Explainer: The State Comptroller and the Appointment Procedure

How is the state comptroller elected? What are the comptroller’s powers, whom does the comptroller audit, and to what extent can they actually influence decision-makers in practice? Here is what you need to know.

Photo by Yonatan Sindel/Flash90

The State Comptroller’s Office is a central pillar of oversight over the country’s public administration, its integrity, and the quality of the services it provides. For this purpose, the comptroller enjoys independent constitutional status, almost unlimited access to documents and information, and the ability to publish reports with broad public and political influence. However, unlike the courts, the police, or the State Attorney’s Office, it is not a classic enforcement body, and its success in attaining real-world impact depends to a large extent on the willingness of the Knesset and the government to adopt its recommendations, and the desire of the media and the public to exert pressure for those recommendations to be implemented (see this study by the Israel Democracy Institute).

Ahead of the appointment of the next state comptroller, the following overview explains of the status and role of the state comptroller and the procedure by which a new comptroller is elected.

What is the constitutional status of the state comptroller?

The constitutional status of the state comptroller in Israel is enshrined in the Basic Law: The State Comptroller (1988) and in the State Comptroller Law (1958) [Consolidated Version]. The comptroller is accountable only to the Knesset and is not subordinate to the government. This principle is designed to ensure full institutional independence, which is considered one of the fundamental characteristics of the State Comptroller’s Office. The Basic Law stipulates that the state comptroller’s duty is to conduct audits of the state’s economy, assets, finances, liabilities, and administration. It also states that these audits are to be carried out in accordance with the standards of legality, integrity, proper administration, efficiency, and frugality in the use of public funds. This is a particularly broad definition, which allows the comptroller to address not only whether a certain action was legal, but also whether it was appropriate, effective, or administratively proper.

Which bodies does the state comptroller audit, and what powers does the comptroller have regarding them?

The range of audited bodies in Israel is particularly wide. In addition to government ministries, the state comptroller is authorized to inspect local authorities, government companies (such as Israel Aerospace Industries, the defense company Rafael, the Israel Electric Corporation, and the national water company Mekorot), public corporations (such as the National Insurance Institute, the Bank of Israel, and the Kan Israel Public Broadcasting Corporation), entities supported by public funds, and even certain private entities that benefit from significant public funding (such as institutions of higher education, health funds, and certain cultural institutions). For this reason, the State Comptroller’s Office is considered one of the broadest oversight mechanisms in the Israeli public system.

The state comptroller is authorized to demand documents and information from anybody under audit and publishes both annual and special audit reports as well as professional opinions on various matters. If an audit raises suspicions of criminal activity, the comptroller brings the matter to the attention of the attorney general, who will then inform the comptroller and the Knesset State Audit Committee of how the matter will subsequently be handled.

Since 1971, the state comptroller has also served as Israel's ombudsman, making the State Comptroller’s Office a central mechanism that connects individual citizens with the country’s public administration. Citizens are entitled to file complaints against public institutions, and the ombudsman is empowered to examine whether a particular institution’s actions were improper or unjust. Although such an examination does not constitute a court hearing, the ombudsman’s determination that a particular complaint is justified may have a significant impact on the conduct of the institution in question and on public trust in it.

How is the state comptroller elected, what qualifications must they have, and what restrictions are imposed on them?

The formal qualification requirements for the position of state comptroller are minimal. Section 8 of the Basic Law: The State Comptroller states that any Israeli citizen who is an Israeli resident is eligible to be a candidate for the position, and that additional eligibility conditions can be set via legislation. The State Comptroller Law did not add any further qualification requirements. In practice, almost all of Israel’s state comptrollers have had legal education, and most of them were retired judges, while a minority came from senior management positions in public institutions (see Table 1 below).

The State Comptroller Law specifies multiple restrictions on the state comptroller during and after their term of office, which are intended to prevent a conflict of interest. Thus, during their term of office, the state comptroller is prohibited from participating in political life, including serving as a member of the Knesset or of a local council, or being a candidate for such office; being a member of the board of directors of a for-profit business; participating in various entities related to the government (for example, entities that hold a government concession); engaging in certain forms of business with the state (for example, purchasing state assets); and generally serving in any position other than state comptroller. To prevent conflict of interest after their term of office, certain restrictions are further imposed on the state comptroller regarding membership in business entities that are subject to the state audit. There are also rules regarding the termination of the comptroller’s service before the end of their term of office.

Regarding the election process: The state comptroller is elected by the Knesset by secret ballot for a single term of seven years. Until the amendment of the law in 1998, comptrollers were elected for a five-year term and serve for a maximum of two terms. The election is held 30–90 days before the end of the outgoing comptroller’s term of office. The current comptroller, Matanyahu Englman, will complete his term on July 3, 2026, and therefore the election must be held by June 3, and is likely to be held on that date. Candidates must submit an application to the speaker of the Knesset at least 14 days before the election date, along with the signatures of at least 10 Knesset members (each Knesset member can sign a declaration of support for only one candidate).

To be elected in the first round of the secret ballot in the Knesset, a candidate must have the support of at least 61 Knesset members. If no candidate receives such support, a second round is held, in which only the two candidates who received the most support in the first round proceed to the second round. In the second round, the candidate who receives more votes from Knesset members wins (if there is a tie, the vote is repeated). If only one candidate stands for election, Knesset members may vote either for or against that candidate, and the candidate is elected if the number of votes in favor is greater than the number of votes against (if there is a tie, the vote is repeated; if the candidate is not elected in the repeat vote, then the candidacy and election process begins anew).

The purpose of the secret ballot is to minimize direct political pressure on Knesset members and allow them to vote more independently. In practice, however, the election process is largely a political one: candidates for the post of comptroller usually need the support of major parties and coalition agreements. Proponents of the existing system argue that election by the Knesset is preferable to a government appointment, since the Knesset represents Israel’s sovereign rule and provides the comptroller with broad public legitimacy. In addition, a relatively long term of seven years should reduce political dependence, since the comptroller does not need the support of the political system for re-election. On the other hand, opponents of the system claim that the election process suffers from a lack of transparency. Often, the public is not sufficiently informed of the considerations that led to the election of a particular candidate, of the preliminary political discussions held, or of the deals agreed behind closed doors, and are not presented with a systematic professional comparison of the various candidates.

Generally speaking, recent election processes have been more political than in the past. Moreover, in the past, there were several occasions on which only one candidate stood for the position (for example, Justices Miriam Ben-Porat, Eliezer Goldberg, and Micha Lindenstrauss),a phenomenon that actually received some criticism at the time. By contrast, the last two elections (in which Justice Yosef Shapira and Matanyahu Englman were elected) were much more competitive and more political. When Englman stood for election as state comptroller in 2019, he faced Maj. Gen. (res.) Giora Rom on the ballot, receiving 67 votes contrary to Rom's 48 votes. Englman was considered Prime Minister Netanyahu’s preferred candidate, while Rom was seen as the opposition candidate. It should also be noted that this election was held during an election, just a few days after the 21st Knesset was dissolved, which suggested that there is no restriction on electing a comptroller after the dissolution of the Knesset.

What is the relationship between the state comptroller and the Knesset?

As noted, the Knesset elects the comptroller by secret ballot.

According to section 6(a) of the State Comptroller Law, “the comptroller shall act in coordination with the Knesset State Audit Affairs Committee and shall provide it with a report on his actions at any time he deems necessary or when required by the Committee.” This means that in performing their duties, the comptroller is accountable only to the Knesset; not to the government they audit. Constitutionally, the comptroller acts on behalf of the Knesset and is responsible for assisting it in fulfilling one of its main functions: oversight of the executive branch. In practice, the deliberations of the State Audit Affairs Committee are indeed based on reports produced by the state comptroller (though sometimes these discussions spill over into other topics), and the staff of the State Comptroller’s Office frequently attend the Committee’s meetings, and sometimes meetings of other Knesset committees. Each year, the Committee submits a report to the Knesset for approval, summarizing its discussions of the state comptroller’s annual report (“Summaries and Suggestions of the State Audit Affairs Committee”).

One of the unique aspects of the relationship between the state comptroller and the Knesset concerns state commissions of inquiry. According to the State Comptroller Law, the Knesset State Audit Affairs Committee is empowered to decide to establish a state commission of inquiry following findings presented in a state comptroller’s report. This decision may be made at the initiative of the committee or in response to the comptroller’s proposal, and the provisions of the Commissions of Inquiry Law (1968) will apply to it. This possibility gives the state comptroller a special constitutional status: The comptrollers' reports are not only a tool for professional auditing, but also a potential basis for the application of public investigative mechanisms with much broader powers. Over the years, the Committee has established four state commissions of inquiry following audit reports—most recently in 2009, with the establishment of the Matza Commission into the treatment of evacuees from Gush Katif and northern Samaria by the relevant authorities.

However, it should be noted that the establishment of a state commission of inquiry is likely to be blocked in practice by the coalition’s majority representation on the Committee if the government opposes it, despite the fact that the Committee is always headed by a Knesset member from the opposition (Knesset Rules of Procedure, section 106(a)(2)).

The reciprocal relationship between the role of the state comptroller and that of state commissions of inquiry has recently been the subject of public, legal, and political debate in the context of the investigation into the events of  October 7, 2023. A discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of the current overview.

What is the state comptroller’s role in Knesset elections and local elections?

One of the areas in which the state comptroller enjoys relatively significant powers is that of party financing. According to the Party Financing Law (1973), the state comptroller is required to audit the accounts of the parties that run in Knesset elections, the accounts of the factions and candidates in local government elections, and the accounts of candidates in party primaries. In addition, the comptroller conducts an audit of the current accounts of the parties represented in the Knesset. The law imposes detailed reporting obligations on parties and factions. They must present their sources of funding, election expenses, donations received, and how their accounts are managed. The comptroller examines whether the parties have acted in accordance with the provisions of the law, and if not, may determine that the funding regulations were violated and impose financial sanctions. In this context, it is important to note that with regard to elections, most of the auditing is carried out retroactively. The comptroller examines the financial statements after the elections and publishes its findings, and only then can it be determined that the provisions of the law have been violated, and fines may be imposed.

In accordance with the provisions of section 10(c) of the Party Financing Law, the state comptroller also publishes a notice prior to the general elections concerning the registration and reporting obligations of all entities carrying out electoral activities. These entities are organizations and bodies that are not official parties but that work to influence public opinion during an election period. This expansion is designed to address indirect political activity, external funding, and non-transparent influence on public discourse. However, due to the way the law was designed, and in part due to the restrictions imposed on entities that are active in elections, no body or individual has registered as such to date.

State comptrollers over the years: A historical comparison and their public influence

Over the years, the institution of the state comptroller has also been shaped by the personalities and styles of the comptrollers themselves. Although the powers of the comptroller are fixed in the law, the manner in which these powers are exercised has changed over different periods and across different officeholders. Siegfried Moses, the first state comptroller, served during the early years of the state and contributed to the establishment of an independent audit institution in a young country, with an emphasis on budgetary, administrative, and financial auditing. Yitzhak Nebenzahl, who served for 20 years between 1961 and 1981, contributed to the further consolidation of the institution and to the expansion of systemic public audit. Yitzhak Tunik (1982–1987) and later Eliezer Goldberg (1998–2005) largely represented a more balanced and measured approach, which focused on enhancing the professionalism of audit work and later on establishing the State Comptroller’s Office as a stable, non-partisan institution.

One of the most influential figures in the history of the State Comptroller’s Office was Miriam Ben-Porat, who served for ten years, between 1988 and 1998, and was the first and only woman to hold the position so far. During her term of office, she particularly strengthened audit activity focused on ethical behavior, with an emphasis on improper appointments, conflicts of interest, and improper use of governmental power. Ben-Porat contributed to shaping the public perception that the State Comptroller’s Office is not only an administrative audit body, but also a gatekeeper of democracy. The tenure of Micha Lindenstrauss, who served from 2005 to 2012, marked a further shift toward more assertive and active public criticism, with prominent use of the media and an intensification of the focus on the personal responsibility of officials. His critics argued that his approach turned the State Comptroller’s Office into an overly active political and public actor, while his supporters saw it as a necessary strengthening of oversight and deterrence. Yosef Shapira (2012–2019) expanded the scope of the State Comptroller’s Office to include broader public and social issues, with an emphasis on the connection between the state audit and citizens’ daily lives. Matanyahu Englman, who has been in office since 2019, is identified with the view that state audit should be constructive and focus on streamlining, reducing regulation, and improving the functioning of public systems. Opponents of this approach argue that it weakens the status of the state comptroller as a gatekeeper because it reduces the critical tone of audit reports.

This historical comparison shows that the influence of state auditors stems not only from the formal powers granted to them, but also from how they perceive their role. Some have seen the State Comptroller’s Office as a professional-managerial body, whereas others have emphasized the importance of integrity and the fight against corruption. In practice, the public and the political system have tended to see comptrollers who succeeded in having a broad impact on public discourse and connecting professional auditing with a demand for public responsibility as more influential. Among the most prominent state comptroller reports over the years, which have gained great public and political attention, are the 1984 report on bank stocks, the 1999 report on the Tze’elim Bet disaster, the 2007 report on the home front during the Second Lebanon War, the 2012 report on the Carmel forest fire, the 2015 housing crisis report, among others.

Table 1. State comptrollers in Israel over the years

Name	Term of office	Education	Previous position
Siegfried Moses	1949–1961	PhD in law	Member of the Provisional State Council and expert in public economics
Yitzhak Nebenzahl	1961–1982	PhD in law	Director-general of the Ministry of Finance
Yitzhak Tunik	1982–1987	Law	Justice on the Jerusalem Magistrates’ Court
Yaakov Malz (resigned after a year after being appointed to the Supreme Court)	1987–1988	Law	Justice on the Tel Aviv District Court
Miriam Ben-Porat	1988–1998	Law	Justice on the Supreme Court
Eliezer Goldberg	1998–2005	Law	Justice on the Supreme Court
Micha Lindenstrauss	2005–2012	Law	Justice on the Haifa District Court
Yosef Shapira	2012–2019	Law	Justice on the Tel Aviv District Court and director-general of the Rabbinical Courts
Matanyahu Englman	2019–2026	Economics, business administration, accounting	Director-general of the Council for Higher Education and director-general of the Technion

 

Conclusion: What influence does the state comptroller have on policy design?

The academic literature on the state comptroller in Israel emphasizes that this is a relatively unusual institution compared with other public audit bodies in the democratic world. On the one hand, the State Comptroller’s Office has no direct enforcement powers in most areas of public life; yet on the other hand, over the years, it has succeeded in influencing to some degree or other the public agenda, government policy, and even perceptions of public responsibility. As early as the 1980s, researchers claimed that the state comptroller in Israel had gradually deviated from the classic model of accounting auditing and gained a degree of political and public influence, because the Office did not restrict itself to examining technical compliance with the law or with budgetary rules, but sometimes also reviewed policy decisions and presented alternatives. Sharkansky[1] also described the institution of the state comptroller as one that “pushes the boundaries of state audit by addressing political behavior, public responsibility, and governmental norms.”

At the same time, the influence of the State Comptroller’s Office remains limited, as it depends on the willingness of the political and public system to adopt its conclusions. For example, a research study that examined the impact of the comptroller’s reports on water policy in Israel found that only a small part of the audit findings led to a direct change in policy. The study found that out of hundreds of deficiencies examined, only a minority were corrected as a direct result of the audit, and these corrections were also sometimes relatively limited.[2] It therefore seems that the power of the State Comptroller’s Office depends on its public and professional legitimacy. The greater this legitimacy, the greater the Office’s ability to influence the public agenda and perceptions of governmental responsibility, as the body whose role is to warn, expose, and demand accountability from the political and bureaucratic system.

 

 

[1] Ira Sharkansky, “Israel’s Auditor as Policy-Maker,” Public Administration, 66(1), 77–89, 1988; Ira Sharkansky, “Israel’s State Comptroller and Public Administration,” Israel Affairs, 7(4), 133–149, 1988.

[2] Tamar Milgrom and Robert Schwartz, “Israel’s Auditor as Policy Change Agent: The Case of Water Policy,” International Journal of Public Administration, 31(8), 862–877, 2008.