Jewish Public Opinion Regarding the Chief Rabbinate and the Elections for the Chief Rabbis
The aim of this review is to present the views of the Jewish public in Israel regarding the institution of the Chief Rabbinate, based on the findings of an opinion survey that was conducted in May 2024.
Chief Ashkenazi Rabbi David Lau. Photo by: Yonatan Sindel/Flash90
The Chief Rabbinate of Israel was established in 1921 under the British Mandate, and today operates on the basis of the Chief Rabbinate of Israel Law, 1980. The Rabbinate is an auxiliary unit of the Ministry of Religious Services; that is, it operates under the aegis of the Ministry, but enjoys relative independence from it and is not subject to its authority. The Rabbinate is headed by two chief rabbis, one Sephardi (the “Rishon LeZion”) and one Ashkenazi, and alongside these is the Chief Rabbinate Council, comprising 16 rabbis (including the two chief rabbis themselves).
Elections for the chief rabbi positions are held every ten years, and are conducted by an electoral assembly numbering 150 members, most of them religious men and including 80 rabbis and 70 elected officials (Knesset members, heads of local authorities, and heads of religious councils).[1] The term of office of the serving chief rabbis, Rabbi Yitzhak Yosef and Rabbi David Lau, was scheduled to end in August 2023, but was extended to July 2024.[2] Accordingly, as the end of their term approaches, elections for new chief rabbis are due to be held at the end of June. However, no official date has yet been set, and petitions have been submitted to the High Court of Justice regarding the composition of the electoral assembly.
The aim of this review is to present the views of the Jewish public in Israel regarding the institution of the Chief Rabbinate, based on the findings of an opinion survey that was conducted in May 2024 (from hereon, all references to “the public” refer solely to the Jewish public).
Methodology: The survey was conducted via the internet and by telephone (to include groups that are under-represented on the internet) between May 1 and May 6, 2024, with 600 Jewish men and women interviewed, constituting a nationally representative sample of the adult Jewish population in Israel aged 18 and over. The maximum sampling error was ±4.00% at a confidence level of 95%. The survey was conducted with the help of the Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute. Field work was carried out by the Dialogue Research and Polling Institute.
Respondents were asked the following questions: “To what extent do you accept the Chief Rabbinate of Israel as a religious or spiritual authority?” As shown in the figure below, 44% of the Jewish public said that they accept the Chief Rabbinate as a religious or spiritual authority, while 54% said that they do not. That is, a small majority of Jews in Israel do not accept the Chief Rabbinate as a religious or spiritual authority.
Figure 1. To what extent do you accept the Chief Rabbinate of Israel as a religious or spiritual authority? (total sample; %)
Figure 2 presents the breakdown of responses to this question by the respondents’ self-defined religiosity.
Figure 2. To what extent do you accept the Chief Rabbinate of Israel as a religious or spiritual authority? (by religiosity; %)
The figure shows considerable differences between the religious groupings. Only 17% of secular Jews view the Chief Rabbinate as a religious or spiritual authority, as do almost half of traditional non-religious Jews (46%). By contrast, in the other groups, which are smaller in terms of their relative share of the population, a clear majority of respondents said that they accept the Chief Rabbinate as a religious or spiritual authority: an almost identical proportion of traditional religious and national religious Jews (76% and 78%, respectively), and a smaller proportion of Haredim (66%).
It is worth noting the difference on this question between voters for United Torah Judaism, almost all of whom are Haredi, and voters for Shas, some of whom are not. Among United Torah Judaism voters, 60% accept the Chief Rabbinate as a religious or spiritual authority (a lower proportion than the overall share among Haredim), compared with 83% of Shas voters. These findings reflect the fact that the Sephardi chief rabbi, Rabbi Yitzhak Yosef, is considered an important spiritual leader for the Shas party and its voters, while it would be difficult to describe the Ashkenazi chief rabbi, Rabbi David Lau, as a dominant figure in Ashkenazi Haredi society.
The question about the Chief Rabbinate as a religious or spiritual authority examines the overall attitude of the public toward this institution. In another question, we looked at public attitudes toward the Chief Rabbinate in a more concrete context. We asked: “What is your view regarding the level of religious conservatism of the Chief Rabbinate?” Respondents were offered three options representing different views on this issue: (1) the Chief Rabbinate should be less conservative; (2) the Chief Rabbinate is currently conservative to the appropriate degree; and (3) the Chief Rabbinate should be more conservative.
As seen in the figure below, the majority of the public (52%) think that the Chief Rabbinate should be less conservative than it is now, that is, that the Rabbinate is currently too conservative. A further 23% think that the Chief Rabbinate is conservative to the appropriate degree, while 12% think that it should be more conservative.
Figure 3. What is your view regarding the level of religious conservatism of the Chief Rabbinate? (total sample; %)
Figure 4 presents a breakdown of responses to this question by respondents’ religiosity.
Figure 4. What is your view regarding the level of religious conservatism of the Chief Rabbinate? (by religiosity; %)
The figure clearly shows an association between religiosity and opinion regarding the conservatism of the Chief Rabbinate. Among secular and traditional non-religious respondents, a clear majority think that the Rabbinate is too conservative, and only 2% think that it should be more conservative. The picture in the traditional religious public is more complex: 43.5% think that the Chief Rabbinate is conservative to the appropriate degree, while 34.5% think that it is too conservative, and 11% that it should be more conservative. Similarly, 43% of the national religious public think that the Rabbinate is conservative to the appropriate degree, 28% that it is too conservative, and 23% that it is not conservative enough. In contrast to all the above groupings, the Haredim are the only group with a clear majority (54%) who think that the Chief Rabbinate should be more conservative, and only 4% of Haredim think that it should be less conservative.
Against the backdrop of the upcoming elections for the Chief Rabbinate, we asked our respondents to rate the importance of the identity of the rabbis who are elected.
The majority of the public (53%) reported that they do not attach importance to which rabbis are elected, and presumably, neither do the additional 8.5% who selected the “don’t know” response. By contrast, 38.5% of the Jewish public in Israel say that it is important to them which rabbis are elected in the upcoming elections, though only 18.5% selected the “very important” response. Among those who do not attach importance to the identity of the rabbis elected, a clear majority say that it is “not at all important,” while of those who do attach importance, a small majority chose the more equivocal option of “quite important,” rather than the more committed “very important.”
Figure 5. Elections for the Chief Rabbinate are due to be held in a few weeks’ time. How important to you is the identity of the rabbis who are elected? (total sample; %)
Figure 6 presents a breakdown of responses to this question by respondents’ religiosity.
Figure 6. Elections for the Chief Rabbinate are due to be held in a few weeks’ time. How important to you is the identity of the rabbis who are elected? (by religiosity; %)
Once again, the figure shows that in the groups with a stronger religious identity (Haredi, national religious, and traditional religious), the majority consider the identity of the elected rabbis to be important, while the majority of secular and traditional non-religious respondents do not attach importance to it. It is worth noting that despite the above-mentioned finding that the Haredi public tends less to view the Chief Rabbinate as a religious or spiritual authority than do the national religious and traditional religious publics, in response to this question, the Haredim attach greater importance to the elections than those other groups. This discrepancy reflects a significant feature of the attitude of the Haredi public toward the Chief Rabbinate: While it considers it a religious-spiritual authority to a lesser extent than do the other religious publics, it does view the elections to the Chief Rabbinate as important, seemingly due to the Rabbinate’s powers and influence over policymaking, and perhaps also to the resources and jobs it controls.
For many years, elections to the Chief Rabbinate have been the scene for struggles between the Haredi political parties and the national religious parties. The last three elections have ended with the appointment of chief rabbis supported by the Haredi parties, and ahead of the upcoming elections the national religious leadership has been investing efforts in advancing the election of at least one chief rabbi identified with the national religious public. The coalitionary agreements signed between the Likud party and the Religious Zionism and Otzma Yehudit parties explicitly state that the Likud will work with these parties to ensure the election of a national religious chief rabbi. Some have highlighted the importance of this step for furthering a rabbinic policy that will be different from that pursued by Haredi rabbis, while others point out that the chief rabbis of Israel should ideally identify with the state and its institutions—that is, they should be Zionist.
In this vein, we asked our respondents how important they think it is for the chief rabbis of Israel to be Zionist.
The figure below shows that the large majority of the public (74%) think that it is important that the chief rabbis are Zionist, including a majority (53%) who define this attribute as very important.
Figure 7. How important is it to you that the chief rabbis of Israel are Zionist? (total sample; %)
Figure 8 presents a breakdown of responses to this question by respondents’ religiosity.
Figure 8. How important is it to you that the chief rabbis of Israel are Zionist? (by religiosity; %)
Unsurprisingly, only a small minority of Haredi respondents think it is important for the chief rabbis to be Zionist, while a clear majority of the other groups prefer Zionist chief rabbis. There are, however, some differences between these groups, with 88% of respondents in both the national religious and traditional non-religious groups stating that it is important for the chief rabbis to be Zionist, compared with 78% of secular respondents and 72% of traditional religious respondents.
The fact that a somewhat smaller share of the secular public express a preference for Zionist chief rabbis would seem to be attributable to this public’s lack of interest in the identity of the chief rabbis elected, as presented above. Some secular Jews are opposed to the institution of the Chief Rabbinate in general, and thus do not care whether the chief rabbis are Zionist or not—unlike the traditional non-religious public, who have a stronger connection to Jewish tradition. At the same time, the majority of secular Jews—even those opposed to the existence of the Chief Rabbinate in its current form—clearly think that as long as the Rabbinate does exist, then its chief rabbis should be Zionist.
Why do traditional religious respondents attach less importance to the chief rabbis being Zionist than do their national religious and traditional non-religious counterparts? The answer would seem to lie in the fact that some parts of this group are linked to the Haredi public, and in particular, to the Shas party.[3] In the Biennial Statistical Report on Religion and State 2022, we noted several topics with regard to which we found the national religious and traditional non-religious publics to hold similar views, while the traditional religious public was closer to the Haredi public in its opinions. These topics were the recognition of conversions carried out in the IDF, willingness to be buried using “saturation burial” methods, and willingness to rely on kashrut certification issued by the Tzohar organization.[4]
Finally, we asked our respondents whether they think that the State of Israel should have a Chief Rabbinate.
The findings, as presented in the figure below, paint an ambivalent picture. On the one hand, a clear majority of the public (77%) think that Israel should indeed have a Chief Rabbinate. On the other hand, most of those who support having a Chief Rabbinate think that it should take a different form from the existing Rabbinate, and thus overall, only 35% of the Jewish public think that the Chief Rabbinate should exist in its current form. It is important to note that the option “Yes, but in a different form from the existing Chief Rabbinate” is a general response indicating dissatisfaction with the current situation, and the respondents who selected it may differ wildly in their views of what the ideal form of the Rabbinate should be.
Figure 9. In your opinion, should the State of Israel have a Chief Rabbinate? (total sample; %)
Figure 10 presents a breakdown of responses to this question by respondents’ religiosity.
Figure 10. In your opinion, should the State of Israel have a Chief Rabbinate? (by religiosity; %)
Once again, this breakdown reveals sizable differences between the various groups. Among those groups with a clearly religious character, hardly any respondents think that there should not be a Chief Rabbinate in Israel, and the majority think that the Rabbinate should continue to exist in its current form. In the traditional non-religious public, and even in the secular public, a majority also think that Israel should have a Chief Rabbinate, but only a small share of respondents (29.5% of the traditional non-religious public and 8% of the secular public) think that the Rabbinate should continue in its current form.
[1] For a professional opinion regarding the composition of the assembly that elects the chief rabbis, see Ariel Finkelstein, “The procedure for elections for the Chief Rabbinate,” Israel Democracy Institute website, 2021.
[2] The formal reason given for the postponement was the proximity to the elections for local authorities, but it would appear that political considerations also played a role.
[3] For an analysis of responses by religiosity, see Ariel Finkelstein, “Voting patterns by religious self-definition,” Israel Democracy Institute website, 2022.
[4] Ariel Finkelstein, Ayala Goldberg, and Shlomit Ravitsky Tur-Paz, Biennial Statistical Report on Religion and State 2022, Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute, 2022, pp. 213, 225, 255.