Conscription of Haredi Yeshiva Students to the IDF and the Emerging Constitutional Crisis

The Supreme Court is currently conducting a hearing that could signal a constitutional crisis—a contempt-of-court motion filed in the case of the Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. Minister of Defense (5819/24), which argues that the government has not complied with the Court’s ruling of November 19, 2025 requiring it to formulate an effective enforcement plan for ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) conscription.

This explainer reviews the background to the Court’s ruling, and considers whether Israel merely faces the risk of a constitutional crisis, or whether such a crisis is already here.

Photo by David Cohen/Flash90

The non-conscription of Haredim: A brief summary of previous events

The issue of Haredi conscription is a political, public, and legal saga stretching back many years. Following the establishment of the State of Israel, an arrangement was set up according to which yeshiva students could claim that “Torah [study] is my occupation” and receive a deferral of (and ultimately exemption from) military service. Over the years, various attempts to legislate broad exemption arrangements that do not significantly reduce discrimination between Israelis who serve in the military and those who receive exemptions have been struck down by the High Court of Justice, due to the severe harms they would cause to the principle of equality under the law.

Exemptions require legislation: In 1998, the High Court of Justice ruled that the minister of defense does not have the authority to grant a sweeping exemption from conscription to Haredim, and that such an exemption requires primary legislation by the Knesset.

Invalidation of amendments to the law: The Tal Law, which was passed in 2002, was struck down by the High Court of Justice in 2012 after it became clear that it was not reducing inequality in conscription. Another amendment to the law (Amendment 21), which was introduced in 2015 with the aim of regulating conscription, was also struck down in 2017, as it was determined unconstitutional.

Expiration of the law: After several postponements and extensions, the last legal arrangement that allowed the deferral of military service for yeshiva students finally expired on June 30, 2023 (which was the original expiration date given in Amendment 21 to the law, in 2015). Consequently, there was no longer any legal framework in place permitting a sweeping exemption from conscription for members of the Haredi public. Thus, Haredi yeshiva students became subject to the law that requires them to serve in the military, like all other eighteen-year-old Israelis.[1]

The government decision and the June 2024 High Court ruling: Despite the expiration of the law, the government passed a decision (Resolution 682) instructing the IDF not to pursue conscription proceedings against yeshiva students until March 31, 2024, with the aim of formulating a new legislative arrangement. In June 2024, in a panel of nine justices, the High Court of Justice unanimously ruled that the government’s decision was illegal. It stipulated that in the absence of a law, the state must take steps to draft yeshiva students in accordance with the provisions of the Defense Service Law, in the same way as these apply to all other citizens. The ruling also required the government to cease the transfer of support funds to yeshivot for students who should have been drafted according to the law.

The conscription issue is back in court. What arguments have the parties put forward?

The petitions in HCJ 5819/24 (the “monitoring” case) were filed by bodies such as the Movement for Quality Government in Israel, among others, claiming that the government was failing to implement the June 2024 ruling.

The petitioners’ claims: The petitioners argued that the government was continuing with improper selective enforcement, was refraining from drafting Haredim to the required extent, and was not imposing sanctions against those who refuse to enlist, thus violating the law and the High Court ruling. They emphasized that this conduct harms the rule of law, the principle of equality, and the security of the state, particularly at a time of war. The petitioners demanded that the Court order the conscription of all Haredim who should be drafted under the terms of the Defense Service Law and have not yet been drafted.

The government's response: The government did not dispute that there is no legal basis for a sweeping exemption. However, it argued that change should be made gradually, taking into account the IDF’s limited capabilities to take in new soldiers, and the need to prevent a bitter public rift. In its responses to the Court (the last of which was submitted on October 27, 2025), the state presented the following data (all of which had already been presented in the Knesset debates on the conscription law):

• In the 2024 conscription year (from July 2024 to June 2025), some 24,000 initial orders were issued to members of the Haredi public to present themselves for the first stage in enlistment to military service. Only 2,738 attended IDF conscription centers. Of these, only 1,508 continued the process, and just 798 were enlisted (while enlistment dates were set for another 432). Regarding the 2025 conscription year, in July 2025, the IDF chief of staff instructed that initial orders be issued to all Haredi men obligated to enlist, with the dates of attendance at conscription centers spread out throughout 2025, and that the period between the initial order and the enlistment date be reduced. A total of 53,741 notices were sent, and the relevant attendance dates for 15,938 of these have already passed, though only 701 have reported for service.
• The IDF currently has a shortfall of some 12,000 soldiers for compulsory service—6,000-7,500 for combat roles, and the rest for combat support roles.
• During 2025, IDF reservists performed an average of 110 days of reserve duty.
• Starting in July 2026, the IDF will be able to take in all those obligated to enlist from the Haredi public.

The government's response also included a letter from the cabinet secretary, stating that the correct way to address the expiration of the law is to pass another amendment to the Defense Service Law—an amendment currently being discussed in the Knesset—rather than adopting a more assertive policy on Haredi conscription.

What was the High Court’s “monitoring” ruling?

In a ruling by an expanded panel of five justices issued on November 19, 2025 (HCJ 5819/24), the Court unanimously accepted the petitioners’ arguments and issued an order absolute against the government. The Court was no longer satisfied with statements of principle, and ordered the government to take concrete and detailed steps to enforce the Defense Service Law.

The main points of the ruling were as follows:

• Rejection of the arguments relating to “gradualism” and limited capacity: The Court harshly criticized the government, and ruled that its conduct to date was close to being a complete disavowal of enforcing the conscription obligation. It rejected the government's attempts to use the arguments relating to “gradualism” or the IDF’s limited capacity as reasons for non-conscription. The Court, in the words of Deputy President Sohlberg, even stated explicitly in its ruling: “There is no justification for continuing to delay; it is time to act.”
• Immediate implementation of the Defense Service Law: The ruling clarifies that in the absence of a valid exemption law, the Defense Service Law applies equally to all citizens, including yeshiva students. Therefore, the government has an unequivocal duty to enforce it. The Court rejected Cabinet Secretary Yossi Fuchs' argument that the government’s “policy” is simply to wait for the legislative process to conclude, either by passing a new exemption law or by adopting other bespoke arrangements for Haredim.
• Formulation of an effective enforcement policy: The Court ordered the government to formulate within 45 days (that is, by January 4, 2026) an “effective enforcement policy” that will lead to real recruitment of Haredi yeshiva students. The government was required to present a clear enforcement plan that, in addition to the criminal measures it was already obliged to take (proceedings against draft evaders), would also set out and implement civilian-economic measures.
• Economic sanctions: The Court explicitly ruled that “the provision of benefits that are given in direct or indirect connection to evasion of the duty of conscription should be discontinued.” In doing so, the Court gave its backing for the cessation of all financial support, direct or indirect, to yeshiva students who do not enlist as legally required.

Has the state taken steps to implement the ruling?

As detailed below, on January 6, 2026, a “contempt-of-court” motion was filed with the High Court, claiming that the government had not acted to uphold the ruling. The implementation of the ruling is in its initial stages and is controversial.

The government's response submitted to the Court reveals a bleak picture. Despite the High Court’s order to formulate an enforcement policy within 45 days, the government did not hold a substantial discussion on the issue and did not develop the required plan.

What is the significance of the government's failure to act?

The government has violated the order by failing to pass a decision and set policy. Furthermore, according to media reports, Cabinet Secretary Yossi Fuchs summed up the government’s position by saying that its “policy” is to approve a conscription law. If this is indeed the government’s position, it does not “only” violate the Court order, but effectively, it contradicts the Court’s explicit ruling that the expectation of future legislation does not exempt the government from its obligations to act in accordance with the law as it currently stands, and this position—which was also submitted by Fuchs to the court—is unlawful, unfounded, and even tainted by internal contradictions.

In general, violations of a judicial order are by their very nature improper and severe. If the government had a reason for not passing a decision regarding the enforcement policy by the date set in the ruling, it should have approached the Court in advance with a reasoned request. However, in the case at hand of enforcing mandatory conscription, no attempt was made to justify the breach on its own merits. The November ruling already noted that “a significant part of the staff work required by the professional bodies has already been completed”, “most of the mooted measures have already been examined and considered”, and therefore, “there is no justification for continuing to delay; it is time to act.”

The government's position has itself resulted in a series of conscious, apparently deliberate violations of the ruling: the attorney general’s communications to the prime minister and the cabinet secretary were left unanswered, the required professional staff work has been left unaddressed, and so far “no action has been taken that can be seen as even a beginning of implementing the ruling.”[2] In short, the prime minister and his ministers have simply allowed themselves to break the law, and then to violate the explicit judicial order that instructed them to act in accordance with the law.

Is this a constitutional crisis?

It would appear that this time, a real constitutional crisis is unfolding, even if at this stage it has not yet reached its strongest form.

According to a rather cautious and restrictive definition, a constitutional crisis[3] is a distinct situation in which the constitutional framework is breached, the foundational rules regulating governmental and political activity are violated, and a powerful actor refuses to recognize or abide by even the most basic correction and control mechanism in society—that of legal disputes being decided by the courts. A conscious, stubborn, and public refusal to uphold a judicial decision is, arguably, the clearest incarnation of a constitutional crisis.

So far, the government has deliberately and blatantly violated the High Court’s explicit judicial order. To this must be added the disregard of the attorney general’s appeals to the government to uphold the ruling, as well as the violation—seemingly committed during the very contempt-of-court proceedings—of well-founded precedents regarding the legal representation of the state in the courts.[4]

Although only several days have passed since the deadline for fulfilling its obligation, the government has deliberately violated the order, and so far there is no sign that it is taking any steps to fulfill it. In addition, though the prime minister and his ministers have not publicly declared that they are contravening the order, the remarks attributed to the cabinet secretary constitute an admission of violation of the order, and a refusal to recognize the court’s authority, the order it issued, and its binding and unequivocal rulings.

What is the special importance of a constitutional crisis?

A constitutional crisis reflects a rejection of the constitutional regulation of governmental and political activity in the state, as well as rejection of the most basic mechanisms for resolving disputes peacefully. Therefore, a constitutional crisis is a dangerous and unstable situation. In a positive scenario, it may ultimately end with the public and institutions taking action to protect the institutional framework underpinning an organized, orderly, and functioning society, rather than shattering, it.

In the current case, this will happen if the crisis ultimately results in the ruling being implemented, and all the more so, if it yields public or political processes that examine the factors which brought the country to the brink of a constitutional crisis, and that seriously seek to address those factors.

However, there is also the risk that a constitutional crisis can end in anarchy or in widespread violence. According to the latest research and comparative experience, and taking into account the processes underway in Israel, it would appear that a more serious and more likely concern than anarchy or widespread violence is the deterioration of democracy  and a move towards an autocratic regime – an event that could occur with or without the precondition of a constitutional crisis. Given the danger and instability inherent in a constitutional crisis, there is no doubt that this is a sensitive situation that requires special attention.

The grave danger to the very existence of the constitutional framework in Israel—and with it, democratic rule—has not gone unnoticed by the State Attorney’s Office, which wrote in its formal response to the Court, inter alia:

This conduct poses real danger to democratic rule in the State of Israel, including the principle of separation of powers. The violation of judicial orders, when it appears that there is no real intention to uphold them, without an orderly application to the Court for an extension of the deadline for implementation of the judicial order, and especially when the violators are the prime minister and the government of Israel, eliminates the ability of judicial courts to conduct effective judicial review of the government’s actions… When the executive branch does not consider itself subject to judicial orders, the judiciary is deprived of its ability to fulfill its constitutional role as the body that oversees the legality of the government’s actions, and a dangerous opening is created for the government to rule with unrestrained power… This danger is underlined by the statements made by some government ministers who are publicly calling for disobedience of certain judicial orders issued by the Court, without these statements being publicly condemned or disavowed by the prime minister.

Where do the legal proceedings currently stand?

The Movement for Quality Government in Israel filed a motion with the Court to launch contempt-of-court proceedings, due to the fact that the government has not fulfilled its obligations as per the ruling. The government was required to submit its response to the request by January 11, 2026, and Vice President Sohlberg later approved for this deadline to be put back to January 12, 2026. On this date, the state’s response was indeed submitted, by the State Attorney’s Office.

In a previous case (regarding the convening of the Judicial Selection Committee for the purpose of electing a president to the Supreme Court), the Court rejected a request to undertake contempt-of-court proceedings against the minister of justice. The Court noted that the question of its authority to initiate contempt-of-court proceedings against the government and public office holders has not yet been decided. In that case, the Court ruled that contempt-of-court proceedings are an extreme measure that should be taken only when it is clear that an explicit order of the Court has been violated.

In the current case, there is no doubt that the Court’s order was violated. It is possible that this time, the Court will have no choice but to decide whether it has the authority to initiate contempt-of-court proceedings against the government, and what these proceedings may include.

What other remedies can the Court provide?

It should be remembered that in exceptional cases, the Court may be required to issue exceptional orders, by virtue of its broad authority as defined in section 15 of the Basic Law: The Judiciary. An example of the use of such legal orders occurred in March 2020, as part of the Edelstein affair, when following the Knesset elections, the interim speaker of the Knesset (a ceremonial and short-term role designed to ensure functional continuity), MK Yuli Edelstein, refused to convene the plenum in order to elect his replacement despite an official request by a majority of Knesset members. In response to a petition, the High Court of Justice stated that his refusal “undermines the foundations of the democratic process,” and ruled that he must convene the Knesset to elect a permanent speaker without delay.[5] Edelstein refused to comply with the ruling and resigned from his position, but before his resignation took effect he adjourned the sitting, thus ending the Knesset session and effectively preventing the Knesset itself from carrying out the order.

In its ruling on petitions calling for its earlier ruling to be enforced by means of the Contempt of Court Ordinance and other remedies, the Supreme Court stated that:

Never before in the history of the state has a government official openly and defiantly refused to uphold a judicial order, saying that his conscience does not allow him to implement the ruling. This is how Respondent 1 chose to act, who is one of the symbols of the government (even though at the current time he is serving in his position by virtue of the law of continuity, without being elected to the position), and the harm that this conduct caused to the public interest in terms of safeguarding the rule of law and the observance of court rulings and orders is immeasurably severe. If this is how those in office behave, why should ordinary citizens behave any differently?[6]

The unprecedented situation also led to a very unusual remedy: “This is a situation that cannot be tolerated, and when dealing with an unprecedented violation of the rule of law, unprecedented remedies are required.”[7] The Court used its broad powers under section 15 of the Basic Law: The Judiciary in order to ensure that its ruling was carried out, and granted the longest-serving Knesset member the authority to convene the Knesset plenum and chair the session to elect a new speaker.

Thus, though it could have waited for Edelstein’s resignation to take effect within 48 hours, the Court conveyed a clear message of “zero tolerance” for non-compliance with its orders absolute, and set an important precedent for enforcing rulings by transferring powers, on a one-time basis, to another functionary. This remedy succeeded in protecting Israeli democracy and as part of the same move narrowly and at the last minute avoiding the development of a dangerous constitutional crisis.

In the current context, as per section 15 of the Basic Law: The Judiciary, the Court could, among other options, order professional officials (and not the government, that is, the political officials) to formulate an enforcement policy against draft evaders and candidates for military service who did not report for service, and to implement it themselves, independently of the ministers, in light of the government’s violation of the ruling by failing to act. This would only be a partial solution, because professional officials cannot make decisions that are under the authority of the government or its ministers, nor can they cause the required government decisions to be passed; and it would be no trivial matter, as it concerns the powers and hierarchies in the executive branch. At the same time, “where dealing with an unprecedented violation of the rule of law, unprecedented remedies are required.”[8] Among other things, explicit instructions to professional officials on how they should act—even in matters that normally depend on a decision by the government or a minister—could solve many of the present difficulties and help end the current constitutional crisis without the country falling into autocracy, widespread violence, or anarchy.

 

[1] Shlomit Ravitsky Tur-Paz, “A Year Since the Supreme Court’s Conscription Ruling—Was It Real, Or Just a Dream?”, Israel Democracy Institute website, June 25, 2025, https://en.idi.org.il/articles/59892.

[2] See the response to the requests based on the Contempt of Court Ordinance on the part of the respondents (response dated January 12, 2026).

[3] Amir Fuchs, Nadav Dagan, and Daphne Benvenisty, “Constitutional Crisis—Definitions, Precedents, Implications,” Israel Democracy Institute website, September 26, 2024, https://en.idi.org.il/articles/56074.

[4] See HCJ 18225-06-25, Gilon v. Government of Israel (ruling of December 1, 2025). According to the government’s response, the state attorney was notified that the cabinet secretary had made a submission to the Court on January 12, 2026 without being requested to do so, and permission had been granted for the government to retain separate representation, this despite the cabinet secretary not being a party to the case.

[5] HCJ 2144/20 Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. Speaker of the Knesset (March 23, 2020).

[6] Ibid., section 4 of the ruling.

[7] Ibid., section 5 of the ruling.

[8] Ibid., section 5 of the ruling.