The Rise and Fall of the (Non-)Conscription Law – Explainer

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The Draft Exemption Bill – Moving Forward or Frozen?

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich announced this week that they are "setting aside" the conscription law and not advancing it at this time. The Chair of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, Boaz Bismuth, announced, by contrast, that the law will be completed under the prime minister's leadership immediately after the war. The prime minister also stated that "the war will continue for weeks."

Based on what can be assessed from the parliamentary calendar, it appears that completing the (non-)conscription law within the current Knesset term will not be possible, and the question of finalizing the law and its contents will be passed along to the next Knesset and government. First, as long as the war with Iran continues throughout March and the state budget passes at the end of the month with the support of all or some of the Haredi parties, the most powerful bargaining chip that the Haredim held — threatening to oppose the budget in order to incentivize progress on the draft exemption bill — is removed from the political system.

Second, in April, shortly after the budget votes, the Knesset will go into Passover recess for 5 or 6 weeks. When the Knesset returns to work in May 2026, the country will begin gearing up for elections, which are scheduled for October (or, if brought forward, no earlier than September). In an election-season reality, and with no alternative leverage available to the Haredim, the government has no remaining incentive to advance the draft exemption bill. Only creative, effective pressure from the Haredi side, which would need to outweigh the opposing pressure from coalition voters who oppose the law, could bring the bill back to the table.

Third, the freezing of the law reflects the serious difficulty that emerged in drafting it, and the inability to reach a compromise between the Haredi parties and the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee's legal advisor. If a law favored by the Haredim is advanced without professional legal backing, the groundwork is also being laid for it to be struck down by the High Court of Justice.

What Is the Dispute Around the Bill?

The debate over the bill reflects a deep social, security, and values-based divide within Israeli society. Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee Chair MK Boaz Bismuth framed the bill as an historic event that would lead to the conscription of Haredim. The prime minister, some coalition members, and the Haredi parties share his position. Others in Likud and the Religious Zionism faction, along with opposition members, representatives of the Finance and Justice Ministries, and many reservist organizations, research institutes, and civil society organizations working in this field, fear that the bill would in fact entrench draft evasion, further undermine the principle of equality and the people's army model, and do nothing to address the military's urgent need for manpower — all during a long and bloody war, with soldiers bearing an incredible burden, reservists called up again and again for extended service, and the Defense Ministry planning to extend the service of regular IDF soldiers. IDF representatives in the committee hearings share some of these concerns, as does the majority of the Jewish Israeli public, as reflected in public opinion polls. At the same time, MKs from the Haredi Hasidic Agudat Yisrael faction also oppose the bill, but from the opposite direction. They aim to maintain the torato umanuto (legal status for full-time Torah study) arrangement voluntary and comprehensive, as it was before.

What Has Happened So Far with the (Non-)Conscription Bill in the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee?

The time and resources devoted to this have been immense: 86 sessions were held in the 25th Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee on the (non-)conscription bill; over 300 hours, some stretching late into the night; between 7 and 20 MKs at any given moment; continuous, full-time oversight by Cabinet Secretary Yossi Fuchs; hundreds of hours of attendance by IDF representatives, the Defense, Finance, Justice, and Education Ministries; hundreds of representatives from reserve organizations, bereaved families, families of hostages, combat trauma survivors, research institutes, and civil society organizations; dozens of position papers and studies; staff hours estimated at approximately NIS 10 million.

All of this against the backdrop of a turbulent public battle over the law's contents and direction — one that cut across the usual political divisions: protests and demonstrations, public conferences, declarations of Haredi rabbinic leadership, journalists and a wide public glued to live broadcasts from the Knesset, and a stream of news notifications from every session pinging into the daily lives of Israeli citizens.

The first half of the sessions, chaired by the previous committee chair, MK Yuli Edelstein, were almost theoretical, with participants working from an outdated 2022 draft bill with no current version on the table. The second half, chaired by the current committee chair, MK Boaz Bismuth, took place in the context of proposed draft of the legislation and amid reservations from the committee's legal counsel, but without any session leading to a conclusion or formal decisions. The bill's clauses were read aloud and opinions were heard, but questions went unanswered, and there was no visible, transparent progress toward either compromise or resolution. Full throttle while driving in neutral.

In recent weeks, the committee's legal advisor team, led by Miri Frankel-Shor, drafted a revised bill incorporating its reservations. A heated round of behind-the-scenes negotiations took place over this draft of the bill, involving the committee chair and additional government representatives, the committee's legal advisor, and Haredi actors from within and outside the Knesset. The draft never saw the light of day. It was not leaked, nor was it even disclosed to members of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee itself. Repeated announcements that the draft was about to be published at any moment, and that the parliamentary process — including committee deliberation, submission of reservations, and votes — would proceed, also came to nothing. To date, no votes have been held in the committee (which would have been expected to pass given the coalition's 10:7 advantage), and the (non-)conscription bill has not been brought to the Knesset plenary for a second and third reading. In the meantime, the political system has been busy counting the votes of potential opponents of the bill in Likud, the Religious Zionism faction, and Agudat Yisrael, and placing bets on the likelihood that the prime minister would advance, on the eve of an election and in the midst of a war, a law that contradicts the position of some of his own voters.

What Will Happen to the Bill Going Forward?

If, indeed, the bill is not brought to a second and third reading during the 25th Knesset, it will be shelved, and if anyone wishes to place it before a future Knesset, it will need to go through the entire parliamentary legislative process from scratch. The original bill, the Defense Service Law (Amendment No. 26) (Integration of Yeshiva Students), 5782–2022, was drafted during the Lapid-Bennett government as a government bill, and was advanced by the then-Defense Minister Benny Gantz, in the era before October 7 and its consequences. The bill passed its first reading in the previous Knesset, and deliberations began in the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. In June 2024, the continuity rule was applied to it,[1] which allowed deliberations to continue in the current Knesset from where they had left off in its predecessor. However, in accordance with a 2025 directive of the Knesset legal advisor and a prior directive of the attorney general,[2] the continuity rule cannot be applied to a bill a second time in a subsequent Knesset. That is to say, barring any surprises, the next Knesset will need to legislate an entirely new conscription law from the beginning.

The Conscription Law Has Been Taken Off the Table — What Is the Legal Situation?

As of July 2023, the date of the legal exemption for Haredim expired, the Defense Service Law applies to all young Haredi men who had not yet reached the age of 26 at that time. In other words, like the rest of Israeli society, all 90,000 (approximately) of them are required to report for an initial conscription order and subsequently, depending on the classification stages, for military service as well. The court affirmed their equal obligation vis-à-vis other young Israelis in June 2024, in what became known as the "High Court of Justice Conscription Ruling."[3] The court further ruled that the state cannot, on the one hand, call up young Haredi men for conscription while, on the other, fund yeshiva students and the "torato umanuto" status that would allow them to study in yeshiva full time — a status that involves violating those very orders.

Following the ruling, the military, the Defense Ministry, the Education Ministry, and the legal system began slowly applying the sanctions stipulated in the Defense Service Law and the Military Justice Law against those subject to the draft, including bans on exiting the country and arrest orders, as well as the denial of financial benefits. The sanctions were applied in a slow, half-hearted manner, and only after significant pressure was brought to bear on the government, the military, and the defense establishment to issue conscription orders,[4] to shorten enforcement proceedings against draft evaders, and to sever the link between the obligation to comply with the existing conscription law and the expectation that the Knesset would pass a new exemption law.

In a further High Court ruling from November 2025[5], which followed up on the implementation of the aforementioned conscription ruling, the court found that the government had not fulfilled its obligation to effectively conscript Haredim, and set timelines for it to present a work plan. The government did not comply with the ruling, pushing Israel to the brink of a constitutional crisis[6] whose consequences have yet to play out. A contempt-of-court hearing against the government is expected soon.

What Sanctions Currently Apply to Young Haredi Men Subject to the Draft?

The following are the main sanctions currently in effect against those subject to the draft who have not enlisted (these do not apply to anyone who has served in military or civilian service, or who holds a medical, psychological, or age-based exemption):

• Yeshiva funding: Since April 2024, Haredi yeshivas and kollels have been denied funding in respect of those subject to the draft. This amounts to approximately NIS 5,000 per year for unmarried yeshiva students and approximately NIS 10,000 per year for married kollel students. In total, this is approximately NIS 650 million per year across all those subject to the draft.
• Daycare subsidies: Since March 2025, kollel students subject to the draft have been denied daycare subsidies. This amounts to approximately NIS 26,400 on average per year per Haredi family. In total, approximately NIS 250 million per year across all those subject to the draft.
• National Insurance (Bituach Leumi): Since January 2026, those subject to the draft have been denied the National Insurance discount, which amounts to approximately NIS 1,000 per person per year. In total, close to NIS 90 million per year.
• Study and training grants: Some of the study grants, scholarships, and vocational training programs designated for Haredim are now conditional on 'regularizing one's status with the military' (a precise figure is difficult to give due to the variety of tracks involved).
• Travel ban: Those subject to the draft become classified as 'draft evaders' after being called a number of times to report to the IDF Admission and Classification Base by various means without complying, and after a 'Section 12 Order' is issued against them which they also fail to obey. Once classified as 'draft evaders,' they are barred from leaving the country. As of January 2026, approximately 15,000 individuals held 'draft evader' status, and an additional approximately 17,000 had received a Section 12 Order.[7] These numbers are expected to rise significantly in the near term as enforcement proceedings already initiated mature.
• Arrest order: Those subject to the draft who hold 'draft evader' status are subject to an arrest order upon any encounter with a police officer. Accordingly, a police officer who incidentally encounters a draft evader, such as during a traffic violation, a demonstration, or the filing of a complaint, is required to detain him and transfer him to the military police, without discretion. The military police also initiates targeted enforcement operations directed at those subject to the draft.

In practice, arrests have encountered difficulties due to the police's refusal to detain those under arrest until the military police arrives, to assist in conducting joint arrest operations, or to authorize military police activity in Haredi residential areas. This refusal leads to selective enforcement that falls disproportionately on non-Haredim and on Haredim living in mixed neighborhoods. In order to cooperate, the police are demanding the allocation of six Border Police companies.

The majority of those arrested to date have been brought before disciplinary proceedings. The Military Prosecution, however, recently decided to toughen its sentencing policy, both by expanding the authority of adjudication officers to impose more days of detention, and by expressing a preference for criminal proceedings, allowing them under a wider range of circumstances.[8]

Under instructions from the attorney general and the Finance Ministry, the cabinet secretary and various government ministries continue to examine additional sanctions on those subject to the draft, including the denial of public benefits such as property tax discounts, participation in government housing tenders, public transportation discounts, and the like. Ways to improve police cooperation are also being explored. In parallel, contempt-of-court proceedings are underway in the High Court of Justice due to the government's refusal to act effectively through the police, the IDF, and government ministries to bring about Haredi conscription. The High Court may compel the government to intensify the sanctions.

Are the Existing Sanctions Leading to Haredi Conscription?

Haredi conscription figures are extremely low. Haredi women do not enlist at all, and Haredi men in most of the past decade through 2023 enlisted at a rate of only approximately 1,200 per year (roughly 9% of the relevant male cohort). This compares with conscription rates of between 88% and 90% among secular, traditional, and national religious men. Even among those 1,200, close to 70% were no longer Haredi at the time of their enlistment — they were in fact graduates of the Haredi education system who had left the sector.

The Iron Swords war that followed the October 7 attack, together with the conscription orders the military began sending out, the economic sanctions and enforcement measures that were taken, and the opening of additional Haredi tracks in the military, have begun to bear fruit. In the 2024 conscription year (July 2024–June 2025), 2,811 young men counted as Haredi enlisted,[9] and in the first third of the 2025 conscription year (July–December 2025), 1,100 enlisted, representing a 20% increase relative to the corresponding third of the previous year, which itself had already shown an increase. If the trend continues through the remainder of the year, the numbers would amount to triple the pre-war figure. This is still a far way off from the military's immediate need for 12,000 combat and combat support soldiers, but it would mark an improvement compared to the past.

This number could rise further if the government meets its commitment to intensify the sanctions and denial of public benefits, or if the court compels it to do so. In such a situation, the sanctions may gain force and become more effective, leading more Haredi soldiers to enlist. Although the conscription issue has accompanied Israeli society and enforcement mechanisms for many decades, the application of significant economic and criminal sanctions against those subject to the draft has never been attempted before, and assessing their effectiveness can only be done against the backdrop of actually implementing them.

In addition, the expectation of a law that would restore the exemption has itself impeded progress in Haredi conscription, as has the weakness of enforcement and the government's fecklessness. The clearer it becomes that the (non-)conscription bill in the Knesset is not advancing, and that crime does not pay, the more yeshiva students may come to understand that the options before them are enlistment or sanctions, not exemption. And many may prefer enlistment.

Do the Budget Transfers to the Haredim Constitute a Substitute for the (Non-)Conscription Law, or a Circumvention of It?

Freezing the (non-)conscription law means that Haredi rabbinical and political leadership is compelled to forgo its central coalition demand of creating a permanent exemption for yeshiva students. This raises concern that Haredim will receive financial compensation for their support of the state budget despite the freeze of the (non-)conscription law, in the form of coalition funds in the 2026 budget, transfers of funds to the baseline budget, and inflation of the 2025 execution budgets. Furthermore, concern arises that coalition funds (that is, funds committed in a coalition agreement to serve a particular political interest) received under various budget lines are effectively compensating for funds denied to those subject to the draft—in violation of court rulings and the principle of equality. This also effectively cancels the incentive to comply with the law. Gatekeepers must remain vigilant on this matter, to ensure that funds are not flowing to those subject to the draft through circumventing channels. Thus, instead of the yeshiva budget being cut, it is in fact being increased in 2026, from NIS 1.7 billion to NIS 1.9 billion. Through this budget, the Haredi parties are effectively providing 'compensation' to the 'Torah world,' including the yeshivas and kollels whose budgets were cut due to the suspension of funding for those subject to the draft.

 

[1]See Ravitsky Tur-Paz and Kandelstein–Heine, Applying the Continuity Rule to the Defense Service Bill, 14.6.24, Israel Democracy Institute.

[2]A preliminary response on behalf of the Knesset Legal Adviser in HCJ 4769/24, which was subsequently issued as a general directive, given with explicit reference to the Defense Service Law (Amendment No. 26) (Integration of Yeshiva Students), 5782–2022. See also Attorney General Directive 2.300 [1.1401 (21.475)] "Continuity of Legislative Proceedings Upon Formation of a New Government" (March 2013).

[3]HCJ 6198/23 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel et al. v. Minister of Defense et al.

[4]It was only in July 2025, two years after the exemption provisions of the Defense Service Law expired, that conscription orders were issued to all those subject to the draft.

[5]HCJ 5819/24 The Association for Quality Government in Israel v. Minister of Defense.

[6]Dagan, Cohen, Fuchs, Toward the Constitutional Crisis and Beyond: Drafting Yeshiva Students into the IDF, 14.1.26, Israel Democracy Institute.

[7]Monitoring report of the Government Legal Advisor on the implementation of court rulings regarding the conscription of yeshiva students, Report No. 12, 1.2.26.

[8]Ibid.

[9]Recurring briefings by Brig. Gen. Shai Tayeb, Head of the Planning and Human Resources Administration Branch in the IDF, to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. As noted, a large portion of this group is no longer Haredi at the time of their enlistment. For example, 55% of those counted as Haredi in 2024 chose non-Haredi-designated service tracks, that is, they did not ask for special kashrut and prayer conditions, Torah classes, or gender-appropriate conditions Haredi soldiers are intitled to. See Malach and Kahaner, Annual Report on Haredi Society (2025), Israel Democracy Institute.