The Political Theater of the Haredi Conscription Compromise
At its core, this is a debate if there should be a blanket exemption for Haredi men and a target number of recruits from the community each year, or if there should be a requirement to serve with a limited number of annual. Counterintuitively, the compromise proposed by the coalition could lead to an outcome that would actually remove from the agenda a meaningful draft of Haredim.
Photo by Chaim Goldberg/Flash90
The Likud faction recently voted to replace MK Yuli Edelstein with MK Boaz Bismuth as their candidate to chair the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, due to Edelstein's refusal to advance a so-called compromise law granting an exemption from IDF service to ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) men. Edelstein argued the proposal on the table would not lead to significant enlistment of Haredim but would rather enshrine in law an exemption from enlistment for Haredim. At its core, this is a debate if there should be a blanket exemption for Haredi men and a target number of recruits from the community each year, or if there should be a requirement to serve with a limited number of annual exemptions for outstanding yeshiva students.
Contrary to Edelstein’s claim, most Likud MKs are arguing that the way to enlist Haredim and prevent a crisis is through consensus building, and therefore it is preferable to advance a proposal acceptable to Haredi lawmakers that will lead to the enlistment of several thousand Haredim, rather than forced enlistment which will only deepen the national divide.
The proposal in question would ostensibly recruit approximately 10,000 Haredi men over the course of two years (of the some 90,000 who are of conscription age) and impose penalties on those who dodge the draft.
There is great doubt as to whether the Haredim will actually enlist, even at the low numbers that were agreed upon. It is more likely that this is a tactic to buy time until elections are held—a tactic whose main effect would be the removal of the existing penalties that have already begun to impact Haredi society.
But let us play out a hypothetical scenario in which this prediction is proven wrong, and in the first stage Haredim do indeed enlist under this framework. This could lead to an outcome that would remove from the agenda a meaningful draft of Haredim.
The first test date of the proposal is at the six-month mark. In this half-year, the target is the enlistment of about 2,400—half of the annual target. Let us suppose that during these six months, Haredi leadership makes a supreme effort, and indeed this number is enlisted. In this scenario, it's likely that most of the Haredi enlistees will come from two groups. The first group is men who are, on paper, considered Haredim since they graduated from the Haredi education system, but have left the Haredi community, do not serve in the army, and do not study in yeshiva. The second group of draftees in this scenario will consist of relatively older yeshiva students, close to the exemption age (26), married and with families. These carefully selected groups would be set up to fail, giving the Haredi leadership "evidence" to prove conscription does not work.
The young men from the first group, those who have left Haredi society, would, of course, continue the non-Haredi lifestyle they led before enlistment in the military. The Haredi leadership would then claim that these men enlisted as Haredim, and it was the military that caused the “corruption” of their values. They could claim that the state and the military violated its promise that Haredi enlistees would remain Haredi. Moreover, enlistment of men who are not truly Haredim into the IDF's designated Haredi frameworks could harm the character and purpose of these frameworks, which are meant to maintain the Haredi lifestyle while serving in the IDF. The newly formed Hasmonean Brigade – which was created as a fully ultra-Orthodox infantry brigade – will succeed in attracting Haredim only if it maintains the community's identity, and not one of the fringe groups on the margins.
Regarding the men from the second group, they will not be suitable for military service in combat or combat-support roles. These are mostly fathers with large families, and the military will likely struggle to place them in meaningful service. Economically, it would also be quite costly to the IDF, as family payments are provided to soldiers who are parents. Given these circumstances, it is likely that many of them will receive exemptions or speedy discharges. This outcome could provide evidence to Haredi leaders seeking to “prove” that the army is not really interested in drafting Haredim.
So, under this scenario, the concern is that after six months in which, ostensibly, Haredi society meets the enlistment target, the Haredim will demand the cancellation of the entire arrangement, claiming it has been proven that the IDF did not meet its promise to allow Haredi service without changing their lifestyle, and that in any case, the army is not interested in their service. The Haredim will also demand the removal of the few penalties already imposed, and the cancellation of the entire compromise – after all, they've proven it is not good for the state.
A draft proposal based on “targets” is subject to this type of manipulation by Haredi leadership, which seeks to maintain the status quo and is not willing to recognize that the draft obligation applies to its sons as it does to large segments of Israeli society. The only true solution is to impose a universal obligation to serve, while granting an exemption to a small group of outstanding Torah scholars, and imposing effective and immediate penalties on draft dodgers. It may well be that in the current Knesset, such a law cannot be passed. In that case, the current draft obligation stipulated in the Security Service Law will continue to apply to members of the Haredi society, and if they evade enlistment, they will have to bear the economic and criminal consequences entailed. These will not lead to the enlistment of all Haredi men obligated to serve, but will certainly lead to more significant enlistment than the compromise outline, which is nothing more than political theater.