A Jewish and Democratic State

The intensive debate over the "Jewish and democratic state" includes tacit assumptions regarding the nature of the institution of the state, Judaism, and democracy. These tacit assumptions lead many to doubt the possibility of any sort of integration between Judaism and democracy, and to act for the establishment of a "Jewish state" or a "democratic state" instead of a Jewish and democratic state. Within the context of these efforts, demands in favor of "separating religion from the state" and "a state of all its citizens" are being heard. The objective of this book is to suggest new insights that will make it possible to maintain, and even strengthen, the combination of state, Judaism and democracy.

This book centers around two proposals. One, to renew the definition of the roles of the institution of the state in democracy in general, and in a democracy attempting to contend with Jewish heritage in particular. Two, to develop a model of democracy that is more sensitive and effective than existing models with regard to cultures whose values tend at times to clash with important democratic values, and with regard to cultural, national and religious rifts.

First, at a time when many have long written about the relations between Judaism and democracy, few have opined about the influence of the institution of the state on the possibilities and nature of their integration. The late entry, only about 55 years ago, of the institution of the state into the already tense relations between Judaism and modernity, and especially between Judaism and democracy, gave rise to considerable changes in the development of Judaism and its relations with democracy. The first chapter in this book discusses the practical and normative difficulties of the connections between state and Judaism, between state and democracy, and between state, Judaism and democracy. It explains, for example, the ambivalent and suspicious attitude of the mostly communitarian Jewish political culture toward the centralization and coerciveness that characterize, to various degrees, the very existence of the institution of the state. Also discussed is the complex attitude of democratic political culture, which is mainly popular, voluntary and pluralistic, toward states, bureaucracy, professional meritocracy, formalism and centralization. Thus, we find, that despite the contrasts between Jewish political culture and democratic political culture, they share a criticism of, and even a certain suspicion toward, the institution of the state. This shared view is not necessarily solely paralyzing and destructive; it also holds the potential for a renewal of the institution of the state, specifically in Israel. In particular, this partnership contains the potential for bolstering the power and authority of civil society against the institution of the state. The failures of the institution of the state in Israel and around the world in contending with economic, environmental, social and cultural difficulties deepen the need for redefining the institution of the state and its relations with civil society. The Jewish and democratic criticism of the institution of the state can, therefore, help improve the state and society in Israel as well as in other democracies.

The third chapter of this book offers an alternative approach to the roles of the state in the context of a democratic state in general, and a democratic and Jewish state in particular. This alternative focuses on reducing the weight of the state's institutions, on the one hand, and increasing the weight of cultural groups and their diasporas, on the other. The development of a "cultural citizenship" alongside and in contrast to state citizenship is proposed. The practical advantage of this alternative approach lies in the extent of its adaptation to the explicit and implicit practices and constraints existing in Israel, as well as in a growing number of democracies in Europe, North America and elsewhere. Its normative advantage lies in its emphasis on the democratic values of liberty, pluralism and equality.

Second, this book proposes a democratic alternative to the traditional theoretical attempts to build democracy within a society marked by cultural, religious and national rifts. The second chapter of this book reviews the common ways, in theory and in practice, in which democracy confronts various kinds of cultural conflicts. In this context, a critical explication of republican democracy and liberal democracy is proposed. One trait shared by both types of democracy is that each of them seems to contradict its own premises, once facing groups whose cultures are not wholly democratic. Thus, for example, liberal democracy tends to display great tolerance toward non-democratic cultures, so long as they do not clash with its principle values. It is even willing to defend non-democratic cultures in their clash with its secondary values. Toward that end, liberal democracy, unlike republican democracy, limits the involvement of the institution of the state in cultural conflicts. However, when a certain culture clashes with a principle value of liberal democracy, the latter tends to qualify, and even to abandon completely, the banner of tolerance, which it usually bears with a sense of superiority. It is, therefore, not coincidental that in certain democracies, such as the United States, "liberal" is interpreted in many cases to be an adjective for someone who is prepared to enlist the physical, legal, economic and cultural might of the state in order to suppress customs that clash with its principle values. At the same time, the label "conservative" in these democracies is attached precisely to someone who takes exception to employing the institution of the state in settling cultural conflicts of this sort. In addition, the recent upsurge in tension between Muslim emigrants and the Western democracies in which they reside, demonstrates the practical insufficiencies of both republican democracy and liberal democracy in tackling cultures that are not wholly democratic. The alternative explicated in this book strives to overcome these inadequacies of both types of democracy.

The final chapter in this book proposes a particular model of multicultural democracy as an alternative more suitable than other models of democracy, for establishing both the democracy and the Judaism of the Israeli state. In essence, the proposed model rests on the equal right of all Jewish and Arab cultural groups in Israel and in their diasporas to preserve and develop their cultures. At the same time, it distinguishes between conditions agreed upon as being vital to the very existence of one or more cultural groups, and conditions whose vital quality is not agreed upon, despite the fact that they are very important: on the one hand, the state is obliged to treat equally the conditions vital to the very existence of each of the various cultural groups within it. On the other hand, regarding the conditions that are not vital (though very important) to the existence of the various cultural groups, the proposed model enables the state and the civil society to be partial to one or more cultural group. With this rule, the proposed model makes it possible, under certain conditions, to prefer the realization of the values of large groups to the realization of the non-vital values of cultural minorities. Thus, for example, while the proposed model requires equal legislation and budgeting for the various educational, cultural and religious institutions, of cultural majorities and minorities alike - it enables the state to prefer the interests of the Jewish majority cultures to those of the Palestinian minority. The justification for such a preference would be even clearer, if a Palestinian state, specializing in fostering the Palestinian cultures, were to be established. In order to apply this model, this book formulates a mechanism for dialogue among representatives of various cultures, in the context of which the agreements and disagreements over the definition of values as being vital or non-vital to various cultures are to be determined. From the practical standpoint, the proposed model surpasses other models in the extent of its adaptability to common insights and practices in the Jewish, Israeli and global politics. From the normative standpoint, it surpasses other models of democracy in its power to justify equal treatment given by the state to the vital interests of all citizens, individuals as well as groups, on the one hand; and preferential treatment given by the state to the values of majoritygroups (Jewish) in Israel and in the Diaspora, on the other.

The study of these issues is not solely theoretical, but rather relies on grappling with challenges that are on the Jewish and Israeli agenda, such as immigration, property laws, and personal status laws, the relations among various streams of Judaism, judicial review, the crises in the education system, and the allocation of funds for cultural and religious enterprises. These concrete questions are used as criteria for justifying and examining the benefit of the proposed model for Israeli democracy and democracy in general, since at least some of them are very relevant to the agendas of other democracies, although they seem to be particular to Israeli democracy. Therefore, throughout this book these problems are discussed not only in the Israeli context, but also with regard to other democratic states, such as Canada, Britain, the Netherlands and Germany, and in the democratic theory in general.