Israeli Voice Index

Low Prospects for a Compromise Between Opposition and Coalition

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This month we found a slight rise in optimism regarding both the future of democratic rule in Israel and the future of national security. However, almost two-thirds of Arab Israeli respondents replied they are worried that they or family members will be victims of violent crime.

Photo by Yonatan Sindel/Flash90

Main Findings

  • Once again, we found that the shares of those who are optimistic about democratic rule in Israel and of those who are optimistic about the future of Israel’s security are just below a third this month, though there has been a slight increase in both. However, while optimists constitute a majority of coalition party voters, only a small minority of voters for opposition parties are optimistic.
  • Less than a quarter of the public define Israel’s current situation as good or very good, with the most common response being that its situation is bad or very bad.
  • A small majority think that the wishes should have been respected of those bereaved families who demanded that government representatives not attend ceremonies in military cemeteries on Memorial Day for Israel’s Fallen Soldiers.
  • Some two-thirds of the Jewish public reported that they watched the broadcast of the main Independence Day ceremony this year. However, around one-fifth said that they did not watch it either in protest at how the ceremony was managed or in protest against the judicial reform.
  • While a clear majority of coalition voters think that the representatives of the opposition and the protest movement are responsible for the fact that there has not yet been any breakthrough in the talks between the two sides, an even greater majority of opposition voters place the blame on the representatives of the government.
  • A majority of both coalition voters and opposition voters think that there is only a small likelihood of a compromise being reached between the representatives of the government and the representatives of the opposition and the protest movement in the negotiations between them.
  • While a majority of coalition voters think that the civil protests will not be halted even if a compromise is reached over the government’s legislative program, the most commonly held view among opposition voters (though not the majority opinion) is that protests will indeed cease in such a case.
  • Only among voters for the Religious Zionism, Shas, and Likud factions is there a majority who support the draft government resolution put forward recently by the Jewish Power party, according to which the values of Zionism will be the guiding and decisive values in legislation and government activity.
  • Fears of becoming a victim of violent crime: Among Arab respondents, we found a sharp increase in the size of the majority who are worried that they or a family member will be victims of violent crime in the area where they live. Among Jews this remains a minority response, and the size of this minority is that same as it was two years ago.

The National Mood

This month we found a slight rise in optimism regarding both the future of democratic rule in Israel and the future of national security. In both cases, however, less than a third of respondents are optimistic.

Optimistic about the future of democratic rule in Israel and about the future of national security, April 2019–April 2023 (total sample; %)

The differences between Jews and Arabs are large (respectively, 38% versus 14% optimistic about the future of democratic rule, and 39% versus just 9% optimistic about the future of national security). Similarly, there are sizable differences between voters for opposition parties and voters for coalition parties, with optimism much higher among the latter, as expected. However, while optimism among coalition voters is higher regarding the future of democratic rule than regarding the future of national security (with optimists in the majority in both cases), among opposition voters the share of optimists about the future of national security is double that of optimists about the future of democratic role (a minority in both cases).

 

Voters for coalition parties

Voters for opposition parties

Future of democratic rule

63

11

Future of national security

54

22.5

 

Israel’s Overall Situation Today

As was the case two months ago, the most common response this month was that Israel’s overall situation today is bad or very bad, though there has been a decline over this period (from 47% in February to 43.5% now). Less than a quarter of respondents (22%, compared with 25% in February) define Israel’s overall situation today as good or very good—the lowest share since 2007, following the Second Lebanon War.

How would you characterize Israel’s overall situation today? (total sample; %)

As expected, and as found in previous surveys, the proportion of Arabs who describe the situation today as good or very good (just 8%) is considerably lower than the equivalent proportion of Jews (24%). Similarly, while the most common response among voters for coalition parties (though not the majority view) is that Israel’s situation today is good or very good (41%), and only 19% describe it as bad or very bad, a clear majority of opposition party voters think that the situation is bad or very bad (61%), and only 6% characterize it as good or very good.

Interesting differences on this issue were also found between men and women, with the former being much more positive in their opinions than the latter: Among Jews, 31% of men say that Israel’s overall situation today is good or very good, compared with just 18% of women; and among Arabs, the equivalent shares are 14% of men and just 2% of women.

How would you characterize Israel’s overall situation today? (Jews-Arabs, Coalition-Opposition, Gender, %)

Remembrance  Day and Independence Day

Ahead of Israel’s 75th Remembrance Day and Independence Day, the main events held to mark these occasions (ceremonies in military cemeteries and the national Independence Day ceremony on Mount Herzl) were overshadowed by the ongoing protests against the government.

Attendance by government ministers at Remembrance Day ceremonies in military ceremonies: A considerable number of bereaved families demanded that government representatives, and especially those who did not serve in the IDF, should not attend memorial services held in military cemeteries. We therefore asked whether their wishes should or should not have been respected. We found that a small majority of Jewish respondents think that the government should have honored this demand (54%), compared with a minority who take the opposite view (32%). While only a minority of Haredi, national religious, and traditional religious respondents said that the families’ demand should have been met (28%, 19%, and 41% respectively), a majority of secular (72%) and traditional non-religious interviewees (64.5%) gave this response. As expected, a large difference was found on this issue between voters for opposition parties (82% of whom responded that the bereaved’ families wishes should have been respected) and voters for coalition parties (one-third of whom took the same view).

Should the demand of certain bereaved families that government representatives not attend memorial services on this month’s Memorial Day for Israel’s Fallen Soldiers have been respected? (Total sample, by Religiosity and Coalition-Opposition voters, %)

Within the coalition, we also found differences among voters for different parties: Likud voters were split on this issue (45% saying that the demand should not have been granted, and 40% that it should), while a much lower share of voters for other parties responded that the families’ wishes should have been respected (Shas, 36%; United Torah Judaism, 24%; Religious Zionism, 23.5%).

Main Independence Day Ceremony: Every year, the broadcast of this ceremony attracts high viewing figures. According to this month’s survey findings, the viewing figures among the Jewish public were again very high this year, with 65.5% reporting that they watched all or part of the ceremony. The equivalent share of the Arab public was predictably much lower (19%). A breakdown of Jewish respondents by religiosity reveals that traditional Jews were the group with the highest viewing figures (traditional religious, 86%; traditional non-religious, 75%), followed by the national religious (70%) and secular (70%) groups, with only a minority of Haredim (34%) having watched the ceremony. With the exception of the Haredi public, the high viewing figures were common to all sectors of the Jewish public—voters for coalition parties and voters for opposition parties, younger and older age groups, and residents of the center of the country and the periphery.

Did you watch the broadcast of the main Independence Day ceremony at Mount Herzl? (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

Among Jews who did not watch the ceremony, the most common explanation given was that they didn’t manage to watch it this year (39%), followed by “I never watch the ceremony” (31%), with slightly more than one-fifth saying that they didn’t watch it as a form of protest, either against the government’s legislative program (13%) or against how the ceremony was managed this year (9%).

A breakdown of the responses of those who did not watch the ceremony by political orientation reveals that while an absolute majority of those on the Right said either that they never watch it or that they didn’t manage to watch it this year (85%), more than a third of those in the Center and a majority of those on the Left (59%) reported that they did not watch the ceremony this year as a form of protest.

 

Why did you not watch the main Independence Day ceremony at Mount Herzl? (Jews who reported that they did not watch the ceremony, by political orientation; %)

Concerns that the main ceremony would be interrupted by protests: Those who said that they watched the ceremony were asked whether they were worried or not worried that the ceremony might be disrupted by protesters against the government’s legislative program. A large majority (two-thirds) were not worried about possible disruptions of the ceremony, while only a minority were concerned. On this issue, no differences were found between coalition and opposition voters.

Were you worried or not worried that the ceremony might be disrupted by protests against the government? (total sample of those who watched the ceremony; %)

The Negotiations at the President’s Residence

This month we asked three questions about the talks being hosted at the President’s Residence regarding the government’s legislative program. The first question was about who is responsible for the fact that no substantial agreements have yet been reached.

Who is responsible for the lack of agreement? As the figure below shows, there is a predictably large difference of opinion on this issue between coalition and opposition voters: A majority of coalition voters (60%) blame the representatives of the opposition and the protest movement, while an even greater majority of voters for opposition parties (75%) blame the representatives of the government. A large proportion of respondents in both camps said that they don’t know, a fact we believe can be attributed to the veil drawn over the negotiations. A small majority of Arab interviewees (52%) hold the representatives of the government responsible for the lack of progress in the talks. The percentage of “don’t know” responses among Arabs is even higher than among Jews (34%) and is in alignment with the relatively low interest among the Arab public in the judicial reforms and related topics.

 

Which of the two sides is responsible for the fact that until now, no substantial agreements have been reached in the talks held at the President’s Residence? (total sample, by vote at the last elections; %)

Likelihood of reaching a compromise: The second question on this topic related to the chances of reaching some form of compromise between the two sides. By contrast with the previous question, there is almost wall-to-wall consensus here that the likelihood of a compromise is very low. A large majority of the total sample, and also of both coalition voters and opposition voters, rate the chances of an agreement being reached as low. No real differences were found on this issue on the basis of vote at the last elections, political orientation, age, religiosity, or nationality.

Likelihood that in the foreseeable future, the talks at the President’s Residence will yield a compromise that will be acceptable to both sides (total sample; %)

Will the public protests cease if a compromise is reached regarding the reforms? The third question in this section is related at least indirectly to the public’s understanding of the goals of the current protests against the government. We asked: “If a compromise is reached between the representatives of the coalition and the opposition regarding the government’s legislative program, do you think that the civil protests against the government’s actions will cease?” A small majority of the total sample (53%) are certain or think that the protests will not be halted even if a compromise is agreed, while 33% believe that they will indeed come to an end, and 14% say they don’t know.

Once again, we found a disparity between voters for coalition parties and voters for opposition parties: A large majority of the former think that the protests will not cease even if a compromise is reached, and thus believe that the protests are not really about the government’s program of legislative changes to the judicial system. On the other hand, the largest share of opposition party voters (though not the majority) are of the opinion that the protests will end when a compromise is agreed, though a very large minority take the opposite view.

If a compromise is reached between the representatives of the coalition and the opposition regarding the government’s legislative program, do you think that the civil protests against the government’s actions will cease? (total sample; %)

The Jewish Power Party’s Proposal for a Government Resolution on Zionist Values

Recently, the Jewish Power party has proposed a government resolution designed to implement the Nation-State Law in practice, stating that the values of Zionism will be the guiding and decisive values in legislation and government activity, which will give clear advantages to Jewish citizens over Arab citizens. We sought to assess the level of public support for this proposal.

A breakdown of responses by vote at the last Knesset elections (November 2022) reveals that only in the case of three of the factions currently represented in the Knesset is there a majority of voters who are in favor of the proposed resolution—Religious Zionism (of which Jewish Power forms a part), Shas, and Likud. Presumably because of the reference to Zionism, less than half of the voters for United Torah Judaism support the proposal.

The Jewish Power party is proposing a government resolution designed to implement the Nation-State Law in practice, stating that the values of Zionism will be the guiding and decisive values in legislation and government activity, which will give clear advantages to Jewish citizens over Arab citizens. Do you support or oppose this proposal? (total sample, support, by vote at the last elections; %)

Violence in Israel

Fears of becoming a victim of violent crime: Against the backdrop of the rising tide of violence in the Arab sector in recent months, it is not at all surprising that there has been a sharp climb compared to two years ago in the share of those responding in the affirmative to the question: “To what extent are you worried that you or a member of your family will be a victim of violent crime in the area where you live?” Among Arab interviewees, this proportion has risen from a half to almost two-thirds over this period, while no difference was observed among Jewish interviewees, with just over one-quarter saying that they are worried.

 

Worried that they or a family member will be a victim of violent crime in the area where they live (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

A breakdown of responses from Arab interviewees reveals that while a small majority of the younger age group (18–34) report being worried, the equivalent majority is much larger among the intermediate (35–54) and older (55+) age groups. Among Jewish respondents, on the other hand, it is the youngest age group that expresses the most concern at being a victim of violent crime in their area of residence.

Worried that they or a family member will be a victim of violent crime in the area where they live (Jewish and Arab samples, by age group; %)

In addition, while no variation was found on this issue among Jewish respondents on the basis of gender (27% of Jewish men and 29% of Jewish women fear becoming victims of violent crime), large differences were found among Arab respondents: 77.5% of Arab men are worried, compared with 52% of Arab women.

While a relatively similar share of concern was found across all political camps (Left, 23%; Center, 27%; Right, 30%), considerable differences emerged on the basis of religiosity, with the greatest worry about being a victim of violent crime reported by traditional Jews (traditional non-religious, 39%; traditional religious, 34%), national religious Jews (25%), and secular Jews (23%). The lowest level of concern was reported by the Haredi public (18%).

Does the police deal equally with violent crime in the Jewish and Arab publics? We asked respondents whether they agree or disagree with the claim that “the police deals with crime in Jewish areas more thoroughly than it deals with crime in Arab areas.” A large majority of Arab interviewees agree with the statement (71%), as do a smaller majority of Jewish interviewees (55%).

Some people claim that the police deals with crime in Jewish areas more thoroughly than it deals with crime in Arab areas. Do you agree or disagree with this claim? (Jewish and Arab samples; %)

A breakdown of Jewish respondents to this question by political orientation reveals that while a large majority of those on the Left (73%) agree that the police deals more thoroughly with crime in Jewish areas than crime in Arab areas, only a small minority of the those in the Center (56%) and around half of those on the Right (52%) take the same view.

 


The April 2023 Israeli Voice Index was prepared by the Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute. The survey was conducted via the internet and by telephone (to include groups that are under-represented on the internet) between March 26 and March 30, 2023, with 602 men and women interviewed in Hebrew and 130 in Arabic, constituting a nationally representative sample of the adult population in Israel aged 18 and over. The maximum sampling error was ±3.69% at a confidence level of 95%. Field work was carried out by the Dialogue Research and Polling Institute. The full data file can be found at: https://dataisrael.idi.org.il.

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