Most Israelis Oppose Meeting US Demands to Shift to New Phase of War
War in Gaza Survey 8 (December 25-28, 2023)
About two-thirds (66%) of Israelis say they do not think Israel should agree to US demands to shift to a phase of the war with a reduced heavy bombing in populous areas. 75% of Jewish Israelis oppose meeting the demands, compared to only 21% of Arab Israelis.
Photo by Chaim Goldberg/Flash90
The survey was conducted by the Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute between December 25–28, 2023, using a representative sample of 605 Jewish Israelis and 151 Arab Israelis.
Topics covered in this report:
- The national mood
- Launching a second front in the north
- Israel’s success so far in attaining its goals for the war
- The best way to secure the release of the hostages
- Should Israel agree to US demands to shift to the third stage of the war?
- Who would Israelis like to see as prime minister after the war?
- Can the governing coalition be held together?
This month saw a significant drop of 6.5 percentage points in the share of optimists about the future of Israel’s security, and a more moderate decline (within the bounds of statistical error) regarding the future of democratic rule in Israel. Presumably, the fall in optimism about security is due to the high number of casualties of IDF fighters in Gaza, the attacks by Hezbollah in the north, and various traumatic events such as the tragic killing by Israeli forces of three hostages who had escaped from their Hamas captors. By contrast, at the time the survey was conducted, there had been no dramatic events related to Israeli democracy, and thus the share of optimists about the future of democratic rule remained almost the same.
Optimistic about the future of democratic rule in Israel and about the future of national security, June 2022–December 2023 (total sample; %)
For the third time since the beginning of the war, we asked our respondents what Israel should do in response to Hezbollah’s aggression in the north. Since the previous measurement five weeks ago, Hezbollah has intensified its attacks on communities and bases along the northern border, and the Israeli public is becoming more informed than previously about the damage being caused to towns and villages in these regions. Despite this, there has been almost no change in public opinion: around half currently support opening a second front and fighting against Hezbollah in the north, and around a third think that this should be avoided. Among Jews, a majority support striking at Hezbollah (57%), a view shared by only a minority of Arabs (20%). At the same time, there has been a significant fall of 9.5 percentage points relative to previous measurements in the share of the Arab public who think that Israel should refrain from opening a second front in the north.
What should Israel do in response to Hezbollah attacks? October–December 2023 (total sample and Jewish and Arab samples; %)
A breakdown of the Jewish sample by area of residence did not find large differences, though (perhaps due to the events of October 7) there was much more support for opening a second front against Hezbollah among residents of the south (70%) than elsewhere (Haifa, 51%; Tel Aviv and central Israel, 55%; Judea and Samaria, 55%; northern Israel, 59%; Jerusalem, 60%).
Breaking down Jewish respondents by political orientation reveals that a majority of those on the Left are in favor of avoiding opening a new front in the north, while a majority of those on the Right support dealing Hezbollah a heavy blow now. In the Center, one-half support striking at Hezbollah, and a lower share think that Israel should refrain from launching another front.
What should Israel do in response to Hezbollah attacks? (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)
Another reason for the decline in optimism about Israel’s security may be found in the responses to the following question: “So far, to what extent is the State of Israel succeeding in meeting the two main goals for the war set by the government—toppling Hamas and bringing the hostages home?” In the total sample, the most common response regarding toppling Hamas was that there has been moderate success so far (36%), while regarding the release of the hostages the most common response was that the extent of Israel’s success to date has been small (42%).
The differences in views between Jews and Arabs are particularly evident regarding the goal of toppling Hamas. The percentage of Arab interviewees who think that Israel is succeeding in this goal is much lower than the equivalent share of Jewish interviewees (14% and 29.5%, respectively), this despite the fact that a very large proportion of Arabs selected the “don’t know” response (almost seven times greater than the equivalent share of Jews). Among Jewish respondents, the most common response was that Israel has been moderately successful so far in toppling Hamas.
To what extent is the State of Israel succeeding in toppling Hamas? (Jewish and Arab samples; %)
A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation finds that the most common response in all three camps is that success in toppling Hamas has been moderate so far (Left, 47%; Center, 36.5%; Right, 38%). Furthermore, only 10% of those on the Left think that Israel’s success in this regard has been fairly large, and none think that it has been very large. By contrast, more than a quarter of those in the Center (27%) assess the extent of Israel’s success in toppling Hamas as fairly large or very large, as do 35% of those on the Right.
When it comes to bringing the hostages home, the differences between Jewish and Arab respondents are very minor. Among Jews, there is a tie between those who rate Israel’s success in this regard as small and those who think it is moderate. In the Arab sample, on the other hand, the most common response is that the extent of success has been small.
To what extent is the State of Israel succeeding in bringing the hostages home? (Jewish and Arab samples; %)
There are large differences on this issue between political camps (Jewish sample): On the Left and in the Center, a majority think that success has been fairly small or very small (Left, 63%; Center, 55%), a view held by only 30% of those on the Right. The most common response on the Right was that there has been moderate success in returning the hostages (48%).
Cross-referencing the responses to these two questions reveals that only 10% of Jews and 7% of Arabs think that Israel is successfully meeting both goals, while 20.5% of Jews and 34% of Arabs think that it is not succeeding in either.
We asked: “What do you think is the best way to bring about the release of the Israeli hostages held by Hamas?” In the total sample, the majority view (56%) is that the best course of action is to continue the intensive fighting and try to have IDF forces free the hostages, while a minority (24%) think that it would be better to release all the Palestinian prisoners held by Israel, even if this means agreeing to Hamas’s demand to halt the fighting. Interestingly, a high share of both the Jewish sample and the Arab sample chose the “don’t know” response, reflecting the fact that many Israelis truly have no idea what would be best.
What do you think is the best way to bring about the release of the Israeli hostages held by Hamas? (Jewish and Arab samples; %)
A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation again finds large differences, though on this issue the Center is closer to the Right than to the Left. On the Left, the highest share of respondents (though not a majority) are in favor of releasing all the Palestinian prisoners held by Israel, while in the Center—and even more so on the Right—the majority think that the best course of action is to continue the intensive fighting and try to have IDF forces free the hostages.
What do you think is the best way to bring about the release of the Israeli hostages held by Hamas?
We asked: “According to reports, the United States is demanding that Israel shifts to a different phase of the war in Gaza, with an emphasis on reducing the heavy bombing of densely populated areas. Should Israel agree to this demand?” A majority of the total sample (66%) responded negatively to this question, and only around a quarter (23%) answered in the affirmative.
The difference between Jewish and Arab interviewees on this issue is huge: A large majority of Jews (75%) oppose agreeing to this demand from the United States, while a majority of Arabs (56%) are in favor of Israel meeting Washington’s demands and shifting to a different phase of the war. A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation indicates considerable polarization on this question as well: On the Left, the majority support agreeing to the US demand, while in the Center and on the Right, only a minority hold this view.
Should Israel agree to the US demand to shift to a different phase of the war in Gaza? (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)
We asked our interviewees an open question (that is, without giving them a series of responses to choose from): “After the war, who would you like to be prime minister of Israel?” Almost a third (30.5%) said that they don’t know or replied “no-one.” Another 8% did not provide a name, with 4% saying they would like someone new who is not part of the political establishment, and 4% responding “anyone but Bibi.”
Of the names that were provided by the respondents, the highest ranked is the leader of the National Unity party, Benny Gantz, who was named as their preferred prime minister after the war by almost a quarter (23%). In second place is the serving prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, with 15%. Despite this low share of the sample who wish to see Netanyahu as prime minister when the war is over, there is currently no other candidate on the Right whose support even comes close: Minister of Internal Security Ben-Gvir is preferred by 1.5%, former head of the Mossad Yossi Cohen by 1%, Minister of the Economy Nir Barkat by 0.7%, and Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant by just 0.5% of respondents.
After Benny Gantz, others from the moderate Right and the Center-Left who were named as preferred candidates for prime minister after the war included Naftali Bennett with 6.5% and Yair Lapid with 6%, and far behind them, Minister Gadi Eisenkot and former MK Yair Golan, each with 0.5%.
After the war, who would you like to be prime minister of Israel? (total sample)
In the Jewish sample, 25% of interviewees named Gantz as their preferred prime minister after the war. Netanyahu was cited by 18%, followed by Naftali Bennett in third place (7.5%) and Yair Lapid in fourth (5%). In the Arab sample, a large majority (68%) responded “don’t know” or “no-one,” and far behind this, 11% cited Benny Gantz and 11% named Yair Lapid.
A breakdown of the Jewish sample by religiosity finds that Netanyahu has a huge advantage over Gantz among Haredim (45% versus just 2%) and the national religious (31% versus just 3%). The two are tied among the traditional religious (Gantz, 26%; Netanyahu, 25%) and traditional non-religious publics (Gantz, 26%; Netanyahu, 25%), while Gantz holds a very large advantage among the secular (39% versus 6%).
Breaking down the Jewish respondents by political orientation reveals that on the Left, Gantz leads other candidates by a large distance, followed by Lapid and Bennett. Gantz is also far in the lead in the Center, again followed by Lapid and Bennett, and with Netanyahu in fourth place. On the Right, Netanyahu is ahead by a considerable margin, with Gantz in second and Bennett in third place. Looking more closely at the Right, which is the largest political camp in Israel and includes almost 60% of the Jewish public, it is worth distinguishing between respondents who identify as moderate Right and those who simply say they are on the Right: On the Right, Netanyahu leads Gantz by some distance (34% to 11%), but among the moderate Right it is Gantz who has the advantage (24% to 13%), and in this group, the support for Bennett (14%) is equivalent to that for Prime Minister Netanyahu.
After the war, who would you like to be prime minister of Israel? (Jewish sample; %)
Breaking down responses by vote in the last elections reveals that among National Unity voters, a majority (55%) would like to have Benny Gantz as prime minister after the war, and none want Netanyahu. By contrast, among Likud voters, around a third would prefer Netanyahu as the next prime minister (36%), with Gantz in second place with 15%, Bennett third with 5%, Yossi Cohen fourth with 3%, and Defense Minister Gallant fifth with 2%.
Only a quarter of interviewees think that Netanyahu will succeed in keeping his coalition together after the war (Jews, 28%; Arabs, 12%). In the Jewish sample, breaking down the responses by religiosity reveals that Haredim are the only group in which a majority think that Netanyahu will be successful in this regard (60%). This view is held by 38% of national religious, 34% of traditional religious, 25.5% of traditional non-religious, and just 17% of secular respondents.
A breakdown by vote in the last elections finds that only among voters for the two Haredi parties—United Torah Judaism and Shas—is there a majority who believe the coalition will remain intact. Just under half of Likud and Religious Zionist voters share this view (Likud, 42.5%; Religious Zionism, 41%). For all other parties, only a small minority of voters think that Netanyahu will be able to keep his coalition together.
Think that Prime Minister Netanyahu will succeed in keeping his coalition together after the end of the war (total sample, by vote in the last elections; %)
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The December 2023 Israeli Voice Index was prepared by the Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute. The survey was conducted via the internet and by telephone (to include groups that are under-represented on the internet) between December 25–28, 2023, with 605 men and women interviewed in Hebrew and 151 in Arabic, constituting a nationally representative sample of the adult population in Israel aged 18 and over. The maximum sampling error was ±3.55% at a confidence level of 95%. Field work was carried out by the Dialogue Research and Polling Institute. The full data file can be found at: https://dataisrael.idi.org.il.