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Postponing Knesset Elections: Conditions and Restrictions

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Holding elections on schedule is one of the fundamental principles of democracy. Yet in certain emergency situations, there may be no choice but to postpone them. Under what circumstances does the law permit elections to be delayed and what safeguards are in place to ensure that such a decision is made solely on substantive grounds?

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The Fundamental Principle: Knesset Elections Should Not Be Postponed

Holding regular elections within a fixed period and on a predetermined date is one of the fundamental principles of democracy, both generally and in Israel in particular.[1] An infringement of this principle, outside of the framework of a national emergency, would make it difficult to define a country as democratic.[2]

In Israel, the foundational provisions governing this issue are set out in Basic-Law: The Knesset. Section 8 of the Basic Law stipulates that "the term of office of the Knesset shall be four years from the day on which it is elected," while section 9 provides that "the elections to the Knesset shall take place on the third Tuesday of the month of Heshvan in the year in which the term of the outgoing Knesset ends [...]". It should be noted that this analysis deals with postponing Knesset elections. Very different rules apply to the postponement of local elections, making such a postponement considerably easier.[3]

Nevertheless, Knesset elections are not always held on their scheduled date. There is, however, a major distinction between holding early elections - which is not considered a departure from the principle of regular elections (indeed, most Knesset elections since the establishment of the state have been held early) - and postponing elections beyond the date prescribed in the Basic Law, which can seriously undermine that principle.

The potential harm to the foundations of democratic government from postponing elections is so severe that Justice Mishael Cheshin took the view that a particular Knesset has no authority at all to enact a provision extending its own term, even in a Basic Law:

"Suppose a particular Knesset enacts a Basic Law stipulating that its own term will be extended by another four years beyond the four years established in section 8 of Basic-Law: The Knesset ("The term of office of the Knesset shall be four years from the day on which it is elected"). In other words: a particular Knesset was elected for four years and now declares that it will serve for a full eight years. In my view, such a law would be manifestly unlawful - as a matter of law - even if all 120 Members of Knesset voted in favor of it (seeking to extend their own term). The people elected the Knesset for four years only. The people did not authorize the Knesset to extend its own term for another four years."[4]

The effort to avoid postponing elections was also clearly evident during the COVID-19 pandemic. Unlike in some other countries,[5] Israel made special efforts to adapt its elections to pandemic conditions rather than postpone them.[6]

Nevertheless, there are clearly exceptional circumstances in which it is practically impossible to hold elections on schedule. Justice Cheshin himself recognized this distinction, clarifying that when he argued that the Knesset lacked the authority to extend its own term, he was not referring to the postponement of elections during an emergency: "We are not speaking, of course, of an emergency and of extending [the Knesset's] term for the duration of that emergency."[7]

Insisting on holding elections on schedule during an emergency could endanger lives or undermine the ability to uphold other fundamental principles. For example, holding elections during an emergency could impair democratic principles such as general and nationwide elections (because some eligible voters, particularly in certain areas, may find it difficult or impossible to vote); equal elections (because the situation could disproportionately affect certain candidate lists - for example, those whose supporters are concentrated in areas where voting is more difficult or dangerous); and fair elections (if the emergency impedes the vote-counting process).[8]

The question, therefore, is: What are the conditions for postponing Knesset elections, and what limitations apply?

Below we describe several mechanisms that can result in some form of postponement. It is important to emphasize at the outset, however, that only the first involves an actual postponement of the election date. The other mechanisms involve far shorter and more specific delays or interruptions.

1. Postponing the Election Date in Special Circumstances

The potential justification for postponing Knesset elections is an emergency. Indeed, even before the legal framework discussed below was adopted, the Knesset postponed elections because of the Yom Kippur War, which broke out on October 6, 1973. Elections originally scheduled for October 30, 1973, were postponed and instead held on December 31, 1973. The postponement was enacted in a law passed with virtually no opposition on October 25, 1973; in its third reading, 67 Members of Knesset voted in favor and one voted against.[9]

In 1996, a provision in Basic-Law: The Knesset came into force restricting the Knesset's power to postpone elections even in an emergency. The provision was enacted together with provisions of Basic-Law: The Government,[10] which established the direct election of the prime minister (direct elections were since repealed), as well as the current constitutional framework governing emergency legislation.[11]

The relevant provision is section 9A of Basic-Law: The Knesset:

"(a) The Knesset shall not extend its term except by a law passed by a majority of eighty Members of Knesset and where special circumstances exist that prevent elections from being held on time; the period of extension shall not exceed the time necessitated by those circumstances; the law shall set the date of the elections; [...]"

Section 9A(a) itself is entrenched and can be amended only by a majority of at least 80 Members of Knesset.[12] In addition, the provisions governing the postponement of elections - like the other provisions of Basic-Law: The Knesset - cannot be altered, temporarily suspended, or made subject to conditions through emergency regulations (pursuant to section 44 of Basic-Law: The Knesset).

Several cumulative conditions for postponing elections can therefore be identified:

  1. The decision must be made by the Knesset. It cannot, for example, be made by a government decision, including through emergency regulations.
  2. The postponement can be enacted only by law.
  3. The law must be passed by a majority of at least 80 Members of Knesset. This is particularly important because, in most cases - including at present, ahead of the elections to the 26th Knesset - it means that significant opposition support must also be secured.[13]
  4. Special circumstances must exist that prevent the elections from being held on time.
  5. The same law must establish the new election date.
  6. The postponement must be kept to the minimum period necessitated by the special circumstances. If circumstances change after the law has been enacted and the postponement can be shortened, section 9A(b) allows the Knesset to do so by a decision supported by 61 Members of Knesset, "provided that the new date shall not be earlier than the date for holding elections to the Knesset pursuant to section 9" - in other words, the elections cannot be brought forward to a date earlier than the original election date prescribed by the Basic Law.[14]

In a lecture delivered on June 23, 2026, Justice Noam Sohlberg, Chair of the Central Elections Committee, and Adv. Din Livne, Acting Director General of the Committee, outlined six principles for a decision to postpone elections:

  1. The principle of necessity: The burden of proving that the elections must be postponed rests with those seeking the postponement.
  2. The principle of temporariness: Any postponement must be for a limited and clearly defined period.
  3. The principle of institutional pluralism: The decision should be made jointly by different branches or institutions of government.
  4. The principle of last resort: Elections should be postponed only if there is no alternative way to hold them.
  5. The principle of transparency and reasoned justification: A postponement must be based on publicly available facts that can be scrutinized.
  6. The principle of a return to normalcy: A decision to postpone the elections must include, from the outset, a framework for ending the exceptional arrangement.[15]

The Importance of Judicial Review of a Knesset Decision to Postpone Elections

It is important to emphasize that the Knesset has an inherent conflict of interest when deciding whether to postpone elections. This is a situation in which the Knesset is, in effect, "legislating for itself," potentially in conflict with one of the fundamental principles of democracy.

While the requirement for a majority of at least 80 Members of Knesset means that, in most cases, significant opposition support for a postponement will be necessary, it does not resolve the inherent conflict of interest of the Knesset as an institution or of individual Members of Knesset. It is also possible - and has occurred in the past - for a governing coalition itself to hold 80 or more seats, in which case opposition support would not, in practice, be necessary in order to postpone the elections.

Two important conclusions follow from this, and are also reflected in the principles outlined by Justice Sohlberg and Adv. Livne:

  1. First, the "special circumstances" must be genuinely exceptional: a real emergency that makes it impossible to hold elections on time. The burden of proving that such circumstances exist rests with those seeking the postponement.
  2. Second, particularly given this inherent conflict of interest, judicial review by the High Court of Justice is essential to ensure that the Knesset does not exceed its authority and effectively extend its own term for improper reasons.[16]

2. Special Powers for a Short Delay in Voting at a Particular Polling Station

Where elections are held on their scheduled date, but special circumstances arise in the vicinity of a particular polling station on the eve of Election Day or on Election Day itself that could interfere with the proper conduct of voting, the Knesset Elections Law grants special powers to the Presidency of the Central Elections Committee.

The Presidency consists of the Committee Chair - who is a Supreme Court justice selected by the justices of the Supreme Court - and the deputy chairs. The deputies are representatives of the four largest parliamentary groups in the Knesset, currently Likud, Yesh Atid, Shas, and Blue and White-National Unity Party. The number of deputies can be increased to eight, in which case the Knesset House Committee determines which parliamentary groups they will represent.

These provisions authorize the Presidency of the Central Elections Committee to delay the opening of a particular polling station, suspend and subsequently resume voting, and extend voting hours - provided that voting is permitted no later than 24 hours after the statutory closing time for polling stations. Section 70A(a) of the Knesset Elections Law provides:

"Where the Chair of the Central Committee and the deputy chairs determine, on the eve of Election Day or on Election Day, that special circumstances exist in a particular polling district which prevent, or in their opinion may prevent, the proper conduct of voting, they may order that the opening of the polling station be delayed, that voting be suspended and subsequently resumed, or that voting hours be extended, provided that voting shall not be permitted more than 24 hours after the closing time established in section 72; they may also direct that voting be conducted in the manner applicable to a member of a polling station committee [...]."[17]

A similar provision was first included in election legislation as a temporary provision for the 1969 elections - that is, as legislation applying only to that particular election.[18] The background was an incident during the Histadrut elections in Kiryat Shmona that year, when voting was halted and subsequently invalidated because of Katyusha rocket fire.[19]

Against this background, the government proposed allowing the Chair of the Central Elections Committee and the deputy chairs to delay voting by up to 48 hours.[20] Following opposition from Members of Knesset to a 48-hour delay, it was ultimately decided to permit a maximum delay of 24 hours.[21] Similar provisions were included in subsequent election laws,[22] and in 1988 the provision became a permanent part of the Knesset Elections Law.[23]

The discretion under this provision is vested in the Chair of the Central Elections Committee and the deputy chairs. When the permanent provision was enacted, concerns were raised that "party operatives," in the form of the deputy chairs of the Central Elections Committee, might order delays in opening polling stations for improper reasons.[24] For this reason, some supported vesting the authority exclusively in the Committee Chair, who, as noted above, is a judge.[25]

3. Additional Powers During an Attack

Additional legal provisions grant various officials the authority to interrupt voting at a particular polling station during an attack.

Regulations 120-123 of the Knesset Elections Regulations, 5733-1973, provide that if "a siren has been sounded, or enemy action has commenced," the secretary of the polling station committee - a representative of the Central Elections Committee rather than of a candidate list - may declare voting suspended and allow committee members and observers to seek shelter. Before doing so, the secretary must secure the ballot box and election materials. The secretary must notify the Chair of the Central Elections Committee and the chair of the relevant regional committee, and voting must resume as soon as circumstances permit.

In addition, under section 9D of the Civil Defense Law, 5711-1951, during a "special home front situation" (which is generally declared by the government or the minister of defense and must be approved within several days by the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee) or during an "attack," certain senior officers specified in the law may issue any instruction necessary to protect or save human life or property.

Among other things, the law expressly authorizes them to require people to remain in a particular place, including a shelter or protected space. Home Front Command officers also have powers on the ground, including the authority to prevent entry into or exit from an area when necessary to protect life or property.[26]

If a polling station is located in an area subject to such an order, the practical result could conceivably be the suspension of voting and evacuation of those present, even if the military order itself is not framed as an order "to suspend voting." On its face, granting a military commander alone such authority in relation to the conduct of elections appears problematic.

However, perhaps in response to this difficulty, special provisions have been enacted for the current elections to the 26th Knesset that will apply to these elections alone, notwithstanding the provisions of the Civil Defense Law or directives issued under it.

Among other things, these provisions stipulate that during a special home front situation or an attack, the Chair of the Central Elections Committee, after consulting with the IDF Chief of Staff or a person authorized by the chief of staff for this purpose, may issue directives concerning matters specified in the Civil Defense Law that will apply at a polling station or at another location where election committees are carrying out election-related activities.

These directives must take account of directives already in force in the relevant area under the Civil Defense Law, while ensuring that the right to vote can be exercised and that the elections can proceed properly. The Chair of the Central Elections Committee is also authorized, after consulting with the IDF Chief of Staff, to establish rules relating to the implementation or application of the Civil Defense Law insofar as they could affect the proper conduct of the elections.

These provisions do not apply to powers under the Civil Defense Law relating to the sounding of a siren or the issuance of advance instructions in response to an enemy attack for the purpose of immediately protecting human life.[27]

It should be emphasized that, as of the time of writing, a special home front situation has been declared through October 20, 2026,[28] a week before Election Day. Assuming that the declaration is extended and remains in force on Election Day, both the powers granted to military authorities under the Civil Defense Law and the limitations placed on those powers through the authority granted to the Chair of the Central Elections Committee under the special provisions enacted for the upcoming elections will apply.

 

[1] Amnon Rubinstein and Barak Medina, The Constitutional Law of the State of Israel, p. 560 (Vol. II, 2005).

[2] Robert Dahl, On Democracy (2002).

[3] See Assaf Shapira and Ariel Finkelstein, "The Bill to Postpone Local Elections Due to the War Is Justified, but the Election Financing Rules Will Also Need to Be Amended," Israel Democracy Institute website (October 25, 2023), https://www.idi.org.il/knesset-committees/51103.

[4] CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Cooperative Village, IsrSC 49(4) 221, 544 (1995).

[5] Avital Friedman and Ofer Kenig, "Elections in the Shadow of COVID-19 - How It Was Done Around the World," Israel Democracy Institute website (December 27, 2020), https://www.idi.org.il/articles/33220.

[6] Avital Friedman, Ofer Kenig, Assaf Shapira, and Guy Lurie, "Elections in the Shadow of a Pandemic: Challenges in Administering Knesset Elections During the COVID-19 Pandemic," Israel Democracy Institute website (December 2020), https://www.idi.org.il/equality-in-elections-workshop/0/?chapter=51700.

[7] Bank Mizrahi, supra note 5, at p. 545.

[8] The principles of general, nationwide, and equal elections are enshrined in section 4 of Basic-Law: The Knesset. The principle of fair elections is related to the principle of secret elections, which is also enshrined in that section, and is widely recognized in the literature examining the conditions for democratic government (see, for example, Dahl, supra note 2).

[9] Elections to the Eighth Knesset and Local Authorities (Temporary Provision) Law, 5734-1973; Knesset Proceedings, October 25, 1973, p. 4575.

[10] Basic-Law: The Government, Book of Laws 5752, p. 214. [Hebrew]

[11] On this framework, see Guy Lurie, Amir Fuchs, and Daphne Benvenisty, Emergency Regulations: A Proposal for Constitutional Reform (Israel Democracy Institute, 2023). [Hebrew]

[12] Pursuant to sections 45 and 45A of Basic-Law: The Knesset. The required majority for an amendment applies in the first, second, and third readings. It has been argued that section 45A itself is not entrenched, and that it would therefore be possible first to amend it by a regular majority so as to reduce the majority required to amend section 9A(a); then to amend section 9A(a) so as to reduce the majority required to postpone the election date; and finally to postpone the elections by law passed by a regular majority. In our view, however, this is a strained interpretation of the law, and amendments of this kind certainly cannot be permitted to take immediate effect.

[13] For criticism of the legal and public legitimacy of this provision - which limits the Knesset's legislative authority by requiring a majority of 80 Members of Knesset, despite itself having been enacted by a smaller majority - see Justice Cheshin's opinion in Bank Mizrahi, supra note 5, p. 544. [Hebrew]

[14] Section 9A(b) of Basic-Law: The Knesset ("[...] the Knesset may, by a decision of a majority of its Members, bring forward the election date determined pursuant to subsection (a), provided that the new date shall not be earlier than the date for holding elections to the Knesset pursuant to section 9").

[15] Avi Ben Har, "Elections Can Be Postponed During an Emergency, but the Conditions Must Be Closely Examined," Zman Yisrael (June 24, 2026), https://www.zman.co.il/697947/. [Hebrew]

[16] These points are reflected in the legislative debates surrounding the Basic Law provision. Members of Knesset expressed concern about allowing Members of Knesset themselves to determine that circumstances exist which prevent the proper conduct of elections. As MK Mordechai Virshubski explained:

"What are 'circumstances that prevent the proper conduct of elections'? Can Members of Knesset themselves really determine this? [...] Suppose the two largest parties together reach a majority of 80 and say: things are going so well, and the prime minister is so comfortable, that they decide to extend the Knesset's term; and in the State of Israel, special circumstances are very easy to find or very easy to create. I remember what happened during the Yom Kippur War, and I understand that in special circumstances and for a limited period it should be possible to extend the Knesset's term. But I still ask whether another institution could not be the one to determine that special circumstances have indeed arisen, rather than the Knesset itself. Over the years, we have taken out of our own hands the authority to set our salaries and other matters, and perhaps it would be desirable to take this matter out of the Knesset's hands as well. My question, therefore, is whether it is possible to create a somewhat different mechanism for extending the term."

(Minutes of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee of the 12th Knesset, June 25, 1991.)

The legislature chose the term "special circumstances" in order to emphasize the exceptional nature of the circumstances required - a genuine emergency. During the legislative process, Members of Knesset also emphasized the importance of judicial review by the Supreme Court to ensure that the circumstances are indeed exceptional and require postponement of the elections. As MK Hagai Merom explained with regard to the arrangement that was ultimately adopted:

"First, I suggest that we accommodate MK Virshubski by writing 'special circumstances' rather than 'circumstances,' in order to make clear that this must be an exceptional situation. Second, if we are speaking of special circumstances, a petition can be filed with the High Court of Justice. In other words, if the Knesset were to regard a completely ordinary situation as special circumstances, the Supreme Court could always say that these are not special circumstances."

(Ibid.)

[17] Knesset Elections Law [Consolidated Version], 5729-1969. [Hebrew]

[18] Knesset Elections (Temporary Provisions) Law, 5730-1969. [Hebrew]

[19] Haaretz (September 5, 1969). [Hebrew]

[20] Knesset Elections (Temporary Provisions) Bill, 5730-1969, Bills 2. [Hebrew]

[21] Hayom (September 26, 1969). [Hebrew]

[22] See, for example, section 30 of the Elections to the Tenth Knesset (Temporary Provision) Law, 5741-1981. [Hebrew]

[23] Knesset Elections Law (Amendment No. 18), 5748-1988. [Hebrew]

[24] See the remarks of MK Matityahu Peled, Knesset Proceedings, November 30, 1987, p. 648. [Hebrew]

[25] See the remarks of MK Dan Meridor, ibid., p. 650. [Hebrew]

[26] Amichai Cohen and Mirit Lavi, "Operation Roaring Lion: A Special Home Front Situation," Israel Democracy Institute website (March 2, 2026), https://www.idi.org.il/articles/63604.

[27] Section 6(6) of the Elections to the Twenty-Sixth Knesset (Special Provisions and Legislative Amendments) Law, 5786-2026.

[28] Notice of the Secretary of the Government following the Government’s meeting of October 6, 2026 (October 7, 2026), https://www.gov.il/he/pages/gov-mes071026. [Hebrew]