The Israel Democracy Institute Publishes its 2024 Israeli Democracy Index
The Israeli Democracy Index 2024 Press Release
Photo by: Amos Ben-Gershom/GPO
For the twenty-second consecutive year, the 2024 Israeli Democracy Index of the Israel Democracy Institute was published today (December 17).
Israel's Status:
Less than one-fifth of Israelis rate Israel’s overall situation as “good” or "very good.”
However, about two-thirds of the public believe that Israel is a good place to live. Additionally, a large majority of Jews and a small majority of Arabs feel a sense of belonging to the State of Israel and its challenges.
Threat to Democracy:
Over three-quarters of the Arab public believe that democratic rule in Israel is in danger—slightly over half of the Jewish public share this concern.
Trust in Institutions:
The IDF enjoys the highest level of trust (October 2024: 77%) despite a slight decline compared to its multi-year average (79.5%).
There has been a significant drop in trust in the Israel Police compared to last year, and even more so following the events of October 7. (December 2023: 55%; October 2024: 37%)
As in the past, trust in the executive and legislative branches—the government and the Knesset – and political parties—is the lowest.
Trust in Security Forces:
Among the general public, the IDF has the highest level of trust. The Mossad and the Shin Bet also enjoy the trust of the majority. In contrast, trust in the police is much lower.
Sense of Solidarity:
Following October 7, there was a significant but temporary increase in assessments of solidarity within Israeli society. While this sense of solidarity later declined, it remains high compared to previous years.
Social Tensions:
Among Jews, the top perceived social tension is between the political right and left, which has increased in severity.
Among Arabs, the main perceived tension is between Jews and Arabs.
Who Can Be Trusted in Times of Trouble:
81% of the Jewish public agree they can always count on their fellow Israelis in times of trouble, while only 25.5% believe the state can be relied upon in times of trouble.
Among Arabs, 62% agree that their fellow Israelis can be relied upon, and 61% believe the state can be relied upon.
Staying in Israel:
About two-thirds of the public prefer to remain in Israel, even if offered citizenship in a Western country.
Personal Security:
Approximately two-thirds of Arab respondents report a low sense of personal security, compared to less than half of Jewish respondents.
Decisions Based on a Political Agenda:
A small majority of Jewish respondents believe the IDF and the Mossad are politically neutral. About half express a similar view of the Shin Bet.
For each of these bodies, the proportion of respondents on the political Right who view them as neutral is lower than that of those in the Center and on the Left. Only a minority perceive the police as politically neutral—they are seen as a politically biased body.
A majority of the Arab public believes that none of the security agencies are politically neutral.
Yohanan Plesner, President of the Israel Democracy Institute, and Professor Tamar Hermann, Director of the Viterbi Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research, presented the 2024 Israeli Democracy Index to President Isaac Herzog at his official residence in Jerusalem earlier today. The Index presents a complex snapshot of the public's assessment of the resilience of Israeli democracy, trust in public institutions, and internal cohesion in society. It also includes a special chapter dedicated to national security. In light of the war and ongoing events, some questions asked initially in May were revisited in October. The Democracy Index 2024 was compiled by Professor Tamar Hermann, Dr. Lior Yohanani, Yaron Kaplan, and Inna Orly Spoznikov.
Isaac Herzog, President of the State of Israel: "The trust we have in ourselves, in our people, and in our state, has always been a cornerstone for us. When trust is shaken, when the foundations are destabilized, the nation is in danger. This is the most basic formula. Therefore, the decline in public trust between Israeli citizens and state institutions, reflecting a trend that has become even more pronounced over the past year, deeply troubles me. I believe that the erosion of public trust cannot be separated from the troubling and violent culture of confrontations and accusations of blame on social media and in the public sphere. All of these are interconnected with the upheaval we are experiencing as a society and as a country. Even now, especially now, we must not forget that our enemies have made and continue to make significant efforts to fuel internal conflicts among us — both in the period leading up to the massacre and throughout this past year. They sought to severely undermine our internal trust, describing it as 'Israeli disintegration.' We must not forget this, and we must not give up on one another, nor on the state and its institutions. We must act to restore public trust in the state and its institutions. Trust is the greatest asset of any nation. At a time when many are concerned about the erosion of democratic values in Israel, I want to emphasize: Israeli democracy has no substitute."
Yohanan Plesner, President of the Israel Democracy Institute: "The sharp decline of public trust in government agencies and democratic institutions reflected in this year's Democracy Index should serve as a glaring warning signal. It is an expression of the fact that many Israelis feel that their government is not working for them. Israelis see their leaders focusing more energy on ensuring the ultra-Orthodox don't have to serve in the military than on tackling the rising cost of living or addressing the plight of Israel’s displaced populations. They see that instead of building internal cohesion to confront our many enemies, our leaders are expending political capital on removing checks and balances, harassing competent civil servants and promoting cronies. The irresponsible weakening of institutions that have served as a source of Israel’s strength and prosperity for decades is a dangerous phenomenon, especially in time of war. Our leaders have much work to do, and time is of the essence.”
Professor Tamar Hermann, Director of the Viterbi Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research:
"Despite the turbulent events of the past year, this year's Index does not indicate sharp fluctuations or changes in trends compared to the 2023 Index. The public remains dissatisfied with the political echelon, and the gaps on key issues between political camps remain the same. The feeling that Israeli democracy is in danger is especially widespread on the Left and in the Center, but a large minority also feels this is the case on the Right. The assessment of solidarity in Israeli society, which peaked following the events of October 7, has eroded to a certain extent, as one would expect, but it is still higher than in the past. In addition, a decline in feelings of personal security was measured (mainly in the Arab public). This comes alongside a feeling among the general public (mainly on the Right but also among Arabs) that security institutions are not politically neutral. Despite everything, a majority believe that Israel is a good place to live and would prefer to stay here, even if they were offered immigration under "de luxe" conditions."
In May 2024, there was a significant increase in the percentage of people describing Israel’s overall situation as bad or very bad (60%). By October, likely due to developments in the northern front in the war against Hezbollah, this figure dropped to less than half (48.5%), accompanied by an increase in those describing Israel’s situation as good or very good or as “so-so” (19% and 32%, respectively). Among Jews, the situation assessment was more positive than among Arabs (October: bad or very bad—Jews 45%, Arabs 67%; good or very good—Jews 22%, Arabs 8%).
This year, there were some declines in public trust across most institutions, but the trust hierarchy remained almost unchanged. The levels of trust among the Jewish public in public institutions are systematically higher than among the Arab public.
The IDF enjoys the highest level of trust, after a slight decline in the first several months of the war. However, trust in the IDF among the overall sample increased to 77% in October 2024, apparently following strategic achievements in the North. The President of Israel ranks second in May (43%, October: 38%). Following a rise in trust in the police after the events of October 7, trust fell again in May 2024 (41%) and dropped further in October (37%). While trust in the Supreme Court has dropped over the years, it still enjoys higher levels of trust than the other two branches of government (the Parliament and the Administration) measured in the Index (2024: May 37%, October 39.5%). Still, the low levels of trust in the government and the Knesset increased slightly during the year (government: from 18% in May to 25% in October; Knesset: from 13% in May to 16% in October). In both surveys, about a quarter of the public expressed trust in the media. Political parties rank at the bottom of the trust hierarchy.
The hierarchy of trust in security agencies among the general public is: the IDF, the Mossad, the Shin Bet, and far behind—the police. Trust in all security forces is much higher among Jews than among Arabs (percentage expressing trust: Jews – 64.3%; Arabs – 26.8%, in May 2024).
A slim majority of Jewish respondents believe the IDF is politically neutral, compared to less than one-third of Arabs. Among Jews, responses regarding the Mossad and IDF are almost identical, as are Arab responses concerning both institutions. Roughly half of Jewish respondents believe the Shin Bet does not have a political agenda, whereas only a minority of Arabs share this view.
The majority of both Jewish and Arab respondents (around two-thirds) believe that the police are not politically neutral.
Perceived Political Neutrality of Security Agencies (% of Respondents, Jews. vs. Arabs)
|
Political Camps (Jews) |
Population Group |
|
|||
|
Left |
Center |
Right |
Arabs |
Jews |
|
|
70 |
65 |
48 |
30 |
55 |
IDF |
|
12 |
27 |
34 |
28 |
29.5 |
Police |
|
60 |
57.5 |
44.5 |
29 |
50 |
Shin Bet |
|
65 |
59 |
49 |
28 |
54 |
Mossad |
Among Jews, 41% report a low sense of personal security, and only about a quarter report a high sense of personal security. In contrast, among Arabs, about two-thirds report a low sense of personal security, while only a small minority (13.5%) report a high sense of personal security. On the Left and in the Center (Jewish sample), the percentage of those reporting a high sense of personal security is significantly lower than on the right (12%, 18%, and 32%, respectively).
Despite only a quarter of Jewish respondents reporting a high sense of personal security, more than 70% in both May and October surveys stated that Jews are safer living in Israel than anywhere else.
A slight majority of Jewish respondents (56%) reported being optimistic about Israel’s future. Among Arabs, a similar majority (59%) expressed pessimism regarding the country’s future.
Furthermore, over three-quarters (77.5%) of the Arab public believe that democratic governance in Israel is under threat—a small majority (54%) of the Jewish public shares this concern. The differences on this issue among Jewish political camps are significant: on the Left, a large majority (94%) perceive a threat, compared to 71% in the Center. However, on the Right, only a minority (38%) believes that democratic governance in Israel is in grave danger.
Nevertheless, about two-thirds of both Jews and Arabs responded that Israel is a good place to live.
Solidarity in Israeli Society:
Following a surge in the assessment of solidarity across the sample after the events of October 7, there was a decline in this assessment. However, the perception of solidarity in 2024 remains higher than in previous years, likely still influenced by the civilian cohesion driven by the circumstances of the time.
The average score for solidarity in Israel among the Jewish sample is 5.5 (on a scale of 1 to 10). Solidarity is rated higher among the right (5.6) and the center (5.5) compared to the left (4.8).
The average score among the Arab public regarding the level of solidarity in Israeli society is 5.0.
Annual Solidarity Scores for Israeli Society, 2011–2024 (On a scale of 1 to 10, Jews, Arabs)
The percentage of those who agree that they can rely upon their fellow Israelis in times of crisis has risen significantly compared to the previous measurement two years ago. Among Jews, this figure increased from 68% in 2022 to 81% this year, and among Arabs, it rose from 39% to 62%.
In contrast, the percentage of those agreeing that the state can always be relied upon in times of crisis dropped among Jews from 37% in 2022 to 25.5% this year. Among Arabs, however, there was an increase in those who believe the state can always be relied upon, from 52% in 2022 to 61% in 2024.
Since the outbreak of war on October 7, civil society organizations in Israel have made an enormous impact. In the total sample, as in both the Jewish and Arab samples, around two-thirds of respondents agree that civil society organizations serve Israeli society better than state institutions do. In both 2024 surveys, around two-thirds of the total public said they think that civil society organizations serve Israeli society better than state institutions do.
This year, there was a sharp increase in the percentage of respondents who view the primary tension in Israeli society as being between the political Right and Left (48%). This was followed by tensions between Jews and Arabs (31%) and between secular and religious groups (14%).
A breakdown of the Jewish public by political camps shows that a higher percentage on the Left than the Center and Right believes the primary tension is between Right and Left (Left – 64%, Center – 49.5%, Right – 53%). Among the Arab public, more than half (55.5%) identified the tension between Jews and Arabs as the strongest.
The Strongest Social Tension in Israeli Society, 2012–2024 (% of Total Sample)
A large majority of Jews and most Arabs feel a part of the State of Israel and its challenges (October: Jews—84%, Arabs—59%). A breakdown by political camp (Jews) shows relatively small differences: Left—77%, Center—79%, Right—88%.
Among Jews, there was a decrease in May 2024 compared to June 2023 in the percentage of those preferring to stay in Israel (from 70% to 64.5%). In October 2024, this figure returned to 70%. Among Arabs, there was an increase from 72% in June 2023 to 77% in May 2024, followed by a decline to 71% in October 2024. A breakdown by political camps (Jews) shows significant differences, with all camps recording an increase in the preference to stay in Israel between May and October 2024 (Left: May – 38%, October – 48%; Center: May – 56%, October – 65%; Right: May – 74%, October – 78%).
What will better ensure the future security of the State of Israel: military strength or a diplomatic agreements?
Between May and October, the overall sample showed a decline in the percentage believing that strengthening military power would better ensure Israel’s near-term security (from 40% to 30%), alongside an increase in those who think a diplomatic settlement with neighbouring countries would better ensure security (from 19% to 28%). In the long term, most of the overall sample saw a combination of both approaches as the best guarantee for Israel's security (38% in May and 41% in October).
A breakdown by political camps (Jews) reveals that on the Left, diplomatic agreements are perceived as the best guarantee for Israel's security in both the near and long term. In the Center, the preferred solution for both timeframes is a combination of both strengthening military power and diplomatic agreements. On the Right, strengthening military power is ranked first in the near term, while combining military strength and diplomatic agreements is preferred in the long term.
For the Selected Findings of the Index: Click here
The two polling firms that carried out the field work for this year’s survey were Shiluv I2R (Hebrew interviews, via internet and telephone) and Afkar Research and Knowledge (Arabic interviews, via telephone). The data were collected between May 16 and May 29, 2024. Between October 28 and November 3, 2024, a validation was conducted of some of the survey findings. The validation was conducted by the Dialogue Research and Polling Institute.