A Review of the Moves Designed to Weaken Israeli Democracy - Summary of 2024

This document presents an overview of the main measures taken by the government and the coalition to weaken Israeli democracy in 2024. The document is based on a series of periodic reviews conducted over the past year, in which we identified the moves to weaken democracy and their expansion over time.¹

The document reviews the various arenas in which the coalition is operating to weaken democracy: harm to the rule of law and the institution of the Attorney General; erosion of the independence of the judicial system and the Israel Police; politicization of the civil service; and the diminishing of basic rights such as freedom of expression, together with threats to a free press.

The examination of these arenas is based on the extensive literature showing that in recent years the erosion of democracy has not occurred in one fell swoop. Rather, it is a gradual and ongoing process by which democratically elected governments weaken democratic institutions, values, and norms. The trend has focused on advancing legislation, constitutional amendments, and political appointments intended to hollow out liberal democracy of its substance.² The systematic analysis of the various arenas of action reveals that seemingly separate steps are, in fact, interconnected - and highlights their cumulative impact on the erosion of democracy.

The moves to weaken democracy in Israel did not begin in 2024,³ nor did they emerge solely under the auspices of the current government.⁴ However, the scope of the democracy-weakening measures undertaken by this government is exceptional compared to its predecessors. This was already apparent in the coalition agreements and the government’s basic guidelines; in the speech of Justice Minister Yariv Levin on January 4, 2023; and of course in the initiatives to advance numerous and unprecedented amendments to Basic Laws and other laws, alongside changes on the ground aimed at altering Israel’s system of government.⁵ These changes are reflected, among other things, in attempts to transform the Judicial Selection Committee into a body controlled by a political majority; significant restrictions on the scope of judicial review that the High Court of Justice may exercise over legislation and administrative decisions;⁶ a dramatic reduction in the powers of the Attorney General and attempts to politicize this role; an expansion of the jurisdiction of the religious courts; the widening of the authority of the Minister of National Security to influence police policy; harming freedom of expression and protest; reducing budgets for the Arab community; and so forth.

Many of these measures, especially those requiring amendments to Basic Laws, were halted in 2023 thanks to a broad and unprecedented public protest movement.⁷ Other measures—particularly those not requiring legislation—began to materialize, such as changes in the relations between the police and the Ministry of National Security. Some of the legislative initiatives were successful, such as the amendment to Basic Law: The Government regarding the grounds for declaring the Prime Minister incapacitated. The Knesset passed the main legislative initiative that reflected the coalition’s desire to limit the authority of the Supreme Court (sitting as the High Court of Justice (HCJ)) — the amendment to the Basic Law: The Judiciary abolishing the “reasonableness” standard. However, the amendment was struck down by the HCJ in a precedential ruling delivered at the beginning of 2024.⁸

In the first days after the murderous Hamas attack of October 7, 2023, and during the subsequent war, many coalition members declared that “we had been dealing in nonsense,” that “the public wants a different kind of politics,” and that the “judicial reform” was off the table. It might also have been assumed that the HCJ’s unequivocal ruling at the beginning of 2024, in which a clear majority of 12 out of 15 justices on the panel found that the HCJ has the authority to strike down a Basic Law that harms the core characteristics of Israeli democracy—would seal the fate of the efforts to harm democracy. Despite this, as the war progressed, it became clear that the government and the coalition had not abandoned their efforts to undermine Israel’s already weak system of checks and balances. Instead, over the course of 2024, the government shifted its main course of action in pursuit of its goal of weakening democratic mechanisms: no longer focusing on amendments to Basic Laws, but instead on creating facts on the ground, reflected in numerous moves circumventing legislation through appointments, decisions, and by disregarding mandatory legal opinions—with similar, and at times even more destructive, results. At first, the Attorney General defined the sequence of measures as a “quiet reform”; however, as time went on, the reform became far less quiet. The coalition’s initiatives continued to escalate at the beginning of 2024 and the damage to democracy became evident in multiple arenas and with increasing frequency.

Thus, the independence of the judicial branch—functioning for almost a year and a half without a permanent president of the Supreme Court (equivalent to a chief justice), with a shortage of judges at all levels, including the Supreme Court, and facing repeated attacks on the legitimacy of both the President and the Judicial Selection Committee—has been compromised. In addition, in recent months the government has doubled down on its assault against the rule of law, ignoring the Attorney General’s opinions, contesting her sole authority to represent the government before the courts, and even openly seeking to depose her.⁹ Throughout the past year, the Minister of National Security tightened his control over the police through actions that appear to constitute repeated violations of the HCJ directive forbidding him from intervening in the operational work of the police. At the end of 2024, however, a ruling struck down one of the amendments to the Police Ordinance that had enabled the Minister to set general policy in the field of investigations. At the same time, the government advanced the politicization of appointment procedures for key positions in the civil service, such as the Civil Service Commissioner and the Ombudsman for Complaints against Judges, and reduced the level of representation of women in senior positions in the public service to an unprecedented low. In addition, over the past year, the government imposed a disproportionate cut in the budgets for Arab society, a trend that may worsen in the 2025 budget with respect to other underprivileged groups in Israeli society.¹⁰

In recent months, the efforts to weaken democracy have also become increasingly evident within the Knesset. Following the HCJ’s decision requiring the Judicial Selection Committee to set a final date for appointing a president to the Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice and other ministers announced plans to push forward a bill to change the Committee’s composition, which is already awaiting its second and third readings in the Knesset. The coalition is also seeking to change the method of appointing the Ombudsman for Complaints against Judges. Additionally, with the opening of the winter session, we have witnessed an assault on the freedom of the press, particularly aimed at the Public Broadcasting Corporation, as well as on freedom of expression. Moreover, during this session, the coalition has begun advancing an amendment to Section 7a of Basic Law: The Knesset, intended to broaden the grounds for disqualification from voting and standing for election, with particular emphasis on Arab society. It is also pursuing legislation aimed at further weakening the civil service.

The year 2024 ended against the backdrop of statements by the Minister of Communications that he would not comply with an interim order of the HCJ extending the term of members of the Council of the Public Broadcasting Corporation. The picture that emerges at the beginning of 2025 is troubling and requires ongoing scrutiny. The government and the coalition are vigorously advancing measures to weaken Israeli democracy across multiple arenas, in a coordinated manner. Additionally, the presentation of the “agreement” outline published by Minister of Justice Levin and Foreign Minister Saar at the beginning of January—which includes a proposal to change the composition of the Judicial Selection Committee and to enact a Basic Law: Legislation—indicates the coalition’s intention to return soon to amendments of Basic Laws that will politicize the selection of judges and significantly curtail the Supreme Court’s authority to exercise judicial review over legislation. At the beginning of 2024, the government acted “under the radar,” primarily through resolutions and on-the-ground measures. It has since shifted to a full-scale barrage of Basic Law amendments, primary legislation, ordinances, resolutions, appointments, and even threats of dismissal—all directed at weakening the state’s democratic institutions.

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1. See the reviews [in Hebrew] on the website of the Israel Democracy Institute: Anat Thon Ashkenazy & Daphne Benvenisty, Processes of Weakening Democracy: A Status Report at the End of the Knesset’s Winter Session, April 2024—Review No. 1 (Israel Democracy Institute, Apr. 9, 2024); Anat Thon Ashkenazy & Daphne Benvenisty, This Is What the "Silent Reform" Looks Like: The Processes of Weakening Democracy Continue—Review No. 2: Apr. 10, 2024-May 30, 2024 (Israel Democracy Institute, June 6, 2024); Anat Thon Ashkenazy & Daphne Benvenisty, The Coalition’s Initiatives to Weaken Democracy: The ‘Not-So-Silent Reform’—Review No. 3: June 1, 2024-Aug. 11, 2024 (Israel Democracy Institute, Aug. 13, 2024); Anat Thon Ashkenazy & Daphne Benvenisty, Even during the Knesset Recess, the Attacks on the Judicial System, the Gatekeepers, and the Politicization of the Education System and the Police Continue—Review No. 4: Aug. 12, 2024-Sept. 16, 2024 (Israel Democracy Institute, Sept. 19, 2024); Anat Thon Ashkenazy & Daphne Benvenisty, One Year after the Outbreak of the "Iron Swords" War and Ahead of the Knesset’s Winter Session: A Review of the Moves to Weaken Israeli Democracy—Review No. 5 (Israel Democracy Institute, Oct. 27, 2024); Anat Thon Ashkenazy & Daphne Benvenisty, The Winter Session Opens with a Storm of Steps for the Expedited Advancement of Moves to Weaken Democracy—Review No. 6: Oct. 27, 2024-Nov. 27, 2024 (Israel Democracy Institute, Nov. 28, 2024); Anat Thon Ashkenazy & Daphne Benvenisty, The Coalition Is Openly and Conspicuously Promoting Moves to Harm Democracy and Weaken the Gatekeepers—Review No. 7: Nov. 28, 2024-Jan. 5, 2025 (Israel Democracy Institute, Jan. 14, 2025).
   
   
2. See, for example: Steven Levitsky & Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die (2018); Kim Lane Scheppele, Autocratic Legalism, 85 U. Chi. L. Rev. 545 (2018); Nancy Bermeo, On Democratic Backsliding, 27(1) J. Democracy 5 (2016); Kim Lane Scheppele, Never Again, And Not Quite, VerfBlog (July 23, 2024).
   
   
3. Suzie Navot, An Overview of Israel’s "Judicial Overhaul": Small Parts of a Big Populist Picture, 56(3) Isr. L. Rev. 482 (2023).
   
   
4. Amir Fuchs, Dana Blander, & Mordechai Kremnitzer, Anti-Democratic Legislation in the 18th Knesset, 2009-2013 (Israel Democracy Institute, 2015) [Hebrew].
   
   
5. Suzie Navot & Guy Lurie, An Attack on the Rule of Law in Israel, 39(1) Isr. Stud. Rev. 20 (2024).
   
   
6. Amichai Cohen & Yuval Shany, Reversing the “Constitutional Revolution”: The Israeli Government’s Plan to Undermine the Supreme Court’s Judicial Review of Legislation, Lawfare, Feb. 15, 2023.
   
   
7. A survey conducted in July 2023 found that about one quarter of respondents (23%) had participated in the protests against the judicial reform. See: Tamar Hermann & Or Anavi, Flash Survey: Equality among Likud Voters between Those Supporting the Continuation of the Legislation and Those Who Believe It Should Be Halted in Favor of Increasing Unity in Israel (Israel Democracy Institute, July 17, 2023) [Hebrew]. For the framing of “the people,” who acted through protest against the judicial reform, as “a fourth branch that protects democracy,” see Yaniv Roznai, We the Fourth Branch? The People as an Institution Protecting Democracy, in Redefining Comparative Constitutional Law: Essays for Mark Tushnet (Madhav Khosla & Vicki C. Jackson, 2024).
   
   
8. HCJ 5658/23 Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. The Knesset (Jan. 1, 2024).
   
   
9. Daphne Benvenisty & Anat Thon Ashkenazy, Separate Representation Is Not Separate Counsel’: Cases in Which the Government Was Permitted to Obtain Separate Legal Representation in Petitions to the High Court of Justice (Israel Democracy Institute, Sept. 8, 2024) [Hebrew].
   
   
10. For example, as part of the 2024 budget, the government approved a sweeping, disproportionate cut in the five-year plans aimed at strengthening Arab society. Government officials even signaled their intention to freeze benefits as part of the 2025 budget, a move that could further deepen the harm to vulnerable populations.