Two States for One People? Israelis Want to Stay United
Trust in the Supreme Court remains stable, while the share of Israelis who trust the Knesset has almost doubled since last year. The majority of respondents are opposed to cantonization, that is, to the partition of Israel into two states – a liberal secular “Israel” and a conservative religious “Judea.”
Photo by Gili Yaari /Flash90
- This month, we found a sizable increase in the percentage of those who are optimistic about the future of Israel’s security. However, there was only a very slight rise in the share of those who are optimistic about the future of democratic rule in Israel.
- The Israeli public as a whole is divided on the question of whether there is a high or low likelihood of the current government completing its term of office as defined in law, with a relatively large share responding that they don’t know.
- Opinions on the likelihood of the government completing its term are also fairly evenly divided in the Jewish public, whereas the majority of the Arab public considers the chances of this happening to be low. A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals that a majority of those on the Right think there is a high likelihood of the government completing its term of office, compared with a minority of those on the Left and even fewer of those in the Center.
- Though there is still only a minority of Israelis who trust the Knesset, their share has almost doubled since last year, when the Bennett-Lapid government was in power. The same is true for trust in the government, which has also risen noticeably, though those who report trusting the government remain a minority.
- Trust in the Supreme Court has remained steady for the last two years at around 40%, with very large discrepancies between those on the Left (of whom a very large majority trust this institution), in the Center (where there is a smaller majority), and on the Right (where only a small minority trust the Supreme Court).
- Slightly over half of Jewish respondents trust their municipality or local authority, compared with just over a third of Arab respondents.
- A majority of the Israeli public think that relations between Right and Left are bad, and the same is true (though to a lesser extent) of relations between Jews and Arabs and between religious and secular. The only two groups considered by a large share of respondents to have good relations between them are Ashkenazim and Mizrahim.
- The majority of respondents do not agree with the claim that the state should refrain from intervening in internal issues within communities. The outlier on this issue is the Haredi population, of whom a majority support the idea that the state should stay out of community affairs.
- When it comes to funding for schools that do not teach the core curriculum, which is a form of state intervention in community affairs, Haredi respondents are actually in favor of state funding, as are national religious respondents and half of the traditional religious respondents. Traditional non-religious and secular Jews are opposed to this idea.
- The majority of Jews do not feel themselves to be a minority in Israel, compared with a large majority of Arabs who do feel this way. However, a half of those who define themselves as on the Left report feeling that they are a minority.
- The majority of respondents are opposed to cantonization, that is, to the partition of Israel into two states – a liberal secular “Israel” and a conservative religious “Judea.”
This month saw a slight and perhaps not even statistically significant rise in optimism about the future of democratic rule in Israel (37% this month, compared with 34% last month). There was a much more meaningful increase in the level of optimism about the future of national security (up to 43% this month from 34% last month). Thus, the relative calm in the security situation, and perhaps also the results of the recent operation in Gaza, seem to have had an impact, while the continued tensions and uncertainty in the political realm mean that the majority of the public remain pessimistic about the future of democratic rule.
Optimistic about the future of democratic rule in Israel and about the future of national security, January 2021–May 2023 (total sample; %)
In the total sample, we found parity between those who think that there is a high likelihood that the current government will complete its term of office as defined in law (44%) and those who view the likelihood of this as low (43.5%). A particularly high share of respondents (12.5%) said that they don’t know. Among Jews, the distribution of respondents is fairly even, but the majority of Arabs think that the chances of the government seeing out its term are low.
In your estimation, what is the likelihood that the current government will complete its term of office as defined in law (four years)? (Jewish and Arab samples; %)
A breakdown of responses in the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals that a majority of those on the Right estimate consider it highly likely that the government will complete its term, while only a minority of those in the Center and on the Left share this view.
Think there is a high likelihood that the government will complete its term of office as defined in law, by political orientation (Jews; %)
A breakdown of responses by vote at the last elections reveals that a solid majority (65%) of voters for coalition parties think there is a high likelihood of the government completing its term of office, compared with a minority (28%) of opposition party voters.
We found a strong association between optimism about the future of democratic rule in Israel and estimation of the chances of the government completing its term. Among optimists, a majority think these chances are high (60%), and only a minority rate them as low (22%). By contrast, a majority of pessimists think there is a low likelihood of the government completing its term as defined in law (58%), while only a minority believe that this is highly likely.
While we usually do so at the end of the year, in light of the current political turmoil we decided to examine now (six months after the formation of the government) what has happened to trust in the various state institutions at the center of Israel’s public, media, and political discourse.
Trust in the Knesset: Since the fall of the Lapid government in June 2022, when trust in the Knesset across the total sample reached a nadir of 14%, there has been a rise in this indicator to the extent that more than one-quarter (26%) of respondents now express trust in this institution—close to the level of trust found when the Bennett-Lapid government was formed in June 2021 (27.5%).
At the same time, trust in the Knesset remains lower than it was in the past (average for 2003–2012, 40.6%; average for 2013–2022, 30.5%). As the figure below shows, Jewish trust in the Knesset, while not high, is considerably higher than Arab trust.
Trust the Knesset (Jewish and Arab samples; %)
Similarly, we found a sizable difference between voters for coalition parties, of whom 39% say they trust the Knesset, and voters for opposition parties, among whom the level of trust is only 16%. It should be noted that a year ago, under the Bennett-Lapid government, the opposite held true.
Breaking down responses by political orientation (Jewish sample) reveals large differences between the camps, with 16% of those on the Left expressing trust in the Knesset compared with 21% in the Center and 37% on the Right.
Trust in the government: Trust in the government has also risen, from 21% in June 2021 to 29% today. Still, in both the Jewish public and the Arab public only a minority say they trust the government, though trust among Arabs is much lower than trust among Jews.
Trust the government (Jewish and Arab samples; %)
On the Left (in the Jewish sample), only 6% say they trust the government (compared with 60% of those in this camp who said they trusted the Bennett-Lapid government last year). The picture is reversed on the Right, where 48% report that they trust the current government, while only 12% last year trusted the Bennett-Lapid government.
Trust the government, by political orientation (Jewish sample; %)
Similarly, we found that voters for coalition parties expressed a higher level of trust in the government than opposition voters (53% versus 7%, respectively). However, as can be seen from the figure below, even among coalition party voters there are many who do not trust the government.
Trust the government, by vote at the last elections (total sample; %)
Trust in the Supreme Court: As was the case in previous measurements over the last two years, less than half of the respondents say they trust the Supreme Court (43%). Among coalition voters, only 16.5% have trust in this institution, compared with 72% of opposition voters. Furthermore, this month’s survey found the lowest level of trust in the Supreme Court recorded so far in the Center and on the Right.
Trust the Supreme Court, by political orientation (Jewish sample; %)
Trust in local government: With less than six months to go before local elections, just over half of Jewish respondents (55%) reported that they trust their municipality or local authority, compared with a minority of Arab respondents (38%) who feel the same.
Trust their municipality or local authority (Jewish and Arab samples; %)
Should the state intervene in community affairs? A question that concerns many countries around the world, including Israel, is what is the “correct” extent of intrusion of the state into community life; or in other words, how much should the state involve itself in internal community affairs? Thus we asked: “Some people argue that the state should refrain from involving itself in ‘internal’ issues in certain communities and sectors, such as the status of women or school curricula, and should allow each community and sector to behave as it sees fit on these issues. Do you agree or disagree with this argument?”
In the total sample, a small majority (53%) disagree with the statement, and a minority (36%) agree with it. However, the variation between different sections of the population is very large: A large majority of Haredim hold that the state should refrain from intervention in internal community affairs, as do around half of national religious Jews and a large share of traditional religious Jews. By contrast, the majority of traditional non-religious respondents and of secular respondents disagree, and instead think that the state should involve itself in such issues.
Do you agree or disagree that the state should refrain from involving itself in “internal” issues in certain communities and sectors, such as the status of women or school curricula, and should allow each community and sector to behave as it sees fit on these issues? (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)
We also found large differences in the Jewish sample according to political orientation. The majority of those on the Left and in the Center do not agree that the state should refrain from intervening in internal community affairs, while those on the Right are divided on this issue.
|
|
Right |
Center |
Left |
|
Agree that the state should refrain from intervening in internal community affairs |
44 |
23 |
26.5 |
|
Do not agree that the state should refrain from intervening in internal community affairs |
46 |
63 |
66 |
|
Don’t know |
10 |
14 |
7.5 |
Core curriculum studies: In a broader context, we also asked: “In your opinion, should the state fund or not fund Haredi schools that do not teach core curriculum studies such as civics, mathematics, and English?” Across the total sample, a small majority (55%) are opposed to funding without core curriculum studies, but naturally there are very large differences on this issue. Among Haredi and national religious respondents, the majority think that the state should fund schools even if they do not teach the core curriculum. Around half the traditional religious public hold the same view, while only a minority of traditional non-religious and secular respondents support state funding for schools without core curriculum studies.
Agree that the state should fund Haredi schools that do not teach core curriculum studies such as civics, mathematics, and English (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)
We cross-referenced the responses to this question and the previous question, and found that among those who support limited state involvement in community affairs, a majority (54.5%) are in favor of the state funding schools that do not teach core curriculum studies—that is, they support budgetary involvement of the state in the internal affairs of the Haredi community. By contrast, among those who do not agree that the state should refrain from interfering, a large majority (69%) are opposed to funding schools without the core curriculum—in effect, limiting state involvement. In a certain sense, we can therefore say that the ideological stances of both sides are not given practical application in the context of this question.
We asked our respondents for their evaluation of the relations between different groups in Israeli society. Unsurprisingly in the circumstances, the relations between Right and Left are seen as bad by the highest share of respondents. Likewise, a majority (though smaller) classed the relations between Jews and Arabs as bad. Regarding relations between secular and religious groups, the most common response was also that they are bad, though this was not a majority view. Only for relations between Ashkenazim and Mizrahim—which feature prominently in political and media discourse—was there a much larger share of respondents who define them as good than who categorize them as bad.
How would you define the relations today between the following groups in Israeli society? (total sample; %)
Relations between Right and Left: A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political orientation reveals that 78% of those on the Left define these relations as bad, compared with slightly smaller shares of those on the Right (69%) and in the Center (64.5%). We also found differences by religiosity: While 77% of secular respondents and 70% of Haredim define relations between Right and Left as bad, only 51% of the national religious public concur, as do 61% of traditional religious Jews and 63% of traditional non-religious Jews.
Relations between Jews and Arabs: While a majority of Jews define the relations between these two groups as bad (59%), only a minority—albeit a large minority—of Arab respondents hold the same view.
Relations between religious and secular: Breaking down responses by religiosity reveals that a small majority of secular Israelis define these relations are bad (53%), compared with only around a third of traditional non-religious Israelis (36%), almost half of traditional religious respondents (44%), one-quarter of the national religious public (25%), and around 40% of Haredim. A majority of those on the Left (Jews) define these relations as bad (58%), compared with half of those in the Center (49%) and a minority of those on the Right (38%).
Relations between Ashkenazim and Mizrahim: As noted above, among Jewish respondents this is the only case in which the share of those who think relations between the two groups are good (44%) is larger than the share of those who class them as bad (19%). Among Arab respondents, a much smaller percentage define relations between Ashkenazim and Mizrahim as good (15%) than as bad (37%).
Who is a minority? In recent years, it is often claimed that Israel is a state of “all its minorities,” and that many different groups feel themselves to be a minority—that is, disadvantaged in some way. We asked: “Many Israelis who belong to different groups feel today that they are a minority in Israeli society. Do you also feel that way?” We found that a majority of the total sample (51%) feel not so much or not at all that they are a minority. However, it was not surprising to discover very large differences between different groups, with a majority of Jews stating that they do not feel themselves to be a minority in Israel, while a large majority of Arabs reported that they do feel this way.
Many Israelis who belong to different groups feel today that they are a minority in Israeli society. Do you also feel that way? (Jewish and Arab samples; %)
At the same time, variables such as political orientation have a strong influence on this sense of underprivilege. Thus, half of those on the Left say that they feel themselves to be a minority, compared with around one-third of those in the Center and on the Right; and 47% of voters for opposition parties feel that they are a minority, compared with around one-third of coalition party voters. Similarly, half of the Haredi respondents reported feeling a minority very much or quite a lot, compared with a minority of around a third in each of the other groups.
Against the backdrop of the considerable tensions between different groups in Israeli society, we asked: “Due to the growing polarization of Israeli society, some people are calling for Israel to be divided into two states: ‘Israel,’ a liberal secular state with Tel Aviv at its center; and ‘Judea,’ a conservative religious state with Jerusalem at its center. Do you support or oppose this idea?” A large majority of respondents are opposed to this proposal (73%), with more than half saying that they “strongly oppose” it. Thus, there is no real support at the moment for cantonization of Israel.
Do you support or oppose the idea of dividing the State of Israel into two states: a liberal secular “Israel” and a conservative religious “Judea”? (total sample; %)
Despite low support among Jewish respondents for the idea of partition into two states (16%), there are variations between different groups by religiosity: One-fifth of secular Jews support the notion (21%), compared with only around one-tenth of Haredi (10%) and national religious (9%) respondents, and a slightly higher share of traditional respondents (traditional religious, 14%; traditional non-religious, 13%).
The largest discrepancies in support for dividing Israel into two were found between political camps in the Jewish public: A third of those on the Left are in favor, compared with much lower shares of those in the Center and on the Right.
Do you support or oppose the idea of dividing the State of Israel into two states: a liberal secular “Israel” and a conservative religious “Judea”? (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)
A breakdown of responses in the Jewish sample by area of residence found small differences, with residents of Tel Aviv and southern Israel being the most in favor of cantonization (19.5% and 19%, respectively), and residents of Jerusalem and Northern Israel expressing the least support (11% and 13%, respectively).
The April 2023 Israeli Voice Index was prepared by the Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute. The survey was conducted via the internet and by telephone (to include groups that are under-represented on the internet) between March 26 and March 30, 2023, with 602 men and women interviewed in Hebrew and 130 in Arabic, constituting a nationally representative sample of the adult population in Israel aged 18 and over. The maximum sampling error was ±3.69% at a confidence level of 95%. Field work was carried out by the Dialogue Research and Polling Institute. The full data file can be found at: https://dataisrael.idi.org.il.