Less than a Third Optimistic about Israel’s Internal Security
44% of Israelis are optimistic about Israel’s external security– only 28% are optimistic regarding Israel’s internal security.
- There was a sharp decline this month in the share of those who are optimistic about Israel’s security, while the level of optimism about the future of democratic rule in Israel has remained steady. In both cases, only a minority of the public is optimistic.
- Relative to the two previous months, there has been a fall in optimism about both Israel’s internal security and its external (military) security. On the Right, optimists form the highest group, and in the case of external security they constitute an outright majority.
- This month saw a sharp increase in the proportion of those who define Israel’s overall situation as bad or very bad. Indeed, this was the highest percentage measured since the Second Lebanon War, which of course marked a nadir in national morale.
- The level of public trust in the Supreme Court has not changed recently, despite the Court being at the center of the struggle currently dividing Israeli society.
- We found a certain rise in the share of those who reported having participated in some form of protest activity against the changes being led by the government. However, protesters are still mainly limited to very particular groups in the Israeli public: Jews; the Left; secular Israelis; and older Israelis.
- The assessment that Israel’s overall situation today is bad or very bad is far more common among those who have participated in protests than among those who do not report having taken part.
- There has been a rise in perceived legitimacy of all forms of protest, with the exception of not paying taxes. The share of those who consider it legitimate not to show up for IDF reserve duty has slightly increased relative to last month, though they remain a minority.
- There is much greater support for all forms of protest among those who reported having participated in protests than among those who did not.
- We also found a rise this month in the share of respondents who agree that in certain circumstances, the use of violence for political ends is justified.
- There was an increase in the proportion of those who believe that broad public protests will not have an effect on the government’s legislative program. However, a small majority still hold the view that protests can moderate, delay, or even cancel the reforms.
- Like last month, the majority of respondents have not given serious thought to obtaining a foreign passport nor taken action to do so. However, the proportion of those who have considered it or taken action is four times higher among those who have participated in protest activities than among those who have not. The same holds true about transferring funds abroad.
- Half of all respondents think that Israel’s situation today is worse than it was before the formation of the current government in terms of the country’s security and its economy. Regarding foreign and diplomatic relations and tensions between different groups in society, a majority hold that the situation today is worse.
- A majority of respondents are worried about being harmed by a terror attack during the upcoming month of Ramadan, with the highest level of concern recorded among residents of Judea and Samaria.
While the level of optimism about the future of democratic rule in Israel remained the same as last month (38%), the share of those who are optimistic about the future of Israel’s national security declined sharply this month from 46% (in January) to 31%—the second lowest finding since we began asking this question in April 2019.
Optimistic about the future of democratic rule in Israel and about the future of national security, April 2019–February 2023 (total sample; %)
There is a large difference between Arabs and Jews in optimism about the future of democratic rule in Israel, with 41% of Jews saying they are optimistic compared with just 19% of Arabs. Yet the gap within the Jewish public between the Left and Center, on the one side, and the Right on the other is even larger: the share of optimists in the former two camps is very small (17% and 19%, respectively), while on the Right, optimists are the majority (61%).
On the other hand, when it comes to national security, optimism is the minority position in all three political camps in the Jewish public, though again the shares are much smaller on the Left (16%) and in the Center (22%) than on the Right (46%). It is worth noting that between January and February, there was a large drop in optimism about national security, seemingly due to the terror attacks of the last month.
Two months ago, we began asking separate questions regarding optimism about internal security and external (military) security. This period has seen a gradual and continuing decline in the level of optimism regarding external security. For internal security, there was a slight rise between December 2022 and January 2023, but this was then followed by a sharp fall over the last month, from 37% to just 28%. In other words, the responses to both the general question about national security and the two specific questions about internal and external security indicate a decline in public optimism about the future.
Optimistic about Israel’s internal security and external security in the foreseeable future (total sample; %)
The differences between political camps on this issue are large (in the Jewish sample). Regarding external security, only a minority on the Left and in the Center are optimistic, compared with a majority on the Right. For internal security, optimists form a minority in all camps, but this minority is particularly small on the Left and in the Center.
Optimistic about external and internal security (Jews; %)
Within a short period of time – over the five months since we last asked this question, in October 2022 – the share of the public who define Israel’s overall situation as bad or very bad has jumped from 30% to 47%. By contrast, the share of those who characterize it as good or very good has remained steady at around one-quarter. That is, there has been a shift from non-committal opinions to negative opinions. This month’s finding represents the highest share of respondents characterizing Israel’s overall situation as bad or very bad since 2007, immediately following the Second Lebanon War.
In the Jewish public, the proportion who describe the situation as bad or very bad has risen from 28% to 43%, and in the Arab public it has climbed from 41% to 66%.
How would you characterize Israel’s overall situation today? (total sample; %)
A breakdown of Jewish respondents by political orientation reveals the strong relation between the political situation and perceptions of the country’s overall situation: In June 2022, when the Bennett-Lapid government was in power, 42% of those on the Left said that Israel’s overall situation was good or very good, and only 17% rated it as bad or very bad. Today, 71% of the Left describe Israel’s situation as bad or very bad, and only 11% as good or very good. A similar picture, though less sharply defined, holds true for the Center, with 32% giving a rating of good or very good and 24% of bad or very bad in June 2022, shifting to 16% good or very good and 58% bad or very bad in February 2023.
On the Right, the picture is reversed: In June 2022, only 23% rated Israel’s situation as good or very good, and 40% as bad or very bad; today, the share of those taking a positive view has risen to 39%, and the share of those with a negative view has fallen to 30%. In other words, political orientation determines one’s assessment of the country’s overall situation.
Israel’s overall situation today (Jews; %)
|
|
Good and very good |
So-so |
Bad and very bad |
Don’t know |
|
|
Left
|
Jun-22 |
42 |
40 |
17 |
1 |
|
Oct-22 |
22 |
45 |
32 |
1 |
|
|
Feb-23 |
11 |
18 |
71 |
0 |
|
|
Center |
Jun-22 |
32 |
44 |
24 |
0 |
|
Oct-22 |
30 |
48.5 |
20 |
1.5 |
|
|
Feb-23 |
16 |
24 |
58 |
2 |
|
|
Right |
Jun-22 |
23 |
36 |
40.5 |
0.5 |
|
Oct-22 |
27 |
41 |
31 |
1 |
|
|
Feb-23 |
39 |
30 |
30 |
1 |
|
In recent months the Supreme Court has found itself the focus of intense public and political debate. Despite this, our assessment of public trust in the Court shows that it has not changed substantially: 44% of respondents this month said they trust the Supreme Court, which is similar to the average of 43% over the last three years.
The differences between political camps in the Jewish public are large, with a similar distribution to that seen previously. At the same time, the level of trust in the Court is slightly higher today on the Left and in the Center than the average of the last three years, and slightly lower on the Right.
Trust in the Supreme Court (total sample, and Jews by political orientation; %)
Who is protesting? As we did in January, we asked respondents: “Have you participated in one or more of the protest activities against the reform to the justice system (demonstrations, signing petitions, etc.)?” We found an increase in the total sample in the proportion of those responding in the affirmative, from 13% in January to 18.5% in February. This change reflects a large rise among Arab respondents, from 7% in January to 14% in February, and a more moderate rise among Jewish respondents, from 15% to 19%.
As in previous surveys, the bulk of participation in protests among the Jewish public is seen among those who define themselves as on the Left (among Jewish protesters, 45.5% self-identify with the Left, 37.5% with the Center, and 17% with the Right). While the Left and the Center have shown a rise in the share of respondents who report having participated in protests, the equivalent proportion on the Right has remained stable (and low).
A breakdown of Jewish respondents by religiosity finds that a far higher share of secular respondents reported participation in protests (one-third) than of other groups.
Participated in at least one protest activity (demonstrations, signing a petition, etc.) against the reform to the justice system (Jews, by political orientation; %)
Among Arab protesters, no clear differences were found between the different age groups, though most of those participating in protests are aged 25–44.
There is also a link between protest participation and assessment of Israel’s overall situation, a subject we have addressed in the past: 74% of those who have taken part in at least one protest activity think that the country’s situation today is bad or very bad, compared with just 41% of those who have not participated.
Legitimate forms of protest: As the interactions between protesters and the police have grown more heated in recent weeks, we wanted to know what proportion of respondents agree that in certain circumstances, it is acceptable to use violence to achieve political goals. We asked: “Do you agree or disagree that the use of violence for political ends is never justified?” Around one-fifth of the total sample (21%)—a much larger share than in the past—disagreed with this statement, thus legitimizing the use of violence for political ends in certain circumstances (by way of comparison, the equivalent finding in the 2022 Democracy Index was just 9%).
Do you agree or disagree that the use of violence for political ends is never justified? (total sample; %)
We did not find a clear association between agreement with the use of violence for political ends and age, political orientation, religiosity, or participation/non-participation in public protests.
As last month, we presented the respondents with several forms of protest and asked which they thought are allowed or forbidden in the context of public protests. Comparing this month’s results with last month’s reveals an increase in support for all protest types (with the exception of not paying tax), but the ranking of each has remained the same, with demonstrations and strikes garnering the most support. Against the backdrop of the rise over the last week in public declarations by IDF reservists that they will not show up for duty in protest at the reforms, it is interesting to see that the level of public support for this action has only risen slightly, and remains relatively low.
Large differences were found between those who have participated in protests in recent months and those who have not, regarding the level of legitimacy granted to the various forms of protest. Among protesters, there is a large majority who are supportive of all the actions presented apart from not showing up for IDF reserve duty and not paying taxes, which have support from a sizable minority. Among respondents who have not taken part in protests, there is large support for the right to demonstrate, and more than half also support the right to strike, but only a small minority consider refusing to perform IDF reserve duty or pay taxes to be legitimate actions.
Agree that each of the following actions is allowed in the context of public protests against the government on a matter of supreme national importance (total sample; %)
Expected impact of broad public protests: Despite the growing intensity of the protests, the proportion of those who think that broad public protests will not influence the progress of the justice system reforms actually rose between January and February. However, there remains a small majority (55%) who believe that protests can moderate, delay, or even cancel the planned reforms.
As might be expected, a breakdown of responses by participation or non-participation in protest activities reveals significant differences: A majority of those who have participated (and a slightly larger majority than last month) believe that the protests can cancel, delay, or moderate the reforms (January, 68%; February, 73.5%). By comparison, half of those who have not participated hold the same view (the same proportion as in January 2023). At the same time, there was an increase in the share of respondents who think that the protests cannot have any impact, among both those who have participated in protests (from 26% last month to 36% this month) and those who have not taken part (from 8.5% to 14%).
Expected possible impact of broad public protests (total sample; %)
Once again, we asked our respondents whether, since the last Knesset elections, they have given serious thought to obtaining, or taken action to obtain, a foreign passport. Again this month, the majority replied in the negative: 60% said that they have neither given it serious consideration nor taken action (the equivalent percentage in January was higher, at 67.5%), compared with 6% who reported having taken action to obtain a foreign passport, and 17% who said they have given it serious thought.
A breakdown of respondents by vote for coalition and opposition parties at the last election reveals that the share of opposition voters who have considered obtaining or taken steps to obtain a foreign passport (37%) is four times larger than the equivalent share of coalition voters (9%). In other words, more than one-third of voters for opposition parties are having thoughts about other countries.
In the last four months, have you given serious thought to obtaining, or taken action to obtain, a foreign passport? (total sample, by vote at the last election for coalition and opposition parties; %)
In addition, we asked the respondents whether, in the last four months, they had given serious thought or taken action to transfer funds abroad. Again, a clear majority (65%) have neither given this serious consideration nor taken any steps in this direction. However, some have thought about it seriously (14%), and as expected, a much smaller share have actually done anything about it (3%).
A breakdown of responses by participation in protests reveals that 7.5% of protesters have taken action to transfer funds outside of Israel, and 34.5% have seriously considered it but not taken action. By contrast, only 2% of those who have not participated in protests have taken steps to move money abroad, and 10% have given it serious thought.
We asked the respondents how Israel is doing currently in several areas (economy, security, foreign and diplomatic relations, and tensions between different groups in Israeli society) compared to the period before the formation of the current government. Regarding economy and security, half the respondents believe that things have become worse, and a majority take the same view with respect to foreign and diplomatic relations and tensions between different groups.
In your opinion, in each of the following areas, how does Israel’s situation today compare to its situation in the period before the formation of the current government? (total sample; %)
A comparison between respondents who voted for coalition parties at the last election and those who voted for opposition parties reveals that even among the former, for each area presented there is not a majority who think that the situation today is better than it was under the Bennett-Lapid government: Regarding Israel’s economy and security, only 44% of coalition voters say that the situation is better today; a slightly smaller share can see an improvement in foreign and diplomatic relations (41%); and only 19% have the same view regarding tensions between different groups in Israeli society. As expected, the views of voters for opposition parties are much more negative, and in all four areas a large majority believe that the situation now is worse than it was.
In your opinion, in each of the following areas, how does Israel’s situation today compare to its situation in the period before the formation of the current government? (total sample, by vote at the last election for coalition and opposition parties; %)
We asked respondents how worried they are that they or someone close to them will be harmed in a terror attack during the upcoming month of Ramadan. The majority (60%) said they are quite or very worried, with only small differences between Jewish and Arab respondents (Jews, 61%; Arabs, 56%). Some differences were found when analyzing responses by area of residence, with residents of Judea and Samaria expressing the highest level of concern about being harmed in a terror attack (73%), while residents of Jerusalem—a city that is often targeted by attackers—reported the lowest level of worry, albeit still a majority (52%).
Are worried that they or someone close to them will be harmed in a terror attack (Jews, by area of residence; %)
Among Jewish respondents, there were also differences between the sexes, with women expressing more worry about being harmed during Ramadan than men (70% versus 53.5%).
The February 2023 Israeli Voice Index was prepared by the Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute. The survey was conducted via the internet and by telephone (to include groups that are under-represented on the internet) between February 27 and March 5, 2023, with 608 men and women interviewed in Hebrew and 173 in Arabic, constituting a nationally representative sample of the adult population in Israel aged 18 and over. The maximum sampling error was ±3.58% at a confidence level of 95%. Field work was carried out by the Dialogue Research and Polling Institute. The full data file can be found at: https://dataisrael.idi.org.il.