Majority Think Too Many Concessions Made to Coalition Partners
The most common opinion in the Israeli public is that formation of the new government will have a negative effect both on Israel’s international standing and on the civil status of Arabs in Israel.
Photo by Yonatan Sindel/Flash90
- In the total sample, as well as in all three political camps in the Jewish sample, this month saw a fall in the level of optimism about the future of democratic rule in Israel, after a rise in optimism immediately following the November elections. Regarding the future of Israel’s national security, the share of optimists has remained steady but small (less than half of all respondents are optimistic).
- A separation of the question about optimism into sub-questions about external (military) security and internal security (policing) revealed that there is greater optimism about the former than the latter, though even for external security only half are optimistic (compared with one-third for internal security). On the Right, there is a majority of optimists in both cases; respondents on the Left and in the Arab sample are pessimistic about both; and those in the Center are pessimistic about internal security and split on the question of external security.
- Around half of the respondents overall believe that Israeli democracy is in grave danger. However, while a majority on the Left and in the Center hold this view, only a minority of those of the Right agree. In the wake of the recent elections, the share of those who perceive democracy to be in peril has risen sharply on the Left and in the Center, and dropped noticeably on the Right.
- A majority of the total sample awarded Prime Minister Netanyahu a grade of not good/ terrible for his handling of the coalitionary negotiations. Similarly, a majority think that the Likud made too many concessions to its coalitionary partners in these negotiations.
- Even lower grades were given to the parties in the new opposition for their conduct over the last two months, with a majority of respondents (including those who voted for these parties) rating it as not good / terrible.
- The most common opinion in the Israeli public is that formation of the new government will have a negative effect both on Israel’s international standing and on the civil status of Arabs in Israel. There are large and systematic differences between the political camps: A majority on the Left and in the Center anticipate a worsening in both cases, compared with a minority on the Right.
- A large majority of secular Jews are worried that they will be unable to maintain their preferred lifestyle because of the increasing power of certain groups in Israeli society. In other groups on the religiosity spectrum, only a minority (of different sizes) feel the same way.
- Of four minority groups we asked about regarding their impact on Israeli politics – Haredim, Arabs, women, and the LGBTQ+ community – only in the case of the Haredim did we find a majority of respondents who think that their influence is larger than their relative share of the population.
- Should protests erupt against the new government, the majority of the public expect that these will take the form of street demonstrations. Only a minority think they might include a tax revolt or failure to show up for IDF reserve duty. Regarding the possibility of increased emigration from Israel to other countries, a majority of those on the Left consider this likely, compared with less than half of those in the Center and just one-quarter of those on the Right.
Regarding optimism about the future of democratic rule in Israel, the picture that emerges some two months after the elections is not particularly encouraging, with a significant decline in the share of optimists in the total sample, from 46% in November to 40% in December. In the Jewish sample, there was a drop from 48% in November to 42% in the most recent survey, while in the Arab sample (where the share of optimists was already low), there has been little change (34% in November and 33% in December).
Optimistic about the future of democratic rule in Israel and about the future of national security, April 2019–December 2022 (total sample; %)
A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals a fall in optimism about the future of democratic rule in Israel in all three camps, with the largest decline seen in the Center and the smallest on the Left, where the share of optimists was already much smaller than in the other two groups.
Optimistic about the future of democratic rule in Israel, October–December 2022 (Jews, by political orientation; %)
Regarding the future of Israel’s national security, there was almost no change this month from the previous two months (43% optimistic, compared with 41% in November and 43% in October), indicating stability at a relatively low level of optimism on this issue (average since we began asking this question: 51.8%). However, in an attempt to decipher how the public understands the concept of security, we tried differentiating this month between external and internal security, which to a certain extent refer respectively to the level of security provided by the IDF versus that provided by the police. We found differences between the two: While only a third of respondents are optimistic about the future of internal security (34%), around half (51%) are optimistic about the future of external security. Thus, the general question we have previously asked about the future of Israel’s security constitutes an average of the two.
A breakdown of responses to these two questions by political orientation reveals large differences, though in all camps more are optimistic about external security than internal security. On the Right, the optimists are a majority in both cases (though the majority is smaller for internal security), while in the Center, around half are optimistic about external security but only a small minority feel the same about internal security. The picture is similar on the Left, albeit with lower levels of optimism, particularly regarding external security. It is not impossible that the fact that only a minority in the Center and on the Left are optimistic about the future of internal security is linked, at least partially, to the appointment of Itamar Ben-Gvir as the minister responsible for this area.
Optimistic about the future of Israel’s internal security and external security (Jews, by political orientation; %)
This month, around half the respondents (49%) agreed that “democratic rule in Israel is in grave danger.” This is identical to the finding in 2021, and to the multi-year average (49.4%)—that is, there has been no increase in the overall share of Israelis who feel that Israeli democracy is teetering on the edge of the abyss.
Agree that democratic rule in Israel is in grave danger (total sample; %)
However, as expected, a breakdown by political orientation reveals large differences: On the Right, which has returned to power, there has been a fall in the share of those who think that democratic rule in Israel is in grave danger, while on the Left and in the Center there has been a sizable increase.
Agree that democratic rule in Israel is in grave danger, 2017–2022 (Jews, by political orientation; %)
Similarly, a breakdown by religiosity (Jews) finds large differences between the various groups: A large majority of secular respondents believe that democratic rule in Israel is in grave danger (70%), compared with less than half of traditional respondents (traditional non-religious, 46%; traditional religious, 35%), and a small minority of the national religious (17%) and Haredi (5%) groups.
Prime Minister Netanyahu: We asked: “What grade would you give to the incoming Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu for his handling of negotiations with the other partners in the coalition he is forming?” A majority of respondents (60%) awarded him a grade of not so good or terrible, while only one-third (32.5%) rated his performance as quite good or excellent.
What grade would you give to the incoming Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu for his handling of negotiations with the other partners in the coalition he is forming? (total sample; %)
Breaking down the responses by voting pattern at the most recent elections shows that Netanyahu receives positive grades for his handling of the coalitionary negotiations from a majority of those who voted for parties in the new government (Likud, 59%; Religious Zionism, 57%; United Torah Judaism, 67%; Shas, 76%). However, a not inconsiderable share of voters for these parties, and especially Likud (38%) and Religious Zionism (36%) voters, give Netanyahu a negative rating for managing the negotiations. Among voters of other parties, the majority give him a poor or even terrible grade. The picture regarding voters for the Arab parties Hadash and Ta’al is confusing, and should be revisited in the future.
What grade would you give to the incoming Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu for his handling of negotiations with the other partners in the coalition he is forming? (total sample, by vote at the 2022 elections; %)
Likud’s handling of the coalitionary negotiations: A majority of respondents (62%) think that the Likud made overly large concessions to the member parties in the coalition. A breakdown by voting pattern at the last elections reveals that only among voters for the two Haredi lists is there a majority who disagree with this assertion, while voters for the Religious Zionism party are divided.
Think that the Likud made overly large concessions in response to the demands of the member parties in the coalition (total sample, by vote at the 2022 elections; %)
Conduct of the opposition parties: We also asked the respondents how they view the conduct of the parties forming the new opposition over the two months since the elections. The grades they awarded were even lower than for Prime Minister Netanyahu: A large majority (71%), which includes voters for these parties, rated their performance as not so good or terrible.
What grade would you give to the opposition parties for their conduct since the elections? (total sample, by vote at the 2022 elections; %)
Impact on Israel’s international standing and on the civil status of Arabs in Israel: We examined the public’s assessment of the effect of the formation of the new government in two areas: Israel’s standing in the international community, and the civil status of Arabs in Israel. In both cases, the most common response in the total sample was that the effect will be negative (51.5% regarding Israel’s international standing, and 48% regarding the civil status of Arabs in Israel). An interesting finding was that for both issues, only a small minority think that the formation of the new government will have no effect (9% for Israel’s international standing, and 15% for the civil status of Arabs in Israel).
In your estimation, how will the formation of the new government affect the following? (total sample; %)
Regarding the expected effect on Israel’s standing in the international community, the differences between political camps (among Jews) are huge: On the Left, 85% expect it to worsen, as do 74% of those in the Center. By contrast, only 36% on the Right estimate that Israel’s international standing will suffer as a result of the formation of the new government. Differences between the Jewish and Arab samples on this question are small, with around half of both publics anticipating a turn for the worse (52% and 49%, respectively).
Interestingly, there are also similar shares of both the Jewish and Arab respondents who believe that the formation of the new government will have a negative effect on the civil status of Arabs in Israel (47% and 53%, respectively). A breakdown by political orientation (Jews) once again reveals a majority on the Left and in the Center who expect things to get worse (78% and 61.5%, respectively), compared with a minority of around one-third on the Right (36%).
Maintaining preferred lifestyles: We also asked: “To what extent are you or are you not worried that you will be unable to maintain your preferred lifestyle because of the increasing power of certain groups in Israeli society that advocate a different way of life from yours?” We found that just over half of the total sample (51.5%) are currently worried about this prospect, while 42% are not worried. Breaking the responses down by religiosity (Jews) revealed that the secular group is the most concerned about threats to its lifestyle:
|
|
% worried that they will be unable to maintain their preferred lifestyle because of the increasing power of certain groups in Israeli society |
|
Haredim |
19 |
|
National religious |
22 |
|
Traditional religious |
34 |
|
Traditional non-religious |
46.5 |
|
Secular |
70 |
In light of claims about the outsize influence of certain minority groups on Israeli politics and the worries we describe above, we presented the interviewees with four groups, and asked them to assess the political influence of each relative to its share of the population: Haredim, Arabs, women, and the LGBTQ+ community.
Three-quarters of interviewees believe that the impact of Haredim on Israeli politics is large relative to their share of the population. The assessment regarding all the other groups is very different, with a majority of respondents saying that their impact on Israeli politics is small relative to their share of the population (women, 57%; LGBTQ+, 57%; Arabs, 55%).
What is the extent of the impact on Israeli politics of each of the following groups, relative to its share of the population? (total sample; %)
Breaking down responses by religiosity (Jews), we found that less than half of Haredi respondents think that Haredim have an outsize influence on Israeli politics, compared with a large majority of the other groups who feel this way (national religious, 85%; traditional religious, 70%; traditional non-religious, 76%; secular, 88%).
In the case of the political influence of Arabs, an analysis of responses by nationality reveals that only a minority in each public believe that this influence is larger than Arabs’ relative share of the population (38% of Jewish respondents, and 31.5% of Arab respondents).
Similarly for women, only a minority think that their political influence is larger than their demographic share. No differences were found between male and female respondents (women, 34%; men, 33%).
Regarding the LGBTQ+ community, there is likewise only a minority who believe that its impact is larger than its relative share. Among Jewish respondents, there are no real differences between political camps, and the views of Haredim are identical to those of secular interviewees.
Against the backdrop of lively debate about the possibility of protests in response to the new government and the policies it intends to pursue, we sought to assess public opinion about the likelihood of different forms of public protest. We asked about street demonstrations, emigration from Israel, a tax revolt, and people failing to show up for IDF reserve duty. The majority of respondents think that there is a very or fairly high likelihood of street protests, in the style of the Balfour Street and bridge protests against the last Netanyahu government. Only a minority consider it likely that there will be increased emigration from Israel to other countries, non-payment of taxes as an act of protest, or refusal to turn up for reserve duty.
Very or fairly high likelihood of a wave of public protest breaking out soon against the new government, in each of the following forms (total sample; %)
Breaking down responses by political orientation (Jews) reveals that a majority in all camps anticipate street demonstrations against the government (Left, 82%; Center, 72%; Right, 63%). In each, only a minority thinks there is a likelihood of a tax revolt (Left, 29.5%; Center, 23.5%; Right, 20%) or of people failing to turn up for IDF reserve duty (Left, 25.5%; Center, 27%; Right, 13%).
The largest difference was found regarding the possibility of increased emigration from Israel to other countries: On the Left, a majority (60%) consider this likely, compared with 45% in the Center and 25% on the Right.
Very or fairly high likelihood of increased emigration from Israel to other countries in response to the new government (Jews, by political orientation; %)
The December 2022 Israeli Voice Index was prepared by the Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute. The survey was conducted via the internet and by telephone (to include groups that are under-represented on the internet) between December 26 and 28, 2022, with 601 men and women interviewed in Hebrew and 150 in Arabic, constituting a nationally representative sample of the adult population in Israel aged 18 and over. The maximum sampling error was ±3.59% at a confidence level of 95%. Fieldwork was carried out by Midgam Research and Consulting Ltd. The full data file can be found at: https://dataisrael.idi.org.il.