The Procedure for Electing Israel's Chief Rabbis
Elections for the Chief Rabbinate Council and the two chief rabbis (“the Chief Rabbinate elections”) will likely be announced in the near term. The present document suggests a number of fundamental changes to its membership, with the goal of making it more representative.
Photo by Yonatan Sindel/Flash90
For the first time in Israeli history, the terms of the chief rabbis expired before elections to replace them were scheduled, and the positions are currently filled on an interim basis. Elections for the Chief Rabbinate Council and the two chief rabbis (“the Chief Rabbinate elections”) will likely be announced in the near term. Chief Rabbinate Law 5740-1980 defines the composition of the 150-member electoral assembly. The present document suggests a number of fundamental changes to its membership, with the goal of making it more representative.
This document is based on several fundamental democratic principles, including that the assembly should provide significant representation to the groups that are directly impacted by the decisions of the Chief Rabbinate; that its members should truly represent the public; and that they be independent.
One of the main reasons for the delay in the current election is the matter of representation of women in the electoral assembly. The first regulations for Chief Rabbinate elections, issued in 1936, stipulated that all members of the electoral assembly be men. Although this stipulation was not carried over into later versions or into the Chief Rabbinate Law, and in 1988 Israel's Supreme Court ruled that women could not be totally excluded from the process, in practice the proportion of women remains very low. Of the 150 members of the Chief Rabbinate electoral assembly, 80 are rabbis who hold official positions and are, therefore, all men—currently under debate is the question of appointing rabbis who are women. A majority of the other 70 are the heads of local councils and religious councils, who are overwhelmingly male. The result is that there are almost no women on the electoral body. For example, in the 2018 elections for the Chief Rabbinate Council, there were only five women among the 150 members of the electoral assembly (3.3%). What is more, even these few women do not usually serve ex officio (unlike local council and religious council heads), but are appointed by the Minister of Religious Services as part of his quota of 10 public representatives, and consequently are not truly independent.
This situation is far from the norm for other public bodies. The Women’s Equal Rights Law stipulates that “public bodies and the tender and appointments committees of public bodies shall include appropriate expression, in the given circumstances, to representation of women for the various types of positions and ranks." Precisely because women cannot be elected to the Chief Rabbinate Council, it is all the more important that they have appropriate representation on the electoral assembly. In addition, the elections for the Chief Rabbinate have a direct impact on women, because the chief rabbis serve as the head of the rabbinic court system, which deals with religious divorce, including situations in which women are unable to officially leave a marriage (agunot and mesoravot get), and there are many complaints about the treatment of women in these situations.
What is more, the situation does not correspond with the norm in other religious services provided in Israel. The last decade has seen a significant increase in women’s representation in the religious establishment: in 2013, the Rabbinical Courts Law was amended to reserve four seats for women (out of 11) on the committee that appoints religious judges (dayyanim)—a minimum representation of 36%; a later amendment, in 2021, reserved five places for women (out of 13)—a minimum of 38% women. In 2014, the Jewish Religious Services Regulations (Election of Town Rabbis) were amended to stipulate that the electoral assembly for a town rabbi include at least 31% women; in 2017, a director general’s bulletin stipulated a minimum of between 20% and 33% women on religious councils (depending on its size).[i] It follows that the body electing the chief rabbis is far behind the times.
The Proposal: The electoral assembly should have a minimum of 30% of women, the same as the assemblies that elect town rabbis. The female delegates will be chosen from local and religious councils (if the heads of these councils continue to be members of the electoral assembly; see below). If there are no women who are heads of large local councils, the quota would be filled by female council heads/mayors or their deputies and by council members in relevant localities. Moreover, other women should be added as ex officio members of the electoral assembly, such as the head of the Authority for the Advancement of the Status of Women and rabbinical court advocates.
The Chief Rabbinate has great influence on the relations between Israel and Diaspora Jewry, an influence that has been increasing over the years. The Chief Rabbinate has authority over the state’s recognition of conversions, marriages, divorces, and kashrut certifications by rabbis who do not live in Israel. This means that it has real power over the ability of Jews abroad to immigrate to Israel and gain legal recognition of their conversion or personal status. In recent years, the Chief Rabbinate’s refusal to recognize rabbis who have a public status abroad has caused great friction in the relations between Israel and Diaspora Jewry. What is more, serious allegations have been made against the Chief Rabbinate for its unfair decisions and the lack of transparency or fixed criteria in these matters.
Neither Diaspora Jewry nor those who come in direct contact with it are represented on the electoral assembly for the Chief Rabbinate. Given the Chief Rabbinate’s impact on Diaspora Jewry, it is essential that the electoral assembly include persons involved with it.
The Proposal: The electoral assembly should include persons who are in close contact with Diaspora Jewry, including the Minister of Diaspora Affairs, the chair of the Jewish Agency and members of its executive, and the chair of the World Zionist organization and members of its executive. In keeping with the previous section, adequate representation of women should be ensured here as well.
Ethiopian Israelis account for almost 2% of the Jews in the country. The relations between the Chief Rabbinate and this community have had their ups and downs over the years. Today the community continues to allege discrimination by some parts of the religious establishment—especially the Chief Rabbinate—which centers on doubts cast on the Jewishness of the members of the Ethiopian Jewish community and the idea that its traditions are not authentic Jewish traditions. For this reason, it seems appropriate to provide Ethiopian Israelis with reserved seats on the electoral assembly, filled from among its kesoch (traditional spiritual leaders in the Ethiopian community) and rabbis who serve on religious councils, as called for by government decisions.
The Proposal: The electoral assembly should include three kesoch (traditional spiritual leaders in the Ethiopian Community) and three Ethiopian Israeli rabbis, the most senior of those serving on religious councils.
One of the principles behind the composition of the electoral assembly is that it should have a rabbinic and religious majority. This goes back to the disagreements between the religious and secular elements of the Zionist leadership when the Chief Rabbinate was established in 1921. Ultimately, the regulations for the election of the Chief Rabbinate, enacted in 1936, stipulated that electoral assembly be composed of rabbis and public representatives appointed by the committees of the several communities (which had legal status under the British Mandate), with 60% rabbis and 40% public representatives. After the establishment of the state, the regulations were amended several times before the adoption of the current law, but always called for a majority of rabbis on the electoral assembly. Today it consists of 80 rabbis and 70 public representatives.
Over the years, however, there has been a major change in the observant public’s domination of the electoral assembly. The original formula called for representatives of the communities, with no specific preference for religious individuals. Under the current law, however, 18 of the 70 public representatives on the electoral assembly (more than a quarter) are the heads of religious councils. Because religious council heads, as a rule, are religious, this means that the religious sector has an even larger representation than in the past. What is more, in a case involving the election of town rabbis, the High Court noted the importance of diversity on the electoral assembly, “because of the need to increase the involvement of broader groups in the election, especially given that the funding comes from public funds and because the town rabbi’s identity and policies may have an influence on all sectors of the public (for example, when they set kashrut policy for business owners). This also reflects the aspiration to involve a large group in decisions that have to do with institutions that provide religious services.”
It is also problematic to see the heads of religious councils as public representatives on the electoral assembly. Local authority heads are democratically elected by the public at large; heads of religious councils are not. Officially, religious council heads are elected by its members, whose status is ostensibly parallel to that of local councilors. In fact, although they are supposed to be representative of the population, they are appointed in a complex process of deal-making among the Minister of Religious Services, representatives of the local authority, and the local rabbis. This means, as the State Comptroller has demonstrated and I have shown in a comprehensive study of the religious councils, that the Minister of Religious Services has almost full control over the appointment of the heads of religious councils; hence it is hard to see them as authentic representatives of the public. What is more, because of the complexity of the procedure, in practice most religious councils today are not filled through negotiations; instead, the Minister of Religious Services directly appoints the heads himself.
The Proposal: The ex officio membership of religious council heads on the electoral assembly should be abolished.
Religious court judges: Under the current law, the 10 most senior incumbent dayyanim serve on the electoral assembly, ex officio. In fact, these religious judges hold a judicial post that is similar to that of a civil court judge. The inclusion of judicial officeholders in a political election process, which is the matter at hand, is incompatible with the principles of democracy and has no parallel in any other Israeli law. As part of the election process, the candidates meet with the members of the electoral assembly, and the political parties make deals to obtain the election of the candidates they favor. It is inappropriate for judicial officeholders to be part of this process.
IDF rabbis: Under the current law, two military rabbis are ex officio members of the electoral assembly: the IDF chief rabbi and his deputy (if there is no deputy, then the IDF rabbi holding the next-highest rank). The involvement of uniformed personnel in a political election is incompatible with the independent status of the military and necessarily involves the IDF in an election that has clear partisan political characteristics.
Neighborhood rabbis: Under the current law, four neighborhood rabbis are ex officio members of the electoral assembly: the most senior neighborhood rabbis in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Beersheva. This provision could be legally problematic. In 2013, the State informed the High Court that the Ministry of Religious Services had decided to abolish the neighborhood rabbi model and consequently would no longer permit the appointment of neighborhood rabbis. By then, in fact, no new neighborhood rabbis had been appointed in a decade. The neighborhood rabbis still serving today (they hold lifetime appointments) were chosen before then, and their number is dwindling. Our research estimated that by the time of the elections for the Chief Rabbinate in 2033, there will be no more than 12 neighborhood rabbis in the entire country, and none in Jerusalem and Haifa. This means that it will no longer be possible to comply with the law as written in 2033.
The Proposal: The ex officio membership of dayyanim, IDF rabbis and neighborhood rabbis on the electoral assembly should be abolished.
Under the current law, 20 members of the electoral assembly are free (rather than ex officio) appointments: 10 rabbis appointed by the chief rabbis, in consultation with the Minister of Religious Services and with confirmation by the Government, and 10 public representatives appointed by the Minister of Religious Services, in consultation with the chief rabbis and with confirmation by the Government. It is clear that the rabbis and the minister will appoint rabbis and public figures who are identified with them and who will vote for their preferred candidates; hence it is hard to see these appointees as independent. The result is that 20 votes are in the pockets of the chief rabbis and minister—and this cannot be justified.
The Proposal: The appointment of 20 members of the electoral assembly by the Minister of Religious Services and the chief rabbis should be abolished. To replace them, the number of public representatives who serve ex officio, including incumbent rabbis, representatives of local authorities, and representatives appointed by the Israel Bar Association, should be increased