The Appointment of the Next Shin Bet Chief and The Advisory Committee on Senior Civil Service Appointments

When and why was the Advisory Committee on Senior Civil Service Appointments established, what are its powers, and which appointments is it supposed to review? Everything you need to know about the “Grunis Committee” that is examining the candidacy of Major General Zini for head of the Shin Bet.

David Zini: Photo by Chaim Goldberg/Flash90 | Justice Asher Grunis: Photo by Hadas Parush/Flash90

In recent days, Prime Minister Netanyahu has advanced the candidacy of Major General (res.) David Zini for head of the Shin Bet to the Advisory Committee on Senior Civil Service Appointments (hereafter referred to as the Advisory Committee, or simply Committee). Here we provide an explanation of the Committee and its role, and present a brief discussion of issues related to the appointment of the next head of the Shin Bet.

What is the role of the Committee?

The main role of the Advisory Committee is to review (at the candidacy stage) appointments to seven of the most senior positions in the public service in Israel: the IDF chief of staff, the police commissioner, the head of the Shin Bet, the head of the Mossad, the commissioner of prisons, the governor of the Bank of Israel, and the deputy governor of the Bank of Israel. The Committee’s role is to assess candidates put forward by ministers (for example, the prime minister in the case of the head of the Shin Bet), to formulate an opinion on whether the proposed appointment is appropriate in terms of ethical integrity, and to recommend to the government whether or not the appointment should be made.

The Committee also has a role in removing these senior officials from their position before the end of their term of office, and we will address this briefly below.

Why and when was the Advisory Committee established?

The Committee was initially established in 1997, as one of the lessons learned from the Bar-On-Hebron affair, in which it was revealed that some of the senior appointments in the public service in Israel, which are exempt from a public tender process, do not undergo any review before being submitted to the government for approval. As a result, Prime Minister Netanyahu ordered the establishment of a ministerial team that would submit recommendations for regulations concerning senior appointments.

In June 1997, the government adopted the team’s recommendations and resolved to establish a new appointments committee for senior positions in the civil service.Government Resolution 2225, June 20, 1997. The government resolution stated that this committee would review appointments that were submitted for government approval and were not examined in any other orderly process, and explicitly named six of the most senior positions—the IDF chief of staff, the police commissioner, the head of the Shin Bet, the head of the Mossad, the commissioner of prisons, and the governor of the Bank of Israel.Government Resolution 4891, March 7, 1999. The resolution noted that the committee should also assess candidates for the position of attorney general until such time as a separate appointment procedure was drawn up. This procedure was adopted by government resolution in 2000 (Government Resolution 2274, August 20, 2000), before the Committee held this role. However, at this stage, the Committee also reviewed other appointments.

In 1999, a resolution was passed that created the Committee in its current form.Government Resolution 1191, December 30, 2001. It stipulated that the Committee would review only the six senior appointments mentioned earlier, and in 2001 the government decided to add the position of deputy governor of the Bank of Israel to this list. Later government resolutions—most recently in 2024Government Resolution 1725, April 30, 2024.—slightly altered the composition of the Committee, its powers, and its methods.

What is the composition of the Committee and how are its members appointed?

The committee currently comprises four members, and a quorum of three members, including the chairperson, is required in order for meetings to be held.A separate question from that regarding the quorum concerns the possibility of the Committee operating with a partial composition; that is, can the Committee operate at all if not all of its members have been appointed? This question was relevant during 2025, when for a time there was not even an acting civil service commissioner. According to administrative law, the default position is that a committee cannot operate with a partial composition, that is, if not all of its members have been appointed, unless explicitly stated otherwise in the legislation that grants the committee its powers. The government resolution from 2018 states that: “Meetings of committees that have four members may also be held in the presence of three members, including the chair of the committee.” This provision explicitly relates to the quorum, not to the issue of partial composition. Therefore, since the relevant legislation does not state otherwise, the Committee cannot operate unless four representatives have been appointed to it. The members are:

• A chairperson, who is a retired Supreme Court justice, appointed by the government (following consultation with the attorney general) for a single term of six years. The committee is currently chaired by former Supreme Court President Asher Grunis (appointed in 2024).
• The civil service commissioner. Currently, Prof. Daniel Hershkowitz is the acting commissioner.
• Two other public figures, who, like the chairperson, are appointed by the government, after consultation with the attorney general, for a single term of six years. Since 2018, these public figures have been Talia Einhorn and Moshe Tery (they will end their terms in 2026, because at the time of the government resolution on appointments, the length of their term of office was set at eight years). The government resolutions do not set criteria for appointing public figures to the Committee, but some general guidelines and procedures do exist, such as those set by the attorney general.For example, Attorney General Guidelines, Guideline No. 1.1502, “Appointment and Composition of Advisory Public Committees and Their Working Methods". For example, these guidelines include a requirement for appropriate representation of women. Indeed, since 2010, the two public figures on the Committee have always been a woman and a man. The guidelines and procedures also include restrictions on the appointment of members who have a business, personal, or political affiliation with members of the government.

Over the years, there have been several “incidents” that have led to public figures being forced or electing to relinquish their membership of the Committee for various reasons. For example, in 2018, Jacob Nagel and Iris Stark were appointed as public representatives on the Committee, but a petition was filed with the High Court of Justice against their appointments, alleging strong ties between them and government members, as well as defects in their own integrity. The Court issued an order nisi and an interim order, effectively suspending the Committee’s work, after which Nagel and Stark resigned.HCJ 4184/18, TLM Anti-Corruption Movement v. Government of Israel et al. (September 6, 2018).

In fact, we are currently in the midst of such an incident once again: Talia Einhorn has announced that she will not participate in the process of appointing the next head of the Shin Bet, in light of the fact that her son is Yisrael (Srulik) Einhorn, whose name has been linked to some of the recent security scandals in the Prime Minister’s Office.

What does the Committee check regarding proposed appointments?

The Committee’s role here is to provide an opinion "regarding the integrity of the appointment, in order to ensure that improper appointments are not made, inter alia, for reasons such as personal affiliation, business affiliation, or political affiliation with a government minister".Government Resolution 3839, May 27, 2018. In other words, the Committee must examine the suitability of the appointment from an ethical standpoint, rather than assessing the candidate’s suitability and qualifications for the position. In this regard, it differs from other appointment committees, such as the Civil Service Commission Appointments Committee; this Committee, which examines (among other things) appointments of directors general of government ministries, is also required to examine the suitability of candidates for the position in question. The same is true of the committee responsible for examining appointments to government companies.

However, according to a ruling by the High Court of Justice,HCJ 1570/07, Ometz—Citizens for Proper Administration and Social Justice in Israel v. Minister of Internal Security et al. (February 25, 2007). the concept of "integrity" should be interpreted broadly as referring to:

1. The integrity of the appointment and the person making it. In other words, the purpose of the Committee is to ensure that the appointment is made based on proper considerations of the public interest, and not, for example, because of any relationship between the appointee and the appointer.
2. The integrity of the appointee. In other words, the Committee’s purpose is also to ensure that a person whose ethical integrity is flawed is not appointed.
3. All other aspects relating to ethical integrity. The High Court of Justice also emphasized the importance of the Committee’s powers of administrative review, which may be broader than those of judicial review.

In this context, it should be noted that over the years, even more “expansive” interpretations of the Committee’s role have been given. Thus, the former chairman Justice Turkel was of the opinion that the Committee may even recommend against appointing a candidate on the grounds of their extreme unsuitability for the position—because if an attempt is being made to appoint such a person, this necessarily indicates that their candidacy was not put forward due to proper considerations of the public interest, but rather due to extraneous considerations, and therefore constitutes an unethical act. In another context, Talia Einhorn opposed the appointment of Herzi Halevi as IDF chief of staff in 2022 due to the timing of the appointment—during an election period.

How does the Committee work and how are its decisions made regarding appointments?

According to the government resolution, the prime minister or the minister proposing the appointment names the candidate at least 30 days before the end of the outgoing official’s term of office. When the candidate’s name is submitted to the Committee, the prime minister or the proposing minister provides the Committee with the candidate’s resume and completed candidacy questionnaire, and also gives the reasoning behind the appointment. As part of the review process, the Committee issues a public notice regarding the appointment and sets a period of up to seven days during which the public can submit responses; interviews the prime minister or the proposing minister, the candidate, and any other person it deems appropriate to summon; and upon completion of its review, forwards its findings to the candidate and allows them to respond. The Committee is also given a legal opinion regarding the appointment by the attorney general, who also contacts institutions such as the police, the Israel Money Laundering Authority (IMPA), and so on. Under Chairperson Goldberg, the Committee even used a polygraph for the first time, when examining Moshe Edri’s candidacy for police commissioner in 2018.

The Appointments Committee comprises four members, and a quorum of three members is required in order for meetings to be held. In the event that opinions in the Committee are equally divided, the Committee chairperson is empowered to cast the deciding vote. As far as is known, the only time such an incident occurred was when the Committee decided against the appointment of Moshe Edri as police commissioner in 2018 (see below).

Is the Committee’s decision the final word?

Like other appointment committees, formally the Advisory Committee is not an “appointing committee,” but rather a “recommending committee.” Its role is to provide a positive or negative opinion on the appointment, but not to “approve” it or “strike it down.” However, according to the rulings of the High Court of Justice and to the relevant procedures relating to other appointments committees, the work and decision of the Appointments Committee constitute a substantial stage in the appointment process, and exceptional circumstances are required for its recommendation to be ignored.See, for example, Civil Service Commissioner Guidelines, Guideline No. 1.3, “Policy on the Work of the Appointments Committee". In any event, this issue has not yet been put to the test in practice: After the Advisory Committee recommended not to appoint Edri as police commissioner, the minister of national security and other members of the government indicated that they intended to submit the appointment for the approval of the government, but this step was not carried out.

What is the role of the Committee in ending the term of office of senior officials?

In its May 2025 judgment in the Ronen Bar case, the High Court of Justice ruled that on the basis of a government resolution from 2016,Government Resolution 1148, February 14, 2016. a recommendation from the Advisory Committee is required before removing the head of the Shin Bet from office before the end of their term of office, and for removing other senior officials appointed after receiving the recommendation of the Advisory Committee.HCJ 54321-03-25, Movement for Quality Government in Israel et al. v. Government of Israel et al. (May 21, 2025). It also struck down an earlier government resolution, passed in March 2025, that exempted the government from this obligation;Government Resolution 2904, March 20, 2025. the High Court ruled that this government resolution was arbitrary and was made without a preliminary discussion, and thus could not supersede previous decisions that gave the Advisory Committee a role in ending the term of senior officials.

Due to Ronen Bar’s own decision to resign as head of the Shin Bet, in this case there was no need for the Advisory Committee to be asked for its recommendation on the matter (and therefore all the details of the procedure that was supposed to be carried out by the Committee were not clarified).

The character of the Committee

Essentially, this is a fairly convenient Committee for the government, for several reasons: historically, the Committee approves the vast majority of candidates without special problems; the Committee’s role is relatively restricted (certainly in comparison to other appointment committees), as it only looks at issues of ethical integrity and does not examine suitability for the position; and currently, it is the government that appoints all the members of the Committee. Indeed, the government directly appointed all the members who are discussing the appointment of the next head of the Shin Bet, without any competitive process: Committee chairperson Asher Grunis (who met the requirement for a retired Supreme Court justice to be appointed as chairperson), public representative Moshe Tery (as well as Talia Einhorn, who is not participating in this process), and Acting Civil Service Commissioner Daniel Hershkowitz.

Notes on the review of David Zini’s candidacy

The procedure for appointing David Zini as head of the Shin Bet is unusual in several respects (one of which has already been mentioned—the fact that Einhorn, one of the Committee members, is not participating in discussions of the appointment).

As early as May 21, 2025, immediately after the High Court of Justice ruling on the removal of former Shin Bet head Ronen Bar, the Attorney General informed the Prime Minister that he must refrain from taking any step to appoint the next head of the Shin Bet, in light of the ruling and the Court’s clarification that he was in conflict of interest, due to the ongoing investigations against staff in the Prime Minister’s Office relating to the Qatari funding affair and to leaks to the German newspaper Bild. However, the very next day, the Prime Minister declared that he intended to appoint Zini, and on May 26, 2025, the government passed a resolution in principle supporting this step.

The formal opinion provided by the Deputy Attorney General (for public-administrative law) on May 26, 2025, which was adopted by the Attorney General, stated that the authority to propose candidacy for this position should be transferred to another minister, that the appointment process should begin anew, and that significant guarantees should be put in place so as to ensure due process. The Advisory Committee chairperson, former Supreme Court President Grunis, announced on June 3, 2025, that he would act in accordance the Attorney General's instructions, unless the Supreme Court were to decide that these instructions were incorrect. Subsequently, petitions were submitted to the High Court of Justice on the matter, and as part of a compromise between the parties, which the Court announced in a decision of July 13, 2025, it was agreed that the Prime Minister would notify the Advisory Committee of his candidate for the position on September 11, 2025 – as indeed happened; that in the public notification to be published by the Advisory Committee, the public would be given five days to respond instead of seven days, as in the case of “regular” appointments (the cutoff point for public responses specified by the Committee in its announcement was midnight on September 17, 2025); and that the incoming head of the Shin Bet would not be involved in the Qatargate and Bild investigations, until this matter is resolved by the Attorney General within the framework of a conflict-of-interest arrangement.

When the Advisory Committee reviews Zini’s candidacy, it must look at all relevant aspects and conduct an in-depth and broad examination, rather than limiting itself to a “lean” examination of the legality of the appointment. As the Supreme Court ruled regarding the work of the Advisory Committee:

The main role of the Advisory Committee is, therefore, to examine the proposed appointment in terms of ethical integrity in the broad sense of this concept, in terms of the person proposed for the position, in terms of the appointing body, and regarding any other possible aspect that may relate to the question of ethical integrity involved in the appointment. This broad interpretation of the mandate of the Advisory Committee stems from the wording of the government resolution and from the purpose and objectives for which the Committee was established. This interpretation is consistent with the approach that emphasizes the importance of administrative review as a highly important means of in-depth and thorough examination of the issue under discussion (Zamir, The Administrative Authority, vol. 2, pp. 641–642). Administrative review may be even broader than judicial review, which focuses, by its nature, on examining whether decisions contained a legal flaw.HCJ 1570/07, Ometz—Citizens for Proper Administration and Social Justice in Israel v. Minister of Internal Security et al. (February 25, 2007).

In light of the above, the Advisory Committee has to pay special attention to the following aspects:

Regarding the integrity of the candidate, it has to address various issues from recent months, including Zini’s “silence” when the prime minister advanced his appointment in complete contradiction to the opinion of the Attorney General, which he should have seen as reflecting the existing law, until the court ruling.HCJ 6198/23, Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. Minister of Defense (June 25, 2024). This silence can be interpreted as agreement to a step taken against the opinion of the Attorney General, in a manner that contradicts the principles of the rule of law. Another issue concerns allegations that while still serving in the IDF, Zini concealed from the chief of staff (among others) his contacts with the prime minister regarding the latter’s intention to appoint him head of the Shin Bet.

Regarding the integrity of the appointer and the appointment, the Committee has to address the question of the Prime Minister's conflict of interest in appointing Zini, because acting while in conflict of interest is a clear violation of ethical integrity.

In this context, it is important to note that in the opinion issued by the Deputy Attorney General on May 26, 2025, he made clear that the Prime Minister's announcement of David Zini as his preferred candidate was marred by considerable flaws, and that as a result there is a danger that the procedure has been tainted, and thus “it is doubtful whether it will be possible to appoint Major General Zini to the position” (even in the framework of the alternative procedure he proposed, in which responsibility for the appointment would be transferred to another minister). It should also be noted that in its ruling of July 13, 2025 regarding the candidacy of Major General Zini, the High Court’s explicitly referred to the parties’ agreement that the Advisory Committee would examine Zini’s candidacy in accordance with the existing law. This includes the case law quoted here regarding the scope of the Committee’s review of issues of integrity, which may also be broader than judicial review, which focuses only on legal defects. While the ruling states that the prime minister can be involved in the appointment of the head of the Shin Bet, it does not legitimize the appointment of David Zini specifically, especially in light of the sequence of events detailed here.

When the Committee examines all these issues, it is important that it bears in mind the significance of the role of head of the Shin Bet. The General Security Service Law, 5762-2002, states that while the Shin Bet is subordinate to the government, it is a non-political body, one of whose functions is to protect democratic order (section 7(b)(1): “... thwarting and preventing illegal activity aimed at damaging the security of the state, the order of the democratic regime or its institutions”), and emphasizes that it should not be used for political and partisan purposes. The wording of the HCJ ruling regarding the removal of Ronen Bar as head of the Shin Bet noted the duty of the head of the Shin Bet to the public, the fact that he is a "clear gatekeeper",HCJ 54321-03-25, Movement for Quality Government in Israel et al. v. Government of Israel et al. (May 21, 2025), section 44 of the ruling issued by Justice Amit. the enormous dangers inherent in the misuse of the Shin Bet’s powers, and the fact that one of the main duties of the head of the Shin Bet is to "ensure the independence of the service".Ibid., section 38 of the ruling issued by Justice Amit.