Quantity and Cost of Reserve Service in the Event that Haredim Enter Regular and Reserve Service in the IDF
In this study, we examine the increased burden of reserve service that the defense establishment is seeking to impose on the population groups that already perform regular and reserve service, and the economic-budgetary implications of this step for the period through to 2050. In addition, we assess the weight of this burden and its cost to Israel’s economy in the event that Haredim enter military service and shoulder some of the responsibility.
Photo by Michael Giladi/Flash90
Background
Due to the military needs arising from the “Iron Swords” war, the IDF is seeking to have the Military Service Law amended so that the period of regular service is extended, and to have the Reserve Service Law amended so as to increase the amount of reserve service performed each year. Legislative memoranda on this issue were published for public review on January 18, 2024 (henceforth referred to as the “Increased Burden Laws”).[1] For mandatory service, an extension was requested from 32 to 36 months (entailing a cancellation of a plan to reduce the service to 24 months). The following table shows the full picture of the proposed extensions of service.
In this study, we examine two alternatives to the proposal outlined above: In the first alternative, we assess the increased burden arising from the planned changes to regular service and reserve service and their economic implications for the period 2025–2050, assuming the current situation continues, in which the proportion of Haredi men of conscription age who perform military service is just 1.7%, and assuming the continuation of current demographic growth trends. In the second alternative, we assess the extent of the additional burden required from the population groups currently serving, and the economic implications, in the event that Haredim serve in the IDF, and in accordance with the demographic growth forecasts for both populations. We apply several scenarios for the level of integration of Haredim into military service—20% integration, 40% integration, 60% integration, and a maximal integration of 87.6%, which is the level of participation in mandatory military service among men in the population groups that currently serve.[2]
Findings
Supply: Additional Service Days Available to the IDF According to Scenarios for Haredi Conscription
Figure 1 below presents the number of service days (in millions) that would be made available to the IDF in the event of Haredi conscription. This is the additional “supply” that the IDF would have at its disposal according to the various scenarios for Haredi conscription. The figure shows that if 20% of Haredi men of the relevant ages enter the IDF, then in 2025 the IDF would benefit from an additional 0.9 million days from regular service personnel, rising to 2.2 million days by 2050. According to the scenario of 40% Haredi integration, the IDF would have an additional 1.9 million days in 2025, rising to 4.7 million days in 2050. The 60% integration scenario would add 2.9 million days in 2025, rising to 7.1 million days by 2050. And in the maximal integration scenario (87.6%), the additional number of days would be 4.3 million in 2025, rising to 10.5 million in 2050.
Figure 1. Total additional service days available to the IDF according to different scenarios for Haredi conscription (millions)
1.1 Demand: Number of Reserve Service Days Needed by the IDF According to the “Partial Utilization” and “Full Utilization” Scenarios
Figure 2 below presents the demand in the IDF for reserve service days, per individual in reserve service. We examine two scenarios.
In the partial utilization scenario, we assume that the IDF will not seek to utilize the maximum number of reserve service days at its disposal after completing the processes described above for increasing the burden of service, and will choose instead to utilize the number of available days only partially, as it did before the war. Therefore, we multiplied the average number of days served by reservists in 2022 (12.3) by a factor of 2.8, which is the factor resulting from raising the maximum age for reserve service by five years and increasing the number of service days per year, as proposed in the Increased Burden Laws (taking into account the relative number of officers and enlisted personnel in the reserve forces). The result is a total of 35 service days per year on average (the actual number of service days per year is 28, but taking into account the higher maximum age of reserve service produces an average result of 35 days).
In the full utilization scenario, the IDF will seek to make full use of the provisions in the law and utilize all the reserve service days at its disposal—that is, multiplying the 19.8 reserve service days per individual (which was the maximum number available before the Increased Burden Laws) by a factor of 2.8. In this scenario, the result is an average of 56 days’ service per year for each reservist (taking into account the higher maximum age of reserve service and the relative number of officers and enlisted personnel; without factoring in the increased age, the actual annual number of reserve service days is 45 on average).
Figure 2. Annual number of reserve service days per individual in reserve service, assuming non-conscription of Haredim, by scenarios for demand for reserve service days following the Increased Burden Laws
Figure 3 below presents the total number of reserve service days needed by the IDF, according to the two utilization scenarios we offered. In 2022, the IDF reported that it utilized 2.4 million service days. According to the partial utilization scenario, the IDF will need 6.8 million days in 2025, rising to 9 million days in 2050, based on the demographic growth trends for the population groups currently serving—which growth was taken into account in formulating the Increased Burden Laws. According to the full utilization scenario, the demand for reserve service days in the IDF will be 10.9 million in 2025, rising to 14.4 million days in 2050, based on the aforementioned demographic growth trends.
Figure 3. Number of reserve service days required according to the two utilization scenarios (millions)
Relation Between Demand and Supply: Reduction in Total Number of Reserve Service Days Assuming Conscription of Haredi Men
Based on the different scenarios for Haredi conscription described, Figure 4 below shows the reduction in total number of reserve service days that will result from the integration of Haredim into regular and reserve service in the IDF, replacing existing reserve soldiers in operational action.
If the IDF employs only partial utilization of the service days at its disposal, as it did previously, then in the scenario in which 20% of Haredim enter military service[3] the total reserve service days in 2025 will be reduced by 13%, rising to a reduction of 25% in 2050. If 40% of Haredi men of the relevant age are conscripted, this will result in a reduction of 28% of the needed reserve service days in 2025, rising to 52% in 2050. The potential savings are even higher in the case of 60% integration, which will bring a reduction of 43% in the number of reserve service days needed in 2025, rising to 79% in 2050. The truly dramatic change is seen in the scenario of full entry of Haredim to military service (at a rate of 87.6%, the conscription rate in the rest of the Jewish population of Israel). Here, the reduction in service days reaches 63% in 2025, rising to fully 100% by as early as 2045. This means that within 20 years, the number of service days performed by Haredi soldiers in regular service would fully meet the needs of the IDF, such that no reserve service days would be necessary for operational purposes, and reserve duty would only be for the purposes of maintaining combat readiness.
In the full utilization scenario, in which the IDF makes full use of the number of reserve service days available to it, and based on a 20% rate of integration of Haredim into military service, the reduction in the number of days required will be 8% in 2025, rising to 15% in 2050. An integration rate of 40% of potential Haredi conscripts will result in a reduction of 17% in the number of days required in 2025, rising to 32% in 2050, while a 60% integration rate will bring a reduction of 27% in 2025 and 49% in 2050. If Haredi society fully commits to military service to the same extent as the rest of the serving population groups, then the resultant reduction in reserve service days will be 39% in 2025 and 73% in 2050.
Figure 4. Relative reduction in reserve service days, according to different scenarios for Haredi conscription, by scenarios for demand for reserve service days (%)
Average Service Days for Reservists given the Integration of Haredi Men
Figure 6 below shows the impact of Haredi men integrating into military service on reducing the number of reserve days for the average reservist. According to the partial utilization scenario, the average service days for reservists in the case of 20% Haredi integration will be 29 days in 2025, and by 2050, will decrease to 24 days. If the integration rate is 40%, the average reserve days will be 23, instead of 35, in 2025 and in 2050, only 14 days. In the case of full integration of Haredi men, reserve days will be 11 in 2025, and the need for reserve service will disappear completely, standing at 0 days after 2045.
According to the full utilization scenario, in which the IDF makes use of all the reserve days available to it, with the integration rate of 20%, the reserve days will be at 50 (rather than 56) in 2025 and will decrease to 44 in 2050. With the integration of 40% of Haredi men, the number of reserve days will be reduced to 43 in 2025 and to 33 in 2050. If 60% of Haredi men serve, reserve days will decrease to 37 in 2025 and to 23 in in 2050; and with maximum integration, a reservist will serve 28 days in 2025, which will be reduced to 11 days in 2050.
Figure 5: Service days for individual reservists according to different scenarios for Haredi conscription, by scenarios for demand for reserve service days
Savings to the Economy According to Scenarios for Haredi Conscription to Regular and Reserve Service[4]
Reserve service days are expensive. Some 20% of IDF reservists work in the high-tech sector. Thus, the cost to the economy of their reserve service is significantly higher than that of younger regular soldiers who do not have a higher education or professional training and experience.[5] The cost of an average reservist in the IDF is 3.05 times higher than that of an average Haredi reservist of the relevant age, based on the rate of participation of Haredi men in the workforce (55%) and their average monthly wage (NIS 3,800, taking into account individuals who do not work).
Figure 7 below shows the cost to the economy[6] of reserve service if the currently serving population groups (97.8% non-Haredi Jews, 1.0% Haredi Jews, and 1.2% non-Jews) remain unchanged and the Increased Burden Laws are applied.
In the scenario of partial utilization of the reserve service days available to the IDF, at the same rate applied before the war, then in 2025 reserve service days will cost NIS 6.2 billion, rising to NIS 8.3 billion in 2050. According to the full utilization scenario, the cost in 2025 will be NIS 10 billion, rising to NIS 13.3 billion in 2050.
Figure 7. Budgetary cost to the Israeli economy assuming continuation of current situation with no Haredi conscription, by scenarios for demand for reserve service days in accordance with the Increased Burden Laws (NIS billions)
If Haredim are integrated into regular and reserve military service, there will be a significant reduction in cost to the economy each year, reaching a saving of more than NIS 10 billion by 2050 (based on full integration of Haredim, in the full utilization scenario).
As shown in Figure 8 below, based on the partial utilization scenario, in which the IDF uses only some of the reserve service days at its disposal, then given an integration rate of 20% of relevant Haredi men into military service, the cost of reserve service will fall to NIS 5.3 billion in 2025 (a saving of NIS 900 million), and to NIS 5.9 billion in 2050 (a saving of NIS 2.4 billion). If the integration rate is 40%, then the cost to the economy of reserve service will decline to NIS 4.3 billion in 2025 (a saving of NIS 1.9 billion) and to NIS 3.6 billion in 2050 (a saving of NIS 4.7 billion). In the event that 60% of Haredi men enter military service, then the cost of reserve service will be NIS 3.3 billion in 2025 (a saving of NIS 2.9 billion), falling to just NIS 1.5 billion in 2050 (a saving of NIS 6.8 billion). Finally, assuming full integration of Haredi men (87.6%), the cost to the economy will fall to just NIS 2 billion in 2025 (a saving of 4.2 billion), and the need for reserve service will disappear completely in 2045 (that is, reservists will need to perform only a few days of reserve duty each year for the purposes of maintaining combat readiness, while all operational activities are performed by regular forces).
In the full utilization scenario, given an integration rate of 20% of Haredi men into military service, the cost of reserve service will fall to NIS 9 billion in 2025 (a saving of NIS 1 billion) and to 10.7 billion in 2050 (a saving of NIS 2.6 billion). Given an integration rate of 40%, the cost of reserve service will be NIS 7.9 billion in 2025 (a saving of NIS 2.1 billion), rising slightly to NIS 8.2 billion in 2050 (a saving of NIS 5.1 billion). If 60% of Haredi men enter military service, then the cost of reserve service will be NIS 6.8 billion in 2025 (a saving of NIS 3.2 billion), and will reach NIS 5.9 billion in 2050 (a saving of NIS 7.4 billion). In the event of maximal integration of Haredi men at the same level as other serving populations, the cost to the economy will stand at NIS 5.4 billion in 2025 (a saving of 4.6 billion), and will reach just NIS 3 billion in 2050 (an annual saving of NIS 10.3 billion).
Figure 8. Budgetary cost to the Israeli economy according to different scenarios for Haredi conscription, by scenarios for demand for reserve service days in accordance with the Increased Burden Laws (NIS billions)
The full extent of the savings to the economy can be seen in Figure 9 below, which shows the proportional saving to the economy relative to the situation in which only population groups currently serving in the IDF continue to serve, following implementation of the Increased Burden Laws. In the event of full integration of Haredi men to military service and of partial utilization by the IDF, the saving achieved reaches 100%.
According to the partial utilization scenario, in which the IDF makes use of only some of the reserve service days available to it, and assuming an integration rate of 20% of Haredi men into military service, the relative saving achieved will be 15.5% in 2025, rising to around 28% in 2050. With an integration rate of 40%, the saving will increase to more than 31% in 2025 and to 56% in 2050. In the event of 60% integration, the saving to the economy will be around 47% in 2025 and some 82% in 2050. Maximal integration of Haredi men into military service (87.6%) will lead to a saving of around 67% in 2025, reaching fully 100% in 2050.
In the full utilization scenario, in which the IDF uses all the reserve service days at its disposal, then in the case of 20% integration of Haredi men into military service, the saving will reach 10.5% in 2025 and around 19% in 2050. Assuming 40% integration, the relative saving rises from around 21% in 2025 to around 38% in 2050. If 60% of Haredi men serve, then the saving will rise from around 31% in 2025 to around 55% in 2050. And in the event of maximal integration of Haredi men, at levels similar to those among currently serving population groups, the relative saving to the economy will be around 45% in 2025 and around 77% in 2050.
Figure 9. Expected proportional saving to the economy according to different scenarios for Haredi conscription, by scenarios for demand for reserve service days (%)
[1] Memorandum on the Military Service Law—Extension of the Period of Mandatory Service for Men, and Memorandum on the Reserve Service Law—Extending the Period of Reserve Service and Raising the Age of Service.
[2] These conscription rates are based on data in the Central Bureau of Statistics’ Social Survey for 2018–2022—the percentage of respondents aged 20–24 who reported that they had been drafted to the IDF. Among non-Jewish Haredi men, the conscription rate stands at 87.6%. Similarly, according to the data from the IDF Spokesperson’s Unit for 2022, the conscription rate among graduates of the state education system is 88%.
[3] As noted earlier, regarding reserve soldiers, the calculation is 20% of only 9.9%, in line with the percentages of reservists in the non-Haredi Jewish population, and so on with the other rates of Haredi integration into military service.
[4] The costings presented in this section apply the methodology used by the Chief Economist Division in the Ministry of Finance, which underpins the report published in February 2024 on the characteristics of IDF reservists and the presentation given to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee on April 1, 2024. The initial paper by the current authors which was published on the Committee website used a different methodology, which referred to net incomes, while the current paper (like the Ministry of Finance documents) refers to gross incomes.
[5] Reservists may also offer advantages, stemming from their previous military experience, in terms of their responsibility, judgment, ability to withstand pressure, and so on. However, our focus here is solely on budgetary cost.
[6] Please note that we refer here to budgetary cost.