Haredim and Arabs are often grouped together because of the similarity between them in certain parameters, for example, the high proportion of young people, relatively low income level, and poor general education. Some even see the two groups as potential allies in changing Israel's national priorities. But as shown below, in keeping with their identification with the Right, the attitude of Haredim toward the Arab population is hostile (much more so than in the non-Haredi public), and as such, there is little prospect of a political alliance between the two groups.

The self-identification of Haredim with the Right is substantiated when we examine their opinions regarding the Arab population in Israel. As shown in the following questions, the Haredi public stands out (in comparison with other Jewish groups) for their lack of empathy toward Arab citizens of Israel, and unwillingness to include them in government and decision-making.

First, the large majority of Haredim (over two-thirds) do not agree with the statement that Arab citizens of Israel suffer from discrimination, as opposed to a majority of the non-Haredi Jewish public who agree that such discrimination exists.

Figure 7.6 \ "Arab citizens of Israel are discriminated against, compared with Jewish citizens of the state" (disagree; Haredi and non-Haredi Jews; %)

A breakdown of Haredi responses to this question by voting patterns in the 2015 Knesset elections did not yield any differences between voters for Shas/Yachad and voters for UTJ. Among those who voted for other parties (in particular the Likud), the proportion who disagree with this statement is even higher (76.5%). Breaking down the results by community affiliation, we find the highest share who disagree with the claim that Arabs in Israel are discriminated against among the Sephardim (74%, as opposed to 71% among Hassidim and 62% among Lita'im). On this question, we found a sizeable difference when analyzing by sex: Haredi women disagree with the assertion of discrimination to a much greater extent than do Haredi men.

Table 7.14 (%)

	Do not agree that Arab Israelis are discriminated against	Agree that Arab Israelis are discriminated against	Don't know	Total
Haredi women	74.5	21.5	4	100
Haredi men	61	34	5	100

Not only is there virtually no acknowledgment by Haredim that Arabs are discriminated against, but they also show a much greater desire to exclude Arabs from decision-making circles than do non-Haredim, who are also none too willing to allow the Arab population to have a say in vital national decisions.

In line with the prevailing view in the Haredi community that Arabs are not discriminated against, we found a much larger share of this population than of non-Haredi Jews who hold that decisions crucial to the state in the political/security realm should be made by a Jewish majority. With respect to decisions in the social/economic sphere, the gap between Haredim and non-Haredim is even greater, perhaps as a result of the competition between the Haredi and Arab population groups for similar state resources.

Figure 7.7 \ "Decisions crucial to the state on peace and security / governance, economy or society should be made by a Jewish majority" (agree; Haredi and non-Haredi Jews; %)

We also found strong support among Haredim for the position that Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel should not have the same rights. As noted earlier, we asked survey participants to express their agreement or disagreement with the view that Jews in Israel should have greater rights than Arabs. While only just over a quarter of non-Haredi Jews supported this obviously undemocratic position, among Haredi respondents a majority felt this way.

Figure 7.8 \ "Jewish citizens of Israel should have greater rights than non-Jewish citizens" (agree; Haredi and non-Haredi Jews; %)

A breakdown by voting patterns in the 2015 Knesset elections shows a higher share who favor greater rights for Jews among voters for Shas or Yachad (65%) than among voters for UTJ (53%) or the non-Haredi parties (56%). Here too, we found a sizeable difference between Haredi men and women: The women agree, to a much greater extent than the men, with the statement that Jews in Israel are entitled to greater rights. In fact, there is not a majority of Haredi men who support this position.

Table 7.15 (%)

	Agree that Jews in Israel should have greater rights	Do not agree that Jews in Israel should have greater rights	Don't know	Total
Haredi women	66	31	3	100
Haredi men	48	50	2	100

The unwillingness of Haredim to encompass Arabs in the Israeli "us" is also reflected in their firm opposition to including Arab parties in the government and appointing Arab ministers. Here, the trend is similar to that of the non-Haredi Jewish public, but much more pronounced.

Table 7.16 (%)

	Haredi Jews	Non-Haredi Jews
Opposed to including Arab parties in coalition and appointing Arab ministers	81	57

On this question as well, the anti-Arab attitude of Haredi women is more uncompromising than that of the men: 87% of the women are opposed to including Arab parties in a coalition or appointing Arab ministers, as compared with 74% of the men. A breakdown by community affiliation indicates a large majority who agree with this position in all the groups, though the proportion is especially large among the Sephardim (85%, as opposed to 79% among the Hassidim and Lita'im).

Breaking down the findings by voting patterns in the 2015 elections shows that opposition to including Arab parties and ministers in the government is slightly less strong among UTJ voters than among those who voted for Shas or Yachad, or for non-Haredi parties.

Table 7.17 (%)

Vote in 2015 elections	United Torah Judaism	Shas or Yachad	Other parties
Opposed to including Arab parties in government and appointing Arab ministers	79	87	88

This unwelcoming attitude toward the Arab community is also reflected in the very high proportion of Haredim, compared with that of non-Haredi Jews, who are opposed to the state investing greater resources to foster the culture and heritage of Arab citizens of Israel. Given the fact that the Haredim are a group that is highly sensitive to their own Jewish heritage and culture, their unmistakable reluctance to assist in furthering the heritage of "the other" testifies even more strongly to the antagonism of the Haredi public towards the Arab population.

Table 7.18 (%)

	Do not agree to increased resources for fostering Arab culture and heritage
Haredi Jews	**81**
Non-Haredi Jews	**49**

Here too, we found that Haredi women are more extreme than the men in their attitudes toward Arabs. It therefore appears—and this point will have to be researched much more thoroughly—that Haredi women are more extreme than Haredi men in their attitude toward the Arab population.

Table 7.19 (%)

	Do not agree to increased resources for fostering Arab culture and heritage
Haredi women	**84**
Haredi men	**78**

It is reasonable to assume that the Haredi public's determination to hold the Arabs at arm's length is tied to their perception of Arab citizens of Israel as a security risk. On this issue, it emerges, the division of opinions among Haredim is the inverse of that of the non-Haredi Jewish public. As shown in the following figure, the share of Haredi Jews who see Arab Israelis as a security risk is double that of non-Haredi Jews—consistent with the Haredi community's political identification with the Right, which we noted earlier.

Figure 7.9 \ "Arab citizens pose a security risk to Israel" (agree; Haredi and non-Haredi Jews; %)

Haredim, Democracy, and the Political System

Next we examined what Haredim think about democracy, how much they trust state institutions and other bodies, and how they view Israel's political system and politicians.

As we saw above, Haredim believe that Jews in Israel should enjoy greater rights than Arabs. This position is problematic from a democratic standpoint, but can be justified to a certain extent by those who consider themselves democratic but hold that Jews "deserve more", especially in the realm of collective rights, simply because Israel is the state of the Jewish people, or by those who feel that Arabs pose a security risk. But what of the universal value of freedom of expression when it does not involve Arabs per se? As we shall see below, this democratic principle is not deeply ingrained in the Haredi public.

Although denial of a citizen's right to vote is highly questionable from a democratic point of view, roughly one-half of the non-Haredi Jewish public (51%) agree that those who are unwilling to affirm that Israel is the nation-state of the Jewish people should lose their right to vote; among Haredim, however, a much higher share of over two-thirds (67%) agree with this position.

Figure 7.10 \ "People who are unwilling to affirm that Israel is the nation-state of the Jewish people should lose their right to vote" (agree; Haredi and non-Haredi Jews; %)

A breakdown of opinions by community affiliation shows a particularly high degree of willingness among Sephardi respondents to deny the right to vote.

Table 7.20 (%)

	Hassidim	Lita'im	Sephardim
Agree that those who are unwilling to affirm that Israel is the state of the Jewish people should lose their right to vote	65	61	76

And what about those who criticize the state for reasons unrelated to its Jewishness? This question is of particular interest in light of the repeated clashes between the Haredi community and the state, and its harsh criticism of Israel over a range of domestic and foreign issues.

As indicated by the data, the fact that Haredim are often fiercely critical of Israel does not cause most of them to support protection of freedom of expression for those who speak out against the state. Only a minority, though not an insignificant one, believe that the freedom of expression of critics of the state should be defended, as opposed to a sizeable majority among the non-Haredi Jewish public.

Table 7.21 (%)

	Haredi Jews	Non-Haredi Jews
Agree that freedom of expression should be protected for those who speak out against the state	43	59

On this issue, we did not find real differences between the various segments of the Haredi community, though among Sephardim the minority who agree that freedom of expression of critics of the state should be safeguarded is slightly smaller than that among Hassidim and Lita'im. A breakdown by voting patterns shows a slightly greater share who support this position among UTJ voters.

From here, we moved on to examining the level of trust in various institutions among the Haredi public. As indicated below, the confidence of Haredim in most of the institutions (with the exception of the banks and political parties) is lower than that among non-Haredi Jews. But in the case of the three major democratic institutions—the parliament (Knesset), government, and political parties—Haredi and non-Haredi Jews do not differ greatly from one another, with both groups reporting very little confidence in these bodies. A breakdown of the Haredi population by voting patterns in the 2015 elections shows a marked similarity among those who voted for the Haredi parties, but differences between them and Haredim who voted for the non-Haredi parties. We encountered particularly striking differences between Haredim and the rest of the Jewish public in the level of trust in the Supreme Court, with only a small minority of Haredim placing their trust in this institution as opposed to a majority of non-Haredi Jews. A sizeable difference was also found in the extent of trust in the president of the state: slightly more than one-quarter of Haredi respondents expressed confidence in him, in contrast to nearly three-quarters of the non-Haredi Jewish public.

Figure 7.11 \ Trust in institutions ("quite a lot" and "very much"; Haredi and non-Haredi Jews; %)

Legend:
- Haredi Jews
- Non-Haredi Jews

Institution	Haredi Jews	Non-Haredi Jews
Media	4	29
Supreme Court	6	62.5
Political parties	19	14
Knesset	25	28
President of Israel	27	72
Government	28	29
Police	34	43
Your local authority	53	55
IDF	66	93
Your bank	74	63

Especially noteworthy is the fact that, even though a majority of Haredim do not serve in the IDF, and have been fighting for years against mandatory conscription, of all the state institutions surveyed the IDF earns the highest level of trust among Haredim. Two-thirds of the Haredi public expressed trust in the army, bringing them closer—though still on a different level—to the non-Haredi Jewish population, where the IDF also ranks the highest in terms of trust.

We found substantial differences between subgroups on this question: Voters for Shas/Yachad and the non-Haredi parties expressed much greater confidence in the army (80% and 76.5%, respectively) than did voters for UTJ (62%). A breakdown by age shows that the oldest group has the greatest trust in the IDF, perhaps because for younger Haredim, the periodic battles conducted against their conscription erode their faith in the army.

Table 7.22 (%)

Age	18–34	35–54	55+
Have trust in the IDF	62	64	79

An interesting finding concerns the high degree of trust placed by Haredim in local government: over one-half reported confidence in the local authority/municipality where they live. Further food for thought is the fact that the bank where they maintain an account earns the highest trust rating of all the institutions studied—roughly three-quarters. (Among non-Haredi Jews too, their bank scored a high ranking—in third place, below the IDF and the president of the state, and their faith in the institution is similar to the level of trust in the Supreme Court.)

We were interested in knowing whether, as a group that does not (at present) belong to mainstream Israeli society but has very active parliamentary representation, the Haredi population feels that their influence on government policy is weaker or stronger than that of the non-Haredi Jewish public.

Despite the prevailing sentiment among the secular public and in the mainstream media that the Haredim "have the government wrapped around their little finger," it seems that there is virtually no difference between Haredi and non-Haredi Jews on this score: a very large majority (almost equal in size) in both groups feel that they have little to no influence over government policy.

Table 7.23 (%)

	Haredi Jews	Non-Haredi Jews
Feel unable to influence government policy	83	81

A breakdown of Haredi responses to this question, by voting patterns in the 2015 elections, shows the greatest perception of powerlessness among voters for UTJ (89%), who feel much less able to influence policy than do voters for Shas/Yachad (75%) and the non-Haredi parties (71%).

As described in Chapter 4, we asked survey participants to express their opinion of the statement that to handle its unique problems, Israel needs a strong leader who is not swayed by the Knesset, the media or public opinion. Obviously, support for such a leader raises questions about whether basic democratic principles have been internalized; and indeed, a majority of non-Haredi Jewish respondents, who arguably uphold these principles at least on the theoretical level, did not favor this idea. By contrast, we found widespread support for it in the Haredi population.

Table 7.24 (%)

	Haredi Jews	Non-Haredi Jews
Agree that Israel needs a strong leader who is not swayed by the Knesset, the media or public opinion	**60**	**36**

A breakdown of Haredi responses to this question by voting patterns in the 2015 Knesset elections yielded very similar results among voters for Shas/Yachad and UTJ; but a much higher degree of support was recorded among voters for the other, non-Haredi parties, most of which are on the Right.

Table 7.25 (%)

Vote in 2015 elections	Shas or Yachad	United Torah Judaism	Other parties
Agree that Israel needs a strong leader	**59**	**57**	**82**

Breaking down the results by community affiliation, we found that among Sephardim and Hassidim, support for the notion of a strong leader for Israel is greater than it is among Lita'im.

Table 7.26 (%)

	Hassidim	Lita'im	Sephardim
Agree that Israel needs a strong leader	65	52	67

And what do Haredim think about Israeli politicians?

Like the low level of trust in institutions, which we found to be common to Haredim and non-Haredim, so too the perception that politicians are detached from the true problems of the public. Politicians are disconnected from the people, despite the impression in the general public that Haredi politicians are more attentive to their voters and committed to their interests.

Indeed, on the question of how well politicians are doing their jobs, Haredim are less negative in their assessment than the non-Haredi public. Only 51% of Haredi respondents disagree with the statement that most Knesset members work hard, compared with 67% of non-Haredi Jews.

Figure 7.12 \ "On the whole, most Knesset members work hard and are doing a good job" (Haredi and non-Haredi Jews; %)

Perhaps the gap in perception between the Haredi and non-Haredi populations can be chalked up to the fact that Haredi politicians are seen by their constituents as harder working than their non-Haredi counterparts. This theory is reinforced by the considerable difference between voters for the Haredi parties (Shas, Yachad, and UTJ) and Haredim who reported voting for non-Haredi parties, with the former more prone to agree that politicians are generally doing a good job. The share of the above groups who do not agree that politicians work hard are as follows: Shas/Yachad voters, 44%; UTJ voters, 48%; and Haredi voters for non-Haredi parties, 71%. A breakdown by community affiliation shows that Sephardim are the least opposed to the claim that politicians work hard (41%), compared with a majority among Lita'im(52%) and Hassidim (56%) who feel this way.

The responses to the question of whether Knesset members work hard and are fulfilling their responsibilities led us directly to the question of whether Haredim think that politicians look out more for themselves than for the public that elected them. We found that on this point there is virtually no difference between the Haredi and non-Haredi populations: Both groups feel that politicians look out more for their own interests (Haredim, 81.5%; non-Haredim, 79%).

From here we moved on to the level of integrity—or alternatively, corruption—of the country's leadership.

We asked: "How would you rate Israel's leadership in terms of corruption on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1=very corrupt and 5=not at all corrupt?" A breakdown of the Jewish public into Haredim and non-Haredim shows that Haredim give Israel's leadership a somewhat more favorable integrity rating than do non-Haredim. It is worth noting that a lower score signifies a perception of greater corruption in government.

Table 7.27 (%)

	Haredi Jews	Non-Haredi Jews
Mean corruption rating	2.65	2.30

A breakdown by community affiliation shows that Hassidim see Israeli leadership as more corrupt than Lita'im and Sephardim do.

Table 7.28 (%)

	Hassidim	Lita'im	Sephardim
Mean corruption rating	2.33	2.65	2.92

Public perception of corruption is often closely related to subjective judgments of the fairness of the system. We wanted to know whether Haredim, who are known for their strong network of community ties, are more or less inclined than non-Haredim to believe that connections are an asset in Israel today.

We examined the extent of agreement or disagreement with the statement: "The only way to get things done in Israel is if you have connections and know the right people," and found that the share of the Haredi population who agree with this assertion is larger than the corresponding figure in the non-Haredi public (85% versus 78.5%, respectively). We have no way of knowing whether the interviewees (in both groups) see this in a positive or negative light, though in terms of good government there is no question that this is an unflattering assessment of Israel's political-social system.

We have seen, then, that the level of trust in the political parties is truly abysmal in both the general public and the Haredi population. We therefore wished to know if there is a party that, in the opinion of the respondents, truly represents their views. In the non-Haredi Jewish public, roughly one-half answered that there is such a party—a surprising finding, given the low level of trust in the parties. Among Haredim, a much larger share report satisfaction with their party representation, almost three quarters.

Table 7.29 (%)

	Haredi Jews	Non-Haredi Jews
There is a party that truly represents my views	71	52

A breakdown of the findings by community affiliation shows that the feeling that there is a party that faithfully represents their views is strongest among the Lita'im.

Table 7.30 (%)

	Hassidim	Lita'im	Sephardim
There is a party that truly represents my views	69	80	73

Breaking down the results by voting patterns in the 2015 elections, we find that a greater share of UTJ voters report that there is a party on the Israeli political map that represents them (almost all of them confirmed that this party is United Torah Judaism). Among voters for Shas and Yachad, there is also a majority, though a smaller one, who feel the same way. By contrast, only a minority of Haredim who voted for non-Haredi parties feel well represented.

Table 7.31 (%)

Vote in 2015 elections	UTJ	Shas or Yachad	Other parties
There is a party that faithfully represents me	85	66	41

We saw that, on the whole, the public is not satisfied with the state's functioning, except in the military-security sphere. Is the State of Israel meeting Haredi expectations in terms of its performance?

It emerges that in the military-security area, the assessment of the Haredi population is much less favorable than that of the non-Haredi public. In the political-diplomatic sphere, the Haredi view is slightly more positive, and in the remaining areas studied, both populations offer similar perceptions. Either way, apart from the military-security domain, the assessments of the state's performance by both groups are not at all complimentary.

Table 7.32 (%)

State performance is good in these areas	Haredi Jews	Non-Haredi Jews
Military-security	60	76
Economic	29	25
Social	18	16
Political-diplomatic	27	17
Maintaining public order	32	32

And what about the political-diplomatic arena? When we asked what the primary reason is for the harsh criticism of Israel by the international community, the largest share of Haredi respondents (48%) pointed to antisemitism. In the non-Haredi public, by contrast, the most common response (30.5%) was Israel's conduct and positions in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with antisemitism in only second place (27%) as primary factors fueling criticism of Israel around the world.

So what do Haredim think about Israeli society?

Haredi Perception of Israeli Society

Though the sense of mutual responsibility ("Israelis will always help their fellow Israelis") is also strong in the non-Haredi public, it is particularly pronounced in the Haredi community.

Figure 7.13 \ "Israelis can always rely on other Israelis to help them out in times of trouble" (agree; Haredi and non-Haredi Jews; %)

Nonetheless, it is no secret that Israeli society is also marked by a high degree of internal tension. We wished to know which groups have the highest level of tension between them, in the eyes of the Haredi public.

As we saw earlier, in the general Jewish public the source of tension that is considered the most serious is that between Jews and Arabs. But as the following figure shows, a much greater share of Haredim than non-Haredim rank this as the biggest focal point of tension (three-quarters compared with roughly one-half). This finding undoubtedly ties in with the Haredi view of Arabs, which we discussed above. And indeed, it is the balance of power between Jews and non-Jews that most concerns the Haredi public, as we will see below. It should be noted that with regards to tensions between Religious and Secular Jews, the two groups (Haredi and non Haredi Jews) share common perceptions about the issue: in both cases 11% define the level of tension as high.

Figure 7.14 \ Which groups in Israeli society have the highest level of tension between them? (Haredi and non-Haredi Jews; %)

Another finding of interest is the especially low share (9%) of Haredim who see the primary area of tension in Israel as that between the political Left and Right, in contrast to the much higher share in the non-Haredi public (29%) who rank it at the top of the list.

As stated in Chapter 6, we presented the interviewees with a list of potential internal threats to Israeli society, and asked them to select the one that they considered the most serious. As the figure below indicates, two factors are seen by the Haredi public as the most threatening to Israel's existence: the diminution of the country's Jewish majority, and strong disagreements between various segments of Israeli society. This is not the case among the non-Haredi respondents, who rank strong disagreements in first place followed by social/economic gaps. The latter factor is seen by a relatively low share of Haredim as the worst threat, despite the fact that many of them have the lowest income levels in the country. It is also noteworthy that the share of Haredim who see the demands to make Israel more democratic as the primary existential threat (11.5%) is greater than the share of non-Haredim who view the calls to make Israel more Jewish as the major threat (7%).

Figure 7.15 \ Which of these is the most serious (internal) existential threat to the State of Israel? (Haredi and non-Haredi Jews; %)

Legend:
- Israel's control of the West Bank/Judea and Samaria
- Social/economic inequality
- Demands to make Israel more democratic
- Demands to make Israel more Jewish
- Diminution of the country's Jewish majority
- Strong disagreements between various segments of Israeli society

To summarize, the data show that Haredim—in particular Sephardim and voters for Shas or Yachad—feel part of "the Israeli endeavor." At the same time, the primary loyalty of Haredim is to Jewish religious law (halakha). They would like a state with a clearly Jewish character, and are concerned about internal differences of opinion among Jews. The vast majority identify themselves with the Right politically, and the predominant explanation in their eyes for international criticism of Israel is antisemitism. This combination of religious-Jewish focus and affiliation with the Right on political-security issues results in Haredim in general being unwilling to afford Arabs a place in the Israeli national project or to interact with them on a personal level. The Haredi hierarchy of trust in state institutions is different from that of the non-Haredi public, but they share the same low level of confidence in the government, Knesset, and political parties. We found further that those Haredim who voted for non-Haredi parties hold different views on a number of issues from Haredim who voted for the Haredi political parties, and that in general the former are more positive about the state and more patriotic—some would even say more chauvinistic.

Appendices

Appendix 1
Israel 2016: An International Comparison—Sources and Methodology

This year, our international comparison is based on 12 democracy indicators, and assesses the performance of selected countries in four areas: democratic rights and freedoms, governance, economy and society, and political stability. Since these indicators were formulated by six different institutions, at times there is some overlap between them. We examine the indicators along two axes: one, Israel's ranking over the past year in comparison with other countries; and two, assessments of Israel in 2016 as compared with 2015.

Table 1 International Indicators by Institution

Indicator	Institution and Publication
Democratic Rights and Freedoms	
1. Political rights and civil liberties	Freedom House: *Freedom in the World*
2. Freedom of the press	Freedom House: *Freedom of the Press*
3. Political participation	Economist Intelligence Unit: *Democracy Index*
4. Civil liberties	Economist Intelligence Unit: *Democracy Index*
5. Voice and accountability	World Bank: *World Governance Indicators*
Political Stability	
6. Functioning of government	Economist Intelligence Unit: *Democracy Index*
7. Rule of law	World Bank: *World Governance Indicators*
8. Corruption perceptions	Transparency International: *Corruption Perceptions Index*

➤

Indicator	Institution and Publication
Economy and Society	
9. Regulatory quality	World Bank: *World Governance Indicators*
10. Human development	UNDP: *Human Development Report*
Governance	
11. Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism	World Bank: *World Governance Indicators*
12. Political risk	PRS Group: *International Country Risk Guide*

Countries studied, and method of comparison

Each institution assembled its own list of countries for assessment, with the number of countries included ranging from 140 to 209. For this reason, the comparison between Israel and the other countries is presented in percentile form rather than in absolute numbers. A high percentile indicates a better quality of democracy, and a low percentile, a poorer one.

To illustrate Israel's performance in relation to specific countries, we selected 27 countries, most of them considered established liberal democracies, detailing the scores of these countries in the relevant democracy indicators. To faithfully represent different areas of the world, the primary factor in constructing the sample was geographic distribution. The secondary distribution is by type of regime or quality of democracy in a given country. We included in the comparison several countries that are not democratic but are located in proximity to Israel, since we felt it was important to assess Israel not only as a democracy per se but also in the context of the Middle East.

Based on geographic location, the list of 27 countries presented in the tables consists of five countries from the Americas (Argentina, United States, Brazil, Venezuela, and Canada); nine countries in Western and Central Europe (Italy, Belgium, United Kingdom, Germany, Greece, Norway, Spain, France, and Switzerland); three countries that were part of the Soviet bloc in Central and Eastern Europe (Hungary, Czech Republic, and Russia); six countries in the Middle East (Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia); and four countries in East and Southeast Asia (India, Japan, New Zealand, and China).

To select the countries for comparison with Israel in quality of democracy, we used the ratings provided by Freedom House, which issues an annual assessment of 195 countries, divided into three categories: free, partly free, and not free. Based on this parameter, our list includes: 18 "free" countries (Italy, Argentina, United States, Belgium, Brazil, United Kingdom, Germany, India, Hungary, Greece, Japan, Norway, New Zealand, Spain, Czech Republic, France, Canada, and Switzerland); three "partly free" countries (Venezuela, Turkey, and Lebanon); and six "not free" countries (Jordan, Egypt, Syria, China, Saudi Arabia, and Russia). Israel is defined by Freedom House as a free country; however, in other, more stringent, classifications, it is described in less complimentary terms, for example as a "defective democracy"[1] or "flawed democracy."[2]

It is important to clarify that changes in the score of a particular country in a given year do not necessarily correspond with changes in its ranking. This is because a country can receive the same annual score for two years or more in succession but can rise or fall in its placement relative to other countries. In other words, if the scores of other countries improve, a given country can drop in its comparative ranking even if its score remains unchanged, and vice versa: if there is a downturn in other countries' scores, a country can rise in the rankings even if its democratic performance does not improve. And a further important comment: when we note the indicators for a certain year, we are referring to the year in which they were published, though in most cases these are based on figures from the previous year. This being the case, the "2016 indicators" generally reflect the figures for 2015. Correspondingly, the 2015 indicators reflect 2014 figures, and so on.

Israel's comparative ranking in 2016

In five of the indicators, Israel's ranking remained the same as last year; in five indicators it improved; and in two indicators it declined.

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1   Wolfgang Merkel, "Embedded and Defective Democracies: Where Does Israel Stand?" in *By the People, For the People, Without the People? The Emergence of (Anti)Political Sentiment in Western Democracies and in Israel*, ed. Tamar S. Hermann (Jerusalem: The Israel Democracy Institute, 2012), 185–225.

2   See *Democracy Index* of the Economist Intelligence Unit:
     http://www.eiumedia.com/index.php/latest-press-releases/item/2127-democracy-in-an-age-of-anxiety

Table 2 Israel's ranking in the 2016 indicators in comparison with other countries

Indicator	2016 Ranking	2016 Percentile	-2015 Ranking	2015 Percentile	Change
Political rights and civil liberties	48–57 (of 195)	71–75	49–58 (of 195)	70–75	=
Freedom of the press	65 (of 199)	67	61–63 (of 199)	68–69	⌄
Political participation	2–5 (of 167)	97–99	3–6 (of 167)	96–98	=
Civil liberties	88–90 (of 167)	46–47	90–96 (of 167)	43–46	⌃
Voice and accountability	61 (of 204)	70	72 (of 212)	66	⌃
Functioning of government	31–42 (of 167)	75–81	32–43 (of 167)	74–81	=
Rule of law	36 (of 209)	83	43 (of 212)	80	⌃
Perception of corruption	32–34 (of 167)	80–81	37–38 (of 174)	78–79	⌃
Regulatory quality	27 (of 209)	87	32 (of 210)	85	⌃
Human development	18 (of 188)	90	19 (of 187)	90	=
Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism	180 (of 207)	13	179 (of 212)	16	⌄
Political risk	57–60 (of 140)	57–59	59–60 (of 140)	57–58	=

⌃   improvement in Israel's ranking compared with previous year

=   no change in Israel's ranking compared with previous year

⌄   decline in Israel's ranking compared with previous year

Israel's scores in 2016 indicators as compared with 2015

Examining Israel's scores in 2016 compared with those of the previous year, we found a decline in the indicator for freedom of the press. By contrast, eight indicators showed improvement over 2015: civil liberties, voice and accountability, rule of law, perception of corruption, regulatory quality, human development, political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, and political risk.

Table 3 Israel's scores in 2016 compared with 2015

Indicator	2016 Score	2015 Score	Scale	Change
Political rights and civil liberties*	6.5	6.5	1–7 (7 = full political rights and civil liberties)	=
Freedom of the press*	68	70	0–100 (100 = full freedom of the press)	⌄
Political participation	8.89	8.89	0–10 (10 = highest level of political participation)	=
Civil liberties	6.18	5.88	0–10 (10 = civil liberties fully respected)	⌃
Voice and accountability	0.73	0.63	(-2.5)–2.5 (2.5 = highest level of voice and accountability	⌃
Functioning of government	7.14	7.14	0–10 (10 = highest level of democratic functioning)	=
Rule of law	1.11	0.95	(-2.5)–2.5 (2.5 = highest extent of rule of law)	⌃

*   In the original indicators (political rights and civil liberties, and freedom of the press), lower scores denote greater freedom, but here we systematically reversed the scale for greater clarity. Thus for all indicators in this table, a higher score reflects better democratic performance.

Indicator	2016 Score	2015 Score	Scale	Change
Perception of corruption	61	60	**0–100** (100 = absence of corruption)	∧
Regulatory quality	1.21	1.15	**(-2.5)–2.5** (2.5 = highest quality of regulatory bodies)	∧
Human development	0.894	0.888	**0–1** (1 = highest level of human development)	∧
Political stability and absence of violence/ terrorism	-0.99	-1.09	**(-2.5)–2.5** (2.5 = highest level of political stability)	∧
Political risk	66.5	66	**0–100** (100 = lowest level of political risk)	∧

∧   improvement in Israel's score compared with previous year

=   no change in Israel's score compared with previous year

∨   decline in Israel's score compared with previous year

International indicators: description and sources

The **political rights and civil liberties** indicator was developed by the longstanding U.S.-based organization, Freedom House, and has been published annually since 1972. It assesses the state of political rights and civil liberties in most of the world's countries. The data for our comparative chapter was drawn from *Freedom in the World 2016.*

The **freedom of the press** indicator, also developed by Freedom House, has been published since 1980. It analyzes the level of press freedom in most of the world (the 2016 report contains scores for 199 countries and territories). For our comparative chapter, we used data reported in *Freedom of the Press 2016.*

The Economist Intelligence Unit publishes an annual *Democracy Index* assessing the state of democracy in 167 countries around the world. It consists of five separate categories: electoral process and pluralism, functioning of government, political participation, political culture, and civil liberties. The authors state that they deliberately apply more comprehensive and rigorous definitions of the term "democracy" than are used by Freedom House; hence more countries receive the label of "flawed democracy." For our comparative chapter, we used the data cited

in *Democracy Index 2015: Democracy in an Age of Anxiety*, noting Israel's scores in three categories: **functioning of government**, **political participation**, and **civil liberties**.

Each year the World Bank publishes comparative data (*Worldwide Governance Indicators*) on most countries around the world, focusing on six aspects of governance: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. We cite figures from four categories: **voice and accountability**, **political stability and absence of violence/terrorism**, **regulatory quality**, and **rule of law**. The latest figures were published in September 2015 on the organization's website.

Transparency International is considered the world's leading organization in the fight against corruption in all forms. Its indicator on the **perception of corruption** (the *Corruption Perceptions Index*) is based on 12 surveys from a range of independent institutions specializing in governance and business climate analysis. The data for our comparative chapter was drawn from *Corruption Perceptions Index 2015*.

The Human Development Index, an indicator of **human development**, is published annually by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Its aim is to reflect the extent to which basic aspects of human development are maintained around the world. For our comparative chapter, we used data reported in the *Human Development Report 2015: Work for Human Development*.

The Political Risk Services Group provides a monthly assessment of the level of political, financial, and economic risk in selected countries. For our comparative chapter, we cited the **political risk** ranking, drawn from the January 2015 edition of the *International Country Risk Guide*.

Appendix 2

Questionnaire and Distribution of Responses (Total Sample; %)

1. How would you characterize Israel's overall situation today?

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Very good	7.6	6.8	12.1
Good	28.9	29.3	26.7
So-so	39.9	41.4	31.7
Bad	12.2	11.4	16.8
Very bad	10.7	10.6	11.6
Don't know / refuse to answer*	0.7	0.5	1.1
Total	100	100	100

* Throughout the survey, this response was recorded if the respondent replied "I don't know," or was unwilling to select one of the options offered.

2. And what about your personal situation?

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Very good	26.0	26.7	22.0
Good	49.4	51.4	38.6
So-so	19.8	17.9	30.6
Bad	2.5	2.1	5.0
Very bad	1.7	1.5	3.3
Don't know / refuse to answer	0.6	0.4	0.5
Total	100	100	100

3. How proud are you to be an Israeli?

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Very much	54.1	60.7	16.5
Quite a lot	27.1	25.0	38.8
Not so much	11.4	10.1	18.5
Not at all	6.1	3.8	19.0
Don't know / refuse to answer	1.3	0.4	7.2
Total	100	100	100

4. In general, are you optimistic or pessimistic about Israel's future?

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Very optimistic	19.3	21.1	9.1
Quite optimistic	47.8	48.7	42.1
Quite pessimistic	22.8	21.0	32.8
Very pessimistic	7.6	7.2	9.9
Don't know / refuse to answer	2.5	2.0	6.1
Total	100	100	100

5. To what extent do you feel part of the State of Israel and its problems?

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Very much	39.8	45.1	9.9
Quite a lot	37.4	38.8	29.5
Not so much	15.4	10.6	42.7
Not at all	6.3	4.6	16.0
Don't know / refuse to answer	1.1	0.9	1.9
Total	100	100	100

6. Israel is defined as a Jewish and democratic state. Do you feel there is a good balance today between the Jewish and the democratic components?

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
There is a good balance between the two components	26.1	29.4	7.2
The Jewish component is too dominant	45.1	38.9	79.9
The democratic component is too dominant	22.9	25.3	9.4
Don't know / refuse to answer	5.9	6.4	3.5
Total	100	100	100

7-11. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements:

7. To safeguard Israel's security, it is permissible for the state to monitor what citizens write on the Internet.

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Strongly disagree	20.2	18.8	28.4
Somewhat disagree	20.4	21.3	15.7
Somewhat agree	32.9	33.6	28.7
Strongly agree	24.7	24.8	24.0
Don't know / refuse to answer	1.8	1.5	3.2
Total	100	100	100

8. Arab citizens of Israel are discriminated against, compared with Jewish citizens of the state.

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Strongly disagree	23.4	26.8	4.4
Somewhat disagree	17.0	19.3	4.1
Somewhat agree	32.1	32.2	31.7
Strongly agree	26.3	20.5	59.0
Don't know / refuse to answer	1.2	1.2	0.8
Total	100	100	100

9. To handle Israel's unique problems, we need a strong leader who is not swayed by the Knesset, the media or public opinion.

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Strongly disagree	35.4	38.5	17.4
Somewhat disagree	20.2	21.2	14.9
Somewhat agree	19.8	17.5	32.5
Strongly agree	22.3	20.8	30.9
Don't know / refuse to answer	2.3	2.0	4.3
Total	100	100	100

10. Decisions crucial to the state on issues of peace and security should be made by a Jewish majority. (Jews)

	Jews
Strongly disagree	11.7
Somewhat disagree	14.9
Somewhat agree	26.1
Strongly agree	45.9
Don't know / refuse to answer	1.4
Total	100

11. Decisions crucial to the state regarding governance, economy or society should be made by a Jewish majority. (Jews)

	Jews
Strongly disagree	20.1
Somewhat disagree	20.9
Somewhat agree	24.5
Strongly agree	32.7
Don't know / refuse to answer	1.8
Total	100

12. To what extent do you trust each of the following individuals or institutions:

Total sample

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
12.1 The media	29.0	46.0	20.8	3.3	0.9	100
12.2 The Supreme Court	16.1	25.1	33.3	22.5	3.0	100
12.3 The police	16.5	42.5	31.8	7.9	1.3	100
12.4 The President of Israel	15.4	20.1	35.0	26.4	3.1	100
12.5 The Knesset	24.0	47.7	22.6	4.0	1.7	100
12.6 The IDF	7.1	10.0	33.9	47.8	1.2	100
12.7 The government	28.6	42.6	21.2	6.0	1.6	100
12.8 The political parties	30.5	51.1	12.6	1.3	4.5	100
12.9 Your municipality or local authority	16.0	31.1	38.2	13.3	1.4	100
12.10 Your bank	9.8	25.0	46.5	16.5	2.2	100

➤ **Jews**

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
12.1 The media	28.9	44.7	22.4	3.3	0.7	100
12.2 The Supreme Court	17.0	24.1	32.4	24.1	2.4	100
12.3 The police	14.0	42.6	33.9	8.0	1.5	100
12.4 The President of Israel	12.5	17.7	37.9	29.7	2.2	100
12.5 The Knesset	21.8	49.0	24.0	4.0	1.2	100
12.6 The IDF	2.5	6.7	36.1	54.3	0.4	100
12.7 The government	26.8	43.7	22.4	6.1	1.0	100
12.8 The political parties	28.2	52.8	13.2	1.1	4.7	100
12.9 Your municipality or local authority	13.5	30.4	40.7	14.1	1.3	100
12.10 Your bank	9.5	24.6	47.0	16.8	2.1	100

➤ **Arabs**

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
12.1 The media	29.2	53.4	11.8	3.3	2.3	100
12.2 The Supreme Court	11.0	31.1	38.6	13.2	6.1	100
12.3 The police	30.6	41.6	19.8	7.4	0.6	100
12.4 The President of Israel	32.0	33.9	18.7	7.4	8.0	100
12.5 The Knesset	36.9	40.5	14.3	4.1	4.2	100
12.6 The IDF	33.3	28.9	21.2	11.0	5.6	100
12.7 The government	38.8	36.4	14.3	5.5	5.0	100
12.8 The political parties	43.5	41.0	9.4	2.2	3.9	100
12.9 Your municipality or local authority	30.0	36.4	24.2	8.5	0.9	100
12.10 Your bank	11.3	27.3	43.5	14.9	3.0	100
12.11 The Supreme Arab Monitoring Committee	20.2	32.3	23.8	5.2	18.5	100
12.12 The Hebrew-language media	32.0	43.4	17.7	3.0	3.9	100
12.13 The Arabic-language media (within Israel)	32.3	44.2	18.0	3.0	2.5	100

13. For many years, the following were considered to be the major sources of tension in Israeli society. How would you characterize the level of tension between these groups today?

Total sample

	High	Moderate	Low	None (not read)	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
13.1 Mizrahim and Ashkenazim	24.7	42.3	27.8	1.3	3.9	100
13.2 Religious and secular Jews	50.4	34.6	12.2	0.7	2.1	100
13.3 Right and Left (regarding Israel's foreign policy and national security issues)	66.8	21.6	7.9	1.0	2.7	100
13.4 Rich and poor	55.7	29.4	11.3	2.0	1.6	100
13.5 Jews and Arabs	78.4	17.4	2.6	0.8	0.8	100

➤ **Jews**

	High	Moderate	Low	None (not read)	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
13.1 Mizrahim and Ashkenazim	24.6	43.2	30.4	1.0	0.8	100
13.2 Religious and secular Jews	51.4	34.8	12.6	0.3	0.9	100
13.3 Right and Left (regarding Israel's foreign policy and national security issues)	70.7	20.2	7.6	0.4	1.1	100
13.4 Rich and poor	58.1	28.8	10.3	1.5	1.3	100
13.5 Jews and Arabs	79.5	16.8	2.5	0.4	0.8	100

Arabs

	High	Moderate	Low	None (not read)	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
13.1 Mizrahim and Ashkenazim	25.3	37.5	12.9	3.6	20.7	100
13.2 Religious and secular Jews	44.9	33.3	9.9	2.8	9.1	100
13.3 Right and Left (on Israel's foreign policy and national security issues)	44.4	29.8	9.9	4.4	11.5	100
13.4 Rich and poor	42.4	32.8	17.1	4.7	3.0	100
13.5 Jews and Arabs	72.2	21.2	2.8	3.0	0.8	100

14. In your opinion, which groups have the highest level of tension between them?

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Mizrahim and Ashkenazim	1.4	1.5	0.6
Religious and secular Jews	10.5	10.7	9.6
Right and Left (on Israel's foreign policy and national security issues)	24.0	27.1	6.3
Rich and poor	8.0	8.1	7.7
Jews and Arabs	53.0	50.3	68.0
Don't know / refuse to answer	3.1	2.3	7.8
Total	100	100	100

15. In your opinion, what is the main reason today for the international community's harsh criticism of Israel?

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Israel's behavior and political positions in the context of the conflict with the Palestinians	33.1	28.7	57.9
Antisemitism around the world	24.5	28.6	1.7
Shortcomings in Israeli public diplomacy	15.0	16.3	7.7
Activities of Israeli peace and human-rights organizations (for example, Breaking the Silence or B'Tselem)	15.0	17.2	2.2
Inequality in Israel between Jewish and Arab citizens	7.8	5.6	20.7
Don't know / refuse to answer	3.3	2.8	6.6
There is no harsh criticism of Israel (not read)	1.3	0.8	3.2
Total	100	100	100

16-19. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements:

16. To deal successfully with the challenges confronting it, Israel must maintain its democratic character.

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Strongly disagree	4.8	4.8	4.7
Somewhat disagree	9.9	10.5	6.6
Somewhat agree	30.5	30.2	32.2
Strongly agree	54.1	54.0	54.8
Don't know / refuse to answer	0.7	0.5	1.7
Total	100	100	100

17. It is acceptable for Israel, as a Jewish state, to allocate more funding to Jewish localities than to Arab ones. (Jews)

	Jews
Strongly disagree	32.2
Somewhat disagree	22.1
Somewhat agree	20.6
Strongly agree	23.8
Don't know / refuse to answer	1.3
Total	100

18. Politicians in Israel are detached from the Israeli public's real needs and problems.

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Strongly disagree	5.1	5.2	4.7
Somewhat disagree	17.9	19.5	9.4
Somewhat agree	35.9	34.8	41.9
Strongly agree	39.1	38.8	40.8
Don't know / refuse to answer	2.0	1.7	3.2
Total	100	100	100

19. Arab leaders are mainly concerned with the problems of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, and not sufficiently concerned with the problems of Israeli Arabs. (Arabs)

	Arabs
Strongly disagree	15.7
Somewhat disagree	19.3
Somewhat agree	33.4
Strongly agree	27.9
Don't know / refuse to answer	3.7
Total	100

20. How would you rate the state's performance in the following areas?

Total sample

	Very poor	Quite poor	Average	Quite good	Very good	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
20.1 Military-security	3.4	5.6	18.3	40.1	31.1	1.5	100
20.2 Economic	20.1	20.5	32.0	21.5	5.3	0.6	100
20.3 Social	20.5	22.5	38.9	14.4	2.5	1.2	100
20.4 Political-diplomatic	24.6	23.9	29.2	16.9	2.3	3.1	100
20.5 Maintaining public order (for example, crime prevention)	13.8	19.5	33.8	26.8	5.1	1.0	100

Jews

	Very poor	Quite poor	Average	Quite good	Very good	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
20.1 Military-security	2.8	4.8	17.3	42.9	31.7	0.5	100
20.2 Economic	21.4	20.1	32.2	21.2	4.4	0.7	100
20.3 Social	21.7	22.7	38.4	13.8	2.1	1.3	100
20.4 Political-diplomatic	26.5	23.6	29.6	16.7	1.6	2.0	100
20.5 Maintaining public order (for example, crime prevention)	13.3	18.7	35.2	27.9	4.1	0.8	100

➤ **Arabs**

	Very poor	Quite poor	Average	Quite good	Very good	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
20.1 Military-security	6.9	9.9	23.7	24.2	27.8	7.5	100
20.2 Economic	12.7	23.1	30.3	22.9	10.5	0.5	100
20.3 Social	13.8	20.9	41.6	17.4	4.7	1.6	100
20.4 Political-diplomatic	14.0	25.6	27.3	18.2	6.1	8.8	100
20.5 Maintaining public order (for example, crime prevention)	16.5	23.7	25.9	20.9	11.0	2.0	100

21. In your opinion, to what extent does each of the following internal factors constitute an existential threat to the State of Israel?

21.1 Israel's control of the West Bank/Judea and Samaria.

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Very much	18.8	17.6	25.3
Quite a lot	25.8	24.6	32.2
Slightly	21.0	21.4	18.5
Not at all	30.3	32.7	16.8
Don't know / refuse to answer	4.1	3.7	7.2
Total	100	100	100

21.2 The social/economic gaps.

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Very much	24.0	25.2	17.4
Quite a lot	39.8	40.7	34.7
Slightly	25.0	23.6	32.5
Not at all	9.1	8.8	10.7
Don't know / refuse to answer	2.1	1.7	4.7
Total	100	100	100

21.3 The demands to make Israel more democratic.

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Very much	9.7	10.1	7.7
Quite a lot	21.2	22.1	16.0
Slightly	25.8	25.7	26.2
Not at all	37.1	36.0	43.5
Don't know / refuse to answer	6.2	6.1	6.6
Total	100	100	100

21.4 The demands to make Israel more Jewish.

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Very much	21.8	19.2	36.1
Quite a lot	29.8	28.5	37.2
Slightly	20.6	22.7	9.1
Not at all	24.3	26.5	11.8
Don't know / refuse to answer	3.5	3.1	5.8
Total	100	100	100

21.5 The diminution of the country's Jewish majority.

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Very much	28.7	31.6	11.8
Quite a lot	32.2	33.5	25.1
Slightly	19.7	18.8	25.3
Not at all	14.0	11.4	28.7
Don't know / refuse to answer	5.4	4.7	9.1
Total	100	100	100

21.6 The strong disagreements between various segments of Israeli society.

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Very much	28.3	29.5	21.5
Quite a lot	36.6	37.1	33.9
Slightly	24.1	23.5	27.8
Not at all	9.0	8.4	12.1
Don't know / refuse to answer	2.0	1.5	4.7
Total	100	100	100

22. Which of these is the most serious (internal) existential threat to the State of Israel?

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Israel's control of the West Bank/Judea and Samaria	15.8	14.0	25.6
Social/economic inequality	20.8	23.0	8.3
Demands to make Israel more democratic	5.3	5.8	2.8
Demands to make Israel more Jewish	9.3	6.9	22.9
Diminution of the country's Jewish majority	18.2	19.5	10.7
Strong disagreements between various segments of Israeli society	24.9	25.9	19.3
Don't know / refuse to answer	5.7	4.9	10.4
Total	100	100	100

23-27. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements:

23. I prefer to keep silent and not express my political opinions in the presence of people I don't know.

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Strongly agree	18.6	17.4	25.3
Somewhat agree	19.9	20.0	19.8
Somewhat disagree	20.0	19.5	22.6
Strongly disagree	40.8	42.6	30.3
Don't know / refuse to answer	0.7	0.5	2.0
Total	100	100	100

24. Israelis can always rely on other Israelis to help them out in times of trouble.

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Strongly agree	31.1	34.2	13.2
Somewhat agree	40.2	40.4	39.1
Somewhat disagree	16.8	15.3	25.3
Strongly disagree	11.1	9.6	19.3
Don't know / refuse to answer	0.8	0.5	3.1
Total	100	100	100

25. The state should allocate more funds to foster the culture and heritage of Arab citizens of Israel.

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Strongly agree	21.6	12.4	73.6
Somewhat agree	31.7	33.5	21.2
Somewhat disagree	21.7	25.1	2.2
Strongly disagree	23.3	27.0	1.9
Don't know / refuse to answer	1.7	2.0	1.1
Total	100	100	100

26. Arab citizens pose a security risk to Israel. (Jews)

	Jews
Strongly agree	22.2
Somewhat agree	21.3
Somewhat disagree	35.3
Strongly disagree	20.3
Don't know / refuse to answer	0.9
Total	100

27. Israel should fight terror any way it sees fit, without taking into consideration the views of other countries.

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Strongly agree	54.7	59.9	25.3
Somewhat agree	22.3	21.2	28.7
Somewhat disagree	12.7	11.4	19.6
Strongly disagree	9.1	6.8	22.3
Don't know / refuse to answer	1.2	0.7	4.1
Total	100	100	100

28. Which countries are able to fight terror most effectively: democratic ones or non-democratic ones?

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Democratic countries	36.2	33.7	50.7
Non-democratic countries	33.9	37.8	11.8
Both to the same degree	17.7	18.4	13.5
Neither of them	7.5	6.5	13.2
Don't know / refuse to answer	4.7	3.6	10.8
Total	100	100	100

29. If the present state of violence continues for a prolonged period, which society—Israeli or Palestinian—do you think can hold out longer?

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Palestinian society	10.3	6.6	31.4
Israeli society	56.2	61.1	28.4
Both societies can hold out for a long time	19.8	20.4	16.5
Neither society can hold out for a long time	9.5	8.7	13.5
Don't know / refuse to answer	4.2	3.2	10.2
Total	100	100	100

30.1 If a contradiction arose between Jewish religious law and a (state) court ruling, which would you follow? (Jews)

	Jews
Jewish religious law	28.1
Court ruling	63.9
It depends / sometimes one, sometimes the other*	4.9
Don't know / refuse to answer	3.1
Total	100

*   This response was not presented by interviewees as an option, but was recorded when volunteered by respondents.

30.2 If a contradiction arose between your religious dictates and a (state) court ruling, which would you follow? (Arabs)

	Arabs
Religious dictates	**47.8**
Court ruling	**44.2**
Don't know / refuse to answer	**8.0**
Total	**100**

31-34. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements:

31. Jewish citizens of Israel should have greater rights than non-Jewish citizens. (Jews)

	Jews
Strongly disagree	**48.7**
Somewhat disagree	**21.5**
Somewhat agree	**12.5**
Strongly agree	**16.4**
Don't know / refuse to answer	**0.9**
Total	**100**

32. On the whole, most Knesset members work hard and are doing a good job.

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Strongly disagree	28.8	29.9	22.9
Somewhat disagree	35.7	35.7	35.5
Somewhat agree	29.6	28.9	34.2
Strongly agree	3.9	3.9	4.1
Don't know / refuse to answer	2.0	1.6	3.3
Total	100	100	100

33. Human- and civil-rights organizations like the Association for Civil Rights and B'Tselem cause damage to the state.*

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Strongly disagree	17.0	12.4	43.3
Somewhat disagree	14.3	12.7	23.4
Somewhat agree	20.8	21.2	18.7
Strongly agree	43.3	50.2	4.1
Don't know / refuse to answer	4.6	3.5	10.5
Total	100	100	100

*   For Arab respondents, we added the example of Adalah.

34. In the fight against terror, there is no room for ethical considerations, and it is permissible to use any means to prevent terrorist attacks.

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Strongly disagree	19.8	18.3	28.1
Somewhat disagree	19.9	18.7	26.4
Somewhat agree	22.9	22.4	25.6
Strongly agree	36.4	40.0	16.3
Don't know / refuse to answer	1.0	0.6	3.6
Total	100	100	100

35. In your opinion, does Israel's current electoral system allow the government to function properly?

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
I am certain that the current system allows the government to function properly	12.3	11.4	17.4
I think that the current system allows the government to function properly	31.6	31.0	35.5
I think that the current system does not allow the government to function properly	29.4	30.8	21.8
I am certain that the current system does not allow the government to function properly	21.5	22.8	14.3
Don't know / refuse to answer	5.2	4.0	11.0
Total	100	100	100

36. If the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet), the police, or the IDF suspects an individual of being involved in terrorist activity, they should be given full powers to investigate as they see fit, without any legal constraints.

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Agree	46.7	50.8	23.7
Disagree	51.7	48.1	72.2
Don't know / refuse to answer	1.6	1.1	4.1
Total	100	100	100

37-38. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements:

37.1. Most Arab citizens of Israel have not reconciled themselves to the state's existence, and support its destruction. (Jews)

	Jews
Strongly disagree	21.6
Somewhat disagree	30.6
Somewhat agree	23.4
Strongly agree	22.6
Don't know / refuse to answer	1.8
Total	100

37.2. Israel has the right to be defined as the state of the Jewish people. (Arabs)

	Arabs
Strongly disagree	57.5
Somewhat disagree	19.3
Somewhat agree	13.8
Strongly agree	3.3
Don't know / refuse to answer	6.1
Total	100

38. Politicians look out more for their own interests than for those of the public who elected them.

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Strongly disagree	3.2	3.2	3.3
Somewhat disagree	15.8	15.8	15.7
Somewhat agree	35.9	35.4	38.3
Strongly agree	43.4	44.1	39.4
Don't know / refuse to answer	1.7	1.5	3.3
Total	100	100	100

39.1 Do you support or oppose having Arab parties in the government, including the appointment of Arab ministers? (Jews)

	Jews
Strongly oppose	34.1
Somewhat oppose	24.7
Somewhat support	28.0
Strongly support	9.1
Don't know / refuse to answer	4.1
Total	100

39.2 Do you support or oppose Arab parties' agreeing to join the government, including the appointment of Arab ministers? (Arabs)

	Arabs
Strongly oppose	7.5
Somewhat oppose	11.6
Somewhat support	52.2
Strongly support	19.9
Don't know / refuse to answer	8.8
Total	100

40. To what extent are you and your friends able to influence government policy?

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Very much	4.1	4.6	1.1
Quite a lot	12.6	13.3	8.8
Not so much	45.3	47.0	35.8
Not at all	36.5	33.8	51.5
Don't know / refuse to answer	1.5	1.3	2.8
Total	100	100	100

41. Is there a political party in Israel today that truly represents your views?

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Yes, there is	50.6	53.5	34.2
No, there isn't	47.5	44.9	62.8
Don't know / refuse to answer	1.9	1.6	3.0
Total	100	100	100

(Only those who answered "yes" to question 41):

42. Is this the same party you voted for in the last elections?

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Yes, the same party	81.7	81.0	87.1
No, a different party	15.2	15.6	11.3
Don't know / refuse to answer	3.1	3.4	1.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

43.1 Which identity is the most important to you? (Jews)

	Jews
Israeli	51.0
Jewish	35.1
Ethnic (Mizrahi/Ashkenazi/mixed)	1.3
Religious (my secularity/religiosity)	7.4
All of the above equally*	3.2
None of the above*	0.8
Don't know / refuse to answer	1.2
Total	100

*   These responses were not presented by interviewees as an option, but were recorded when volunteered by respondents

43.2 Which identity is the most important to you? (Arabs)

	Arabs
Israeli	24.6
Palestinian	11.9
Arab	24.0
Religious (Muslim/Christian/Druze)	29.3
All of the above equally*	3.0
None of the above*	4.1
Don't know / refuse to answer	3.1
Total	100

* These responses were not presented by interviewees as an option, but were recorded when volunteered by respondents

44-46. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements:

44. People who are unwilling to affirm that Israel is the nation-state of the Jewish people should lose their right to vote. (Jews)

	Jews
Strongly disagree	28.6
Somewhat disagree	16.8
Somewhat agree	20.6
Strongly agree	31.9
Don't know / refuse to answer	2.1
Total	100

45. The only way to get things done in Israel is if you have connections and know the right people.

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Strongly disagree	7.0	6.6	9.4
Somewhat disagree	13.6	13.6	13.5
Somewhat agree	44.6	45.1	41.9
Strongly agree	33.7	34.0	32.0
Don't know / refuse to answer	1.1	0.7	3.2
Total	100	100	100

46. Freedom of expression should be protected, even for people who speak out against the state.

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Strongly disagree	19.2	21.5	6.1
Somewhat disagree	18.6	19.8	11.8
Somewhat agree	37.0	36.2	41.0
Strongly agree	23.5	21.2	36.9
Don't know / refuse to answer	1.7	1.3	4.2
Total	100	100	100

47a. Would you be willing to accept an Arab: (Jews)

		Yes	No	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
47.1	As your spouse or that of your children	20.7	76.2	3.1	100
47.2	As a friend	67.2	31.6	1.2	100
47.3	As a neighbor	67.2	31.5	1.3	100
47.4	As a coworker	82.0	17.3	0.7	100
47.5	As a citizen of the state	84.2	14.7	1.1	100
47.6	As a tourist in Israel	86.1	13.1	0.8	100

47b. Would you be willing to accept a Jew: (Arabs)

		Yes	No	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
47.1	As your spouse or that of your children	22.3	74.9	2.8	100
47.2	As a friend	88.2	11.0	0.8	100
47.3	As a neighbor	86.2	12.1	1.7	100
47.4	As a coworker	95.6	3.0	1.4	100

48. Who is more hesitant to express their political opinions in Israel today—people on the Right, or people on the Left?

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
No one in Israel is hesitant to express their political opinions	35.3	36.8	26.7
People on the right are more hesitant	17.3	18.9	8.0
People on the left are more hesitant	30.0	29.6	32.0
Everyone is equally hesitant to express their political opinions	13.2	12.6	16.8
Don't know / refuse to answer	4.2	2.1	16.5
Total	100	100	100

49. How would you rate Israel's leadership in terms of corruption, where 1 = very corrupt and 5 = not at all corrupt?

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
1 – Very corrupt	27.0	26.2	31.1
2	27.9	29.0	21.8
3	30.9	30.8	31.4
4	10.0	10.8	5.2
5 – Not at all corrupt	2.4	2.1	4.1
Don't know / refuse to answer	1.8	1.1	6.4
Total	100	100	100
Mean 1-5	2.32	2.33	2.25

Appendix 3

Sociodemographic Breakdown and Self-Definitions (Total Sample; %)

Sex (total sample)	
Men	50.4
Women	49.6
Total	100
Age (total sample)	
18–24	14.5
25–34	20.6
35–44	17.8
45–54	14.7
55–64	15.4
65+	17.0
Total	100
Education (total sample)	
Elementary or partial high school	14.0
Full high school with matriculation certificate	23.2
Post-secondary (teachers' college, nursing school, engineering school)	14.6
Post-secondary yeshiva	1.6
Partial college/university (without degree)	6.0
Full academic degree, B.A. or higher	39.9
Did not respond	0.7
Total	100

Monthly household income (total sample)	
Well below average	**23.4**
Slightly below average	**21.0**
Average	**18.2**
Slightly above average	**20.6**
Well above average	**9.4**
Did not respond / not relevant	**7.4**
Total	**100**
Nationality (total sample)	
Jews and others[1]	**85.0**
Arabs	**15.0**
Total	**100**
Religion (Arabs)	
Muslim	**73.0**
Christian	**13.8**
Druze	**11.6**
Refuse to answer	**1.6**
Total	**100**

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1   As defined by the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), the category of "others" consists of non-Arab Christians, respondents who answered "no religion," and respondents with "no Ministry of Interior religious classification."

Birth place (Jews) (by respondent's birthplace; if Israeli-born, by father's birthplace)[2]	
Israeli-born; Israel	29.1
Europe-America	20.0
Israeli-born; Europe-America	23.4
Asia-Africa	7.7
Israeli-born; Asia-Africa	17.7
Don't know / refuse to answer	2.1
Total	100
Length of residence in Israel (Jews)	
Native-born or longtime residents (arrived before 1990)	87.5
Immigrants (from 1990 onward)	11.4
Did not respond	1.1
Total	100
Ethnic affiliation (Jews, self-defined)[3]	
Ashkenazi	46.0
Mizrahi	22.1
Sephardi	17.1
Mixed / both	8.4
Neither Ashkenazi nor Mizrahi / Israeli	4.6
Don't know / refuse to answer	1.8
Total	100

2   Respondents born in the CIS/Former Soviet Union, and Israeli-born respondents whose father was born there, are included in this table under "Europe-America" or "Israeli-born: Europe-America" (respectively). Comparing our 2016 sample (based on respondent's birthplace and father's ethnic origin) with data from the Central Bureau of Statistics, we find a somewhat smaller proportion in our sample of Asian/African-born respondents and their Israeli-born descendants, and a slightly larger proportion of European/American-born respondents and their Israeli-born descendants. This disparity may be explained by the fact that we included all respondents from the CIS/FSU in the Europe-America category, and did not ask about the republic of origin within the CIS.

3   The responses offered by the interviewers were limited to Ashkenazi, Mizrahi or Sephardi.

Political orientation	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Right	25.9	30.1	1.9
Moderate right	19.9	22.9	2.8
Center	21.8	22.8	16.3
Moderate left	13.8	11.9	24.0
Left	9.3	7.4	19.8
Don't know / refuse to answer	9.3	4.9	35.2
Total	100	100	100

Voting patterns in 2015 Knesset elections		Jews	Arabs
Likud		22.2	3.6
Zionist Union		19.6	2.2
Yesh Atid		9.8	0.3
Jewish Home Party		9.9	---
Kulanu		4.1	1.9
Yisrael Beytenu		2.4	0.6
Meretz		6.1	4.4
United Torah Judaism		4.9	---
Shas		3.5	0.6
Yachad		2.1	---
Joint (Arab) List		---	54.0
Didn't vote		6.2	23.1
Refused to say if voted, or for which party / blank ballot		7.8	8.4
Other		1.4	0.9
Total		100	100

The figure below shows the self-defined political affiliation of voters in our sample with one of three camps: Right, Center or Left. As shown, only among voters for the Yesh Atid party was there a majority who identified with the Center. A majority of voters for Meretz and the Joint List, and roughly half those who voted for the Zionist Union, placed themselves on the Left. The majority of voters for the remaining parties associated themselves with the Right.

Political Orientation by Voting Pattern (total sample; %)

Level of Religiosity (Jews)	
Haredi (ultra-Orthodox)	**9.0**
Haredi leumi (national ultra-Orthodox)	**1.9**
National religious	**8.8**
Traditional religious	**12.5**
Traditional non-religious	**23.7**
Secular	**42.8**
Other	**1.3**
Total	**100**
Level of Religiosity (Arabs)	
Very religious	**3.6**
Religious	**25.9**
Traditional	**47.7**
Not at all religious	**21.5**
Refuse to answer	**1.3**
Total	**100**

Political Orientation (Jews, by Religiosity)

	Right	Center	Left	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
Total sample	**53.0**	**22.8**	**19.3**	**4.9**	**100**
Haredi	**75.4**	**11.9**	**2.5**	**10.2**	**100**
Religious	**83.2**	**9.8**	**2.8**	**4.2**	**100**
Traditional religious	**73.1**	**14.1**	**5.5**	**7.3**	**100**
Traditional non-religious	**55.0**	**28.8**	**14.0**	**2.2**	**100**
Secular	**33.8**	**27.7**	**33.9**	**4.6**	**100**

Level of Religiosity, by Religion (Arabs)

Religion	Very religious	Religious	Traditional	Not at all religious	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total
Total sample	3.9	26.1	47.4	21.3	1.3	100
Muslim	3.6	31.5	47.0	16.7	1.2	100
Christian	3.2	6.5	58.1	29.0	3.2	100
Druze	7.7	15.4	42.3	34.6	----	100

Appendix 4

Survey Results Compared with Previous Years (total sample, %)[1]

1. How would you characterize Israel's overall situation today?

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Very good	2.5	2.3	2.8	3.1	3.2	5.3	4.3	5.8	6.4	9.5	9.5	10.7	7.3	7.6
Good*	8.6	11.1	16.5	19.4	11.4	23.1	26.9	33.9	21.4	28.6	25.7	33.6	33.9	28.9
So-so	26.1	32.9	37.5	38.2	34.3	35.7	38.4	35.2	41.0	40.5	41.1	36.6	38.7	39.9
Bad*	24.3	22.7	16.8	18.4	25.0	16.1	17.1	13.8	16.0	11.4	9.8	8.8	9.3	12.2
Very bad	38.5	30.6	25.8	20.4	25.2	18.2	12.2	9.8	13.7	8.6	11.8	8.2	8.7	10.7
Don't know / refuse to answer	–	0.4	0.6	0.5	0.9	1.6	1.1	1.5	1.5	1.4	2.1	2.1	2.0	0.7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

*   Up to and including 2013, the wording used was "quite good" and "quite bad," respectively.

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1   General comments:
- The comparative analysis presents the distribution of the results of the entire sample including the category "don't know / refuse to answer" (with the exception of questions asked of Jewish or Arab respondents only, and of several questions where only the Jewish responses are cited).
- The wording of the questions and the response categories is based on the 2016 Democracy Survey. In cases where the wording of a question or response differs from past Democracy Surveys, or a particular response category did not appear in a given year, this is stated in a footnote beneath the relevant table.
- N/A (not applicable) indicates that the question was not asked that year (or a particular response was not offered as a choice).
- For certain variables, an even number of response categories was offered in this year's survey while an odd number was offered in previous years. In such cases, the mid-point response is split between two categories. For example, "somewhat agree" is divided proportionally between the percentages who agreed and disagreed in that year.

2. And what about your personal situation?

	2014	2015	2016
Very good	19.5	22.6	26.0
Good	46.4	52.1	49.4
So-so	22.3	19.8	19.8
Bad	6.4	3.3	2.5
Very bad	3.1	1.5	1.7
Don't know / refuse to answer	2.3	0.7	0.6
Total	100	100	100

3. How proud are you to be an Israeli?

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Very much	57.6	48.8	52.1	55.6	46.6	53.0	50.4	56.2	58.1	57.6	56.5	59.8	N/A	54.1
Quite a lot	26.1	28.4	26.7	29.7	28.7	25.1	27.3	23.1	24.6	23.8	20.0	22.0		27.1
Not so much	9.2	13.7	12.8	8.5	13.9	13.2	12.7	12.7	8.8	9.8	10.5	10.3		11.4
Not at all	6.9	7.5	7.3	5.6	9.3	6.9	8.0	5.9	7.2	6.8	10.7	5.9		6.1
Don't know / refuse to answer	0.2	1.6	1.1	0.6	1.5	1.8	1.6	2.1	1.3	2.0	2.3	2.0		1.3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100		100

4. In general, are you optimistic or pessimistic about Israel's future?

	2014	2015	2016
Very optimistic	38.4	N/A	19.3
Quite optimistic	37.2		47.8
Quite pessimistic	16.0		22.8
Very pessimistic	5.8		7.6
Don't know / refuse to answer	2.6		2.6
Total	100		100

5. To what extent do you feel part of the State of Israel and its problems?*

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Very much	52.0	45.3	43.6	35.3	28.0	28.1	32.3	33.5	39.6	35.5	33.2	38.8	41.8	39.8
Quite a lot	26.2	27.4	29.0	33.6	30.3	27.0	31.4	30.8	29.9	29.6	27.4	36.3	37.4	37.4
To some extent	12.7	16.8	14.4	20.5	25.3	27.6	23.6	22.0	18.2	20.8	21.1	N/A	N/A	N/A
Not so much	5.3	6.1	4.4	7.3	9.5	9.8	7.3	7.8	5.5	7.9	9.4	13.4	14.2	15.4
Not at all	3.5	3.6	3.0	3.1	5.7	6.2	4.7	4.8	6.7	4.7	6.6	8.1	5.2	6.3
Don't know / refuse to answer	0.3	0.8	5.6	0.2	1.2	1.3	0.7	1.1	0.1	1.5	2.3	3.4	1.4	1.1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* In 2003–2013, 5 response categories were presented: "to a very large extent," "to a large extent," "to some extent," "to a small extent," and "to a very small extent." From 2014 onward, the intermediate category of "to some extent" was eliminated.

7–11. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements:

7. To safeguard Israel's security, it is permissible for the state to monitor what citizens write on the Internet.

	2014	2015	2016
Strongly disagree	18.8	22.9	20.2
Somewhat disagree	17.6	15.1	20.4
Somewhat agree	24.7	26.8	32.9
Strongly agree	32.0	29.7	24.7
Don't know / refuse to answer	6.9	5.4	1.8
Total	100	100	100

8. Arab citizens of Israel are discriminated against, compared with Jewish citizens of the state.*

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Strongly disagree	27.4	23.8	21.9	27.4	20.8	27.3	36.0	N/A	29.8	30.9	N/A	35.8	20.1	23.4
Somewhat disagree	17.1	10.8	21.7	18.1	22.4	19.7	20.3		17.2	21.2		20.7	13.8	17.0
Somewhat agree	30.2	30.6	26.0	25.0	24.9	24.4	17.7		27.0	25.1		24.0	27.2	32.1
Strongly agree	24.9	32.3	29.2	28.3	27.9	25.6	22.6		22.7	19.5		15.6	32.1	26.3
Don't know / refuse to answer	0.4	2.5	1.2	1.2	4.0	3.0	3.4		3.3	3.3		3.9	6.8	1.2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	–	100	100		100	100	100

*   In the 2011 Democracy Index and earlier, the response categories were (respectively): "do not agree at all," "agree to a small extent," "agree somewhat," and "agree strongly."

9. To handle Israel's unique problems, we need a strong leader who is not swayed by the Knesset, the media or public opinion.*

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Strongly disagree	17.4	23.2	20.3	18.4	14.9	17.4	19.9	30.3	40.2		N/A	35.2	N/A	35.4
Somewhat disagree	26.0	17.4	21.5	20.6	14.1	16.1	15.3	23.2	23.5	61.1		19.5		20.2
Somewhat agree	35.7	25.0	27.8	29.2	28.6	27.3	22.4	22.8	21.6			19.3		19.8
Strongly agree	20.3	31.2	28.7	30.2	36.9	33.6	37.1	19.0	10.8	31.8		21.4		22.3
Don't know / refuse to answer	0.7	3.3	1.7	1.6	5.5	5.6	5.3	4.7	3.9	7.1		4.6		2.3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100		100		100

*   In 2003–2009, the question was worded as follows: "A few strong leaders can be more useful to the country than all the discussions and the laws." The four response categories ranged from "definitely disagree" to "definitely agree."

In 2012, the wording was: "In your opinion, is the following statement correct or incorrect: 'What Israel needs today is a strong leader who doesn't need to take the Knesset or elections into account'?" The response categories were: "correct" (equated with "strongly agree" and "somewhat agree" in the present survey) and "incorrect" (equated with "strongly disagree" and "somewhat disagree" in the present survey).

In 2010 and 2011, the equivalent question was: "What is your opinion of having a strong leader who does not need to take the Knesset or elections into account?" The possible responses were that such a form of government was "very bad" or "somewhat bad" (corresponding in the present survey to "strongly disagree" and "somewhat disagree," respectively) and "somewhat good" or "very good" (corresponding in this year's survey to "somewhat agree" and "strongly agree," respectively).

10. Decisions crucial to the state on issues of peace and security should be made by a Jewish majority. (Jews)

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Strongly disagree	8.2	5.5	13.2	10.0	12.4	16.3	5.8	4.6	9.5	N/A	20.0	11.0	11.3	11.7
Somewhat disagree	14.5	9.7	17.8	12.7	17.4	19.5	10.6	9.0	10.8		9.9	10.5	9.7	14.9
Somewhat agree	38.6	28.2	34.3	34.2	36.2	30.9	33.8	29.3	25.2		19.7	24.0	22.4	26.1
Strongly agree	38.0	53.6	32.9	41.8	29.1	27.7	45.4	53.6	52.6		47.0	49.8	51.2	45.9
Don't know / refuse to answer	0.7	3.0	1.8	1.3	4.9	5.6	4.4	3.5	1.9		3.4	4.7	5.4	1.4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100		100	100	100	100

11. Decisions crucial to the state regarding governance, economy or society should be made by a Jewish majority. (Jews)

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Strongly agree	42.3	N/A	37.4	35.3	31.3	32.7
Somewhat agree	27.2		19.5	25.8	22.3	24.5
Somewhat disagree	16.1		15.7	18.6	22.2	20.9
Strongly disagree	13.1		23.4	16.1	18.3	20.1
Don't know / refuse to answer	1.3		4.0	4.2	5.9	1.8
Total	100		100	100	100	100

12. To what extent do you trust each of the following individuals or institutions:*

12.1 The media

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Not at all	28.1	23.8	24.3	28.9	26.5	30.4	30.3	34.5	24.4	25.7	25.9	22.4	21.0	29.0
Not so much	23.3	24.8	25.2	27.0	27.3	31.9	34.1	30.3	22.8	26.1	24.2	44.3	41.9	46.0
Quite a lot	36.8	36.3	35.0	32.6	31.9	28.7	26.7	24.1	37.4	32.3	32.5	23.8	30.2	20.8
Very much	11.8	14.7	15.1	11.4	12.5	8.3	7.8	9.7	14.4	14.0	14.8	5.9	5.5	3.3
Don't know / refuse to answer	0.1	0.4	0.4	0.1	1.8	0.7	1.1	1.4	1.0	1.9	2.6	3.6	1.4	0.9
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Up to and including 2013, the response categories for this set of questions were: "not at all," "to a small extent," "to some extent," and "to a large extent."

12.2 The Supreme Court

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Not at all	16.0	11.4	22.3	15.5	18.4	25.2	23.2	21.6	13.6	10.7	17.7	10.3	12.1	16.1
Not so much	13.8	9.1	16.3	15.6	19.1	23.7	17.3	22.0	13.0	12.3	14.4	21.4	19.9	25.1
Quite a lot	30.4	27.4	28.6	29.0	28.7	29.1	28.1	27.9	27.3	30.5	28.1	33.5	37.0	33.3
Very much	39.4	49.0	31.4	37.5	29.2	18.3	23.1	23.8	41.4	42.9	32.7	27.4	25.4	22.5
Don't know / refuse to answer	0.4	3.1	1.4	2.4	4.6	3.7	8.3	4.7	4.7	3.6	7.1	7.4	5.7	3.0
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

12.3 The police

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Not at all	14.9	15.5	19.1	28.7	30.3	35.6	30.3	23.2	20.5	15.8	18.3	16.8	19.1	16.5
Not so much	18.6	18.3	24.6	26.8	27.1	31.1	27.7	33.5	21.8	21.3	19.8	32.4	34.7	42.5
Quite a lot	41.6	41.8	36.2	30.7	28.3	23.1	27.2	29.8	38.2	40.0	38.4	35.0	34.2	31.8
Very much	24.8	23.6	19.5	12.5	11.9	8.4	10.4	11.5	17.9	20.9	20.6	11.5	8.2	7.9
Don't know / refuse to answer	0.1	0.8	0.6	1.3	2.4	1.8	4.4	2.0	1.6	2.0	2.9	4.3	3.8	1.3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

12.4 The President of Israel

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Not at all	16.1	12.3	17.6	15.3	54.2	29.6	21.8	14.6	10.8	9.3	13.6	11.8	10.3	15.4
Not so much	15.6	12.9	16.9	16.9	20.0	22.4	15.9	14.3	9.8	9.6	10.2	12.8	12.0	20.1
Quite a lot	36.1	33.7	29.4	30.3	14.9	24.1	27.4	25.7	21.8	22.5	22.4	30.0	37.3	35.0
Very much	31.4	35.5	34.7	33.5	5.6	21.6	30.2	42.3	56.0	56.1	50.6	38.6	32.8	26.4
Don't know / refuse to answer	0.8	5.6	1.4	4.0	5.3	2.3	4.7	3.1	1.6	2.5	3.2	6.8	7.5	3.1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

12.5 The Knesset

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Not at all	19.5	24.4	42.2	33.0	32.0	36.2	29.5	25.8	19.7	18.2	20.0	21.5	21.5	24.0
Not so much	28.6	28.6	33.5	33.7	33.2	33.9	31.4	34.8	27.3	26.1	24.7	37.9	39.4	47.7
Quite a lot	38.2	37.3	20.0	25.3	26.0	22.9	27.1	27.6	43.3	38.4	37.1	27.7	29.3	22.6
Very much	13.1	8.5	4.0	7.4	6.2	5.5	8.6	8.8	8.3	14.3	14.8	7.3	6.1	4.0
Don't know / refuse to answer	0.6	1.2	0.3	0.6	2.6	1.5	3.4	3.0	1.4	3.0	3.4	5.6	3.6	1.7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

12.6 The IDF

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Not at all	8.8	6.8	8.9	11.2	10.6	13.9	11.3	10.7	7.2	7.1	8.8	5.3	7.7	7.1
Not so much	7.6	7.1	7.6	9.6	14.8	15.2	7.5	8.1	5.8	5.8	6.7	9.0	6.0	10.0
Quite a lot	23.4	25.1	27.2	24.9	28.8	26.2	22.8	18.7	17.0	20.2	16.6	27.9	27.0	33.9
Very much	59.8	59.8	55.7	53.5	43.7	43.9	56.4	60.3	68.8	65.0	65.5	54.5	57.5	47.8
Don't know / refuse to answer	0.4	1.2	0.6	0.8	2.1	0.8	1.9	2.2	1.2	1.9	2.4	3.3	1.8	1.2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

12.7 The government

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Not at all	19.9	27.7	26.6	31.2	37.2	41.4	30.7	30.5	22.3	18.0	20.8	20.0	23.8	28.6
Not so much	25.4	30.8	30.5	28.8	30.2	32.2	35.4	35.1	25.6	22.5	21.6	39.4	37.0	42.6
Quite a lot	40.8	35.3	30.3	29.6	23.6	20.1	24.9	26.4	41.1	41.3	36.5	28.6	28.1	21.2
Very much	13.8	4.4	12.1	9.1	6.6	5.0	6.1	6.3	9.9	15.5	17.5	9.1	8.1	6.0
Don't know / refuse to answer	0.1	1.8	0.5	1.3	2.4	1.3	2.9	1.7	1.1	2.7	3.6	2.9	3.0	1.6
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

12.8 The political parties

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Not at all	34.0	37.8	50.3	41.3	44.1	46.9	35.4	32.6	28.3	31.5	26.2	N/A	28.3	30.5
Not so much	33.4	34.0	31.6	35.9	32.5	36.1	39.9	39.3	32.7	30.5	30.9		42.3	51.1
Quite a lot	28.0	22.8	15.5	19.2	17.5	13.5	16.9	19.8	31.9	28.7	28.6		16.2	12.6
Very much	4.3	3.8	2.1	3.2	3.1	1.8	2.7	4.0	3.7	5.4	9.1		2.9	1.3
Don't know / refuse to answer	0.3	1.6	0.5	0.4	2.8	1.7	5.1	4.3	3.4	3.9	5.2		10.4	4.5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100		100	100

13. For many years, the following were considered to be the major focal points of tension in Israeli society. How would you characterize the level of tension between each of these groups today?

13.1 Tension between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
High	23.3	29.0	24.5	24.0	24.7
Moderate*	42.6	38.5	36.1	41.9	42.3
Low	30.3	23.8	28.6	25.2	27.8
There is no tension (not read)	N/A	2.9	2.7	3.0	1.3
Don't know / refuse to answer	3.8	5.8	8.1	5.9	3.9
Total	100	100	100	100	100

*   In 2012, this was rendered as "so-so."

13.2 Tension between religious and secular Jews

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
High	59.7	55.7	52.2	47.5	50.4
Moderate*	28.9	30.6	30.4	37.4	34.6
Low	9.5	7.9	8.9	11.3	12.2
There is no tension (not read)	N/A	1.9	1.9	0.7	0.7
Don't know / refuse to answer	1.9	3.9	6.6	3.2	2.1
Total	100	100	100	100	100

*   In 2012, this was rendered as "so-so."

13.3 Tension between Right and Left (on foreign policy and national security issues)

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
High	51.8	50.5	45.3	59.7	66.8
Moderate*	33.3	32.4	32.8	27.7	21.6
Low	10.5	9.8	12.5	7.1	7.9
There is no tension (not read)	N/A	1.8	1.7	1.1	1.0
Don't know / refuse to answer	4.4	5.5	7.7	4.4	2.7
Total	100	100	100	100	100

*   In 2012, this was rendered as "so-so."

13.4 Tension between Rich and poor

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
High	55.7	57.9	54.5	50.6	55.7
Moderate*	29.4	26.6	25.8	31.6	29.4
Low	11.9	8.1	11.6	11.8	11.3
There is no tension (not read)	N/A	3.0	2.3	2.4	2.0
Don't know / refuse to answer	3.0	4.4	5.8	3.7	1.6
Total	100	100	100	100	100

*   In 2012, this was rendered as "so-so."

13.5 Tension between Jews and Arabs

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
High	70.6	68.0	58.0	67.1	78.4
Moderate*	21.8	23.8	29.7	25.6	17.4
Low	5.5	3.2	5.5	3.9	2.6
There is no tension (not read)	N/A	1.3	1.7	0.5	0.8
Don't know / refuse to answer	2.1	3.7	5.1	2.9	0.8
Total	100	100	100	100	100

*   In 2012, this was rendered as "so-so."

14. In your opinion, which groups have the highest level of tension between them?

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Mizrahim and Ashkenazim	3.0	N/A	N/A	3.9	1.4
Religious and secular Jews	20.3			10.3	10.5
Right and Left (on foreign policy and national security issues)	8.7			18.4	24.0
Rich and poor	13.2			12.8	8.0
Jews and Arabs	47.9			47.0	53.0
Don't know / all the same / no difference (not read)	6.9			7.6	3.1
Total	100			100	100

17. "It is acceptable for Israel, as a Jewish state, to allocate more funding to Jewish localities than to Arab ones." (Jews)

	2014	2015	2016
Strongly disagree	23.7	32.0	32.2
Somewhat disagree	23.8	22.5	22.1
Somewhat agree	17.4	17.0	20.6
Strongly agree	29.8	24.0	23.8
Don't know / refuse to answer	5.3	4.5	1.3
Total	100	100	100

20. How would you rate the state's performance in the following areas?

20.1 Military-security

	2008	2016
Very poor	18.7	3.4
Quite poor	11.9	5.6
Average	39.8	18.3
Quite good	18.5	40.1
Very good	8.1	31.1
Don't know / refuse to answer	3.0	1.5
Total	100	100

20.2 Economic

	2008	2016
Very poor	21.9	20.1
Quite poor	17.9	20.5
Average	31.6	32.0
Quite good	20.1	21.5
Very good	6.4	5.3
Don't know / refuse to answer	2.1	0.6
Total	100	100

20.3 Social

	2008	2016
Very poor	28.1	20.5
Quite poor	20.0	22.5
Average	35.5	38.9
Quite good	10.7	14.4
Very good	3.5	2.5
Don't know / refuse to answer	2.2	1.2
Total	100	100

20.5 Maintaining public order

	2008	2016
Very poor	24.3	13.8
Quite poor	19.1	19.5
Average	35.1	33.8
Quite good	13.7	26.8
Very good	4.9	5.1
Don't know / refuse to answer	2.9	1.0
Total	100	100

25–26. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements:

25. The state should allocate more funds to foster the culture and heritage of Arab citizens of Israel.

	2015	2016
Strongly agree	25.6	21.6
Somewhat agree	24.5	31.7
Somewhat disagree	19.2	21.7
Strongly disagree	21.4	23.3
Don't know / refuse to answer	9.3	1.7
Total	100	100

26. Arab citizens pose a security risk to Israel. (Jews)

	2015	2016
Strongly agree	18.1	22.2
Somewhat agree	20.9	21.3
Somewhat disagree	37.5	35.3
Strongly disagree	17.1	20.3
Don't know / refuse to answer	6.4	0.9
Total	100	100

29. If the present state of violence continues for a prolonged period, which society—Israeli or Palestinian—do you think can hold out longer?

	2011*	2016
Palestinian society	17.4	10.3
Israeli society	55.8	56.2
Both for a long time	11.6	19.8
Neither for very long	7.2	9.5
Don't know / refuse to answer	8.0	4.2
Total	100	100

*   Peace Index, May 2011.

31–33. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements:

31. Jewish citizens of Israel should have greater rights than non-Jewish citizens. (Jews)

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Strongly disagree	42.6	N/A	N/A	N/A	32.5	42.0	48.8	48.7
Somewhat disagree	19.4				14.8	20.9	22.5	21.5
Somewhat agree	15.3				16.0	15.2	12.8	12.5
Strongly agree	20.6				32.9	19.8	12.6	16.4
Don't know / refuse to answer	2.1				3.8	2.1	3.3	0.9
Total	100				100	100	100	100

32. On the whole, most Knesset members work hard and are doing a good job.

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Strongly disagree	27.8	31.6	25.4	N/A	27.9	28.8
Somewhat disagree	35.3	30.2	22.7		26.5	35.7
Somewhat agree	28.7	26.3	26.7		27.1	29.6
Strongly agree*	4.4	7.6	19.1		9.6	3.9
Don't know / refuse to answer	3.8	4.3	6.1		8.9	2.0
Total	100	100	100		100	100

*   Up to and including 2013, this was rendered as "agree totally."

33. Human- and civil-rights organizations like the Association for Civil Rights and B'Tselem cause damage to the state.

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Strongly disagree	18.7	N/A	N/A	23.0	N/A	26.2	17.0
Somewhat disagree	20.8			14.7		14.1	14.3
Somewhat agree	24.8			18.4		19.1	20.8
Strongly agree*	25.5			31.8		31.1	43.3
Don't know/ refuse to answer	10.2			12.1		9.5	4.6
Total	100			100		100	100

*   Up to and including 2013, this was rendered as "agree totally."

36. If the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet), the police, or the IDF suspects an individual of being involved in terrorist activity, they should be given full powers to investigate as they see fit, without any legal constraints.

	2010	2016
Agree	50.3	46.7
Disagree	43.0	51.7
Don't know / refuse to answer	6.7	1.6
Total	100	100

37.1 Most Arab citizens of Israel have not reconciled themselves to the state's existence, and support its destruction. (Jews)

	2015	2016
Strongly disagree	23.9	21.6
Somewhat disagree	28.4	30.6
Somewhat agree	18.3	23.4
Strongly agree	24.0	22.6
Don't know/ refuse to answer	5.4	1.8
Total	100	100

38. Politicians look out more for their own interests than for those of the public who elected them.*

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Strongly disagree	11.1	11.1	2.7	5.4	12.2	6.1	N/A	3.2
Somewhat disagree	17.3	15.6	8.9	11.4	11.6	13.7		15.8
Not sure	20.4	21.9	16.8		N/A			N/A
Somewhat agree	29.4	26.3	28.1	30.3	24.6	28.9		35.9
Strongly agree	19.5	22.8	42.5	49.9	46.9	46.0		43.4
Don't know / refuse to answer	2.3	2.3	1.0	3.0	4.7	5.3		1.7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100		100

*   Prior to 2009, different versions of this question were posed.

39. Do you support or oppose having Arab parties in the government, including the appointment of Arab ministers?*

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011-2014	2015	2016
Strongly oppose	34.7	30.8	28.9	33.9	39.8	37.5	35.9	36.2	N/A	27.9	30.1
Somewhat oppose	26.9	22.7	25.9	24.3	27.3	24.6	25.6	27.0		21.4	22.7
Somewhat support	24.6	32.1	27.3	29.2	18.5	25.5	22.9	24.5		25.7	31.6
Strongly support	13.5	12.3	16.0	11.3	10.8	9.4	10.7	8.9		17.1	10.7
Don't know / refuse to answer	0.3	2.1	1.9	1.3	3.6	3.0	4.9	3.4		7.8	4.9
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100		100	100

* Arab respondents were asked: "Do you support or oppose Arab parties' agreeing to join the government, including the appointment of Arab ministers?" The distribution of responses for 2016 reflects the responses of both Jews and Arabs (questions 39.1 and 39.2).

40. To what extent are you and your friends able to influence government policy?*

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Very much	4.6	3.8	7.4	6.1	5.7	3.1	3.9	2.9	7.3	9.5	11.3	6.6	4.9	4.1
Quite a lot	15.2	13.8	23.4	21.3	17.1	15.4	12.4	16.1	21.1	25.4	23.7	13.5	14.6	12.6
Not so much	40.1	32.4	32.3	36.5	30.6	31.2	31.6	31.5	35.3	34.9	28.0	42.2	45.3	45.3
Not at all	39.7	35.6	35.6	35.8	43.9	45.6	50.0	46.5	35.3	27.8	33.2	33.5	32.4	36.5
Don't know / refuse to answer	0.4	14.4	1.3	0.3	2.7	4.7	2.1	3.0	1.0	2.4	3.8	4.2	2.8	1.5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

*   Up to and including 2013, the categories were: "to a large extent," "to some extent," "to a small extent," and "not at all."

41. Is there a political party in Israel today that truly represents your views?

	2012	2016
Yes, there is	37.6	50.6
No, there isn't	57.0	47.5
Don't know / refuse to answer	5.4	1.9
Total	100	100

43.1 Which identity is the most important to you? (Jews)

	2008	2016
Israeli	40.5	51.0
Jewish	44.8	35.1
Ethnic (Mizrahi/Ashkenazi/mixed)	2.9	1.3
Religious (my secularity/religiosity)	7.8	7.4
All of the above equally (not read)	N/A	3.2
None of the above (not read)	N/A	0.8
Don't know / refuse to answer	4.0	1.2
Total	100	100

43.2 Which identity is the most important to you? (Arabs)

	2008	2016
Israeli	17.3	24.6
Palestinian	23.8	11.9
Arab	45.4	24.0
Religious (Muslim/Christian/Druze)	7.6	29.3
All of the above equally (not read)	N/A	3.0
None of the above (not read)	N/A	4.1
Don't know / refuse to answer	5.9	3.1
Total	100	100

49. How would you rate Israel's leadership in terms of corruption, where 1 = very corrupt and 5 = not at all corrupt?

	2014	2015	2016
1 – Very corrupt	22.8	28.7	27.0
2	19.8	19.1	27.9
3	31.4	31.8	30.9
4	15.2	11.1	10.0
5 – Not at all corrupt	3.2	3.2	2.4
Don't know / refuse to answer	6.6	6.1	1.8
Total	100	100	100
Mean 1-5	2.5	2.4	2.3

Appendix 5
Questionnaire and Distribution of Responses
(Haredi and Non-Haredi Jews; %)

1. How would you characterize Israel's overall situation today?

	Haredi	Non-Haredi
Very good	14.6	6.1
Good	30.0	29.2
So-so	40.6	41.4
Bad	7.6	11.7
Very bad	6.4	11.0
Don't know / refuse to answer*	0.8	0.6
Total	100	100

*   Throughout the survey, this response was recorded if the respondent replied "I don't know," or was unwilling to select one of the options offered.

2. And what about your personal situation?

	Haredi	Non-Haredi
Very good	54.6	24.0
Good	33.3	53.2
So-so	10.1	18.6
Bad	0.0	2.3
Very bad	1.7	1.4
Don't know / refuse to answer	0.3	0.5
Total	100	100

3. How proud are you to be an Israeli?

	Haredi	Non- Haredi
Very much	47.1	62.1
Quite a lot	22.4	25.3
Not so much	14.3	9.7
Not at all	13.2	2.9
Don't know / refuse to answer	3.0	0.0
Total	100	100

4. In general, are you optimistic or pessimistic about Israel's future?

	Haredi	Non-Haredi
Very optimistic	29.7	20.3
Quite optimistic	45.1	49.1
Quite pessimistic	16.5	21.4
Very pessimistic	5.3	7.4
Don't know / refuse to answer	3.4	1.8
Total	100	100

5. To what extent do you feel part of the State of Israel and its problems?

	Haredi	Non-Haredi
Very much	29.1	46.7
Quite a lot	34.7	39.2
Not so much	21.0	9.6
Not at all	13.4	3.8
Don't know / refuse to answer	1.8	0.7
Total	100	100

6. Israel is defined as a Jewish and democratic state. Do you feel there is a good balance today between the Jewish and the democratic components?

	Haredi	Non-Haredi
There is a good balance between the two components	17.1	30.6
The Jewish component is too dominant	3.9	42.4
The democratic component is too dominant	68.9	20.9
Don't know / refuse to answer	10.1	6.1
Total	100	100

7-11. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements:

7. To safeguard Israel's security, it is permissible for the state to monitor what citizens write on the Internet.

	Haredi	Non-Haredi
Strongly disagree	9.8	19.6
Somewhat disagree	10.4	22.3
Somewhat agree	29.1	34.1
Strongly agree	46.2	22.7
Don't know/ refuse to answer	4.5	1.3
Total	100	100

8. Arab citizens of Israel are discriminated against, compared with Jewish citizens of the state.

	Haredi	Non-Haredi
Strongly disagree	50.4	24.5
Somewhat disagree	17.9	19.4
Somewhat agree	21.0	33.3
Strongly agree	6.2	21.9
Don't know/ refuse to answer	4.5	0.9
Total	100	100

9. To handle Israel's unique problems, we need a strong leader who is not swayed by the Knesset, the media or public opinion.

	Haredi	Non-Haredi
Strongly disagree	19.9	40.4
Somewhat disagree	17.4	21.5
Somewhat agree	23.8	16.9
Strongly agree	35.9	19.3
Don't know/ refuse to answer	3.0	1.9
Total	100	100

10. Decisions crucial to the state on issues of peace and security should be made by a Jewish majority.

	Haredi	Non-Haredi
Strongly disagree	2.5	12.6
Somewhat disagree	2.5	16.1
Somewhat agree	14.3	27.3
Strongly agree	80.1	42.5
Don't know/ refuse to answer	0.6	1.5
Total	100	100

11. Decisions crucial to the state regarding governance, economy or society should be made by a Jewish majority.

	Haredi	Non-Haredi
Strongly disagree	4.2	21.7
Somewhat disagree	9.5	22.1
Somewhat agree	21.0	24.8
Strongly agree	63.0	29.7
Don't know / refuse to answer	2.3	1.7
Total	100	100

12. To what extent do you trust each of the following individuals or institutions:

Haredi

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
12.1 The media	61.6	34.2	3.1	0.8	0.3	100
12.2 The Supreme Court	56.9	34.5	5.3	1.1	2.2	100
12.3 The police	19.3	45.4	29.4	4.2	1.7	100
12.4 The President of Israel	30.3	35.0	21.3	5.9	7.5	100
12.5 The Knesset	24.4	49.6	22.7	2.2	1.1	100
12.6 The IDF	10.6	22.7	39.2	26.6	0.9	100
12.7 The government	24.1	46.5	23.8	3.9	1.7	100
12.8 The political parties	28.0	48.7	16.5	2.2	4.6	100
12.9 Your municipality or local authority	12.0	34.5	42.6	10.6	0.3	100
12.10 Your bank	4.5	19.0	54.6	17.4	4.5	100

➤ **Non-Haredi**

	Not at all	Not so much	Quite a lot	Very much	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
12.1 The media	25.7	45.8	24.3	3.6	0.6	100
12.2 The Supreme Court	13.0	23.1	35.1	26.4	2.4	100
12.3 The police	13.5	42.4	34.3	8.4	1.4	100
12.4 The President of Israel	10.7	16.0	39.5	32.1	1.7	100
12.5 The Knesset	21.5	48.9	24.1	4.1	1.4	100
12.6 The IDF	1.6	5.1	35.8	57.1	0.4	100
12.7 The government	27.0	43.4	22.3	6.3	1.0	100
12.8 The political parties	28.2	53.2	12.9	1.0	4.7	100
12.9 Your municipality or local authority	13.6	30.0	40.5	14.5	1.4	100
12.10 Your bank	10.1	25.1	46.3	16.7	1.8	100

13. For many years, the following were considered to be the major focal points of tensions in Israeli society. How would you characterize the level of tension between these groups today?

Haredi

	High	Moderate	Low	None of the above*	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
13.1 Mizrahim and Ashkenazim	21.3	45.7	30.8	0.0	2.2	100
13.2 Religious and secular Jews	40.1	44.8	13.2	0.6	1.3	100
13.3 Right and Left (regarding Israel's foreign policy and national security issues)	58.3	29.4	9.2	0.0	3.1	100
13.4 Rich and poor	38.7	39.8	15.4	3.6	2.5	100
13.5 Jews and Arabs	87.7	9.8	1.7	0.0	0.8	100

*   This response was not presented by interviewees as an option, but was recorded when volunteered by respondents.

Non-Haredi

	High	Moderate	Low	None of the above*	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
13.1 Mizrahim and Ashkenazim	25.0	43.0	30.4	1.1	0.5	100
13.2 Religious and secular Jews	52.5	33.8	12.6	0.3	0.8	100
13.3 Right and Left (regarding Israel's foreign policy and national security issues)	72.0	19.3	7.4	0.4	0.9	100
13.4 Rich and poor	60.0	27.7	9.8	1.3	1.2	100
13.5 Jews and Arabs	78.7	17.5	2.6	0.5	0.7	100

*   This response was not presented by interviewees as an option, but was recorded when volunteered by respondents.

14. In your opinion, which groups have the highest level of tension between them?

	Haredi	Non-Haredi
Mizrahim and Ashkenazim	0.8	1.6
Religious and secular Jews	11.2	10.6
Right and Left (on foreign policy and national security issues)	9.0	28.9
Rich and poor	3.1	8.6
Jews and Arabs	73.1	48.1
Don't know / refuse to answer	2.8	2.2
Total	100	100

15. In your opinion, what is the main reason today for the international community's harsh criticism of Israel?

	Haredi	Non-Haredi
Israel's behavior and political positions in the context of the conflict with the Palestinians	10.4	30.5
Anti-Semitism around the world	48.2	26.6
Shortcomings in Israeli public diplomacy	8.1	17.1
Activities of Israeli peace and human-rights organizations (for example, Breaking the Silence or B'Tselem)	26.1	16.4
Inequality in Israel between Jewish and Arab citizens	2.2	5.9
Don't know / refuse to answer	4.8	2.6
There is no harsh criticism of Israel (not read)	0.2	0.9
Total	100	100

16-18. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements:

16. To deal successfully with the challenges confronting it, Israel must maintain its democratic character.

	Haredi	Non-Haredi
Strongly disagree	16.8	3.7
Somewhat disagree	21.0	9.5
Somewhat agree	39.8	29.2
Strongly agree	19.9	57.4
Don't know / refuse to answer	2.5	0.2
Total	100	100

17. It is acceptable for Israel, as a Jewish state, to allocate more funding to Jewish localities than to Arab ones.

	Haredi	Non-Haredi
Strongly disagree	9.8	34.4
Somewhat disagree	14.8	22.8
Somewhat agree	19.9	20.6
Strongly agree	53.5	20.9
Don't know / refuse to answer	2.0	1.3
Total	100	100

18. Politicians in Israel are detached from the Israeli public's real needs and problems.

	Haredi	Non-Haredi
Strongly disagree	6.2	5.1
Somewhat disagree	17.1	19.7
Somewhat agree	36.4	34.7
Strongly agree	37.8	38.9
Don't know / refuse to answer	2.5	1.6
Total	100	100

20. How would you rate the state's performance in the following areas?

Haredi

	Very poor	Quite poor	Average	Quite good	Very good	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
20.1 Military-security	5.6	5.6	26.9	38.4	21.8	1.7	100
20.2 Economic	14.0	18.8	37.8	23.0	5.9	0.5	100
20.3 Social	17.9	17.9	43.7	14.8	3.6	2.1	100
20.4 Political-diplomatic	11.5	20.2	36.7	20.7	5.9	5.0	100
20.5 Maintaining public order (for example, crime prevention)	13.2	19.0	34.2	24.4	7.6	1.6	100

➤ Non-Haredi

	Very poor	Quite poor	Average	Quite good	Very good	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
20.1 Military-security	2.5	4.7	16.3	43.4	32.7	0.4	100
20.2 Economic	22.1	20.2	31.7	21.1	4.3	0.6	100
20.3 Social	22.1	23.2	37.9	13.7	2.0	1.1	100
20.4 Political-diplomatic	28.0	23.9	28.9	16.3	1.2	1.7	100
20.5 Maintaining public order (for example, crime prevention)	13.4	18.7	35.3	28.2	3.7	0.7	100

21. In your opinion, to what extent does each of the following internal factors constitute an existential threat to the State of Israel?

21.1 Israel's control of the West Bank/Judea and Samaria

	Haredi	Non-Haredi
Very much	9.0	18.5
Quite a lot	17.9	25.3
Slightly	17.1	21.9
Not at all	51.5	30.9
Don't know / refuse to answer	4.5	3.4
Total	100	100

21.2 The social/economic gaps

	Haredi	Non-Haredi
Very much	15.1	26.2
Quite a lot	40.3	40.7
Slightly	28.0	23.2
Not at all	13.4	8.3
Don't know / refuse to answer	3.2	1.6
Total	100	100

21.3 The demands to make Israel more democratic

	Haredi	Non-Haredi
Very much	18.5	9.3
Quite a lot	27.2	21.6
Slightly	27.5	25.5
Not at all	21.0	37.5
Don't know / refuse to answer	5.8	6.1
Total	100	100

21.4 The demands to make Israel more Jewish

	Haredi	Non-Haredi
Very much	12.0	20.0
Quite a lot	8.4	30.5
Slightly	14.6	23.5
Not at all	62.7	22.9
Don't know / refuse to answer	2.3	3.1
Total	100	100

21.5 The diminution of the country's Jewish majority

	Haredi	Non-Haredi
Very much	46.5	30.2
Quite a lot	27.5	34.1
Slightly	10.6	19.6
Not at all	12.9	11.2
Don't know / refuse to answer	2.5	4.9
Total	100	100

21.6 The strong disagreements between various segments of Israeli society

	Haredi	Non-Haredi
Very much	24.9	30.0
Quite a lot	39.8	36.9
Slightly	23.5	23.4
Not at all	10.9	8.2
Don't know / refuse to answer	0.9	1.5
Total	100	100

22. Which of these is the most serious (internal) existential threat to the State of Israel?

	Haredi	Non-Haredi
Israel's control of the West Bank/Judea and Samaria	4.8	15.0
The social/economic inequality	12.0	24.1
The demands to make Israel more democratic	11.5	5.2
The demands to make Israel more Jewish	3.4	7.2
The diminution of the country's Jewish majority	36.1	17.9
The strong disagreements between various segments of Israeli society	26.3	25.9
Don't know / refuse to answer	5.9	4.7
Total	100	100

23-27. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements:

23. I prefer to keep silent and not express my political opinions in the presence of people I don't know.

	Haredi	Non-Haredi
Strongly agree	23.0	16.9
Somewhat agree	26.6	19.3
Somewhat disagree	12.0	20.2
Strongly disagree	37.8	43.1
Don't know / refuse to answer	0.6	0.5
Total	100	100

24. Israelis can always rely on other Israelis to help them out in times of trouble.

	Haredi	Non-Haredi
Strongly agree	49.3	32.7
Somewhat agree	34.2	41.0
Somewhat disagree	10.9	15.7
Strongly disagree	5.3	10.1
Don't know / refuse to answer	0.3	0.5
Total	100	100

25. The state should allocate more funds to foster the culture and heritage of Arab citizens of Israel.

	Haredi	Non-Haredi
Strongly agree	2.2	13.4
Somewhat agree	15.4	35.3
Somewhat disagree	22.4	25.4
Strongly disagree	58.8	23.9
Don't know / refuse to answer	1.2	2.0
Total	100	100

26. Arab citizens pose a security risk to Israel.

	Haredi	Non- Haredi
Strongly agree	53.5	19.1
Somewhat agree	27.5	20.6
Somewhat disagree	14.3	37.3
Strongly disagree	4.2	21.9
Don't know / refuse to answer	0.5	1.1
Total	100	100

27. Israel should fight terror any way it sees fit, without taking into consideration the views of other countries.

	Haredi	Non-Haredi
Strongly agree	70.3	58.8
Somewhat agree	16.2	21.7
Somewhat disagree	7.0	11.9
Strongly disagree	5.0	6.9
Don't know / refuse to answer	1.5	0.7
Total	100	100

28. Which countries are able to fight terror most effectively: democratic ones or non-democratic ones?

	Haredi	Non-Haredi
Democratic countries	20.7	34.9
Non-democratic countries	38.1	37.8
Both to the same degree	23.2	18.0
Neither of them	13.7	5.8
Don't know / refuse to answer	4.3	3.5
Total	100	100

29. If the present state of violence continues for a prolonged period, which society—Israeli or Palestinian—do you think can hold out longer?

	Haredi	Non-Haredi
Palestinian society	6.2	6.6
Israeli society	59.7	61.3
Both societies can hold out for a long time	20.7	20.3
Neither society can hold out for a long time	9.0	8.7
Don't know / refuse to answer	4.4	3.1
Total	100	100

30.1 If a contradiction arose between Jewish religious law and a (state) court ruling, which would you follow?

	Haredi	Non-Haredi
Jewish religious law	96.4	21.3
Court ruling	1.4	70.1
It depends / sometimes one, sometimes the other*	1.1	5.3
Don't know / refuse to answer	1.1	3.3
Total	100	100

*   This response was not presented by interviewees as an option, but was recorded when volunteered by respondents

31-34. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements:

31. Jewish citizens of Israel should have greater rights than non-Jewish citizens.

	Haredi	Non-Haredi
Strongly disagree	22.4	51.3
Somewhat disagree	17.4	21.9
Somewhat agree	19.0	11.8
Strongly agree	39.2	14.2
Don't know / refuse to answer	2.0	0.8
Total	100	100

32. On the whole, most Knesset members work hard and are doing a good job.

	Haredi	Non-Haredi
Strongly disagree	18.8	31.0
Somewhat disagree	31.9	36.1
Somewhat agree	39.2	27.8
Strongly agree	6.4	3.6
Don't know / refuse to answer	3.7	1.5
Total	100	100

33. Human- and civil-rights organizations like the Association for Civil Rights and B'Tselem cause damage to the state.

	Haredi	Non-Haredi
Strongly disagree	5.3	13.1
Somewhat disagree	5.9	13.4
Somewhat agree	12.0	22.1
Strongly agree	70.9	48.1
Don't know / refuse to answer	5.9	3.3
Total	100	100

34. In the fight against terror, there is no room for ethical considerations, and it is permissible to use any means to prevent terrorist attacks.

	Haredi	Non-Haredi
Strongly disagree	7.0	19.4
Somewhat disagree	11.2	19.5
Somewhat agree	25.2	22.1
Strongly agree	55.5	38.5
Don't know / refuse to answer	1.1	0.5
Total	100	100

35. In your opinion, does Israel's current electoral system allow the government to function properly?

	Haredi	Non-Haredi
I am certain that the current system allows the government to function properly	11.5	11.4
I think that the current system allows the government to function properly	49.6	29.1
I think that the current system does not allow the government to function properly	20.2	31.9
I am certain that the current system does not allow the government to function properly	11.5	23.9
Don't know / refuse to answer	7.2	3.7
Total	100	100

36. If the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet), the police, or the IDF suspects an individual of being involved in terrorist activity, they should be given full powers to investigate as they see fit, without any legal constraints.

	Haredi	Non-Haredi
Agree	56.3	50.2
Disagree	40.9	48.8
Don't know / refuse to answer	2.8	1.0
Total	100	100

37-38. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements:

37.1. Most Arab citizens of Israel have not reconciled themselves to the state's existence, and support its destruction.

	Haredi	Non-Haredi
Strongly disagree	7.0	23.0
Somewhat disagree	15.1	32.1
Somewhat agree	30.0	22.7
Strongly agree	46.5	20.3
Don't know / refuse to answer	1.4	1.9
Total	100	100

38. Politicians look out more for their own interests than for those of the public who elected them.

	Haredi	Non-Haredi
Strongly disagree	4.5	3.1
Somewhat disagree	12.3	16.2
Somewhat agree	38.4	35.1
Strongly agree	43.1	44.1
Don't know / refuse to answer	1.7	1.5
Total	100	100

39.1 Do you support or oppose having Arab parties in the government, including the appointment of Arab ministers?

	Haredi	Non-Haredi
Strongly oppose	57.7	31.8
Somewhat oppose	23.2	24.9
Somewhat support	12.6	29.5
Strongly support	2.8	9.8
Don't know / refuse to answer	3.7	4.0
Total	100	100

40. To what extent are you and your friends able to influence government policy?

	Haredi	Non-Haredi
Very much	4.2	4.7
Quite a lot	10.9	13.5
Not so much	41.2	47.6
Not at all	41.5	33.1
Don't know / refuse to answer	2.2	1.1
Total	100	100

41. Is there a political party in Israel today that truly represents your views?

	Haredi	Non-Haredi
Yes, there is	70.6	51.8
No, there isn't	27.2	46.6
Don't know / refuse to answer	2.2	1.6
Total	100	100

(Only those who answered "yes" to question 41):

42. Is this the same party you voted for in the last elections?

	Haredi	Non-Haredi
Yes, the same party	89.7	79.9
No, a different party	5.6	17.0
Don't know / refuse to answer	4.7	3.1
Total	100	100

43.1 Which identity is the most important to you?

	Haredi	Non-Haredi
Israeli	1.1	56.0
Jewish	55.5	33.1
Ethnic (Mizrahi/Ashkenazi/mixed)	1.1	1.4
Religious (my secularity/religiosity)	41.5	4.0
All of the above equally*	0.6	3.4
None of the above*	0.0	0.8
Don't know / refuse to answer	0.2	1.3
Total	100	100

* These responses were not presented by interviewees as options, but were recorded when volunteered by respondents.

44-46. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements:

44. People who are unwilling to affirm that Israel is the nation-state of the Jewish people should lose their right to vote.

	Haredi	Non-Haredi
Strongly disagree	15.1	29.9
Somewhat disagree	14.0	17.1
Somewhat agree	18.2	20.8
Strongly agree	48.5	30.3
Don't know / refuse to answer	4.2	1.9
Total	100	100

45. The only way to get things done in Israel is if you have connections and know the right people.

	Haredi	Non-Haredi
Strongly disagree	3.6	6.9
Somewhat disagree	11.2	13.9
Somewhat agree	38.7	45.7
Strongly agree	45.9	32.8
Don't know / refuse to answer	0.6	0.7
Total	100	100

46. Freedom of expression should be protected, even for people who speak out against the state.

	Haredi	Non-Haredi
Strongly disagree	30.5	20.6
Somewhat disagree	25.2	19.3
Somewhat agree	28.9	37.0
Strongly agree	13.7	21.9
Don't know / refuse to answer	1.7	1.2
Total	100	100

47. Would you be willing to accept an Arab.

Haredi Jews

	Yes	No	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
47.1 As your spouse or that of your children	0.6	99.4	0.0	100
47.2 As a friend	16.0	82.6	1.4	100
47.3 As a neighbor	14.0	85.2	0.8	100
47.4 As a coworker	37.0	60.8	2.2	100
47.5 As a citizen of the state	60.8	36.7	2.5	100
47.6 As a tourist in Israel	68.1	30.3	1.6	100

Non-Haredi Jews

	Yes	No	Don't know / refuse to answer	Total
47.1 As your spouse or that of your children	22.7	73.9	3.4	100
47.2 As a friend	72.3	26.6	1.1	100
47.3 As a neighbor	72.4	26.2	1.4	100
47.4 As a coworker	86.4	13.0	0.6	100
47.5 As a citizen of the state	86.6	12.5	0.9	100
47.6 As a tourist in Israel	87.9	11.4	0.7	100

48. Who is more hesitant to express their political opinions in Israel today—people on the Right, or people on the Left?

	Haredi	Non-Haredi
No one in Israel is hesitant to express their political opinions	45.9	35.9
People on the right are more hesitant	35.3	17.3
People on the left are more hesitant	4.8	32.1
Everyone is equally hesitant to express their political opinions	10.9	12.8
Don't know / refuse to answer	3.1	1.9
Total	100	100

49. How would you rate Israel's leadership in terms of corruption, where 1 = very corrupt and 5 = not at all corrupt?

	Haredi	Non-Haredi
1 – Very corrupt	18.8	27.0
2	17.9	30.1
3	44.5	29.5
4	12.0	10.7
5 – Not at all corrupt	4.5	1.8
Don't know / refuse to answer	2.3	0.9
Total	100	100
Average 1-5	2.65	2.30

Appendix 6
Sociodemographic Breakdown and Self-Definitions of Haredi Sample (%)

Sex	2016 Haredi Sample
Men	45.1
Women	54.9
Total	100
Age	
18–24	13.4
25–34	29.7
35–44	23.5
45–54	15.4
55–64	8.1
65+	9.5
Did not respond	0.4
Total	100
Education	
Elementary or partial high school	14.9
Full high school with matriculation certificate	15.4
Post-secondary (teachers' college, nursing school, engineering school)	25.8
Post-secondary yeshiva	13.2
Partial college/university (without degree)	6.4
Full academic degree, B.A. or higher	22.1
Did not respond	2.2
Total	100

Monthly household income	
Well below average	43.7
Slightly below average	22.1
Average	15.4
Slightly above average	9.0
Well above average	3.1
Did not respond	6.7
Total	100
Birth place (by respondent's birthplace; if Israeli-born, by father's birthplace)	
Israeli-born; Israel	44.0
Europe-America	10.9
Israeli-born; Europe-America	23.3
Asia-Africa	5.0
Israeli-born; Asia-Africa	15.4
Don't know / refuse to answer	1.4
Total	100
Length of residence in Israel	
Native-born or longtime residents (arrived before 1990)	96.4
Immigrants (from 1990 onward)	3.6
Total	100

Ethnic affiliation (self-defined)[1]	
Ashkenazi	62.7
Mizrahi	10.4
Sephardi	22.1
Mixed / both	3.4
Neither Ashkenazi nor Mizrahi / Israeli	0.8
Don't know / refuse to answer	0.6
Total	100
Political orientation	
Right	38.7
Moderate right	37.3
Center	11.8
Moderate left	1.7
Left	0.8
Don't know / refuse to answer	9.7
Total	100

1   The responses offered by the interviewers were limited to Ashkenazi, Mizrahi or Sephardi.

Voting patterns in 2015 Knesset elections	
Likud	3.4
Zionist Union	0.6
Kulanu	0.3
United Torah Judaism	52.1
Shas	21.8
Yachad	7.6
Other	0.6
Didn't vote	10.1
Refused to say if voted, or for which party / blank ballot	3.5
Total	100
Affiliation with Haredi subgroups	
Hassidic	28.6
Lita'im	35.9
Sephardi	24.6
Modern Haredi	2.8
Chabad/Lubavitch	4.8
Do not belong to any Haredi subgroup	2.8
Don't know / refuse to answer	0.5
Total	100

The Research Team

Prof. Tamar Hermann is the academic director of IDI's Guttman Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research, and a Senior Fellow at IDI. She is a full professor of political science at the Open University of Israel. Her fields of expertise are public opinion research, civic society, and extra-parliamentary politics.

Ella Heller is the survey coordinator at IDI's Guttman Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research. She is the former research director of the Modi'in Ezrachi Research Institute, and served as a senior researcher at the Knesset's Research and Information Center. She specializes in public opinion polls and survey research.

Chanan Cohen is a researcher at IDI's Guttman Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research and a doctoral student in the Department of Political Science at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. His fields of interest are ethnic and national identities, local politics in Israel, political violence, and social sciences research methodology.

Dana Bublil is a member of the research team at IDI's Guttman Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research and other IDI projects. She is pursuing a master's degree in political science at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, where she earned her B.A. in statistics and political science.

Fadi Omar is a member of the research team at IDI's Guttman Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research. He holds an M.A. degree in sociology and anthropology from Bar-Ilan University, and has worked as a researcher and teaching assistant in the field of statistics. His areas of interest are quantitative research methods, the study of Arab society in Israel, and organizational research.

The Israel Democracy Institute (IDI) is an independent center of research and action dedicated to strengthening the foundations of Israeli democracy. IDI works to bolster the values and institutions of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. A non-partisan think-and-do tank, the institute harnesses rigorous applied research to influence policy, legislation and public opinion. The institute partners with political leaders, policymakers, and representatives of civil society to improve the functioning of the government and its institutions, confront security threats while preserving civil liberties, and foster solidarity within Israeli society. The State of Israel recognized the positive impact of IDI's research and recommendations by bestowing upon the Institute its most prestigious award, the Israel Prize for Lifetime Achievement.

The Guttman Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research was established in its current configuration in 1998, when it became a part of IDI. The Guttman Institute was founded in 1949 by Professor Eliyahu (Louis) Guttman and has since enriched the public discourse on thousands of issues by way of applied rigorous and pioneering research methods, enhanced by the unique "continuing survey" that has documented the attitudes of the Israeli public in all aspects of life in over 1,200 studies.

The Israeli Democracy Index is a public opinion poll project conducted by the Guttman Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research. Since 2003, an extensive survey has been conducted annually on a representative sample of Israel's adult population. Each survey presents an estimate of the quality of Israeli democracy for that year.

The project aims at assessing trends in Israeli public opinion regarding realization of democratic values and the performance of government systems and elected officials. Analysis of its results may contribute to public discussion of the status of democracy in Israel and create a cumulative empirical database to intensify discourse concerning such issues.