The Politicization Revolution in Judicial Selection
The Sa'ar-Levin proposal represents a shift from prioritizing professional qualifications in the Judicial Selection Committee to emphasizing political loyalty as the basis for judicial appointments. This risks eroding judicial independence, compromising professionalism, and incentivizing ideological extremism.
Photos by Yonatan Sindel/Flash90
Justice Minister Yariv Levin and Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar have presented their proposed changes to the composition of the Judicial Selection Committee as a so-called "compromise" aimed at achieving a gradual ("evolutionary") change in the judicial selection process. Now, it is evident that this is not a compromise but rather a unilateral framework formulated by two ministers from the same coalition. Moreover, this proposal represents a revolutionary shift rather than a gradual adjustment as it has been portrayed. The core of this revolution lies in adopting political loyalty and affiliation as the central criteria for judicial selection, replacing the current method, which prioritizes professional qualifications while balancing the principles of judicial independence, democratic accountability, and social reflection in the composition of the judiciary.
Levin and Sa’ar propose replacing the two representatives of the Israeli Bar Association on the Judicial Selection Committee with one representative from the coalition and one from the opposition, both of whom must be attorneys. Judicial selection across all courts would require a simple majority in the committee, as opposed to the current supermajority of seven members for appointments to the Supreme Court. For Supreme Court appointments, at least one member from the coalition and one from the opposition must agree (effectively granting veto power to the coalition and the opposition). For other courts, approval would also require the consent of one judge. If no agreement is reached on Supreme Court selection within a year, Levin and Sa’ar suggest that the coalition and opposition representatives each present three candidates, from which the opposing side, together with the judicial representatives, would select one (currently, candidates may be proposed by the Minister of Justice, the President of the Supreme Court, or three members of the committee).
In other words, the current committee structure, which gives a majority to independent professionals rather than elected officials, would be replaced under the Levin-Sa’ar revolution by a majority of political representatives—even if two have a legal background. Furthermore, the entire mechanism would rely on mutual vetoes between coalition and opposition representatives, and in cases of "deadlock," only they could propose candidates. This shift would mean that anyone aspiring to a judicial appointment at any level in Israel would know that their path to selection and promotion depends solely on political alignment. Worse still, during deadlock scenarios, each political camp would be incentivized to nominate the most ideologically extreme candidates to further their agenda. Professional qualifications would be sidelined entirely.
The implications of this revolution would be the complete destruction of the foundational principles underlying the current judicial appointment system. Should this revolution proceed, judicial selection—from magistrates to district courts and the Supreme Court—would be determined by political loyalty rather than professional merit or adherence to the law. Supreme Court justices selected solely based on their political affiliation, rather than their professional expertise, would lack the competence and independence necessary to guide complex legal doctrine in civil and criminal matters or to rule against the government when it exceeds its authority or violates human rights. A magistrate judge might fear angering their political patron when ruling on arrests in protests, and a criminal judge might hesitate to convict a government minister for corruption, fearing a veto on their promotion. Ultimately, every judicial promotion decision would hinge on the political stance and loyalty of the candidates, rather than on their professionalism or on social diversity.
We have already witnessed the destructive consequences of a political loyalty-based appointment system in Itamar Ben-Gvir's police force. Over the past two years, as professionalism ceased to be a criterion for appointments and promotions, police performance has declined sharply. This is a glimpse into the future of our judiciary should this revolution take hold —a judiciary filled with judges whose primary incentive is to avoid offending politicians. Their last concern will be delivering impartial and professional rulings based solely on the law.
This column was published in the Times of Israel.