Large Majority of Jewish Israelis Want Changes to the Conscription Law
War in Gaza Survey 12
Most Israelis would like to see the exemption given to the Haredi community changed; when asked whether the Israel can continue relying on the US's support, public opinion was divided, with an inclination toward continued reliance; around half of Israelis think Israel's standing in the international arena is not good.
Photo by Chaim Goldberg/Flash90
The survey was conducted by the Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute between February 28 and March 4, 2024, using a representative sample of 600 Jewish Israelis and 150 Arab Israelis.
Topics covered in this report:
- The national mood
- Israel’s military activity in Rafah
- Israel’s standing in the international arena
- America’s commitment to Israel
- Restricting access of Arab citizens of Israel to the Temple Mount compound during Ramadan
- The new Conscription Law: Should the exemptions given to Haredim and Arabs be changed?
- Should the National Unity party remain in the Netanyahu government?
- Likelihood of recovery from the impact of the war in the near future
This month’s survey found no change in the level of optimism about the future of democratic rule in Israel relative to last month, while optimism about the future of Israel’s security has declined very slightly.
Optimistic about the future of democratic rule in Israel and about the future of national security (total sample; %)
There are large differences in optimism between Jews and Arabs: 45% of Jewish respondents are optimistic about the future of democratic rule, compared with only 25% of Arabs, and 41% of Jews are optimistic about the future of national security, compared with only 20% of Arabs.
A breakdown of responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals that a majority of those on the Right are optimistic about the future of democratic rule in Israel (59%), while only a minority of those in the Center (25%) and on the Left (17%) hold the same view.
Interestingly, there are smaller differences between the three camps regarding the future of national security: On the Right, only around one-half are optimistic, and while the shares of optimists in the Center and on the Left are low, they are higher than the equivalent shares regarding the future of Israeli democracy (Center, 32%; Left, 21%).
Optimistic about the future of democratic rule in Israel and about the future of national security (Jewish sample; %)
Israelis’ personal situation: Among other components, our assessment of the national mood also includes respondents’ evaluations of their personal situation. As can be seen in the figure below, Jewish Israelis’ assessments of their personal situation are very similar to those in 2020 and in 2022. While over the years, Arab respondents have given lower ratings of their personal situation than have Jews, there have been periods when the majority of the Arab public have rated their personal situation positively. Still, since 2022, the share of Arabs who define their personal situation as good or very good has fallen below one-half, and now stands at just one-quarter.
Rate their personal situation as good or very good (%)
A breakdown of responses to this question by political orientation (Jewish sample) reveals that around half of those in the Center and on the Left currently rate their personal situation as very good or good, compared with a majority of those on the Right (64%) who give this assessment.
We analyzed respondents’ optimism about the future of democratic rule in Israel and the future of Israel’s national security by their rating of their own personal situation, and found that among Jews who define their situation as good or very good, 56% are optimistic about the future of democratic rule and 53% are optimistic about the future of national security. Among those who rate their personal situation as bad or very bad, only around one-fifth are optimistic about the future of democracy and the future of national security in Israel. In the Arab sample, among those who describe their personal situation as good or very good, 42% are optimistic about the future of democratic rule and 36% about the future of national security, while among those who rate their situation as bad or very bad, only a tiny minority have an optimistic view of the future of democracy and security. In other words, there is a strong association between respondents’ assessment of their own personal situation and their assessment of the future of the state in the areas we examined.
Optimistic about the future of democratic rule in Israel and the future of national security, by assessment of personal situation (%)
Feeling part of Israel and its problems: Unsurprisingly, at the beginning of the war we found a sizable rise in feelings of belonging to Israel and its problems (the “rallying around the flag” phenomenon). This was true both of Jewish respondents, whose sense of belonging to the State of Israel has always been very strong over the years, and of Arab respondents, who have always had a weaker sense of belonging. However, the steepest increase following the events of October 7 was found in the Arab sample. Some have attributed this to fears among Arab respondents of expressing a lack of identification with the state; others have surmised that Arab citizens did indeed feel more strongly part of the Israeli collective than in the past, given the unusual circumstances. This month’s survey clearly indicates that among both publics, these feelings have returned to pre-war levels, which may be explained as part of the process of returning to normal that we have identified in previous surveys. It is worth noting that in contrast to most of the survey questions, the differences on this issue between political camps in the Jewish sample are very small.
Feel part of Israel and its problems, (%)
Against the backdrop of internal disagreement in Israel and external international pressure regarding military activity in Rafah, we asked our respondents whether they think that Israel should refrain from expanding its military operations into Rafah so as not to endanger relations with Egypt and the deal being brokered for the release of the hostages, or that Israel should expand its military operations into Rafah in order to pressure Hamas into agreeing to a better deal for the release of the hostages.
Around three-quarters of Jewish respondents are in favor of expanding military operations into Rafah, while around two-thirds of Arab respondents think that Israel should refrain from this course of action. Breaking down responses by political orientation in the Jewish sample reveals that only on the Left is there a plurality of respondents (though not a majority) who think that Israel should refrain from expanding its military operations, while in the Center and especially on the Right, the majority are in favor of expanding operations into Rafah.
How should Israel proceed with its military operations in Rafah? (%)
Around half of the Israeli public think that Israel’s standing in the international arena is not good, while around a third think it is so-so, and only a minority that it is positive. The share of Arab respondents who rate Israel’s international situation as negative (63%) is larger than the equivalent share of Jewish respondents (44%). We also found large differences according to political orientation in the Jewish sample: A majority of those on the Left and in the Center think that Israel’s standing in the international arena is not good (63% and 60%, respectively), while only a third of those on the Right take the same view.
On a scale from 1 = not good at all to 5 = very good, how would you define Israel’s situation today in terms of its international standing? (%)
We asked: “Against the backdrop of the disagreements between the Israeli government and the US administration over a political agreement and the continuation of the fighting in Gaza, to what extent is it currently possible to rely on continued massive American support for Israel?” Public opinion is divided on this issue, with an inclination toward relying on the United States. Around 40% think that it is possible to rely on American support fully or to a large extent, 34% that such support can be relied on to a moderate extent, and around 20% that continued massive American support for Israel cannot be relied on. Similar distributions of responses were found in the Jewish and Arab samples.
On a scale from 1 = not at all to 5 = fully, against the backdrop of the disagreements between the Israeli government and the US administration over a political agreement and the continuation of the fighting in Gaza, to what extent is it currently possible to rely on continued massive American support for Israel? (total sample; %)
A breakdown of responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals that the share of those who think that American support for Israel can be relied on is highest in the Center, and lowest on the Left.
We asked: “The month of Ramadan is about to begin. Against the backdrop of the current security situation, do you think that the special restrictions the government of Israel has imposed on the entry of Arab citizens of Israel to the Temple Mount compound will (a) increase the likelihood of acts of violence and attacks occurring during Ramadan; (b) not effect the likelihood of acts of violence and attacks occurring during Ramadan; or (c) reduce the likelihood of acts of violence and attacks occurring during Ramadan?” In the Jewish sample, the largest share of respondents (though not a majority) think that these restrictions will increase the likelihood of violence (45%), an opinion also held by the majority of Arab respondents (69%). Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals that a large majority of those on the Left and in the Center think that the restrictions will make violence more likely (67% and 57%, respectively), while just over a third of those on the Right agree with this assessment.
What will be the impact of the special restrictions that the government of Israel has imposed on the entry of Arab citizens of Israel to the Temple Mount compound? (%)
The expected changes to the Conscription Law are set to place an additional burden of military service on the shoulders of those publics who already serve in the IDF. We asked whether this should also affect the exemption from military service currently granted to Haredim and Arabs. Among Jewish respondents, a very large majority (70%) think that changes should be made to the exemption given to Haredim (in the Arab sample, fully 43% of respondents selected the “don’t know” response with regard to Haredim). By contrast, when it comes to Arabs and military service, the Jewish public is divided, while a majority of Arab respondents think that increasing the burden on those who already serve should not affect the exemption given to Arab citizens. Breaking down the Jewish sample by self-defined religiosity reveals that Haredim are the only group in which the majority of respondents think that the new circumstances created by the war should not affect the issue of conscription of Haredim in the future. The Haredim are also the group with the highest share of those who think that the exemption from service given to Arabs should not be changed.
Should the exemption from military service granted to Haredim and to Arabs be changed? (%)
We asked: “In your opinion, should the National Unity party, led by Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot, remain in the government headed by Netanyahu or leave it?” The majority of Jewish respondents think that the party should remain in the government (among those who say they would vote for National Unity if elections were held today, three-quarters believe it should stay in the government). In fact, with the exception of Meretz, Labor, and Yesh Atid, the voters for all other Zionist parties think that National Unity should remain in the government. By contrast, the majority of voters for Arab parties think that it should leave.
In your opinion, should the National Unity party, led by Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot, remain in the government headed by Netanyahu or leave it? (%)
We wanted to find out what the public think is the likelihood of Israel recovering from the impact of the war in the foreseeable future. The largest share of respondents (42%) think that there is a good or very good chance of this happening, 30% rate the likelihood as so-so, and around one-quarter believe that the chances are not good. There is a large difference between Jews and Arabs on this question: Almost half of the Jewish respondents (47%) rate the chances of recovery as good, compared with only 16% of Arabs.
There are also thought-provoking differences between the political camps in the Jewish sample: Only 18% of those on the Left and 34% in the Center think that there is a high likelihood of recovery from the impact of the war in the foreseeable future, compared with a majority of those on the Right (59%).
On a scale from 1 = not good at all to 5 = very good, how would you define Israel’s situation today in terms of likelihood of recovering from the impact of the war in the foreseeable future? (%)
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The February 2024 Israeli Voice Index was prepared by the Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute. The survey was conducted via the internet and by telephone (to include groups that are under-represented on the internet) between February 28 and March 4, 2024, with 600 men and women interviewed in Hebrew and 150 in Arabic, constituting a nationally representative sample of the adult population in Israel aged 18 and over. The maximum sampling error was ±3.65% at a confidence level of 95%. Field work was carried out by the Dialogue Research and Polling Institute. The full data file can be found at: https://dataisrael.idi.org.il.