Israelis are deeply divided on the upcoming Supreme Court hearings
Israeli Voice Index August 2023
41.5% of coalition voters and 6% of opposition voters said that the Court lacks the authority to perform judicial review over Basic Laws passed by Knesset. 73% of Israelis agree that in order to bridge the divisions between the political camps, attempts should be made to reach a compromise.
Photo by Olivier Fitoussi/Flash90
- A steady but small share of the Israeli public—around a third—are currently optimistic about both the future of democratic rule in Israel and the future of Israel’s security. Those on the Right are much more optimistic than those in the Center and even more so relative to those on the Left. This difference is even evident among secular Jewish Israelis (who constitute the least optimistic of all the religious groupings) when broken down by political orientation.
- Among those who support the protests against the government’s reforms, the share of optimists in both cases is extremely small, while among opponents of the protests, the equivalent shares are much larger.
- With regard to both external military-strategic security and internal security (internal terrorism and crime), only a small minority of the total sample think that there has been an improvement under the current government, compared to the preceding period.
- As expected, voters for opposition parties think that things have become worse under the current government in both security areas. More surprisingly, the most common opinion among coalition party voters is that there has been no change under the Netanyahu government. Regarding internal security, the share of coalition party voters who say that the situation today is worse than it was before is larger than those who say it is better.
- The Israeli public is divided in its opinions about the protests against the government’s judicial reforms, with a slightly larger share supporting the protests than opposing it. The majority of supporters are found on the Left and in the Center, as expected, though almost a third of those who define themselves as on the Right also said they support the protests.
- The majority of the public thinks that it is not legitimate to attempt to avoid being drafted into the IDF in protest against the government’s reforms or in response to legislation to exempt Haredi yeshiva students from military service. However, the share of those who think this action is legitimate is considerably larger in the second case (exemption legislation) than the first (judicial reforms).
- A fairly steady majority of the public—between two-thirds and three-quarters—support dialogue and compromise between the sides regarding the government’s legislative program. Support is higher among opposition party voters than among voters for coalition parties.
- We found strong opposition to the idea of instituting separate bathing for men and women at natural springs, with voters for opposition parties being particularly trenchant in their opposition and coalition party voters slightly less so.
- More than half of the total sample think that if the Supreme Court orders the justice minister to convene the Judicial Selection Committee, then he should do so. Only one-fifth hold that the minister should not convene the Committee under these circumstances. Among Likud voters, a much larger share say that the minister should abide by the Court’s decision than that he should continue his policy of refusing to convene the Committee.
- The Israeli public is divided on the issue of whether the Supreme Court should rule in favor of the petition to revoke the reasonableness law or rule against it.
- Regarding media reports of American negotiations that include the possibility of a formal agreement between Israel and Saudi Arabia, the majority of respondents believe that this would be an important step for Israel. At the same time, the majority oppose accepting the reported Saudi condition that as part of such an agreement, Saudi Arabia will be permitted to have nuclear capabilities for civilian purposes.
This month’s findings further support the assessment that the level of optimism about both the future of Israel’s security and the future of democratic rule in Israel is fairly stable, at around one-third in both cases.
Optimistic about the future of democratic rule in Israel and about the future of national security, June 2022–August 2023 (total sample; %)
In both cases, Jews are more optimistic than Arabs. In the Jewish sample, the more religious groups (Haredi, national religious, and traditional religious) are significantly more optimistic in both regards than are traditional non-religious Jews, and even more so relative to secular Jews. A breakdown of secular respondents by political orientation reveals, unsurprisingly, that while only a tiny minority of those on the Left and in the Center are optimistic about the future of democracy in Israel (8% and 11%, respectively), a much larger share of those on the right hold this view (43%). Similar differences exist with regard to the future of Israel’s national security, but to a much lesser degree (optimistic: Left secular, 17%; Center secular, 20%; Right secular, 37.5%).
Optimistic about the future of democratic rule in Israel and about the future of national security (total sample; %)
Another analysis we performed this month was a breakdown of these responses according to support for (or opposition to) the protests against the judicial reforms being advanced by the government. In the same vein as the breakdown by vote for coalition or opposition parties, we found here that 16% of those who support the protests are optimistic about the future of democratic rule in Israel, and 22% of the same population are optimistic about the future of national security in Israel. By contrast, among those who do not support the protests, 56% are optimistic about the future of democratic rule and 52% about the future of national security.
We found a strong association between optimism or pessimism about the future of democracy and optimism or pessimism about the future of the security situation: A large majority of optimists about the future of democratic rule are also optimistic about the future of Israel’s national security, and conversely, an even greater majority of those who are pessimistic about the future of democracy are also pessimistic about the future of national security.
Optimism/pessimism about the future of democratic rule in Israel, by view of the future of national security in Israel (total sample; %)
The Functioning of the Government on Internal Security and Military-Strategic Security
In light of the stormy recent debates about both external security risks and challenges in the realm of internal security, we asked our respondents two separate questions on these issues, focusing on the functioning of the current government compared to its predecessor. We asked whether, compared to the period before the formation of the current government, the situation today is better, worse, or the same. As shown by the figure below, the largest share of respondents in both cases (and a majority in the case of internal security) think that the situation today is worse than it was before the current government was formed. Only a small minority in each case have seen an improvement under the current government, and around a quarter believe that there has been no change for the better or for the worse.
Compared to the period before the formation of the current government, regarding external military-strategic security and internal security (crime and internal terrorism), is Israel’s situation today better, worse, or the same? (total sample; %)
The fact that differences exist between coalition and opposition party voters is hardly surprising, and nor is the fact that the majority of opposition party voters think that things have deteriorated under the current government in both areas. What is more surprising is the finding that only a minority of coalition party voters consider there to have been an improvement under the current government compared to the preceding period (slightly over one-third regarding military-strategic security and just 10% regarding internal security). For both areas, the most common response given by coalition voters was that the situation has not changed relative to the past, that is, compared to the term of the previous government—which they wished to bring down supposedly because of its poor functioning, especially on security.
Compared to the period before the formation of the current government, regarding external military-strategic security and internal security (crime and internal terrorism), is Israel’s situation today better, worse, or the same? (total sample, by vote at the last elections; %)
Interestingly, among Likud voters, the most common response to the question about external security was that the situation under the current government is no different from what it was previously (39%). Regarding internal security, the most common view among Likud voters was that the situation now is better than it was under the previous government.
Compared to the period before the formation of the current government, regarding internal security (crime and internal terrorism), is Israel’s situation today better, worse, or the same? (total sample, by vote at the last elections; %)
We asked: “Do you support or oppose protest activities against the judicial reforms being advanced by the government?” In the total sample, around half the public support these activities, and a sizable minority are opposed. In the Jewish sample, there is no clear numerical outcome, with the share of those who support the protests being only slightly larger than that of those who oppose them (48% versus 41%). In the Arab sample, meanwhile, there is a clear majority who are in support, and only a minority who are opposed (72% compared with 20%).
Do you support or oppose protest activities against the judicial reforms being advanced by the government? (total sample; %)
A breakdown of responses by political orientation reinforces our earlier findings that the protests are largely supported by the Left and the Center, with only a minority on the Right who support them. Similarly, the share of “don’t know” responses is almost zero on the Left, but much larger in the Center and on the Right. At the same time, almost a third of those who defined themselves as on the Right say that they support the protests.
A breakdown by age group reveals that support for the protests is much stronger among the older age groups than among the younger cohorts. This may be due to the larger presence of Haredi and national religious Jews in the younger age groups, both in our sample and in the general public.
Support or oppose protest activities against the judicial reforms being advanced by the government, by political orientation and age (Jewish sample; %)
Recent media reports have told of various initiatives by candidates for military service, and their parents, calling on their peers to try to avoid the mandatory draft (as opposed to the refusal to perform voluntary reserve duty)—whether as part of the opposition to the government’s judicial reform program, or in the more specific context of the possible passing of the new Military Service Law, which will provide a sweeping exemption from service for Haredi yeshiva students.
In the Jewish sample, we found a large difference in the level of support for avoiding the draft between the two cases, though in both a majority of respondents are opposed. Avoidance in the broader context of the protests against the reforms is considered legitimate by around one-fifth of the respondents, while the majority say that such actions are “not at all legitimate.” However, in the context of a new law providing sweeping exemptions for yeshiva students from serving in the IDF, support for avoiding the draft reached around 40%, and the share of those whose response was “not at all legitimate” was significantly smaller.
Is it legitimate for young people to pursue courses of action to avoid being drafted into mandatory service in the IDF, in each of the following situations: as part of their opposition to the judicial reforms being advanced by the government; if legislation is passed to exempt Haredim studying in yeshiva from military service? (Jewish sample; %)
Breaking down the responses to these two questions by support for or opposition to the protests, we found that a majority of both supporters and opponents of the protests think that avoiding the draft as part of these protests is not legitimate: Among those who support the protests, 34% think that avoiding the draft in this context is legitimate, while 54% of them think it is not legitimate; and among those who are opposed to the protests, the gap between those who think that draft avoidance is legitimate and those with the opposing view is much larger, at 12% versus 82%.
When it comes to avoiding the draft in the context of the law to exempt all Haredi yeshiva students from military service, supporters of the protests are divided, with 46% believing such actions to be legitimate, and 45% ruling them illegitimate. Among those who oppose the protests, 32% say that avoiding the draft is a legitimate response, and 62% that it is not.
A breakdown by religiosity shows that support for avoiding the draft in the context of the protests against the government’s reforms is more common at both ends of the spectrum—in the Haredi and secular groups—while among the other groupings the level of support is around one-quarter and below. By contrast, in the case of draft avoidance in the context of the military exemption for yeshiva students, the levels of support are much higher in all groups, including among Haredim, of whom a majority consider avoidance to be legitimate in this context—perhaps because draft avoidance among non-Haredi young people provides greater legitimacy for Haredim not to serve in the military.
Breaking down the secular group by political orientation reveals that 63% of secular Jews on the Left think that it is legitimate to take steps to avoid the draft in these circumstances, compared with 42% in the Center and 30% on the Right.
Believe it is legitimate for young people to pursue courses of action to avoid being drafted into mandatory service in the IDF, in each of the following situations: as part of their opposition to the judicial reforms being advanced by the government; if legislation is passed to exempt Haredim studying in yeshiva from military service (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)
As in almost every survey in recent months, this month’s findings also show support from the majority of respondents for the idea that “in order to bridge divisions between the political camps, discussions should be held over legislative proposals and attempts made to reach compromises.”
Agree that, in order to bridge divisions between the political camps, discussions should be held over legislative proposals and attempts made to reach compromises (total sample; %)
A breakdown of the responses received in January’s survey, when the judicial reforms were first presented and the protests against them began, and of the responses from this months’ survey reveal that support among opposition party voters for dialogue and compromise remains higher than among coalition party voters, but that there has also been a rise in support among coalition party voters since January. This development is particularly evident among voters for Haredi parties, of whom 51% were in favor of discussions and compromises in January, compared with 71% this month.
Do you agree or disagree that, in order to bridge divisions between the political camps, discussions should be held over legislative proposals and attempts made to reach compromises? January and August 2023 (total sample; %)
We wanted to know what the public think the minister of justice should do if the Supreme Court rules that he must convene the Judicial Selection Committee. A majority of respondents think that the minister should act in accordance with the Court’s ruling. As expected, we found noticeable differences on this issue between voters for coalition parties and voters for opposition parties: A large majority of opposition party voters say that the justice minister should abide by the Court’s ruling, while only a minority of coalition party voters concur, though this was the most common response (that is, the other responses received even less support). Even among voters for the justice minister’s party, Likud, only around a quarter (27%) believe that he should not obey the Court, while almost half (47%) take the opposite view.
The Supreme Court will soon discuss a petition demanding that the minister of justice be required to convene the Judicial Selection Committee. If the Court instructs the minister to convene the Committee, what should the minister of justice do? (total sample; %)
The largest differences on this question were found when breaking down responses by religiosity (Jewish sample). Half the Haredi respondents think that even after a ruling from the Supreme Court, the minister should refrain from convening the Committee, while one-quarter take the opposite view. Among secular Jews, the picture is reversed: A majority of three-quarters believe that the justice minister should convene the Committee in accordance with the Court’s ruling, and only a tiny minority say that he should not.
The Supreme Court will soon discuss a petition demanding that the minister of justice be required to convene the Judicial Selection Committee. If the Court instructs the minister to convene the Committee, what should the minister of justice do? (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)
We found that the public is divided on this issue: 37% of respondents think that the petition should be rejected; that is, that the Supreme Court should not intervene in the Knesset’s decision, whether because the law in question is a basic law, or because restricting the use of the reasonableness doctrine does not harm the democratic character of the state. On the other hand, a similar share believe that the Supreme Court should accept the petition and strike down the reasonableness law, whether because the law harms the democratic character of the state (25%) or because the legislative process was faulty or incomplete (9%).
A breakdown by vote at the last Knesset elections (in 2022) reveals opposing views: The most common response among coalition party voters is that the Supreme Court is not authorized to intervene, while among opposition party voters, the most common response is that the Court should strike down the law.
How do you think the Supreme Court should rule on the petition to strike down the law restricting the use of the reasonableness doctrine? (total sample; %)
Recent media reports have stated that the United States is holding negotiations with Saudi Arabia on new regional strategic planning, which may also include an extensive agreement with Israel. We wanted to know how important our respondents think that signing such an agreement would be for Israel. First, it is worth noting that because this issue has barely featured in public discourse until now, our findings constitute a form of “embryonic public opinion” that may change substantially when the topic is at the center of attention (an indication of this is the large share of respondents who selected the “don’t know” option).
In any case, a majority of 57% of respondents currently think that signing an agreement is fairly or very important for Israel. However, we found very large differences on this issue between Jewish and Arab respondents. While the majority of Jews think this would be an important development, the corresponding share of Arabs is much smaller, and indeed, is smaller than the share who consider it not important. Presumably, the lack of enthusiasm in the Arab public is linked to the fact that it remains unclear whether and how such an agreement might affect relations between Israel and the Palestinians, particularly given previous experience with the Abraham Accords, which did nothing to improve Israeli-Palestinian relations.
According to recent media reports, the United States is holding negotiations with Saudi Arabia on regional strategic planning, including an extensive agreement with Israel. How important do you think it is for Israel to sign such an agreement? (Jewish and Arab samples; %)
A breakdown of responses by political orientation (Jewish sample) reveals a majority in each of the three camps who attach importance to the signing of an agreement between Israel and Saudi Arabia, though the majority on the Left is larger than that in the Center and on the Right (Left, 77%; Center, 63%; Right, 56%).
Clearly, signing such an agreement will also require a price to be paid by Israel. Though little information is yet available, some of the demands made by the Saudi negotiators have already reached the media. We asked: “In the discussions over this agreement, Saudi Arabia has apparently demanded that Israel agree for it to have nuclear capabilities for civilian purposes. In your opinion, can Israel agree to such a demand in order to reach an agreement with Saudi Arabia?” On this issue, the picture is very different, and the majority of respondents answered in the negative.
In the discussions over this agreement, Saudi Arabia has apparently demanded that Israel agree for it to have nuclear capabilities for civilian purposes. In your opinion, can Israel agree to such a demand in order to reach an agreement with Saudi Arabia? (total sample; %)
A breakdown by political orientation shows opposition to this proposal from half of those who define themselves as on the Left (51%) and around two-thirds of those in the Center and on the Right (65% and 64%, respectively).
As part of our efforts to assess the level of willingness to compromise on specific issues, we asked the respondents whether they support or oppose the proposal that certain bathing hours at springs administered by the Israel Nature and Parks Authority should be officially allocated for separate bathing for men and women. Just over half of the Jewish respondents oppose separate bathing at natural springs (53%), while a large minority are in favor (40%). While much of the support for this proposal is mild (24.5% “somewhat support”), the opposition is largely very firm (40% “strongly oppose”).
Support or oppose the proposal that some bathing hours at springs administered by the Israel Nature and Parks Authority be officially allocated for separate bathing for men and women (Jewish sample; %)
As expected, almost all the Haredi respondents support having separate bathing hours for men and women at natural springs. Majority support (though to a lesser degree) was also found among national religious and traditional religious Jews. By contrast, traditional non-religious Jews are opposed to this proposal, and secular Jews even more so. A breakdown by political orientation reveals that a majority of those on the Right support having separate bathing hours, though a considerable share (37%) are opposed. On the Left and in the Center, a large majority oppose having separate bathing hours for men and women at natural springs.
Support having separate bathing hours for men and women at natural springs (Jewish sample; %)
We further found that among those who support holding discussions and seeking compromises (as noted, a position that is more prevalent among voters for opposition parties), the majority are opposed to separate bathing at natural springs (57%), with only a minority in favor (38%). By contrast, among those who oppose dialogue and compromise (who, as noted, constitute a large share of voters for coalition parties), the majority support separate bathing at springs (55%), compared with a large minority who are opposed (44%).
Ahead of the Jewish new year, we always ask our participants whether the coming year will be better or worse than the last for the State of Israel. This year, the sense of pessimism was highly notable: The percentage of those who think that the coming year will be worse than the last has doubled, and is the highest found in any of our measurements to date. This year’s findings also reveal a continuation of the downward trend in the share of those who think that the coming year will be better than the last (2021, 34%; 2022, 29%; 2023, 23%), reaching its lowest ever level.
Overall, what do you think the coming (Jewish) year will be like for the State of Israel? (total sample; %)
A breakdown of responses by nationality finds that Arabs are more pessimistic than Jews: a majority of Arabs think that the coming year will be worse than the last, while only a minority (albeit large) of Jews concur.
A breakdown by vote at the last election reveals that a large majority of voters for opposition parties think that the coming year will be worse than the last, while the most common response among coalition party voters (though not the majority response) is that it will be better. In fact, the only party with a majority of voters who believe that the coming year will be better than its predecessor is United Torah Judaism, though even here, the majority is very small (52%).
A breakdown of responses in the Jewish sample by religiosity shows that, while less than one-tenth of Haredim and a similar (though slightly higher) share of national religious and traditional religious Jews think that the coming year will be worse than the year now coming to an end, this is the view held by the majority of secular Jews, and is also the most common view (though not majority view) among traditional non-religious Jewish respondents.
Overall, what do you think the coming (Jewish) year will be like for the State of Israel? (total sample; %)
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The August 2023 Israeli Voice Index was prepared by the Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute. The survey was conducted via the internet and by telephone (to include groups that are under-represented on the internet) between August 28 and August 30, 2023, with 621 men and women interviewed in Hebrew and 150 in Arabic, constituting a nationally representative sample of the adult population in Israel aged 18 and over. The maximum sampling error was ±3.55% at a confidence level of 95%. Field work was carried out by the Dialogue Research and Polling Institute. The full data file can be found at: https://dataisrael.idi.org.il.