Most Israelis Prefer to Wait Until After the War to Designate Responsibility
Israeli Voice Index: War on Hamas
The October 2023 edition of the Israeli Voice Index shows that a significant majority of Jewish Israelis trust the heads of the IDF over PM Netanyahu. If elections were to be held today, a majority of Israelis (55%) would vote for the same bloc they voted for in the last elections.
Photo by Erik Marmor/Flash90
The survey was conducted by the Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute between October 24–26, 2023, using a nationally representative sample of 602 Jewish Israelis and 151 Arab Israelis.
Topics covered in this report:
- Optimism/pessimism about the future of democratic rule in Israel and the future of Israel’s security
- The influence of public disagreements about the government’s judicial reforms on the timing of the Hamas attack
- When should the issue of responsibility for the failure of October 7 be examined?
- Who do Israelis trust more to direct the war?
- Grading the functioning of government institutions regarding evacuees and the home front
- Releasing Palestinian prisoners in exchange for the release of the hostages held by Hamas
- Drafting Haredim to the IDF
- The war and Jewish-Arab relations in Israel
- Future voting intentions
In line with the findings of the War in Gaza surveys we have conducted since mid-October, which indicated a rise in optimism about the future of Israel despite the severity of the current situation, this month’s survey also found an increase in the share of optimists regarding both the future of democratic rule in Israel and the future of Israel’s security. Optimism was higher among Jews than among Arabs once again this month, at 43% versus 26% respectively regarding the future of democratic rule, and 46% versus 18% regarding the future of Israel’s security.
In the Jewish sample, only a minority of those who define themselves as on the Left (23%) or in the Center (34%) are optimistic about the future of democratic rule in Israel (though these are larger minorities than in the past), compared with a majority of those on the Right (56%). The picture is similar regarding the future of Israel’s security: Left, 34%; Center, 40%; Right, 52%.
Optimistic about the future of democratic rule in Israel and about the future of national security, June 2022–October 2023 (total sample; %)
A large majority of the public (70%) think that the disagreements between supporters and opponents of the government’s judicial reforms influenced Hamas’s decision to execute its attack plans at this time (Jews, 75%; Arabs, 46%). No meaningful differences were found on this issue between the three political camps in the Jewish sample.
Agree that the severe disagreements between those who supported the government’s judicial reforms and those who opposed them affected Hamas’s decision to carry out its attack plans at this point in time (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)
A large majority of the Israeli public (63%) believe that any examination of the issue of responsibility for the failure of October 7 should be postponed until after the war. Very large differences were found on this question between different political camps in the Jewish sample, with only half of those on the Left in favor of postponing such an inquiry, compared with two-thirds of those in the Center and more than three-quarters of those on the Right.
(The correct time to examine responsibility for the failure of October 7 (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)
We asked: “Several media outlets have reported tensions between Prime Minister Netanyahu and the heads of the IDF regarding the war in Gaza and conducting the northern front against Hezbollah. Who do you trust more on these issues?” Around half of the respondents in the total sample (and 55% of Jewish respondents) said that they have more trust in the heads of the IDF; a quarter that they don’t trust any of them (19% of Jewish respondents); around one-fifth that they trust Netanyahu and the heads of the IDF equally (19% of Jewish respondents); and only a tiny minority reported that they trust Netanyahu more (7% of Jewish respondents). It is worth noting that almost one-half of Arab respondents (46%) said that they do not trust any of these leaders.
A particularly interesting finding in the Jewish sample was that among those who define themselves as on the Right, only 10% said that they trust Netanyahu more than the heads of the IDF. This camp also has the largest share of respondents who do not trust anyone.
Several media outlets have reported tensions between Prime Minister Netanyahu and the heads of the IDF regarding the war in Gaza and conducting the northern front against Hezbollah. Who do you trust more on these issues? (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)
Only a minority of respondents rate the functioning of government institutions regarding the evacuees and the home front (such as organizing the education system, providing alternative housing and equipment for evacuees, and managing Israel’s public relations efforts abroad) as good or excellent, whereas around half rate their functioning as satisfactory on the provision of essential services such as electricity, food, and water.
How would you rate the functioning of government institutions since the beginning of the war on the following issues? (total sample; %)
Breaking down responses by vote at the 2022 Knesset elections reveals that for each of the four issues, voters for coalition parties give higher grades to government institutions for their functioning than do voters for opposition parties. At the same time, for three of the four issues (the exception being “ensuring a regular supply of essential services”), only a minority of respondents rate the functioning of government institutions as good or excellent, among both coalition party voters and opposition party voters alike.
Rate the functioning of government institutions on the following issues as good or excellent (total sample, by vote at the last elections; %)
We also asked respondents whether the state should help find alternative housing only for people who left their homes in response to government instructions to do so, or also for people who decided to leave their homes because they felt unsafe. The public seems divided on this issue. In the total sample, almost equivalent shares of respondents think that the state should find alternative housing only for those instructed to leave their homes (43%) and that the state should also take care of those who left their homes because they felt unsafe, even if not explicitly instructed to do so (45%). We did not find disparities among respondents on this issue by place of residence, but we did find a difference according to income: Among those with lower-than-average incomes, the majority (57.5%) said that the government should also help those who decided to leave their homes of their own accord, while only a minority of those with above-average incomes (32%) think the same.
The respondents are divided as to whether it would be right or wrong to release large numbers of Palestinian prisoners held in Israel in return for the release of the Israeli hostages held by Hamas, with 43% supporting such an exchange and 39% opposing it. The rest (18%) selected the “don’t know” response. A sizable majority of Arab respondents (60.5%) are in favor of a deal of this nature, while among Jewish respondents, a large minority of 45% oppose it, and 40% support it.
Would it be right or wrong to release Palestinian prisoners held by Israel in exchange for the release of the Israeli hostages held by Hamas? (Jewish and Arab samples; %)
In the Jewish sample, differences were found on this issue between the political camps: On the Right, the majority think that it would be wrong to release Palestinian prisoners in exchange for the release of the Israeli hostages; on the Left, the majority believe that this course of action would be right; and those in the Center are divided, with a tendency toward supporting a prisoner swap.
Would it be right or wrong to release Palestinian prisoners held by Israel in exchange for the release of the Israeli hostages held by Hamas? (Jewish sample, by political orientation; %)
In light of a sizable number of young Haredim having requested to enlist in the IDF since October 7, we sought to examine public opinion regarding the military drafting of Haredi men. Almost half of the Jewish respondents think that Haredim should be drafted in the same way as every other segment of the Jewish public (45%); approximately one-third believe that exemptions can be granted to a small group of Haredim so that they can study Torah, but that the majority of Haredim should be drafted; and only a small minority (14%) think that all Haredi men should be exempted from military service in order to study Torah.
Very large differences on this topic were found when breaking the Jewish sample down by religiosity: Three-quarters of Haredim believe that all Haredi youngsters should be exempted from military service in order to engage in Torah study, while a small majority of national religious respondents (56%) think that exemptions should be given to a small group of Haredim in order to study Torah and the majority of Haredim should be drafted. Among traditional interviewees, the most common response (though not the majority view) was that Haredi youngsters should be drafted just like all other Jewish youngsters in Israel (traditional religious, 34%; traditional non-religious, 48%), a view also held by two-thirds of secular Jews.
Opinion on drafting Haredim to the IDF (Jewish sample, by religiosity; %)
A breakdown of responses in the Jewish sample by vote in the 2022 Knesset elections finds that only a minority of both opposition party voters and coalition party voters support giving a total exemption from military service to young Haredim (coalition voters, 24.5%; opposition voters, 1%). However, while a majority of opposition party voters think that all Haredim should be drafted, among coalition party voters some think that the draft should apply to all Haredim, while a sizable share hold the opinion that a small group of Haredim should be exempted so that they can study Torah.
This issue also reveals noticeable differences between voters for the different coalition parties: Among Likud voters, the most common response is that Haredim should be drafted just like other Jewish youngsters; and among voters for Religious Zionism, the preference is for giving an exemption to a small group of Haredim and drafting the rest. By contrast, the most popular response among voters for Haredi parties is that all Haredi youngsters should be exempted from military service so they can engage in Torah study, though even here there are significant differences between parties: 82% of voters for United Torah Judaism selected this response, compared with only one-half of Shas voters.
Opinion on drafting Haredim to the IDF (Jewish sample, by vote at the 2022 Knesset elections; %)
We asked: “How would you characterize relations between Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel today: very good, good, so-so, bad, or very bad?” An interesting finding, and one that requires further investigation, was a decline in the share of Jewish respondents who say that relations are bad relative to the previous measurement, and a slight rise in the share who say that they are good. Among Arab respondents, meanwhile, the picture is reversed: the share who characterize Jewish-Arab relations as good has fallen, while the share of those who rate them as bad has increased.
How would you characterize relations between Jewish citizens of Israel and Arab citizens of Israel today? (Jewish and Arab samples; %)
Despite the extensive criticism of the government voiced since the outbreak of the war, particularly toward the prime minister—criticism which is also reflected in the various findings presented in this article—only a tiny minority (6%) of the total sample said that if elections were held in the foreseeable future, they would vote for a party in the opposing bloc from the one they voted for at the last elections (coalition party voters, 7%; opposition party voters, 5%). The majority (55%) said that they would vote for a party in the same bloc, whether they intend to vote for the same party they voted for last time (40%) or for another party in the same bloc (15%). Bloc loyalty was found to be higher among opposition party voters (74%) than among coalition party voters (54%). Importantly, the share of respondents who say they have not yet decided who they will vote for is markedly high (27%).
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The October 2023 Israeli Voice Index was prepared by the Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute. The survey was conducted via the internet and by telephone (to include groups that are under-represented on the internet) between October 24–26, 2023, with 602 men and women interviewed in Hebrew and 151 in Arabic, constituting a nationally representative sample of the adult population in Israel aged 18 and over. The maximum sampling error was ±3.55% at a confidence level of 95%. Field work was carried out by the Dialogue Research and Polling Institute. The full data file can be found at: https://dataisrael.idi.org.il.