What is the “MK Expulsion Law?"
The Knesset passed Amendment 44 in 2016 to regulate the possibility of impeaching MK's. An MK can be expelled if the Knesset finds that his or her actions constituted incitement to racism or support of an armed struggle against Israel.
The Knesset vote to expel MK Cassif. Photo by Chaim Goldberg/Flash90
Deliberations about the expulsion of a Knesset member—also known as impeachment—can begin after a request by 70 MKs, including at least 10 members of the opposition • An MK can be expelled if the Knesset finds that his or her actions constituted incitement to racism or support of an armed struggle against Israel • An MK who has been expelled is entitled to appeal the decision to the Supreme Court, which will consider whether the action was justified and compatible with the grounds and proofs for the expulsion.
The Knesset passed Amendment 44 to the Basic Law: The Knesset (“the MK Expulsion Law”) in July 2016. According to this amendment §42a(3) of the Basic Law: The Knesset is empowered, following a special procedure and with a supermajority, to expel one of its members. Since that there have only been two requests to expel (AKA impeach) a Member of Knesset that have been debated in the Knesset House Committee: MK Ofer Cassif in 2024 and now MK Ayman Odah.
The Basic Law states explicitly that a precondition for expulsion of a member is that “it has determined that what is said in article 7a(a)(2) or (3) regarding a candidate, applies to him, after that Knesset was elected.” In other words, the Knesset must have determined, inter alia, that the MK’s actions constitute “incitement to racism” or “support for an armed struggle by an enemy state, or of a terrorist organization, against the State of Israel.” Note that the amendment, unlike in paragraph, §7(a), which applies to Knesset candidates prior to election, does not include “denying the existence of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state” as grounds for expulsion.
The procedure is laid forth in the Basic Law: The Knesset as well as in the Knesset Law. Expulsion proceedings can begin only after a request has been submitted by 70 MKs, of whom at least 10 must be affiliated with the opposition.The Basic Law: The Knesset, §42a(c)(3). The request, accompanied by evidence and arguments, must be submitted to the Speaker of the Knesset.The Knesset Law, §8a(a). The MK in question must be informed of the House Committee session that takes up the matter at least 10 days in advance. The committee may not reach a decision before it has given the MK and the Attorney General a chance to state their case. The MK is entitled to be represented by an attorney.The Knesset Law, §8a(c)3–4. A committee decision to proceed with the expulsion requires a three-fourths majority.The Basic Law: The Knesset, §42a(c)(2). A committee decision against expulsion is final. If it does recommend expulsion, the Knesset plenum must convene to take up the matter; expulsion requires that 90 MKs vote in favor. That is, while 70 MKs are required to advance the initial request for expulsion, a 90 MK supermajority is required in the Knesset for final approval of the expulsion.
If the Knesset approves the expulsion, the MK has the right to appeal the decision to the Supreme Court.The Basic Law: The Knesset, §42a(c)(4). This is not a petition to the High Court of Justice, but an appeal of the decision itself. Therefore, it is not a question of whether the Knesset has overstepped its authority or made an unreasonable decision, but rather of whether expulsion is justified on the basis of the evidence and grounds alleged. Even though such a proceeding has never taken place, it will probably be similar to those about disqualification of a candidate or the granting or removal of an MK’s parliamentary immunity. Experience shows that the court will delve into the substance of the matter, unlike its custom when exercising oversight of other Knesset actions. This is because the expulsion procedure is quasi-judicial. The Knesset is not voting for a political decision, but has made a legal finding that deals a heavy blow to the right to vote and be elected.
When an appeal was filed against the expulsion amendment after its passage, now-retired Chief Justice Esther Hayut wrote as follows:
Judicial review of an expulsion decision based on the law is anchored as an inherent part of the mechanism to terminate membership. Taking note of the quasi-judicial nature of the expulsion power, we are dealing with judicial review of relatively broad purview.HCJ 577416, Ben-Meir v. the Knesset (27.5.2018), §31 of Justice Hayut’s opinion.
Justice Hayut added that, “given the common purpose underlying the Expulsion Law on the one hand and §7a of the Basic Law, on the other, it is appropriate that the standards set in rulings about application of the mechanism established by §7a of the Basic Law guide the Knesset for implementation of the mechanism stated in the Expulsion Law as well.” In future proceedings “according to these standards, it would be appropriate that the expulsion power be exercised in a precise and limited fashion and only in extreme and highly exceptional cases".Ibid. It seems plausible, then, that the court, when engaged in judicial review of a decision to disqualify a candidate, will insist on unambiguous, clear, and persuasive proofs that demonstrate the existence of one of the two grounds: incitement to racism or support for an armed struggle against the State of Israel. If the evidence does not sustain the existence of either of these, the court is likely to intervene and overturn the Knesset’s decision, even though it was passed by the requisite three-fourth majority.
High Court petitions asking the law be struck down were filed after the passage of the Expulsion Law. The main argument was that it might deal a grievous blow to the right to vote and stand as an MK, made by a body that is not appropriate for doing so. The claim was that the Knesset, as a political entity, is not the forum for hearing testimony in order to reach a quasi-judicial decision. It was further alleged that the Knesset has an inherent conflict of interest when it considers expelling one of its members, in part because of non-objective electoral considerations. What is more, the amendment, it was asserted, was meant to apply mainly to MKs representing Arab parties; making the legislation personal in nature. In addition, because the two grounds stated (incitement to racism and support for an armed struggle) are criminal offenses, the Knesset is intruding on the separation of powers, bypassing the enforcement agencies, and usurping their role of punishing the malefactor. In 2018, the Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the petitions.HCJ 577416, Ben-Meir v. the Knesset, supra, n. 6. In its ruling the court rejected the State’s motion in limine that the petition was not “ripe” for consideration because the law had never been implemented. The court held that the tension with the right to vote and stand as a candidate was clear and would exist whenever an MK was expelled pursuant to the law.HCJ Ben-Meir, §9 of Justice Hayut’s opinion. It also rejected the petitioners’ claim that the amendment contradicted §4 of the Basic Law: The Knesset, which stipulates that elections will be general, national, direct, equal, secret, and proportional. This is an important point, because any change to that clause requires a majority of the Knesset (61 members), and such a majority did not support the bill on its first reading. The court ruled that, contrary to the petitioners’ argument, the amendment does not undermine the principle of equal elections and in any case does not apply during an election period but only during the tenure of the Knesset.Ibid., §16 of Justice Hayut’s opinion.
In fact, the most important reason the petition was rejected was that it was an amendment to a Basic Law. When the ruling was handed down, in 2018, the doctrine of an “unconstitutional constitutional amendment” had not yet been formulated (as distinct from “abuse of constituent power” for which there already was a precedent). Several justices noted, without deciding about the Supreme Court’s authority to review the constitutionality of Basic Laws, that even if it has such power, the Expulsion Law did not pose such a fundamental injury to democracy as to justify its invoking the power to review Basic Laws.Ibid., §25 of Justice Hayut’s opinion.
Even though the court recognizes that the amendment detracts from the right to vote and be voted for, as well as the right to freedom of political expression,Ibid., §26 of Justice Hayut’s opinion. it accepted the position advanced by the State and the Knesset that the law was a “complementary measure” to the power to disqualify candidates under §7a and incorporated checks and balances that were added during the legislative process. These include the deletion of the vague ground of “negation of the existence of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state,” which is one of the grounds for disqualification under §7a of the Basic Law: The Knesset; the unique proceedings and special majority required; and, in particular, the existence of judicial review. This, as already mentioned, is not a High Court petition but an appeal, and consequently the court will delve into the heart of the matter and require unambiguous proof of the existence of one of the two grounds.
Internal parliamentary mechanisms for removing members of parliament from office are relatively rare in democratic countries, and their actual use is even rarer. In most countries, legislation stipulates that MPs accused or convicted of criminal offenses—or who fail to meet eligibility criteria—are automatically disqualified from serving in parliament. As such, no additional internal parliamentary procedure is necessary. Where such mechanisms do exist, they are treated as emergency measures, applied only in exceptional cases, requiring a special majority and broad cross-party support. These mechanisms are not used for political purposes.
Examples of Countries without Parliamentary Removal Mechanisms:
Countries like Germany, Canada, Australia, Finland, and Norway do not have internal parliamentary mechanisms for removing MPs. However, these countries do have laws that disqualify MPs who no longer meet eligibility criteria—such as bankruptcy, holding dual citizenship, or criminal convictions. This is similar to Israel’s Basic Law: The Knesset, which disqualifies members convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude. In these systems, removal is not subject to parliamentary votes but is instead handled through legal or judicial procedures.
Countries with Parliamentary Removal Mechanisms:
United States:
In the U.S., a sitting member of Congress (in either the House or Senate) can be expelled by a two-thirds majority vote in the relevant chamber. This is reserved for serious misconduct—such as major ethical violations or serious crimes. There is no automatic removal mechanism even upon criminal conviction, so the internal parliamentary tool fills that gap. Due to the two-party system, bipartisan cooperation is required for expulsion, making it difficult to implement.
Case Study – George Santos (2023):
Republican Congressman George Santos was expelled after being indicted for financial fraud and identity theft—though his conviction came after his removal. His expulsion was initially voted down twice due to an insufficient majority (290 votes needed). However, after a scathing ethics report was released by the Congress’s ethics committee, the House voted again, and his expulsion was approved with both Democratic and Republican support (114–311). A special election was held two months later to fill his seat.
This was only the sixth time in U.S. House history that a member was expelled and the only instance of expulsion prior to a criminal conviction (but post-indictment). The case illustrates that the internal mechanism compensates for the lack of an automatic legal disqualification process and is not used for political purposes.
United Kingdom:
In the UK House of Commons, MPs may be expelled by a two-third vote, but this mechanism is rarely used. Any MP can propose expulsion, but it is typically brought to a vote only with broad political or government support.
The last time this mechanism was used was in 1954, when MP Peter Baker was expelled after a 7-year prison sentence for fraud, at a time when there was no automatic mechanism. Since then, two additional mechanisms for expelling MPs from office have been introduced, making the internal parliamentary mechanism redundant. First, the British Representation of the People Act of 1981 determined that MPs are automatically disqualified if convicted and sentenced to at least one year in prison. Second, since 2015, voters can initiate a recall of their MP if the MP is convicted and sentenced to prison or detained; suspended from Parliament for at least 10 sitting days; or submits false or misleading financial reports. In both cases, the process of expulsion from parliament does not involve an internal parliamentary mechanism and is initiated by political peers, whereas it relies on the legal system or the constituency the relevant MP represents.
New Zealand:
New Zealand does not have an internal parliamentary mechanism for expelling MPs. Instead, it has a unique intra-party mechanism, unrelated to the Parliament as a whole.
- A political party can vote to expel one of its members from parliament by a two-thirds majority within the faction.
- If the expelled MP was elected from a national party list, the next candidate on the list replaces them.
- If the MP was elected via a specific constituency, a by-election is triggered.
Key Point: Only members of the MP’s own party (i.e., their internal caucus) can vote on their removal. Parliament as a whole has no authority to remove them.
It is worth briefly noting that the proceedings held in the Knesset Committee regarding the attempt to remove MK Ayman Odeh highlight all the concerns that were raised during the legislation of the impeachment law — namely, that the Knesset is not the appropriate body to conduct a quasi-judicial process involving the review of evidence and legal determinations.
One illustrative example is the opening statement by the Chair of the Committee, MK Ofir Katz, who was also one of the signatories to the letter calling for Odeh’s disqualification. Even before hearing any testimony — including that of MK Odeh and his attorney — Katz declared that Odeh "clearly supports terrorism" and stated, "I will not allow his term to continue," despite describing the process as "quasi-judicial" and explaining the hearing procedures.
Similarly, during the hearing, MK Moshe Saada stated:
"They say we’re in a quasi-judicial process, but does anyone even question that this man supports armed struggle and terrorism? I’m asking seriously — does anyone have any doubt about this?"
The fact that the committee chair — heading what is supposed to be a quasi-judicial body — expressed such a firm conclusion before hearing from the Knesset Legal Advisor, the Attorney General, MK Odeh, or his lawyer, and that another member of this "quasi-judicial" body declared there was "no question at all" about the outcome, fundamentally undermines the integrity of the process.
This typified the hearing, which was riddled with aggressive, politically charged speeches and disregard for the legal counsel of the Knesset Legal Advisor. For instance, legal advisors emphasized that only the specific statements referenced in the initial letter signed by 70 MKs (initiating the impeachment process) could be considered — yet even this procedural limit was ignored.
The Deputy Attorney General supported the Knesset Legal Advisor’s opinion that MK Odeh’s statement did not meet the legal threshold for impeachment. Nonetheless, the Knesset Committee disregarded this legal guidance and approved the recommendation to disqualify him.
This complete disregard for the legal opinions of both the Attorney General and the Knesset Legal Advisor represents another stage in the ongoing judicial overhaul, reflected in the repeated dismissal of professional legal positions — especially from the legal advisory apparatus.
It also exemplifies additional characteristics of the broader democratic backsliding: infringement on the rights of the Arab public (such as through budget cuts), and erosion of the right to vote and be elected. In this case, the disregard is twofold:
First, the legal grounds for impeachment in the law are tied to criminal offenses (such as supporting terrorism under the Counter-Terrorism Law, or incitement to racism under the Penal Code), which are not covered by parliamentary immunity.
Second, cooperating with an impeachment process under these conditions essentially bypasses the judgment of the legal advisory system and the state prosecution, and constitutes a vote of no confidence in their authority.
The impeachment law is highly unusual in the democratic world. In the few countries where an internal parliamentary mechanism to expel members of parliament exists, it usually compensates for the absence of automatic disqualification for failing to meet the requirements expected of representatives. Even in those states, the use of internal parliamentary impeachment is rare and not politicized.
In Israel, however, the law allows for a parliamentary impeachment mechanism even though the law already includes automatic disqualification in cases such as conviction for offenses involving moral turpitude. The fact that a parliamentary majority can remove a minority representative through a political decision severely undermines the right to vote and be elected, and the right of minority communities for representation.
These concerns were clearly illustrated in the attempt to remove MK Ayman Odeh. As opponents of the law had predicted, the Knesset is not a suitable venue for conducting quasi-judicial proceedings involving legal findings and evidence. The process devolved into a display of political speeches and personal attacks.