30 years after the Oslo Accords: A large share of Israelis think it was wrong for Israel to enter the process
Israeli Voice Index September 2023
As we mark the 30th anniversary of the Oslo Accords this month, a larger share of Jewish respondents think it was incorrect to enter into that process, while the percentage of respondents who selected "don't know" was exceptionally large. Israelis are divided on the question of the Supreme Court's intervention in the amendment restricting the reasonableness doctrine.
Main Findings
- Only around a third of the Israeli public are optimistic about both the future of democratic rule in Israel and the future of Israel’s security. Jews are more optimistic than Arabs, and those on the Right are more optimistic than those on the Left and in the Center.
- Against the backdrop of media reports concerning the US-sponsored negotiations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, we found an unclear picture of public opinion this month, with no sizable differences between the different population groups: Similar shares of respondents in all groups believe that signing such an agreement will either strengthen Netanyahu’s position in terms of internal politics or will leave it unchanged. Regarding the impact on the protest movement if an agreement is signed, a small majority think that it will continue on the same path and that the agreement will not affect its future.
- On the 30th anniversary of the Oslo Accords, a larger share of Jewish respondents think that entering into that process was incorrect than think that it was the correct thing to do. Among Arab respondents, a larger proportion think that it was the right move in retrospect than think that it was a mistake. At the same time, in both the Arab and the Jewish samples, the percentage of interviewees who selected the “don’t know” response was exceptionally large, especially for a question about a historical issue.
- On the question of who was responsible for the Oslo process failing to produce a peace agreement, the most common view among Jewish respondents is that the responsibility lies with the Palestinians, while the most common view among Arab respondents is that both sides are equally responsible.
- In the total sample, the majority of respondents watched all or part of the Supreme Court hearing on the reasonableness law. A larger proportion of Jews watched the hearing than of Arabs, and a larger share of opposition party voters did so than of coalition party voters.
- The majority of opposition party voters who watched all or part of the Supreme Court hearing think that the Supreme Court justices displayed a higher level of professionalism and presented more persuasive arguments than did the other speakers in court. By contrast, the most common view among coalition party voters is that the legal representatives of the government and the Knesset were the most professional and most persuasive.
- A large majority of voters for coalition parties think that the Supreme Court should not intervene with the amendment to the basic law restricting the use of the reasonableness doctrine, while a large majority of voters for opposition parties hold the opposite view.
- Against the backdrop of the Supreme Court hearing, we assessed the public’s familiarity with Israel’s Declaration of Independence. Around a third of respondents, and just over a quarter of Jewish respondents, said that they cannot remember whether they have ever read the Declaration.
- Around a half of Jewish respondents, and a minority of Arab respondents, agreed that the Declaration of Independence is suitable to serve as a special-status document used to guide legislation and policy in the current conditions in Israel. A far larger share of those on the Left and in the Center than of those on the Right attribute such a special status to the Declaration today.
- There is now a lack of agreement regarding the goals of the protest movement: Among those who support the government, the majority think that the protests’ main aim is to topple the democratically elected right-wing government, while the majority of those in the opposition camp that the protests’ central purpose is to defend Israeli democracy in the spirit of the Declaration of Independence.
- This month saw a decline relative to previous surveys in the share of respondents who think there is a high likelihood that civil war will break out in Israel in the foreseeable future.
- More than 80% of those on the Left support holding demonstrations abroad against Israel’s government, as do more than half of those in the Center. Only a small minority of those on the Right consider such demonstrations to be legitimate.
Over recent months, around a third of the Israeli public have consistently expressed optimism about both the future of Israel’s security and the future of democratic rule in Israel. While in the past, optimism about security was higher than about democracy (and only changed in response to various security-related incidents), the two indicators have largely merged in recent months.
There are considerable differences between Jews and Arabs in both cases, though in both groups only a minority are optimistic: 36% of Jews are optimistic about the future of democratic rule in Israel, compared with 17% of Arabs; and 39% of Jews are optimistic about the future of Israel’s security, compared with 15% of Arabs.
Optimistic about the future of democratic rule in Israel and about the future of national security, June 2022–September 2023 (total sample; %)
In this month’s survey, as in the past, there is higher optimism among those who situate themselves on the Right or who reported voting for parties that are now in the coalition than among those who position themselves on the Left or in the Center or who voted for opposition parties. An interesting finding was that among those who define themselves as on the Right and among voters for coalition parties (there is a large but not total overlap between these two groups), optimism about the future of democratic rule is higher than optimism about the future of Israel’s national security.
Optimistic about the future of democratic rule in Israel and about the future of national security, by political orientation and vote in the 2022 Knesset elections (total sample; %)
Last month, media reports began to emerge of communication between Israel and Saudi Arabia, with American mediation, about a possible peace agreement as part of a broad regional treaty. Thus, we asked our respondents about the value of such an agreement, and found that a majority of them (though not a large majority) consider it to be important for Israel, and that only a minority support an agreement that gives Saudi Arabia a green light to develop civilian nuclear capabilities. This month, when it was already public knowledge that US-sponsored negotiations are underway between the two countries, we asked two questions about the expected impact that reaching an agreement would have on the internal Israeli arena.
Expected impact of an agreement on Netanyahu’s standing: The first question related to the effect of such an agreement on the political standing of Prime Minister Netanyahu. It appears that there is considerable uncertainty among the public on this issue. While the largest share of respondents (41%) estimate that such a development would strengthen Netanyahu’s position, a similar proportion (39%) think that his political standing would remain unchanged, while a tiny minority (5%) believe that he would be weakened by signing an agreement (15% selected the “don’t know” response). As the figure below shows, there are only small differences between Jews and Arabs on this question.
If an agreement is signed in the near future between Israel and Saudi Arabia as part of a broad regional deal that includes American guarantees, how will this affect the political standing of Prime Minister Netanyahu? (Jewish and Arab samples; %)
A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals insubstantial differences between the camps, though those on the Right are more inclined to think that an agreement will strengthen Netanyahu’s standing. Presumably, if the negotiations move forward and the leaderships of the various political parties present clearer agendas regarding the advantages and disadvantages of such an agreement, then the different groups will develop more differentiated opinions, as is seen in other foreign and domestic issues.
How will an agreement with Saudi Arabia affect the political standing of Prime Minister Netanyahu? (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)
Expected impact of an agreement on the protests against the government: Our second question related to the expected effect of an agreement with Saudi Arabi on the protests against the government’s judicial reform program. The majority opinion (though again, not a large majority) in the total sample—as in all three political camps in the Jewish sample—is that this will not affect the protests. On the Left, a majority of around two-thirds hold this opinion (64%), while the equivalent majorities are smaller in the Center (56%) and on the Right (58%).
What do you think will happen to the protests against the government if such an agreement is reached? (total sample; %)
Was it correct or incorrect for Israel to enter the Oslo process? This month marks the 30th anniversary of the signing of the first document in the Oslo Accords—at the White House in September 1993—which launched the Oslo process. We wanted to know what the Israeli public thinks now about whether this process was worthwhile. In the total sample, just over a third said that it was correct for Israel to enter the process, a similar share stated that it was incorrect, and a quarter selected the “don’t know” response. This is a surprisingly mixed distribution given the strong feelings and extreme responses provoked by the Oslo process at the time, and which are still present today albeit to a lesser extent.
More than a third of both the Jewish and the Arab respondents think it was correct for Israel to enter the Oslo process. But while the most common response among Jews is that this was incorrect (42%), the equivalent share among Arabs is only 28%.
This month marks the 30th anniversary of the signing of the Oslo Accords. Looking back, was it correct or incorrect for Israel to enter this process? (total sample and Jewish and Arab samples; %)
A breakdown by political orientation of the views in the Jewish sample regarding the Oslo process reveals expected differences. More surprising was the high proportion of respondents who selected the “don’t know” response, particularly in the Center and on the Left.
Was it correct or incorrect for Israel to enter the Oslo process? (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)
Breaking down response by age did not find significant differences among the five youngest age groups. The 65+ group, however, was an outlier, as the only group in which the majority thinks that it was correct for Israel to enter the Oslo process. Almost certainly, this is due to the relatively large share of the members of this group who identify as being on the Left.
Think that it was correct for Israel to enter the Oslo process (Jewish sample, by age; %)
Who is responsible for the fact that the process did not lead to peace? In the total sample, the largest share of respondents lay this responsibility on the Palestinians, while a smaller proportion think that both sides are equally responsible. Only a tiny minority places the blame on Israel. In the Jewish sample, meanwhile, around half of the respondents hold the Palestinians responsible, around a third say that both sides are to blame, and only a tiny minority cites Israel as the responsible party. Among Arab respondents, however, the picture is different: Around a half say that both sides are equally responsible for the failure to reach a peace agreement, 30% blame the Israelis, and a very small minority think that the Palestinians are responsible.
Who do you think is more responsible for the fact that the process did not result in a peace agreement?
Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation again reveals a much higher proportion of interviewees who selected the “don’t know” response on the Left and in the Center than on the Right. Both the Left and the Center also show a greater propensity to attribute responsibility to both sides equally, while on the Right, a large majority blame the Palestinians.
Who do you think is more responsible for the fact that the process did not result in a peace agreement?
Watching the broadcast of the hearing: A small majority of interviewees reported that they watched a broadcast of the hearing (54%), whether all or part of it, whether live or via summaries shown on the various news channels. Interest in the court case was common in both the Jewish and Arab publics, with almost 60% of Jews and around 40% of Arabs saying that they watched some or all of the hearing.
Did you watch the broadcast of the Supreme Court hearing on the reasonableness law? (Jewish and Arab samples; %)
While a large majority of Jewish interviewees who voted for one of the opposition parties reported that they watched some or all of the hearing (72%), only around a half of coalition party voters said the same (48%). A breakdown of Jewish respondents by political orientation reveals that half of those on the Right did not watch any of the Supreme Court hearing, compared with 35% of those in the Center and around 30% of those on the Left.
Did you watch the broadcast of the Supreme Court hearing on the reasonableness law? (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)
We found no real differences between the different age groups, with just over a half of respondents in all age groups reporting having watched at least some of the hearing, indicating that younger Israelis are no less interested in these events than older Israelis.
The Supreme Court hearing—who was more professional and more persuasive? We asked this question to those respondents who reported having watched some or all of the Supreme Court hearing on the reasonableness law (as stated above, these constituted 54% of the total sample). Unsurprisingly, the views of voters for coalition parties were at odds with the views of voters for opposition parties: A majority of opposition party voters who watched some or all of the hearing think that the Supreme Court justices showed a higher level of professionalism and persuasiveness, while a majority of coalition party voters feel that the legal representatives of the Knesset and the government were the most professional and persuasive.
From what you saw and heard, which party showed a higher level of professionalism and was more persuasive? (total sample that watched some or all of the Supreme Court hearing on the reasonableness law, by vote at the last elections; %)
Is it proper for the Supreme Court to strike down the amendment to the basic law regarding the reasonableness doctrine? On this issue, no differences were found between Jews and Arabs, but overall the respondents were deeply divided. A large majority of voters for coalition parties believe that the Supreme Court should not intervene on the reasonableness law (65%), while a large majority of opposition party voters hold the contrary view (73.5%).
Do you think it is proper or improper for the Supreme Court to rule that the amendment to the basic law regarding the reasonableness doctrine should be struck down? (total sample, by vote at the last elections; %)
A breakdown of the Jewish sample by religiosity also reveals the considerable disparities between the different groups: A large majority of secular Jews (69%) think that the Supreme Court should strike down the reasonableness law; traditional Jews are divided on the issue (among traditional non-religious respondents, 46% are in favor and 39% against; among traditional religious respondents, 39% are in favor and 47% are opposed); while the majority of national religious (64%) and Haredi (84%) interviewees believe that the Supreme Court should not intervene and strike down the law passed by the Knesset.
As was widely reported, at the Supreme Court hearing held this month on the reasonableness law, Adv. Ilan Bombach—representing the government—made a surprising comment about the importance (or irrelevance) of the Declaration of Independence, which received wall-to-wall condemnation. Consequently, we were interested to know what proportion of Israelis have ever read the Declaration.
As shown in the figure below, around a third of the total sample, and just over a quarter of Jewish respondents, chose to respond that they do not remember whether they have ever read the Declaration of Independence, which would imply that they are not familiar with its contents. A majority of Arab interviewees (60%) gave the same answer.
Have you read Israel’s Declaration of Independence? (total sample and Jewish and Arab samples; %)
Breakdowns of responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation and by religiosity reveal considerable discrepancies among the different groups: The proportion of those on the Right who do not remember whether they have read this foundational document is almost twice the equivalent share on the Left and much larger than that in the Center.
Have you read Israel’s Declaration of Independence? (Jewish sample, by political orientation and by religiosity; %)
The Declaration of Independence—a special-status document for legislation? We further asked: “In your opinion, is the Declaration of Independence, which was signed in 1948, suitable to serve as a special-status document used to guide legislation and policy in current conditions in Israel?” A breakdown of responses by nationality reveals that while a majority of Jews thank that the Declaration should indeed have a special status and guide legislation (54%), only a minority of Arabs hold the same view (26.5%). In addition, the share of Arabs who selected the “don’t know” response is almost double that of Jews.
In your opinion, is the Declaration of Independence, which was signed in 1948, suitable to serve as a special-status document used to guide legislation and policy in current conditions in Israel? (Jewish and Arab samples; %)
Breaking down the Jewish sample by political orientation finds a majority on the Left and in the Center who think that the Declaration of Independence is indeed viable as a special-status document in current times, compared with a (large) minority on the Right of those who concur. A breakdown by religiosity reveals that a majority of secular and traditional non-religious Jews hold this view, compared with a large minority of national religious and traditional religious respondents, and a very small minority of Haredim.
Think that the Declaration of Independence is suitable to serve as a special-status document used to guide legislation and policy in current conditions in Israel (Jewish sample; %)
Since January, we have asked our respondents on several occasions if they think we are heading for civil war. This month’s survey found a decline, relative to the previous measurement in July, in the proportion of those who think there is a likelihood of this happening in the foreseeable future. However, against the backdrop of deep disagreements in Israeli society, this view is still held by a sizable minority of the Israeli public.
Think there is a high likelihood of a civil war breaking out in Israel in the near future which includes violence between the different sides (total sample; %)
Among Jewish respondents, this decline in the share of those who think there is a danger of civil war is mainly due to a fall on the Left and in the Center of the political map, where two months ago there was a majority who considered the likelihood of civil war to be high.
Think that the State of Israel is heading toward civil war (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)
At the current time, there is no broad consensus in the Israeli public about the goal of the public protests. We first asked about this issue in April, and repeated the question this month. The findings indicate that there has been no change in the views of the Jewish public: In both measurements, the most popular response was “to bring down the right-wing government, even though it was legally elected by the majority of the public” (April, 37%; September, 37%); in second place was “to protect the democratic essence of the State of Israel in the spirit of the Declaration of Independence” (April, 32%; September, 28%); and in third place, “the same as it was—opposition to the government’s judicial reforms” (April, 15%; September, 16%).
Yet, while the majority of voters for coalition parties think that the protesters’ goal is to bring down the right-wing government (61%), with the next most popular opinion being that the goal is to maintain the power of the old elites (12%), the most common response among opposition party voters is that the aim of the protests is to protect the democratic essence of the State of Israel in the spirit of the Declaration of Independence (44%), followed by the view that the goal remains the same as it was—opposition to the government’s judicial reforms (26%).
What do you think is the main goal of the protests today? (total sample, by vote at the last election; %)
Against the backdrop of the protests against Prime Minister Netanyahu during his recent visits to various countries, we once again asked our respondents: “Do you support or oppose holding protests abroad against the legislative changes being advanced by the government?” In March, the public was split on this issue, with 41% supporting protests abroad and 44% opposing them. This picture has remained largely the same, with 45% now expressing support for protests held abroad against the government and 44% opposed.
Do you support or oppose holding protests abroad against the legislative changes being advanced by the government? (total sample; %)
A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals deep differences of opinion regarding protests held abroad against the government: In this month’s survey, as in March, more than 80% of those on the Left support such protests, as do more than half of those in the Center, while on the Right, only a small minority are willing to countenance these demonstrations.
Support holding protests abroad (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)
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The September 2023 Israeli Voice Index was prepared by the Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute. The survey was conducted via the internet and by telephone (to include groups that are under-represented on the internet) between September 18 and September 21, 2023, with 609 men and women interviewed in Hebrew and 152 in Arabic, constituting a nationally representative sample of the adult population in Israel aged 18 and over. The maximum sampling error was ±3.55% at a confidence level of 95%. Field work was carried out by the Dialogue Research and Polling Institute. The full data file can be found at: https://dataisrael.idi.org.il.