The Ministry of Justice Pardons Dept. on Netanyahu's Clemency Request
The Pardons Department in the Ministry of Justice writes that they cannot determine the President of the State has the authority to pardon Prime Minister Netanyahu, nor can they recommend the extraordinary and far-reaching step of doing so.
Photo by Yonatan Sindel/FLASH90
In December 2025, Prime Minister Netanyahu requested a presidential pardon for his ongoing criminal trial.
On March 9, the Pardons Department of the Ministry of Justice, which is the body to which pardon requests are referred at the first stage, submitted its opinion on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's pardon request. The request was transferred to Heritage Minister Amichai Eliyahu after Justice Minister Yariv Levin decided to transfer responsibility for handling it to Minister Eliyahu.
A review of the lengthy and detailed opinion reveals five central conclusions.
- An exceptional request
The department first emphasizes that this is an exceptionally unusual request because it concerns a pardon before conviction and in the midst of ongoing criminal proceedings. Under these circumstances, and without precedent, the President cannot rely on an agreed factual or legal foundation. The institution of pardon cannot replace a judicial body responsible for examining and ruling on factual and legal claims.
- No precedent in Israeli law
Netanyahu’s request to exercise the pardon power by terminating the ongoing criminal proceedings without admitting to any criminal wrongdoing has no precedent in Israeli law. The general rule is that a pardon is granted alongside an admission of wrongdoing, or at the very least with clear indications of such acknowledgment.
- The Bus 300 precedent does not apply
The central characteristics of the pardon granted in the “Bus 300 Affair,” to which virtually everyone refers since it was the case in which a pre-conviction pardon was granted, are not present in the case before us.
It is worth examining these characteristics in detail, as they constitute the existing legal framework for granting a pardon prior to conviction.
(a) In the Bus 300 Affair there was an admission of wrongdoing. In the Netanyahu case, there is no admission.
Before the justices in the Barzilai High Court of Justice (HCJ) case (the Bus 300 Affair), the admissions of the pardon petitioners regarding the acts attributed to them were on record. These admissions formed part of the factual basis and were explicitly addressed in the majority opinion. In that case, the majority opinion tied the pardon to an admission of wrongdoing. This stands in contrast to the starting point of Netanyahu’s request, which is that he denies his guilt and insists that the continuation of his trial would lead to a full acquittal.
- b) In the Bus 300 Affair there was no alternative remedy. In the Netanyahu case, there is an alternative remedy.
The pardon in the Bus 300 Affair was granted at a point in time when the Attorney General was not yet empowered to order a stay of proceedings (the authority to suspend a criminal case, which exists only after the filing of an indictment). The Netanyahu case is at the post-indictment stage, and therefore an alternative to exercising the pardon power exists: the Attorney General’s authority to order a stay of proceedings.
(c) In the Bus 300 Affair there was resignation from office. In the Netanyahu case, he seeks to continue in office.
In the Bus 300 Affair, the President made the pardon of the Shin Bet chief conditional on his resignation from the position. "It appears the President wished to ensure that the head of the service took responsibility for his actions, not merely in words… In Mr. Netanyahu’s case, the President is being asked to grant a pardon in order to 'ease the continuation of Mr. Netanyahu’s functioning and tenure as Prime Minister.'"
(d) In the Bus 300 Affair the trial had not yet begun. In the Netanyahu case, the proceedings are at a very advanced stage.
The pardon requests in the Bus 300 affair were submitted before the police investigation had begun. In the Netanyahu case, what is effectively being requested is the halting of a trial before a judicial ruling is reached. This would remove the criminal case from the hands of the judiciary and would severely undermine the principle of separation of powers and the foundations of democratic governance. "Moreover, granting a pardon at such an advanced stage of a case that has been heard over a number of years… could create a 'chilling effect' on the fight against governmental corruption."
(e) In the Bus 300 case there were no implications for other defendants. In Netanyahu’s case there are.
In the Bus 300 Affair, a pardon was granted to all those involved, and not a single one of them stood trial, such that the principle of equality was not undermined. In Netanyahu’s case, the trial of the others is expected to continue. A serious difficulty would then arise if, at the conclusion of the legal proceedings, the other co-defendants are found guilty. Since the offenses are "bilateral," meaning that the acts of both sides are complementary to one another, the implication would be that the Prime Minister did indeed commit the offenses but was not held accountable for them. This would constitute a genuine violation of the principle of equality before the law, which in turn amounts to a violation of the rule of law.
(f) In the Bus 300 case the public interest was broadly agreed upon. In Netanyahu’s case it is not.
In the Bus 300 affair, the central public interest underlying the pardon concerned a vital national security interest, namely the risk of exposing highly sensitive state secrets. The concern and the need to prevent such exposure were not disputed.
In Netanyahu’s case, by contrast, the request relies on a list of broad public interest considerations about which there is no broad consensus among the relevant parties.
- Serious doubt regarding the existence of the authority
The Pardons Department notes it is appropriate to act in accordance with the Supreme Court’s ruling in the Barzilai HCJ case, but it turns out that there is a profound difference between the circumstances of that case and the circumstances of Netanyahu’s pardon request. Accordingly, the opinion concludes that "there is a genuine difficulty in determining that the pardon authority established in Basic Law: The President of the State applies in the present case."
- Even if the authority did exist, it would be deeply problematic
The opinion adds that “even if we assume that the pardon authority applies to a case of this kind,” exercising it in the Prime Minister’s case could harm the principle of equality before the law. Given Netanyahu’s senior position, such a significant infringement of the principles of equality and separation of powers could seriously damage public trust in both the institution of clemency and the presidency itself. It could also deepen the divisions and polarization within Israeli society.
It is worth noting the phrase “even if we assume the authority applies.” The implication appears to be that it likely does not.
What Happens Now?
The next step is for the Attorney General to present her position. The Pardons Department’s opinion states that “should a position be submitted by the State Attorney’s Office or by the Attorney General prior to the President’s decision, we will update and supplement our opinion accordingly, so that these positions are also incorporated into the overall framework of considerations.”
Minister Eliyahu, to whom the Justice Minister transferred responsibility for the matter, is expected to forward both his position and the Pardons Department’s opinion to the President of the State.
In Summary
The Pardons Department writes to the President of the State that "we cannot determine" that you have the authority to pardon Netanyahu in this case, and also that "we cannot recommend" that you take the extraordinary and far-reaching step of a pardon by way of terminating the ongoing criminal proceedings against Mr. Netanyahu.
