Analysis of Voting Trends and Intentions in Israel: Review of 2024
An analysis of the potential voting patterns for future elections, voter transitions between parties, and an exploration of the potential electoral power of the Democrats party in upcoming elections.
Photos by Flash90: Miriam Alster, Lior Agami, Yonatan Sindel.
Repeat voting for parties, and voter transition between parties
- The Likud party has recovered significantly since August 2024, with a sizable increase in the share of repeat voters—that is, the proportion, among those who voted for the party in 2022, who would vote for it again if new elections were held now—from 39% in August to around 54% in December. The bulk of these “regained” votes have come at the expense of the National Unity Party on the one hand, and the Otzma Yehudit Party on the other. The (still theoretical) option of a new right-wing party receives low support among Likud voters.
- Religious Zionism and Otzma Yehudit experienced a considerable decline in repeat voter share during the summer months (down to just 50% in August). Since then, they have shown signs of recovery, though this trend is not unequivocal. Comparing these two parties, which ran together in 2022, we find that the share of voters for the joint list who intend to vote for Otzma Yehudit is consistently larger than the share who intend to vote for Religious Zionism.
- National Unity has seen a dramatic fall in the share of its voters in 2022 who would vote for it again now, from 70% in April to 34% in December. Two parties in particular have drawn away National Unity voters: Yisrael Beytenu, and a (still theoretical) new right-wing party.
- A large proportion of voters for all the parties have not yet decided who they will vote for at the next elections.
Under the magnifying glass: The Democrats
This report includes an in-depth comparative analysis of two voter groups:
- Those who say they would vote for the Democrats party if elections were held today.
- Potential voters for the Democrats party—respondents who say they would vote for another party or who are still undecided, and who meet at least one of the following two criteria: (a) they voted for Meretz or Labor in the 2022 elections; and (b) they self-identify as on the Left (hereon referred to as “potential voters” for the Democrats).
The findings below are based on a comparison between these two groups:
- The Democrats party attracts mainly former Meretz voters, but is struggling to attract Labor voters.
- There is a significant gender discrepancy, with men more likely than women to vote for the party.
- Support for the party is more common among far-left voters, while those identified with the moderate Left are less inclined to vote for it.
- A very large proportion (close to 40%) of potential voters for the Democrats are unsure for whom to vote and did not express a preference for any party.
- In terms of opinions, those who intend to vote for the Democrats can be characterized as “critical Zionists”: On the one hand, they support the rule of law and the separation of powers, have a high level of trust in the IDF and its senior command, and express a relatively high degree of support for residency along the state’s borders. On the other hand, they hold critical opinions about the government and its policies, and want change (they support diplomatic solutions and an end to the war in Gaza, and are even doubtful about their own future in Israel). This set of views differentiates them from the potential voters, who hold more hawkish opinions regarding security, stress the importance of living in Israel, and tend more to support military solutions than diplomatic solutions.
The analysis in the first part of the report is based on data collected via the monthly Israeli Voice Index survey between February 2024 and December 2024. Each month, the survey respondents were asked both about how they voted in the 2022 elections and about their current voting intentions for the future. The data are presented as a moving three-month average; that is, each monthly data point represents the average for that month and the previous two months. This method helps identify long-term trends and moderates the impact of extreme swings following one-time events.
The second part of the report, which looks more closely at voter intentions related to the Democrats party, is based on an in-depth analysis of three surveys: two Israeli Voice surveys (October and December 2024), and a survey on the judicial overhaul that was conducted in December 2024.
Unlike focused election surveys, which are based on voting quotas at the previous elections, the sampling in the surveys which this report addresses is based on population characteristics such as nationality, religiosity, area of residence, and gender. Thus, these data should not be viewed as a prediction for the next election, but rather as general background that can offer an understanding of the trends analyzed in the report.
If elections were held today, which party would you vote for? February–December 2024* (%)
* The voting shares shown in the graph were calculated as the proportion of the voters who expressed a preference for a particular party, and do not include respondents who are unsure, declined to answer, or have not yet decided who they will vote for.
** In July, Yisrael Beytenu, the National Right, and a new right-wing party were presented together.
*** Since June, Labor and Meretz have been presented as a joint party—the Democrats.
The share of voters for a particular party who intend to vote for the same party again offers an indication, to some degree, of voters’ satisfaction with the party’s behavior.
The Likud party has undergone a gradual and consistent recovery in 2024. Up to August, the moving average of repeat voter share was below 40%, but over the subsequent months, perhaps as a result of the military successes in Lebanon and greater security stability, there was a significant increase in the share of Likud voters who said they would vote for the party again, up to 54% in December. Among those who did not express an intention to vote for the Likud again, there was a particularly high proportion who either declined to respond or said they don’t know which party they would vote for (26%). Currently, there are no other parties that attract large numbers of Likud voters. National Unity and Otzma Yehudit, each of which drew 8% of Likud voters in August, attracted only 2% and 3% (respectively) in December.
Religious Zionism and Otzma Yehudit, which ran on a joint list at the last elections, began the period reviewed here with a high moving average of 62% of voters in April who expressed an intention to vote for them again. This combined share for both parties fell considerably over the summer, but has since recovered to a moving average of 63% in December. That month, 6% of voters for the combined list said they would vote for Likud and 5% for Yisrael Beytenu, while 23% reported that they remained undecided or declined to express a preference.
As noted, we also examined voter intentions regarding each party separately. Among those who voted for the combined list at the last elections, the share who intend to vote for Otzma Yehudit was higher than the share who intend to vote for Religious Zionism in almost every survey, with an average difference of 11 percentage points in favor of Otzma Yehudit.
The Haredi parties have the highest average share of repeat voters. The figure below shows that United Torah Judaism has maintained a high level of stability, while the repeat voter share for Shas has declined since September. However, this apparent drop in support for Shas can be explained largely by the outlier finding in September (27%), while the repeat voter share has remained stable in all other months, at above 60% (note that the figure below displays the three-month moving average). In the December survey, 68% of Shas voters said they intend to vote for Shas again in future elections, while 8% would vote for Likud, and 21% were still undecided.
Would vote for the same party they voted for in the 2022 elections—coalition parties (%)
Among the opposition parties, the low share of repeat voters for National Unity stands out in particular. The party began with a repeat voter share of 70% in April, but since then has seen a steady decline, down to 34% in December. Of those who voted for the party in the last elections and do not intend to do so again, sizable shares expressed an intention to vote for a new right-wing party (October, 9%; December, 11.5%) or for Yisrael Beytenu (October, 12%; December, 9%). Also notable was the large proportion who have not yet decided or who declined to respond (October, 36%; December, 27.5%).
Yesh Atid has maintained a low but stable repeat voter share of around 30% in all surveys. Among those who voted for the party in the last elections, notable proportions declared their intention to vote for National Unity (October, 20%; December, 15.5%) or for the Democrats (October, 10%; December, 9%).
Throughout the period studied, the repeat voter share for Yisrael Beytenu has been highly inconsistent—rising from 65% in April to a peak of 78% in June, and then declining to 52% in December. There is no clear pattern of voter transition to a specific party or parties; rather, in recent surveys, parties from across the political spectrum gained between 4% and 8% of those who voted for Yisrael Beytenu in the 2022 elections.
The left-wing parties have recovered significantly since the announcement of the Democrats party (a unification of the Meretz and Labor parties) in June 2024. Labor had a dramatic improvement in repeat voter share, from just 20% in April, when it seemed that it would run on its own in future elections, up to 50% of Labor voters who expressed an intention to vote for the combined party in recent months. Meretz also experienced an increase in repeat voter share, from a respectable 55% in April up to 74% in August, though this has fallen again in recent months, down to 62% in December. For both parties, the share of voters who remain undecided or who declined to respond was particularly large (December: Labor voters, 28%; Meretz voters, 26%).
Would vote for the same party they voted for in the 2022 elections—Zionist opposition parties (%)
* From June 2024, the voter shares for Labor and Meretz refer to those intending to vote for the Democrats party, headed by Yair Golan.
** From August 2024, respondents were offered the option of “a new right-wing party,” with no names specified. In addition, Gideon Sa’ar’s party, the National Right, was presented separately. The voter share for National Unity includes both voters for Blue and White who intend to vote for National Unity and voters who intend to vote for the National Right headed by Sa’ar (0%–2%, a negligible share).
Voting patterns for the Arab parties have differed over this period: Ra’am has maintained a relatively stable level of support, of 55%–65%. Hadash-Ta’al underwent a crisis in the summer, when its repeat voter share fell to a low of 39%, but has since recovered to a share of 51% in December. Balad had the greatest fluctuation, from 49% in April, down to just 28% in July, and then a consistent and dramatic increase to 61% in December. It should be noted that the volatility in the data for Hadash-Ta’al and Balad may stem from, among other things, the small number of interviewees in the survey sample who voted for Arab parties in the last elections. For this reason, it is also not possible to conduct an in-depth analysis of voter transition from these parties.
Would vote for the same party they voted for in the 2022 elections—Arab opposition parties (%)
The formation in June 2024 of the Democrats party headed by Yair Golan, which unified Meretz and Labor, led to a significant rise in voter share in the total sample, from 7%–8% for both parties together before unification, to 13.4% afterward. In the following months, support for this combined party stabilized at around 10%.
In parallel, two other significant trends were seen: a gradual decline in support for Yesh Atid, and a sharp drop in support for National Unity. As of December 2024, the three parties—the Democrats, Yesh Atid, and National Unity—have similar voting shares.
If elections were held today, which party would you vote for? February–December 2024* (%)
* The voting shares shown in the graph were calculated as the proportion of the voters who expressed a preference for a particular party, and do not include respondents who are unsure, declined to answer, or have not yet decided who they will vote for.
** Between February and May, the percentage shown represents the combined voting share for Labor and Meretz. In June, the parties were unified as the Democrats.
Regarding the two most recent surveys, in October and December, just under half of Labor voters and just over half of Meretz voters in the last elections expressed an intention to vote for the Democrats, as did around 10% of Yesh Atid voters. Only a negligible percentage of National Unity voters intend to vote for the Democrats.
Voting intentions among those who voted for Labor, Meretz, Yesh Atid, and National Unity in the 2022 elections, October and December 2024 (%)
In this section, we identify similarities and differences between two groups: (1) interviewees who said they would vote for the Democrats if elections were held today; and (2) potential voters for the Democrats, that is, interviewees who said they would not vote for the Democrats, but have characteristics that make them likely to do so, because (a) they voted for Labor or Meretz in 2022, and/or (b) they self-identify as being on the Left.
To carry out this comparison, we used data from three surveys:
- The Israeli Voice survey from October 2024, which included 750 respondents
- The Israeli Voice survey from December 2024, which also included 750 respondents
- A survey on the judicial overhaul, conducted in December 2024, which included 1,200 respondents
We identified 152 respondents who said they would vote for the Democrats, and 237 “potential voters” who said they would not vote for the Democrats:
As shown in the figure below, there are three main sources of support for the Democrats: former voters for Labor and Meretz, who constitute more than half of those who intend to vote for the new party, and Yesh Atid voters, who constitute around a quarter of future voters. Together, these three groups make up around 80% of the respondents who intend to vote for the Democrats.
A comparison between the group of respondents who expressed an intention to vote for the Democrats and the group of potential voters for this party reveals that Meretz voters form a larger share of the former group than of the latter: 27% of those who say they would vote for the Democrats, versus 13% of potential voters, voted for Meretz in the 2022 elections. The difference is less pronounced among Labor voters, who constitute 29% of those who would vote for the Democrats, versus 23% of potential voters. Among Yesh Atid voters, there is not a large discrepancy between their share among those who intend to vote for the Democrats (23%) and their share among potential voters for the Democrats (28%).
Voting pattern in the last elections among respondents who intend to vote for the Democrats and “potential voters” (%)
Analysis of the future voting intentions expressed by the potential voters reveals a complex picture. The most salient finding is the particularly large share (39%) who are unsure who they will vote for. This means that a significant proportion of potential voters have not expressed a preference for a specific party. Among those potential voters who did express a preference, Yesh Atid and National Unity receive most support, with 21.5% and 17.5% respectively.
Voting intentions among potential voters (%)
A breakdown by age shows that the group of those who intend to vote for the Democrats is older than the group of potential voters, though the differences are not statistically significant.
Age distribution of respondents who intend to vote for the Democrats and potential voters (%)
The sample of these two groups contained a total of 185 men and 204 women. Our analysis revealed a clear gender difference between those who intend to vote for the Democrats and potential voters: among the former, men are the majority, while among potential voters, there is a sizable majority of women.
Gender distribution of respondents who intend to vote for the Democrats and potential voters (%)
As expected, the share of respondents who self-identify as on the Left is very large in both groups—80% of those who intend to vote for the party, and 87% of the potential voters.
We examined which of the two groups tends more to the left side of the political map in Israel, and which is more centrist, by comparing the average location of respondents on a Left-Right scale where 1=Left and 7=Right. We found that the average score of the potential voters (2.91) was higher than that of those who intend to vote for the Democrats (2.64), and that the difference was statistically significant. That is, those who intend to vote for the Democrats are more left-wing than the potential voters, who are slightly closer to the Center, albeit still on the Left.
The findings we have presented so far indicate that the Democrats’ main challenge is not persuading former Meretz voters or strongly left-wing voters, but garnering support among former Labor voters, the moderate Left, and women, many of whom are currently considering voting for such parties as Yesh Atid and National Unity. Below, we present several comparisons between the opinions of the two groups on key issues.
In December, a comprehensive survey was conducted that included 15 questions on the judicial overhaul. In both groups, the majority opposed the overhaul and its various components, but the strength of opposition differed. Among those who intend to vote for the Democrats, 95% oppose both the overhaul itself and its advancement at the current time. Among the potential voters, there was also sizable opposition, but to a lesser extent (oppose the overhaul, 79%; oppose its advancement at the current time, 82%). These findings tally with the higher level of trust in the Supreme Court among those who intend to vote for the Democrats than among the potential voters.[1]
When we examined differences between the two groups on issues of security, establishing communities along the border, and identification with the state, we found a complex and even (on occasion) paradoxical state of affairs. Those who intend to vote for the Democrats presented a complicated pattern of opinions that can be called “critical Zionism.” On the one hand, they have a higher degree of trust in the IDF than the potential voters, identify more strongly with the values of the IDF senior command, and stress the importance of residency along the country’s borders.
Opinions on security issues—respondents who intend to vote for the Democrats and potential voters (%)
On the other hand, again relative to the potential voters, they hold more critical views regarding the government’s current policies and have a stronger desire for substantial change. They are more supportive of diplomatic solutions, of ending the war in Gaza, and of withdrawing from territories captured in Syria. They are also more open to the idea of living in a different country, and agree more with the claim that it is safer for Jews to live abroad than in Israel. The potential voters, meanwhile, hold slightly more hawkish views, and have a more positive view of living in Israel.
Which of the following will best ensure the future security of Israel in the short term and in the long term? (%)
Where is it safer for Jews to live? (%)
If you had the opportunity, would you prefer to live in Israel or to move to another Western country? (%)