Pandemic Dictates Substantial Changes

54% of Israeli say that the pandemic has caused them to change their daily routine, and 45% said that they have made significant changes such as switching jobs or halting their studies. As 2021 drew to a close, more than a quarter of those participating in the survey said they are considering or intending to leave their current workplace in the foreseeable future.

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Main Findings

* The rate of optimists about the future of national security (slightly less than half) remains as it was in recent months. The rate of optimists about the future of Israel’s democratic governance saw a slight decrease this month. On both issues there is a clear majority of optimists on the left, a small majority in the center, and a large minority on the right.

* A majority of the public gives the government as a whole, the prime minister, and the other ministers grades of “not good” or “poor.” The overall picture is similar among Jews and Arabs, though the rate of “not good” and “poor” grades is higher among the Arabs. The same holds true regarding voters for the coalition and the opposition: in both camps the rate of those giving “not good” and “poor” grades exceeds the rate of those assigning “good” and “excellent” grades, though among the voters for the coalition parties the picture is a little more positive than among the voters for the opposition parties.

* A majority of the Israeli public attests that the COVID-19 crisis has caused a change in daily routine. The rate of those attesting to such a change is highest among those aged 25-34. The rate of Jewish men whose daily routine has changed is the lowest.

* Slightly less than half the interviewees reported that the COVID-19 crisis has caused them to make substantial changes in their lives (putting an end to studies, changing the home vs. work balance, finding a new workplace, etc.). Jewish men have made fewer changes in their lives than Jewish women, and Arab women fewer than Arab men. The intermediate ages have made more changes than those younger or older.

* In the sample as a whole, the most common assessment of one’s personal economic situation is “medium.” The rate of those assessing their situation as moderately good or very good exceeds the rate of those assessing their economic situation as moderately bad or very bad.

* Among the groups to which employment is relevant, the majority feels considerable job security. At the same time, the public is divided on the question of the chances of finding an alternative workplace with the same or better conditions; the assessment is influenced, as expected, by factors such as economic situation, age, and so on. More than a quarter of the interviewees in the entire sample are considering or intending to leave their current workplace in the foreseeable future.

* The year 2021 is seen as positive on the personal level by a large majority of the respondents, but only a minority views it as positive from the standpoint of the country. The expectations for 2022 are indeed more positive, but here too optimism about personal situation is a good deal higher than optimism about the country.

The National Mood

The stability we measured during the previous four months regarding the rate of optimists about the future of national security – which stands at 48%, slightly less than half of the Israeli public – remains this month, too. Again we also found a particularly high rate of optimists on the left, a bit fewer in the center, and only a minority on the right (Jewish sample). The young age groups are less optimistic than the older ones on this issue, but that may be a result of a higher concentration of young people on the right, which shifts the explanation from the age factor to the political-position factor.

This month saw a small decrease in the rate of optimists about the future of Israel’s democratic governance, which is always lower than the rate of optimists about the future of national security. This month as well the rate of optimists among the Jews (44%) is considerably higher than among the Arabs (36%). Moreover, as on the question about the future of national security, also regarding the future of democratic governance the optimism concentrates on the left and in the center, and is much lower on the right (Jewish sample).

Optimistic about the future of Israeli democracy and about the future of national security, April 2019─December 2021 (%, entire sample)

Latest Grades for the Government

Half a year after the formation of the government we asked the interviewees to give grades to the government as a whole, to the prime minister, and to the ministers. The general assessment of the government is low: the highest rate (42%) gave it grades of “not good” or “poor,” 28% gave it “medium” grades, and only about a quarter gave the current government grades of “good” or “excellent.” A look at the grades of the ministers and the prime minister reveals a similar picture: among the public as a whole Defense Minister Gantz gets the highest grades, but for him, too, the rate of “good” or “excellent” grades is lower than the rate of “not good” or “poor” grades. After him come Foreign Minister and Alternate Prime Minister Lapid, and Prime Minister Bennett. The lowest grades went to Transportation Minister Michaeli, Interior Minister Shaked, and Internal Security Minister Bar-Lev.

The grades for the government, the prime minister, and the other ministers (%, entire sample)

A segmentation of these grades by voting in the most recent elections reveals a considerable gap between voters for the opposition parties and for the coalition parties, though the situation is not encouraging for the latter parties either. Only 43% of those who voted for the coalition parties give the government “good” or “excellent” grades – and this rate is still much higher than the rate among the opposition-party voters, the overwhelming majority of whom give the government, the prime minister, and the ministers “poor” grades. An interesting finding is that the highest grades among the coalition-party voters went to Foreign Minister Lapid, while among the opposition-party voters the highest went to Minister Gantz.

Good or excellent grades for the government, the prime minister, and the ministers (%, entire sample)

Jewish and Arab Israelis – The Arab interviewees give the government a lower overall grade than the Jews do; only 17% of the Arabs granted the current government “good” or “excellent” grades compared to 26% of the Jews. And while the highest grades in the Jewish public went to Defense Minister Gantz (33% “good” or “excellent” grades), in the Arab public it is Foreign Minister Lapid who wins the highest rate of positive grades (25%).

Location on the Haredi-secular spectrum (Jews) – The government as a whole, the prime minister, as well as the ministers get higher grades from the less religious groups.

“Good” or “excellent” grades for the government, the prime minister, and the ministers (%, entire sample)

	Secular	Nonreligious traditional	Religious traditional	Religious	Haredi
The government, overall	35	28	18	19	7
Foreign Minister Lapid	38	28	15	14	9
Defense Minister Gantz	42	37	20	17	20
Prime Minister Bennett	34.5	31.5	19	28	6
Health Minister Horowitz	33	25	16.5	15.5	10
Finance Minister Liberman	31	23	13	10	5
Religious Services Minister Kahana	28	18.5	13	24	9
Communications Minister Hendel	26	19	14	21	10
Justice Minister Saar	22	19	15	12	6
Transportation Minister Michaeli	19	19	6	5	6
Interior Security Minister Bar-Lev	20	15	8	7	7
Education Minister Shasha-Biton	17	22	18	17	10
Interior Minister Shaked	12.5	16	20	26	5

Effects of COVID-19

The continuation of the COVID-19 crisis with its repercussions led us to focus on its effects on the personal level. We asked: “To what extent has the COVID-19 pandemic caused substantial changes in your daily routine?” Out of the entire sample, a majority of 55% testified about themselves that their routine had changed to a very large or quite a large extent.

To what extent has the COVID-19 pandemic caused substantial changes in your daily routine? (%, entire sample)

A comparison between the Jewish interviewees’ responses and those of the Arabs shows that on this issue the difference between them is small; on both sides there is a majority for whom COVID-19 has changed their daily routine (Jews 54%, Arabs 56%).

A segmentation of the Jewish sample by self-placement on the Haredi-secular spectrum reveals that the Haredim and the traditional religious experienced the change at the lowest rates (respectively 43% and 49%). Among the other groups a majority underwent it, though not a large one (nonreligious traditional 59%, religious 57%, secular 54%).

Jewish and Arab Israelis segmentation by gender shows that among both Jews and Arabs the women attest to greater change in routine than the men (Jewish and Arab women as a whole—58%). Arab men experienced a change in routine at a higher rate than Jewish men (56.5% vs. 49%). In other words, for Jewish men a change in routine brought on by COVID-19 occurred less than for everyone else, though here too about half underwent a change in routine.

A segmentation by income shows that among the Jews, the higher the income, the lower the rate of those whose routine has changed (below-average income 58%, average income 53%, above-average income 48%). This situation is also found in the Arab public: among the Arabs the rate of those with above-average income who experienced a change is much lower than among those with average or below-average income (below-average 58%, average 60%, above-average 41%).

An analysis of the results by age shows that among both the Jews and the Arabs the greatest disruption of routine occurred in the 25-34 age group (Jews 64.5%, Arabs 76%). The diagram below shows that the routines of the Jewish older people changed more than those of the Arab older people.

To what extent has the COVID-19 pandemic caused substantial changes in your daily routine? (%, by age, Jews and Arabs)

We went on to ask the interviewees whether the COVID-19 crisis has led them to “rethink their lives.” Out of the entire sample, 45% answered that they had indeed rethought their lives while 50% answered that they had not.

Some claim that COVID-19 has led them to “rethink their lives” – for example, a change in career, a new balance between life at work and at home, putting an end to studies, and the like. Have you personally experienced or not experienced such substantial changes because of COVID-19? (%, entire sample)

Among the Jews 43.5% responded that they had made substantial changes in their lives because of the virus, while among the Arabs about half (49%) said they had.

A segmentation by self-placement on the Haredi-secular spectrum revealed that the rate of those who have made substantial changes in their lives is highest among the religious traditional (54%) and lowest among the Haredim (39.5%).

A segmentation by income shows that among the Jews those with average income have made changes at a higher rate than those with below-average income or above-average income (respectively: average income 50% compared to below-average income 45.5% and above-average income 39%). The same holds true among the Arabs, though the rates of those who have made changes are higher (average income 60%, below-average income 47%, above-average income 53%).

A segmentation by gender reveals that Jewish men have made the least changes and Arab men the most: Jewish men – 42%, Jewish women – 45%, Arab women – 48%, Arab men – 51%.

A segmentation by age reveals that, as expected, in the oldest age groups fewer have “rethought their lives,” while among those of medium age more have done so.

Some claim that COVID-19 has led them to “rethink their lives”—for example, a change in career, a new balance between life at work and at home, putting an end to studies, and the like. Have you personally experienced or not experienced such substantial changes because of COVID-19? (%, by age, Jews and Arabs)

We looked into whether those for whom COVID-19 has changed their daily routine have rethought their lives more than those who reported no change in their routine. As expected, a strong relationship was found between the two: among those who reported that the virus had changed their routine 65.5% answered that there had been substantial changes in their lives compared to only 21% of those who reported that their routine had not been affected by the COVID-19 crisis.

Employment Expectations

Assessment of personal economic situation – The survey finds that out of the entire sample, the prevailing assessment of personal economic situation is “medium.” The rate of those assessing their economic situation as moderately good or very good (36.5%) exceeds the rate of those assessing their economic situation as moderately bad or very bad (20%).

How would you define your economic situation at present? (%, entire sample)

The assessment of personal economic situation differs, however, between groups. Among the Jews 39% define their personal economic situation as good, 42.5% as medium, and only 17% as not good. Among the Arab respondents, however, only 24% define their economic situation as good and 38% define it as not good (medium – 37%). When segmenting also by gender, the findings are very interesting: 40% of the Arab men define their economic situation as not so good or not good at all, and 36% of the Arab women. Among the Jewish men, however, only 15% define their personal economic situation that way, and among the women the rate is similar at 18%.

A segmentation of the Jewish sample by location on the Haredi-secular spectrum shows that, even though according to the official data the economic situation of the Haredim is the worst, this is not reflected in the assessments of personal economic situation, perhaps because the economic expectations are different.

Personal economic situation (%, Jews)

	Moderately good and very good	Medium	Not so good and not good at all
Haredim	41	37	18.5
National Religious	52	31	15.5
Religious traditional	27	56	14
Religious nontraditional	34	49	15
Secular	41	39	18

A segmentation by political camp (Jewish sample) turns up small disparities in the rates of those defining their situation as not good (left – 18%, center – 15%, right – 16%). However, there is considerable disparity in the rates of those defining their personal economic situation as good (left – 49.5%, center – 39%, right – 38.5%).

Employment security – Against the backdrop of what we have noted above, we went on to gauge the Israeli public’s sense of employment security. As shown in the diagram below, among the groups to which employment is relevant the majority feels considerable employment security. About a third, however, report a low sense of employment security.

To what extent do you feel sure or unsure that if you want to, you can stay at your current workplace for the foreseeable future? (%, entire sample)

Arab Israelis’ sense of employment security is significantly lower than that of the Jews: a large majority of Jewish Israelis (61.5%) and a smaller majority of the Arabs (52.5%) feel employment security.

A segmentation by gender indicates that among Jewish men the sense of employment security is the highest (62.5%), but it is also considerable among Jewish and Arab women and Arab men (Jewish women 60%, Arab women 50%, Arab men 55.5%).

A segmentation by income revealed large gaps in the sense of employment security among the Jews and smaller disparities among the Arabs. Not surprisingly, those with higher income feel greater employment security.

To what extent do you feel sure or unsure that if you want to, you can stay at your current workplace for the foreseeable future? (%, by income, sure they will be able to stay at their workplace, Jews and Arabs)

We wanted to know whether there is a relationship between assessment of personal economic situation and assessment of the chances of remaining in the current workplace. We found that, indeed, there is: among those who defined their economic situation as good, 83% believe they will be able to maintain their current workplace. Among those who defined their economic situation as medium, the rate was 55%, and among those who defined it as bad, only 34% feel employment security in their current workplace.

Chances of alternative employment – And what are the chances of finding a workplace with similar or better conditions? The public is divided on this question, with a tilt toward optimism.

How do you assess your chances to find a new workplace with similar or better conditions, if you are forced or decide to leave your present workplace? (%, entire sample)

A segmentation by age reveals, as expected, that the Jewish young people are much more optimistic about the chances to find a workplace with equal or preferable conditions. In the Arab sample the disparities are less substantial.

How do you assess your chances to find a new workplace with similar or better conditions, if you are forced or decide to leave your present workplace? (%, very high or moderately high chances, by age, Jews and Arabs)

Changing a workplace by choice – Lately there has been much talk about the phenomenon, unprecedented in scope, of leaving the workplace by choice. We asked the interviewees whether they are considering or intending to leave their current workplace in the foreseeable future. Out of the entire sample, more than a quarter answered the question positively (27%). On this question we found a large gap between the Jewish and the Arab respondents: whereas the rate among the Jews of those considering or intending to leave their workplace comes to about a quarter, among the Arabs it is almost double (44%).

Are you considering leaving, or intending to leave, your current workplace in the foreseeable future? (%, considering or intending to leave, Jews and Arabs)

A segmentation by age reveals that intentions or plans for a change of workplace are more common among Arabs in all the age groups.

Are you considering leaving, or intending to leave, your current workplace in the foreseeable future? (%, Jews and Arabs, by age, considering or intending to leave)

A segmentation by economic situation (personal assessment) shows that among the Jews, the better the economic situation, the higher the rate of those who are not considering leaving their workplace. Of those who defined their economic situation as good, 78% are not considering leaving; among those whose situation is medium, 59%; and among those who define their situation as bad, 45%. Among the Arab interviewees, the largest gap is between those defining their economic situation as good, among whom 69% are not considering leaving their current workplace, and those whose economic situation is medium or bad, for whom the corresponding rates are respectively 45% and 49%.

We looked into the relationship between an interest or intention to seek a new workplace and assessment of the chances of remaining in the current workplace. As expected, a relationship between the two emerged. Among those who are considering or intending to seek a new workplace, only 37% are sure they will be able to remain in the current one, compared to 76% of those who are not considering or intending to seek a new one. That is, the sense of employment security of those considering or intending to seek a new workplace is lower than among those not considering or intending to do so. As for the chances of finding a new workplace, among those considering or intending to seek a new one, more than half (53%) are sure they have high chances of finding a new one with conditions equal to or better than their current conditions. In comparison, less than half (47%) of those who are not considering or intending to seek a new workplace see good chances of finding one equal to or better than their current one.

Summing Up 2020 and Expectations for 2022

As 2021 came to a close, we asked the interviewees how they viewed that year on the personal level and from the state of Israel’s standpoint. Between the two assessments a large gap emerged: two-thirds of the respondents indicated that on the personal level they had had a good or very good year, compared to less than a third who gave that answer regarding Israel.

How was the year that has ended on the personal level and from the country’s standpoint? (%, entire sample)

One of the main factors that explain the two assessments is the respondents’ economic situation. A large majority (86%) of those who reported a good economic situation said the year that has ended was good from the personal standpoint, and so did a considerable majority (63%) of those who defined their economic situation as medium—compared to only a minority (41%) of those who defined their economic situation as not so good or not good at all. Similar gaps between the three groups were found when assessing 2021 in terms of the country, though the level is lower: 43% of those with a good economic situation indicated that the past year was good from the country’s standpoint, compared to 29% who took that view among those with a medium economic situation and only 14% of those who attested that their economic situation is not good.

How was the year that has ended on the personal level and on the level of the country? (%, entire sample, a moderately good or very good year)

Voting for the coalition or the opposition parties was also found to influence the assessment of 2021 from the country’s standpoint. Whereas a large majority of the opposition-party voters (77%) say last year was not good from Israel’s standpoint, among the coalition-party voters the distribution of opinions is more balanced – a small majority (52.5%) says the year was not good but 44% consider that it was good for Israel.

An increase in interviewees’ age is also accompanied by a more positive assessment of the past year, though in all the age groups the rate assessing 2021 negatively exceeds the rate assessing it positively. Among the young people (up to age 34) less than a quarter indicated that the past year was good for Israel, compared to 29% of the medium age group (35-54) and over 40% of those aged 55 and over.

A segmentation by income was likewise found to be a distinguishing factor: only about a quarter of those with below-average income indicated that the past year was good for Israel, compared to more than a third of those whose income is above average for the country. It was also found that the rate of Jewish men who think 2021 was good for the country is higher than the rate of Jewish women who think so. On this issue gaps did not emerge between Jews and Arabs; about a third of both groups (Jews – 30.5%, Arabs – 33%) consider that the year that has ended was good for the country.

The past year was moderately good or very good from the country’s standpoint (%, entire sample)

Voting in the elections	Coalition parties	44
	Opposition parties	18
Age	18-34	23.5
	35-54	29
	55	41
Income	Lower than average	27
	Average	32
	Higher than average	38
Gender (Jews)	Men	36
	Women	25

The level of optimism of the Israeli public, regarding both personal situation and the country’s situation in the new year, is slightly higher than its assessments of the past year. About three-fourths of the interviewees think the coming year will be a good one for them on the personal level, and 44% indicated that the coming year would be a good one from Israel’s standpoint.

How will 2022, the year that is now beginning, be on the personal level and on the country’s level? (%, entire sample)

Just as for the past year, for the one that is beginning disparities were found regarding Israel’s future between coalition-party and opposition-party voters. More than half (57.5%) of those who voted for the parties that compose the coalition think 2022 will be a good year, compared to only a third of the opposition voters.

How will 2022 be from the country’s standpoint? (%, entire sample, a moderately good or very good year, by voting in the elections)

Disparities in degree of optimism about the coming year were also found between men, half of whom are optimistic, and women, only a little more than a third of whom are optimistic. Gaps were also found between those with different incomes: whereas only 39% of those with below-average income think the coming year will be good from Israel’s standpoint, about half (48%) of those with average income think so, along with a majority of those with above-average income (52%). Even larger gaps were found according to the responses to the question on interviewees’ economic situation: a majority (59%) of those who indicated that their economic situation is very good or moderately good predicted that 2022 will be a good year for Israel, compared to a minority, though considerable (40%), of those who defined their economic situation as average and 30% of those whose economic situation is not good.

The Israeli Voice Index for December 2021 was prepared by the Viterbi Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research of the Israel Democracy Institute. In the survey, which was conducted on the internet and by telephone (supplements of groups that are not sufficiently represented on the network) from December 30, 2021, to January 3, 2022, 612 men and women were interviewed in Hebrew and 152 in Arabic, constituting a representative national sample of the entire adult population of Israel aged 18 and older. The maximum sampling error for the entire sample was ±3.59% at a confidence level of 95%. The fieldwork was done by the Midgam Institute. For the full data file see: Data Israel.