A majority of Israelis think that Israel is currently in a state of emergency
The July 2023 edition of the Israeli Voice Index finds that 58% of Israelis believe the country is in a "state of emergency." Only a small minority of Israelis believe that IDF reservists, who fail to report for duty in protest of the judicial overhaul, should be dismissed.
- As in previous months, only slightly more than one-third of the Israeli public are optimistic this month regarding both the future of democratic rule in Israel and the future of Israel’s security, with the latter measure suffering a slightly larger gradual decline than the former compared to previous months.
- At the same time, while optimism among voters for opposition parties is low in both cases, the majority of voters for coalition parties are optimistic.
- A similar distribution is seen regarding respondents’ personal mood: The majority of opposition party voters report that their mood is worse than usual, while the majority of coalition party voters say that their mood is no better or worse than usual.
- Unsurprisingly, the gap between the two blocs is also strongly evident in their assessment of the effect of the recent legislation canceling the reasonableness doctrine: While a very large majority of voters for opposition parties believe that the law is bad for Israel, a majority (albeit smaller) of voters for coalition parties think that the law is good for the country.
- However, in both camps, a majority would have preferred for a compromise to have been reached to tone down the law before it was passed.
- This finding helps explain why the leaders of both blocs received poor grades for their functioning ahead of this legislation. However, while the majority of coalition party voters gave their leadership a good grade, more than half of opposition party voters awarded their leaders bad grades. In other words, opposition voters were far more dissatisfied with their leadership than coalition voters were with theirs.
- On the question of IDF reservists failing to show up for duty in protest against the legislation, a majority of those on the Left think that the IDF should exercise restraint and accept their position, while on the Right, the largest share of respondents (though not a majority) think that the IDF should instigate disciplinary proceedings against them, but not dismiss them from reserve service. The responses from those in the Center indicate a degree of confusion, given the very large share who selected the “don’t know” option.
- In the total sample, the majority of respondents think that Israel is currently in a state of emergency. But as expected, this view is highly prevalent among opposition voters and those who oppose the government’s policies, and far less so among those who support the government.
- Just under half of the total sample oppose the idea of forming an emergency government headed by Netanyahu, in which the Center parties replace the Religious Zionism party, but the share of respondents who support such a step is only slightly smaller.
- Over the last half a year, there has been a large increase in the share of respondents who think that the functioning of the police in response to the public protests has been inadequate. This increase has been particularly sharp on the Left and in the Center.
- The majority of the public believe that the government will continue its legislative program, either as soon as the next Knesset session begins, or at a slightly slower pace, while only a minority think that it will suspend the program or halt it entirely.
- A large majority of those on the Left and in the Center think that the protest movement will become stronger if the legislative process continues, a view held by only a minority (albeit large) of those on the Right.
- The majority of coalition party voters are not worried that they themselves will be significantly negatively affected financially by the possibility that the credit rating agencies will lower Israel’s rating. By contrast, the majority of voters for opposition parties fear that they will be financially affected to a large or fairly large degree.
This month has seen small increases in the level of optimism about both the future of Israel’s security and the future of democratic rule in Israel. However, in both cases the share of optimists remains only slightly larger than one-third—that is, optimists are in the minority. Since November 2022, optimism in both cases has remained at more or less the same level, with primacy switching between them from month to month. It is worth noting that in the past (since we began these measurements in April 2019), optimism regarding the future of Israel’s security was almost always higher than optimism in the future of democratic rule, and thus the current situation represents a deterioration in this regard.
Optimistic about the future of democratic rule in Israel and about the future of national security, January 2021–July 2023 (total sample; %)
There is a huge difference this month on this issue between voters for coalition and opposition parties: Among the former, optimists constitute the majority in both cases, while among the latter, only a tiny minority are hopeful about the future. In other words, there is no agreement whatsoever between the two camps regarding the future of Israel in terms of both national security and democratic rule.
Optimistic about the future of national security and the future of democratic rule in Israel (total sample, by vote at the last elections; %)
|
|
Optimistic about the future of Israel’s security |
Optimistic about the future of democratic rule in Israel |
|
Coalition party voters |
60 |
69 |
|
Opposition party voters |
15 |
11 |
Against the background of the above findings, we asked: “How would you describe your mood at the present time?” In the total sample, we found two groups of exactly the same size: those who say their mood is no better or worse than usual, and those who say their mood is worse than usual. Only a small minority reported being in a better mood than usual. Again, we found a very large disparity between voters for coalition parties and voters for opposition parties, with a majority of the former saying that their mood is no better or worse than usual, and a majority of the latter that their mood is worse than usual.
How would you describe your mood at the present time? (total sample and by vote at the last elections; %)
Breaking down responses by political orientation reveals that a majority of those on the Left (75%) say that their mood is worse than usual, a response provided by just under half of those in the Center (48.5%), but by only a small minority of those on the Right (23%).
After the Knesset passed the reasonableness law, limiting the Supreme Court’s use of the reasonableness doctrine, which was supported by all the members of the coalition while all the opposition members absented themselves from the vote in protest, we asked: “In your opinion, is the reasonableness law good or bad for Israeli democracy?” Around one-third of respondents said that the law is good (35%), while the majority stated that the law is bad for Israeli democracy (60.5%).
However, the results for the total sample hide more than they reveal. Using various breakdowns, we found that opinions on the law canceling the reasonableness doctrine, which the heads of the coalition presented as a somewhat peripheral component of the judicial reform, again reflect contrasting views and a deep division in Israeli society. A large majority of those who voted for coalition parties think that this is a beneficial law, while only a negligible minority of voters for opposition parties concur. We further found that, though only a minority of both Jews and Arabs said the law is good, there is a very large disparity between the two population groups, and we also found large differences between the various religious groupings within the Jewish public, with an overwhelming majority of Haredim believing that the reasonableness law is good for Israeli democracy, while an overwhelming majority of secular Israelis hold the opposite view. There is also sizable variation, of course, among the three political camps in the Jewish sample, with a majority of those on the Right in favor of the law, compared with a small minority in the Center and a tiny minority on the Left.
Think that the reasonableness law is good for Israeli democracy (total sample; %)
We asked the respondents: “In your opinion, would it have been desirable or undesirable for the coalition and the opposition to have reached an agreed compromise before the vote in order to tone down the bill that was eventually passed into law?” In the total sample, a majority of more than two-thirds (68%) supported the idea of compromise. We found a sizable majority with this view among both coalition party voters and opposition party voters, though the majority was larger in the latter group.
Would it have been desirable or undesirable for the coalition and the opposition to have reached an agreed compromise before the vote in order to tone down the bill that was eventually passed into law? (total sample, by vote in the last elections; %)
|
|
Desirable |
Undesirable |
Don’t know |
Total |
|
Coalition party voters |
62 |
29 |
9 |
100 |
|
Opposition party voters |
80 |
15 |
5 |
100 |
A breakdown of responses by vote at the last elections reveals that voters for the Center parties (National Unity and Yesh Atid) express the strongest support for reaching an agreed compromise between the opposition and the coalition. A similar level of support, though slightly lower at just under three-quarters of respondents, was found among voters for the other opposition parties. Differences were found among voters for the coalition parties, with two-thirds of Likud voters in favor of compromise and moderating the law that was passed, a view held by only half of Shas voters and slightly more than half of voters for Religious Zionism.
Think it would have been desirable for the coalition and the opposition to have reached an agreed compromise before the vote in order to tone down the bill that was eventually passed into law (total sample, by vote in the last elections; %)
We asked: “Last week, the Knesset passed the ‘reasonableness law,’ stripping the Supreme Court of its power to strike down government decisions that it considers extremely unreasonable. How would you rate the heads of the coalition and the heads of the opposition for their organization and voting on the bill?” Around half of the total sample awarded the heads of the coalition a grade of fairly bad or very bad, while the majority gave these grades to the heads of the opposition. However, only around one-quarter of voters for coalition parties gave bad grades to the leadership of the coalition, while more than half of the voters for opposition parties gave the opposition leadership bad grades. That is, coalition party voters are largely satisfied with their leadership, while opposition party voters are displeased with their leadership’s organization for the vote on the reasonableness law.
Gave grades of fairly bad or very bad to the heads of the coalition and the heads of the opposition for their organization and voting (total sample and by vote at the last elections; %)
In light of the highly charged public debate of recent weeks about appropriate responses to the government’s legislative program, we asked: “If an IDF reservist fails to show up when summoned for duty, how should the IDF respond?” In the total sample, there was a very high degree of uncertainty, with around one-fifth of interviewees selecting the “don’t know” response, while the rest were divided fairly evenly among the three possibilities suggested to them, with the option of dismissal from reserve service receiving the lowest level of support: take disciplinary steps against them, but keep them as a reservist (29%); exercise restraint and accept their position (28%); and immediately dismiss them from reserve service (21%).
As expected, there were large differences among the political camps: The majority of those on the Left are in favor of restraint and acceptance; in the Center there is a certain degree of confusion, with around a third saying they don’t know, but with the largest share supporting restraint and acceptance; and on the Right, around a half think that the IDF should take disciplinary steps against reservists who fail to show up but not dismiss them from reserve service.
If an IDF reservist fails to show up when summoned for duty, how should the IDF respond? (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)
|
|
Take disciplinary steps against them, but keep them as a reservist |
Exercise restraint and accept their position |
Immediately dismiss them from reserve service |
Don’t know |
|
Left |
16 |
58 |
9 |
16 |
|
Center |
19.5 |
35 |
13 |
32 |
|
Right |
46 |
10 |
33 |
11 |
Given the very high level of tension between groups in Israeli society, we examined whether the Israeli public considers the country to be in a state of emergency. We asked: “Some people claim that we are in a state of emergency due to the severe internal crisis, and that the State of Israel is on the verge of economic, social, and political collapse. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this assessment?”
The majority of respondents (58%) believe that Israel is indeed in a state of emergency, compared with only one-third who disagree with this analysis. Demographic breakdowns once again found fundamental differences of view regarding the current situation: A huge majority of opposition party voters think that Israel is indeed facing a state of emergency, a view held by less than one-third of voters for coalition parties. We also found considerable variation among voters for different parties, with a relatively small difference among Likud voters between those who think we are in a state of emergency (39%) and those who hold the opposite view (52%), compared to a larger difference among Religious Zionism voters (state of emergency, 19%; not a state of emergency, 77%).
Breakdowns of the Jewish sample by religiosity and by political orientation reveal, unsurprisingly, large differences: An overwhelming majority of those on the Left (94%) and a large majority of secular Jews (78.5%) believe Israel is in a state of emergency, compared with a small minority of Haredi and national religious Jews (18.5% and 19%, respectively) and of those on the Right (37%).
In both the Arab and the Jewish samples, a majority consider Israel to be in a state of emergency, though this majority is much larger among Arabs than among Jews.
Agree that Israel is in a state of emergency (total sample; %)
Given the sense of emergency felt by sizable sections of the Israeli public, we inquired whether the solution might be an emergency government headed by Netanyahu, in which the Center parties of Yesh Atid and National Unity replaced the Religious Zionism party. Just under half the total sample oppose this idea (46%), while a slightly lower share support it (39%), and the rest provided a response of “don’t know.”
This question was asked twice, first in mid-July, before the reasonableness law was finally enacted, and again at the end of the month, after the law was passed. While only minor differences were found between the two measurements, the most striking of these was a decline of 6 percentage points in the support for changing the government among coalition party voters, compared with an increase of 3 percentage points among opposition party voters. And while there was no change in opinion on this issue among Yesh Atid voters, support for the idea of entering government rose considerably among National Unity voters.
Support the establishment of a national emergency government headed by Netanyahu and including the Yesh Atid and National Unity parties instead of the Religious Zionism party (total sample, by vote at the last elections; %)
Cross-referencing support or opposition to the establishment of an emergency government with agreement or disagreement with the statement that Israel is currently in a state of emergency, we found that almost half (47%) of those who consider Israel to be in a state of emergency also support forming an emergency government, compared with only a quarter of those who do not think we are currently in a state of emergency.
Since the beginning of the protests against the judicial reform in January, the functioning of the police has been subject to close public scrutiny. This month, we returned to a question we asked in March: “On a scale from 1=very poor to 5=excellent, what grade would you give the police for its functioning at the protest events of the last few months?” In the total sample, the share of those think that the functioning of the police has not been good has grown significantly over the last four months.
Grade given to the police for its functioning at the protest events, March and July 2023 (total sample; %)
The shift in views about police functioning becomes much clearer when the findings are broken down by political orientation (Jewish sample): In March, 10% of those on the Left defined the police’s functioning as poor or very poor, while today the equivalent share is 62%; in the Center, this share has doubled since March, though it remains a minority; while on the Right, no significant change has occurred.
Give the police a grade of poor or very poor for its functioning at the protest events, March and July 2023 (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)
We asked, “What do you think the government will do now regarding the legislative program that has been led by Levin and Rothman?” The most common response, given by one-third of interviewees, is that the government will continue with this legislation as soon as the next Knesset session begins. A similar share (31.5%) think that the government will continue with the legislation but at a slower pace, while 13% believe it will freeze the legislation for a limited period, and only a tiny minority (4%) think the government will shelve its legislative proposals.
What will the government do now regarding the judicial reform? (total sample; %)
A breakdown of responses by vote at the last elections reveals the concerns, or even suspicions, of opposition party voters: Almost half of them (45%) believe that as soon as the next Knesset session opens, the government will continue to advance the legislation for its judicial reform, while only 14% think this legislation will be frozen for a period of six months to a year or will be shelved entirely. Among coalition party voters, the most common response is that the government will continue with the legislation but at a slower pace, and less than one-quarter (23%) believe the legislation will resume as soon as the next Knesset session begins.
What will the government do now regarding the judicial reform? (total sample; %)
We asked our respondents what they think will happen to the protest movement against the judicial reform. The majority said that it will grow stronger (56%), while only a relatively small minority (28%) predicted it will weaken. On this question, the scores for the most extreme responses were particularly noticeable—one-third of interviewees said that the protests will get a lot stronger, compared with just 8% who said it will get a lot weaker.
What do you think will happen to the protest movement against the judicial reform?
Against the backdrop of warnings issued by the major credit rating agencies, we asked: “In your assessment, in what way will the warnings issued by credit rating agencies such as Moody’s harm the Israeli economy, so that your own personal financial situation is also affected?”
Around half the respondents think that the judicial reform will result in harm to their financial situation due to its negative impact on the Israeli economy: More than a third (35%) believe their financial situation will be harmed greatly or quite a lot, and 14% that it will be harmed to a moderate degree (49% in total); while 15% think that their financial situation will be harmed only a little, and 22% that the judicial reform will result in no harm at all to their finances (37% in total).
We also found that views about the possible economic consequences of the legislation are closely linked to the respondent’s political orientation: The most common response among coalition party voters is that their financial situation will be unaffected (42.5%), while another fifth rate the potential damage as small, and only around 10% think that their financial situation will be harmed greatly or quite a lot. On the other hand, the majority of voters for opposition parties (59%) believe that the judicial reform will result in significant damage to their financial situation, and only 4% think it will not be harmed at all.
In what way will the warnings issued by credit rating agencies harm the Israeli economy so that your own personal financial situation is also affected? (total sample, and by vote at the last elections; %)
We further found that more than two-thirds of Arab respondents (68%) believe that their financial situation will be harmed greatly or quite a lot, compared with 28% of Jews who hold the same view.
***
The July 2023 Israeli Voice Index was prepared by the Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute. The survey was conducted via the internet and by telephone (to include groups that are under-represented on the internet) between July 30 and August 1, 2023, with 615 men and women interviewed in Hebrew and 150 in Arabic, constituting a nationally representative sample of the adult population in Israel aged 18 and over. The maximum sampling error was ±3.55% at a confidence level of 95%. Field work was carried out by the Dialogue Research and Polling Institute. The full data file can be found at: https://dataisrael.idi.org.il.