National Mood Unrestful
This month saw a decline in optimism regarding both the future of democratic rule in Israel and the future of national security. 21% of Israelis have participated in at least one act of protest against the judicial reforms.
Photo by Noam Revkin Fenton/Flash90
- There was a sharp decline this month in both the share of those who are optimistic about democratic rule in Israel and the share of those who are optimistic about the future of Israel’s security. The combined score of the two is the lowest since we began our measurements four years ago.
- The proportion of those who think that Israeli democracy is in grave danger is the same as it was at the end of 2022, at just over one-half. However, opinions on this issue have become more polarized: While there is almost full consensus on the Left that such danger exists and a majority in the Center concur, only a minority on the Right take the same view.
- As was the case last month, we again found a rise in the share of respondents who reported having participated in at least one protest activity against the legislation being advanced by the government, reaching around one-fifth of the Israeli public. No increase in participation in the protests was recorded among Arab respondents.
- The majority of respondents believe that the protests have had little influence on the government’s policy until now. Around a third assess the influence to have been large.
- Regarding the police’s handling of protests, we found equal shares of respondents who think they have functioned well and who think they have functioned poorly. Those who have participated in protests have a more positive view of the police’s conduct than do those who have not.
- More than a third of respondents reported having had severe disagreements with family members or co-workers regarding the legislative changes being advanced by the government and the protests against them. There were almost no differences found between political camps, but there were differences on the basis of participation or non-participation in protests.
- Though there was a certain increase in the share of those who think there is a high likelihood of a violent civil war breaking out, the majority still believe that this is unlikely. More of those on the Left than in the Center or on the Right estimate the likelihood to be high.
- The majority of the Jewish public oppose soldiers refusing to be drafted into the IDF on ideological or religious grounds, agreeing to be drafted but refusing to serve in the occupied territories, or refusing orders that are against their conscience. However, around a quarter of the Jewish public support all three of these actions, with support highest on the Left and lowest in the Center.
- Those in favor of making the IDF into a professional army are also more supportive of people refusing to serve on ideological or religious grounds than are those who think that the IDF should remain a “people’s army.”
- The majority of the Jewish public also opposes refusal by IDF reservists to show up for duty—whether for training, operational service by pilots, or mobilization for combat—in protest against the government. Most of the voters for coalition parties expressed fierce opposition to such acts, while voters for opposition parties were divided on this issue.
- Differences between coalition and opposition voters were also found regarding the appropriate response by the IDF to reservists who refuse to show up for duty in protest against the government: The majority of coalition voters think that legal proceedings should be taken in such a case, compared with only a quarter of voters for opposition parties who support that option.
- The public is split on the question of the possible influence on government policy of IDF reservists’ refusal to serve, but a greater share rate the possible influence as low than rate it as high. Understandably, we found differences on this issue between coalition and opposition voters.
- The public is also divided on the question of whether Israel should or should not take into consideration the view of the US administration regarding the legislative changes the government is pursuing. Those who think that Washington’s position should be taken into account form the largest group, but they are still less than half the respondents. Just over a third think that the Americans’ view should not be taken into consideration.
- A similar picture emerges regarding protests held abroad against the legislative changes being pursued by the government: Overall, the public is almost equally split between supporters and opponents of such protests, with a slight advantage to the opponents. However, among voters for coalition parties there is a large majority against protests abroad, and among voters for opposition parties, a large majority in favor. In the Arab public, a majority support such protests.
- A large majority of the Arab public disagrees with the statement by Minister Smotrich that “there is no such thing as a Palestinian people.” The Jewish public is divided on this issue: A majority of those on the Left disagree, as do just over half of those in the Center, but only a small minority on the Right demur to the minister’s statement.
This month saw a decline in optimism regarding both the future of democratic rule in Israel (from 38% to 32% in the total sample) and the future of national security (from 31% to 30% in the total sample). Taken together, these findings produce the lowest combined optimism score since we began our measurements in April 2019, reflecting the gloomy national mood at the current time.
Optimistic about the future of democratic rule in Israel and about the future of national security, April 2019–March 2023 (total sample; %)
While optimists are in the minority in both the Jewish and Arab samples, their share in the Jewish sample (36%) is almost three times larger than in the Arab sample (11%).
There is a tremendous difference in the level of optimism about the future of democratic rule in Israel between the political camps (Jews), with optimists constituting a tiny minority on the Left and in the Center, and a majority on the Right (4%, 16%, and 56%, respectively). There are also large differences between these camps regarding the future of Israel’s national security, though less pronounced, and on this issue optimists are in the minority even on the Right (Left, 16%; Center, 20%; Right, 46%).
A review of past findings reveals that until April 2021, optimism about the future of national security was stronger than optimism about the future of democratic rule in Israel, usually to a considerable extent. But since May 2021 (Operation Guardian of the Walls), not only has optimism about national security fell to similar levels as optimism about Israeli democracy, but it has also become much more variable from month to month.
|
|
Optimistic about the future of Israel’s national security |
Optimistic about the future of democratic rule in Israel |
|
Average up to April 2021 |
56.8 |
41.3 |
|
Average from May 2021 |
44.4 |
40.3 |
This month, we once again looked at whether the public thinks that the system of democratic rule in Israel is in grave danger. Surprisingly, given recent events, we found no change in the total sample relative to our previous measurement in December 2022—in both cases, a small majority of 57% held that this is indeed the case. The substantial difference between Jews and Arabs on this question has been maintained, with 53% of Jews sensing danger compared with 74% of Arabs.
The figure below shows again the differing perceptions of current realities among the political camps (Jews): On the Left, there is almost complete consensus that Israeli democracy is indeed in grave danger, and the share holding that view has risen sharply in recent months. In the Center, this remains a majority opinion, though with a slightly smaller majority than previously. And on the Right, there is a minority of just one-third who believe that Israeli democracy is in peril. An almost identical picture emerges from a breakdown of respondents into voters for coalition and opposition parties (respectively, 29% and 86% perceive grave danger to democratic rule in Israel).
Agree that the system of democratic rule in Israel is in grave danger (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)
Participation in protests: Since the beginning of the public protests, we have assessed the proportion of respondents each month who report having participated in at least one act of protest against the legislative changes that the government is pursuing. There has been a steady rise in participation from 13% at the end of January to 21% at the end of March. Naturally, the share of those who report having taken part in protests is much higher on the Left and in the Center than on the Right, but in all three camps (Jews), there has been an increase in participation over this period. We did not find a rise from last month in the share of Arab respondents who reported having participated in protests.
Participated in at least one act of protest against the judicial reforms (%)
Influence of the protests: After three months of demonstrations and other forms of protest, we asked, “In your opinion, to what extent has the protest movement succeeded or not succeeded in influencing the legislative changes being advanced by the government?” The respondents are divided on this issue: The majority (56%) think that the influence has been small or non-existent, while 31.5% believe that it has been fairly or very large.
On this question we found a similarity (perhaps surprisingly) between voters for coalition parties and voters for opposition parties: 60% of coalition voters said that the protests had been successful “not at all” or “to a fairly small extent” in influencing the legislative changes being advanced by the government, a view also held by 53% of opposition voters. The same assessment was given by more than half (52%) of respondents who have participated in protests.
In your opinion, to what extent have the public protests succeeded in influencing the legislative changes being advanced by the government? (total sample; %)
Functioning of the police at demonstrations against the government’s reforms: The respondents are divided in their assessment of the police’s functioning at public protests—30% rate it as poor or very poor, a third as good or excellent, and around a quarter as so-so. Among those who voted for coalition parties, a greater share rated police performance as not good than rated it as good (41% compared with 29%, respectively), while among voters for opposition parties the situation is reversed (15% not good, 47% good).
A particularly interesting finding was that those who have participated in protests have a much more positive assessment of the police’s functioning than those who have not participated.
Scores given to the police for its functioning at protests against the reforms in recent months (%)
|
|
Very poor / Poor |
So-so |
Good / Excellent |
Don’t know |
|
|
Total sample |
30 |
26 |
33 |
11 |
|
|
Vote at the last elections |
Coalition |
41 |
23 |
29 |
7 |
|
Opposition |
17 |
30 |
47 |
6 |
|
|
Participation in protests against the reforms |
Participated in protests |
14 |
41 |
41 |
4 |
|
Did not participate in protests |
35 |
22 |
31 |
12 |
|
It appears that disagreements about the government’s legislative agenda have filtered into the everyday lives of Israel’s citizens to a considerable degree. More than a third of respondents (35.5%) said they had personally experienced severe differences of opinion with people close to them in their family or at work, regarding the legislative changes being advanced by the government and the protests against them. This experience was common to all three political camps (Jews): 42% of those on the Right reported having been in this situation, as did 38% in the Center and 36% on the Left. Among Jewish respondents, we found a higher share of women who reported having severe differences of opinion with those close to them than of men (45% versus 33%, respectively). Among voters for Arab parties, only a minority shared this experience.
Have personally experienced severe differences of opinion with people close to them in their family or at work regarding the legislative changes being advanced by the government and the protests against them (total sample, by vote at the last elections; %)
On this issue, we found a fairly predictable difference between respondents who participated in protests (of whom 45% reported having had severe differences of opinion with those around them) and those who have not participated in protests (33%).
Again this month, we asked respondents what they think the likelihood is of a civil war breaking out in Israel in the near future which will include violence between the different sides. The majority still consider this likelihood to be low (51.5%), but we found an increase relative to January 2023 in the share of respondents who rate the likelihood as high (from 31% to 41%).
What is the likelihood of a civil war breaking out in Israel in the near future which includes violence between the different sides? (total sample; %)
Among both Arab and Jewish respondents, only a minority (albeit sizable) currently think there is a high likelihood of a violent civil war in the near future (Jews, 39.5%; Arabs, 45%). A breakdown by political orientation (Jews) reveals that fears of a civil war are highest on the Left and lowest on the Right.
Likelihood of a civil war breaking out in Israel in the near future which includes violence between the different sides (Jewish sample; %)
|
Left |
Center |
Right |
|
57% |
48% |
31% |
All the questions on the issue of refusal to serve were asked only of Jewish respondents.
There has recently been vigorous public debate in Israel about the legitimacy of IDF reservists stating that if the government does not abandon its plans for judicial reform, then they will not show up for duty when called. We therefore found it necessary to examine several practical and theoretical aspects of this issue this month, differentiating between mandatory military service and reserve service, as well as between different types of refusal to serve.
Mandatory service: Regarding soldiers in mandatory service, we asked Jewish respondents about the legitimacy of soldiers refusing to be drafted for ideological or religious reasons; being willing to be drafted but refusing to serve in the occupied territories; and refusing to participate in military activities that are against their conscience. As can be seen from the figure below, a minority of around one-quarter consider refusals in such cases to be permissible.
Consider it permissible for a soldier in mandatory service to perform each of the following actions (Jewish sample; %)
As the following table shows, those who define themselves as on the Left are much more accepting of the three different types of refusal by soldiers in mandatory service; those in the Center are the least accepting; and those on the Right are somewhere in between. In each of the three cases, the youngest age group is the most understanding of refusal by soldiers in mandatory service.
|
Consider these actions permissible (Jewish sample; %) |
Political orientation |
Age |
||||
|
Right |
Center |
Left |
18-34 |
35-54 |
55+ |
|
|
Refuse to be drafted to the IDF due to opposition on principle to military service (pacifism or religious reasons) |
26 |
18 |
39 |
37 |
22 |
19 |
|
Refuse to participate in a military activity on grounds of conscience |
21.5 |
24 |
46 |
34 |
19 |
23 |
|
Agree to be drafted, but refuse to serve in the occupied territories |
21 |
18 |
47 |
26 |
21 |
25.5 |
We found a clear link between opinions on whether the IDF should become a professional army and on the legitimacy of refusing to be drafted on ideological or religious grounds: Those who think that the IDF should remain a people’s army are less open to the possibility of refusing to be drafted than are those who think it should be made a professional army.
Opinion on whether to keep the IDF as a people’s army or make it into a professional army, by opinion on refusal to be drafted on ideological or religious grounds (Jewish sample; %)
Reserve duty: We asked respondents whether they think that, in the context of the protests against the government, it is forbidden or permissible for IDF reservists to refuse to show up for duty in three different cases.
Regarding a call-up for combat in a time of war, we found that a large majority of respondents think this should not be refused. There was greater support for reservists refusing to show up for routine military training, as well as for refusing to show up for service that is part of the IDF’s routine operational activities (e.g., IAF pilots).
The level of legitimacy afforded reservists not showing up for duty is associated with respondents’ political orientation, and of course with their opinion regarding the legislative changes being advanced by the government. Among coalition voters, who presumably mostly support the government’s actions, very little legitimacy is given to IDF reservists who refuse to show up, while among voters for opposition parties, considerable legitimacy is granted, with the exception of the active combat scenario.
Consider it permissible for IDF reservists to refuse to show up for each of these types of duty, as part of the protests against the legislation currently being advanced by the government (Jews, by vote at the last elections; %)
What should be the response of the IDF to those refusing to serve? We asked: “What should be the response of the IDF to a reservist who declares that he will not show up if called to serve?” The respondents’ preferred option is for his commanding officers to talk to him and try to persuade him to show up for duty when called (46%). A smaller share of respondents support immediately dismissing the reservist from reserve service (27%), and only a small minority (13%) are in favor of accepting his position and doing nothing. Here, too, there are large differences between voters for coalition and opposition parties: The preferred response among coalition voters is immediate dismissal from reserve service (46%), while the preferred response among opposition voters is a conversation with commanding officers (57%).
What should be the response of the IDF to a reservist who declares that he will not show up if called to serve? (Jewish sample, by vote at the last elections; %)
|
|
Conversation with commanders to try to persuade him |
Immediately dismiss him from reserve service |
Accept his position and do nothing |
Don’t know |
|
Jewish sample overall |
46 |
27 |
13 |
14 |
|
Voters for coalition parties |
41 |
46 |
4 |
9 |
|
Voters for opposition parties |
57 |
7 |
26 |
10 |
If a reservist does not show up in practice when called to serve, then the response that the IDF should take in the opinion of the largest share of respondents (40%) is to instigate legal proceedings (disciplinary and criminal) against him. In second place in order of preference is to accept the reservist’s position and do nothing (23%), while a similar proportion (20%) are in favor of immediately dismissing him from reserve service.
As with the previous question, so in the case of a reservist who does not show up in practice when called, we found large differences between voters for coalition and opposition parties: More than half (54%) of coalition voters support legal proceedings, while the most common response among opposition voters is to accept the reservist’s position and do nothing.
How should the IDF respond if the reservist does not show up in practice when called to serve? (Jewish sample, by vote at the last elections; %)
|
|
Legal proceedings against him |
Immediately dismiss him from reserve service |
Accept his position and do nothing |
Don’t know |
|
Jewish sample overall |
40 |
20 |
23 |
17 |
|
Voters for coalition parties |
54 |
27 |
8 |
11 |
|
Voters for opposition parties |
25 |
12 |
42 |
21 |
Can the protest by IDF reservists influence the government? The respondents are divided on the question of the influence of the reservists’ protest on the government’s legislative program. Around one-half (47.5%) think it can have little or no influence, while 39.5% believe it can have a fairly large or very large influence.
Once again, the differences between voters for coalition and opposition parties are considerable: While around two-thirds of coalition voters say that the influence of the protest by reservists, on its own, is low or non-existent, a similar share of opposition voters take the opposite view, and believe it can indeed influence the government’s actions.
In your opinion, to what extent can the protest by IDF reservists in recent weeks, on its own, influence or not influence the government regarding the legislative changes it is advancing? (Jewish sample, by vote at the last elections; %)
Should Israel take into consideration the view of the United States regarding the reforms?
The tensions within Israel surrounding the government’s judicial reforms have also affected Israel’s foreign relations with its closest ally—the United States. We asked: “In your opinion, should the Israeli government take into consideration the view of the US administration regarding the legislative changes it is pursuing, or should it not?”
The Israeli public is divided on this issue, with almost half of respondents saying that the Israeli government should take the view of the US administration into account, while 37% take the opposite view. Arab respondents are more in favor than Jewish respondents of giving consideration to the American position (61% compared with 44%, respectively).
A large majority of those who voted for opposition parties think that Israel should take the view of the Americans into account (80%), while a majority of voters for coalition parties think it should not. Large differences also emerged on this issue between religious groupings (Jews); as is well known, there is considerable overlap between religiosity and voting patterns, with the more religious groups voting in higher numbers for coalition parties. Consequently, the view that Israel should not take the US position into consideration is more prevalent among the more religious groups. And once again, unsurprisingly, those who have participated in protests are more in favor of heeding Washington’s position than are those who have not.
Should the Israeli government take into consideration the view of the US administration regarding the legislative changes it is pursuing, or should it not? (%)
In several locations in the United States and Europe, especially where Prime Minister Netanyahu has visited recently, there have been protest demonstrations by Israelis and Jews against the government’s legislative plans. We wanted to know the extent to which the public in Israel supports holding these protests. We found that the largest share of respondents (44%) oppose them, while 41% say they are in favor. Arab support for protests abroad is significantly higher than support among Jews (55% versus 38%, respectively).
Opinions on this issue are clearly closely aligned with support for the government: Only 12% of those who voted for coalition parties support holding demonstrations abroad, compared with 73% of those who voted for opposition parties.
Do you support or oppose holding protests abroad against the legislative changes being advanced by the government? (total sample, and by vote at the last elections; %)
Is there such a thing as a Palestinian people?
In a recent speech delivered in France, Minister Bezalel Smotrich declared that “there is no such thing as a Palestinian people.” We asked respondents whether they agree or disagree with this statement. There is extremely strong opposition to the minister’s claim in the Arab public, while the Jewish public is largely divided, albeit with a certain tendency to agree with the statement. The differences among political camps in the Jewish public are enormous: A huge majority of those on the Left disagree that there is no Palestinian people, as do a small majority of those in the Center, but on the Right a large majority agree with Smotrich’s view.
Agree with Finance Minister Smotrich’s statement that “there is no such thing as a Palestinian people” (Jewish and Arab samples; %)
The March 2023 Israeli Voice Index was prepared by the Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute. The survey was conducted via the internet and by telephone (to include groups that are under-represented on the internet) between March 26 and March 30, 2023, with 602 men and women interviewed in Hebrew and 130 in Arabic, constituting a nationally representative sample of the adult population in Israel aged 18 and over. The maximum sampling error was ±3.69% at a confidence level of 95%. Field work was carried out by the Dialogue Research and Polling Institute. The full data file can be found at: https://dataisrael.idi.org.il.