The Attorney General’s Agreement with Ben-Gvir
The Attorney General recently announced an agreement with Itamar Ben-Gvir in response to petitions challenging his reappointment as Minister of National Security. What is included in this agreement, can it be enforced, and is it an appropriate solution to ensure an independent police force?
Photos by Yonatan Sindel, Chaim Goldberg | FLASH 90
In January of this year, Itamar Ben-Gvir's Otzma Yehudit Party left the coalition due to the ceasefire deal struck, and Ben-Gvir stepped down as Minister of National Security, accordingly. In March 2025, he rejoined the coalition and was reappointed as the Minister of National Security – a move that most of the Israeli public was against.
A few days ago, in response to petitions challenging the reappointment of Itamar Ben-Gvir as Minister of National Security, the Attorney General announced that, as part of her efforts to exhaust all options before a judicial ruling is made regarding the reasonableness of the appointment, she has formulated—together with the Minister—an “outline of principles” concerning the interface between the Minister and the Israel Police. This outline is designed to safeguard the professional and independent functioning of the police.
As is well known, Ben-Gvir’s turbulent tenure as Minister of National Security has been characterized by heavy-handed involvement in police operations and by politicization of police work. On the face of it, the outline of principles appears to be a creative solution.
The Contents of the Framework
According to the framework, the Minister’s policy regarding public protests must be published in advance, following consultation with the Commissioner of Police and the Attorney General’s Office. This policy must be forward-looking, public, equitable, and general in nature—meaning it cannot be issued or altered in response to a specific event. Furthermore, the Minister will not issue directives or otherwise interfere in the operational decision-making or the executive discretion of the police. Conversations between the Minister and police officers must be coordinated in advance with the Commissioner’s office and formally documented. This reflects some of the principles that were reaffirmed by the justices of the Supreme Court in January, when the Court struck down a clause from what came to be known as the “Ben-Gvir Amendment” to the Police Ordinance (described below).
The framework also states that the Minister has no authority to set policy concerning investigations and is prohibited from directly or indirectly interfering in investigative matters in general—and in investigations involving police officers, in particular. It should be recalled that in the January ruling, the Supreme Court invalidated a clause from the “Ben-Gvir Amendment” which would have allowed the Minister to dictate investigative policy after merely “hearing” the Attorney General’s position. As President Amit, then Acting President of the Court, wrote: ministerial intervention in investigations could enable the advancement of a political agenda by encouraging over- or under-enforcement in sensitive areas of law enforcement.
Special emphasis in the Attorney General's outline is placed on the police appointments process. As is known, Ben-Gvir’s undue influence over police activity—under the guise of general policy—was further exacerbated by his abuse of authority in the appointment of senior police officers. To reduce politicization from this angle as well, the framework stipulates that appointments up to the rank of Police Major General must be based on professional recommendations from senior police officials, and any rejection of such recommendations by the Minister must be justified. It also states that interviews for appointments at the ranks of Police Commander or Chief Superintendent must be conducted in the presence of a senior police representative, and that the Minister will not interview candidates for promotion at the rank of Superintendent. The Minister will also not interview candidates for positions in the Investigations and Intelligence Division, Legal Advisory Unit, or Prosecutorial Department, except for the highest-ranking positions. These principles align with recommendations made over the years by public committees and the State Comptroller regarding police appointments, and signal progress toward setting concrete boundaries in this area. However, legislative amendments should accompany these steps to further delineate the Minister’s authority over appointments and dismissals in the Police Ordinance.
The framework applies not only to the Minister himself, but also to staff in his office and to anyone acting on his behalf.
How Are Frameworks Like These Enforced?
The central question, of course, is whether these principles will be implemented in practice, and what penalties exist for violations. We have seen signed documents with restrictions on officeholders in the past. For example, a conflict-of-interest arrangement was crafted for Prime Minister Netanyahu following what's known as the 11-0 case. In that case, decided five years ago, the Supreme Court unanimously held that there was no legal basis to prevent Netanyahu from serving as Prime Minister while under indictment. Nevertheless, the Court ruled that “Member of Knesset Netanyahu’s term as Prime Minister shall be subject to a conflict-of-interest arrangement to be made with him that will set limitations regarding the fulfillment of his duties in matters relating to the law enforcement system.” That arrangement, drawn up later, appears to have been repeatedly violated without consequence. Just recently, a proposal was advanced to dismiss the Attorney General—or at the very least, to split her role—despite this being in direct contradiction to the terms of the conflict-of-interest arrangement.
Regarding the agreement with Minister Ben-Gvir, even the Attorney General acknowledges that enforcing the principles “is not simple at all on a practical level.” Consequently, and unlike the Netanyahu conflict-of-interest arrangement—which included a proposed appointment of a dedicated official in the Prime Minister’s Office to help ensure compliance—the Ben-Gvir framework stipulates that the principles must be anchored, within 60 days, in the Ministry of National Security’s regulations as well as in police rules and procedures.
Furthermore, the petition regarding the reasonableness of Ben-Gvir’s appointment remains (for now) pending. If the arrangement is not upheld, this could influence a decision in this case. The Supreme Court justices clarified that they are awaiting an update on its implementation, which is due by mid-July. According to the Court, a decision on how to proceed with the petitions will be made after the update is submitted. Additionally, the Attorney General has stated that an assessment will be required to evaluate whether the principles are being applied in practice—by the Minister and his associates—in order to determine their effectiveness and the implications for the appointment review.
Conclusion:
Ultimately, this constitutes a kind of creative middle-ground solution aimed at securing the independence of the police. Under current circumstances, even though it does not encompass all relevant principles governing the relationship between the Minister and the police, the framework does appear to establish clearer and more immediate boundaries. These boundaries apply to all Ministers responsible for the police and were fairly well-preserved—until the term of the current Minister, during which they have been repeatedly breached. Whether the framework agreed upon between the Attorney General and Minister Ben-Gvir will indeed ensure a professional and apolitical Israeli Police remains to be seen. If the arrangement is not formally codified within the Ministry of National Security and the Police, or if it is not honored, the judicial proceedings regarding the reasonableness of Ben-Gvir’s appointment should resume, as the independence, professionalism, and national integrity of the Israel Police must be preserved.