Most Arab Israelis: October 7 Attack Does Not Reflect Islamic, Palestinian, or Arab Society Values
Public Opinion Survey of Arab Society in Israel on the War in Gaza November–December 2023
Some two-thirds of Arab citizens of Israel feel part of the state and its problems. More than half (56%) agree with a statement by MK Mansour Abbas that the Hamas attack on October 7 does not reflect Arab society and Islamic values, and 86.5% support helping out with civilian volunteering efforts during the war. At the same time, 71% do not feel comfortable expressing themselves freely on social media, 84% are worried about their physical security, and 86% are worried about their economic security.
Photo by: Levi Meir Clancy
This survey of public opinion in Arab society in Israel on the war in Gaza was conducted by the Center for Democratic Values and Institutions (Arab Society in Israel Program) in collaboration with the Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute. Data collection was carried out between November 27 and December 4, 2023, with 538 men and women interviewed by telephone in Arabic. The maximum sampling error was ±4.31% at a confidence level of 95%. Field work was carried out by Afkar Research Ltd. headed by Dr. Hisham Jubran.
Topics covered in this report:
- Feeling of belonging to the state
- Support for assisting with civilian volunteering efforts during the war
- The extent to which the October 7 attack by Hamas reflects the values of Islam and Arab society in Israel
- Awareness of and adherence to emergency instructions from the IDF Home Front Command
- Worries about personal and familial physical security and economic security
- Performance assessments for various institutions since the beginning of the war
- Sense of assurance in various settings since the beginning of the war
- Relations with Jewish friends and acquaintances
- Responsibility for harm to Palestinian civilians who were not involved in the fighting against Israel
Note on methodology: We analyzed the data from the survey using variables such as religion, vote in the 2022 Knesset elections, gender, age, area of residency, education level, and income. In this report we present only those breakdowns of data in which we found statistically significant or notable differences between the different sub-groups. We found the variables of education level and income to be congruent, and thus in certain cases we present analyses by education level and in others by income.
We asked respondents about the extent to which they feel part of the State of Israel and its problems. Around two-thirds (65%) said that they do feel this way—a finding that continues and reinforces the trend for a growing sense of belonging observed in a November 2023 survey,[1] in which 70% of Arab respondents reported that they feel part of the State of Israel and its problems. This stands in contrast to findings from previous years, when no more than half of the Arab public felt this way.
To what extent do you feel part of Israel and its problems? (%)
Breaking down responses by religion reveals that a sizable majority in all three groups feel part of the State of Israel. This majority is largest among Druze respondents (80%), followed by Christians (73%) and Muslims (62%).
Similarly, a breakdown by vote in the 2022 Knesset elections produces a considerable majority who feel part of Israel and its problems among the various groups of voters, with the exception of a (large) minority of Balad voters (Zionist party voters, 84%; Ra’am voters, 69%; Hadash-Ta’al voters, 64%; Balad voters, 43%).
Analysis by age group shows that the older the respondents, the more strongly they feel part of the State of Israel and its problems (18–34, 57%; 35–54, 68%; 55+, 76%). We further found that this feeling is more widely present among those with a lower level of education than those with a higher level of education (up to partial secondary with no matriculation certificate, 75%; full secondary with matriculation certificate, 71%; post-secondary and partial academic, 59%; academic education, 54.5%).
Finally, we broke down responses to this question by area of residence and found a stronger sense of belonging among residents of the Negev (73%) and of mixed cities (71%) than among residents of the Galilee (64%) and the Triangle[2] (60%). This finding may be due to the fact that Negev residents are closest to the war in Gaza, and that Arab residents of Israel’s mixed cities are in close daily interaction with Jews.
We asked respondents whether they support or oppose the participation of Arab citizens of Israel in civilian volunteering efforts during the war, such as helping evacuees and providing medical assistance. A very large majority expressed their support for such participation (86.5%).
Support or oppose assisting with civilian volunteering efforts during the war (%)
We found a large majority of supporters in all sub-groups. At the same time, younger respondents express less support than older respondents (18–34, 79%; 35–54, 90%; 55+, 96%). There was also slightly less support among Balad voters relative to voters for other parties (Balad voters, 75%; Hadash-Ta’al voters, 93%; Ra’am voters, 92%; Zionist party voters, 88%).
We asked our interviewees for their response to the recent statement by the head of the Ra’am party, MK Mansour Abbas, that Hamas’s actions on October 7 “do not reflect Arab society, the Palestinian people, and the Islamic nation.” More than half expressed agreement with this assertion. A breakdown by religion reveals that the proportion of Druze and Christians who agree with Abbas’s comments (69.5% and 68%, respectively) is larger than the equivalent proportion of Muslims (53%).
Agree or disagree that the October 7 attack by Hamas does not reflect the values of Islam and Arab society in Israel (by religion; %)
We analyzed the responses to the question according to vote in the 2022 Knesset elections, and discovered that only a minority of Balad voters (39%) agree with Abbas’s statement, compared with a majority of Hadash-Ta’al voters and Ra’am voters (65% and 66%, respectively). We found even stronger agreement among those who voted for Zionist parties (76%). We also found that men agree more with this assertion than do women (61.5% versus 50.5%, respectively) and that those with above-average incomes (68%) agree more than those with average incomes (58%) and below-average incomes (55%).
The respondents were asked whether they are familiar with the instructions from the IDF Home Front Command about what to do in an emergency (for example, when a siren sounds), and whether they follow them. A very large majority (86.5%) said that they are familiar with these instructions, and a smaller majority of around 60% reported that they always follow them.
Are you familiar with the instructions from the IDF Home Front Command about what to do in an emergency (for example, when a siren sounds), and do you follow them? (%)
A breakdown of responses to this question by religion reveals that a majority of each of the three religious groups answered this question in the affirmative, though the share of Druze who always follow the Home Front Command instructions (74%) is higher than the equivalent proportion of Christians (61%) and Muslims (58%). This may well be because the large majority of Druze men serve in the IDF and likely have a higher awareness of instructions from the Home Front Command and how to conduct themselves during an emergency.
Older respondents are more likely to always follow emergency instructions than their younger counterparts (18–34, 51%; 35–54, 65%; 55+, 70%).
We further found that women are more likely than men to always follow these instructions (64% compared with 55%, respectively), and that those with a non-academic level of education are more likely to do so than those with an academic education (up to partial secondary education with no matriculation certificate, 61%; full secondary with matriculation certificate, 63%; post-secondary and partial academic, 61%; academic education, 54%).
Finally, we also analyzed the responses to this question by area of residence and discovered that Negev residents are most likely to always follow the Home Front Command instructions. The discrepancy between Arab residents of the Negev and Arab residents of the Galilee likely stems from the fact that the former are on the frontlines of the war in Gaza. Since the outbreak of the war, 20 Bedouin residents of the Negev have been killed by rocket fire from Gaza. In addition, the Bedouin villages in the south have a severe lack of protective structures in which to shelter from rocket attacks.
Are you familiar with the instructions from the IDF Home Front Command about what to do in an emergency (for example, when a siren sounds), and do you follow them? (by area of residence; %)
We repeated a question that was featured in previous IDI surveys,[3] about the extent to which interviewees are worried about their and their family’s physical and economic security. We found an increase in the level of concern relative to previous measurements. Interestingly, worries about both these issues actually declined among Jewish respondents between mid-October and the end of November: physical security from 63% to 46%; and economic security from 57% to 50.5%.
Worried about the future of their and their family’s physical security and economic security (%)
A similarly high degree of concern was found in all the sub-groups we assessed (religion, area of residence, age, level of education, income, sex, and vote in the 2022 Knesset elections). However, women are more worried than men about both their physical security and their economic security. One explanation for this may lie in the fact that Arab women face much more complex employment challenges, featuring various social, cultural, and political aspects. The lack of employment opportunities open to them, and the difficulties experienced by many companies as a result of the war, will presumably make it even harder for Arab women to find employment and to ensure their and their family’s economic future.
We also broke down responses to this question by vote in the 2022 elections and found that voters for Arab parties (Hadash-Ta’al, Ra’am, and Balad) expressed more worry than voters for Zionist parties.
In addition, we found differences by income: Regarding both physical and economic security, respondents with below-average and average incomes are more worried about the future than are respondents with above-average incomes.
Worried about the future of their and their family’s physical security and economic security (by vote in the 2022 Knesset elections and by income; %)
We asked interviewees for their assessment of the functioning of five institutions since the war began: the Hadash-Ta’al party, the Ra’am party, the municipality or local authority where they live, the Israel Police, and the Arabic-language Israeli media.
Around half the interviewees rated the performance of all these institutions as somewhat poor or poor, and only a quarter or less graded them as good or excellent.
On a scale of 1 = poor to 5 = excellent, what grade would you give each of the following institutions for their functioning since the beginning of the war? (%)
Breaking down the respondents’ assessments of Hadash-Ta’al and Ra’am by vote in the 2022 Knesset elections reveals that just over one-third (36%) of Hadash-Ta’al voters rated their party’s functioning as good or excellent, a view shared by around a quarter of voters for Zionist parties and an even smaller share of voters for the other Arab parties. In the case of Ra’am, around half of the voters for that party rated its performance as good or excellent (48%), as did around a third of voters for Zionist parties and a smaller minority of voters for the other Arab parties.
On a scale of 1 = poor to 5 = excellent, what grade would you give the Hadash-Ta’al and Ra’am political parties for their functioning since the beginning of the war? (by vote in the 2022 Knesset elections; %)
A breakdown of responses to these questions by religion shows that the share of Druze who rated as good or excellent the performance of most of these institutions (excepting the political parties, regarding which no meaningful differences emerged) was larger than the equivalent shares of Christians and Muslims (municipalities and local authorities: Druze, 38%; Christians, 21.5%; Muslims, 23%; Israel Police: Druze, 39%; Christians, 26%; Muslims, 20%; Arabic-language Israeli media: Druze 38%; Christians, 22%; Muslims, 24%).
Analyzing the grades given to the Israel Police by education level finds that the proportion of those with a lower level of education who rate the police’s performance as good or excellent is greater than that of those with a higher level of education (up to partial secondary education with no matriculation certificate, 26%; full secondary with matriculation certificate, 30.5%; post-secondary and partial academic, 20%; academic education, 16.5%).
Regarding the functioning of municipalities and local authorities, while no significant differences emerged between regions, it was evident that residents of mixed cities were more likely to rate their municipality’s performance as good or excellent than were residents of other areas (mixed cities, 31%; Triangle, 25%; Negev, 24%; Galilee, 23%). This might be because the level of municipal services provided in mixed cities is higher than in Arab localities.
We presented four social situations to our interviewees: entering Jewish or mixed localities for work or to run errands; expressing oneself freely on social media; speaking Arabic when around Jews, such as on public transport or next to unfamiliar people; and contacting relatives and friends in Gaza and in the West Bank.[4],[5] We asked them whether, since the beginning of the war, they feel comfortable in each situation. Regarding two of the scenarios—expressing oneself on social media and contacting relatives and friends in Gaza and the West Bank—we found that a large majority do not feel comfortable. Regarding entering Jewish or mixed localities for work or to run errands, a small majority of respondents report feeling uncomfortable. By contrast, around half say they feel comfortable speaking Arabic around Jews or unfamiliar people, and a lower proportion say they feel uncomfortable doing so.
Since the beginning of the war, do you feel comfortable in each of the following situations? (%)
As stated, around half our respondents reported feeling comfortable speaking Arabic around Jews since the beginning of the war. However, this is a lower percentage than found in previous surveys in which we asked a similar question (2017, 71%; 2019, 84%; 2023, 76%).[6] It is reasonable to assume that this decline stems from a higher fear among sections of the Arab public of getting into violent confrontations with Jewish Israelis in public spaces, given that tensions are high because of the war.
We broke down responses to these questions by religion, sex, and vote in the 2022 Knesset elections and found that the share of respondents who do not feel comfortable entering Jewish or mixed localities for work, speaking Arabic around Jews, and expressing themselves on social media is higher among Muslims and lower among Druze, higher among women than among men and higher among voters for Arab parties (Hadash-Ta’al, Ra’am, and Balad) than among Zionist party voters.
Since the beginning of the war, do not feel comfortable in each of the following situations (by religion, sex, and vote in the 2022 Knesset elections; %)
Interestingly, the majority of interviewees (71%) reported that they do not feel comfortable expressing themselves freely on social media. Presumably, this is due to the fact that since the outbreak of the war, there has been a noticeable rise in the number of complaints made and charges brought by law enforcement agencies for the offense of incitement.
On this topic, we found that a higher share of younger respondents than of older respondents feel uncomfortable (18–34, 75%; 35–54, 71%; 55+, 64%), and that the higher the level of education, the more widespread the lack of comfort with expressing themselves on social media (up to partial secondary education with no matriculation certificate, 67%; full secondary with matriculation certificate, 68%; post-secondary and partial academic, 75%; academic education, 77%).
Regarding discomfort with contacting relatives and friends in Gaza and the West Bank, among relevant respondents [7] (i.e., those who have friends and relatives in Gaza and the West Bank), we only found meaningful differences between the sexes: women, more than men, do not feel comfortable making such contact (84% versus 66%, respectively).
We asked: “Since the outbreak of the war, what has happened to your relations with Jewish friends and acquaintances?” Some three-quarters of all respondents said they have relations with Jews (74%), and of these, the overwhelming majority (78%) reported that there has not been any change in these relations. A small minority (15.5%) said that relations have worsened, and an even smaller minority (5.5%) that they have improved.
Since the outbreak of the war, what has happened to your relations with Jewish friends and acquaintances? (respondents who have relations with Jews; %)
We broke down responses to this question by religion, vote in the 2022 Knesset elections, and area of residence, and found that across all sub-groups, a majority of interviewees say that their relations with Jews have not changed since the outbreak of the war. However, a higher proportion of Muslims reported a worsening of their relations with Jews than Christians and Jews. Relative to voters for Arab parties, more Zionist party voters say that their relations with Jews have improved since the war began. And the share of residents of the Galilee and the Triangle who noted that their relations with Jews have worsened is larger than the equivalent share of residents of the Negev and of mixed cities.
Since the outbreak of the war, what has happened to your relations with Jewish friends and acquaintances? (respondents who have relations with Jews, by religion, vote in the 2022 Knesset elections, and area of residence; %)
We asked: “During the war, Palestinian civilians in the Gaza Strip who were not involved in the fighting against Israel have also been harmed. In your opinion, who is most responsible for this harm to civilians?” Interestingly, the majority opinion on this issue is that Hamas and Israel are equally responsible for the harm inflicted on civilians.
Who is most responsible for harm to Palestinian civilians in the Gaza Strip who were not involved in fighting against Israel? (%)
A breakdown by religion finds that a higher share of Druze and of Christians than of Muslims attribute responsibility to Hamas. Looking at vote in the 2022 Knesset elections, we see that a majority of voters for Arab parties think that Hamas and Israel are equally responsible for the harm caused to civilians, while half of the voters for Zionist parties hold Hamas responsible. Breaking down responses by income reveals that around a quarter of those with above-average incomes consider Hamas to be responsible, compared with lower shares of those with average and below-average incomes. Meanwhile, among those with below average income and average income, a majority think that Israel and Hamas share equal responsibility for the harm to civilians, and about half of those with above average income think the same.
Who is most responsible for harm to Palestinian civilians in the Gaza Strip who were not involved in fighting against Israel? (by religion, vote in the 2022 Knesset elections, and income; %)
We cross-referenced the responses to this question with the responses to the question of the sense of belonging to the State of Israel and its problems. Among both those who feel part of the state of Israel and those who do not, we found a majority put equal responsibility on Hamas and the State of Israel/the IDF. However, among those who feel part of the State of Israel and its problems, a larger proportion place the responsibility on Hamas than among those who do not feel this way. Those who do not feel part of the state of Israel, on the other hand, place responsibility on the State of Israel/the IDF at a higher rate.
Who is most responsible for harm to Palestinian civilians in the Gaza Strip who were not involved in fighting against Israel? (by feeling part of the State of Israel and its problems; %)
Overall, the survey findings paint a complex picture of the atmosphere in Arab society during the war and highlight the differences between the residents of various regions throughout Israel. The discrepancies found, then, are often more geographical than political. This survey was conducted during a particularly sensitive period which has seen changes in the social behavior of the Arab public in Israel. It will be important to assess these questions again at different periods over time.
[1] War in Gaza Survey conducted by the Viterbi Center between November 5–6, 2023.
[2] The Triangle is an area in central Israel with a largely Arab population, including the major Arab towns of Tayibe, Tira, Baqa al-Gharbiyye, and Umm el-Fahm.
[3] War in Gaza Survey (conducted October 18–19, 2023) and Israeli Voice Index November 2023 (November 27–30, 2023).
[4] With regard to contacting relatives and friends in Gaza and in the West Bank, it should be noted that 57% of respondents said that this question was not relevant to them (they do not have relatives and/or friends in those areas), and thus for the purposes of our analysis, we have chosen to present findings only for those respondents who said that the question was relevant in their case.
[5] In another question in this survey, we asked interviewees directly whether they have first- or second-degree relatives in the West Bank and/or in Gaza. Only 8% responded in the affirmative, a much lower percentage than found in the past (19% in the 2023 Conditional Partnership report). This may be due to interviewees’ unease during wartime of saying that they have relatives in the West Bank and/or Gaza.
[6] A Conditional Partnership 2023, Israel Democracy Institute.
[7] As mentioned, this question was analyzed only among the relevant interviewees who have relatives and/or friends in Gaza and the West Bank (43%). We examined and segmented only through the variables of gender, age, and education, as only subgroups of these variables had a sufficient number of respondents for statistical analysis. Among these variables, significant differences were found only in the gender variable.