The Israeli Democracy Index 2023
The IDF and local authorities received the highest trust ratings from the Jewish public, while the political institutions were at the bottom with the lowest level. The post October 7th survey also saw a substantial increase in trust in the Israeli police.
The 2023 Israeli Democracy Index survey was conducted in June 2023. However, due to the dramatic subsequent events, a number of the questions were repeated at the end of 2023 and at the beginning of 2024. |
Even after October 7 and the war, only minor changes were found in the public trust ratings and rankings for Israeli institutions:
In both survey rounds, the IDF and municipalities/local authorities received the highest trust ratings from the Jewish public, while the political institutions were at the bottom with the lowest level. The second, post-October 7 survey saw a substantial increase in trust in the Israel Police. In the Arab public, the Supreme Court topped the trust rankings on both occasions.
Sense of “togetherness”:
After October 7, ratings of the level of solidarity in Israeli society as a whole improved dramatically in both the Jewish and Arab publics, as did the sense of belonging to the State of Israel.
Israel’s overall situation:
In mid-2023 and at the end of the year, only around one-fifth of Israelis rate Israel’s overall situation as good or very good.
Main sources of tension in Israeli society:
As in June, relations between the Right and Left again topped the list of sources of tension in Israeli society according to Jewish respondents at the end of 2023, while tensions between Arabs and Jews were ranked highest by Arab respondents in both rounds.
The 2023 Israeli Democracy Index is published by the Israel Democracy Institute today on March 14, 2024. The Index has been published annually for the last 21 years, and it presents a complex picture regarding the public’s assessment of the strength of Israeli democracy, public trust in state institutions, and internal solidarity in Israeli society. Due to the expectation that the events of October 7 and the ensuing war would have a considerable impact on public opinion in Israel, we repeated several of the questions asked in June 2023 at the end of 2023 (November and December) and in January 2024.
Yohanan Plesner, president of the Israel Democracy Institute said: "The rupture that we experienced following the events of October 7th is reflected in the findings of this year's Israeli Democracy Index: the public places great trust in the IDF and its commanders, who set a personal example, take responsibility, and act with courage and conviction in every aspect of the war. Local government and the police also saw a spike in public trust. By contrast, we found a conspicuously low level of trust in the government and the Knesset - less than a quarter of the public trusts their elected officials. Despite the distrust in leadership, we see a promising increase in the sense of social solidarity, which is likely related to the widespread engagement and scope of civilian volunteerism since the start of the war—this is a particularly welcomed development following the low levels of solidarity measured last summer, during the height of the judicial overhaul. Restoring trust in institutions at the national level is possible, but our national leaders must show Israelis that they are acting in the public interest and with a sense of personal responsibility."
Prof. Tamar Hermann, Director of the Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute said: “The Israeli public, across its various population segments, is not satisfied (to say the least) with the functioning of the Israeli political system, and at the same time, cleavages between the groups are growing. Even the events of October 7 and the ensuing war, which were initially viewed as unifying events (as expressed by the slogan “Together we will win”), can now be seen to have had only a temporary bridging impact on the pre-existing internal divisions. However, and despite its strong criticism of the country’s leadership, the Israeli public is very strongly committed to the state and to Israeli society, and only a minority would prefer to emigrate elsewhere if given the chance.”
The main findings of the Index are as follows:
Only around one-fifth of Israelis rate Israel’s overall situation as good or very good (21% in June and 22% in December). However, breaking down responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals a decline on the Left in the share of those who consider Israel’s situation to be bad (from 73% in June to 63% in December), along with a slight decrease in the Center (from 54% in June to 51% in December), and no change on the Right (31% in both measurements).
In June, 18% of Arab respondents rated Israel’s overall situation as good or very good, falling to just 9% in December.
Jewish public
Overall, the level of public trust in most of the state institutions measured in December 2023 was similar to that found in June 2023—particularly in terms of the relative ranking of these institutions, but also in terms of the trust ratings they received. Thus, the average trust levels were slightly higher in December than in June. The IDF has the highest trust rating (86% on average), with municipalities/local authorities placing second (55% in June, 64% in December), and the President of Israel in third (54% in June, 61% in December). The most salient change was found in trust in the Israel Police, which rose considerably following the role played by police officers on October 7 and during the first days of the war. Against the backdrop of growing public criticism of Israel’s political leadership, and in contrast to the increase in trust we found regarding most other institutions, there was a noticeable decline in trust in the government and the Knesset (from 28% to 23% for the government, and from 24% to just 19% for the Knesset). Public trust (or distrust) in the political parties remained almost the same.
Trust in state institutions, June and December 2023 (Jewish sample; %)
Arab public
As in the past, both in total and on average, trust in state institutions is lower in the Arab public than in the Jewish public. However, the level of trust in the Arab public in these institutions rose sharply in December compared to June 2023. This may be due to fears of expressing critical views during wartime (which might explain, for example, the surprising and unprecedented increase in trust in the IDF, from 21% in June to 44% in December), or to the rise in the sense of belonging to the State of Israel found in the Arab sample. In both survey rounds, the Supreme Court topped the trust rankings (26% in June and 53% in December), while as in the Jewish public, the Knesset and the political parties were ranked lowest by Arab respondents, though a slight increase was found (from 18% to 28% for the Knesset, and from 15% to 25% for the political parties). Trust in the government remained almost unchanged.
Trust in state institutions, June and December 2023 (Arab sample; %)
After slipping to a low of 4.4 (on a scale from 1 to 10) in June, at the height of the public protests against the government’s judicial reforms, there was a jump in the rating of solidarity in Israeli society as a whole given by Jewish respondents, to 7.2 in October, followed by a slight decline to 6.7 in December. This decline is likely attributable to the renewed prominence of internal tensions in Israel.
These changes in solidarity ratings were found in all three political camps in the Jewish sample—on the Left (3.5 in June, 7.5 in October, and 6.9 in December), in the Center (4.0 in June, 7.1 in October, and 6.9 in December), and on the Right (4.8 in June, 7.2 in October, and 6.6 in December).
In the Arab sample, there was also a significant rise in the rating of solidarity in Israeli society as a whole, from 3.6 in June to 4.8 in October, followed by a further climb to 5.2 in December.
How would you rate the level of solidarity (sense of “togetherness”) of Israeli society as a whole (Jews, Arabs, and all other citizens), where 1 = “no solidarity at all” and 10 = “a high level of solidarity”? 2011–2023 (Jewish and Arab samples; Average)
Among Jewish respondents, relations between Right and Left topped the list of sources of tension in Israeli society with no significant difference between the June and December surveys (43%, 46% respectively). In second place are tensions between Jews and Arabs (31.5%), which in 2021 and 2022 were ranked highest. The share who named religious and secular Jews as having the highest level of tension between them fell by half, from 19% to 9%. There are noticeable differences on this issue between the different political camps in the Jewish public: On the Left, the proportion who rated tensions between Right and Left as the highest fell from 51% in June to 45% in December; the equivalent share on the Right rose from 42% in June to 48.5% in December; while there was no change in the Center, with a finding of 44% in both surveys. As in the past, among Arab respondents, tension between Jews and Arabs topped the list of sources of tension in Israeli society (June: 53%; December 47.5%)
In December, around half (51%) of the Israeli public said that democratic rule in Israel is in grave danger, down from 58.5% in June.
There was an increase in the share of Jewish respondents who think that there is a common set of values and understandings shared by a majority of Israelis today (a national consensus), from 31% in June 2023 to 43% in January 2024. By contrast, the proportion of Arab respondents who hold this view fell by around half, from 52% in June to 25% in January.
Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation, we found that in all three camps there was an increase between June 2023 and January 2024 in the share of those who think that there is a common set of values and understandings, with the sharpest rise found in the Center (Left, from 18% to 24.5%; Center, from 22% to 42%; Right, from 38% to 49%).
In June, at the height of the tensions over the judicial reforms, only a quarter of Israelis thought that there was a high likelihood of a “new social-political contract” being created. In January 2024, we found an increase in the share of those who hold this view regarding a new contract between citizens and the government (though they are still a minority), from 25% to 35%, and a sizeable increase in the share who think there is a high likelihood of a new contract between the different groups in Israeli society, from 26% to 43%.
We asked: “If you could receive American citizenship, or that of another Western country, would you prefer to live there or to remain in Israel?” Among Jewish respondents, there was an increase during the war in the proportion of those who prefer to remain in Israel, relative to June 2023 (from 70% to 80.5%). Among Arab respondents, this share remained relatively stable (62% and 59%).
For questions or further information:
Tova Cohen
International Spokesperson
+972-58-555-1043
The full Israeli Democracy Index is available in Hebrew here. English language materials, including the full Index and executive summary, will be published soon. Please email Tova Cohen to request to receive these materials upon publication: tovac@idi.org.il, or respond to this email.
Methodology Notes:
The 2023 Israeli Democracy Index survey was conducted in June 2023. However, due to the dramatic subsequent events, a number of the questions were repeated in surveys in October 2023, December 2023 and January 2024.
The June 2023 survey was conducted via the internet and by telephone (to include groups that are underrepresented on the internet) between June 20 and June 28, 2023, with 1,008 men and women interviewed in Hebrew and 201 interviewed in Arabic, constituting a nationally representative sample of the adult population in Israel aged 18 and over. The maximum sampling error for the total sample is ±2.88% (±3.16% for the Jewish sample, and ±7.05% for the Arab sample). The two polling firms that carried out the field work were Shiluv I2R (Hebrew interviews) and Afkar Research and Knowledge (Arabic interviews).
The October 2023, December 2023, and January 2024 surveys were conducted via the internet and by telephone between October 24-26; December 25–28, 2023 and January 28-30, 2024. The October survey included 602 people interviewed in Hebrew and 151 in Arabic; the December survey 605 in Hebrew and 151 in Arabic; and the January survey 619 in Hebrew and 153 in Arabic, each constituting a nationally representative sample of the adult population in Israel. The maximum sampling error was ±3.55% at a confidence level of 95% (October and December) and ±3.59% at a confidence level of 95% (January). Field work for both was carried out by the Dialogue Research and Polling Institute.