Israeli Voice Index

Ahead of the Jewish New Year - National Mood Pessimistic

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Ahead of the Jewish New Year, 60% of Israelis define the national mood as "pessimistic." 52% of Jewish Israelis may skip their holiday meals if they include unvaccinated guests.

Main Findings

* For the first time since the measurements began, the rate of optimists about the future of Israeli democracy exceeds the rate of optimists about the future of national security. The decline is evident primarily in the right-wing camp.

* Although the prevailing assessment is that the national mood is pessimistic, the rate of those who see it that way is lower than last year and the rate of those viewing the national mood as optimistic is higher than before the previous Rosh Hashanah. Again, the right-wing camp tends more to assess the national mood as pessimistic, the left to view the national mood as optimistic.

* In the entire sample the prevailing assessment is that the coming year will be a little or a lot better than the preceding year. The distribution of opinions by political camps is similar to the previous question.

* The grade that the public as a whole gives the government for its handling of the current wave of COVID-19 is medium to low, with the Jews generally less kind to the government than the Arabs. At the same time, as expected, the grades given the government on the right are much lower than on the left and in the center.

* The most widespread position in the public is that the restrictions imposed on unvaccinated people are too light.

* A large majority reported that they had had all the vaccinations allowed according to their age and state of health.

* In light of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, the prevailing position among the Jewish public is that Israel should take into account the possibility that the United States will forsake its commitments to Israel. Among the Arabs the most common opinion is that there is no reason for such a fear because the US will not abandon Israel.

* Apart from the Jews in the left-wing camp and the Arabs, all the other groups oppose opening the country to even a limited number of refugees from Afghanistan whose lives are in danger.

* Slightly over half of the Jewish interviewees responded that the presence of unvaccinated people at the holiday table could cause them not to take part in the event. This rate is higher among the older age groups.

* A large majority of the Jewish public likes family meals for the holidays. Among the secular and those who located themselves on the left, the rate of those who like such events is lower than among the more religious groups and those in the center and on the right.

The National Mood

Each month we measure Israelis’ degree of optimism about the future of Israeli democracy and about the future of national security. This month, for the first time since we began the measurements in April 2019, the rate of optimists about the future of democracy (47%) exceeded the rate of optimists about the future of national security (44.5%). This reversal results from a gradual increase since May this year in the rate of optimism about the future of democracy and a gradual decrease since March 2021 in optimism about the future of national security.

Optimistic about the future of Israeli democracy and about the future of national security, April 2019─August 2021 (%, entire sample)

Most of the decline in the rate of optimists about the future of national security is in the right-wing camp (Jews). In March 2021 three-fourths of the right-wing camp responded that they were optimistic about the future of Israel’s national security compared to 39% today, and there is reason to assume that the drop is linked to the change of leadership. This period also saw a decline on the right in the degree of optimism about the future of democratic governance, though it was more moderate: from 52% to 40%. On the left and in the center, those months saw a large increase in optimism about the future of democratic governance (left: from 16% to 65%; center: from 29% to 63%). In these two camps only a slight change occurred in the rate of optimists about the future of national security (left: from 57.5% to 57%; center: from 62% to 57%).

Toward the New Year

As we saw, both regular indexes indicate that less than half are optimistic. So we asked directly: “At the start of the new Hebrew year, how would you define the ‘national mood’ at present?” The answers tend in the pessimistic direction though not extremely so. Note that when an identical question was asked before the previous Rosh Hashanah, the mood was a little more pessimistic (67% compared to 60% this year) and the rate of optimists was lower (25% vs. 32%):

At the start of the new Hebrew year, how would you define the “national mood” at present? (%, entire sample)

As the next diagram shows, more Arabs than Jews assess the national mood as optimistic and the left is much more optimistic than the center and the right, probably because of the change in leadership.

At the start of the new Hebrew year, how would you define the “national mood” at present? (%, Jews and Arabs and by political camp)

The outlook for the new year regarding the country as a whole

On this question the findings show a certain degree of optimism or a sense of stability. In the entire sample the highest rate, about a third, think the new year will be better than the one now ending while slightly fewer say it will be like the previous year – in other words, that it will not be worse.

How, in your opinion, will the new Hebrew year be in general from the standpoint of the country? (%, entire sample)

Here the Arabs are in fact less optimistic than the Jews, but they too do not foresee a deterioration. A segmentation by political camp (Jews) shows that the left is more optimistic than the center while the right is the least optimistic.

How, in your opinion, will the new Hebrew year be in general from the standpoint of the country? (%, Jews and Arabs, and by political camp)

COVID-19

Grading the Government

We asked: “What grade would you give the new government for its handling of the current wave of the COVID-19 pandemic on a scale from poor (1) to excellent (10)?” The average grade the government received is medium-low, 4.53, with 39% of the interviewees giving it a grade of poor (1-3) and only 16% assigning it a grade of very good (8-10). The average grade that the Jews give the government for its handling of COVID-19 (4.33) is substantially lower than the grade the Arabs give it (5.54).

A segmentation by political camp (Jews) reveals large disparities: while on the left and in the center the majority gives the government a positive grade (70% and 60% respectively), on the right a very large majority assigns it a negative grade (78%).

Average grade for the government for its handling of the current wave of the COVID-19 pandemic (average grade on a scale from 1=poor to 10=excellent, Jewish sample and Arab sample)

The Restrictions – Too Light or Too Heavy?

About half of the interviewees see the restrictions the current government is imposing on the unvaccinated as too light, while only 15% regard them as too heavy.

Are the restrictions the current government is imposing on those not vaccinated against COVID-19 too heavy or too light? (%, entire sample)

Whereas a majority of the Jews view the restrictions as too light (53%), only a third of the Arabs see them that way (32.5%). The most widespread answer in the Arab public is that the directives are appropriate (44%), compared to a quarter of the Jews who think so.

Are the restrictions the current government is imposing on those not vaccinated against COVID-19 too heavy or too light? (%, Jews and Arabs)

A segmentation of the Jewish public by age reveals that among older people (55+) and intermediate ages (35-54), the majority thinks the restrictions on unvaccinated people are too light (61% and 55% respectively). Only a minority of the young people aged 18-34, however, views those restrictions as too light (43%).

Vaccinations

Eighty-three percent of the interviewees responded that they had had all the vaccinations that their age and state of health allow, compared to 17% who said they had not been vaccinated. A segmentation by national group shows that 84% of the Jews and 74% of the Arabs said they had had all the vaccinations. These data are similar to the official reports on the rate of those getting vaccinated in Israel’s adult population.

We asked those who had not gotten vaccinated – why they had not done so. The chief reason the interviewees gave is a belief that the vaccinations cause damage to health (29%); another almost one-fourth responded that they “had not gotten around” to getting all the vaccinations (that is, they do not oppose it in principle); and about a fifth do not believe the vaccinations help to prevent COVID-19. On the reasons for not getting vaccinated, differences were not found between Jews and Arabs.

Why have you not gotten vaccinated? (%, entire sample, those who have not yet received all the vaccinations they are entitled to)

Among the interviewees who said they had not received all the vaccinations, 44% are under age 35. An analysis of the reasons for not getting vaccinated reveals gaps between the younger and the older by national group. Thus, the primary reason for not getting vaccinated among Jewish young people is the belief that the vaccinations cause damage to health (42%); while Arab young people responded that the main reason was that they had not gotten around to receiving all the vaccinations. Among the older Jews the main reason was that they had not gotten around to being vaccinated, while among the Arabs at their age level the reason was the belief that the vaccinations cause damage to health.

Why have you not gotten vaccinated? (%, Jewish sample and Arab sample, division by age)

    Believe that the vaccinations cause damage to health Have not gotten around to receiving all the vaccinations Do not believe that the vaccinations help prevent COVID-19 Believe that the vaccinations are only a result of economic/political interests Recovering Other Total
Up to 34 Jews 42 8 21 10.5 18 0.5 100
  Arabs 24 39 32 0 3 3 100
35 and older Jews  19 33 21 7 10 10 100
  Arabs 34 8.5 14 11 23 9.5 100

The US Withdrawal from Afghanistan

The US withdrawal from Afghanistan, even though it was anticipated, raised questions about America’s degree of commitment to its allies, a question that is also relevant to Israel even if in a different way. So we wanted to know whether, in the interviewees’ opinion, Israel should draw any conclusions from this American move. We found that in the Jewish sample, the rate of those who think Israel must take into account the possibility that the US will also withdraw from its commitments to Israel’s security exceeds the rate of those who see no reason for such a fear because the US is a true friend of Israel (49% vs. 36%).

In the Arab sample, the rate of those who see no reason for such a fear exceeds the rate of those who see a basis for it (38% vs. 25%; in the Arab sample the rate of “Don’t knows” was especially high – over a third). A segmentation by political camp shows that on the left and in the center, a higher percentage (on the left – a majority) regards the US as a true friend of Israel and hence sees no reason to fear that what occurred in Afghanistan will happen here as well. On the right, however, the majority says the possibility that the US will withdraw from its commitments to Israel must be taken into account.

Following the pullout of the American forces from Afghanistan and the clearing of the way for the Taliban, which of the two following claims do you agree with more: (a) Israel has to take into account the possibility that the US will also withdraw from its commitments to Israel’s security; (b) The US is a true friend of Israel and there is no reason to fear that it will withdraw from its commitments to Israel’s security. (%)

In light of what is happening in Afghanistan, there have been voices calling on the Israeli government to absorb a limited number of refugees from there whose lives are in danger. So we asked: “In your opinion, should or should not Israel absorb a limited number (up to 1,000) of political refugees from Afghanistan whose lives are in real danger because of the Taliban forces’ takeover of the country?”

In the entire sample, about two-thirds answered the question negatively. Among the Arabs the opposition to absorbing refugees is smaller than in the Jewish public. Among the Jews the left is more open to such a possibility than the right and the center. The less religious groups in the Jewish public are a little more open to this possibility, though in all the cases there is a majority of opponents.

Think Israel should not absorb refugees from Afghanistan (%)

Family Meals for the Holidays

Stay Away from the Holiday Meals?

We asked the Jewish interviewees whether the knowledge that their family’s holiday meals will include unvaccinated people could cause them to decide not to take part in those meals. Slightly over half of the respondents said this knowledge could cause them to stay away from these holiday meals (52%) while 43% said it would not affect their decision.

A segmentation by age reveals that, while among the younger people (up to age 44) a minority responded that they would forgo the holiday meals if they were to include unvaccinated people, a majority of the older people (age 45 and over) said they would do so.

The knowledge that their family’s holiday meals will include unvaccinated people could cause them to decide not to take part in those meals (%, Jewish sample by age)

A segmentation of the intention to take part in the holidays meals between those who have had all the vaccinations and those who have not reveals that, among the vaccinated, a majority (58%) said the knowledge that the holiday meals would include unvaccinated people could cause them not to come to the meals, compared to a large majority of unvaccinated people (71%) who said it would not affect their decision on whether to attend the meals.

Do You Like Family Meals?

This year as well, as in the previous inquiry in 2018, a majority of the Jewish public (82%) likes family meals for the holidays. As the following table shows, however, not all like them to the same extent: in the more religious groups and also in the center and on the right, people like such events more than on the left and among the secular (though in those groups too there is a majority that likes these events).

    Like family meals for the holidays (%)*
Self-placement on the Haredi-secular spectrum Haredi 97 (75)
  Religious 84 (58)
  Religious traditional 88 (55)
  Nonreligious traditional 86 (51)
  Secular 78 (35)
Political camp Left 72 (31)
  Center  78 (40)
  Right (54) 86

* In parentheses – the rate of those who “really like” family meals for the holidays.

The Israeli Voice Index for August 2021 was prepared by the Viterbi Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research of the Israel Democracy Institute. In the survey, which was conducted on the internet and by telephone (supplements of groups that are not sufficiently represented on the network) from August 23 to 26, 2021, 602 men and women were interviewed in Hebrew and 155 in Arabic, constituting a representative national sample of the entire adult population of Israel aged 18 and older. The maximum sampling error for the entire sample was 3.59%± at a confidence level of 95%. The fieldwork was done by the Midgam Institute. For the full data file see: Data Israel.